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In the '''Battle of Thermopylae''' of ], an alliance of ] ]s fought the invading ] army at the pass of ] in central ]. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks held back the invader in one of history's most famous ]s. A small force led by King ] of ] blocked the only road through which the massive army of ] could pass. After three days of battle, a local resident named ] betrayed the Greeks by revealing a mountain path that led behind the Greek lines. Dismissing the rest of the army, King Leonidas stayed behind with 300 ] and 700 ] volunteers. Though they knew it meant their own deaths, they held their position and secured the retreat of the other Greek forces. The Persians succeeded in taking the pass but sustained heavy losses, extremely disproportionate to those of the Greeks. The fierce resistance of the Spartan-led army offered ] the invaluable time to prepare for a decisive naval battle.<ref name="russel">{{cite book |last=Bury |first=J. B. |coauthors=Russell Meiggs |title=A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great |edition=4th Revised Edition |year=2000 |month=July |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=0333154932 |pages=page 271}}</ref> The subsequent Greek victory at the ] left much of the Persian navy destroyed and Xerxes was forced to retreat back to ], leaving his army in Greece under ], who was to meet the ] in battle one last time. The Spartans assembled at full strength and led a pan-Greek army that defeated the Persians decisively at the ], ending the ] and with it Persian expansion into ].<ref name = "Friedell">E. Friedell, Kulturgeschichte Griechenlands</ref> In the '''Battle of Thermopylae''' of ], an alliance of ] ]s fought the invading ] army at the pass of ] in central ]. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks held back the invader in one of history's most famous ]s. A small force led by King ] of ] blocked the only road through which the massive army of ] could pass. After three days of battle, a local resident named ] betrayed the Greeks by revealing a mountain path that led behind the Greek lines. Dismissing the rest of the army, King Leonidas stayed behind with 300 ] and 700 ] volunteers. Though they knew it meant their own deaths, they held their position and secured the retreat of the other Greek forces. The Persians succeeded in taking the pass but sustained heavy losses, extremely disproportionate to those of the Greeks. The fierce resistance of the Spartan-led army offered ] the invaluable time to prepare for a decisive naval battle.<ref name="russel">{{cite book |last=Bury |first=J. B. |coauthors=Russell Meiggs |title=A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great |edition=4th Revised Edition |year=2000 |month=July |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=0333154932 |pages=page 271}}</ref> The subsequent Greek victory at the ] left much of the Persian navy destroyed and Xerxes was forced to retreat back to ], leaving his army in Greece under ], who was to meet the ] in battle one last time. The Spartans assembled at full strength and led a pan-Greek army that defeated the Persians decisively at the ], ending the ] and with it Persian expansion into ].<ref name = "Friedell">E. Friedell, Kulturgeschichte Griechenlands</ref>


The performance of the defenders at the battle of Thermopylae is often used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain to maximize an army's potential, and has become a symbol of courage against overwhelming odds. The heroic sacrifice of the Spartans and the Thespians has captured the minds of many throughout the ages and has given birth to many cultural references as a result. The performance of the defenders at the battle of Thermopylae is often used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain to maximize an army's potential, and has become a symbol of courage against overwhelming odds. The heroic sacrifice of the Spartans and the Thespians has captured the minds of many throughout the ages and has given birth to many cultural references as a result.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


== Greek preparations == == Greek preparations ==
After the expedition to Greece had got under way, Xerxes sent messengers to all Greek cities offering blandishments if they would submit, and asking for "earth and water" from their soil as a token of their submission. Many smaller states submitted. However, the Athenians threw their envoys into a pit and the Spartans threw theirs into a well, taunting them with the retort, "Dig it out for yourselves" (referring to the 'earth and water' demand). After the expedition to Greece had got under way, Xerxes sent messengers to all Greek cities offering blandishments if they would submit, and asking for "earth and water" from their soil as a token of their submission. Many smaller states submitted. However, the Athenians threw their envoys into a pit and the Spartans threw theirs into a well, taunting them with the retort, "Dig it out for yourselves" (referring to the 'earth and water' demand).{{cn|date=March 2007}}}


Support gathered around these two leading states. A congress met at ] in late autumn of ]<ref>Herodotus . He does not use the term "congress" or any ancient equivalent. He only says that they exchanged pledges and consulted together,</ref> and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. There is no evidence that any one state was in charge. Herodotus calls them simply "the Greeks" or "the Greeks who had banded together." The interests of all the states played a part in determining defensive strategy. Nothing else is known about the internal workings of the congress or the discussion during its proceedings. Support gathered around these two leading states. A congress met at ] in late autumn of ]<ref>Herodotus . He does not use the term "congress" or any ancient equivalent. He only says that they exchanged pledges and consulted together,</ref> and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. There is no evidence that any one state was in charge. Herodotus calls them simply "the Greeks" or "the Greeks who had banded together." The interests of all the states played a part in determining defensive strategy. Nothing else is known about the internal workings of the congress or the discussion during its proceedings.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


The Persian army first encountered a joint force of 10,000 Athenian and Spartan ]s led by Euanetus and ] in the ]. Upon hearing this, Xerxes sent the army through the Sarantaporo strait, which was unguarded, and sidestepped them. The hoplites, warned by ], vacated the pass.<ref>Herodotus </ref> The allied Greeks judged that the next strategic choke point where the Persian army could be stopped was ].<ref>Herodotus </ref> They decided to defend it and send a fleet to ], a naval choke point, as Xerxes' army was being supplied and supported by sea. Using the fleet, Xerxes' army might have crossed Maliacos bay and outflanked the Greek army again. The Persian army first encountered a joint force of 10,000 Athenian and Spartan ]s led by Euanetus and ] in the ]. Upon hearing this, Xerxes sent the army through the Sarantaporo strait, which was unguarded, and sidestepped them. The hoplites, warned by ], vacated the pass.<ref>Herodotus </ref> The allied Greeks judged that the next strategic choke point where the Persian army could be stopped was ].<ref>Herodotus </ref> They decided to defend it and send a fleet to ], a naval choke point, as Xerxes' army was being supplied and supported by sea. Using the fleet, Xerxes' army might have crossed Maliacos bay and outflanked the Greek army again.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


The Greek high strategy is confirmed by an oration later in the same century: The Greek high strategy is confirmed by an oration later in the same century:
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Some modern historians, such as Bengtson,<ref>{{cite book |last=Bengtson |first=Hermann |title=Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die rö̈mische Kaiserzeit |year=1969 |publisher=Beck |location=Munich |id= }}</ref> claim that the purpose of the land force was to slow down the Persian army while the Persian navy was defeated at sea. Another theory is that the land army was expected to hold back the Persian forces in the north and defeat it through attrition, epidemics, and food deprivation.<ref name=IEE>Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek Nation) volume B</ref> Some modern historians, such as Bengtson,<ref>{{cite book |last=Bengtson |first=Hermann |title=Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die rö̈mische Kaiserzeit |year=1969 |publisher=Beck |location=Munich |id= }}</ref> claim that the purpose of the land force was to slow down the Persian army while the Persian navy was defeated at sea. Another theory is that the land army was expected to hold back the Persian forces in the north and defeat it through attrition, epidemics, and food deprivation.<ref name=IEE>Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek Nation) volume B</ref>


