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| This article focuses on '''ethnic minorities in Iran''' and their related political issues. | |||
| ==Overview== | |||
| ], an ethnic ]<ref>http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=53543<br /> http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HF08Ak02.html<br /> http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FI28Ak01.html</ref>, is the current ] of ], which makes him the Head of the State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.]] | |||
| ] is an ethnically diverse country, and interethnic relations are generally amicable.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | title = Iran:Ethnic groups| encyclopedia =britannica |url=http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-230041/Iran }} </ref> ]s form the majority of the population. However, historically the terms "]" and "]" have refereed to a confederation of all groups native to the ], and the speakers of ], whether located in Iran or not (e.g. ], ], etc.). Therefore, historically, the use of the term "]" has included all the various regional dialects and subgroups of Iran. | |||
| While many ] identify with a secondary ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional background in some way, the primary identity unifying virtually all of these sub-groups is their distinctly ] language, and/or culture. The main ethno-linguistic minority groups in Iran are the ]s, ], ], ]s, ], ], ], and ]. The tribal groups include the ]s, ], ], ], as well as others. Though many of the tribal groups have become urbanized over the decades, some continue to function as rural ]. According to the CIA World Factbook and other Western sources, ethnicity/race in Iran breaks down as follows: Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%. However, these statistics are largely discredited and viewed as flawed by ] themselves,{{Facts|date=February 2007}} because the Western data ignores considerable intermarriage rates over centuries between these groups, and the fact that almost all of these groups speak ] as their first language, and identify with their sub-identity only secondarily.{{Facts|date=October 2007}} | |||
| ], ].]] | |||
| Moreover, there is debate as to what the definition of a ] is. According to Western sources, such as the CIA World Factbook, anyone in ] who associates with a regional linguistic sub-identity is deemed an "ethnic minority", even though the individual speaks ] as their first language, and is ethnically indistinguishable from the rest of ], including ]. Conversely, Western sources erroneously define the "]" "ethnicity" as basically anyone living in ] who does not claim a secondary regional linguistic identity. | |||
| While, many of these ethnic groups have their own ]s, ]s, and often ], their languages and cultures are essentially regional variations of ] and are all native to ], similar to the relationship between ], ], and ] cultures, which are all similar and are native to ]. Despite their overwhelming similarities, in modern times, their differences occasionally emerge as political ambitions, largely as a result of provocation from outside powers. Some of these groups are also ]. For instance, the majority of ], ]s and ] are ] Muslims, while the state religion in Iran is ] Islam. The overwhelming majority of ] and ]s are Shi'a. | |||
| One of the major internal policy challenges during the centuries up until now for most or all Iranian governments has been to find the appropriate and balanced approach to the difficulties and opportunities caused by this diversity, particularly as this internal diversity has often been readily utilized by foreign powers.{{Fact|date=February 2007}} | |||
| ], Iran]] | |||
| According to Professor ]<ref></ref>: | |||
| {{cquote| Thus the mosaic of peoples living in Iran today reflects the central geographical situation of the country throughout history, frequently described as a crossroads of Eurasia. Although many languages and dialects are spoken in the country, and different forms of social life, the dominant influence of the Persian language and culture has created a solidarity complex of great strength. This was revealed in the Iran-Iraq War when Arabs of Khuzestan did not join the invaders, and earlier when Azeris did not rally to their northern cousins after World War II, when Soviet forces occupied Azerbaijan. Likewise the Baluch, Turkmen, Armenians and Kurds, although with bonds to their kinsmen on the other side of borders, are conscious of the power and richness of Persian culture and willing to participate in it.}} | |||
| ==Current policy==<!-- This section is linked from ] --> | |||
| The ] guarantees freedom of cultural expression and linguistic diversity. Many Iranian provinces have ] and ] stations in local language or dialect. School education is in ], the ], but use of ]s is allowed under the ], and ] and culture is studied at universities and other institutions of higher education. Article 15 of the ] states: | |||
