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{{Short description|Theory or practice prioritizing pleasure}} {{Short description|Family of views prioritizing pleasure}}
{{Other uses}} {{Other uses}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2021}} {{Use dmy dates|date=January 2021}}
{{Hedonism|expanded=all}}


'''Hedonism''' is a family of philosophical views that prioritize ]. '''Psychological hedonism''' is the theory that the underlying ] of all human behavior is to maximize pleasure and avoid ]. As a form of ], it suggests that people only help others if they expect a personal benefit. '''Axiological hedonism''' is the view that pleasure is the sole source of ]. It asserts that other things, like knowledge and money, only have value insofar as they produce pleasure and reduce pain. This view divides into quantitative hedonism, which only considers the intensity and duration of pleasures, and qualitative hedonism, which holds that the value of pleasures also depends on their quality. The closely related position of '''prudential hedonism''' states that pleasure and pain are the only factors of ]. '''Ethical hedonism''' applies axiological hedonism to ], arguing that people have a ] to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. ] versions assert that the goal is to increase overall happiness for everyone, whereas ] versions state that each person should only pursue their own pleasure. Outside the academic context, ''hedonism'' is a pejorative term for an egoistic lifestyle seeking short-term gratification.
'''Hedonism''' refers to the prioritization of ] in one's lifestyle, actions, or thoughts. The term can include a number of theories or practices across ], ], and ], encompassing both sensory pleasure and more intellectual or personal pursuits, but can also be used in everyday parlance as a pejorative for the ] pursuit of short-term gratification at the expense of others.{{sfn|Weijers}}<ref>{{cite web |title=Hedonism |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hedonism#note-1 |website=www.merriam-webster.com |access-date=30 January 2021 |language=en}}</ref>


Hedonists typically understand pleasure and pain broadly to include ]. While traditionally seen as bodily sensations, contemporary philosophers tend to view them as attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects. Hedonists often use the term '']'' for the balance of pleasure over pain. The ] nature of these phenomena makes it difficult to measure this balance and compare it between different people. The ] and the ] are proposed psychological barriers to the hedonist goal of long-term happiness.
The term originates in ], where '''axiological''' or '''value hedonism''' is the claim that pleasure is the ] of ],{{sfn|Moore|2019}}<ref>{{cite web |title=Psychological hedonism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/psychological-hedonism |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=29 January 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Haybron">{{cite book |last1=Haybron |first1=Daniel M. |title=The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being |year=2008 |publisher=] |page=62 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HAYTPO-8}}</ref> while '''normative''' or '''ethical hedonism''' claims that pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain for oneself or others are the ultimate expressions of ethical good.{{sfn|Weijers}} Applied to ] or what is good for someone, it is the thesis that pleasure and suffering are the only components of well-being.<ref name="Crisp">{{cite web |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |title=Well-Being: 4.1 Hedonism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/#Hed |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2017}}</ref>


As one of the oldest philosophical theories, hedonism was discussed by the ] and ] in ], the ] school in ], and ] in ]. It attracted less attention in the ] but became a central topic in the ] with the rise of utilitarianism. Various criticisms of hedonism emerged in the 20th century, while its proponents suggested new versions to meet these challenges. Hedonism remains relevant to many fields, ranging from ] and ] to ].
'''Psychological''' or '''motivational hedonism''' claims that ] is psychologically determined by desires to increase pleasure and to decrease ].{{sfn|Moore|2019}}{{sfn|Weijers}}


== Types == == Types ==
The term ''hedonism'' refers not to a single theory but to a family of theories about the role of ]. These theories are often categorized into ], ], and ] hedonism depending on whether they study the relation between pleasure and ], ], or right action.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> While these distinctions are common in contemporary philosophy, earlier philosophers did not always clearly differentiate between them and sometimes combined several views in their theories.<ref>{{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism}}</ref> The term ''hedonism'' refers not to a single theory but to a family of theories about the role of ]. These theories are often categorized into ], ], and ] hedonism depending on whether they study the relation between pleasure and ], ], or right action.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> While these distinctions are common in contemporary philosophy, earlier philosophers did not always clearly differentiate between them and sometimes combined several views in their theories.<ref>{{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism}}</ref> The word ''hedonism'' derives from the ] word {{lang|grc|ἡδονή}} ({{transl|grc|]}}), meaning {{gloss|pleasure}}.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hoad|1993|p=213}} | {{harvnb|Cresswell|2021|loc=§ Epicure}} }}</ref> Its earliest known use in the English language is from the 1850s.<ref>{{harvnb|Oxford University Press|2024}}</ref>


=== Psychological hedonism === === Psychological hedonism ===
] was a key advocate of psychological hedonism.<ref name="auto3">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}} | {{harvnb|Schmitter|2021|loc=§ 3. The Classification of the Passions}} | {{harvnb|Abizadeh|2018|p=}} }}</ref>]]

Psychological or motivational hedonism is the view that all human actions aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding ]. It is an empirical view about what motivates people, both on the conscious and the unconscious levels.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1c. Motivational Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Buscicchi|loc=§ 2. Paradoxes of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ IV. Psychological Hedonism}} }}</ref> Psychological hedonism is usually understood as a form of ], meaning that people strive to increase their own happiness. This implies that a person is only motivated to help others if it is in their ] because they expect a personal benefit from it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|2001|p=1326}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ IV. Psychological Hedonism}} }}</ref> As a theory of human motivation, psychological hedonism does not imply that all behavior leads to pleasure. For example, if a person holds mistaken beliefs or lacks necessary skills, they may attempt to produce pleasure but fail to attain the intended outcome.<ref>{{harvnb|Bruton|2024}}</ref> Psychological or motivational hedonism is the view that all human actions aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding ]. It is an empirical view about what motivates people, both on the conscious and the unconscious levels.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1c. Motivational Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Buscicchi|loc=§ 2. Paradoxes of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ IV. Psychological Hedonism}} }}</ref> Psychological hedonism is usually understood as a form of ], meaning that people strive to increase their own happiness. This implies that a person is only motivated to help others if it is in their ] because they expect a personal benefit from it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|2001|p=1326}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ IV. Psychological Hedonism}} }}</ref> As a theory of human motivation, psychological hedonism does not imply that all behavior leads to pleasure. For example, if a person holds mistaken beliefs or lacks necessary skills, they may attempt to produce pleasure but fail to attain the intended outcome.<ref>{{harvnb|Bruton|2024}}</ref>


The standard form of psychological hedonism asserts that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the only sources of all motivation. Some psychological hedonists propose weaker formulations, suggesting that considerations of pleasure and pain influence most actions to some extent or limiting the their role to certain conditions.<ref>{{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1c. Motivational Hedonism}}</ref> For example, reflective hedonism says that human motivation is only driven by pleasure and pain when people actively reflect on the overall consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|2001|p=1326}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism}} }}</ref> Another version is genetic hedonism, which accepts that people desire various things besides pleasure but asserts that each desire has its origin in a desire for pleasure.<ref>{{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ IV. Psychological Hedonism}}</ref> The standard form of psychological hedonism asserts that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the only sources of all motivation. Some psychological hedonists propose weaker formulations, suggesting that considerations of pleasure and pain influence most actions to some extent or limiting their role to certain conditions.<ref>{{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1c. Motivational Hedonism}}</ref> For example, reflective or rationalizing hedonism says that human motivation is only driven by pleasure and pain when people actively reflect on the overall consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|2001|p=1326}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|2005|pp=363–364}} }}</ref> Another version is genetic hedonism, which accepts that people desire various things besides pleasure but asserts that each desire has its origin in a desire for pleasure.<ref>{{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ IV. Psychological Hedonism}}</ref>


Proponents of psychological hedonism often highlight its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, arguing that many desires directly focus on pleasure while the others have an indirect focus by aiming at the means to bring about pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ Why Think Hedonism Is True?}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 1.1 Arguments For Psychological Hedonism}} }}</ref> Critics of psychological hedonism often cite apparent counterexamples in which people act for reasons other than their personal pleasure. Proposed examples include acts of genuine ], such as a soldier sacrificing themselves on the battlefield to save their comrades or a parent wanting their child to be happy. Critics also mention non-altruistic cases, like a desire for ]. It is an open question to what extent these cases can be explained as types of pleasure-seeking behavior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|2001|p=1326}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ Why Think Hedonism Is True?}} }}</ref> Proponents of psychological hedonism often highlight its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, arguing that many desires directly focus on pleasure while the others have an indirect focus by aiming at the means to bring about pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ Why Think Hedonism Is True?}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 1.1 Arguments For Psychological Hedonism}} }}</ref> Critics of psychological hedonism often cite apparent counterexamples in which people act for reasons other than their personal pleasure. Proposed examples include acts of genuine ], such as a soldier sacrificing themselves on the battlefield to save their comrades or a parent wanting their children to be happy. Critics also mention non-altruistic cases, like a desire for ]. It is an open question to what extent these cases can be explained as types of pleasure-seeking behavior.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|2001|p=1326}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Bruton|2024}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ Why Think Hedonism Is True?}} }}</ref>


=== Axiological hedonism === === Axiological hedonism ===
Axiological or evaluative hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of ]. An entity has intrinsic value or is good in itself if its worth does not depend on external factors. Intrinsic value contrasts with ], which is the value of things that lead to other good things. According to axiological hedonism, pleasure is intrinsically valuable because it is good even when it produces no external benefit. Money, by contrast, is only instrumentally good because it can be used to obtain other good things but lacks value apart from these uses. Axiological hedonism asserts that only pleasure has intrinsic value whereas other things only have instrumental value to the extent that they lead to pleasure or the avoidance of pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} }}</ref> The overall value of a thing depends on both its intrinsic and instrumental value. In some cases, even unpleasant things, like a painful surgery, can be overall good, according to axiological hedonism, if their positive consequences make up for the unpleasantness.<ref>{{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}}</ref> Axiological or evaluative hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of ]. An entity has intrinsic value or is good in itself if its worth does not depend on external factors. Intrinsic value contrasts with ], which is the value of things that lead to other good things. According to axiological hedonism, pleasure is intrinsically valuable because it is good even when it produces no external benefit. Money, by contrast, is only instrumentally good because it can be used to obtain other good things but lacks value apart from these uses. Axiological hedonism asserts that only pleasure has intrinsic value whereas other things only have instrumental value to the extent that they lead to pleasure or the avoidance of pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} }}</ref> The overall value of a thing depends on both its intrinsic and instrumental value. In some cases, even unpleasant things, like a painful surgery, can be overall good, according to axiological hedonism, if their positive consequences make up for the unpleasantness.<ref name="auto1">{{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}}</ref>


Prudential hedonism is a form of axiological hedonism that focuses specifically ] or what is good for an individual. It states that pleasure and pain are the sole factors of well-being, meaning that how good a life is for a person only depends on its balance of pleasure over pain. Prudential hedonism allows for the possibility that other things than well-being have intrinsic value, such as beauty or freedom.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|de Bres|2014|loc=}} }}</ref> Prudential hedonism is a form of axiological hedonism that focuses specifically ] or what is good for an individual. It states that pleasure and pain are the sole factors of well-being, meaning that how good a life is for a person only depends on its balance of pleasure over pain. Prudential hedonism allows for the possibility that other things than well-being have intrinsic value, such as beauty or freedom.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|de Bres|2014|loc=}} }}</ref>


According to quantitative hedonism, the intrinsic value of pleasure depends solely on its intensity and duration. Qualitative hedonists hold that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor. They argue, for instance, that subtle pleasures of the mind, like the enjoyment of fine art and philosophy, can be more valuable than simple bodily pleasures, like enjoying food and drink, even if their intensity is lower.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?}} }}</ref> According to quantitative hedonism, the intrinsic value of pleasure depends solely on its intensity and duration. Qualitative hedonists hold that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor. They argue, for instance, that subtle pleasures of the mind, like the enjoyment of fine art and philosophy, can be more valuable than simple bodily pleasures, like enjoying food and drink, even if their intensity is lower.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?}} }}</ref>


Proponents of axiological hedonism often focus on intuitions about the relation between pleasure and value or on the observation that pleasure is desirable.<ref>{{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}}</ref> The idea that most pleasures are valuable in some form is relatively uncontroversial. However, the stronger claim that all pleasures are valuable and that they are the only source of intrinsic value is subject to debate.<ref>{{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}}</ref> Some critics assert that certain pleasures are worthless or even bad, like disgraceful and ] pleasures.<ref>{{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=38–39}}</ref>{{efn|A more controversial objection asserts that all pleasures are bad.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vogt|2018|p=}} | {{harvnb|Aufderheide|2020|p=}} }}</ref>}} A different criticism comes from ], who contend that other things beside pleasure have value. To support the idea that ] is an additional source of value, ] used a ] involving two worlds: one exceedingly beautiful and the other a heap of filth. He argued that the beautiful world is better even if there is no one to enjoy it.<ref>{{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=51–52}}</ref> Another influential thought experiment, proposed by ], involves an ] able to create artificial pleasures. Based on his observation that most people would not want to spend the rest of their lives in this type of pleasant illusion, he argued that hedonism cannot account for the values of authenticity and genuine experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|pp=}} }}</ref>{{efn|Another historically influential argument, first formulated by Socrates, suggests that a pleasurable life void of any higher ] processes, like the life of a happy ], is not the best form of life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2d. The Oyster Example}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=43–44}} }}</ref>}} ]'s ] is an influential ] against hedonism.<ref name="auto4">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|pp=}} }}</ref>]]
Proponents of axiological hedonism often focus on intuitions about the relation between pleasure and value or on the observation that pleasure is desirable.<ref name="auto1"/> The idea that most pleasures are valuable in some form is relatively uncontroversial. However, the stronger claim that all pleasures are valuable and that they are the only source of intrinsic value is subject to debate.<ref>{{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}}</ref> Some critics assert that certain pleasures are worthless or even bad, like disgraceful and ] pleasures.<ref>{{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=38–39}}</ref>{{efn|A more controversial objection asserts that all pleasures are bad.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vogt|2018|p=}} | {{harvnb|Aufderheide|2020|p=}} }}</ref>}} A different criticism comes from ], who contend that other things besides pleasure have value. To support the idea that ] is an additional source of value, ] used a ] involving two worlds: one exceedingly beautiful and the other a heap of filth. He argued that the beautiful world is better even if there is no one to enjoy it.<ref>{{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=51–52}}</ref> Another influential thought experiment, proposed by ], involves an ] able to create artificial pleasures. Based on his observation that most people would not want to spend the rest of their lives in this type of pleasant illusion, he argued that hedonism cannot account for the values of authenticity and genuine experience.<ref name="auto4"/>{{efn|Another historically influential argument, first formulated by Socrates, suggests that a pleasurable life void of any higher ] processes, like the life of a happy ], is not the best form of life.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2d. The Oyster Example}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=43–44}} }}</ref>}}


=== Ethical hedonism === === Ethical hedonism ===
] developed a nuanced form of ethical hedonism, arguing that a ] cultivated through moderation leads to the greatest overall happiness.<ref name="auto2">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2c. Epicurus}} }}</ref>]]

Ethical or ] hedonism is the thesis that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the highest ] principles of human behavior.{{efn|Some definitions do not distinguish between ethical and axiological hedonism, and define ethical hedonism in terms of intrinsic values rather than right action.<ref>{{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=Lead section, § 2. Ethical Hedonism}}</ref>}} It implies that other moral considerations, like ], ], or ], are relevant only to the extent that they influence pleasure and pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ II. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> Ethical or ] hedonism is the thesis that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the highest ] principles of human behavior.{{efn|Some definitions do not distinguish between ethical and axiological hedonism, and define ethical hedonism in terms of intrinsic values rather than right action.<ref>{{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=Lead section, § 2. Ethical Hedonism}}</ref>}} It implies that other moral considerations, like ], ], or ], are relevant only to the extent that they influence pleasure and pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ II. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref>


Theories of ethical hedonism can be divided into egoistic and ] theories. Egoistic hedonism says that each person should only pursue their own pleasure. According to this controversial view, a person only has a moral reason to care about the happiness of others if this happiness impacts their own well-being. For example, if a person would feel guilty about harming others, they have a reason not to do so. However, a person would be free to harm others, and would even be morally required to, if they overall benefit from it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1e. Hedonistic Egoism}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ II. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> Theories of ethical hedonism can be divided into egoistic and ] theories. Egoistic hedonism says that each person should only pursue their own pleasure. According to this controversial view, a person only has a moral reason to care about the happiness of others if this happiness impacts their own well-being. For example, if a person feels guilty about harming others, they have a reason not to do so. However, a person would be free to harm others, and would even be morally required to, if they overall benefit from it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1e. Hedonistic Egoism}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ II. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref>