Some have argued that the Athenians were confident that a small Greek force led by Leonidas would be enough to hold back the Persians; otherwise, they would have already vacated their city and sent their whole army to Thermopylae.<ref name=IEE/> There is one known case in which a small force did stop a larger invading force from the north: in ]/] the Athenians managed to stop the forces of ] by deploying 5,000 hoplites and 400 horsemen. Some have argued that the Athenians were confident that a small Greek force led by Leonidas would be enough to hold back the Persians; otherwise, they would have already vacated their city and sent their whole army to Thermopylae.<ref name=IEE/> There is one known case in which a small force did stop a larger invading force from the north: in ]/] the Athenians managed to stop the forces of ] by deploying 5,000 hoplites and 400 horsemen.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Herodotus writes: Herodotus writes:
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Strive as they may; he is mighty as ]; there is naught that shall stay him,<br> Strive as they may; he is mighty as ]; there is naught that shall stay him,<br>
Till he have got for his prey ], or your glorious city.</blockquote> Till he have got for his prey ], or your glorious city.</blockquote>
In essence, the Oracle's warning was that either Sparta would be conquered and left in ruins or one of her ], descendant of ], must sacrifice his life to defend her. In essence, the Oracle's warning was that either Sparta would be conquered and left in ruins or one of her ], descendant of ], must sacrifice his life to defend her.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Thus King ] took charge of his personal fighting unit, the 300 Spartans, and headed to Thermopylae.<ref>Herodotus </ref> Herodotus writes that Leonidas was idolized by his men. He was convinced that he was going to certain death and his forces were not adequate for a victory. He selected only men who had fathered sons who were old enough to take over the family responsibilities. ] mentions in his ''Sayings of Spartan Women'' that after encouraging her husband before his departure for the battlefield, Gorgo, the wife of ] asked him what she should do on his departure. To this Leonidas replied: " Marry a good man, and have good children". Thus King ] took charge of his personal fighting unit, the 300 Spartans, and headed to Thermopylae.<ref>Herodotus </ref> Herodotus writes that Leonidas was idolized by his men. He was convinced that he was going to certain death and his forces were not adequate for a victory. He selected only men who had fathered sons who were old enough to take over the family responsibilities. ] mentions in his ''Sayings of Spartan Women'' that after encouraging her husband before his departure for the battlefield, Gorgo, the wife of ] asked him what she should do on his departure. To this Leonidas replied: " Marry a good man, and have good children".{{cn|date=March 2007}}


== Battle == == Battle ==
] ]
===Arrival of the Persians=== ===Arrival of the Persians===
On the Persian army's arrival to the battle scene, Greek troops instigated a council meeting. Some ] suggested withdrawal to the ] and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. They were well aware that the Persians would have to go through ] in order to reach them there. The Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas and the Spartans agreed with the Phocians and Locrians. On the Persian army's arrival to the battle scene, Greek troops instigated a council meeting. Some ] suggested withdrawal to the ] and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. They were well aware that the Persians would have to go through ] in order to reach them there. The Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas and the Spartans agreed with the Phocians and Locrians.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Meanwhile, the Persians entered the pass and sent a mounted scout to reconnoiter. The Greeks allowed him to come up to the camp, observe them, and depart. When the scout reported to Xerxes the size of the Greek force and that the Spartans were indulging in ] and combing their long hair, Xerxes found the reports laughable. Seeking the counsel of an exiled Spartan in his employ, ], Xerxes was told that the Spartans were preparing for battle and that it was their custom to adorn their hair beforehand. The exile called them "the bravest men in Greece" and warned the Great King that they intended to dispute the pass. Meanwhile, the Persians entered the pass and sent a mounted scout to reconnoiter. The Greeks allowed him to come up to the camp, observe them, and depart. When the scout reported to Xerxes the size of the Greek force and that the Spartans were indulging in ] and combing their long hair, Xerxes found the reports laughable. Seeking the counsel of an exiled Spartan in his employ, ], Xerxes was told that the Spartans were preparing for battle and that it was their custom to adorn their hair beforehand. The exile called them "the bravest men in Greece" and warned the Great King that they intended to dispute the pass.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Xerxes remained incredulous. According to another account, he sent emissaries to the Greek forces. At first, he asked Leonidas to join him by offering the kingship of all Greece. Leonidas answered: "If you knew what is good in life, you would abstain from wishing for foreign things. For me it is better to die for Greece than to be monarch over my compatriots."<ref>(Plutarch, Moralia, 225, 10)</ref> Xerxes remained incredulous. According to another account, he sent emissaries to the Greek forces. At first, he asked Leonidas to join him by offering the kingship of all Greece. Leonidas answered: "If you knew what is good in life, you would abstain from wishing for foreign things. For me it is better to die for Greece than to be monarch over my compatriots."<ref>(Plutarch, Moralia, 225, 10)</ref>
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Despite their extremely disproportionate numbers, Greek morale was high. Herodotus writes that when ], a Spartan soldier, was informed that Persian arrows would be so numerous as "''to blot out the sun''", he remarked with characteristically ] prose, "''So much the better, we shall fight in the shade.''" Today Dienekes's phrase is the motto of the ].<ref>For the insignia with the motto on it, see .</ref> Despite their extremely disproportionate numbers, Greek morale was high. Herodotus writes that when ], a Spartan soldier, was informed that Persian arrows would be so numerous as "''to blot out the sun''", he remarked with characteristically ] prose, "''So much the better, we shall fight in the shade.''" Today Dienekes's phrase is the motto of the ].<ref>For the insignia with the motto on it, see .</ref>


Xerxes waited four days for the Greek force to disperse. On the fifth day he ordered the ] and the ]ns to take the Greeks prisoner and bring them before him. Xerxes waited four days for the Greek force to disperse. On the fifth day he ordered the ] and the ]ns to take the Greeks prisoner and bring them before him.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


===Failure of the frontal assault=== ===Failure of the frontal assault===
Xerxes sent in the ] who had been only recently conquered by the Persians perhaps, as ] suggested,<ref>], Library, XI,6,3</ref> because he wanted them to bear the brunt of the fighting. Xerxes sent in the ] who had been only recently conquered by the Persians perhaps, as ] suggested,<ref>], Library, XI,6,3</ref> because he wanted them to bear the brunt of the fighting.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


The Medes soon found themselves in a frontal assault. The Greeks had camped on either side of the rebuilt Phocian wall. That the wall was guarded shows that the Greeks were using it to establish a reference line for the battle, but they fought in front of it. The Medes soon found themselves in a frontal assault. The Greeks had camped on either side of the rebuilt Phocian wall. That the wall was guarded shows that the Greeks were using it to establish a reference line for the battle, but they fought in front of it.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Details of the tactics are somewhat scant. The Greeks probably deployed in a ], a wall of overlapping shields and layered spearpoints, spanning the entire width of the pass. Herodotus says that the units for each state were kept together. The Persians, armed with arrows and short spears, could not break through the long spears of the Greek phalanx, nor were their lightly armoured men a match for the superior armour, weaponry, and discipline of the Greek ]. Details of the tactics are somewhat scant. The Greeks probably deployed in a ], a wall of overlapping shields and layered spearpoints, spanning the entire width of the pass. Herodotus says that the units for each state were kept together. The Persians, armed with arrows and short spears, could not break through the long spears of the Greek phalanx, nor were their lightly armoured men a match for the superior armour, weaponry, and discipline of the Greek ].{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Yet there are some indications the Greeks did not fight entirely in close formation. They made use of the feint to draw the Medes in, pretending to retreat in disorder only to turn suddenly and attack the pursuing Medes. In this way they killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have started up off the seat from which he was watching the battle three times. According to ], the first wave numbered 10,000 soldiers and were commanded by ]. Yet there are some indications the Greeks did not fight entirely in close formation. They made use of the feint to draw the Medes in, pretending to retreat in disorder only to turn suddenly and attack the pursuing Medes. In this way they killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have started up off the seat from which he was watching the battle three times. According to ], the first wave numbered 10,000 soldiers and were commanded by ].{{cn|date=March 2007}}


The king eventually withdrew the Medes. Having taken the measure of the enemy, he threw the best troops he had into a second assault: the ], an elite corps of 10,000 men. On his side, Leonidas had arranged a system of relays between the hoplites of the various cities so as to constantly have fresh troops on the front line. In the heat of the battle, however, the units did not get a chance to rotate. Being able to approach the Greek line only in such numbers as the space allowed, the Immortals fared no better than the Medes. Xerxes had to withdraw them as well. The first day of battle probably ended there. The king eventually withdrew the Medes. Having taken the measure of the enemy, he threw the best troops he had into a second assault: the ], an elite corps of 10,000 men. On his side, Leonidas had arranged a system of relays between the hoplites of the various cities so as to constantly have fresh troops on the front line. In the heat of the battle, however, the units did not get a chance to rotate. Being able to approach the Greek line only in such numbers as the space allowed, the Immortals fared no better than the Medes. Xerxes had to withdraw them as well. The first day of battle probably ended there.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


On the second day, the assault failed again. The account of the slain gives some indication why: the wall of bodies must have broken up the Persian line and detracted from their morale. Climbing over the bodies, they could see that they had stepped into a killing machine but the officers behind prevented them from withdrawing. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and withdrew to his camp, totally perplexed. He now knew that a head-on confrontation against Spartan-led troops in a narrow place was the wrong approach. On the second day, the assault failed again. The account of the slain gives some indication why: the wall of bodies must have broken up the Persian line and detracted from their morale. Climbing over the bodies, they could see that they had stepped into a killing machine but the officers behind prevented them from withdrawing. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and withdrew to his camp, totally perplexed. He now knew that a head-on confrontation against Spartan-led troops in a narrow place was the wrong approach.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