| {{cquote|The Official Language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian}} | |||
| Further, Article 19 of the ] adds: | |||
| {{cquote|All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.}} | |||
| Besides Arabic being a mandatory language throughout Iran , ''There is in fact, a considerable publication (book, newspaper, etc.) taking place in the two largest minority languages in the Azerbaijani language and Kurdish, and in the academic year 2004-05 B.A. programmes in the Azerbaijani language and literature (in Tabriz) and in the Kurdish language and literature (in Sanandaj) are offered in Iran for the very first time''.<ref> Annika Rabo, Bo Utas, “The role of the state in West Asia”, Swedish Research institute in Istanbul , 2005. pg 156. Excerpt:"There is in fact, a considerable publication (book, newspaper, etc.) taking place in the two largest minority languages in the Azerbaijani language and Kurdish, and in the academic year 2004-05 B.A. programmes in the Azerbaijani language and literature (in Tabriz) and in the Kurdish language and literature (in Sanandaj) are offered in Iran for the very first time"</ref>. | |||
| ''Regional and local radio programmes are broadcast in Arabic, Armenian, Assyrian, Azerbaijani, Baluchi, Bandari, Farsi, Kurdish, Mazandarani, Pashtu, Turkoman, Turkish and Urdu''.<ref>World of Information Staff, “ Middle East Review 2003 2003: The Economic and Business Report”, Kogan Page, 2003. pp 52-53</ref> | |||
| However, some human rights groups have accused the Iranian government of violating the constitutional guarantees of equality, and the ] has voiced its concern over "increasing discrimination and other human rights violations against ethnic and religious minorities." In a related report, ] says: | |||
| {{cquote|Despite constitutional guarantees of equality, individuals belonging to minorities in Iran, who are believed to number about half of the population of about 70 millions, are subject to an array of discriminatory laws and practices. These include land and property confiscations, denial of state and para-statal employment under the gozinesh criteria and restrictions on social, cultural, linguistic and religious freedoms which often result in other human rights violations such as the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, grossly unfair trials of political prisoners before Revolutionary Courts, corporal punishment and use of the death penalty, as well as restrictions on movement and denial of other civil rights <ref></ref>.}} | |||
| Some Western some columnists and commentators have expressed similar views. John Bradley is of the opinion that: <ref></ref> | |||
| {{cquote|Iran’s ethnic minorities share a widespread sense of discrimination and deprivation toward the central Tehran government. Tehran’s highly centralized development strategy has resulted in a wide socioeconomic gap between the center and the peripheries, where there is also an uneven distribution of power, socioeconomic resources, and sociocultural status. Fueled by these long-standing economic and cultural grievances against Tehran, unrest among the country’s large groups of ethnic minorities is increasing.' The violence in remote regions such as Khuzestan and Baluchistan clearly has ethnic components, but the far greater causes of the poverty and unemployment that vexes members of those ethnic groups are government corruption, inefficiency, and a general sense of lawlessness, which all Iranians, including Persians, must confront.}} | |||
| Nevertheless, representatives of various ethnic minorities have enjoyed a successful political career in ]. For example ] the current Supreme Leader is Azeri and ] the former defense minister is Arab. Many, if not most, members of the national cultural and political elite have mixed ethnic roots, with many Iranians in Tehran of mixed Persian and Azeri origin. Most provincial governors and many members of the local ruling classes and clergy are members of the relevant ethnic groups.{{Fact|date=June 2007}} Many, if not most, members of the national cultural and political elite have mixed ethnic roots. | |||
| Separatist tendencies, led by some groups such as the ] and ] in ], for example, had led to frequent unrest and occasional military crackdown throughout the ] and even to the present . In Iran, Kurds have twice had their own ] regions independent of central government control: The ] in Iran which was the second independent Kurdish state of the ], after the ] in modern ]; and the second time after the ] in ]. | |||
| Jalal Talabani leader of the Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in a 1998 interview, constrasted the situation in Iran with that of Turkey, with respect to Kurds: | |||