Utilitarian hedonism, also called ''classical utilitarianism'', asserts that everyone's happiness matters. It says that a person should maximize the sum total of happiness of everybody affected by their actions. This sum-total includes the person's own happiness, but it is only one factor among many without any special preference compared to the happiness of others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1f. Hedonistic Utilitarianism}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ II. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> As a result, utilitarian hedonism sometimes requires of people to forego their own enjoyment to benefit others. For example, philosopher ] argues that good earners should donate a significant portion of their income to charities since this money can produce more happiness for people in need.<ref>{{harvnb|Singer|2016|pp=163, 165}}</ref> Utilitarian hedonism, also called ''classical utilitarianism'', asserts that everyone's happiness matters. It says that a person should maximize the sum total of happiness of everybody affected by their actions. This sum total includes the person's own happiness, but it is only one factor among many without any special preference compared to the happiness of others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1f. Hedonistic Utilitarianism}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ II. Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> As a result, utilitarian hedonism sometimes requires of people to forego their own enjoyment to benefit others. For example, philosopher ] argues that good earners should donate a significant portion of their income to charities since this money can produce more happiness for people in need.<ref>{{harvnb|Singer|2016|pp=163, 165}}</ref>


Ethical hedonism is often understood as a form of ], which asserts that an act is right if it has the best consequences. It is typically combined with axiological hedonism, which links the intrinsic value of consequences to pleasure and pain. As a result, the arguments for and against axiological hedonism also apply to ethical hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frykhol|Rutherford|2013|p=}} | {{harvnb|Robertson|Walter|2013|p=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1e. Hedonistic Egoism, § 1f. Hedonistic Utilitarianism}} }}</ref> Ethical hedonism is often understood as a form of ], which asserts that an act is right if it has the best consequences. It is typically combined with axiological hedonism, which links the intrinsic value of consequences to pleasure and pain. As a result, the arguments for and against axiological hedonism also apply to ethical hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frykhol|Rutherford|2013|p=}} | {{harvnb|Robertson|Walter|2013|p=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1e. Hedonistic Egoism, § 1f. Hedonistic Utilitarianism}} }}</ref>
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=== Pleasure and pain === === Pleasure and pain ===
{{main|Pleasure|Pain}} {{main|Pleasure|Pain}}
]'' by ], 1894.]] ]'' by ], 1894]]
Pleasure and pain are fundamental experiences about what is attractive and aversive, influencing how people feel, think, and act.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pallies|2021|pp=887–888}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|2009|pp=704–705}} }}</ref> They play a central role in all forms of hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} }}</ref> Both pleasure and pain come in degrees corresponding to their intensity. They are typically understood as a continuum ranging from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees.<ref>{{harvnb|Alston|2006|loc=§ Demarcation of the Topic}}</ref> However, some hedonists reject the idea that pleasure and pain form a symmetric pair and suggest instead that avoiding pain is more important than producing pleasure.<ref>{{harvnb|Shriver|2014|pp=135–137}}</ref> Pleasure and pain are fundamental experiences about what is attractive and aversive, influencing how people feel, think, and act.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pallies|2021|pp=887–888}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|2009|pp=704–705}} }}</ref> They play a central role in all forms of hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} }}</ref> Both pleasure and pain come in degrees corresponding to their intensity. They are typically understood as a continuum ranging from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees.<ref>{{harvnb|Alston|2006|loc=§ Demarcation of the Topic}}</ref> However, some hedonists reject the idea that pleasure and pain form a symmetric pair and suggest instead that avoiding pain is more important than producing pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shriver|2014|pp=135–137}} | {{harvnb|Luper|2009|p=}} }}</ref>


The nature of pleasure and pain is disputed and affects the plausibility of various versions of hedonism. In everyday language, these concepts are often understood in a narrow sense associated with specific phenomena, like the pleasure of food and sex or the pain of an injury.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 4b. Pleasure as Sensation, § 4d. Pleasure as Pro-Attitude}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016a|loc=§ Note 1}} }}</ref> However, hedonists usually take a wider perspective in which pleasure and pain cover any positive or negative experiences. In this broad sense, anything that feels good is a pleasure, including the joy of watching a sunset, whereas anything that feels bad is a pain, including the sorrow of losing a loved one.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pallies|2021|pp=887–888}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Alston|2006|loc=§ Demarcation of the Topic}} }}</ref> A traditionally influential position says that pleasure and pain are specific bodily sensations, similar to the sensations of hot and cold. A more common view in contemporary philosophy holds that pleasure and pain are attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects. This view implies that they do not have a specific location in the body and do not arise in isolation since they are always directed at an object that people enjoy or suffer.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} | {{harvnb|Pallies|2021|pp=887–888}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 4b. Pleasure as Sensation, § 4d. Pleasure as Pro-Attitude}} }}</ref> The nature of pleasure and pain is disputed and affects the plausibility of various versions of hedonism. In everyday language, these concepts are often understood in a narrow sense associated with specific phenomena, like the pleasure of food and sex or the pain of an injury.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 4b. Pleasure as Sensation, § 4d. Pleasure as Pro-Attitude}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016a|loc=§ Note 1}} }}</ref> However, hedonists usually take a wider perspective in which pleasure and pain cover any positive or negative experiences. In this broad sense, anything that feels good is a pleasure, including the joy of watching a sunset, whereas anything that feels bad is a pain, including the sorrow of losing a loved one.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pallies|2021|pp=887–888}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Katz|2016|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Alston|2006|loc=§ Demarcation of the Topic}} }}</ref> A traditionally influential position says that pleasure and pain are specific bodily sensations, similar to the sensations of hot and cold. A more common view in contemporary philosophy holds that pleasure and pain are attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects.{{efn|In this context the term "pro-attitude" is also used.<ref>{{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 4b. Pleasure as Sensation}}</ref>}} This view implies that they do not have a specific location in the body and do not arise in isolation since they are always directed at an object that people enjoy or suffer.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Pallies|2021|pp=887–888}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 4b. Pleasure as Sensation, § 4d. Pleasure as Pro-Attitude}} }}</ref>


==== Measurement ==== ==== Measurement ====
Both philosophers and psychologists are interested in methods of measuring pleasure and pain to guide ] and gain a deeper understanding of their causes. A common approach is to use self-report ]s in which people are asked to quantify how pleasant or unpleasant an experience is. For example, some questionnaires use a nine-point scale from -4 for the most unpleasant experiences, to +4 for the most pleasant ones. Some methods rely on memory and ask individuals to retrospectively assess their experiences. A different approach is for individuals to evaluate their experiences while they are happening to avoid ] and inaccuracies introduced by memory.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Alston|2006|loc=§ The Measurement of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|2009|pp=706–707}} | {{harvnb|Bartoshuk|2014|pp=91–93}} | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|2024|pp=51–58}} }}</ref> Both philosophers and psychologists are interested in methods of measuring pleasure and pain to guide ] and gain a deeper understanding of their causes. A common approach is to use self-report ]s in which people are asked to quantify how pleasant or unpleasant an experience is. For example, some questionnaires use a nine-point scale from -4 for the most unpleasant experiences, to +4 for the most pleasant ones. Some methods rely on memory and ask individuals to retrospectively assess their experiences. A different approach is for individuals to evaluate their experiences while they are happening to avoid ] and inaccuracies introduced by memory.<ref name="auto">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Alston|2006|loc=§ The Measurement of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|2009|pp=706–707}} | {{harvnb|Bartoshuk|2014|pp=91–93}} | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|2024|pp=51–58}} }}</ref>


In either form, the measurement of pleasure and pain poses various challenges. As a highly ] phenomenon, it is difficult to establish a standardized metric. Moreover, asking people to rate their experiences using an artificially constructed scale may not accurately reflect their subjective experiences. A closely related problem concerns comparisons between individuals since different people may use the scales differently and thus arrive at different values even if they had similar experiences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Alston|2006|loc=§ The Measurement of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Johnson|2009|pp=706–707}} | {{harvnb|Bartoshuk|2014|pp=91–93}} | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|2024|pp=51–58}} }}</ref> ] avoid some of these challenges by using ] techniques such as ] and ]. However, this approach comes with new difficulties of its own since the neurological basis of happiness is not yet fully understood.<ref>{{harvnb|Suardi|Sotgiu|Costa|Cauda|2016|pp=383–385}}</ref> In either form, the measurement of pleasure and pain poses various challenges. As a highly ] phenomenon, it is difficult to establish a standardized metric. Moreover, asking people to rate their experiences using an artificially constructed scale may not accurately reflect their subjective experiences. A closely related problem concerns comparisons between individuals since different people may use the scales differently and thus arrive at different values even if they had similar experiences.<ref name="auto"/> ] avoid some of these challenges by using ] techniques such as ] and ]. However, this approach comes with new difficulties of its own since the neurological basis of happiness is not yet fully understood.<ref>{{harvnb|Suardi|Sotgiu|Costa|Cauda|2016|pp=383–385}}</ref>


Based on the idea that individual experiences of pleasure and pain can be quantified, ] proposed the ] as a method to combine various episodes to arrive at their total contribution to happiness. This makes it possible to quantitatively compare different courses of action based on the experiences they produce to choose the course with the highest overall contribution to happiness. Bentham considered several factors for each pleasurable experience: its intensity and duration, the likelihood that it occurs, its temporal distance, the likelihood that it causes further experiences of pleasure and pain, and the number of people affected. Some simplified versions of the hedonic calculus focus primarily on what is intrinsically valuable to a person and only consider two factors: intensity and duration.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} | {{harvnb|Bowie|Simon|1998|p=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3a. Bentham}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|2017|loc=Lead section, § Dimensions of the Hedonistic Calculus}} }}</ref> Based on the idea that individual experiences of pleasure and pain can be quantified, ] proposed the ] as a method to combine various episodes to arrive at their total contribution to happiness. This makes it possible to quantitatively compare different courses of action based on the experiences they produce to choose the course with the highest overall contribution to happiness. Bentham considered several factors for each pleasurable experience: its intensity and duration, the likelihood that it occurs, its temporal distance, the likelihood that it causes further experiences of pleasure and pain, and the number of people affected. Some simplified versions of the hedonic calculus focus primarily on what is intrinsically valuable to a person and only consider two factors: intensity and duration.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} | {{harvnb|Bowie|Simon|1998|p=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3a. Bentham}} | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2013|loc=§ What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|2017|loc=Lead section, § Dimensions of the Hedonistic Calculus}} }}</ref>
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Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|p=}} }}</ref> According to a common view, pleasure is one component of well-being. It is controversial whether it is the only factor and what other factors there are, such as health, knowledge, and friendship. Another approach focuses on desires, saying that well-being consists in the satisfaction of desires.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=§ 1. The Concept, § 4. Theories of Well-being}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|pp=}} }}</ref> The view that the balance of pleasure over pain is the only source of well-being is called ''prudential hedonism''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=§ 4.1 Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Hughes|2014|p=}} }}</ref> Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|p=}} }}</ref> According to a common view, pleasure is one component of well-being. It is controversial whether it is the only factor and what other factors there are, such as health, knowledge, and friendship. Another approach focuses on desires, saying that well-being consists in the satisfaction of desires.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=§ 1. The Concept, § 4. Theories of Well-being}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|pp=}} }}</ref> The view that the balance of pleasure over pain is the only source of well-being is called ''prudential hedonism''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2021|loc=§ 4.1 Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Hughes|2014|p=}} }}</ref>


Eudaimonia is a form of well-being rooted in ], serving as a foundation of many forms of hedonism during this period. ] understood eudaimonia as a type of flourishing in which a person is happy by leading a fulfilling life and manifesting their inborn capacities. Ethical theories based on eudaimonia are typically not pure versions of hedonism since they combine an interest in long-term happiness with a form of ] advocating an active lifestyle focused on ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lelkes|2021|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=15–16}} | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|pp=364–365}} }}</ref> Eudaimonia is a form of well-being rooted in ], serving as a foundation of many forms of moral philosophy during this period. ] understood eudaimonia as a type of flourishing in which a person is happy by leading a fulfilling life and manifesting their inborn capacities. Ethical theories based on eudaimonia often share parallels with hedonism, like an interest in long-term happiness, but are distinguished from it by their emphasis of ], advocating an active lifestyle focused on ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lelkes|2021|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=15–16}} | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|pp=364–365}} }}</ref>


=== Paradox of hedonism and hedonic treadmill === === Paradox of hedonism and hedonic treadmill ===
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==History== ==History==

===Etymology===
The term ''hedonism'' derives from the ] ''hēdonismos'' ({{Langx|grc|ἡδονισμός|lit=delight|label=none}}; from {{Langx|grc|ἡδονή|lit=pleasure|label=none|translit=]}}), which is a ] from ] ''swéh₂dus'' through ]
''hēdús'' ({{Langx|grc|ἡδύς|lit=pleasant to the taste or smell, sweet|label=none}}) or ''hêdos'' ({{Langx|grc|ἧδος|lit=delight, pleasure|label=none}})
+ suffix ''-ismos'' (-ισμός, ']').

=== Ancient === === Ancient ===
] is often seen as the first proponent of philosophical hedonism.]] ] is often seen as the first proponent of philosophical hedonism.]]


Hedonism is one of the oldest philosophical theories and some interpreters trace it back to the ], written around 2100–2000 BCE.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Porter|2001|p=}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Forgas|Baumeister|2018|loc=}} | {{harvnb|Ackermann|Schroeder|Terry|Upshur|2008|p=161}} }}</ref> A central topic in ], ] (435-356 BCE) is usually identified as its earliest philosophical proponent. As a student of ] ({{circa|469–399 BCE}}),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=178}}</ref> he formulated a hedonistic egoism, arguing that personal pleasure is the highest good. He and the school of ] he inspired focused on the gratification of immediate sensory pleasures with little concern for long-term consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2b. Aritippus and the Cyrenaics}} | {{harvnb|Brandt|2006|p=255}} | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|p=364}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} }}</ref> ] ({{circa|428–347 BCE}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=156}}</ref> critiqued this view and proposed a more balanced pursuit of pleasure that aligns with virtue and rationality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|p=364}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref> Following a similar approach, ] (384–322 BCE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=13}}</ref> associated pleasure with ] or the realization of natural human capacities, like reason.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|p=365}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref> Hedonism is one of the oldest philosophical theories and some interpreters trace it back to the ], written around 2100–2000 BCE.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Porter|2001|p=}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Forgas|Baumeister|2018|loc=}} | {{harvnb|Ackermann|Schroeder|Terry|Upshur|2008|p=161}} }}</ref> A central topic in ], ] (435-356 BCE) is usually identified as its earliest philosophical proponent. As a student of ] ({{circa|469–399 BCE}}),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=178}}</ref> he formulated a hedonistic egoism, arguing that personal pleasure is the highest good. He and the school of ] he inspired focused on the gratification of immediate sensory pleasures with little concern for long-term consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2b. Aristippus and the Cyrenaics}} | {{harvnb|Brandt|2006|p=255}} | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|p=364}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|pp=}} }}</ref> ] ({{circa|428–347 BCE}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=156}}</ref> critiqued this view and proposed a more balanced pursuit of pleasure that aligns with virtue and rationality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|p=364}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref> Following a similar approach, ] (384–322 BCE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=13}}</ref> associated pleasure with ] or the realization of natural human capacities, like reason.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Taylor|2005|p=365}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref>


] (341–271 BCE) developed a nuanced form of hedonism that contrasts with the indulgence in immediate gratification proposed by the Cyrenaics. He argued that excessive desires and anxiety result in suffering, suggesting instead that people practice moderation, cultivate a ], and avoid pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2c. Epicurus}} }}</ref> Following ] ({{circa|446—366 BCE}}), the ] warned against the pursuit of pleasure, viewing it as an obstacle to freedom.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Piering|loc=§ 2. Basic Tenets}} }}</ref> The ] also dismissed a hedonistic lifestyle, focusing on virtue and integrity instead of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Pigliucci|loc=§ 1d. Debates with Other Hellenistic Schools}} }}</ref> ] ({{circa|99–55 BCE}}) further expanded on Epicureanism, highlighting the importance of overcoming obstacles to personal happiness, such as the fear of death.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Simpson|loc=§ 2b.iii. Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Ewin|2002|p=}} | {{harvnb|Asmis|2018|pp=}} }}</ref> ] (341–271 BCE) developed a nuanced form of hedonism that contrasts with the indulgence in immediate gratification proposed by the Cyrenaics. He argued that excessive desires and anxiety result in suffering, suggesting instead that people practice moderation, cultivate a ], and avoid pain.<ref name="auto2"/> Following ] ({{circa|446—366 BCE}}), the ] warned against the pursuit of pleasure, viewing it as an obstacle to freedom.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Piering|loc=§ 2. Basic Tenets}} }}</ref> The ] also dismissed a hedonistic lifestyle, focusing on virtue and integrity instead of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Pigliucci|loc=§ 1d. Debates with Other Hellenistic Schools}} }}</ref> ] ({{circa|99–55 BCE}}) further expanded on Epicureanism, highlighting the importance of overcoming obstacles to personal happiness, such as the fear of death.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Simpson|loc=§ 2b.iii. Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Ewin|2002|p=}} | {{harvnb|Asmis|2018|pp=}} }}</ref>