===Encirclement of the Greeks=== ===Encirclement of the Greeks===
Late on the second day of battle, as the king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall: a ] Greek traitor named ] informed him of a path around Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army through the pass. Ephialtes was motivated by the desire of a reward. For this act, the name of Ephialtes received a lasting stigma: it means "nightmare" and is synonymous with "traitor" in Greek.<ref>Tegopoulos-Fytrakis dictionary of modern Greek, word:Εφιάλτης</ref> Late on the second day of battle, as the king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall: a ] Greek traitor named ] informed him of a path around Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army through the pass. Ephialtes was motivated by the desire of a reward. For this act, the name of Ephialtes received a lasting stigma: it means "nightmare" and is synonymous with "traitor" in Greek.<ref>Tegopoulos-Fytrakis dictionary of modern Greek, word:Εφιάλτης</ref>


The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at Alpenus, first town of Locris. Leonidas had stationed 1,000 ] volunteers on the heights to guard that path. The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at Alpenus, first town of Locris. Leonidas had stationed 1,000 ] volunteers on the heights to guard that path.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Despite their indignation and determination on defending Thermopylae, the Phocians were not expecting such an outcome: There were no advance positions, sentinels, or patrols. Their first warning of the approach of the Immortals under Hydarnes was the rustling of oak leaves at first light on the third day of the battle. Herodotus says that they "jumped up", suggesting that the Greek force was still asleep, and were "greatly amazed", which no alert unit should have been. Despite their indignation and determination on defending Thermopylae, the Phocians were not expecting such an outcome: There were no advance positions, sentinels, or patrols. Their first warning of the approach of the Immortals under Hydarnes was the rustling of oak leaves at first light on the third day of the battle. Herodotus says that they "jumped up", suggesting that the Greek force was still asleep, and were "greatly amazed", which no alert unit should have been.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Hydarnes was as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves. He feared that they were Spartans, but was enlightened by Ephialtes. Not wishing to be delayed by an assault, Hydarnes resorted to a tactic that later turned out to be a victorious one: He fired "showers of arrows" at them. The Phocians retreated to the crest of the mountain to make their stand. The Persians branched left to Alpenus. Hydarnes was as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves. He feared that they were Spartans, but was enlightened by Ephialtes. Not wishing to be delayed by an assault, Hydarnes resorted to a tactic that later turned out to be a victorious one: He fired "showers of arrows" at them. The Phocians retreated to the crest of the mountain to make their stand. The Persians branched left to Alpenus.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


===Final stand of the Spartans and Thespians=== ===Final stand of the Spartans and Thespians===
None of the Persians' actions surprised Leonidas. From a variety of sources, he was kept apprised of their movements and received intelligence of the Persian outflanking movement before first light. None of the Persians' actions surprised Leonidas. From a variety of sources, he was kept apprised of their movements and received intelligence of the Persian outflanking movement before first light. {{cn|date=March 2007}}


When Leonidas learned that the Phocians had not held, he called a council at dawn. During the council some Greeks argued for withdrawal in the face of the overwhelming Persian advance, while others pledged to stay. After the council, many of the Greek forces did choose to withdraw. Herodotus believed that Leonidas blessed their departure with an order, but he also offered the alternate point of view that those retreating forces departed without orders. The Spartans had pledged themselves to fight to the death, while the Thebans were held as hostage against their will. However, a contingent of about 700 ], led by general ], the son of Diadromes, refused to leave with the other Greeks, but cast their lot with the Spartans. When Leonidas learned that the Phocians had not held, he called a council at dawn. During the council some Greeks argued for withdrawal in the face of the overwhelming Persian advance, while others pledged to stay. After the council, many of the Greek forces did choose to withdraw. Herodotus believed that Leonidas blessed their departure with an order, but he also offered the alternate point of view that those retreating forces departed without orders. The Spartans had pledged themselves to fight to the death, while the Thebans were held as hostage against their will. However, a contingent of about 700 ], led by general ], the son of Diadromes, refused to leave with the other Greeks, but cast their lot with the Spartans.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Ostensibly, the Spartans were obeying their oath and following the oracle of Delphi (see below). However, it might also have been a calculated strategy to delay the advance of the Persians and cover the retreat of the Greek army. In fact, with the Persians so close at hand, the decision to stand and fight was probably a tactical requirement only made more palatable by the oracle. Ostensibly, the Spartans were obeying their oath and following the oracle of Delphi (see below). However, it might also have been a calculated strategy to delay the advance of the Persians and cover the retreat of the Greek army. In fact, with the Persians so close at hand, the decision to stand and fight was probably a tactical requirement only made more palatable by the oracle.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


<!--come up with the source of the story and put this paragraph back in without the citeneeded: The significance of the Thespians' refusal to leave should not be ignored. The Spartans, as brave as their sacrifice indubitably was, were professional soldiers, trained from birth to be ready to give their lives in combat as ] dictated. Conversely, the Thespians were citizen-soldiers (Demophilus, for example, made his living as an architect) who elected to add whatever they could to the fight, rather than allow the Spartans to be annihilated alone. Though their bravery is often overlooked by history, it was most certainly not overlooked by the Spartans, who are said to have exchanged cloaks with the Thespians and promised to be allies for eternity.{{citeneeded}}--> <!--come up with the source of the story and put this paragraph back in without the citeneeded: The significance of the Thespians' refusal to leave should not be ignored. The Spartans, as brave as their sacrifice indubitably was, were professional soldiers, trained from birth to be ready to give their lives in combat as ] dictated. Conversely, the Thespians were citizen-soldiers (Demophilus, for example, made his living as an architect) who elected to add whatever they could to the fight, rather than allow the Spartans to be annihilated alone. Though their bravery is often overlooked by history, it was most certainly not overlooked by the Spartans, who are said to have exchanged cloaks with the Thespians and promised to be allies for eternity.{{citeneeded}}-->
At dawn Xerxes made libations. He paused to allow the Immortals sufficient time to descend the mountain, and then began his advance. At dawn Xerxes made libations. He paused to allow the Immortals sufficient time to descend the mountain, and then began his advance.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter as many Persians as they could. They fought with spears until every spear was shattered and then switched to ] (short swords). In this struggle, Herodotus tells us that two brothers of Xerxes fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes. Leonidas also died in the assault. The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter as many Persians as they could. They fought with spears until every spear was shattered and then switched to ] (short swords). In this struggle, Herodotus tells us that two brothers of Xerxes fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes. Leonidas also died in the assault.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Receiving intelligence that Ephialtes and the Immortals were advancing toward the rear, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand on a small hill behind the wall. The Thebans deserted to the Persians but a few were slain before their surrender was accepted.<ref name="herodotus_vii:223">Herodotus VII:223</ref> While some of the remaining Greeks fought with their xiphoi, some were left with only their hands and teeth. Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered the hill surrounded and the Persians rained down arrows until the last Greek was dead.<ref>Herodotus, Book VII, 225.</ref> Modern archaeologists have found evidence of the final arrow shower.<ref>Reed College's describes the excavations by ].</ref> Receiving intelligence that Ephialtes and the Immortals were advancing toward the rear, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand on a small hill behind the wall. The Thebans deserted to the Persians but a few were slain before their surrender was accepted.<ref name="herodotus_vii:223">Herodotus VII:223</ref> While some of the remaining Greeks fought with their xiphoi, some were left with only their hands and teeth. Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered the hill surrounded and the Persians rained down arrows until the last Greek was dead.<ref>Herodotus, Book VII, 225.</ref> Modern archaeologists have found evidence of the final arrow shower.<ref>Reed College's describes the excavations by ].</ref>
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After the departure and defeat of the Persians, the Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. A stone lion was erected to commemorate Leonidas. Forty years after the battle, Leonidas' body was returned to Sparta where he was buried again with full honors and funeral games were held every year in his memory.<ref>Pausanias 3.14.1</ref> After the departure and defeat of the Persians, the Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. A stone lion was erected to commemorate Leonidas. Forty years after the battle, Leonidas' body was returned to Sparta where he was buried again with full honors and funeral games were held every year in his memory.<ref>Pausanias 3.14.1</ref>