| {{cquote|Iran never tried to obliterate the Kurd's identity. There is a province in Iran called Kordestan province. The Iranian name their planes after the province in Iran ". <ref>Interview in the Jordanian newspaper ''al-Ahram al-Yawm'' (amman), December 1, 1998, BBC ME/3398 MED/17</ref>}} | |||
| Similar tendencies have been observed in other provinces such as ], ] (see '']'') and ]. However, many have been suspected of being instigated by foreign colonial powers. | |||
| ==Foreign involvement== | |||
| {{POV-section|date=December 2007}} | |||
| Foreign governments, both before<ref>''The Strangling of Persia: Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue That Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans'', ], 1987 edition. ISBN 093421106X</ref><ref>See ''Russia and Britain in Persia: A study in Imperialism''. F. Kazemzadeh. ].</ref> and after the revolution, have often been accused of attempting to de-stabilize Iran through the formation of ethnic tensions<ref>Iran even went so far as to expel ] from its territory for allegedly inciting ethnic unrest in ]. Link: </ref>, which ignore the ] declaration on the ''"inadmissibility of interference in the Internal Affairs of States"''<ref>] document. Link: </ref>. Western media reports and statements from former ] operatives seem to corroborate such suspicions<ref>See: | |||
| * | |||
| * by Zoltan Grossman | |||
| * | |||
| *</ref> | |||
| While some commentators claim that these ethnic unrests in Iran are not inspired by foreign governments but by the policies of the Iranian government which have been described as discriminatory, others disagree.<ref></ref><ref></ref> Professor ] in fact first unveiled a project for the separation of Khuzestan from Iran, formally proposing the fragmentation or ] of Iran along regional, ethnic, and linguistic lines especially among the Arabs of Khuzestan (the Al-Ahwaz project), the Baluchis (the Pakhtunistan project), the Kurds (the Greater Kurdistan project) and the Azerbaijanis (the Greater Azerbaijan Project).<ref>], ]. ''Hostage to Khomeini''. New York: New Benjamin Franklin House Publishing Company. 1980. ISBN 0-933488-11-4 p.157</ref> | |||
| Some Iranians even accuse Britain of "trying to topple the regime by supporting insurgents and separatists".<ref></ref> Other states however are also believed to be involved in the politics of ethnicity in southern Iran. Professor Efraim Kash traces out the origins of Saddam Hussein's wish to annex ] using the ethnic card<ref>Efraim Karsh, ’The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, Osprey Publishing, 2002, pg 27.</ref>: | |||
| {{cquote|Nor did Saddam’s territorial plans go beyond the Shatt al-Arab and a small portion of the southern region of Khuzestan, where he hoped, the substantial Arab minority would rise against their Iranian ''Oppressors''. This did not happen. The underground Arab organization in Khuzestan proved to be a far cry from the mass movement anticipated by the Iraqis, and Arab masses remained conspicuously indifferent to their would-be liberators}} | |||
| During Iran's 1979 revolution, after sending thousands of Iraqi Shi'ites into exile in Iran and the quick and brutal suppression of Kurdish dissent,{{cquote|Saddam Hussein saw an opportunity to take advantage of Iran 's instability during its political transition and the weakness of its military (which had been decimated through regular purges of military officers once loyal to the former regime) in order to seize Iran 's oil-rich, primarily Arab-populated Khuzestan province. Hussein had wrongly expected the Iranian Arabs to join the Arab Iraqi forces and win a quick victory for Iraq<ref>], ''Iran In A Nutshell'', Enisen Publishing, pg 30</ref>.}} | |||
| During the ], the Soviet Union's "tentacles extended into Iranian Kurdistan".<ref>], ''Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos''. Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. ISBN 1403962758 p.59</ref> As the main supporter of ethnic communist enclaves such as the ], and (later on) as the main arms supplier of ], both the ] and its predecessor the ], made many attempts to divide Iran along ethnic lines. Moscow's policies were specifically devised "inorder to sponsor regional powerbases, if not to annex territory".<ref>] et al., ''Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos''. Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. ISBN 1403962758 p.59</ref> For example, in a cable sent on July 6th 1945 by the ''Central Committee of the ] of the ]'', the Secretary of the Communist Party of ] was instructed as such: | |||
| {{cquote|TOP SECRET | |||
| To Cde. Bagirov | |||
| Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces in Northern Iran | |||
| #Consider it advisable to begin preparatory work to form a national autonomous Azerbaijan district with broad powers within the Iranian state. At the same time develop a separatist movement in the provinces of ], ], Gorgan, and ]. | |||
