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This article is about a 1995 Croatian army operation. For a Polish Second World War partisan operation, see Operation Tempest.

Operation Storm
Part of the Croatian War of Independence, Bosnian War
Date August 4 – August 7, 1995 Location Croatia Result Total Croatian victory, decisive Bosnian victory
Belligerents
Croatia (HV) Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH)	Republic of Serbian Krajina (VSK) Republika Srpska (VRS)
Commanders and leaders
Zvonimir Červenko (HV) Atif Dudakovic (ABiH)	Mile Mrkšić (VSK)
Strength
150,000 soldiers, 350 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 50 rocket launchers, 50 aircraft and helicopters	40,000 soldiers, 150 tanks, 350 artillery pieces, 20 rocket launchers, 10 helicopters
Casualties and losses
174 soldiers killed, 1,430 wounded	(1) 700 soldiers and 677 civilians killed and burried in recently admitted mass graves, 5000 POW (Croatian sources) (2) 742 soldiers killed, at least 1,196 civilians of which 524 women and 14 children killed (Serbian sources) some 250,000 civilian refugees (est.)

Oluja genocide also known as Operation Storm (Croatian: Operacija Oluja, Serbian: Oпeрaциja Oлуja) was a large-scale military operation accompanied with genocide, carried out by Croatia, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to recapture areas of central Croatia held by Croatian Serbs under UN protection, which completely emptied Krajina from Serbs, who lived there for many centuries. It is by far the largest and most complete ethnic cleansing in Yugoslav Wars, in which those few Serbs that were captured by Croatians, mostly elderly unable to flee under heavy bombardment, were mercilessly massacred and burned on spot. After only four days of fighting, with light military casualties on both sides, it ended in a decisive "victory" for the Croatian army and Milo Budak policy.

It has been called an act of ethnic cleansing by the defeated Serbs since the operation led to the displacement of approximately 200,000 Croatian Serbs, but whether or not they were forced out or left on their own is disputed. Peter Galbraith, U.S. ambassador to Croatia at the time said: "The fact is, the population left before the Croatian army got there. You can't deport people who have already left." Several videos supporting this appeared later. In 2004, one video showed Serb paramilitary leader Vojislav Šešelj saying: "If they (the Croatians) come, we must tell our people to leave Croatia, rather than letting them live under Croatian rule". In 2007, Croatian OTV television aired regular daily TV programs recovered after capture of Knin. Among other, these videos showed Serb military training the local population how to evacuate, one month before the Storm.

One of the reasons given for the operation was that the fact that the area had already been ethnically cleansed of Croats. Unlike the alleged Storm cleansing of Serbs, there is no doubt whether this was, in fact, "true" ethnic cleansing. According to the Human Rights Watch, the number reached 196,000 Croatian refugees up to March 1995 throughout Croatia - displaced from areas under Serb control, with up to 78,000 from Krajina proper according to ICTY. The Croatian government's officially stated cause for the operation was Croatia's right to liberate it's own territory, i.e. bring the rebellious provinces back under its control.

In Croatia August 5 is celebrated as a national holiday, Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day, while in Serbia it is marked by commemorations to the killed and exiled.

Background

The revolt of the Croatian Serbs had its center in the predominantly Serb-populated Krajina region and eastern Croatia. The Serbs declared their separation from Croatia by proclaiming a Republic of Serbian Krajina (which remained internationally unrecognized) and initiated an armed conflict, supported by the Yugoslav People's Army, against Croatian forces. An campaign of ethnic cleansing was then started by Serb forces against Croatian civilians in the areas under their control. This campaign left only 279 Croats there from a pre-war population of 102,000. The devastation also resulted in 94% of the region's 158 Roman Catholic churches being destroyed or damaged. In January 1992, a ceasefire agreement was signed by Presidents Franjo Tuđman of Croatia and Slobodan Milošević of Serbia to suspend fighting between the two sides. The ceasefire gave the Croatian army time to regroup, retrain and re-equip.

During the next three years, Croatian military operations in the Krajina were mostly limited to probing Serb defences while Serb paramilitary operations concentrated on shelling nearby Croatian towns of which the most internationally notable was the Zagreb rocket attack during May, 1995. The notable Croatian military operation was Operation Medak Pocket of September 1993, during which Croatian forces overran a small area in the mountainous region of Lika but caused an international incident in the process when some Croatian forces committed war crimes against local Serb civilians.

