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{{Infobox Military Conflict {{Infobox Military Conflict
|conflict=Battle of Kursk |conflict="Battle of Kursk" or the Kursk Bulge (see article)
|partof=the ] of ] |partof=the ] of ]
|image=] |image=]
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|strength1=2,700 tanks<br/>800,000 infantry<br/> 2,109 aircraft<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 123-125;figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Frieburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin</ref> |strength1=2,700 tanks<br/>800,000 infantry<br/> 2,109 aircraft<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 123-125;figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Frieburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin</ref>
|strength2=3,600 tanks<br/>20,000 guns<ref>There are variant numbers given depending on the stage of the operations which took place, and how they were calculated. Soviet sources include all guns, mortars, rocket and anti-aircraft artillery employed from the start of the Operation Citadel to the end of the Soviet counter-offensives. German sources also add tanks deployed in static dug-in positions.</ref><br/>1,300,000 infantry and supporting troops<br/> 2,792 aircraft<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 127-128;figures from Russian archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow</ref> |strength2=3,600 tanks<br/>20,000 guns<ref>There are variant numbers given depending on the stage of the operations which took place, and how they were calculated. Soviet sources include all guns, mortars, rocket and anti-aircraft artillery employed from the start of the Operation Citadel to the end of the Soviet counter-offensives. German sources also add tanks deployed in static dug-in positions.</ref><br/>1,300,000 infantry and supporting troops<br/> 2,792 aircraft<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 127-128;figures from Russian archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow</ref>
|casualties1= '''German Kursk'''<ref name=gscop>Using the German dates of battle</ref> : <br/> 50,000 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>300 tanks<br/>200 aircraft ,<br/> '''Soviet Kursk'''<ref name=sscop>Using the Soviet dates of battle</ref> : <br/> 500,000 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>900 tanks<br/>200 aircraft |casualties1= '''German Kursk'''<ref name=gscop>Using the German dates of operation</ref> : <br/> 50,000 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>300 tanks<br/>200 aircraft ,<br/> '''Soviet Kursk'''<ref name=sscop>Using the Soviet dates of operation</ref> : <br/> 500,000 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>900 tanks<br/>200 aircraft
|casualties2= '''German Kursk'''<ref name=gscop>Using the German dates of battle</ref> : <br/> 180,000 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>1,600 tanks<br/>1,000 aircraft , <br/> '''Soviet Kursk'''<ref name=sscop>Using the Soviet dates of battle</ref> : <br/> 607,737 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>1,500 tanks<br/>1,000 aircraft |casualties2= '''German Kursk'''<ref name=gscop>Using the German dates of operation</ref> : <br/> 180,000 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>1,600 tanks<br/>1,000 aircraft , <br/> '''Soviet Kursk'''<ref name=sscop>Using the Soviet dates of operation</ref> : <br/> 607,737 dead, wounded, or captured<br/>1,500 tanks<br/>1,000 aircraft
|}} |}}
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{{Campaignbox Kursk}} {{Campaignbox Kursk}}
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]. Green areas show German advances on Kursk.]] ]. Green areas show German advances on Kursk.]]
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The '''Battle of Kursk''' ({{lang-ru|Курская битва}}) or '''Kursk Campaign''' (] ], ]), also called '''Operation Citadel''' (]: ''Unternehmen Zitadelle'') by the ], was a major battle on the ] of ] and the last ] '']'' offensive in the east as well as the last German offensive of such scale in the war. The exact definition of the battle varies: the Germans saw it as comprising Operation Citadel only, while the ]s considered (and Russians today consider) it to include Citadel and the subsequent Soviet ]s, ] and ]. Overall, the campaign, which included the famous sub-battle at ], remains both the largest ] ] and the most costly single day of ] to date. The '''Battle of Kursk''' ({{lang-ru|Курская битва}}) is the misnamed title given to a series of German and Soviet operations which for ]'s ] were a part of the strategic offensive '''Operation Citadel''' (]: ''Unternehmen Zitadelle''); it was one of the major strategic operations on the ] of ]. It was also the last ] '']'' offensive in the east executed by the German forces on a strategic scale during the war.