| #Establish a democratic party in Southern Azerbaijan under the name “Azerbaijan Democratic Party” with the objective of guiding the separatist movement. The creation of the Democratic Party in Southern Azerbaijan is to be done by a corresponding reorganization of the Azerbaijani branch of the People’s Party of Iran and drawing into it supporters of the separatist movement from all strata of the population. | |||
| #Conduct suitable work among the Kurds of northern Iran to draw them into the ] movement to form a national autonomous Kurdish district. | |||
| #Establish in Tabriz a group of responsible workers to guide the ] movement, charging them with coordinating their work with the USSR General Consulate in Tabriz.<ref name="cpsubaghirov">Decree of the Central Committee of CPSU Politbureau on "Measures to Organize a ] Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran", GAPPOD Republic of Azerbaijan, f. 1, op. 89, d. 90, ll. 4-5, obtained by Jamil Hasanli, translated for the ] by Gary Goldberg </ref>}} | |||
| Foreign interest in the ethnic politics of Iran continues to resurface in modern times. In April 2006, ] brought widespread attention to claims of covert operations in Iran when his article in ] revealed special units that were "working with minority groups in Iran, including the Azeris in the north, the Baluchis in the southeast, and the Kurds in the northeast of Iran." According to the report, US troops in Iran were "recruiting local ethnic populations to encourage local tensions that could undermine the regime".<ref>Seymour M. Hersh, the Iran Plan, ''The New Yorker'', April 2006. Link: .</ref> | |||
| Former ] weapons inspector ] has also suggested that the US military is setting up the infrastructure for an enormous military presence in Azerbaijan that will be utilized for a land-based campaign designed to bring down the government in Tehran. He also claims ] paramilitary operatives and US Special Forces are training special Azerbaijani units capable of operating inside Iran in order to mobilize the large Azeri ethnic population within Iran.<ref>], '' Bush courts Azerbaijani President as Part of Build-Up against Iran'', Global Research, May 9, 2006</ref>. | |||
| Statements made by various ] officials have supported such claims. In September 7, 2004, referring to ]'s ethnic minorities, U.S. Secretary of Defense ] stated: | |||
| {{cquote|There are some things internal to Iran that one has to look at. Demographics are one. The Persians are almost a minority in their own country now -- they're like 52% or something. There are many more Azeris in Tabriz than there are in Azerbaijan , just for the record. So that has an effect over time of changing things.<ref>''Iran: A Tougher Nut than North Korea'', September 7, 2004, Link: </ref>}} | |||
| ] officials have further met with minority separatists such as ].<ref>Sharon Behn and Khadija Ismayilova, ''Pentagon officials meet with regime foe'',], 2003.</ref> And both ]<ref></ref> and ]<ref></ref> reacted angrily to a map of "The new Middle East"<ref></ref> by Colonel ], when it was revealed that the map was used in training programs at ]'s Defense College for senior military officers, and National War Academy.<ref></ref><ref></ref><ref></ref><ref></ref><ref></ref><ref></ref><ref></ref> () | |||
| Some representatives of Western governments have even met with leaders of such groups. An example is June 31st 2005, when ] met Rafiq Abu-Sharif, a separatist representative of the ].<ref>Al-Ahwaz website: http://www.alahwaz.com/1364.htm</ref> According to the front's website, Abu-Sharif "submitted a detailed letter to Pettigrew...detailing the ''nationalities'' under oppression in Iran", further meeting with Canadian parliamentaries "to further discuss the matter".<ref></ref><ref>Picture of meeting: http://www.iranian.com/Kasraie/2005/April/Ahwaz/Images/pic1.jpg</ref> | |||
| The ] is also accused of encouraging ethnic divisions in the ].<ref name="atimes"></ref> According to ], former director of ], "Washington should also pay attention to Iran's geographic and ethnic fissures - for example, a large share of Iran's oil is located in the restive Arab-populated regions in Iran's south".<ref>David Eshel, ''Ethnic Opposition on the rise in Iran'', Link: </ref><ref></ref> ], quotes another ] operative describing: | |||
| {{cquote|] was rich in possibilities. Accessible through Turkey and ex-Soviet ], more Westward-looking than most of ], and economically going nowhere, Iran 's richest agricultural province was an ideal covert action theater.}} | |||
| ] continues: | |||
| {{cquote|In his book '''', ] constantly mentally prods methods of destabilizing the Islamic republic, from cultivating high-ranking Azeris to inciting separatist Kurds to fostering divisive clerical rivalry between the holy Shi'ite cities of ] in Iraq and ] in Iran.<ref>], "''Stirring the ethnic pot''", ], April 29, 2005 </ref>}} | |||
| The ] in an article titled "US funds terror groups to sow chaos in Iran" on February 25, 2007, wrote: | |||