The simultaneous naval ] was a stalemate, whereupon the Athenian navy retreated. The Persians were now in control of the ] and all of peninsular Greece as far south as ]. The Spartans prepared to defend the ] and the ], while Xerxes sacked an evacuated city of ], whose inhabitants had already fled to ]. In September, the Greeks defeated the Persians at the naval ], which led to the rapid retreat of Xerxes. The remaining Persian army, left under the charge of ], was defeated in the ] by a combined Greek army again led by the Spartans, under the regent Pausanias. That last battle was probably the final stroke to avenge Leonidas's death. The simultaneous naval ] was a stalemate, whereupon the Athenian navy retreated. The Persians were now in control of the ] and all of peninsular Greece as far south as ]. The Spartans prepared to defend the ] and the ], while Xerxes sacked an evacuated city of ], whose inhabitants had already fled to ]. In September, the Greeks defeated the Persians at the naval ], which led to the rapid retreat of Xerxes. The remaining Persian army, left under the charge of ], was defeated in the ] by a combined Greek army again led by the Spartans, under the regent Pausanias. That last battle was probably the final stroke to avenge Leonidas's death.{{cn|date=March 2007}}
<!--The battle can be used to illustrate a lot of things, but this article is about the battle, not the subsequent classroom speeches on it. As for it being regarded as anything, why don't we leave it up to the reader to do the regarding?: This battle, along with ] and similar actions, is used in ] around the world to show how a small group of well-trained and well-led soldiers can have an impact out of all proportion to their numbers. It is worth noting also that the effectiveness of the Greeks against such a vastly larger army was due in large part to the battlefield itself. Had this battle been fought on an open field, rather than a narrow pass, the smaller Greek army could have been surrounded and defeated with ease, despite the quality of the Greek infantry. Thus Thermopylae is also regarded as being as much a lesson in the importance of favorable terrain and good strategy as it is in good training and discipline.--> <!--The battle can be used to illustrate a lot of things, but this article is about the battle, not the subsequent classroom speeches on it. As for it being regarded as anything, why don't we leave it up to the reader to do the regarding?: This battle, along with ] and similar actions, is used in ] around the world to show how a small group of well-trained and well-led soldiers can have an impact out of all proportion to their numbers. It is worth noting also that the effectiveness of the Greeks against such a vastly larger army was due in large part to the battlefield itself. Had this battle been fought on an open field, rather than a narrow pass, the smaller Greek army could have been surrounded and defeated with ease, despite the quality of the Greek infantry. Thus Thermopylae is also regarded as being as much a lesson in the importance of favorable terrain and good strategy as it is in good training and discipline.-->


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This is the account for the land armies present at Thermopylae. Regarding the total number of forces Xerxes assembed to invade Greece (land army, fleet crew etc), this number needs to be nearly doubled in order to account for support troops and thus Herodotus reports that the total Persian force numbered 5,283,220 men,<ref>Herodotus </ref> a figure which is regarded erroneous by modern estimations. The poet ], who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million. ], ]'s personal physician, wrote a history of Persia according to Persian sources that unfortunately has not survived, and gives 800,000 as the total number of the original army that met in ], ], after crossing the ]. Modern scholars have given different estimates based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route. This is the account for the land armies present at Thermopylae. Regarding the total number of forces Xerxes assembed to invade Greece (land army, fleet crew etc), this number needs to be nearly doubled in order to account for support troops and thus Herodotus reports that the total Persian force numbered 5,283,220 men,<ref>Herodotus </ref> a figure which is regarded erroneous by modern estimations. The poet ], who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million. ], ]'s personal physician, wrote a history of Persia according to Persian sources that unfortunately has not survived, and gives 800,000 as the total number of the original army that met in ], ], after crossing the ]. Modern scholars have given different estimates based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Modern estimations tend to consider the figures given in ancient texts as miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors. It is assumed that if Herodotus' 300,000 estimate at Mycalae were to be accepted, then the land army at Thermopylae could not have surpassed 500,000, and the total Persian presence in Greece would be estimated at 1,000,000. This accounts for one fifth of Herdotus' record.<ref>A History of Greece: From the Time of Solon to 403 B. C. (p. 214) - George Grote, John Malcolm Mitchell, Max Cary, Paul Cartledge</ref> Others give an upper limit of 250,000 total land forces and 500,000 for the expedition. The main reason most often given for these values is a lack of water; Sir Frederick Maurice,<ref>{{cite journal | last=Maurice | first=F | date= | year=1930 | month= | title=The size of the army of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece 480 B.C. | journal=] | volume=50 | issue= | pages=115–128 | doi=10.2307/626811 }}</ref> a ] ] in ], was among the first to claim that the army could not have surpassed 175,000 due this reason. A minority of scholars have suggested land force figures lower than 100,000, while a popular view supports a range of 100,000-150,000 or 150,000-200,000. The subject has been hotly debated, but the current consensus rests on the theory that Herodotus confused Persian terms for ''chiliarchy'' and ''myriarchy'' (one thousand and ten thousand).<ref name=cch>''The Cambridge companion to Herodotus'' p. 217, Carolyn Dewald, John. Marincola</ref> This suggests that the actual size of the Persian land forces would be around 210,000. All those estimates concern the land forces alone, whereas the entire Persian presence, including support troops and fleet crew, would almost double this number, dividing Herodotus' five million figure by ten.<ref name=cch/> Modern estimations tend to consider the figures given in ancient texts as miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors. It is assumed that if Herodotus' 300,000 estimate at Mycalae were to be accepted, then the land army at Thermopylae could not have surpassed 500,000, and the total Persian presence in Greece would be estimated at 1,000,000. This accounts for one fifth of Herdotus' record.<ref>A History of Greece: From the Time of Solon to 403 B. C. (p. 214) - George Grote, John Malcolm Mitchell, Max Cary, Paul Cartledge</ref> Others give an upper limit of 250,000 total land forces and 500,000 for the expedition. The main reason most often given for these values is a lack of water; Sir Frederick Maurice,<ref>{{cite journal | last=Maurice | first=F | date= | year=1930 | month= | title=The size of the army of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece 480 B.C. | journal=] | volume=50 | issue= | pages=115–128 | doi=10.2307/626811 }}</ref> a ] ] in ], was among the first to claim that the army could not have surpassed 175,000 due this reason. A minority of scholars have suggested land force figures lower than 100,000, while a popular view supports a range of 100,000-150,000 or 150,000-200,000. The subject has been hotly debated, but the current consensus rests on the theory that Herodotus confused Persian terms for ''chiliarchy'' and ''myriarchy'' (one thousand and ten thousand).<ref name=cch>''The Cambridge companion to Herodotus'' p. 217, Carolyn Dewald, John. Marincola</ref> This suggests that the actual size of the Persian land forces would be around 210,000. All those estimates concern the land forces alone, whereas the entire Persian presence, including support troops and fleet crew, would almost double this number, dividing Herodotus' five million figure by ten.<ref name=cch/>
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The numbers given by Herodotus on the Persian fleet are considered largely realistic. It is generally maintained that Herodotus or his sources had access to official Persian records of the forces involved in the expedition<ref name=souza>"The Greek and Persian Wars, 499-386 BC" - Philip De Souza, p. 41</ref>, and it is more likely the numbers on the fleet were given precisely, whereas the contigent of the army may have been listed in general terms rather than exact figures.<ref name=souza/> Whatever the real numbers were, it is clear that Xerxes was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea.<ref name=souza/> The numbers given by Herodotus on the Persian fleet are considered largely realistic. It is generally maintained that Herodotus or his sources had access to official Persian records of the forces involved in the expedition<ref name=souza>"The Greek and Persian Wars, 499-386 BC" - Philip De Souza, p. 41</ref>, and it is more likely the numbers on the fleet were given precisely, whereas the contigent of the army may have been listed in general terms rather than exact figures.<ref name=souza/> Whatever the real numbers were, it is clear that Xerxes was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea.<ref name=souza/>


Based on the fact that Xerxes led a multi-ethnic army and not just a Persian one, a second school contends that some ancient sources do give realistic numbers. According to the texts the Greeks at the end of the ] mustered 110,000 (]) or 100,000 (]) troops: 38,700 ] and 71,300 or 61,300 ]s respectively, the difference probably being 10,000 ]. In that battle, according to Herodotus, they faced 300,000 Persians and 50,000 Greek allies. This gives a 6-to-1 ratio for the two armies, which proponents of the school consider a realistic proportion. Based on the fact that Xerxes led a multi-ethnic army and not just a Persian one, a second school contends that some ancient sources do give realistic numbers. According to the texts the Greeks at the end of the ] mustered 110,000 (]) or 100,000 (]) troops: 38,700 ] and 71,300 or 61,300 ]s respectively, the difference probably being 10,000 ]. In that battle, according to Herodotus, they faced 300,000 Persians and 50,000 Greek allies. This gives a 6-to-1 ratio for the two armies, which proponents of the school consider a realistic proportion.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