In ], the ] school developed a hedonistic egoism, starting between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. Their belief in the ] or an ] led them to advocate for enjoying life in the present to the fullest. Many other Indian traditions rejected this view and recommended for a more ascetic lifestyle, a tendency common among ], ], and ] schools of thought.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2a. Cārvāka}} | {{harvnb|Riepe|1956|pp=551–552}} | {{harvnb|Turner-Lauck Wernicki|loc=§ 2b. Materialism as Heresy}} | {{harvnb|Wilson|2015|loc=§ Introduction}} }}</ref> In ancient China, ] ({{circa|440–360 BCE}}){{efn|Some interpreters question whether Yang Zhu is a historical or a mythical figure.<ref>{{harvnb|Norden|Ivanhoe|2023|p=}}</ref>}} argued that it is human nature to follow self-interest and satisfy personal desires. His hedonistic egoism inspired the subsequent school of ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Roetz|1993|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Norden|Ivanhoe|2023|p=}} }}</ref> In ], the ] school developed a hedonistic egoism, starting between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. Their belief in the ] or an ] led them to advocate for enjoying life in the present to the fullest. Many other Indian traditions rejected this view and recommended a more ascetic lifestyle, a tendency common among ], ], and ] schools of thought.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 2a. Cārvāka}} | {{harvnb|Riepe|1956|pp=551–552}} | {{harvnb|Turner-Lauck Wernicki|loc=§ 2b. Materialism as Heresy}} | {{harvnb|Wilson|2015|loc=§ Introduction}} }}</ref> In ancient China, ] ({{circa|440–360 BCE}}){{efn|Some interpreters question whether Yang Zhu is a historical or a mythical figure.<ref>{{harvnb|Norden|Ivanhoe|2023|p=}}</ref>}} argued that it is human nature to follow self-interest and satisfy personal desires. His hedonistic egoism inspired the subsequent school of ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Roetz|1993|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Norden|Ivanhoe|2023|p=}} }}</ref>


=== Medieval === === Medieval ===
⚫ Hedonist philosophy received less attention in ].<ref>{{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}}</ref> The early Christian philosopher ] (354–430 CE),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=16}}</ref> was critical of the hedonism found in ancient Greek philosophy, warning of the dangers of earthly pleasures as obstacles to a spiritual life dedicated to God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rist|1994|p=}} | {{harvnb|Alexander|Shelton|2014|p=}} }}</ref> ] (1225–1274 CE) developed a nuanced perspective on hedonism, characterized by some interpreters as spiritual hedonism. He held that humans are naturally inclined to seek happiness, arguing that the only way to truly satisfy this inclination is through a ] of God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dewan|2008|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Wieland|2002|p=}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|p=}} }}</ref> In ], the problem of pleasure played a central role in the philosophy of ] ({{circa|864—925 or 932 CE}}). Similar to Epicureanism, he recommended a life of moderation avoiding the extremes of excess and ].<ref name="auto5">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goodman|2020|pp=387–389}} | {{harvnb|Adamson|2021|loc=§ 3. Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Adamson|2021a|pp=5–6, 177–178}} }}</ref>{{efn|It is controversial whether al-Razi's position is a form of hedonism.<ref name="auto5"/>}} Both ] ({{circa|878–950 CE}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=63}}</ref> and ] (980–1037 CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=19}}</ref> asserted that a form of intellectual happiness, reachable only in the afterlife, is the highest human good.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Germann|2021|loc=§ 2.1 Happiness and the afterlife}} | {{harvnb|McGinnis|2010|pp=}} }}</ref>
] developed a moderate hedonism.]]

⚫ Hedonist philosophy received less attention in ].<ref>{{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}}</ref> The early Christian philosopher ] (354–430 CE),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=16}}</ref> was critical of the hedonism found in ancient Greek philosophy, warning of the dangers of earthly pleasures as obstacles to a spiritual life dedicated to God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rist|1994|p=}} | {{harvnb|Alexander|Shelton|2014|p=}} }}</ref> ] (1225–1274 CE) developed a nuanced perspective on hedonism, characterized by some interpreters as spiritual hedonism. He held that humans are naturally inclined to seek happiness, arguing that the only way to truly satisfy this inclination is through a ] of God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dewan|2008|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Wieland|2002|p=}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|2004|p=}} }}</ref> In ], ] ({{circa|864—925 or 932 CE}}) was influenced by Epicureanism and defended a subtle form of hedonism, emphasizing moderation and the avoidance of excess.<ref>{{harvnb|Goodman|2020|pp=387–389}}</ref> Both ] ({{circa|878–950 CE}})<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=63}}</ref> and ] (980–1037 CE)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=19}}</ref> asserted that a form of intellectual happiness, reachable only in the afterlife, is the highest human good.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Germann|2021|loc=§ 2.1 Happiness and the afterlife}} | {{harvnb|McGinnis|2010|pp=}} }}</ref>


=== Modern and contemporary === === Modern and contemporary ===
At the transition to the early modern period, ] ({{circa|1406–1457}}) synthesized Epicurean hedonism with ], suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues.<ref>{{harvnb|Nauta|2021|loc=§ 4. Moral Philosophy}}</ref> Hedonism gained prominence during the ].<ref>{{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}}</ref> According to ]'s (1588–1679)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=88}}</ref> psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}} | {{harvnb|Schmitter|2021|loc=§ 3. The Classification of the Passions}} | {{harvnb|Abizadeh|2018|p=}} }}</ref> ] (1632-1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sheridan|2024|loc=§ 1.1 The puzzle of Locke’s moral philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Rossiter|2016|pp=203, 207–208}} }}</ref> ] (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|1992|pp=211–214}} | {{harvnb|Garrett|2023|loc=§ 5. Self-Love and Benevolence}} }}</ref> According to ] (1711–1776),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=91}}</ref> pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}} | {{harvnb|Dorsey|2015|pp=245–246}} | {{harvnb|Merivale|2018|loc=}} }}</ref> The ] novels of ] (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or ].<ref>{{harvnb|Airaksinen|1995|pp=11, 78–80}}</ref> At the transition to the early modern period, ] ({{circa|1406–1457}}) synthesized Epicurean hedonism with ], suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues.<ref>{{harvnb|Nauta|2021|loc=§ 4. Moral Philosophy}}</ref> Hedonism gained prominence during the ].<ref>{{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}}</ref> According to ]'s (1588–1679)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=88}}</ref> psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation.<ref name="auto3"/> ] (1632–1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sheridan|2024|loc=§ 1.1 The puzzle of Locke’s moral philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Rossiter|2016|pp=203, 207–208}} }}</ref> ] (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|1992|pp=211–214}} | {{harvnb|Garrett|2023|loc=§ 5. Self-Love and Benevolence}} }}</ref> According to ] (1711–1776),<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=91}}</ref> pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blakemore|Jennett|2001|loc=§ Pleasure and the Enlightenment}} | {{harvnb|Dorsey|2015|pp=245–246}} | {{harvnb|Merivale|2018|loc=}} }}</ref> The ] novels of ] (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or ].<ref>{{harvnb|Airaksinen|1995|pp=11, 78–80}}</ref>


] formulated a universal form of hedonism that takes everyone's pleasure into account.]] ] formulated a universal form of hedonism that takes everyone's pleasure into account.]]
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] (1748–1832)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=25}}</ref> developed an influential form of hedonism known as ]. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the ] to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3a. Bentham}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=666}} }}</ref> His student ] (1806–1873)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=132}}</ref> feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3b. Mill}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref> ] (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=26–27}} | {{harvnb|Schultz|2024|loc=Lead section, § 2.2 Reconstruction and Reconciliation}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref> ] (1748–1832)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=25}}</ref> developed an influential form of hedonism known as ]. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the ] to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3a. Bentham}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=666}} }}</ref> His student ] (1806–1873)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=132}}</ref> feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Weijers|loc=§ 3b. Mill}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref> ] (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=26–27}} | {{harvnb|Schultz|2024|loc=Lead section, § 2.2 Reconstruction and Reconciliation}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} }}</ref>


] (1844–1900)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=144}}</ref> rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hassan|2023|p=}} | {{harvnb|Faustino|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by ] (1838–1917).<ref>{{harvnb|Kriegel|2018|p=}}</ref> He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objects{{efn|According to this view, for instance, the pleasure of reading a novel is a positive attitude towards the novel.<ref>{{harvnb|Massin|2013|pp=}}</ref>}}{{em dash}}a position also later defended by ] (1916–1999).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=668}} | {{harvnb|Massin|2013|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} }}</ref> ] (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early ]. He stated that the ] describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the ] represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wallwork|1991|p=}} | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|p=}} }}</ref> ] (1844–1900)<ref>{{harvnb|Dehsen|2013|p=144}}</ref> rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hassan|2023|p=}} | {{harvnb|Faustino|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism}} }}</ref> An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by ] (1838–1917).<ref>{{harvnb|Kriegel|2018|p=}}</ref> He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objects{{efn|According to this view, for instance, the pleasure of reading a novel is a positive attitude towards the novel.<ref>{{harvnb|Massin|2013|pp=}}</ref>}}{{em dash}}a position also later defended by ] (1916–1999).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2001|p=668}} | {{harvnb|Massin|2013|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure}} }}</ref> ] (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early ]. He stated that the ] describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the ] represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wallwork|1991|p=}} | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|p=}} }}</ref>


The 20th century saw various criticisms of hedonism.<ref>{{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=43–44}}</ref> ] (1873–1958)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=443}}</ref> rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his ], there are other sources, such as ] and ],<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2021|loc=§ 4. The Ideal}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.3 Other Arguments Against Ethical Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=43}} }}</ref> a criticism also shared by ] (1877–1971).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Skelton|2022|loc=§ 4.2 The Good}} | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=43}} }}</ref> Both ] (1887–1971) and ] (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Hurka|2011a|p=73}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2002|p=616}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|p=38}} }}</ref> ] (1938–2002) used his ] thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Heathwood|2015|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|pp=}} }}</ref> The 20th century saw various criticisms of hedonism.<ref>{{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=43–44}}</ref> ] (1873–1958)<ref>{{harvnb|Bunnin|Yu|2009|p=443}}</ref> rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his ], there are other sources, such as ] and ],<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hurka|2021|loc=§ 4. The Ideal}} | {{harvnb|Gosling|1998|loc=§ 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Moore|2019|loc=§ 2.3 Other Arguments Against Ethical Hedonism}} | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=43}} }}</ref> a criticism also shared by ] (1877–1971).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Skelton|2022|loc=§ 4.2 The Good}} | {{harvnb|Mason|2023|loc=§ 1.1 Foundational and Non-foundational Pluralism}} | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=43}} }}</ref> Both ] (1887–1971) and ] (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Hurka|2011a|p=73}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2002|p=616}} | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|p=38}} }}</ref> ] (1938–2002) used his ] thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality.<ref name="auto4"/>


In response to these and similar criticisms, ] (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=120–123}} | {{harvnb|McLeod|2017|loc=}} }}</ref> ] (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about ].{{efn|Singer was initially a proponent of ] but has shifted his position in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rice|2015|p=}} | {{harvnb|Schultz|2017|p=}} }}</ref>}} He has advocated ], relying on ] and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schultz|2017|p=}} | {{harvnb|Fesmire|2020|loc=}} }}</ref> Inspired by the philosophy of ] (1913–1960), ] (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McClellan|2015|pp=xviii–xx}} | {{harvnb|Bishop|2020|pp=}} }}</ref> ] (1959–present) has developed a ] version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from ] to ], to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Adams IV|2004|p=}} | {{harvnb|Ross|2020|p=}} }}</ref> The emergence of ] at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=44}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2006|pp=}} }}</ref> In response to these and similar criticisms, ] (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Feldman|2004|pp=120–123}} | {{harvnb|McLeod|2017|loc=}} }}</ref> ] (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about ].{{efn|Singer was initially a proponent of ] but has shifted his position in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rice|2015|p=}} | {{harvnb|Schultz|2017|p=}} }}</ref>}} He has advocated ], relying on ] and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schultz|2017|p=}} | {{harvnb|Fesmire|2020|loc=}} | {{harvnb|Miligan|2015|p=}} }}</ref> Inspired by the philosophy of ] (1913–1960), ] (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McClellan|2015|pp=xviii–xx}} | {{harvnb|Bishop|2020|pp=}} }}</ref> ] (1959–present) has developed a ] version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from ] to ], to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Adams IV|2004|p=}} | {{harvnb|Ross|2020|p=}} }}</ref> The emergence of ] at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crisp|2011|p=44}} | {{harvnb|Peterson|2006|pp=}} }}</ref>


== In various fields == == In various fields ==
] studies how to cultivate happiness and promote optimal human functioning. Unlike traditional ], which often focuses on ], positive psychology emphasizes that optimal functioning goes beyond merely the absence of ]. On the individual level, it investigates experiences of pleasure and pain and the role of ]s. On the societal level, it examines how ]s impact human well-being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Kaczmarek|2023|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Colman|2015|loc=}} | {{harvnb|Seligman|Csikszentmihalyi|2000|pp=5–6}} | {{harvnb|Kaczmarek|2023|pp=}} }}</ref> ] studies how to cultivate happiness and promote optimal human functioning. Unlike traditional ], which often focuses on ], positive psychology emphasizes that optimal functioning goes beyond merely the absence of ]. On the individual level, it investigates experiences of pleasure and pain and the role of ]s. On the societal level, it examines how ]s impact human well-being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Kaczmarek|2023|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Colman|2015|loc=}} | {{harvnb|Seligman|Csikszentmihalyi|2000|pp=5–6}} }}</ref>


Hedonic psychology or hedonics{{efn|In a different sense, the term ''hedonics'' is also used in ethics for the study of the relation between pleasure and duty.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}} | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2024}} }}</ref>}} is one of the main pillars of positive psychology by studying on pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences. It investigates and compares different states of consciousness associated with pleasure and pain, ranging from joy and satisfaction to boredom and sorrow. It also examines the role or ] of these states, such as signaling to individuals what to approach and avoid, and their purpose as reward and punishment to ] or discourage future behavioral patterns. Additionally, hedonic psychology explores the circumstances that evoke these experiences, on both the biological and social levels.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kahneman|Diener|Schwarz|1999|p=}} | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Kaczmarek|2023|pp=}} }}</ref> It includes questions about psychological obstacles to pleasure, such as ], which is a reduced ability to experience pleasure, and ], which is a fear or aversion to pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018}} | {{harvnb|Doctor|Kahn|2010|p=}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2009|p=}} }}</ref> Positive psychology in general and hedonic psychology in particular are relevant to hedonism by providing a scientific understanding of the experiences of pleasure and pain and the processes impacting them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Kahneman|Diener|Schwarz|1999|p=}} }}</ref> Hedonic psychology or hedonics{{efn|In a different sense, the term ''hedonics'' is also used in ethics for the study of the relation between pleasure and duty.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}} | {{harvnb|HarperCollins|2024}} }}</ref>}} is one of the main pillars of positive psychology by studying pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences. It investigates and compares different states of consciousness associated with pleasure and pain, ranging from joy and satisfaction to boredom and sorrow. It also examines the role or ] of these states, such as signaling to individuals what to approach and avoid, and their purpose as reward and punishment to ] or discourage future behavioral patterns. Additionally, hedonic psychology explores the circumstances that evoke these experiences, on both the biological and social levels.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kahneman|Diener|Schwarz|1999|p=}} | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Kaczmarek|2023|pp=}} }}</ref> It includes questions about psychological obstacles to pleasure, such as ], which is a reduced ability to experience pleasure, and ], which is a fear or aversion to pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|American Psychological Association|2018}} | {{harvnb|Doctor|Kahn|2010|p=}} | {{harvnb|Campbell|2009|p=}} }}</ref> Positive psychology in general and hedonic psychology in particular are relevant to hedonism by providing a scientific understanding of the experiences of pleasure and pain and the processes impacting them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Vittersø|2012|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Kahneman|Diener|Schwarz|1999|p=}} }}</ref>


In the field of ], ] examines how economic activities affect ]. It is often understood as a form of ] that uses considerations of welfare to evaluate economic processes and policies. Hedonist approaches to welfare economics state that pleasure is the main criterion of this evaluation, meaning that economic activities should aim to promote societal happiness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hausman|2010|pp=321–322, 324–325, 327}} | {{harvnb|Mishan|2008|loc=§ Lead section}} }}</ref> The ] is a closely related field studying the relation between economic phenomena, such as wealth, and individual happiness.<ref>{{harvnb|Graham|2012|pp=}}</ref> Economists also employ ], a method used to estimate the value of ] based on their ] or effect on the owner's pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goodstein|Polasky|2017|p=}} | {{harvnb|Hackett|Dissanayake|2014|p=}} }}</ref> In the field of ], ] examines how economic activities affect ]. It is often understood as a form of ] that uses considerations of welfare to evaluate economic processes and policies. Hedonist approaches to welfare economics state that pleasure is the main criterion of this evaluation, meaning that economic activities should aim to promote societal happiness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hausman|2010|pp=321–322, 324–325, 327}} | {{harvnb|Mishan|2008|loc=§ Lead section}} }}</ref> The ] is a closely related field studying the relation between economic phenomena, such as wealth, and individual happiness.<ref>{{harvnb|Graham|2012|pp=}}</ref> Economists also employ ], a method used to estimate the value of ] based on their ] or effect on the owner's pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Goodstein|Polasky|2017|p=}} | {{harvnb|Hackett|Dissanayake|2014|p=}} }}</ref>