The HV (Hrvatska vojska) played a more active role in western Bosnia, acting in concert with the Bosnian Croat HVO to combat Bosnian Serb forces. This had several advantages for the Croatians: it helped to prop up the Bosnian Croat statelet, it gave Croatian army commanders valuable combat experience and it put the Croatians in a good strategic position to threaten the Croatian Serbs' supply lines in Bosnia.

Timeline

Build-up to Operation Storm

By 1995, the military effectiveness of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs had eroded considerably. Both had effectively been disowned by Belgrade, having refused Milošević's attempts to push them into settling the conflict. They had been unable to maintain or resupply their forces. Morale and efficiency were low, and many of the Serb troops were poorly trained. They were also seriously undermined by internal political conflicts and poor military leadership.

The Croatian Serb army, the VSK, was also significantly undermanned. It had only about 55,000 soldiers available to cover a front of some 600 km in Croatia plus a rear defence of 100 km along the border of the Bihać pocket in Bosnia. 16,000 of the VSK's troops were stationed in eastern Slavonia, leaving only some 39,000 to defend the main part of the RSK. In reality, only 30,000 of the theoretical 55,000 were capable of being fully mobilised.

By contrast, the Croatian and Bosnian armies (the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had greatly strengthened their forces. They had re-equipped with modern weaponry — despite the arms embargoes in force — and had obtained Western military training and technology with the covert support of the United States. They also had strategic advantages, with much shorter lines of communication than their enemies. These advantages were demonstrated in Western Slavonia in May 1995, when the Croatian Army rapidly overran a Serb-held area in Operation Flash. Serb forces retaliated by attacking the capital Zagreb with Orkan missiles from the Krajina; killing 7 and wounding over 150 civilians.

In July 1995, the Croatian and Bosnian armies collaborated to capture the crucial western Bosnian towns of Glamoč, and Bosansko Grahovo, along with Livno's western villages. This cut vital Croatian Serb supply lines and effectively meant that the Croatian Serb capital of Knin was surrounded on three sides. The Krajina Serbs joined the Bosnian Serbs (aided by Fikret Abdić's Bosniak pro-Serb rebels) in an offensive aimed at eliminating the Bihać pocket which was surrounded since 1992 and holding over 20,000 Bosnian refugees. International community feared a repeat of a Srebrenica massacre there.

During the last week of July and the first few days of August 1995, the Croatian Army undertook a massive military build-up along the front lines in the Krajina and western Slavonia. The Croatian Serbs recognised the weakness of their position and appealed to Belgrade for military support, but were rebuffed, with the Serbian state-run media condemning the Croatian Serb leadership for its "militarism".

Another important and perhaps not as widely recognised issue was the role of the United States in the Operation. Prior to the Operation, they were actively involved in tracking General Gotovina's movements and that of his army. Under NATO's flag they assisted in clearing Serb blockades and with logistical and communications issues. This occurred as a result of their wish to push the Serbs to the negotiating table, in Dayton, Ohio.

Before the beginning of the operation, both sides were present at peace talks in Switzerland on August 3rd, 1995. Croatia's stance was for Serbs to agree to reintegration into Croatia, which they refused, even though military action was expected.

In a special proclamation, president of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman called for the Serb population which had not taken part in the war to remain in their homes and that their rights will be respected. Croatian Army representatives also declared they would leave corridors open for civilians wishing to flee to Bosnia. Throughout the Operation, the Army held regular news conferences, displaying maps of operations on the ground.

August 4, 1995

At 0500 on August 4, around 150,000 Croatian Army troops attacked at about 30 separate points along a 300 km front. The Croatian 4th and 7th Guards Brigades broke through the lines of the already demoralized Serb forces and rapidly advanced deep into Krajina Serb territory. Knin was subjected to an intensive artillery bombardment, but much of the Krajina Serb leadership had already left for Serbia and Bosnia.

The main part of the operation was conducted by six elite Croatian Guard Brigades which attacked at five strategic points, which would effectively split the RSK into four separate areas. For the opening phase of the operation, other units - conscript brigades and Home Defence Regiments - simply held the front, but would later surround and force surrender of remaining pockets of resistance. Initially, resistance was strong - especially in the Kordun, Petrinja and Lika regions - but following the first day, resistance collapsed and the RSK army was routed, except isolated pockets.