Furthermore, Munro<ref> J.A.R. Munro, Cambridge ancient history vol IV 1929 </ref> and Macan<ref>The 7th,8th and 9th book of Herodotus, New York 1971</ref> argue for realism based on Herodotus giving the names of 6 major commanders and 29 '' μυρίαρχοι '' (muriarchoi)—leaders of the ], the basic unit of the Persian infantry, which numbered about 10,000 strong.<ref>Papademetriou Konstantinos, ''Περσικό Πεζικό: Η δύναμη που κατέκτησε τη νοτιοδυτική Ασία'' (Persian Infantry: The force that conquered southwest Asia), Panzer magazine, Issue 22 September–October 2005, Periscopio editions Athens; Nicholas Sekunda, Simon Chew, ''The Persian Army (560–330&nbsp;BC)'', Elite series, Osprey 1992, Oxford. For an online article see also .</ref> As troops were lost through attrition, the Persians preferred to dissolve crippled baivabarams to replenish the ranks of others.<ref> Η Μάχη του Μαραθώνα, το λυκαυγές της κλασσικής Ελλάδος = The battle of Marathon, the dawn of classical Greece, Πόλεμος και ιστορία = War and History magazine, issue 26 January 2000, Communications editions, Athens </ref> It is therefore likely that the units were at full strength.<!--This has nothing to do with the argument: , since Xerxes, upon leaving Greece after the ], had taken with him a large part of the army, 60,000 according to Ctesias (though Beloch believes that Xerxes took very few of his troops with him), and the remaining troops would have been folded together into full-sized units.--> Adding casualties of the battles and attrition due to the need to guard cities and strategic objectives obtains a force of 400,000 minimum. Furthermore, Munro<ref> J.A.R. Munro, Cambridge ancient history vol IV 1929 </ref> and Macan<ref>The 7th,8th and 9th book of Herodotus, New York 1971</ref> argue for realism based on Herodotus giving the names of 6 major commanders and 29 '' μυρίαρχοι '' (muriarchoi)—leaders of the ], the basic unit of the Persian infantry, which numbered about 10,000 strong.<ref>Papademetriou Konstantinos, ''Περσικό Πεζικό: Η δύναμη που κατέκτησε τη νοτιοδυτική Ασία'' (Persian Infantry: The force that conquered southwest Asia), Panzer magazine, Issue 22 September–October 2005, Periscopio editions Athens; Nicholas Sekunda, Simon Chew, ''The Persian Army (560–330&nbsp;BC)'', Elite series, Osprey 1992, Oxford. For an online article see also .</ref> As troops were lost through attrition, the Persians preferred to dissolve crippled baivabarams to replenish the ranks of others.<ref> Η Μάχη του Μαραθώνα, το λυκαυγές της κλασσικής Ελλάδος = The battle of Marathon, the dawn of classical Greece, Πόλεμος και ιστορία = War and History magazine, issue 26 January 2000, Communications editions, Athens </ref> It is therefore likely that the units were at full strength.<!--This has nothing to do with the argument: , since Xerxes, upon leaving Greece after the ], had taken with him a large part of the army, 60,000 according to Ctesias (though Beloch believes that Xerxes took very few of his troops with him), and the remaining troops would have been folded together into full-sized units.--> Adding casualties of the battles and attrition due to the need to guard cities and strategic objectives obtains a force of 400,000 minimum.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


According to this view, there was no lack of water. The available surface water in Greece today satisfies the needs of a much larger population than the number of Xerxes's troops, though the majority of that water is used for irrigation. According to this view, there was no lack of water. The available surface water in Greece today satisfies the needs of a much larger population than the number of Xerxes's troops, though the majority of that water is used for irrigation. {{cn|date=March 2007}}


Other historians' estimates include: Other historians' estimates include:
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To this number must be added 1,000 other Lacedemonians mentioned by ]<ref>book XI,5</ref> and perhaps 800 auxiliary troops from other Greek cities, bringing the total up to 7,000. Diodorus gives 4,000 as the total of Greek troops, and ] 11,200.<ref>Pausanias 10,20,2</ref> Modern historians, who usually consider Herodotus more reliable, prefer his claim of 7,000 men. To this number must be added 1,000 other Lacedemonians mentioned by ]<ref>book XI,5</ref> and perhaps 800 auxiliary troops from other Greek cities, bringing the total up to 7,000. Diodorus gives 4,000 as the total of Greek troops, and ] 11,200.<ref>Pausanias 10,20,2</ref> Modern historians, who usually consider Herodotus more reliable, prefer his claim of 7,000 men.{{cn|date=March 2007}}


==Date of the battle== ==Date of the battle==

Revision as of 18:43, 11 March 2007

For other uses, see Battle of Thermopylae (disambiguation).
Battle of Thermopylae
Part of the Persian Wars
Leonidas at Thermopylae, by Jacques-Louis David (1814)
Leonidas at Thermopylae, by Jacques-Louis David (1814)
Date11 August 480 BC
LocationThermopylae
Result Persian victory
Belligerents
Greek-city states Persian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Leonidas I † Xerxes I the Great of Persia
Strength
300 Spartans
700 Thespians
6,000 other Greek allies		 100,000-2,000,000 (estimates vary)
Casualties and losses
300 Spartans and 700 Thespians;
1,400 Greek allies in total.		 20,000 (Modern estimates)
20,000 (Herodotus)
80,000+ (Ctesias)
Herodotus estimates a total Persian military presence of 2,641,610 (Herodotus VII,186)
Out of the initial 7,000-strong Greek army, all but 1,400 were dismissed on the third day.
Greco-Persian Wars

In the Battle of Thermopylae of 480 BC, an alliance of Greek city-states fought the invading Persian army at the pass of Thermopylae in central Greece. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks held back the invader in one of history's most famous last stands. A small force led by King Leonidas of Sparta blocked the only road through which the massive army of Xerxes I could pass. After three days of battle, a local resident named Ephialtes betrayed the Greeks by revealing a mountain path that led behind the Greek lines. Dismissing the rest of the army, King Leonidas stayed behind with 300 Spartans and 700 Thespian volunteers. Though they knew it meant their own deaths, they held their position and secured the retreat of the other Greek forces. The Persians succeeded in taking the pass but sustained heavy losses, extremely disproportionate to those of the Greeks. The fierce resistance of the Spartan-led army offered Athens the invaluable time to prepare for a decisive naval battle. The subsequent Greek victory at the Battle of Salamis left much of the Persian navy destroyed and Xerxes was forced to retreat back to Asia, leaving his army in Greece under Mardonius, who was to meet the Greeks in battle one last time. The Spartans assembled at full strength and led a pan-Greek army that defeated the Persians decisively at the Battle of Plataea, ending the Greco-Persian War and with it Persian expansion into Europe.

The performance of the defenders at the battle of Thermopylae is often used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain to maximize an army's potential, and has become a symbol of courage against overwhelming odds. The heroic sacrifice of the Spartans and the Thespians has captured the minds of many throughout the ages and has given birth to many cultural references as a result.

Greek preparations

After the expedition to Greece had got under way, Xerxes sent messengers to all Greek cities offering blandishments if they would submit, and asking for "earth and water" from their soil as a token of their submission. Many smaller states submitted. However, the Athenians threw their envoys into a pit and the Spartans threw theirs into a well, taunting them with the retort, "Dig it out for yourselves" (referring to the 'earth and water' demand).}

Support gathered around these two leading states. A congress met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. There is no evidence that any one state was in charge. Herodotus calls them simply "the Greeks" or "the Greeks who had banded together." The interests of all the states played a part in determining defensive strategy. Nothing else is known about the internal workings of the congress or the discussion during its proceedings.