For the Soviet historians the series of operations conducted as part of the ] (1 July - 31 December) include:
Kursk is further notable for the deliberately defensive battle ] on the Soviets' part. Having good intelligence on Hitler's intentions, the Soviets established and managed to conceal elaborate layered defense works, mine fields, and stage and disguise large reserve forces poised for a tactical and strategic ] typical of defensive battle plans. Though the Germans planned and initiated an offensive strike, the well-planned defense not only frustrated their ambitions, but also enabled the Soviets to follow up with counter-offensives and exhausted the German abilities in the theater, thereby seizing the initiative for the remainder of the war. In that sense it may be seen as the second phase of the turning point that began with the German defeat at the ], whose aftermath set the scene by establishing the Kursk Salient (also known as the "Kursk Bulge"), the reduction of which was the objective of the German armies entering in July. The subsequent counter-attacks retook ] and ] on ], and ] on ], pushing back the Germans across a broad front. This was the first successful major Soviet summer offensive of the war.
*] (5 July 1943 - 23 July 1943)
:] (5 July 1943 - 11 July 1943)
:] (5 July 1943 - 23 July 1943)
:] (5 July 1943 - 23 July 1943)
:] (5 July 1943 - 12 July 1943)
:]
*] (codenamed ''Operation Kutuzov'') (12 July 1943 - 18 August 1943)
:] (12 July 1943 - 18 August 1943)
:] (15 July 1943 - 18 August 1943)
:]
*] (codenamed ''Operation Rumyantsev'') (3 August 1943 - 23 August 1943)
:] (3 August 1943 - 23 August 1943)
:] (3 August 1943 - 23 August 1943)
::] (12 July 1943)
:] (12 August 1943 - 23 August 1943)


The exact definition of the operations varies. The Germans saw it only as the Operation Citadel offensive, while the ] and Russian historians continue today to combine Citadel and the subsequent Soviet ]s, ] and ] as a single strategic event.
Kursk was a further demonstration that the conflict in the East contained the largest scale of warfare in history, in terms of manpower involved. So well designed was the Soviet defensive planning, that when entering the archetypal counter-attack phase, the Soviets were able to attack along four separate axes of advance, and execute a planned stop at a phase line, thus avoiding the pitfalls of overextending during the counter-attack and earning this battle's deserved place as a model campaign in war college curricula.<ref name='Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk'> When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived infallibility of blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the future hopes of the German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east. Kursk announced to the world that for every offensive theory, there is a suitable defensive one available to those who devote the requisite thought necessary to develop it.{{cite journal|title=Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943|journal=U.S. Army Command and General Staff College|date=|first=Colonel David M. |last=Glantz|coauthors=|volume=Soviet Army Studies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute|issue=CSI Report No. 11|pages=|id= |url=|format=|accessdate=}}</ref> ] comments ''Although often thought of as a tank battle, Kursk as a whole arguably demonstrated the triumph of artillery, infantry and engineers over armour. The Soviet plan was to soak up the German assault in a colossal web of defensive positions, and only then launch their armoured counter-attack. It was also an important air battle, in which the balance now shifted in the favour of the Soviets.'' <ref>''Atlas of World War II'' edited by John Keegan (2006, Collins, London) ISBN 10:0-00-721465-0 </ref>

Overall, the operations, which included the famous battle at ], remains both the largest ] ] and the most costly single day of ] to date.

Kursk is further notable for the deliberately defensive operation ] on the Red Army's part. Having good intelligence on Hitler's intentions, the Red Army established and managed to conceal elaborate layered defense works, mine fields, and stage and disguise large reserve forces poised for a tactical and strategic ] typical of defensive battle plans.<ref>pp.149-159, Glantz, Soviet Military Deception</ref> Though the Germans planned and initiated an offensive strike, the well-planned defense not only frustrated their ambitions, but also enabled the Soviets to follow up with counter-offensives that exhausted the German abilities in the Theater, thereby seizing the initiative for the remainder of the war. In that sense it may be seen as the second phase of the turning point that began with the German defeat at the ], whose aftermath set the scene by establishing the Kursk Salient (also known as the "Kursk Bulge"), the reduction of which was the objective of the German armies entering in July. The subsequent counter-attacks retook ] and ] on ], and ] on ], pushing back the Germans across a broad front. This was the first successful strategic Soviet summer offensive of the war.