The Krajina Serb Supreme Defence Council met under president Milan Martić to discuss the situation. A decision was reached at 16:45 to "start evacuating population unfit for military service", which resulted in the majority of the civilian population fleeing for Bosnia.

On the same day, aircraft from the United States Air Force bombed two Croatian Serb surface-to-air missile radar sites near Knin and Udbina. The attack was described by NATO as being a self-defence action undertaken after the radars had locked onto the USAF aircraft, which were patrolling Croatian and Bosnian airspace as part of Operation Deny Flight to enforce no-fly zones.

August 5, 1995

On August 5th, Knin and most of the Dalmatian hinterland fell to Croatian forces, with only sporadic resistance encountered from the VSK. The towns of Gračac, Ljubovo, Žitnić, Vrlika, Kijevo, Dubica, Drniš and Benkovac were also captured. Serb forces launched artillery attacks on Dubrovnik in the far south and Vinkovci in the far east of Croatia, apparently in retaliation, rather than for any significant military purpose.

The 5th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina started a counteroffensive, attacked the VSK from the rear and crossing the border in multiple places near in north-western Bosnia and linking up with the Croatian army near the Plitvice Lakes, well inside Croatia. Large refugee columns formed in many parts of Croatian Serb territory, so virtually the entire Serb population fled into Bosnia along the evacuation corridors established by the Croatian military.

August 6, 1995

On August 6, the Croatian 1st Guards Brigade and allied units of the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps continued to advance into Krajina Serb territory near Slunj (north of Plitvice) and reached the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The towns of Petrinja, Kostajnica, Obrovac, Korenica, Slunj, Bruvno, Vrhovine, Plaški, Cetingrad, Plitvice and Glina all fell during the course of the day. Strong resistance was only encountered in the town of Glina (south of Sisak). The Croatian-held town of Karlovac was subjected to retaliatory shelling by the VSK, and Bosnian Serb aircraft attacked a chemical plant in the town of Kutina. President Tuđman staged a triumphal entry into Knin, where the Croatian flag was raised above the fortress that dominates the old town.

August 7, 1995

Fighting continued on August 7 but at a much lower intensity than on the previous days. Two Serb aircraft were shot down near Daruvar and Pakrac, and the towns of Turanj and Dvor na Uni were captured. Croatian and Bosnian army units linked up at Zirovać, to the east of the Bihać pocket. The Bosnian town of Velika Kladuša, which had been the "capital" of the self-proclaimed breakaway Republic of Western Bosnia (pro-Serb Bosniak forces of Fikret Abdić), was captured by Bosnian forces. In the evening, Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak declared the end to major combat operations, as most of the border with Bosnia was controlled by the Croatian Army and only mopping-up actions remained to be completed.

August 8, 1995 onwards

The last mopping-up actions took place on August 8 with the unopposed capture of Gornji Lapac, Donji Lapac and Vojnić. On August 9, the surrounded VSK's 21st Corps (Kordun) surrendered en masse to the Croatian Army near Vojnić.

By this time, virtually the entire Serb population of the Krajina was on the move, crossing into Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia. The exodus was complicated by the presence of armed Krajina Serb soldiers among the civilian refugees. A large refugee column that was moving on the Glina-Dvor road during August 1995 suffered casualties on two occasions: one report mentions Croatian army shelling of the column, and another mentions tanks of the Serbian 2nd Tank Brigade making way through the road without regard to civilians. The Croatian government claimed that around 90,000 Serb civilians had fled , while Serbian sources claimed that there were as many as 250,000 refugees. The United Nations put the figure at 150,000-200,000. The BBC reports the number to be 200,000 ( and )

On August 11, the Croatian government announced that 174 Croatian soldiers had been killed in the offensive and 1,430 wounded.

Although the VSK was known to be less capable than the Croatian Army, its lack of serious resistance proved a surprise to many observers. The Croatian Army had reportedly expected at least a week's fighting. However, other than the fighting around Glina, the Krajina Serb military response proved little more than symbolic in most places. The VSK largely collapsed, many of its soldiers deserting and joining the civilian exodus and others carrying their weapons into Bosnia. Around 5,000 were said to have surrendered and handed in their weapons to Croatian and UN forces.