The Persian army first encountered a joint force of 10,000 Athenian and Spartan hoplites led by Euanetus and Themistocles in the vale of Tempe. Upon hearing this, Xerxes sent the army through the Sarantaporo strait, which was unguarded, and sidestepped them. The hoplites, warned by Alexander I of Macedon, vacated the pass. The allied Greeks judged that the next strategic choke point where the Persian army could be stopped was Thermopylae. They decided to defend it and send a fleet to Artemision, a naval choke point, as Xerxes' army was being supplied and supported by sea. Using the fleet, Xerxes' army might have crossed Maliacos bay and outflanked the Greek army again.

The Greek high strategy is confirmed by an oration later in the same century:

But while Greece showed these inclinations , the Athenians, for their part, embarked in their ships and hastened to the defence of Artemisium; while the Spartans and some of their allies went off to make a stand at Thermopylae, judging that the narrowness of the ground would enable them to secure the passage.

Some modern historians, such as Bengtson, claim that the purpose of the land force was to slow down the Persian army while the Persian navy was defeated at sea. Another theory is that the land army was expected to hold back the Persian forces in the north and defeat it through attrition, epidemics, and food deprivation.

Some have argued that the Athenians were confident that a small Greek force led by Leonidas would be enough to hold back the Persians; otherwise, they would have already vacated their city and sent their whole army to Thermopylae. There is one known case in which a small force did stop a larger invading force from the north: in 353 BC/352 BC the Athenians managed to stop the forces of Philip II of Macedon by deploying 5,000 hoplites and 400 horsemen.

Herodotus writes:

The force with Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as was likely they might have done had they seen that Sparta was backward. They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian Festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army. The rest of the allies intended to act similarly; for it happened that the Olympic Festival fell exactly at this same period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylae decided so speedily; wherefore they were content to send forward a mere advance guard. Such accordingly were the intentions of the allies.

The legend of Thermopylae, as told by Herodotus, has it that Sparta consulted the Oracle at Delphi before setting out to meet the Persian army. The Oracle is said to have made the following prophecy in hexameter verse:

O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon!
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus,
Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country
Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.
He cannot be withstood by the courage of bulls nor of lions,
Strive as they may; he is mighty as Jove; there is naught that shall stay him,

Till he have got for his prey your king, or your glorious city.

In essence, the Oracle's warning was that either Sparta would be conquered and left in ruins or one of her two hereditary kings, descendant of Hercules, must sacrifice his life to defend her.

Thus King Leonidas took charge of his personal fighting unit, the 300 Spartans, and headed to Thermopylae. Herodotus writes that Leonidas was idolized by his men. He was convinced that he was going to certain death and his forces were not adequate for a victory. He selected only men who had fathered sons who were old enough to take over the family responsibilities. Plutarch mentions in his Sayings of Spartan Women that after encouraging her husband before his departure for the battlefield, Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas I asked him what she should do on his departure. To this Leonidas replied: " Marry a good man, and have good children".

Battle

The Battle of Thermopylae and movements to Salamis.

Arrival of the Persians

On the Persian army's arrival to the battle scene, Greek troops instigated a council meeting. Some Peloponnesians suggested withdrawal to the Isthmus and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. They were well aware that the Persians would have to go through Athens in order to reach them there. The Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas and the Spartans agreed with the Phocians and Locrians.

Meanwhile, the Persians entered the pass and sent a mounted scout to reconnoiter. The Greeks allowed him to come up to the camp, observe them, and depart. When the scout reported to Xerxes the size of the Greek force and that the Spartans were indulging in calisthenics and combing their long hair, Xerxes found the reports laughable. Seeking the counsel of an exiled Spartan in his employ, Demaratus, Xerxes was told that the Spartans were preparing for battle and that it was their custom to adorn their hair beforehand. The exile called them "the bravest men in Greece" and warned the Great King that they intended to dispute the pass.

Xerxes remained incredulous. According to another account, he sent emissaries to the Greek forces. At first, he asked Leonidas to join him by offering the kingship of all Greece. Leonidas answered: "If you knew what is good in life, you would abstain from wishing for foreign things. For me it is better to die for Greece than to be monarch over my compatriots."

Then Xerxes asked him more forcefully to surrender their arms. To this Leonidas gave his noted answer:

Μολών Λαβέ
(pronounced: /molɔːn labe/),

meaning "Come take them". This quote has been repeated by many later generals and politicians in order to express an army's or nation's determination to not surrender without a battle. It is today the emblem of the Greek First Army Corps.

Despite their extremely disproportionate numbers, Greek morale was high. Herodotus writes that when Dienekes, a Spartan soldier, was informed that Persian arrows would be so numerous as "to blot out the sun", he remarked with characteristically laconic prose, "So much the better, we shall fight in the shade." Today Dienekes's phrase is the motto of the Greek 20th Armored Division.

Xerxes waited four days for the Greek force to disperse. On the fifth day he ordered the Medes and the Cissians to take the Greeks prisoner and bring them before him.

Failure of the frontal assault

Xerxes sent in the Medes who had been only recently conquered by the Persians perhaps, as Diodorus Siculus suggested, because he wanted them to bear the brunt of the fighting.

The Medes soon found themselves in a frontal assault. The Greeks had camped on either side of the rebuilt Phocian wall. That the wall was guarded shows that the Greeks were using it to establish a reference line for the battle, but they fought in front of it.

Details of the tactics are somewhat scant. The Greeks probably deployed in a phalanx, a wall of overlapping shields and layered spearpoints, spanning the entire width of the pass. Herodotus says that the units for each state were kept together. The Persians, armed with arrows and short spears, could not break through the long spears of the Greek phalanx, nor were their lightly armoured men a match for the superior armour, weaponry, and discipline of the Greek hoplites.

Yet there are some indications the Greeks did not fight entirely in close formation. They made use of the feint to draw the Medes in, pretending to retreat in disorder only to turn suddenly and attack the pursuing Medes. In this way they killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have started up off the seat from which he was watching the battle three times. According to Ctesias, the first wave numbered 10,000 soldiers and were commanded by Artapanus.

The king eventually withdrew the Medes. Having taken the measure of the enemy, he threw the best troops he had into a second assault: the Immortals, an elite corps of 10,000 men. On his side, Leonidas had arranged a system of relays between the hoplites of the various cities so as to constantly have fresh troops on the front line. In the heat of the battle, however, the units did not get a chance to rotate. Being able to approach the Greek line only in such numbers as the space allowed, the Immortals fared no better than the Medes. Xerxes had to withdraw them as well. The first day of battle probably ended there.

On the second day, the assault failed again. The account of the slain gives some indication why: the wall of bodies must have broken up the Persian line and detracted from their morale. Climbing over the bodies, they could see that they had stepped into a killing machine but the officers behind prevented them from withdrawing. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and withdrew to his camp, totally perplexed. He now knew that a head-on confrontation against Spartan-led troops in a narrow place was the wrong approach.

Encirclement of the Greeks

Late on the second day of battle, as the king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall: a Malian Greek traitor named Ephialtes informed him of a path around Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army through the pass. Ephialtes was motivated by the desire of a reward. For this act, the name of Ephialtes received a lasting stigma: it means "nightmare" and is synonymous with "traitor" in Greek.

The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at Alpenus, first town of Locris. Leonidas had stationed 1,000 Phocian volunteers on the heights to guard that path.

Despite their indignation and determination on defending Thermopylae, the Phocians were not expecting such an outcome: There were no advance positions, sentinels, or patrols. Their first warning of the approach of the Immortals under Hydarnes was the rustling of oak leaves at first light on the third day of the battle. Herodotus says that they "jumped up", suggesting that the Greek force was still asleep, and were "greatly amazed", which no alert unit should have been.

Hydarnes was as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves. He feared that they were Spartans, but was enlightened by Ephialtes. Not wishing to be delayed by an assault, Hydarnes resorted to a tactic that later turned out to be a victorious one: He fired "showers of arrows" at them. The Phocians retreated to the crest of the mountain to make their stand. The Persians branched left to Alpenus.

Final stand of the Spartans and Thespians

None of the Persians' actions surprised Leonidas. From a variety of sources, he was kept apprised of their movements and received intelligence of the Persian outflanking movement before first light.

When Leonidas learned that the Phocians had not held, he called a council at dawn. During the council some Greeks argued for withdrawal in the face of the overwhelming Persian advance, while others pledged to stay. After the council, many of the Greek forces did choose to withdraw. Herodotus believed that Leonidas blessed their departure with an order, but he also offered the alternate point of view that those retreating forces departed without orders. The Spartans had pledged themselves to fight to the death, while the Thebans were held as hostage against their will. However, a contingent of about 700 Thespians, led by general Demophilus, the son of Diadromes, refused to leave with the other Greeks, but cast their lot with the Spartans.

