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'''Order Number One by Lin Biao''' ({{zh|first=s|s=林副主席第一个号令|t=林副主席第一個號令}}) was |
'''Order Number One by Lin Biao''' ({{zh|first=s|s=林副主席第一个号令|t=林副主席第一個號令}}) was a military emergency order issued by ], then ] and ], on October 18, 1969.<ref name=":0">{{Citation |last=Xu |first=Jinzhou |title=9 Analysis of 1969’s “Order Number One” |date=2015-01-01 |work=Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China |pages=168–193 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004292673/B9789004292673_010.xml |access-date=2025-01-03 |publisher=Brill |language=en |isbn=978-90-04-29267-3}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Lee |first=Hong Yung |date=August 2018 |title=From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China |url=https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9n39p3pc&chunk.id=d0e8966&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e8966&brand=ucpress |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=] |page=108}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web |title=中国共产党大事记·1969年 |trans-title=Major events of the Chinese Communist Party (1969) |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240806101132/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |archive-date=2024-08-06 |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=]}}</ref> The order required all personnel of the ] to enter the emergency state of combat readiness and to prepare for the imminent attack including nuclear strike from the ].<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /> | ||
== History == | == History == | ||
] in 1969.]] | |||
With the ] in the 1960s, the tension between the two countries reached its climax after the ] in March 1969.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":722">{{Cite web |last=Xu |first=Ni |title=1969年, 中苏核危机始末 |trans-title=The nuclear crisis between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220303213408/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |archive-date=2022-03-03 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref> The Soviet Union planned to launch a large-scale nuclear strike against China.<ref name=":722" /><ref name=":32">{{Cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Mark |date=May 12, 2010 |title=Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack |url=https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912221259/https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |archive-date=2015-09-12 |website=]}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-13 |title=USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100516014916/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |archive-date=2010-05-16 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=] |language=en}}</ref> Meanwhile, Lin Biao was named the successor of Chairman ] at the ] (CCP) in April 1969, during which the CCP leaders were also preparing for the war with the Soviet.<ref name=":0" /><ref |
With the ] in the 1960s, the tension between the two countries reached its climax after the ] in March 1969.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":722">{{Cite web |last=Xu |first=Ni |title=1969年, 中苏核危机始末 |trans-title=The nuclear crisis between China and the Soviet Union in 1969 |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220303213408/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85039/7218846.html |archive-date=2022-03-03 |website=] |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":32" /> The ] planned to launch a large-scale nuclear strike against China.<ref name=":722" /><ref name=":32">{{Cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Mark |date=May 12, 2010 |title=Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack |url=https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912221259/https://www.scmp.com/article/714064/nixon-intervention-saved-china-soviet-nuclear-attack |archive-date=2015-09-12 |website=]}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-13 |title=USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100516014916/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |archive-date=2010-05-16 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=] |language=en}}</ref> Meanwhile, Lin Biao was named the successor of Chairman ] at the ] (CCP) in April 1969, during which the CCP leaders were also preparing for the war with the Soviet.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Lamb |first=Stefanie |date=December 2005 |title=Introduction to the Cultural Revolution |url=https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/introduction_to_the_cultural_revolution |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241203035801/https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/introduction_to_the_cultural_revolution |archive-date=2024-12-03 |access-date=2025-01-03 |website=] |language=en}}</ref> | ||
On October 14, 1969, the ] released an urgent evacuation order to the ] in Beijing, requiring all leaders to leave Beijing by October 20 given the high likelihood of imminent Soviet |