Operation Storm did not target the Serb-inhabited area of Eastern Slavonia, along the border with Serbia, which was the easternmost end of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (though geographically disconnected from the other Serb-held areas of Croatia). Although there were fears of a direct military confrontation between Croatia and Serbia in Eastern Slavonia, large-scale armed conflict was not resumed in that region.

Aftermath

Military and political

In the days immediately following Operation Storm, Croatian Army and Ministry of the Interior (MUP) units conducted a series of follow-up operations in the Krajina region. The majority of the Croatian Army forces withdrew from the area in August 1995, but military operations continued until November 1995. Some of these operations constituted sweeps to flush out a number of remaining Serb forces in the area, particularly in the north of the Croatian Krajina. After the operation, joint Croatian and Bosnian forces would continue the offensive in western Bosnia, advancing towards Bosnian Serb capital Banja Luka.

Operation Storm lifted the siege of Bihać. Bosnian general Atif Dudaković (commander of the Bihać 5th Corps) said that Operation Storm was an answer to the Split agreement signed by presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic that pledged aid to the besieged pocket.

Neither Serbian President Slobodan Milošević nor the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Army came to the aid of the Krajina Serbs during the offensive. Although Milošević condemned the Croatian military assault, the Serbian government-controlled press also attacked the Krajina Serb leaders, claiming they were unfit to hold office.

Operation Storm was seen as a total reversal of the military balance of power in the region. Along with NATO's bombing campaign in Bosnia (Operation Deliberate Force), Operation Storm and its follow-up offensives in western Bosnia were seen as vital contributing factors to peace talks resuming, that would result with the Dayton Agreement a few months later.

In a highly publicized event, Croatia organized a Freedom Train; running from Zagreb to Knin as a symbol of a free and unified Croatia, since until Operations Flash and Storm, the country was effectively split into four segments with little or no land communication.

In 2005, Prime Minister of Croatia Ivo Sanader said, "Storm is a brilliant historical military and police operation that we can be proud of, the operation which liberated central parts of the occupied Croatia." Furthermore, he stated that if a sovereign country is occupied, it has the right to liberate its territory.

War crimes

Croatian forces also conducted widespread actions against Serb civilians and property which were later condemned by prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It was reported that Croatian forces undertook an extensive campaign of looting and destroying Krajina Serb property. According to the Croatian Helsinki Committee 677 Serb civilians have been killed in the operation. Serbian sources put the number at 2500. The ICTY Chief Prosecutor found that the Croatian forces operated in "'arson squads' using inflammable fuels, incendiary bullets and explosives… some towns and numerous villages completely destroyed." The intention of this campaign, according to the Prosecutor, was to make it impossible for the Krajina Serb population to return.

The ICTY has alleged that hundreds of Krajina Serbs were murdered or disappeared in the wake of Operation Storm. A few notable cases included the murder of five (possibly six) Serb civilians in the hamlet of Grubori in the Plavno valley north of Knin on August 25, and the murder of 18 Serb civilians in the villages of Varivode, Gosici and two other hamlets in the former Sector South in the September of 1995. There were also numerous individual murders or murders of several people from the same household. By November 1995 the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia, UNPROFOR, had documented the deaths of more than 200 people in the area.

Across the entire region, Serbs were displaced en masse. In Knin, the Croatian Army rounded up and detained all the male inhabitants of fighting age, releasing them after a week. In the town of Obrovac, on the other hand, the entire population had already left during the first day of the operation. When Croatian Radiotelevision reporters entered the town soon afterwards they found a single old man. Many of those people packed whatever they could and went on the road together with their families.

Out of the 122 Serbian Orthodox churches in the area, 17 were damaged, but only one was completely destroyed. According to a September 1995 communiqué from the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the U.N., most of the damage to the Orthodox churches occurred prior to the Serbian retreat.

In the years following Operation Storm, Croatian authorities have uncovered over 3,000 dead Croatian bodies in mass graves in the former Krajina territory, buried there since the ethnic cleansing campaign in 1991.

Refugees

Most Serbs fleeing the Krajina region went to Banja Luka or to Serbia proper. The majority of them were resettled in the Serbian province of Vojvodina, and a smaller number were in predominantly Albanian-populated Kosovo in southern Serbia.