Ostensibly, the Spartans were obeying their oath and following the oracle of Delphi (see below). However, it might also have been a calculated strategy to delay the advance of the Persians and cover the retreat of the Greek army. In fact, with the Persians so close at hand, the decision to stand and fight was probably a tactical requirement only made more palatable by the oracle.

At dawn Xerxes made libations. He paused to allow the Immortals sufficient time to descend the mountain, and then began his advance.

The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter as many Persians as they could. They fought with spears until every spear was shattered and then switched to xiphoi (short swords). In this struggle, Herodotus tells us that two brothers of Xerxes fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes. Leonidas also died in the assault.

Receiving intelligence that Ephialtes and the Immortals were advancing toward the rear, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand on a small hill behind the wall. The Thebans deserted to the Persians but a few were slain before their surrender was accepted. While some of the remaining Greeks fought with their xiphoi, some were left with only their hands and teeth. Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes ordered the hill surrounded and the Persians rained down arrows until the last Greek was dead. Modern archaeologists have found evidence of the final arrow shower.

Aftermath

When the body of Leonidas was recovered by the Persians, Xerxes, in a rage at the loss of so many of his soldiers, ordered that the head be cut off and the body crucified. This was very uncommon for the Persians; they had the habit of treating enemies that fought bravely against them with great honor, as the example of Pytheas captured earlier off Skyros shows. However, Xerxes was known for his rage, as when he had the Hellespont whipped because it would not obey him.

Xerxes was curious as to why there was such a small Greek force guarding Thermopylae and interrogated some Arcadian prisoners. The answer was that all the other men were participating in the Olympic Games, forbidding them to participate in war. When Xerxes asked what the prize for the winner was, "An olive-wreath" came the answer. Upon hearing this, Tritantaechmes, a Persian general, spontaneously responded by saying to Mardonius: "Good heavens! Mardonius, what kind of men are these against whom you have brought us to fight? Men who do not compete for money, but for honor".

After the departure and defeat of the Persians, the Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. A stone lion was erected to commemorate Leonidas. Forty years after the battle, Leonidas' body was returned to Sparta where he was buried again with full honors and funeral games were held every year in his memory.

The simultaneous naval Battle of Artemisium was a stalemate, whereupon the Athenian navy retreated. The Persians were now in control of the Aegean Sea and all of peninsular Greece as far south as Attica. The Spartans prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth and the Peloponnese, while Xerxes sacked an evacuated city of Athens, whose inhabitants had already fled to Salamis Island. In September, the Greeks defeated the Persians at the naval Battle of Salamis, which led to the rapid retreat of Xerxes. The remaining Persian army, left under the charge of Mardonius, was defeated in the Battle of Plataea by a combined Greek army again led by the Spartans, under the regent Pausanias. That last battle was probably the final stroke to avenge Leonidas's death.

Topography of the battlefield

At the time, the pass of Thermopylae consisted of a track along the shore of the Gulf of Malis so narrow that only one chariot could pass through. On the southern side of the track stood the cliffs, while on the north side was the gulf. Along the path was a series of three constrictions, or "gates" (pylai), and at the center gate a short wall that had been erected by the Phocians in the previous century to aid in their defense against Thessalian invasions. The name "hot gates" comes from the hot springs that were located there.

Today, the pass is not near the sea but is inland due to infilling of the Gulf of Malis. The old track appears at the foot of hills around the plain, flanked by a modern road. It still is a natural defensive position to modern armies.

Detailed maps of the region are to be found at these sites:

Pictures showing the terrain are to be found at these sites:

Size of the Persian army

Xerxes I, king of Persia, had been preparing for years to continue the Greco-Persian Wars started by his father Darius. In 481 BC, after four years of preparation, the Persian army and navy arrived in Asia Minor. A bridge of ships had been made at Abydos. This allowed the land forces to cross the Hellespont. Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who wrote the first history of this war, gave the size of Xerxes's army as follows:

Units Numbers
Fleet crew 517,610
Infantry 1,700,000
Cavalry 80,000
Arabs and Libyans 20,000
Greek puppet troops 324,000
Total 2,641,610

This is the account for the land armies present at Thermopylae. Regarding the total number of forces Xerxes assembed to invade Greece (land army, fleet crew etc), this number needs to be nearly doubled in order to account for support troops and thus Herodotus reports that the total Persian force numbered 5,283,220 men, a figure which is regarded erroneous by modern estimations. The poet Simonides, who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million. Ctesias of Cnidus, Artaxerxes Mnemon's personal physician, wrote a history of Persia according to Persian sources that unfortunately has not survived, and gives 800,000 as the total number of the original army that met in Doriskos, Thrace, after crossing the Hellespont. Modern scholars have given different estimates based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route.

Modern estimations tend to consider the figures given in ancient texts as miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors. It is assumed that if Herodotus' 300,000 estimate at Mycalae were to be accepted, then the land army at Thermopylae could not have surpassed 500,000, and the total Persian presence in Greece would be estimated at 1,000,000. This accounts for one fifth of Herdotus' record. Others give an upper limit of 250,000 total land forces and 500,000 for the expedition. The main reason most often given for these values is a lack of water; Sir Frederick Maurice, a British general in World War I, was among the first to claim that the army could not have surpassed 175,000 due this reason. A minority of scholars have suggested land force figures lower than 100,000, while a popular view supports a range of 100,000-150,000 or 150,000-200,000. The subject has been hotly debated, but the current consensus rests on the theory that Herodotus confused Persian terms for chiliarchy and myriarchy (one thousand and ten thousand). This suggests that the actual size of the Persian land forces would be around 210,000. All those estimates concern the land forces alone, whereas the entire Persian presence, including support troops and fleet crew, would almost double this number, dividing Herodotus' five million figure by ten.

The numbers given by Herodotus on the Persian fleet are considered largely realistic. It is generally maintained that Herodotus or his sources had access to official Persian records of the forces involved in the expedition, and it is more likely the numbers on the fleet were given precisely, whereas the contigent of the army may have been listed in general terms rather than exact figures. Whatever the real numbers were, it is clear that Xerxes was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea.

Based on the fact that Xerxes led a multi-ethnic army and not just a Persian one, a second school contends that some ancient sources do give realistic numbers. According to the texts the Greeks at the end of the battle of Plataea mustered 110,000 (Herodotus) or 100,000 (Pompeius) troops: 38,700 hoplites and 71,300 or 61,300 peltasts respectively, the difference probably being 10,000 helots. In that battle, according to Herodotus, they faced 300,000 Persians and 50,000 Greek allies. This gives a 6-to-1 ratio for the two armies, which proponents of the school consider a realistic proportion.

Furthermore, Munro and Macan argue for realism based on Herodotus giving the names of 6 major commanders and 29 μυρίαρχοι (muriarchoi)—leaders of the baivabaram, the basic unit of the Persian infantry, which numbered about 10,000 strong. As troops were lost through attrition, the Persians preferred to dissolve crippled baivabarams to replenish the ranks of others. It is therefore likely that the units were at full strength. Adding casualties of the battles and attrition due to the need to guard cities and strategic objectives obtains a force of 400,000 minimum.

According to this view, there was no lack of water. The available surface water in Greece today satisfies the needs of a much larger population than the number of Xerxes's troops, though the majority of that water is used for irrigation.

Other historians' estimates include:

  • Nicholas Hammond accepts 300,000 Persians at the battle of Plataea, though he claims that the numbers at Doriskos were smaller.
  • The metrologist Livio Catullo Stecchini argues that Ctesias's figure of 800,000 battle troops for the Persian army is accurate and that Herodotus's figure of 1,700,000 includes both battle and support troops.
  • Dr. Manousos Kampouris argues that Herodotus' 1,700,000 for the infantry plus 80,000 cavalry (including support) is realistic for various reasons including the size of the area from which the army was drafted (from modern-day Libya to Pakistan), the lack of security against spies, the ratios of land troops to fleet troops, of infantry to cavalry and Persian troops to Greek troops.
  • On the other hand, Christos Romas believes that the Persian troops accompanying Xerxes were a little over 400,000.