Kursk was a further demonstration that the conflict in the East contained the largest scale of warfare in history, in terms of manpower involved. So well designed was the Soviet defensive planning, that when entering the archetypal counter-attack phase, the Soviets were able to attack along four separate axes of advance, and execute a planned stop at a phase line, thus avoiding the pitfalls of overextending during the counter-attack and earning this operation's deserved place as a model strategic operation in a war college curricula.<ref name='Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk'> When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived infallibility of blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the future hopes of the German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east. Kursk announced to the world that for every offensive theory, there is a suitable defensive one available to those who devote the requisite thought necessary to develop it.{{cite journal|title=Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943|journal=U.S. Army Command and General Staff College|date=|first=Colonel David M. |last=Glantz|coauthors=|volume=Soviet Army Studies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute|issue=CSI Report No. 11|pages=|id= |url=|format=|accessdate=}}</ref> ] comments ''Although often thought of as a tank battle, Kursk as a whole arguably demonstrated the triumph of artillery, infantry and engineers over armour. The Soviet plan was to soak up the German assault in a colossal web of defensive positions, and only then launch their armoured counter-attack. It was also an important air battle, in which the balance now shifted in the favour of the Soviets.'' <ref>''Atlas of World War II'' edited by John Keegan (2006, Collins, London) ISBN 10:0-00-721465-0 </ref>


==Background== ==Background==
In the winter of ]–] the Soviets conclusively won the ]. ] had been lost, along with about 800,000 German and ], seriously depleting Axis strength in the east. With an ] ] clearly looming, ] realized an outright defeat of the Soviets before the Western Allies arrived had become unlikely, and he decided to force the Soviets to a draw.{{Fact|date=March 2007}} In the winter of ]–] the Red Army conclusively won the ]. ] had been lost, along with about 800,000 German and ], seriously depleting Axis strength in the east. With an ] ] clearly looming, ] realized an outright defeat of the Soviets before the Western Allies arrived had become unlikely, and he decided to force the Soviets to a draw.{{Fact|date=March 2007}}


In ], the Germans had built the famous ] on the ], shortening their lines and thereby increasing their defensive strength. They planned on repeating this strategy in Russia and started construction of a massive series of ] known as the ]. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated. In ], the Germans had built the famous ] on the ], shortening their lines and thereby increasing their defensive strength. They planned on repeating this strategy in Russia and started construction of a massive series of ] known as the ]. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated.
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===German plans=== ===German plans===


Von Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had just successfully pursued at Kharkov, when he cut off an overextended Soviet offensive. He suggested tricking the Soviets into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming ], leading them into the ] in the eastern ]. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the ] River towards ] and trap the entire southern wing of the ] against the ]. Von Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had just successfully pursued at Kharkov, when he cut off an overextended Red Army offensive. He suggested tricking the Red Army into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming ], leading them into the ] in the eastern ]. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the ] River towards ] and trap the entire southern wing of the ] against the ].


] did not approve von Manstein's plan, and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Three Soviet armies occupied the ground in and around the salient, and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line, and capture the strategically useful railway town of ] located on the main north-south railway line running from Rostov to ]. ] did not approve von Manstein's plan, and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Three Red Army armies occupied the ground in and around the salient, and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line, and capture the strategically useful railway town of ] located on the main north-south railway line running from Rostov to ].


In March the plans crystallized. ]'s ] would attack southwards from Orel while ]'s ] and ] under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk, but if the offensive went well they would have permission to continue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to create a new line at the ] far to the east. In March the plans crystallized. ]'s ] would attack southwards from Orel while ]'s ] and ] under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk, but if the offensive went well they would have permission to continue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to create a new line at the ] far to the east.


Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the ] considerable control over the planning of the battle. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping the entire German line of practically anything remotely useful for deployment in the upcoming battle. They first set the attack for ], but then delayed it until ], and finally until ] in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new ]s. Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the ] considerable control over the planning of the operation. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping the entire German line of practically anything remotely useful for deployment in the upcoming operation. They first set the attack for ], but then delayed it until ], and finally until ] in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new ]s.


The basic concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and, for the Germans, hitherto usually successful) ], or ''Kesselschlacht'' (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a ] method, and the tools of '']'' made these types of tactics even more effective. ''Blitzkrieg'' depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a major pitched battle. The basic concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and, for the Germans, hitherto usually successful) ], or ''Kesselschlacht'' (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a ] method, and the tools of '']'' made these types of tactics even more effective. ''Blitzkrieg'' depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a major ].