On October 14, 1969, the ] released an urgent evacuation order to the ] in ], requiring all leaders to leave Beijing by October 20 given the high likelihood of an imminent Soviet nuclear attack.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":32" /><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |last=Lewis |first=John Wilson |author-link=John Wilson Lewis |last2=Xue |first2=Litai |date=2010 |title=1969年中国安危系于千钧一发——苏联核袭击计划胎死腹中 |trans-title=In 1969, China's security was at a critical moment——Soviet nuclear attack plan aborted |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241202202634/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |archive-date=2024-12-02 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=China News Digest |publisher=领导者 |language=zh}}</ref> Mao travelled to ] and Lin travelled to ], while Premier ] remaining in charge in Beijing.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":32" /><ref name=":10" /> On October 17, Lin Biao issued an emergency order to put all ] personnel on alert; on the next day, Lin's followers including ] released the order as "Order Number One" by Vice President Lin, and all PLA members henceforth entered the emergency state of combat readiness.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Li |first=Chenghong |date=2010 |title=Re-examining Lin Biao's Role in Sino-U.S. Initial Rapprochement |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44288931 |journal=American Journal of Chinese Studies |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=119–130 |issn=2166-0042}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last=Uhalley |first=Stephen |last2=Qiu |first2=Jin |date=1993 |title=The Lin Biao Incident: More Than Twenty Years Later |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2759617 |journal=Pacific Affairs |volume=66 |issue=3 |pages=386–398 |doi=10.2307/2759617 |issn=0030-851X}}</ref> | ||
== Aftermath == | == Aftermath == | ||
After the ] on September 14, 1971, |
After the ] on September 14, 1971, his "Order Number One" in 1969 was viewed by some as an evidence of Lin's intention usurp Mao Zedong's leadership or even a ].<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":3" /> According to some sources, Lin only reported to Mao regarding "Order Number One" on October 19, 1969, after the order had been released to PLA, and upon hearing the report, Mao's immediate comment was that the order should be burned.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":10" /> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||
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* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | * ] | ||
* ] | |||
== References == | == References == | ||
{{reflist|2}} | {{reflist|2}} | ||
] |
Latest revision as of 19:55, 3 January 2025
Order Number One by Lin Biao (simplified Chinese: 林副主席第一个号令; traditional Chinese: 林副主席第一個號令) was a military emergency order issued by Lin Biao, then Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Vice President of the Central Military Commission, on October 18, 1969. The order required all personnel of the People's Liberation Army to enter the emergency state of combat readiness and to prepare for the imminent attack including nuclear strike from the Soviet Union.
History
With the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the tension between the two countries reached its climax after the Zhenbao Island Incident in March 1969. The Soviet Union planned to launch a large-scale nuclear strike against China. Meanwhile, Lin Biao was named the successor of Chairman Mao Zedong at the 9th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in April 1969, during which the CCP leaders were also preparing for the war with the Soviet.
On October 14, 1969, the Central Committee of the CCP released an urgent evacuation order to the Party and state leaders in Beijing, requiring all leaders to leave Beijing by October 20 given the high likelihood of an imminent Soviet nuclear attack. Mao travelled to Wuhan and Lin travelled to Suzhou, while Premier Zhou Enlai remaining in charge in Beijing. On October 17, Lin Biao issued an emergency order to put all PLA personnel on alert; on the next day, Lin's followers including Huang Yongsheng released the order as "Order Number One" by Vice President Lin, and all PLA members henceforth entered the emergency state of combat readiness.
Aftermath
After the Lin Biao Incident on September 14, 1971, his "Order Number One" in 1969 was viewed by some as an evidence of Lin's intention usurp Mao Zedong's leadership or even a coup. According to some sources, Lin only reported to Mao regarding "Order Number One" on October 19, 1969, after the order had been released to PLA, and upon hearing the report, Mao's immediate comment was that the order should be burned.
See also
References
- ^ Xu, Jinzhou (2015-01-01), "9 Analysis of 1969's "Order Number One"", Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China, Brill, pp. 168–193, ISBN 978-90-04-29267-3, retrieved 2025-01-03
- ^ Lee, Hong Yung (August 2018). "From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China". University of California. p. 108. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
- ^ "中国共产党大事记·1969年" [Major events of the Chinese Communist Party (1969)]. People's Net. Archived from the original on 2024-08-06. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
- ^ Xu, Ni. "1969年, 中苏核危机始末" [The nuclear crisis between China and the Soviet Union in 1969]. People's Net (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2022-03-03.
- ^ O'Neill, Mark (May 12, 2010). "Nixon intervention saved China from Soviet nuclear attack". South China Morning Post. Archived from the original on 2015-09-12.
- "USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969". The Telegraph. 2010-05-13. Archived from the original on 2010-05-16. Retrieved 2024-12-29.
- Lamb, Stefanie (December 2005). "Introduction to the Cultural Revolution". Stanford University. Archived from the original on 2024-12-03. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
- ^ Lewis, John Wilson; Xue, Litai (2010). "1969年中国安危系于千钧一发——苏联核袭击计划胎死腹中" [In 1969, China's security was at a critical moment——Soviet nuclear attack plan aborted]. China News Digest (in Chinese). 领导者. Archived from the original on 2024-12-02. Retrieved 2024-12-29.
- Li, Chenghong (2010). "Re-examining Lin Biao's Role in Sino-U.S. Initial Rapprochement". American Journal of Chinese Studies. 17 (2): 119–130. ISSN 2166-0042.
- ^ Uhalley, Stephen; Qiu, Jin (1993). "The Lin Biao Incident: More Than Twenty Years Later". Pacific Affairs. 66 (3): 386–398. doi:10.2307/2759617. ISSN 0030-851X.