] has applied ] to problems of ].<ref>{{harvnb|Miligan|2015|p=}}</ref>]]
⚫ ] is the branch of ] studying human behavior towards other animals. Hedonism is an influential position in this field as a theory about ]. It emphasizes that humans have the responsibility to consider the impact of their actions on how animals feel to minimize harm done to them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wilson|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gordon, "''Bioethics''"|ref=Gordon, "''Bioethics''"|loc=Lead section, § 3c. Animal Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Robbins|Franks|von Keyserlingk|2018|loc=§ Abstract, § Introduction}} }}</ref> Some quantitative hedonists suggest that there is no significant difference between the pleasure and pain experienced by humans and other animals. As a result of this view, ] considerations about promoting the happiness of other people apply equally to all ] animals. This position is modified by some qualitative hedonists, who argue that human experiences carry more weight because they include higher forms of pleasure and pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|2024|pp=24–25}} | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|Singer|2014|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|2019|p=}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} }}</ref>


⚫ ] is the branch of ] studying human behavior towards other animals. Hedonism is an influential position in this field as a theory about ]. It emphasizes that humans have the responsibility to consider the impact of their actions on how animals feel to minimize harm done to them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wilson|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gordon, "''Bioethics''"|ref=Gordon, "''Bioethics''"|loc=Lead section, § 3c. Animal Ethics}} | {{harvnb|Robbins|Franks|von Keyserlingk|2018|loc=§ Abstract, § Introduction}} }}</ref> Some quantitative hedonists suggest that there is no significant difference between the pleasure and pain experienced by humans and other animals. As a result of this view, ] considerations about promoting the happiness of other people apply equally to all ] animals. This position is modified by some qualitative hedonists, who argue that human experiences carry more weight because they include higher forms of pleasure and pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|2024|pp=24–25}} | {{harvnb|Lazari-Radek|Singer|2014|pp=}} | {{harvnb|Weijers|2019|p=}} | {{harvnb|Tilley|2012|loc=§ III. Axiological Hedonism}} }}</ref>
⚫ While many religious traditions are critical of hedonism, some have embraced it or certain aspects of it, such as ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Piper|2011|p=}} | {{harvnb|Chryssides|2013|pp=}} }}</ref> Elements of hedonism are also found in various forms of ], such as ], the ], and the enduring influences of the ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Danesi|2016|p=}} | {{harvnb|Blue|2013|loc=}} | {{harvnb|Boden|2003|p=}} | {{harvnb|Smith|1990|pp=416}} }}</ref>


⚫ While many religious traditions are critical of hedonism, some have embraced it or certain aspects of it, such as ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Piper|2011|p=}} | {{harvnb|Chryssides|2013|pp=}} }}</ref> Elements of hedonism are also found in various forms of ], such as ], the ], and the enduring influences of the ].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Danesi|2016|p=}} | {{harvnb|Blue|2013|loc=}} | {{harvnb|Boden|2003|p=}} | {{harvnb|Smith|1990|p=416}} }}</ref>
==See also==
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]