Size of the Greek army

According to Herodotus, the Greek army included the following forces:

Units Numbers
Spartans 300
Mantineans 500
Tegeans 500
Arcadian Orchomenos 120
Other Arcadians 1,000
Corinthians 400
Phlians 200
Mycenaeans 80
Thespians 700
Thebans 400
Phocians 1,000
Opuntian Locrians 13
Total 5,200+

To this number must be added 1,000 other Lacedemonians mentioned by Diodorus Siculus and perhaps 800 auxiliary troops from other Greek cities, bringing the total up to 7,000. Diodorus gives 4,000 as the total of Greek troops, and Pausanias 11,200. Modern historians, who usually consider Herodotus more reliable, prefer his claim of 7,000 men.

Date of the battle

Based on information from Herodotus's The Histories Book VII, the date of Ephialtes' betrayal and use of the mountain path by the Immortals can be narrowed to a few days in September of 480 BC, as follows. Not knowing the terrain, they would have needed some form of light, but torches would have given away their intent. They therefore traversed the path when light from the moon would be the greatest - the full moon. In Book VII Herodotus mentions the solar eclipse that occurred at the crossing of the Hellespont by the Persians. By estimating the distance the Persian army could move each day, it can be established that the battle took place around September of 480 BC. Tracing back via a lunar calendar, the date of the betrayal can be narrowed to September 18, 19, or 20, 480 BC.

Monuments at site

Epitaph of Simonides

Epitaph with Simonides' epigram

Simonides composed a well-known epigram, which was engraved as an epitaph on a commemorative stone placed on top of the burial mound of the Spartans at Thermopylae. It is also the hill on which the last of them died. Spyridon Marinatos discovered large numbers of Persian arrowheads there. The original stone is not to be found now. Instead the epitaph was engraved on a new stone erected in 1955. The text is

Template:Polytonic
Template:Polytonic.
Ō xein', angellein Lakedaimoniois hoti tēde
keimetha tois keinōn rhēmasi peithomenoi.

An ancient alternative rendering substitutes πειθόμενοι νομίμοις for ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

The form of this ancient Greek poetry is an elegiac couplet. Some English translations are given in the table below.

Translation Notes
Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by,
that here, obedient to their laws, we lie 		Steven Pressfield, in Gates of Fire
Go, stranger, and to Lacedaemon tell
That here, obeying her behests, we fell. 		George Rawlinson
Go tell the Spartans, thou that passest by,
That here, obedient to their laws, we lie. 		William Lisle Bowels
Go tell the Spartans, passerby,
That here, by Spartan law, we lie 		Frank Miller, in his comic series 300
Go tell the Spartans, you who read;
We took their orders, and are dead. 		Audrey de Sélincourt
Go, tell the Spartans, you who read this stone
That we lie here, and that their will was done. 		?
Go tell them in Sparta, passer-by,
That here, obedient to their laws, we lie. 		Anon.
Go, stranger, and tell the Spartans
That we lie here in obedience to their laws 		?
Stranger, bear this message to the Spartans,
that we lie here obedient to their laws. 		W. R. Paton
Stranger, report this word, we pray, to the Spartans,
that lying Here in this spot we remain, faithfully keeping their laws. 		G. C. Macaulay
Stranger, tell the Spartans,
Here we lie, Obedient. 		?
Stranger! To Sparta say, her faithful band,
Here lie in death, remembering her command. 		Erich von Manstein
Lost Victories
Stranger to the Spartans go, and tell,
How here, obedient to their laws, we fell. 		?
Friend, tell the Spartans that on this hill
We lie obedient to them still.
 Michael Dodson, 1951
Oh foreigner, give a message to the Lacedaemonians
that here lie we, their words obeying. 		?
Tell them in Lacadaemon, passer-by
Obedient to our orders, here we lie 		?
Stranger, tell the Spartans that we behaved as they would wish us to, and are buried here. William Golding, The Hot Gates, 1965

Ruskin said of this epitaph that it was the noblest group of words ever uttered by man. Its purpose is not to attract attention, but rather to show that they fear that Sparta may become suspicious that their soldiers left their duties, and they wished to ask travelers to tell Sparta the truth.

Leonidas monument

File:Afbeelding-Thermopyles monument.jpeg
The modern monument in Thermopylae

Additionally, there is a modern monument at the site, called the "Leonidas Monument" in honor of the Spartan king. It reads simply: "Μολών λαβέ" ("Come and take them!")

Thermopylae in Popular Culture

See Battle of Thermopylae in popular culture.

References

Notes

  1. Bury, J. B. (2000). A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great (4th Revised Edition ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. pp. page 271. ISBN 0333154932. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help); |pages= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  2. E. Friedell, Kulturgeschichte Griechenlands
  3. Herodotus VII,145. He does not use the term "congress" or any ancient equivalent. He only says that they exchanged pledges and consulted together,
  4. Herodotus VII,173
  5. Herodotus VII,175
  6. Lysias, Funeral oration 30, translated by W.R.M. Lamb, M.A.
  7. Bengtson, Hermann (1969). Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die rö̈mische Kaiserzeit. Munich: Beck.
  8. ^ Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek Nation) volume B
  9. Herodotus VII.206 entire.
  11. Herodotus VII.204
  12. (Plutarch, Moralia, 225, 10)
  13. For the insignia with the motto on it see army.gr].
  14. For the insignia with the motto on it, see army.gr.
  15. Diodorus Siculus, Library, XI,6,3
  16. Tegopoulos-Fytrakis dictionary of modern Greek, word:Εφιάλτης
  17. Herodotus VII:223
  18. Herodotus, Book VII, 225.
  19. Reed College's Thermopylae describes the excavations by Spyridon Marinatos.
  20. See Herodotus VII,181
  21. Herodotus 7.35.
  22. Herodotus, VIII, 26
  23. Pausanias 3.14.1
  24. Herodotus VII 175
  25. Herodotus VII,176
  26. Herodotus VII,7
  27. Herodotus VII,60
  28. Herodotus VII,87
  29. Herodotus VII,184
  30. Herodotus VII,186
  31. A History of Greece: From the Time of Solon to 403 B. C. (p. 214) - George Grote, John Malcolm Mitchell, Max Cary, Paul Cartledge
  32. Maurice, F (1930). "The size of the army of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece 480 B.C.". Journal of Hellenic Studies. 50: 115–128. doi:10.2307/626811. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
  33. ^ The Cambridge companion to Herodotus p. 217, Carolyn Dewald, John. Marincola
  34. ^ "The Greek and Persian Wars, 499-386 BC" - Philip De Souza, p. 41
  35. J.A.R. Munro, Cambridge ancient history vol IV 1929
  36. The 7th,8th and 9th book of Herodotus, New York 1971
  37. Papademetriou Konstantinos, Περσικό Πεζικό: Η δύναμη που κατέκτησε τη νοτιοδυτική Ασία (Persian Infantry: The force that conquered southwest Asia), Panzer magazine, Issue 22 September–October 2005, Periscopio editions Athens; Nicholas Sekunda, Simon Chew, The Persian Army (560–330 BC), Elite series, Osprey 1992, Oxford. For an online article see also here.
  38. Η Μάχη του Μαραθώνα, το λυκαυγές της κλασσικής Ελλάδος = The battle of Marathon, the dawn of classical Greece, Πόλεμος και ιστορία = War and History magazine, issue 26 January 2000, Communications editions, Athens
  39. See the metrum site
  40. Η στρατηγική διάσταση των Μηδικών Πολέμων (The strategic dimension of the Persian Wars), Πόλεμος και Ιστορία (War and History) Magazine no.34, October 2000
  41. Οι δυνάμεις των Ελλήνων και των Περσών (The forces of the Greeks and the Persians), E Istorika no.164, 19/10/2002
  42. VII, 202 and also 203.
  43. book XI,5
  44. Pausanias 10,20,2
  45. The text is given in Herodotus' work The Histories (7.228)
  46. The source of this version as well as Cicero's translation into Latin is given in Michael Hendry's site, Curculio.

Further reading

  • Cartledge, Paul. Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World. Woodstock, NY; New York: The Overlook Press, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 1-58567-566-0).
  • Hammond, Nicholas G.L. "Sparta at Thermophylae", Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 45, No. 1. (1996), pp. 1–20.
  • Matthews, Rupert. The Battle of Thermopylae: A Campaign in Context. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing, 2006 (hardback, ISBN 1-86227-325-1).
  • Morris, Ian Macgregor. "To Make a New Thermopylae: Hellenism, Greek Liberation, and the Battle of Thermopylae", Greece & Rome. Vol. 47, No. 2. (2000), pp. 211–230.

See also

External links

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