However, such breakthroughs were easier to achieve if they hit an unexpected location, as the Germans had achieved attacking through the ] in 1940, and towards ] and the ] in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated the principle of surprise: anyone who could read a map could confidently predict the obvious point of attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably ], who asked Hitler: However, such breakthroughs were easier to achieve if they hit an unexpected location, as the Germans had achieved attacking through the ] in 1940, and towards ] and the ] in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated the principle of surprise: anyone who could read a map could confidently predict the obvious point of attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably ], who asked Hitler:
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The ] had also begun planning for their own upcoming ], and had settled on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of ] and ] would flatten out the line, and potentially lead to a breakout near the ]. However, Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans. The ] had also begun planning for their own upcoming ], and had settled on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of ] and ] would flatten out the line, and potentially lead to a breakout near the ]. However, Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans.


The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Soviets by surprise, but in this case Kursk seemed the obvious target. ] received warning of the German plans through the ] in ]. This was almost unnecessary, since ] ] had already correctly predicted the site of the German attack as early as ], when he wrote his initial report to '']'' (the Soviet General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the ]. The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Red Army by surprise, but in this case Kursk seemed the obvious target. ] received warning of the German plans through the ] in ]. This was almost unnecessary, since ] ] had already correctly predicted the site of the German attack as early as ], when he wrote his initial report to '']'' (the Red Army General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the ].


] and a handful of ''Stavka'' officers wanted to strike first{{Fact|date=June 2007}}. The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success. ''Blitzkrieg'' had worked against all opposing armies, including the Soviets'. None had succeeded in stopping a German breakthrough. On the other hand, Soviet offensive actions during both winters showed their own offensives now worked well. However, the overwhelming majority of ''Stavka'' members, most notably Zhukov himself, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves, first. Zhukov's opinion swayed the argument. ] and a handful of ''Stavka'' officers wanted to strike first{{Fact|date=June 2007}}. The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success. ''Blitzkrieg'' had worked against all opposing armies, including the Red Army. None had succeeded in stopping a German breakthrough. On the other hand, Soviet offensive actions during both winters showed their own offensives now worked well. However, the overwhelming majority of ''Stavka'' members, most notably Zhukov himself, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves, first. Zhukov's opinion swayed the argument.


The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Soviets four months in which to prepare, and with every passing day they turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended points on earth. Two Fronts, the ] and ], manned the defensive lines, and the ] was available to act as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million ]s and dug about 5000km (3000mi) of ]es, to a depth of 175km (95mi). In addition, they massed a huge army of their own, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 ] pieces and 2,400 ]. The Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month they pulled further ahead in men and material. The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Red Army four months in which to prepare, and with every passing day they turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended points on earth. Two Fronts, the ] and ], manned the defensive lines, and the ] was available to act as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million ]s and dug about 5000km (3000mi) of ]es, to a depth of 175km (95mi). In addition, they massed a huge army of their own, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 ] pieces and 2,400 ]. The Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month they pulled further ahead in men and material.


Many of the troops assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the ], but the Red Army also added over one million new men to its ranks in the first half of 1943. Thus, the Soviet Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive gave the new units an unusually long time to train. Many of the troops assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the ], but the Red Army also added over one million new men to its ranks in the first half of 1943. Thus, the Red Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive gave the new units an unusually long time to train.


The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Soviets were determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from ]s would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from ], ], and 85mm (3.3") towed ]s and ]s would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German Ninth Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometer of defended front. In the ] and ] sectors in the south, the density was lower at about 10 guns per kilometer. The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from ]s would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from ], ], and 85mm (3.3") towed ]s and ]s would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German Ninth Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometer of defended front. In the ] and ] sectors in the south, the density was lower at about 10 guns per kilometer.


] ]
The preparation of the battlefield by Soviet ]s was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 ]s and 439,348 ] were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 antitank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometer of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometer and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometer. Soviet engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid ], built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Dummy positions were built to attract German artillery fire. Camouflaging of these positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units would have of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns would be their own vehicles exploding. The ] by Red Army ]s was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 ]s and 439,348 ] were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 antitank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometer of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometer and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometer. Red Army engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid ], built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Dummy positions were built to attract German artillery fire. Camouflaging of these positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units would have of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns would be their own vehicles exploding.