== References == == References ==
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* {{cite book |last1=Abizadeh |first1=Arash |title=Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-27866-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZahxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA146 |language=en |date=2018 }} * {{cite book |last1=Abizadeh |first1=Arash |title=Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-27866-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZahxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA146 |language=en |date=2018 }}
* {{cite book |editor1-last=Ackermann |editor1-first=Marsha E. |editor2-last=Schroeder |editor2-first=Michael J. |editor3-last=Terry |editor3-first=Janice J. |editor4-last=Upshur |editor4-first=Jiu-Hwa Lo |editor5-last=Whitters |editor5-first=Mark F. |title=Encyclopedia of World History 2: The Ancient World Prehistoric Eras to 600 CE |publisher=Facts on File |isbn=978-0-8160-6386-4 |date=2008 }} * {{cite book |editor1-last=Ackermann |editor1-first=Marsha E. |editor2-last=Schroeder |editor2-first=Michael J. |editor3-last=Terry |editor3-first=Janice J. |editor4-last=Upshur |editor4-first=Jiu-Hwa Lo |editor5-last=Whitters |editor5-first=Mark F. |title=Encyclopedia of World History 2: The Ancient World Prehistoric Eras to 600 CE |publisher=Facts on File |isbn=978-0-8160-6386-4 |date=2008 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Adams IV |first1=Nathan A. |editor1-last=Colson |editor1-first=Charles W. |editor2-last=Cameron |editor2-first=Nigel M. de S. |title=Human Dignity in the Biotech Century: A Christian Vision for Public Policy |publisher=InterVarsity Press |isbn=978-0-8308-2783-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ygIiRL7mQBkC&pg=PA167 |language=en |chapter=An Unnatural Assault on Natural Law |date=2004 }} * {{cite book |last1=Adams IV |first1=Nathan A. |editor1-last=Colson |editor1-first=Charles W. |editor2-last=Cameron |editor2-first=Nigel M. de S. |title=Human Dignity in the Biotech Century: A Christian Vision for Public Policy |publisher=InterVarsity Press |isbn=978-0-8308-2783-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ygIiRL7mQBkC&pg=PA167 |language=en |chapter=An Unnatural Assault on Natural Law |date=2004 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Airaksinen |first1=Timo |title=The philosophy of the Marquis de Sade |publisher=Routledge |isbn=0-415-11228-1 |date=1995 }} * {{cite web |last1=Adamson |first1=Peter |title=Abu Bakr al-Razi |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abu-bakr-al-razi/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=4 November 2024 |date=2021 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Adamson |first1=Peter |title=Al-Rāzī |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780197555033 |date=2021a }}
* {{cite book |last1=Airaksinen |first1=Timo |title=The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-11228-4 |date=1995 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Alexander |first1=Bruce K. |last2=Shelton |first2=Curtis P. |title=A History of Psychology in Western Civilization |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-99183-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9YTXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA143 |language=en |date=2014 }} * {{cite book |last1=Alexander |first1=Bruce K. |last2=Shelton |first2=Curtis P. |title=A History of Psychology in Western Civilization |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-99183-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9YTXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA143 |language=en |date=2014 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Alston |first1=William |title=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 7: Oakeshott - Presupposition |publisher=Macmillan Reference |isbn=0-02-865787-X |edition=2 |chapter=Pleasure |date=2006 |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/anatomy-and-physiology/anatomy-and-physiology/pleasure}} * {{cite book |last1=Alston |first1=William |title=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 7: Oakeshott - Presupposition |publisher=Macmillan Reference |isbn=978-0-02-865787-5 |edition=2 |chapter=Pleasure |date=2006 |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/anatomy-and-physiology/anatomy-and-physiology/pleasure}}
* {{cite web |author1=American Psychological Association |title=Anhedonia |url=https://dictionary.apa.org/anhedonia |website=APA Dictionary of Psychology |language=en |date=2018 |publisher=American Psychological Association }} * {{cite web |author1=American Psychological Association |title=Anhedonia |url=https://dictionary.apa.org/anhedonia |website=APA Dictionary of Psychology |language=en |date=2018 |publisher=American Psychological Association }}
* {{cite book |last1=Asmis |first1=Elizabeth |editor1-last=Harris |editor1-first=William V. |title=Pain and Pleasure in Classical Times |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-37950-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZpByDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Lucretian Pleasure |date=2018 }} * {{cite book |last1=Asmis |first1=Elizabeth |editor1-last=Harris |editor1-first=William V. |title=Pain and Pleasure in Classical Times |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-37950-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZpByDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Lucretian Pleasure |date=2018 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Aufderheide |first1=Joachim |title=Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X: Translation and Commentary |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-86128-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F5jIDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA57 |language=en |chapter=Commentary |date=2020 }} * {{cite book |last1=Aufderheide |first1=Joachim |title=Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics Book X: Translation and Commentary |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-86128-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F5jIDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA57 |language=en |chapter=Commentary |date=2020 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Bartoshuk |first1=Linda |title=The Measurement of Pleasure and Pain |journal=Perspectives on Psychological Science |volume=9 |issue=1 |doi=10.1177/1745691613512660 |date=2014 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Bartoshuk |first1=Linda |title=The Measurement of Pleasure and Pain |journal=Perspectives on Psychological Science |volume=9 |issue=1 |doi=10.1177/1745691613512660 |date=2014 |pages=91–93 |pmid=26173247 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Besser |first1=Lorraine L. |title=The Philosophy of Happiness: An Interdisciplinary Introduction |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-28367-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9yUAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT12 |language=en |chapter=5. Happiness as Satisfaction |date=2020 }} * {{cite book |last1=Besser |first1=Lorraine L. |title=The Philosophy of Happiness: An Interdisciplinary Introduction |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-28367-8 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9yUAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT12 |language=en |chapter=5. Happiness as Satisfaction |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Bishop |first1=Paul |editor1-last=Acharya |editor1-first=Vinod |editor2-last=Johnson |editor2-first=Ryan J. |title=Nietzsche and Epicurus |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-1-350-08631-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IYLPDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 |language=en |chapter=Nietzsche, Hobbes and the Tradition of Political Epicureanism |date=2020 }} * {{cite book |last1=Bishop |first1=Paul |editor1-last=Acharya |editor1-first=Vinod |editor2-last=Johnson |editor2-first=Ryan J. |title=Nietzsche and Epicurus |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-1-350-08631-9 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IYLPDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 |language=en |chapter=Nietzsche, Hobbes and the Tradition of Political Epicureanism |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Blakemore |first1=Colin |last2=Jennett |first2=Sheila |title=The Oxford Companion to the Body |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-852403-8 |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/hedonism |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2001 }} * {{cite book |last1=Blakemore |first1=Colin |last2=Jennett |first2=Sheila |title=The Oxford Companion to the Body |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-852403-8 |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/hedonism |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2001 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Blue |first1=Ronald |title=Evangelism and Missions |publisher=Thomas Nelson |isbn=978-0-529-10348-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Ux1CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT48 |language=en |date=2013 }} * {{cite book |last1=Blue |first1=Ronald |title=Evangelism and Missions |publisher=Thomas Nelson |isbn=978-0-529-10348-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Ux1CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT48 |language=en |date=2013 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Boden |first1=Sharon |title=Consumerism, Romance and the Wedding Experience |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-230-00564-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3EGEDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 |language=en |date=2003 }} * {{cite book |last1=Boden |first1=Sharon |title=Consumerism, Romance and the Wedding Experience |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-230-00564-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3EGEDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 |language=en |date=2003 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Bowie |first1=Norman E. |last2=Simon |first2=Robert L. |title=The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-8476-8780-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rhbSquEOBHcC&pg=PA25 |language=en |date=1998 }} * {{cite book |last1=Bowie |first1=Norman E. |last2=Simon |first2=Robert L. |title=The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-8476-8780-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rhbSquEOBHcC&pg=PA25 |language=en |date=1998 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Brandt |first1=Richard B. |title=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 4: Gadamer - Just war theory |publisher=Macmillan Reference |isbn=0-02-865784-5 |edition=2 |chapter=Hedonism |date=2006 }} * {{cite book |last1=Brandt |first1=Richard B. |title=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 4: Gadamer - Just War Theory |publisher=Macmillan Reference |isbn=978-0-02-865784-4 |edition=2 |chapter=Hedonism |date=2006 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Bruton |first1=Samuel V. |title=Psychological Hedonism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/psychological-hedonism |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |publisher=Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. |access-date=25 October 2024 |language=en |date=2024}} * {{cite web |last1=Bruton |first1=Samuel V. |title=Psychological Hedonism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/psychological-hedonism |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |publisher=Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. |access-date=25 October 2024 |language=en |date=2024}}
* {{cite book |last1=Bunnin |first1=Nicholas |last2=Yu |first2=Jiyuan |title=The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy |date=2009 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-4051-9112-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M7ZFEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA134 |language=en |access-date=January 3, 2024 }} * {{cite book |last1=Bunnin |first1=Nicholas |last2=Yu |first2=Jiyuan |title=The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy |date=2009 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-4051-9112-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M7ZFEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA134 |language=en |access-date=January 3, 2024 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Buscicchi |first1=Lorenzo |title=Paradox of Hedonism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/paradox-of-hedonism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=19 October 2024}} * {{cite web |last1=Buscicchi |first1=Lorenzo |title=Paradox of Hedonism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/paradox-of-hedonism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=19 October 2024}}
* {{cite book |last1=Campbell |first1=Robert Jean |title=Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-534159-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=76vPu_G2UkgC&pg=PA449 |language=en |date=2009 }} * {{cite book |last1=Campbell |first1=Robert Jean |title=Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-534159-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=76vPu_G2UkgC&pg=PA449 |language=en |date=2009 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Chryssides |first1=George D. |editor1-last=Meister |editor1-first=Chad V. |editor2-last=Copan |editor2-first=Paul |title=The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-78294-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5KrAa6e_VN4C&pg=PA762 |language=en |chapter=New Religious Movements |date=2013 }} * {{cite book |last1=Chryssides |first1=George D. |editor1-last=Meister |editor1-first=Chad V. |editor2-last=Copan |editor2-first=Paul |title=The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-78294-4 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5KrAa6e_VN4C&pg=PA762 |language=en |chapter=New Religious Movements |date=2013 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Colman |first1=Andrew M. |title=A Dictionary of Psychology |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-965768-1 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199657681.001.0001/acref-9780199657681-e-9229 |language=en |chapter=Positive Psychology |date=2015 }} * {{cite book |last1=Colman |first1=Andrew M. |title=A Dictionary of Psychology |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-965768-1 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199657681.001.0001/acref-9780199657681-e-9229 |language=en |chapter=Positive Psychology |date=2015 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |title=Hedonism Reconsidered |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=73 |issue=3 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00551.x |date=2006 }} * {{cite book |last1=Cresswell |first1=Julia |title=Oxford Dictionary of Word Origins |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-886875-0 |edition=3 |date=2021 }}
⚫ * {{cite journal |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |title=Hedonism Reconsidered |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=73 |issue=3 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00551.x |date=2006 |pages=619–645 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |editor1-last=Hurka |editor1-first=Thomas |title=Underivative duty: British moral philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780199577446 |chapter=2. Pleasure and Hedonism in Sidgwick |date=2011 }} * {{cite book |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |editor1-last=Hurka |editor1-first=Thomas |title=Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-957744-6 |chapter=2. Pleasure and Hedonism in Sidgwick |date=2011 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |title=Well-Being |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=19 October 2024 |date=2021 }} * {{cite web |last1=Crisp |first1=Roger |title=Well-Being |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=19 October 2024 |date=2021 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Danesi |first1=Marcel |title=Concise Dictionary of Popular Culture |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-4422-5312-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=61mBDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 |language=en |date=2016 }} * {{cite book |last1=Danesi |first1=Marcel |title=Concise Dictionary of Popular Culture |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-4422-5312-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=61mBDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 |language=en |date=2016 }}
* {{cite book |last1=de Bres |first1=Helena |editor1-last=Mandle |editor1-first=Jon |editor2-last=Reidy |editor2-first=David A. |title=The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-19398-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t-CkBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT428 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2014 }} * {{cite book |last1=de Bres |first1=Helena |editor1-last=Mandle |editor1-first=Jon |editor2-last=Reidy |editor2-first=David A. |title=The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-19398-3 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t-CkBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT428 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2014 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Dehsen |first1=Christian von |title=Philosophers and Religious Leaders |date=13 September 2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-95102-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ |language=en }} * {{cite book |last1=Dehsen |first1=Christian von |title=Philosophers and Religious Leaders |date=13 September 2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-95102-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cU7cAAAAQBAJ |language=en }}
* {{cite book |last1=Dewan |first1=Lawrence |title=Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics |publisher=Fordham University Press |isbn=978-0-8232-2796-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9RwKiqay4h4C&pg=PA101 |language=en |date=2008 }} * {{cite book |last1=Dewan |first1=Lawrence |title=Wisdom, Law, and Virtue: Essays in Thomistic Ethics |publisher=Fordham University Press |isbn=978-0-8232-2796-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9RwKiqay4h4C&pg=PA101 |language=en |date=2008 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Diener |first1=Ed |last2=Lucas |first2=Richard E. |last3=Scollon |first3=Christie Napa |title=Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation Theory of Well-Being |journal=The Science of Well-Being |volume=37 |doi=10.1007/978-90-481-2350-6_5 |date=2009 }} * {{cite book |last1=Diener |first1=Ed |last2=Lucas |first2=Richard E. |last3=Scollon |first3=Christie Napa |chapter=Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation Theory of Well-Being |title=The Science of Well-Being |series=Social Indicators Research Series |volume=37 |doi=10.1007/978-90-481-2350-6_5 |date=2009 |pages=103–118 |isbn=978-90-481-2349-0 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Dietz |first1=Alexander |title=Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=97 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/00048402.2018.1483409 |date=2019 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Dietz |first1=Alexander |title=Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=97 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/00048402.2018.1483409 |date=2019 |pages=497–510 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/DIEETP }}
* {{cite book |last1=Doctor |first1=Ronald M. |last2=Kahn |first2=Ada P. |title=The Encyclopedia of Phobias, Fears, and Anxieties |publisher=Infobase Publishing |isbn=978-1-4381-2098-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E2imSyZZDh0C&pg=PA270 |language=en |date=2010 |edition=3 }} * {{cite book |last1=Doctor |first1=Ronald M. |last2=Kahn |first2=Ada P. |title=The Encyclopedia of Phobias, Fears, and Anxieties |publisher=Infobase Publishing |isbn=978-1-4381-2098-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E2imSyZZDh0C&pg=PA270 |language=en |date=2010 |edition=3 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Dorsey |first1=Dale |title=Objectivity and Perfection in Hume’s Hedonism |journal=Journal of the History of Philosophy |volume=53 |issue=2 |doi=10.1353/hph.2015.0028 |date=2015 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Dorsey |first1=Dale |title=Objectivity and Perfection in Hume's Hedonism |journal=Journal of the History of Philosophy |volume=53 |issue=2 |doi=10.1353/hph.2015.0028 |date=2015 |pages=245–270 |hdl=1808/22187 |hdl-access=free }}
* {{cite book |last1=Ewin |first1=R. E. |title=Reasons and the Fear of Death |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-7425-1276-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KrpEdzoEktQC&pg=PA12 |language=en |date=2002 }} * {{cite book |last1=Ewin |first1=R. E. |title=Reasons and the Fear of Death |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-7425-1276-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KrpEdzoEktQC&pg=PA12 |language=en |date=2002 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Faustino |first1=Marta |title=On the 'How' and the 'Why': Nietzsche on Happiness and the Meaningful Life |journal=Open Philosophy |volume=7 |issue=1 |doi=10.1515/opphil-2024-0033 |date=2024 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Faustino |first1=Marta |title=On the 'How' and the 'Why': Nietzsche on Happiness and the Meaningful Life |journal=Open Philosophy |volume=7 |issue=1 |doi=10.1515/opphil-2024-0033 |date=2024 |doi-access=free }}
* {{cite book |last1=Feldman |first1=Fred |editor1-last=Becker |editor1-first=Lawrence C. |editor2-last=Becker |editor2-first=Charlotte B. |title=Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-35096-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KfeOAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2001 }} * {{cite book |last1=Feldman |first1=Fred |editor1-last=Becker |editor1-first=Lawrence C. |editor2-last=Becker |editor2-first=Charlotte B. |title=Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-35096-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KfeOAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2001 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Feldman |first1=Fred |title=The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=65 |issue=3 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00223.x |date=2002 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Feldman |first1=Fred |title=The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=65 |issue=3 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00223.x |date=2002 |pages=604–628 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Feldman |first1=Fred |title=Pleasure and the good life: concerning the nature, varieties and plausibility of hedonism |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=0-19-926516-X |date=2004 }} * {{cite book |last1=Feldman |first1=Fred |title=Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-926516-9 |date=2004 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Fesmire |first1=Steven |editor1-last=Frega |editor1-first=Roberto |editor2-last=Levine |editor2-first=Steven |title=John Dewey’s Ethical Theory: The 1932 Ethics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-53550-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5vzvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT33 |language=en |chapter=2. Dewey's Independent Factors in Moral Action |date=2020 }} * {{cite book |last1=Fesmire |first1=Steven |editor1-last=Frega |editor1-first=Roberto |editor2-last=Levine |editor2-first=Steven |title=John Dewey's Ethical Theory: The 1932 Ethics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-53550-5 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5vzvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT33 |language=en |chapter=2. Dewey's Independent Factors in Moral Action |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Fletcher |first1=Emily |editor1-last=Shapiro |editor1-first=Lisa |title=Pleasure |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-088249-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RftdDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA24 |language=en |chapter=Two Platonic Criticisms of Pleasure |date=2018 }} * {{cite book |last1=Fletcher |first1=Emily |editor1-last=Shapiro |editor1-first=Lisa |title=Pleasure |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-088249-5 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RftdDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA24 |language=en |chapter=Two Platonic Criticisms of Pleasure |date=2018 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Forgas |first1=Joseph P. |last2=Baumeister |first2=Roy F. |editor1-last=Forgas |editor1-first=Joseph P. |editor2-last=Baumeister |editor2-first=Roy F. |title=The Social Psychology of Living Well |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-18969-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DipKDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1951 |language=en |chapter=The Social Psychology of Living Well |date=2018 }} * {{cite book |last1=Forgas |first1=Joseph P. |last2=Baumeister |first2=Roy F. |editor1-last=Forgas |editor1-first=Joseph P. |editor2-last=Baumeister |editor2-first=Roy F. |title=The Social Psychology of Living Well |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-18969-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DipKDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1951 |language=en |date=2018 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Framarin |first1=Christopher G. |title=Hedonism and Asceticism |journal=Religious Studies |volume=54 |issue=4 |doi=10.1017/S0034412517000166 |date=2018 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Framarin |first1=Christopher G. |title=Hedonism and Asceticism |journal=Religious Studies |volume=54 |issue=4 |doi=10.1017/S0034412517000166 |date=2018 |pages=489–508 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Frykhol |first1=Erin |last2=Rutherford |first2=Donald |editor1-last=Anstey |editor1-first=Peter R. |title=The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-954999-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5KeaFMOoqbUC&pg=PA416 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism and Virtue |date=2013 }} * {{cite book |last1=Frykhol |first1=Erin |last2=Rutherford |first2=Donald |editor1-last=Anstey |editor1-first=Peter R. |title=The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-954999-3 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5KeaFMOoqbUC&pg=PA416 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism and Virtue |date=2013 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Garg |first1=Mridula |title=The Ascetic as Hedonist: An Under View of Literature |journal=Indian Literature |volume=50 |issue=2 (232) |doi=10.2307/23340936 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23340936 |issn=0019-5804 |date=2006 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Garg |first1=Mridula |title=The Ascetic as Hedonist: An Under View of Literature |journal=Indian Literature |volume=50 |issue=2 (232) |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23340936 |issn=0019-5804 |date=2006 |pages=161–166 |jstor=23340936 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Garrett |first1=Aaron |title=Joseph Butler’s Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/butler-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 October 2024 |date=2023 }} * {{cite web |last1=Garrett |first1=Aaron |title=Joseph Butler's Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/butler-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 October 2024 |date=2023 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Germann |first1=Nadja |title=al-Farabi's Philosophy of Society and Religion |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-farabi-soc-rel/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 September 2024 |date=2021 |archive-date=22 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240922163543/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-farabi-soc-rel/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Germann |first1=Nadja |title=Al-Farabi's Philosophy of Society and Religion |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-farabi-soc-rel/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 September 2024 |date=2021 |archive-date=22 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240922163543/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/al-farabi-soc-rel/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Goodman |first1=Lenn Evan |title=Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age |publisher=Rutgers University Press |isbn=978-0-8135-2760-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t4kqRyeoGOQC&pg=PA60 |language=en |date=1999 }} * {{cite book |last1=Goodman |first1=Lenn Evan |title=Jewish and Islamic Philosophy: Crosspollinations in the Classic Age |publisher=Rutgers University Press |isbn=978-0-8135-2760-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t4kqRyeoGOQC&pg=PA60 |language=en |date=1999 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Goodman |first1=Lenn E. |editor1-last=Leaman |editor1-first=Oliver |editor2-last=Nasr |editor2-first=Seyyed Hossein |title=History of Islamic Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-15902-8 |language=en |chapter=Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā' al-Rāzī |date=2020 }} * {{cite book |last1=Goodman |first1=Lenn E. |editor1-last=Leaman |editor1-first=Oliver |editor2-last=Nasr |editor2-first=Seyyed Hossein |title=History of Islamic Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-15902-8 |language=en |chapter=Muhammad Ibn Zakariyyā' Al-Rāzī |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Goodstein |first1=Eban S. |last2=Polasky |first2=Stephen |title=Economics and the Environment |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-119-36986-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DPhcDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA78 |language=en |date=2017 }} * {{cite book |last1=Goodstein |first1=Eban S. |last2=Polasky |first2=Stephen |title=Economics and the Environment |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-119-36986-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DPhcDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA78 |language=en |date=2017 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Gordon |first1=John-Stewart |title=Bioethics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/bioethics/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=23 December 2023 |archive-date=October 27, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231027011137/https://iep.utm.edu/bioethics/ |url-status=live |ref=Gordon, "''Bioethics''" }}
⚫ * {{cite journal |last1=Gorodeisky |first1=Keren |title=On Liking Aesthetic Value |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=102 |issue=2 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12641 |date=2021 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Gosling |first1=J. C. B. |title=Hedonism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/hedonism/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=13 October 2024 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-L034-1 |date=1998 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Gorodeisky |first1=Keren |title=On Liking Aesthetic Value |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=102 |issue=2 |doi=10.1111/phpr.12641 |date=2021 |pages=261–280 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Gosling |first1=Justin |editor1-last=Becker |editor1-first=Lawrence C. |editor2-last=Becker |editor2-first=Charlotte B. |title=Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-35096-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KfeOAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Pleasure |date=2001 }} * {{cite book |last1=Gosling |first1=J. C. B. |chapter=Hedonism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/hedonism/v-1 |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=13 October 2024 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-L034-1 |date=1998 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Gosling |first1=J. C. B. |editor1-last=Becker |editor1-first=Lawrence C. |editor2-last=Becker |editor2-first=Charlotte B. |title=Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-35096-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KfeOAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Pleasure |date=2001 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Gosling |first1=J. C. B. |chapter=Hedonism |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }} * {{cite book |last1=Gosling |first1=J. C. B. |chapter=Hedonism |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Graham |first1=Carol |title=Happiness Around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960628-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QdwUDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA6 |language=en |date=2012 }} * {{cite book |last1=Graham |first1=Carol |title=Happiness Around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960628-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QdwUDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA6 |language=en |date=2012 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Hackett |first1=Steven |last2=Dissanayake |first2=Sahan T. M. |title=Environmental and Natural Resources Economics: Theory, Policy, and the Sustainable Society |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-47129-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t1DfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 |language=en |date=2014 }} * {{cite book |last1=Hackett |first1=Steven |last2=Dissanayake |first2=Sahan T. M. |title=Environmental and Natural Resources Economics: Theory, Policy, and the Sustainable Society |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-47129-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t1DfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 |language=en |date=2014 }}
* {{cite web |author1=HarperCollins |title=Hedonics |url=https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/hedonics |website=Collins English Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins Publishers |access-date=28 October 2024 |date=2024 }} * {{cite web |author1=HarperCollins |title=Hedonics |url=https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/hedonics |website=Collins English Dictionary |publisher=HarperCollins Publishers |access-date=28 October 2024 |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Hassan |first1=Patrick |title=Nietzsche's Struggle against Pessimism |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-009-38032-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5Cz_EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA227 |language=en |date=2023 }} * {{cite book |last1=Hassan |first1=Patrick |title=Nietzsche's Struggle Against Pessimism |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-009-38032-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5Cz_EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA227 |language=en |date=2023 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Hausman |first1=Daniel M. |title=Hedonism and Welfare Economics |journal=Economics and Philosophy |volume=26 |issue=3 |doi=10.1017/S0266267110000398 |date=2010 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Hausman |first1=Daniel M. |title=Hedonism and Welfare Economics |journal=Economics and Philosophy |volume=26 |issue=3 |doi=10.1017/S0266267110000398 |date=2010 |pages=321–344 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Haybron |first1=Dan |title=Happiness |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=19 October 2024 |date=2020 }} * {{cite web |last1=Haybron |first1=Dan |title=Happiness |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/happiness/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=19 October 2024 |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Heathwood |first1=Chris |title=The International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-8641-4 |edition=1 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee780 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2013 }} * {{cite book |last1=Heathwood |first1=Chris |title=The International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-4051-8641-4 |edition=1 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee780 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2013 |doi=10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee780 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Heathwood |first1=Chris |editor1-last=Hirose |editor1-first=Iwao |editor2-last=Olson |editor2-first=Jonas |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-022143-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Monism and Pluralism about Value |date=2015 }} * {{cite book |last1=Heathwood |first1=Chris |editor1-last=Hirose |editor1-first=Iwao |editor2-last=Olson |editor2-first=Jonas |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-022143-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Monism and Pluralism About Value |date=2015 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Hughes |first1=Julian C. |editor1-last=Kirkwood |editor1-first=Thomas B. L. |editor2-last=Cooper |editor2-first=Cary |title=Wellbeing: A Complete Reference Guide, Wellbeing in Later Life |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-60844-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KEzHCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA239 |language=en |chapter=Maintaining Wellbeing Through the End of Life |date=2014 }} * {{cite book |last1=Hoad |first1=T. F. |title=The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology |date=1993 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-283098-2 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Hughes |first1=Julian C. |editor1-last=Kirkwood |editor1-first=Thomas B. L. |editor2-last=Cooper |editor2-first=Cary |title=Wellbeing: A Complete Reference Guide, Wellbeing in Later Life |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-60844-9 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KEzHCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA239 |language=en |chapter=Maintaining Wellbeing Through the End of Life |date=2014 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Hurka |first1=Thomas |title=The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters |publisher=Oxford university press |isbn=978-0-19-533142-4 |date=2011a }} * {{cite book |last1=Hurka |first1=Thomas |title=The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters |publisher=Oxford university press |isbn=978-0-19-533142-4 |date=2011a }}
* {{cite web |last1=Hurka |first1=Thomas |title=Moore’s Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 October 2024 |date=2021 }} * {{cite web |last1=Hurka |first1=Thomas |title=Moore's Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 October 2024 |date=2021 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Johnson |first1=Danielle |editor1-last=Lopez |editor1-first=Shane J. |title=Encyclopedia of positive psychology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |isbn=978-1-4051-6125-1 |chapter=Pleasure |date=2009 }} * {{cite book |last1=Johnson |first1=Danielle |editor1-last=Lopez |editor1-first=Shane J. |title=Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |isbn=978-1-4051-6125-1 |chapter=Pleasure |date=2009 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Kaczmarek |first1=Lukasz Dominik |editor1-last=Glăveanu |editor1-first=Vlad Petre |title=The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-90913-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d7mpEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1054 |language=en |chapter=Positive Psychology |date=2023 }} * {{cite book |last1=Kaczmarek |first1=Lukasz Dominik |editor1-last=Glăveanu |editor1-first=Vlad Petre |title=The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-90913-0 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d7mpEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1054 |language=en |chapter=Positive Psychology |date=2023 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Kaelber |first1=Walter |editor1-last=Eliade |editor1-first=Mircea |editor2-last=Adams |editor2-first=Charles J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Religion |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-02-909840-0 |language=en |chapter=Asceticism |date=1987 }} * {{cite book |last1=Kaelber |first1=Walter |editor1-last=Eliade |editor1-first=Mircea |editor2-last=Adams |editor2-first=Charles J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Religion |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-02-909840-0 |language=en |chapter=Asceticism |date=1987 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |last2=Diener |first2=Edward |last3=Schwarz |first3=Norbert |title=Well-Being: Foundations of Hedonic Psychology |publisher=Russell Sage Foundation |isbn=978-1-61044-325-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-wIXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 |language=en |chapter=Preface |date=1999 }} * {{cite book |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |last2=Diener |first2=Edward |last3=Schwarz |first3=Norbert |title=Well-Being: Foundations of Hedonic Psychology |publisher=Russell Sage Foundation |isbn=978-1-61044-325-8 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-wIXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 |language=en |chapter=Preface |date=1999 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Leonard D. |title=Pleasure |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 October 2024 |date=2016 }} * {{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Leonard D. |title=Pleasure |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 October 2024 |date=2016 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Leonard D. |title=Pleasure > Notes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/notes.html |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 October 2024 |language=en |date=2016a }} * {{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Leonard D. |title=Pleasure > Notes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pleasure/notes.html |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 October 2024 |language=en |date=2016a }}
* {{cite book |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-879148-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2018 }} * {{cite book |last1=Kriegel |first1=Uriah |title=Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-879148-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3e9IDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |date=2018 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Larsen |first1=Randy J. |last2=Prizmic |first2=Zvjezdana |editor1-last=Eid |editor1-first=Michael |editor2-last=Larsen |editor2-first=Randy J. |title=The Science of Subjective Well-Being |publisher=Guilford Press |isbn=978-1-60623-073-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uoD1Ly9CeRAC&pg=PA269 |language=en |chapter=Regulation of Emotional Well-Being: Overcoming the Hedonic Treadmill |date=2008 }} * {{cite book |last1=Larsen |first1=Randy J. |last2=Prizmic |first2=Zvjezdana |editor1-last=Eid |editor1-first=Michael |editor2-last=Larsen |editor2-first=Randy J. |title=The Science of Subjective Well-Being |publisher=Guilford Press |isbn=978-1-60623-073-2 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uoD1Ly9CeRAC&pg=PA269 |language=en |chapter=Regulation of Emotional Well-Being: Overcoming the Hedonic Treadmill |date=2008 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Lazari-Radek |first1=Katarzyna de |title=The Philosophy of Pleasure: An Introduction |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-351-60594-6 |language=en |date=2024 }} * {{cite book |last1=Lazari-Radek |first1=Katarzyna de |title=The Philosophy of Pleasure: An Introduction |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-351-60594-6 |language=en |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Lazari-Radek |first1=Katarzyna de |last2=Singer |first2=Peter |title=The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960369-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GGZeAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA72 |language=en |date=2014 }} * {{cite book |last1=Lazari-Radek |first1=Katarzyna de |last2=Singer |first2=Peter |title=The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-960369-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GGZeAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA72 |language=en |date=2014 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Lelkes |first1=Orsolya |title=Sustainable Hedonism: A Thriving Life that Does Not Cost the Earth |publisher=Policy Press |isbn=978-1-5292-1797-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g0QvEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA85 |language=en |date=2021 }} * {{cite book |last1=Lelkes |first1=Orsolya |title=Sustainable Hedonism: A Thriving Life that Does Not Cost the Earth |publisher=Policy Press |isbn=978-1-5292-1797-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g0QvEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA85 |language=en |date=2021 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Luper |first1=Steven |title=The Philosophy of Death |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-88249-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ccv8A385ZYAC&pg=PA102 |language=en |date=2009 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Mason |first1=Elinor |title=Value Pluralism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=6 September 2024 |date=2023 |archive-date=23 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230623192513/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Mason |first1=Elinor |title=Value Pluralism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=6 September 2024 |date=2023 |archive-date=23 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230623192513/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Massin |first1=Olivier |title=Themes from Brentano |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-94-012-0993-9 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/9789401209939/B9789401209939-s018.xml |language=en |chapter=The Intentionality of Pleasures and other Feelings, a Brentanian Approach |date=2013 }} * {{cite book |last1=Massin |first1=Olivier |title=Themes from Brentano |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-94-012-0993-9 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/9789401209939/B9789401209939-s018.xml |language=en |chapter=The Intentionality of Pleasures and Other Feelings, a Brentanian Approach |date=2013 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Matthen |first1=Mohan |last2=Weinstein |first2=Zachary |title=Aesthetic Hedonism |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0223.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies |access-date=26 October 2024 |language=en |date=2020 }} * {{cite web |last1=Matthen |first1=Mohan |last2=Weinstein |first2=Zachary |title=Aesthetic Hedonism |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0223.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies |access-date=26 October 2024 |language=en |date=2020 }}
* {{cite book |last1=McClellan |first1=Joseph |title=A Hedonist Manifesto: The Power to Exist |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-17126-7 |chapter=Translator's Introduction |date=2015 }} * {{cite book |last1=McClellan |first1=Joseph |title=A Hedonist Manifesto: The Power to Exist |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-17126-7 |chapter=Translator's Introduction |date=2015 }}
* {{cite book |last1=McGinnis |first1=Jon |title=Avicenna |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-533147-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M28EjkCdFecC&pg=PA209 |language=en |date=2010 }} * {{cite book |last1=McGinnis |first1=Jon |title=Avicenna |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-533147-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M28EjkCdFecC&pg=PA209 |language=en |date=2010 }}
* {{cite book |last1=McLeod |first1=Owen |editor1-last=Raibley |editor1-first=Jason R. |editor2-last=Zimmerman |editor2-first=Michael J. |title=The Good, the Right, Life and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-88870-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=q8w3DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT225 |language=en |chapter=Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Reexamination of the Connections between Desert and Intrinsic Value |date=2017 }} * {{cite book |last1=McLeod |first1=Owen |editor1-last=Raibley |editor1-first=Jason R. |editor2-last=Zimmerman |editor2-first=Michael J. |title=The Good, the Right, Life and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-351-88870-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=q8w3DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT225 |language=en |chapter=Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Reexamination of the Connections Between Desert and Intrinsic Value |date=2017 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Merivale |first1=Amyas |title=Hume on Art, Emotion, and Superstition: A Critical Study of the Four Dissertations |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-78746-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IjZ7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT54 |language=en |date=2018 }} * {{cite book |last1=Merivale |first1=Amyas |title=Hume on Art, Emotion, and Superstition: A Critical Study of the Four Dissertations |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-78746-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IjZ7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT54 |language=en |date=2018 }}
* {{cite web |author1=Merriam-Webster |title=Definition of Hedonics |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hedonics |website=Merriam-Webster Dictionary |publisher=Merriam-Webster, Incorporated |access-date=28 October 2024 |language=en |date=2024 }} * {{cite web |author1=Merriam-Webster |title=Definition of Hedonics |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hedonics |website=Merriam-Webster Dictionary |publisher=Merriam-Webster, Incorporated |access-date=28 October 2024 |language=en |date=2024 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Miligan |first1=Tony |title=Animal Ethics: The Basics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-54330-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TEjLCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA26 |language=en |date=2015 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Mishan |first1=E. J. |title=International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-02-865965-7 |edition=2. |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-business-and-labor/economics-terms-and-concepts/welfare-economics |chapter=Welfare Economics |date=2008 }} * {{cite book |last1=Mishan |first1=E. J. |title=International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences |publisher=Macmillan |isbn=978-0-02-865965-7 |edition=2. |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-business-and-labor/economics-terms-and-concepts/welfare-economics |chapter=Welfare Economics |date=2008 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Moore |first1=Andrew |title=Hedonism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 October 2024 |date=2019 }} * {{cite web |last1=Moore |first1=Andrew |title=Hedonism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 October 2024 |date=2019 }}
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* {{cite book |last1=Norden |first1=Bryan W. Van |last2=Ivanhoe |first2=Philip J. |title=Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy |publisher=Hackett Publishing |isbn=978-1-64792-109-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z663EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA111 |language=en |date=2023 }} * {{cite book |last1=Norden |first1=Bryan W. Van |last2=Ivanhoe |first2=Philip J. |title=Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy |publisher=Hackett Publishing |isbn=978-1-64792-109-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z663EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA111 |language=en |date=2023 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Norman |first1=Richard |chapter=Happiness |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }} * {{cite book |last1=Norman |first1=Richard |chapter=Happiness |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }}
* {{cite web |author1=Oxford University Press |title=Hedonism |url=https://www.oed.com/dictionary/hedonism_n?tab=factsheet |website=Oxford English Dictionary |publisher=Oxford University Press |access-date=17 October 2024 |doi=10.1093/OED/3601271206 |date=2024 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Pallies |first1=Daniel |title=An honest look at hybrid theories of pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=178 |issue=3 |doi=10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5 |date=2021 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Pallies |first1=Daniel |title=An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure |journal=Philosophical Studies |volume=178 |issue=3 |doi=10.1007/s11098-020-01464-5 |date=2021 |pages=887–907 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Peterson |first1=Christopher |title=A Primer in Positive Psychology |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-988494-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FGpIA9RmCngC&pg=PA4 |language=en |date=2006 }} * {{cite book |last1=Peterson |first1=Christopher |title=A Primer in Positive Psychology |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-988494-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FGpIA9RmCngC&pg=PA4 |language=en |date=2006 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Piering |first1=Julie |title=Antisthenes |url=https://iep.utm.edu/antisthenes/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}} * {{cite web |last1=Piering |first1=Julie |title=Antisthenes |url=https://iep.utm.edu/antisthenes/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}}
* {{cite web |last1=Pigliucci |first1=Massimo |title=Stoicism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/stoicism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}} * {{cite web |last1=Pigliucci |first1=Massimo |title=Stoicism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/stoicism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}}
* {{cite book |last1=Piper |first1=John |title=Desiring God, Revised Edition: Meditations of a Christian Hedonist |publisher=Multnoham Books |isbn=978-1-60142-391-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MI1RdmBbvekC&pg=PA31 |language=en |date=2011 }} * {{cite book |last1=Piper |first1=John |title=Desiring God: Meditations of a Christian Hedonist |publisher=Multnoham Books |isbn=978-1-60142-391-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MI1RdmBbvekC&pg=PA31 |language=en |date=2011 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Porter |first1=Burton F. |title=The Good Life: Alternatives in Ethics |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-7425-0201-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MCRZ3AlBDJ4C&pg=PA94 |language=en |date=2001 }} * {{cite book |last1=Porter |first1=Burton F. |title=The Good Life: Alternatives in Ethics |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-7425-0201-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MCRZ3AlBDJ4C&pg=PA94 |language=en |date=2001 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Quinn |first1=Philip L. |title=Asceticism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/asceticism/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=20 October 2024 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-L006-1 |date=1998 }} * {{cite book |last1=Quinn |first1=Philip L. |chapter=Asceticism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/asceticism/v-1 |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=20 October 2024 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-L006-1 |date=1998 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Rice |first1=Christopher M. |editor1-last=Fletcher |editor1-first=Guy |title=The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-40265-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zZdGCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA379 |language=en |chapter=Well-being and Animals |date=2015 }} * {{cite book |last1=Rice |first1=Christopher M. |editor1-last=Fletcher |editor1-first=Guy |title=The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-40265-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zZdGCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA379 |language=en |chapter=Well-being and Animals |date=2015 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Riepe |first1=Dale |title=Early Indian Hedonism |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=16 |issue=4 |doi=10.2307/2104258 |date=1956 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Riepe |first1=Dale |title=Early Indian Hedonism |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |volume=16 |issue=4 |doi=10.2307/2104258 |date=1956 |pages=551–555 |jstor=2104258 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Rist |first1=John M. |title=Augustine |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-58952-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7YeKchlhn7MC&pg=PA158 |language=en |date=1994 }} * {{cite book |last1=Rist |first1=John M. |title=Augustine |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-58952-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7YeKchlhn7MC&pg=PA158 |language=en |date=1994 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Robbins |first1=Jesse |last2=Franks |first2=Becca |last3=von Keyserlingk |first3=Marina A. G. |title='More than a Feeling': An Empirical Investigation of Hedonistic Accounts of Animal Welfare |journal=PLoS One |volume=13 |issue=3 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0193864 |date=2018 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Robbins |first1=Jesse |last2=Franks |first2=Becca |last3=von Keyserlingk |first3=Marina A. G. |title='More Than a Feeling': An Empirical Investigation of Hedonistic Accounts of Animal Welfare |journal=PLOS ONE |volume=13 |issue=3 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0193864 |date=2018 |pages=e0193864 |doi-access=free |pmid=29529090 |pmc=5846737 |bibcode=2018PLoSO..1393864R }}
* {{cite book |last1=Robertson |first1=Michael |last2=Walter |first2=Garry |title=Ethics and Mental Health: The Patient, Profession and Community |publisher=CRC Press |isbn=978-1-4441-6864-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kaN7AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 |language=en |date=2013 }} * {{cite book |last1=Robertson |first1=Michael |last2=Walter |first2=Garry |title=Ethics and Mental Health: The Patient, Profession and Community |publisher=CRC Press |isbn=978-1-4441-6864-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kaN7AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 |language=en |date=2013 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Roetz |first1=Heiner |title=Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age: A Reconstruction under the Aspect of the Breakthrough Toward Postconventional Thinking |publisher=SUNY Press |isbn=978-1-4384-1762-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BV2NjFqsUTEC&pg=PA243 |language=en |date=1993 }} * {{cite book |last1=Roetz |first1=Heiner |title=Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age: A Reconstruction Under the Aspect of the Breakthrough Toward Postconventional Thinking |publisher=SUNY Press |isbn=978-1-4384-1762-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BV2NjFqsUTEC&pg=PA243 |language=en |date=1993 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Ross |first1=Benjamin |title=The Philosophy of Transhumanism: A Critical Analysis |publisher=Emerald Group Publishing |isbn=978-1-83982-622-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jy3fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA134 |language=en |date=2020 }} * {{cite book |last1=Ross |first1=Benjamin |title=The Philosophy of Transhumanism: A Critical Analysis |publisher=Emerald Group Publishing |isbn=978-1-83982-622-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jy3fDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA134 |language=en |date=2020 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Rossiter |first1=Elliot |title=Hedonism and Natural Law in Locke’s Moral Philosophy |journal=Journal of the History of Philosophy |volume=54 |issue=2 |doi=10.1353/hph.2016.0044 |date=2016 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Rossiter |first1=Elliot |title=Hedonism and Natural Law in Locke's Moral Philosophy |journal=Journal of the History of Philosophy |volume=54 |issue=2 |doi=10.1353/hph.2016.0044 |date=2016 |pages=203–225 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Schmitter |first1=Amy M. |title=17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions > Hobbes on the Emotions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD3Hobbes.html |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 October 2024 |language=en |date=2021 }} * {{cite web |last1=Schmitter |first1=Amy M. |title=17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions > Hobbes on the Emotions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD3Hobbes.html |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 October 2024 |language=en |date=2021 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Schultz |first1=Bart |editor1-last=Crimmins |editor1-first=James E. |title=The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-1-350-02168-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fQVpDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA514 |language=en |chapter=Singer, Peter (b. 1946) |date=2017 }} * {{cite book |last1=Schultz |first1=Bart |editor1-last=Crimmins |editor1-first=James E. |title=The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-1-350-02168-6 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fQVpDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA514 |language=en |chapter=Singer, Peter (b. 1946) |date=2017 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Schultz |first1=Barton |title=Henry Sidgwick |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 October 2024 |date=2024 }} * {{cite web |last1=Schultz |first1=Barton |title=Henry Sidgwick |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sidgwick/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 October 2024 |date=2024 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Seligman |first1=Martin E. P. |last2=Csikszentmihalyi |first2=Mihaly |title=Positive psychology: An introduction. |journal=American Psychologist |volume=55 |issue=1 |doi=10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.5 |date=2000 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Seligman |first1=Martin E. P. |last2=Csikszentmihalyi |first2=Mihaly |title=Positive Psychology: An Introduction |journal=American Psychologist |volume=55 |issue=1 |doi=10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.5 |date=2000 |pages=5–14 |pmid=11392865 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Sheridan |first1=Patricia |title=Locke’s Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 October 2024 |date=2024 }} * {{cite web |last1=Sheridan |first1=Patricia |title=Locke's Moral Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-moral/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=14 October 2024 |date=2024 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Shriver |first1=Adam |title=The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain to Subjective Well-Being |journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology |volume=5 |issue=1 |doi=10.1007/s13164-013-0171-2 |date=2014 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Shriver |first1=Adam |title=The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain to Subjective Well-Being |journal=Review of Philosophy and Psychology |volume=5 |issue=1 |doi=10.1007/s13164-013-0171-2 |date=2014 |pages=135–153 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Simpson |first1=David |title=Lucretius |url=https://iep.utm.edu/lucretiu/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=14 October 2024}} * {{cite web |last1=Simpson |first1=David |title=Lucretius |url=https://iep.utm.edu/lucretiu/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=14 October 2024}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Singer |first1=Peter |title=The most good you can do: a response to the commentaries |journal=Journal of Global Ethics |volume=12 |issue=2 |doi=10.1080/17449626.2016.1191523 |date=2016 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Singer |first1=Peter |title=The Most Good You Can Do: A Response to the Commentaries |journal=Journal of Global Ethics |volume=12 |issue=2 |doi=10.1080/17449626.2016.1191523 |date=2016 |pages=161–169 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Skelton |first1=Anthony |title=William David Ross |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/william-david-ross/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 October 2024 |date=2022 }} * {{cite web |last1=Skelton |first1=Anthony |title=William David Ross |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/william-david-ross/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 October 2024 |date=2022 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=Tom W. |title=A Report: The Sexual Revolution? |journal=Public Opinion Quarterly |volume=54 |issue=3 |doi=10.1086/269215 |date=1990 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=Tom W. |title=A Report: The Sexual Revolution? |journal=Public Opinion Quarterly |volume=54 |issue=3 |doi=10.1086/269215 |date=1990 |page=415 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Stewart |first1=Robert M. |title=Butler’s Argument Against Psychological Hedonism |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |volume=22 |issue=2 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1992.10717278 |date=1992 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Stewart |first1=Robert M. |title=Butler's Argument Against Psychological Hedonism |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |volume=22 |issue=2 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1992.10717278 |date=1992 |pages=211–221 }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Suardi |first1=Angelo |last2=Sotgiu |first2=Igor |last3=Costa |first3=Tommaso |last4=Cauda |first4=Franco |last5=Rusconi |first5=Maria |title=The neural correlates of happiness: A review of PET and fMRI studies using autobiographical recall methods |journal=Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience |volume=16 |issue=3 |doi=10.3758/s13415-016-0414-7 |date=2016 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Suardi |first1=Angelo |last2=Sotgiu |first2=Igor |last3=Costa |first3=Tommaso |last4=Cauda |first4=Franco |last5=Rusconi |first5=Maria |title=The Neural Correlates of Happiness: A Review of PET and FMRI Studies Using Autobiographical Recall Methods |journal=Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience |volume=16 |issue=3 |doi=10.3758/s13415-016-0414-7 |date=2016 |pages=383–392 |pmid=26912269 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Taylor |first1=C. C. W. |chapter=Hedonism, Ancient |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }} * {{cite book |last1=Taylor |first1=C. C. W. |chapter=Hedonism, Ancient |editor1-last=Honderich |editor1-first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Tiberius |first1=Valerie |editor1-last=Hirose |editor1-first=Iwao |editor2-last=Olson |editor2-first=Jonas |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-022143-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Prudential Value |date=2015 }} * {{cite book |last1=Tiberius |first1=Valerie |editor1-last=Hirose |editor1-first=Iwao |editor2-last=Olson |editor2-first=Jonas |title=The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-022143-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=Prudential Value |date=2015 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Tilley |first1=John J. |title=Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics |publisher=Academic Press |isbn=978-0-12-373932-2 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2012 |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/TILH.pdf |editor-last1=Chadwick |editor-first1=Ruth }} * {{cite book |last1=Tilley |first1=John J. |title=Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics |publisher=Academic Press |isbn=978-0-12-373932-2 |language=en |chapter=Hedonism |date=2012 |url=https://philpapers.org/archive/TILH.pdf |editor-last1=Chadwick |editor-first1=Ruth }}
* {{cite web |last1=Turner-Lauck Wernicki |first1=Abigail |title=Lokayata/Carvaka – Indian Materialism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/indmat/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}} * {{cite web |last1=Turner-Lauck Wernicki |first1=Abigail |title=Lokayata/Carvaka – Indian Materialism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/indmat/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Van der Berg |first1=Servaas |title=Aesthetic hedonism and its critics |journal=Philosophy Compass |volume=15 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/phc3.12645 |date=2020 }} * {{cite journal |last1=Van der Berg |first1=Servaas |title=Aesthetic Hedonism and Its Critics |journal=Philosophy Compass |volume=15 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/phc3.12645 |date=2020 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/VANAHA }}
* {{cite book |last1=Vittersø |first1=Joar |editor1-last=Lopez |editor1-first=Shane J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-34467-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=snys_ihoEigC&pg=PA475 |language=en |chapter=Hedonics |date=2012 }} * {{cite book |last1=Vittersø |first1=Joar |editor1-last=Lopez |editor1-first=Shane J. |title=The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-34467-5 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=snys_ihoEigC&pg=PA475 |language=en |chapter=Hedonics |date=2012 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Vogt |first1=Katja Maria |editor1-last=Harris |editor1-first=William V. |title=Pain and Pleasure in Classical Times |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-37950-3 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004379503/BP000015.xml |language=en |chapter=What is Hedonism? |date=2018 }} * {{cite book |last1=Vogt |first1=Katja Maria |editor1-last=Harris |editor1-first=William V. |title=Pain and Pleasure in Classical Times |publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-37950-3 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004379503/BP000015.xml |language=en |chapter=What Is Hedonism? |date=2018 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wallwork |first1=Ernest |title=Psychoanalysis and Ethics |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-06167-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5hf_KTvrypAC&pg=PA115 |language=en |date=1991 }} * {{cite book |last1=Wallwork |first1=Ernest |title=Psychoanalysis and Ethics |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-06167-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5hf_KTvrypAC&pg=PA115 |language=en |date=1991 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Weijers |first1=Dan |title=Hedonism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}} * {{cite web |last1=Weijers |first1=Dan |title=Hedonism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=13 October 2024}}
* {{cite book |last1=Weijers |first1=Dan |editor1-last=Tonon |editor1-first=Graciela H. |title=Teaching Quality of Life in Different Domains |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-21551-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wvGrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 |language=en |chapter=Teaching Well-Being/Quality of Life from a Philosophical Perspective |date=2019 }} * {{cite book |last1=Weijers |first1=Dan |editor1-last=Tonon |editor1-first=Graciela H. |title=Teaching Quality of Life in Different Domains |publisher=Springer Nature |isbn=978-3-030-21551-4 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wvGrDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 |language=en |chapter=Teaching Well-Being/Quality of Life from a Philosophical Perspective |date=2019 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wieland |first1=Georg |editor1-last=Pope |editor1-first=Stephen J. |title=The Ethics of Aquinas |publisher=Georgetown University Press |isbn=978-0-87840-888-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PtLyH02x60MC&pg=PA59 |language=en |chapter=Happiness (Ia IIae, qq. 1–5) |translator-last1=Kaplan |translator-first1=Grant |date=2002 }} * {{cite book |last1=Wieland |first1=Georg |editor1-last=Pope |editor1-first=Stephen J. |title=The Ethics of Aquinas |publisher=Georgetown University Press |isbn=978-0-87840-888-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PtLyH02x60MC&pg=PA59 |language=en |chapter=Happiness (Ia IIae, qq. 1–5) |translator-last1=Kaplan |translator-first1=Grant |date=2002 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Wilson |first1=Scott D. |title=Animals and Ethics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/animals-and-ethics/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=24 December 2023 |archive-date=July 15, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230715062727/https://iep.utm.edu/animals-and-ethics/ |url-status=live }} * {{cite web |last1=Wilson |first1=Scott D. |title=Animals and Ethics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/animals-and-ethics/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=24 December 2023 |archive-date=July 15, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230715062727/https://iep.utm.edu/animals-and-ethics/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Wilson |first1=Liz |title=Buddhism and Asceticism |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-9780195393521-0206.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies Online |access-date=13 October 2024 |language=en |doi=10.1093/obo/9780195393521-0206 |date=2015}} * {{cite web |last1=Wilson |first1=Liz |title=Buddhism and Asceticism |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-9780195393521-0206.xml |website=Oxford Bibliographies Online |access-date=13 October 2024 |language=en |doi=10.1093/obo/9780195393521-0206 |date=2015}}
* {{cite book |last1=Woodward |first1=Vanessa |title=The Encyclopedia of Corrections |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-118-84542-4 |edition=1 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118845387.wbeoc037 |language=en |chapter=Hedonistic Calculus |date=2017 }} * {{cite book |last1=Woodward |first1=Vanessa |title=The Encyclopedia of Corrections |publisher=Wiley |isbn=978-1-118-84542-4 |edition=1 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118845387.wbeoc037 |language=en |chapter=Hedonistic Calculus |date=2017 |pages=1–4 |doi=10.1002/9781118845387.wbeoc037 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |editor1-last=Wainwright |editor1-first=William |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-803158-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GbcuCf9TlDgC&pg=PA350 |language=en |chapter=Morality and Religion |date=2004 }} * {{cite book |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |editor1-last=Wainwright |editor1-first=William |title=The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-803158-1 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GbcuCf9TlDgC&pg=PA350 |language=en |chapter=Morality and Religion |date=2004 }}
{{refend}} {{refend}}