During the first days after the offensive, Serbia accepted arriving refugees. However, during August 12-13th, the authorities started to forcibly recruit able-bodied men who had recently arrived from the Krajina area and sent them to Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia and eastern Slavonia, to be conscripted into Serbian armed forces in those areas. On August 12th, Serbia also announced that men of military age would no longer be allowed to cross from Bosnian Serb-controlled territory into Serbia proper, claiming that it had accepted 107,000 refugees from Krajina since August 4.

Some of the RSK refugees were declared illegal migrants by FRY authorities and many were deported. Some were reportedly turned over by the police to paramilitary units of Zeljko Raznjatovic, a.k.a. Arkan, in the latter's base in the village of Erdut in eastern Slavonia and reported being mistreated by Arkan's men. Reportedly, conscripted refugees taken to eastern Slavonia had been beaten and humiliated in public because they "surrendered Krajina to the enemy."

The large influx of refugees raised local tensions and Vojvodina's sizable Croatian minority was harassed. Liberal opposition leaders in Vojvodina and Croatian government representatives in Belgrade, asserted that between 800 and 1,000 Croats left Vojvodina during August 1995 due to eviction and intimidations from Krajina refugees and local extremists.

In The Guardian, Johathan Steele wrote: "I remember being stunned at how quickly victims can turn into villains. In the town of Gibarac just inside the border of Serbia, I watched newly arrived Serb refugees being helped to find shelter by local relatives who went into homes and evicted Croatian families."

Approximately 50,000 refugees remained in Bosnian Serb territory (largely in the Banja Luka area). In retaliation for their displacement, some refugees - with the assistance of Serbian paramilitary groups - forcibly evicted thousands of Croats and Muslims from their homes in the area. Other abuses - including execution and disappearance of non-Serbs - also intensified in the Bosanska Krajina area after the August 1995 offensive in Croatia. Local and regional Bosnian Serb authorities encouraged the expulsion of Croats and Muslims from the region, particularly in September and October 1995.

In the weeks following the operation, over 1,000 Bosnian Croat families have been expelled and many have been tortured and killed as revenge. Mass killings of non-Serbs took place in Bosnia (Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Bosanska Dubica) in September and October, in part to make room for Serb refugees who fled after Operation Storm. Croats reportedly were particular targets for revenge. U.N. and other international observers collected numerous accounts of killings and other atrocities. Only about 3,000 Croats remain in Banja Luka today out of 29,000 that lived there.

Approximately 300,000 Croatian Serbs were displaced during the entire war, only a third of which (or about 117,000) are officially registered as having returned as of 2005. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 200,000 Croatian refugees, mostly Croatian Serbs, are still displaced in neighbouring countries and elsewhere. Many Croatian Serbs cannot return because they have lost their tenancy rights. Croatian Serbs continue to be the victim of discrimination in access to employment and with regard to other economic and social rights. Some cases of violence and harassment against Croatian Serbs continue to be reported. Some of the Croatian Serbs will not return out of fear of being charged for war crimes, as the Croatian police has secret war crime suspect lists; Croatia passed a General Amnesty law pardoning everyone who has not taken an active part in the war. The return of refugees is further complicated by the fact that many Croats and Bosniaks, expelled from Bosnia have taken residence in their vacated houses. Another reason for the non-return of refugees is the fact that areas that were under Croatian Serb rule were economically ruined during the era (unemployment in RSK was 92%). Since that time, Croatia has started a series of projects aimed at rebuilding these areas and jump-starting the economy (including special tax exemptions), but unemployment is still high.

The primary Serb political party in Croatia, SDSS supports the current Croatian government and has made speeding up the return of refugees its main priority. The Croatian government has passed a number of laws aimed at enabling easier return to refugees.

Later events

Following the death of President Tuđman in 1999, the Croatian authorities began to undertake investigations of the activities of Croatian forces in the wake of Operation Storm. According to Croatia's Ministry of Justice, state prosecutors filed around 3,000 lawsuits against a total of 811 people for crimes allegedly committed during and after the operation. Several dozen people were convicted to jail sentences (up to 20 years according to Croatian law). Amnesty International has criticized the Croatian courts for inadequately investigating the war crimes allegations and failing to protect evidence as well as encouraging impunity for human rights violations.