Set in the larger vista of the war on the ], Kursk is significant because it demonstrated the Soviet high command and staff now worked more effectively than ]—largely due to Stalin finally being prepared to act on the advice of his professional intelligence and staff officers, while Hitler was systematically ignoring his{{Fact|date=June 2007}}. This was evidenced by the defeat of the ''Blitzkrieg'' in summer campaigning weather (albeit at a very high price) and the ability of the Soviet forces to move from defensive to offensive operations due to better staff work, larger reserves and better planning. In these senses Kursk, and not Stalingrad, can be viewed as the turning point in the war: certainly the initiative passed decisively from the Germans to Soviets. Set in the larger vista of the war on the ], Kursk is significant because it demonstrated the Soviet high command and staff now worked more effectively than ]—largely due to Stalin finally being prepared to act on the advice of his professional intelligence and staff officers, while Hitler was systematically ignoring his{{Fact|date=June 2007}}. This was evidenced by the defeat of the ''Blitzkrieg'' in summer campaigning weather (albeit at a very high price) and the ability of the Red Army forces to move from defensive to offensive operations due to better staff work, larger reserves and better planning. In these senses Kursk, and not Stalingrad, can be viewed as the turning point in the war: certainly the initiative passed decisively from Wehrmacht to the Red Army.


==Operation Citadel== ==Operation Citadel==
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===Preliminary Actions=== ===Preliminary Actions===
It took four months before the Germans felt ready, by which time they had collected 200 of the new ]s (only 40 were available at the beginning of the battle due to technical problems with the new type), 90 ] ]s and every flyable ] ], as well as 270 ], late model ] and even a number of captured ]s{{Fact|date=September 2007}}. In total they assembled some 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft and 800,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy. It took four months before the Germans felt ready, by which time they had collected 200 of the new ]s (only 40 were available at the beginning of the operation due to technical problems with the new type), 90 ] ]s and every flyable ] ], as well as 270 ], late model ] and even a number of captured ]s{{Fact|date=September 2007}}. In total they assembled some 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft and 800,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy.


By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on German military strength. Although ] hardly constituted the Soviets' longed-for ], the battle there did begin to tell on the Germans, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of ] losses occurred in the battles over ] and ]. German ] was no longer guaranteed. The ]s far outnumbered the Luftwaffe, and were quickly gaining in technology as well. Both Air Forces possessed very effective series of ground-attack aircraft capable of decimating armour; the Soviet ] and the German ]G (Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added ''Bordkanone'' 37mm gunpods).<ref>] of StG 2 ''Immelmann'' had used the Ju 87 equppied with two 37 mm cannon over the Kuban front in the Spring of 1943. The ''Geschwaders'' ''Stukas'' were equipped with them on the very first day of the Kursk offensive. Rudel destroyed 12 Soviet tanks on 5 July. Bergstrom 2007 p. 79-81; 102; 106; 114; 118. </ref> By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on German military strength. Although ] hardly constituted the Red Army's longed-for ], the operation there did begin to tell on the Germans, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of ] losses occurred in the battles over ] and ]. German ] was no longer guaranteed. The ]s far outnumbered the Luftwaffe, and were quickly gaining in technology as well. Both Air Forces possessed very effective series of ground-attack aircraft capable of decimating armour; the Soviet ] and the German ]G (Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added ''Bordkanone'' 37mm gunpods).<ref>] of StG 2 ''Immelmann'' had used the Ju 87 equppied with two 37 mm cannon over the Kuban front in the Spring of 1943. The ''Geschwaders'' ''Stukas'' were equipped with them on the very first day of the Kursk offensive. Rudel destroyed 12 Soviet tanks on 5 July. Bergstrom 2007 p. 79-81; 102; 106; 114; 118. </ref>


] ]s and Wehrmacht ]s during the start of Operation Citadel]] ] ]s and Wehrmacht ]s during the start of Operation Citadel]]
The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on ] the orders to attack on ] were issued. The following day, ] ] warned the Front commanders (], ] and ]) that the long-awaited German offensive would begin sometime between ] and ]. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from their ] (German: ''Rote Kapelle'') ] organization, whose sources included officers in the Nazi administration, among others in ]’s aviation ministry. The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on ] the orders to attack on ] were issued. The following day, ] ] warned the Front commanders (], ] and ]) that the long-awaited German offensive would begin sometime between ] and ]. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from their ] (German: ''Rote Kapelle'') ] organization, whose sources included officers in the Nazi administration, among others in ]’s aviation ministry.