== Further reading ==
* {{Citation |last=Annas |first=Julia |author-link=Julia Annas |year=1995 |title=The Morality of Happiness |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-509652-5}}
* {{Citation |last=Copleston |first=Frederick Charles |author-link=Frederick Copleston |year=2003 |title=A History of Philosophy: Book 1 |publisher=] |isbn=0-8264-6895-0}}
* {{cite EB1911 |wstitle = Hedonism |short = x }}
* ]. 2006. ''Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism.'' ].
* —— 1997. ''Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy''. ]
* —— 2010. ''What Is This Thing Called Happiness?''. Oxford University Press
*{{Cite book|last=MacAskill |first=William |author-link=William MacAskill |url=https://www.utilitarianism.net/|title=Introduction to Utilitarianism: An Online Textbook|year=2020|location=Oxford|chapter=Elements and Types of Utilitarianism: Hedonism and Theories of Welfare|chapter-url=https://www.utilitarianism.net/types-of-utilitarianism#theories-of-welfare}}
* ]. 2002. ''L'invention du plaisir : fragments cyréaniques''. ].
* —— 2006. ''La puissance d'exister : Manifeste hédoniste''. Grasset & Fasquelle
* ]. ''''.
* {{Citation |last1=Reale |first1=Giovanni |last2=Catan |first2=John R. |year=1986 |title=A History of Ancient Philosophy: From the Origins to Socrates |publisher=SUNY Press |isbn=0-88706-290-3}}
* ]. 1998. ''Hedonistic Utilitarianism''. ]
* ]. 1891. '']''. (Hedonism is prominent throughout the novel, influencing many of the decisions made by the titular protagonist.)
* Socrates and Hedonism: "Protagoras" 351b-358d Donald J.ZEYL