| {{cquote|In a move that reflects Washington's growing concern with the failure of diplomatic initiatives, CIA officials are understood to be helping opposition militias among the numerous ethnic minority groups clustered in Iran's border regions. The operations are controversial because they involve dealing with movements that resort to terrorist methods in pursuit of their grievances against the Iranian regime. Funding for their separatist causes comes directly from the CIA's classified budget but is now "no great secret", according to one former high-ranking CIA official in Washington who spoke anonymously to The Sunday Telegraph. His claims were backed by ], a former US state department counter-terrorism agent, who said: "The latest attacks inside Iran fall in line with US efforts to supply and train Iran 's ethnic minorities to destabilise the Iranian regime.<ref>] in Washington DC and ], Sunday Telegraph, 25/02/2007, </ref>}} | |||
| ==Historical notes== | |||
| {{POV-section|date=December 2007}} | |||
| ] in ], Iran.]] | |||
| Iran (then called ]) traditionally was governed over the last few centuries in a fairly decentralised way with much regional and local autonomy. In particular, weaker members of the ] often did not rule much beyond the capital ], a fact exploited by the imperial powers Britain and ] in the ]. For example, when British cartographers, diplomats, and telegraph workers traveled along Iran's southern coast in the early 19th century laden with guns and accompanied by powerful ships, some local chieftains quickly calculated that their sworn allegiance to the Shah in ] with its accompanying tax burden might be optional. When queried, they proclaimed their own local authority.<ref>"Memorandum by the Rev. George Percy Badger on the Pretensions of Persia in Beloochistan and Mekran, drawn up with special reference to Her Claim to Gwadur and Charbar," London, Dec. 23, 1863, FOP 60/287.</ref> However during ] ethnic minorities including ], ]s and ] fought together for establishment of democracy in Iran while they had the power to become independent. | |||
| ], and to a lesser degree his son ], successfully strengthened the central government by using reforms, bribes and suppressions. In particular, the Bakhtiaris, Kurds, and Lurs until the late ] required persistent military measures to keep them under governmental control. According to Tadeusz Swietochowski, in 1930s ] pursued the official policy of ] to assimilate Azerbaijanis and other ethnic minorities in Iran: | |||
| {{cquote|The steps that the Teheran regime took in the 1930s with the aim of Persianization of the Azeris and other minorities appeared to take a leaf from the writings of the reformist-minded intellectuals in the previous decade. In the quest of imposing national homogeneity on the country where half of the population consisted of ethnic minorities, the Pahlavi regime issued in quick succession bans on the use of Azeri on the premises of schools, in theatrical performances, religious ceremonies, and, finally, in the publication of books. Azeri was reduced to the status of a language that only could be spoken and hardly ever written. As the Persianization campaign gained momentum, it drew inspiration from the revivalist spirit of Zoroastrian national glories. There followed even more invasive official practices, such as changing Turkic-sounding geographic names and interference with giving children names other than Persian ones. While cultivating cordial relations with Kemalist Turkey, Reza Shah carried on a forceful de-Turkification campaign in Iran.<ref>Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition. p.122, ISBN 0231070683</ref>}} | |||
| According to Lois Beck in 1980 <ref>Lois Beck. "Revolutionary Iran and Its Tribal Peoples". | |||
| ''MERIP Reports, No. 87,'' (May, 1980), p. 16</ref>: | |||
| {{cquote|''Tribal populations, as well as all ethnic minorities in Iran, were denied many national rights under the Pahlavis and were victims of Persian chauvinism. National education, in which all students were required to read and write in Persian and in which Persian culture and civilization were stressed to the almost complete neglect of the contributions of other population segments, was culturally destructive.''}} | |||
| In studying the history of ethnicity in Iran, it is important to remember that "ethnic nationalism is largely a nineteenth century phenomenon, even if it is fashionable to retroactively extend it."<ref>]. ''Eternal Iran''. Palgrave Macmillan. 2005 ISBN 1-4039-6276-6 p.23</ref> | |||
| ==References== | |||
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| ==See also== | |||
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| ==External links== | |||
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| * by Zoltan Grossman | |||
| * by Chris Zambelis | |||
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| ] | |||
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