The ICTY issued indictments against three senior Croatian commanders, Colonel General Ivan Čermak, Colonel General Mladen Markač and Brigadier (later General) Ante Gotovina. The three indictees were said to have had personal and command responsibility for war crimes carried out against Krajina Serb civilians. It was later disclosed by the ICTY prosecutor, Louise Arbour, that had he not died when he did, Croatia's President Tuđman would probably also have been indicted.

Čermak and Markač were handed over to the ICTY, but Gotovina fled. He was widely believed to be at liberty in Croatia or the Croat-inhabited parts of Bosnia, where many view him as a hero, and his continued freedom was attributed to covert help from — or at least a "blind eye" turned by — the Croatian authorities; which proved to be false. The US Government offered a $5 million reward for the capture of Ante Gotovina and he became one of the ICTY's most wanted men. The issue was a major stumbling block for Croatia's international relations. Its application to join the European Union was rebuffed in March 2005 due to the Croatian government's perceived complicity in Gotovina's continued evasion of the ICTY.

On December 8, 2005, Gotovina was captured by Spanish police in a hotel on Tenerife in the Canary Islands. His passport revealed he had been hiding all over the world, including Haiti and Russia. He was transferred to Madrid for court proceedings before extradition to the ICTY at The Hague. The ICTY later joined the proceedings against the three generals into a single case, which is due to start in 2007.

Battle figures

According to a Croatian source:

Croatian forces and allies

Croatian Army (HV):

• 150,000 strong
  • 80,000 soldiers in brigades, 70,000 in home guard regiments (domobranske pukovnije)
  • 2nd echelon, 50,000
  • 3rd echelon, 25 brigades
• 350 T-55 and M-84 tanks
• 800 heavy artillery pieces
• 45-50 rocket launchers
• 18 MiG-21 "Fishbed" fighter jets
• 5 Mi-8 "Hip" transport helicopters
• 12 Mi-24D "Hind" attack helicopters

Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH):

• 5th Corps (Bihać pocket forces - five Mountain Infantry brigades)
• 25,000 soldiers est.
• 15 T-55 tanks
• 80 heavy artillery pieces

Serbian forces and allies

Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (VSK)

• 40,000 strong
  • 20,000 1st echelon
  • 10,000 2nd echelon
  • 10,000 3rd echelon
• 200 T-55, M-84 and T-72 tanks
• 350 heavy artillery pieces
• 20-25 rocket launchers

Army of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia

• 10,000 strong (?)

Notes

1. ^ "Croatia: Operation "Storm" - still no justice ten years on". Amnesty International. 2005-08-04. Retrieved 2007-06-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
2. Robin Harris (2006). "America, The Hague, and Ante Gotovina". The American Spectator. Retrieved 2007-06-12. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
3. Božena Matijević (2007-05-10). "Dokazi: Snimka Srba s Korduna iz 1995" (in Croatian). Večernji list. Retrieved 2007-06-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
4. Ivana Nizich (1995). Civil and Political Rights in Croatia. Human Rights Watch. ISBN 1564321487. OCLC 34153250. Retrieved 2007-06-12. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
5. "Milan Babic - Initial Indictment". ICTY. Retrieved 2007-06-12.
6. ^ Croatian prime minister
7. Jerry Blaskovich, Anatomy of Deceit: An American Physician's First-hand Encounter With The Realities Of The War In Croatia
8. SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Section K, Point 161 by United Nations Economic and Social Council
9. Milosevic Allegedly Angered by Zagreb Shelling by Institute For War and Peace Reporting
10. THE TRIBUNAL ISSUES AN INTERNATIONAL ARREST WARRANT AGAINST MILAN MARTIC a press release by The Hague, 8 March 1996
11. "'We needed Operation Storm as much as Croatia did'". interview with General Atif Dudakovic. Bosnian Institute. 2006-09-11. Retrieved 2007-06-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
12. Michael (1995-09-05). "Serbia Demands International Action". The Independent. {{cite news}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Check date values in: |date= (help)
13. Ratko Gajica of SDSS on Nedjeljom u dva, in 2005.
14. Cite error: The named reference Anatomy of Deceit was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
15. http://www.croatianworld.net/CROWNframes.htm?http://www.croatianworld.net/Letters/60.htm
16. Judah, Tim (1995-09-18). "Able-Bodied Refugees Are Forced Back to the Fight". The Daily Telegraph. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
17. "Spotlight Report No. 20: Violations of Refugees Rights in Serbia and Montenegro". Humanitarian Law Center/Humanitarian Law Fund. 1995. p. 11. {{cite news}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
18. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview with Ivo Kujundzic, Counsellor for Humanitarian Affairs, and Davor Vidis, Spokesperson, Office of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, Belgrade, Serbia, September 11, 1995.
19. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview with Nenad Canak, President of the Social Democratic League of Vojvodina, Novi Sad, Vojvodina, Serbia, August 31, 1995.
20. Steele, Jonathan (1999-06-14). "unknown title". The Guardian. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
21. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, "Northwestern Bosnia: Human Rights Abuses during a Cease-Fire and Peace Negotiations," (A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 8, no. 1, February 1996)
22. Neven Madey (1995-08-14). "UN Commission on Human Rights report". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Retrieved 2007-06-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
23. Gordana Katana (2003-06-20). "Bosnia: Papal Boost for Banja Luka". Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Retrieved 2007-06-12. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)