== External links == == External links ==
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Latest revision as of 11:16, 4 January 2025

Family of views prioritizing pleasure For other uses, see Hedonism (disambiguation).

Hedonism is a family of philosophical views that prioritize pleasure. Psychological hedonism is the theory that the underlying motivation of all human behavior is to maximize pleasure and avoid pain. As a form of egoism, it suggests that people only help others if they expect a personal benefit. Axiological hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of intrinsic value. It asserts that other things, like knowledge and money, only have value insofar as they produce pleasure and reduce pain. This view divides into quantitative hedonism, which only considers the intensity and duration of pleasures, and qualitative hedonism, which holds that the value of pleasures also depends on their quality. The closely related position of prudential hedonism states that pleasure and pain are the only factors of well-being. Ethical hedonism applies axiological hedonism to morality, arguing that people have a moral obligation to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Utilitarian versions assert that the goal is to increase overall happiness for everyone, whereas egoistic versions state that each person should only pursue their own pleasure. Outside the academic context, hedonism is a pejorative term for an egoistic lifestyle seeking short-term gratification.

Hedonists typically understand pleasure and pain broadly to include any positive or negative experience. While traditionally seen as bodily sensations, contemporary philosophers tend to view them as attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects. Hedonists often use the term happiness for the balance of pleasure over pain. The subjective nature of these phenomena makes it difficult to measure this balance and compare it between different people. The paradox of hedonism and the hedonic treadmill are proposed psychological barriers to the hedonist goal of long-term happiness.

As one of the oldest philosophical theories, hedonism was discussed by the Cyrenaics and Epicureans in ancient Greece, the Charvaka school in ancient India, and Yangism in ancient China. It attracted less attention in the medieval period but became a central topic in the modern era with the rise of utilitarianism. Various criticisms of hedonism emerged in the 20th century, while its proponents suggested new versions to meet these challenges. Hedonism remains relevant to many fields, ranging from psychology and economics to animal ethics.

Types

The term hedonism refers not to a single theory but to a family of theories about the role of pleasure. These theories are often categorized into psychological, axiological, and ethical hedonism depending on whether they study the relation between pleasure and motivation, value, or right action. While these distinctions are common in contemporary philosophy, earlier philosophers did not always clearly differentiate between them and sometimes combined several views in their theories. The word hedonism derives from the Ancient Greek word ἡδονή (hēdonē), meaning 'pleasure'. Its earliest known use in the English language is from the 1850s.

Psychological hedonism

Painting of Thomas Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes was a key advocate of psychological hedonism.

Psychological or motivational hedonism is the view that all human actions aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain. It is an empirical view about what motivates people, both on the conscious and the unconscious levels. Psychological hedonism is usually understood as a form of egoism, meaning that people strive to increase their own happiness. This implies that a person is only motivated to help others if it is in their own interest because they expect a personal benefit from it. As a theory of human motivation, psychological hedonism does not imply that all behavior leads to pleasure. For example, if a person holds mistaken beliefs or lacks necessary skills, they may attempt to produce pleasure but fail to attain the intended outcome.

The standard form of psychological hedonism asserts that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the only sources of all motivation. Some psychological hedonists propose weaker formulations, suggesting that considerations of pleasure and pain influence most actions to some extent or limiting their role to certain conditions. For example, reflective or rationalizing hedonism says that human motivation is only driven by pleasure and pain when people actively reflect on the overall consequences. Another version is genetic hedonism, which accepts that people desire various things besides pleasure but asserts that each desire has its origin in a desire for pleasure.

Proponents of psychological hedonism often highlight its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, arguing that many desires directly focus on pleasure while the others have an indirect focus by aiming at the means to bring about pleasure. Critics of psychological hedonism often cite apparent counterexamples in which people act for reasons other than their personal pleasure. Proposed examples include acts of genuine altruism, such as a soldier sacrificing themselves on the battlefield to save their comrades or a parent wanting their children to be happy. Critics also mention non-altruistic cases, like a desire for posthumous fame. It is an open question to what extent these cases can be explained as types of pleasure-seeking behavior.

Axiological hedonism

Axiological or evaluative hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of intrinsic value. An entity has intrinsic value or is good in itself if its worth does not depend on external factors. Intrinsic value contrasts with instrumental value, which is the value of things that lead to other good things. According to axiological hedonism, pleasure is intrinsically valuable because it is good even when it produces no external benefit. Money, by contrast, is only instrumentally good because it can be used to obtain other good things but lacks value apart from these uses. Axiological hedonism asserts that only pleasure has intrinsic value whereas other things only have instrumental value to the extent that they lead to pleasure or the avoidance of pain. The overall value of a thing depends on both its intrinsic and instrumental value. In some cases, even unpleasant things, like a painful surgery, can be overall good, according to axiological hedonism, if their positive consequences make up for the unpleasantness.

Prudential hedonism is a form of axiological hedonism that focuses specifically well-being or what is good for an individual. It states that pleasure and pain are the sole factors of well-being, meaning that how good a life is for a person only depends on its balance of pleasure over pain. Prudential hedonism allows for the possibility that other things than well-being have intrinsic value, such as beauty or freedom.

According to quantitative hedonism, the intrinsic value of pleasure depends solely on its intensity and duration. Qualitative hedonists hold that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor. They argue, for instance, that subtle pleasures of the mind, like the enjoyment of fine art and philosophy, can be more valuable than simple bodily pleasures, like enjoying food and drink, even if their intensity is lower.

Photo of Robert Nozick
Robert Nozick's experience machine is an influential thought experiment against hedonism.

Proponents of axiological hedonism often focus on intuitions about the relation between pleasure and value or on the observation that pleasure is desirable. The idea that most pleasures are valuable in some form is relatively uncontroversial. However, the stronger claim that all pleasures are valuable and that they are the only source of intrinsic value is subject to debate. Some critics assert that certain pleasures are worthless or even bad, like disgraceful and sadistic pleasures. A different criticism comes from value pluralists, who contend that other things besides pleasure have value. To support the idea that beauty is an additional source of value, G. E. Moore used a thought experiment involving two worlds: one exceedingly beautiful and the other a heap of filth. He argued that the beautiful world is better even if there is no one to enjoy it. Another influential thought experiment, proposed by Robert Nozick, involves an experience machine able to create artificial pleasures. Based on his observation that most people would not want to spend the rest of their lives in this type of pleasant illusion, he argued that hedonism cannot account for the values of authenticity and genuine experience.

Ethical hedonism

Bust of Epicurus
Epicurus developed a nuanced form of ethical hedonism, arguing that a tranquil state of mind cultivated through moderation leads to the greatest overall happiness.

Ethical or normative hedonism is the thesis that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the highest moral principles of human behavior. It implies that other moral considerations, like duty, justice, or virtue, are relevant only to the extent that they influence pleasure and pain.

Theories of ethical hedonism can be divided into egoistic and utilitarian theories. Egoistic hedonism says that each person should only pursue their own pleasure. According to this controversial view, a person only has a moral reason to care about the happiness of others if this happiness impacts their own well-being. For example, if a person feels guilty about harming others, they have a reason not to do so. However, a person would be free to harm others, and would even be morally required to, if they overall benefit from it.

Utilitarian hedonism, also called classical utilitarianism, asserts that everyone's happiness matters. It says that a person should maximize the sum total of happiness of everybody affected by their actions. This sum total includes the person's own happiness, but it is only one factor among many without any special preference compared to the happiness of others. As a result, utilitarian hedonism sometimes requires of people to forego their own enjoyment to benefit others. For example, philosopher Peter Singer argues that good earners should donate a significant portion of their income to charities since this money can produce more happiness for people in need.

Ethical hedonism is often understood as a form of consequentialism, which asserts that an act is right if it has the best consequences. It is typically combined with axiological hedonism, which links the intrinsic value of consequences to pleasure and pain. As a result, the arguments for and against axiological hedonism also apply to ethical hedonism.

Others

Aesthetic hedonism is a theory about the nature of aesthetic value or beauty. It states that a thing, like a landscape, a painting, or a song, has aesthetic value if people are pleased by it or get aesthetic pleasure from it. It is a subjective theory because it focuses on how people respond to aesthetically engaging things. It contrasts with objective theories, which assert that aesthetic value only depends on objective or mind-independent features of things, like symmetry or harmonic composition. Some aesthetic hedonists believe that any type of pleasure is relevant to the aesthetic value of a thing. Others offer a more nuanced characterization, saying that aesthetic value is only based on how people with a well-developed taste respond to it.