Preliminary fighting started on ] ] in the south, as ] had elected to try to take the Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on ]. Thus they deliberately sacrificed tactical surprise. However, the Soviet forward positions were on small hills overlooking German assembly areas, so it is likely surprise would have been lost in any case. Preliminary fighting started on ] ] in the south, as ] had elected to try to take the Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on ]. Thus they deliberately sacrificed tactical surprise. However, the Red Army forward positions were on small hills overlooking German assembly areas, so it is likely surprise would have been lost in any case.


In the afternoon, ] blew a two-mile-wide gap in the front lines on the north in a short period of 10 minutes, and then turned for home while the German ] opened up to continue the pounding. Hoth's ], the ], then advanced on the Soviet positions around ]. At the same time, the ''Großdeutschland'' Division attacked ] in torrential rain, and the ] took the high ground around Butovo. To the west of Butovo the going proved tougher for ''Großdeutschland'' and the ], which met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. The ] launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts, and again met with stiff resistance until assault troops equipped with ]s cleared the ]s and outposts. In the afternoon, ] blew a two-mile-wide gap in the front lines on the north in a short period of 10 minutes, and then turned for home while the German ] opened up to continue the pounding. Hoth's ], the ], then advanced on the Soviet positions around ]. At the same time, the ''Großdeutschland'' Division attacked ] in torrential rain, and the ] took the high ground around Butovo. To the west of Butovo the going proved tougher for ''Großdeutschland'' and the ], which met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. The ] launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts, and again met with stiff resistance until assault troops equipped with ]s cleared the ]s and outposts.


At 22:30, the Soviets hit back with an ] bombardment in the north and south. This barrage, by over 3,000 guns and mortars, expended up to one-half of the artillery supply for the entire operation. The goal was to delay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly against German artillery positions and managed to suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they targeted. The result was much weaker German artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. Also, German units attacked at staggered times on ] due to the disruption caused by this bombardment. In the south, the Soviets chose to fire largely against the German infantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially successful in delaying the German attack, but caused few casualties. At 22:30, the Red Army hit back with an ] bombardment in the north and south. This barrage, by over 3,000 guns and mortars, expended up to one-half of the artillery supply for the entire operation. The goal was to delay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly against German artillery positions and managed to suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they targeted. The result was much weaker German artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. Also, German units attacked at staggered times on ] due to the disruption caused by this bombardment. In the south, the Red Army chose to fire largely against the German infantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially successful in delaying the German attack, but caused few casualties.


===Main Battle=== ===Main operations===
====The Northern Face==== ====The Northern Face====
The real battle opened on ] 1943. The Soviets, now aware even of the exact time of the planned German offensive, launched a massive attack by the ] on the ] airbases in the area, in an attempt to counter the classic German tactic of eliminating local air support within the first hour of battle. The next few hours turned into possibly the largest air battle ever fought. The real operation opened on ] 1943. The Red Army, now aware even of the exact time of the planned German offensive, launched a massive attack by the ] on the ] airbases in the area, in an attempt to counter the classic German tactic of eliminating local air support within the first hour of operation. The next few hours turned into possibly the largest air operation ever fought.


The Soviet co-ordination of the attack had failed. Soviet fighters were dispatched too soon, arriving over German airbases before the arrival of the Soviet bomber forces, eventually retiring due to lack of fuel. The German fighters had nothing to prevent them from taking off and engaging the approaching attackers.<ref>The air battle is misunderstood in most accounts. The ''Freya'' radar stations established in Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet formations approaching from Belgorod and were not responsible for sealing the failure of the strike; Bergström 2007, p.26.</ref>.The Soviets suffered the loss of 120 aircraft.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 27.</ref> The Red Army co-ordination of the attack had failed. Red Air Force fighters were dispatched too soon, arriving over German airbases before the arrival of the Red Air Force bomber forces, eventually retiring due to lack of fuel. The German fighters had nothing to prevent them from taking off and engaging the approaching attackers.<ref>The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The ''Freya'' radar stations established in Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet formations approaching from Belgorod and were not responsible for sealing the failure of the strike; Bergström 2007, p.26.</ref>.The Red Air Force suffered the loss of 120 aircraft.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 27.</ref>