References

• RSK, Vrhovni savjet odbrane, Knin, 4. avgust 1995., 16.45 časova, Broj 2-3113-1/95. The faximile of this document was published in: Rade Bulat "Srbi nepoželjni u Hrvatskoj", Naš glas (Zagreb), br. 8.-9., septembar 1995., p. 90.-96. (the faximile is on the page 93.).

Vrhovni savjet odbrane RSK (The Supreme Council of Defense of Republic of Serb Krajina) brought a decision 4. August 1995 in 16.45. This decision was signed by Milan Martić and later verified in Glavni štab SVK (Headquarters of Republic of Serb Krajina Army) in 17.20.

• RSK, Republički štab Civilne zaštite, Broj: Pov. 01-82/95., Knin, 02.08.1995., HDA, Dokumentacija RSK, kut. 265

This is the document of Republic headquarters of Civil Protection of RSK. In this document it was ordered to all subordinated headquarters of RSK to immediately give all reports about preparations for the evacuation, sheltering and taking care of evacuated civilians ("evakuacija, sklanjanje i zbrinjavanje") (the deadline for the report was 3. August 1995 in 19 h).

• RSK, Republički štab Civilne zaštite, Broj: Pov. 01-83/95., Knin, 02.08.1995., Pripreme za evakuaciju materijalnih, kulturnih i drugih dobara (The preparations for the evacuation of material, cultural and other goods), HDA, Dokumentacija RSK, kut. 265

This was the next order from the Republican HQ of Civil Protection. It was referred to all Municipal Headquarters of Civil Protection. In that document was ordered to all subordinated HQ's to implement the preparation of evacuation of all material and all mobile cultural goods, archives, evidentions and materials that are highly confidential/top secret, money, lists of valuable stuff (?)("vrednosni popisi") and referring documentations.

• Drago Kovačević, "Kavez - Krajina u dogovorenom ratu" , Beograd 2003. , p. 93.-94.

• Milisav Sekulić, "Knin je pao u Beogradu" , Bad Vilbel 2001., p. 171.-246., p. 179.

• Marko Vrcelj, "Rat za Srpsku Krajinu 1991-95" , Beograd 2002., p. 212.-222.

External links

• BBC: Evicted Serbs remember Storm
• NGO Organization, Member of United Nations: US Officials aided and abetted Croatian General Ante Gotovina
• Former Croatian minister confirms CIA's involvement in 1995 military operation
• Was the US behind the ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia?
• Centre for Collecting Documents and Informations VERITAS
• Dossier "Storm"
• Croatian Radio Television: News from operation Storm '95
• Yugoslav Report on Croatian army and police crimes in Krajina in 1995
• Amnesty international article about Operation Storm
• Chronology of Operation Storm
• Operation Storm Destroyed "Greater Serbia", Balkan Insight 20 January 2006
• Video taken during abuse of captured Serb soldiers and civilians Download 33 MB RealMedia File

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• Conflicts in 1995
• Battles involving Croatia
• Bosnian War
• Croatian War of Independence
• War crimes in former Yugoslavia