Outside the academic contexts of philosophy and psychology, the word hedonism is often used in a more narrow sense as a pejorative term. Sometimes called folk hedonism, it describes a lifestyle dedicated to the egoistic pursuit of short-term gratification. For example, a person who indulges in sex and drugs without concern for the long-term consequences of their behavior is acting hedonistically in this sense. The negative connotation of the term is associated with a lack of interest or foresight regarding the potential harm or ethical implications of such actions. Negative consequences can impact both the individual and the people around them, affecting areas such as health, financial stability, relationships, and societal responsibilities. Most philosophical hedonists reject the idea that a lifestyle characterized by folk hedonism leads to long-term happiness.

Basic concepts

Pleasure and pain

Main articles: Pleasure and Pain
Photo of statue Bacchante and Infant Faun
Bacchante and Infant Faun by Frederick William MacMonnies, 1894

Pleasure and pain are fundamental experiences about what is attractive and aversive, influencing how people feel, think, and act. They play a central role in all forms of hedonism. Both pleasure and pain come in degrees corresponding to their intensity. They are typically understood as a continuum ranging from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees. However, some hedonists reject the idea that pleasure and pain form a symmetric pair and suggest instead that avoiding pain is more important than producing pleasure.

The nature of pleasure and pain is disputed and affects the plausibility of various versions of hedonism. In everyday language, these concepts are often understood in a narrow sense associated with specific phenomena, like the pleasure of food and sex or the pain of an injury. However, hedonists usually take a wider perspective in which pleasure and pain cover any positive or negative experiences. In this broad sense, anything that feels good is a pleasure, including the joy of watching a sunset, whereas anything that feels bad is a pain, including the sorrow of losing a loved one. A traditionally influential position says that pleasure and pain are specific bodily sensations, similar to the sensations of hot and cold. A more common view in contemporary philosophy holds that pleasure and pain are attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects. This view implies that they do not have a specific location in the body and do not arise in isolation since they are always directed at an object that people enjoy or suffer.

Measurement

Both philosophers and psychologists are interested in methods of measuring pleasure and pain to guide decision-making and gain a deeper understanding of their causes. A common approach is to use self-report questionnaires in which people are asked to quantify how pleasant or unpleasant an experience is. For example, some questionnaires use a nine-point scale from -4 for the most unpleasant experiences, to +4 for the most pleasant ones. Some methods rely on memory and ask individuals to retrospectively assess their experiences. A different approach is for individuals to evaluate their experiences while they are happening to avoid biases and inaccuracies introduced by memory.

In either form, the measurement of pleasure and pain poses various challenges. As a highly subjective phenomenon, it is difficult to establish a standardized metric. Moreover, asking people to rate their experiences using an artificially constructed scale may not accurately reflect their subjective experiences. A closely related problem concerns comparisons between individuals since different people may use the scales differently and thus arrive at different values even if they had similar experiences. Neuroscientists avoid some of these challenges by using neuroimaging techniques such as PET scans and fMRI. However, this approach comes with new difficulties of its own since the neurological basis of happiness is not yet fully understood.

Based on the idea that individual experiences of pleasure and pain can be quantified, Jeremy Bentham proposed the hedonistic calculus as a method to combine various episodes to arrive at their total contribution to happiness. This makes it possible to quantitatively compare different courses of action based on the experiences they produce to choose the course with the highest overall contribution to happiness. Bentham considered several factors for each pleasurable experience: its intensity and duration, the likelihood that it occurs, its temporal distance, the likelihood that it causes further experiences of pleasure and pain, and the number of people affected. Some simplified versions of the hedonic calculus focus primarily on what is intrinsically valuable to a person and only consider two factors: intensity and duration.

Happiness, well-being, and eudaimonia

Main articles: Happiness, Well-being, and Eudaimonia

Some theorists formulate hedonism in terms of happiness rather than pleasure and pain. According to a common interpretation, happiness is the balance of pleasure over pain. This means that a person is happy if they have more pleasure than pain and unhappy if the balance is overall negative. There are also other ways to understand happiness that do not fully align with the traditional account of hedonism. One view defines happiness as life satisfaction. This means that a person is happy if they have a favorable attitude toward their life, for example, by being satisfied with their life as a whole or by judging it to be good overall. This attitude may be affected by the balance of pleasure over pain but can also be shaped by other factors.

Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person. According to a common view, pleasure is one component of well-being. It is controversial whether it is the only factor and what other factors there are, such as health, knowledge, and friendship. Another approach focuses on desires, saying that well-being consists in the satisfaction of desires. The view that the balance of pleasure over pain is the only source of well-being is called prudential hedonism.

Eudaimonia is a form of well-being rooted in ancient Greek thought, serving as a foundation of many forms of moral philosophy during this period. Aristotle understood eudaimonia as a type of flourishing in which a person is happy by leading a fulfilling life and manifesting their inborn capacities. Ethical theories based on eudaimonia often share parallels with hedonism, like an interest in long-term happiness, but are distinguished from it by their emphasis of virtues, advocating an active lifestyle focused on self-realization.

Paradox of hedonism and hedonic treadmill

Main articles: Paradox of hedonism and Hedonic treadmill

The paradox of hedonism is the thesis that the direct pursuit of pleasure is counterproductive. It says that conscious attempts to become happy usually backfire, acting as obstacles to one's personal happiness. According to one interpretation, the best way to produce pleasure is to follow other endeavors, with pleasure being a by-product rather than the goal itself. For example, this view suggests that a tennis player who tries to win a game may enjoy the activity more than a tennis player who tries to maximize their enjoyment. It is controversial to what extent the paradox of hedonism is true since, at least in some cases, the pursuit of pleasure is successful.

A related phenomenon, the hedonic treadmill is the theory that people return to a stable level of happiness after significant positive or negative changes to their life circumstances. This suggests that good or bad events affect a person's happiness temporarily but not in the long term—their overall level of happiness tends to revert to a baseline as they get used to the changed situation. For instance, studies on lottery winners indicate that their happiness initially increases as the newly acquired wealth augments their living standards but returns to its original level after about one year. If true, this effect would undermine efforts to increase happiness in the long term, including personal efforts to lead a healthy lifestyle and social efforts to create a free, just, and prosperous society. While there is some empirical support for this effect, it is controversial how strong this tendency is and whether it applies to all fields or only to certain aspects of life.

Non-hedonism and asceticism

Non-hedonist theories reject certain aspects of hedonism. One form of non-hedonism says that pleasure is one thing in life that matters but not the only thing. Another form argues that some pleasures are good while others are bad. The strongest rejection of hedonism, sometimes termed anti-hedonism, claims that all pleasures are bad. Motivations to adopt this view include the idea that pleasure is an irrational emotion and that the pursuit of pleasure is an obstacle that prevents people from leading a good life.

Asceticism is a lifestyle dedicated to a program of self-discipline that renounces worldly pleasures. It can take various forms, including abstinence from sex and drugs, fasting, withdrawal from society, and practices like prayer and meditation. This lifestyle is often motivated by religious aspirations to become close to the divine, reach a heightened spiritual state, or purify oneself. Most forms of asceticism are opposed to hedonism and its pursuit of pleasure. However, there are forms of ascetic hedonism that combine the two views, for example, by asserting that the right form of ascetic practice leads to higher overall happiness by replacing simple sensory pleasures with deeper and more meaningful spiritual pleasures.

History

Ancient

Picture of Aristippus
Aristippus of Cyrene is often seen as the first proponent of philosophical hedonism.

Hedonism is one of the oldest philosophical theories and some interpreters trace it back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, written around 2100–2000 BCE. A central topic in ancient Greek thought, Aristippus of Cyrene (435-356 BCE) is usually identified as its earliest philosophical proponent. As a student of Socrates (c. 469–399 BCE), he formulated a hedonistic egoism, arguing that personal pleasure is the highest good. He and the school of Cyrenaics he inspired focused on the gratification of immediate sensory pleasures with little concern for long-term consequences. Plato (c. 428–347 BCE) critiqued this view and proposed a more balanced pursuit of pleasure that aligns with virtue and rationality. Following a similar approach, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) associated pleasure with eudaimonia or the realization of natural human capacities, like reason.

Epicurus (341–271 BCE) developed a nuanced form of hedonism that contrasts with the indulgence in immediate gratification proposed by the Cyrenaics. He argued that excessive desires and anxiety result in suffering, suggesting instead that people practice moderation, cultivate a tranquil state of mind, and avoid pain. Following Antisthenes (c. 446—366 BCE), the Cynics warned against the pursuit of pleasure, viewing it as an obstacle to freedom. The Stoics also dismissed a hedonistic lifestyle, focusing on virtue and integrity instead of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Lucretius (c. 99–55 BCE) further expanded on Epicureanism, highlighting the importance of overcoming obstacles to personal happiness, such as the fear of death.

In ancient India, the Charvaka school developed a hedonistic egoism, starting between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. Their belief in the non-existence of God or an afterlife led them to advocate for enjoying life in the present to the fullest. Many other Indian traditions rejected this view and recommended a more ascetic lifestyle, a tendency common among Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain schools of thought. In ancient China, Yang Zhu (c. 440–360 BCE) argued that it is human nature to follow self-interest and satisfy personal desires. His hedonistic egoism inspired the subsequent school of Yangism.

Medieval

Hedonist philosophy received less attention in medieval philosophy. The early Christian philosopher Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), was critical of the hedonism found in ancient Greek philosophy, warning of the dangers of earthly pleasures as obstacles to a spiritual life dedicated to God. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) developed a nuanced perspective on hedonism, characterized by some interpreters as spiritual hedonism. He held that humans are naturally inclined to seek happiness, arguing that the only way to truly satisfy this inclination is through a beatific vision of God. In Islamic philosophy, the problem of pleasure played a central role in the philosophy of al-Razi (c. 864—925 or 932 CE). Similar to Epicureanism, he recommended a life of moderation avoiding the extremes of excess and asceticism. Both al-Farabi (c. 878–950 CE) and Avicenna (980–1037 CE) asserted that a form of intellectual happiness, reachable only in the afterlife, is the highest human good.

Modern and contemporary

At the transition to the early modern period, Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406–1457) synthesized Epicurean hedonism with Christian ethics, suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues. Hedonism gained prominence during the Age of Enlightenment. According to Thomas Hobbes's (1588–1679) psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation. John Locke (1632–1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil. Joseph Butler (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects. According to David Hume (1711–1776), pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions. The libertine novels of Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or sexual restraint.

Painting of Jeremy Bentham
Jeremy Bentham formulated a universal form of hedonism that takes everyone's pleasure into account.

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) developed an influential form of hedonism known as classical utilitarianism. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the hedonic calculus to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration. His student John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body. Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided. An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by Franz Brentano (1838–1917). He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objects—a position also later defended by Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999). Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early psychoanalytic theory. He stated that the pleasure principle describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the reality principle represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences.

The 20th century saw various criticisms of hedonism. G. E. Moore (1873–1958) rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his axiological pluralism, there are other sources, such as beauty and knowledge, a criticism also shared by W. D. Ross (1877–1971). Both C. D. Broad (1887–1971) and Richard Brandt (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value. Robert Nozick (1938–2002) used his experience machine thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality.

In response to these and similar criticisms, Fred Feldman (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved. Peter Singer (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about animal welfare. He has advocated effective altruism, relying on empirical evidence and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact. Inspired by the philosophy of Albert Camus (1913–1960), Michel Onfray (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form. David Pearce (1959–present) has developed a transhumanist version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from genetic engineering to nanotechnology, to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future. The emergence of positive psychology at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism.

In various fields

Positive psychology studies how to cultivate happiness and promote optimal human functioning. Unlike traditional psychology, which often focuses on psychopathology, positive psychology emphasizes that optimal functioning goes beyond merely the absence of mental illness. On the individual level, it investigates experiences of pleasure and pain and the role of character traits. On the societal level, it examines how social institutions impact human well-being.

Hedonic psychology or hedonics is one of the main pillars of positive psychology by studying pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences. It investigates and compares different states of consciousness associated with pleasure and pain, ranging from joy and satisfaction to boredom and sorrow. It also examines the role or biological function of these states, such as signaling to individuals what to approach and avoid, and their purpose as reward and punishment to reinforce or discourage future behavioral patterns. Additionally, hedonic psychology explores the circumstances that evoke these experiences, on both the biological and social levels. It includes questions about psychological obstacles to pleasure, such as anhedonia, which is a reduced ability to experience pleasure, and hedonophobia, which is a fear or aversion to pleasure. Positive psychology in general and hedonic psychology in particular are relevant to hedonism by providing a scientific understanding of the experiences of pleasure and pain and the processes impacting them.

In the field of economics, welfare economics examines how economic activities affect social welfare. It is often understood as a form of normative economics that uses considerations of welfare to evaluate economic processes and policies. Hedonist approaches to welfare economics state that pleasure is the main criterion of this evaluation, meaning that economic activities should aim to promote societal happiness. The economics of happiness is a closely related field studying the relation between economic phenomena, such as wealth, and individual happiness. Economists also employ hedonic regression, a method used to estimate the value of commodities based on their utility or effect on the owner's pleasure.

Photo of Peter Singer
Peter Singer has applied utilitarianism to problems of animal ethics.

Animal ethics is the branch of ethics studying human behavior towards other animals. Hedonism is an influential position in this field as a theory about animal welfare. It emphasizes that humans have the responsibility to consider the impact of their actions on how animals feel to minimize harm done to them. Some quantitative hedonists suggest that there is no significant difference between the pleasure and pain experienced by humans and other animals. As a result of this view, moral considerations about promoting the happiness of other people apply equally to all sentient animals. This position is modified by some qualitative hedonists, who argue that human experiences carry more weight because they include higher forms of pleasure and pain.

While many religious traditions are critical of hedonism, some have embraced it or certain aspects of it, such as Christian hedonism. Elements of hedonism are also found in various forms of popular culture, such as consumerism, the entertainment industry, and the enduring influences of the sexual revolution.

References

Notes

  1. A more controversial objection asserts that all pleasures are bad.
  2. Another historically influential argument, first formulated by Socrates, suggests that a pleasurable life void of any higher cognitive processes, like the life of a happy oyster, is not the best form of life.
  3. Some definitions do not distinguish between ethical and axiological hedonism, and define ethical hedonism in terms of intrinsic values rather than right action.
  4. In this context the term "pro-attitude" is also used.
  5. Some interpreters question whether Yang Zhu is a historical or a mythical figure.
  6. It is controversial whether al-Razi's position is a form of hedonism.
  7. According to this view, for instance, the pleasure of reading a novel is a positive attitude towards the novel.
  8. Singer was initially a proponent of preference utilitarianism but has shifted his position in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.
  9. In a different sense, the term hedonics is also used in ethics for the study of the relation between pleasure and duty.

Citations

  2. Gosling 1998, § 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism
  4. Oxford University Press 2024
  5. ^
  8. Bruton 2024
  9. Weijers, § 1c. Motivational Hedonism
  11. Tilley 2012, § IV. Psychological Hedonism
    • Weijers, § 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism
    • Tilley 2012, § III. Axiological Hedonism
  15. ^ Tilley 2012, § III. Axiological Hedonism
  18. ^
  19. Weijers, Lead section
  20. Feldman 2004, pp. 38–39
  22. Feldman 2004, pp. 51–52
  24. ^
  25. Moore 2019, Lead section, § 2. Ethical Hedonism
    • Weijers, § 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1e. Hedonistic Egoism
    • Tilley 2012, § II. Ethical Hedonism
    • Weijers, § 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1f. Hedonistic Utilitarianism
    • Tilley 2012, § II. Ethical Hedonism
  29. Singer 2016, pp. 163, 165
    • Weijers, § 1a. Folk Hedonism
    • Buscicchi, § 1. Condensed Conceptual History, § 2. Paradoxes of Hedonism
  35. Alston 2006, § Demarcation of the Topic
  39. Weijers, § 4b. Pleasure as Sensation
  41. ^
  42. Suardi et al. 2016, pp. 383–385
  56. Dehsen 2013, p. 178
  58. Dehsen 2013, p. 156
  60. Dehsen 2013, p. 13
    • Gosling 1998, § 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism
    • Pigliucci, § 1d. Debates with Other Hellenistic Schools
  66. Norden & Ivanhoe 2023, p. 111
  68. Gosling 1998, § 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism
  69. Dehsen 2013, p. 16
  72. ^
  73. Dehsen 2013, p. 63
  74. Dehsen 2013, p. 19
  76. Nauta 2021, § 4. Moral Philosophy
  77. Blakemore & Jennett 2001, § Pleasure and the Enlightenment
  78. Dehsen 2013, p. 88
  81. Dehsen 2013, p. 91
  83. Airaksinen 1995, pp. 11, 78–80
  84. Dehsen 2013, p. 25
  86. Dehsen 2013, p. 132
  89. Dehsen 2013, p. 144
  91. Kriegel 2018, p. 2
  92. Massin 2013, pp. 307–308
  95. Crisp 2011, pp. 43–44
  96. Bunnin & Yu 2009, p. 443
  112. Graham 2012, pp. 6–8
  114. Miligan 2015, p. 26

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