] ]
The ''Luftwaffe'' directed an all out effort against Soviet positions on the northern flank during first day of the battle, while Soviet deployment errors granted the ''Luftwaffe'' initial air-superiority. ''General-Leytenant'' Rudenko, unsure whether this was the major German attack, ordered only one-third of his fighter strength to engage the masses of German aircraft, while the rest stood down. The out-numbered Soviet units were engaged over their own rear-areas and suffered heavily. The German fighters had flown ahead of the bomber and ''Stuka'' units to prevent Soviet intervention over the battle field. The unprotected ''Stuka'' and ''Kampfgruppen'' then began their assault on the Soviet positions unhindered. The Soviets fed their aerial strength in piecemeal and it suffered heavy losses.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 38.</ref> The ''Luftwaffe'' directed an all out effort against Red Army positions on the northern flank during first day of the operation, while Soviet deployment errors granted the ''Luftwaffe'' initial air-superiority. ''General-Leytenant'' Rudenko, unsure whether this was the major German attack, ordered only one-third of his fighter strength to engage the masses of German aircraft, while the rest stood down. The out-numbered Red Army units were engaged over their own rear-areas and suffered heavily. The German fighters had flown ahead of the bomber and ''Stuka'' units to prevent Red Army intervention over the battlefield. The unprotected ''Stuka'' and ''Kampfgruppen'' then began their assault on the Red Army positions unhindered. The Soviets fed their aerial strength in piecemeal and it suffered heavy losses.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 38.</ref>
In the first three days of fighting over the northern flank '']'' lost a total of 39 aircraft against Soviet losses of 386.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 120.</ref> In the first three days of fighting over the northern flank '']'' lost a total of 39 aircraft against Soviet losses of 386.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 120.</ref>


The ] attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on ]. The attack sector had been correctly anticipated by the Soviet ]. Attacking on a 45-kilometer-wide front, the Germans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive ], and needed engineering units to come up and clear them under artillery fire. Although a few ] and Borgward remote-control engineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields, they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles cleared mines, they had no on-board marking system to show following tanks where the cleared lanes were. Soviet units covered the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delaying and inflicting losses on German engineers clearing mines manually. Thus German losses in the Soviet minefields were high. For example, the German ] began the attack with 49 ] self-propelled guns; 37 of them had been lost in the minefields before 17:00 on ]. Although most of the lost vehicles were ]s rather than permanent losses, they were out of action until they could be repaired. While idle they added nothing to German combat power and were easier for Soviet artillery to knock out permanently. Since the Germans were advancing, any repairable vehicles could be fixed and put back into action. The ] attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on ]. The attack sector had been correctly anticipated by the Red Army ]. Attacking on a 45-kilometer-wide front, the Germans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive ], and needed engineering units to come up and clear them under artillery fire. Although a few ] and Borgward remote-control engineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields, they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles cleared mines, they had no on-board marking system to show following tanks where the cleared lanes were. Red Army units covered the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delaying and inflicting losses on German engineers clearing mines manually. Thus German losses in the Red Army minefields were high. For example, the German ] began the attack with 49 ] self-propelled guns; 37 of them had been lost in the minefields before 17:00 on ]. Although most of the lost vehicles were ]s rather than permanent losses, they were out of action until they could be repaired. While idle they added nothing to German combat power and were easier for Red Army artillery to knock out permanently. Since the Germans were advancing, any repairable vehicles could be fixed and put back into action.


There are a number of factors that explain Ninth Army’s lack of progress. The combination of Soviet defensive planning and, on the German side, the lack of concentration of force were the main factors. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength and often without sufficient infantry support.<ref>''Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North'', by Restayn and Moller, page 333</ref> Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovskiy had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had ] those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The ], which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and ]s than the other Central Front units, and indeed held the strongest defensive positions in the entire salient. A major planning error by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff was their expectation that the main weight of the German attack would come in the north on the Central Front. Thus they concentrated more strength there. Also, the Central front chose to defend the tactical zone (to a depth of 20 km) very heavily, leaving far fewer units in the depths of the defense. Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and the Ninth Army also committed major units piecemeal due to some disruption caused by the Soviet pre-emptive artillery barrage. Finally, Ninth Army led with reinforced ] divisions that were already in the line facing the Soviets, rather than attacking with uncommitted units. There are a number of factors that explain the 9th Army’s lack of progress. The combination of Soviet defensive planning and, on the German side, the lack of concentration of force were the main factors. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength and often without sufficient infantry support.<ref>''Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North'', by Restayn and Moller, page 333</ref> Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovskiy had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had ] those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The ], which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and ]s than the other Central Front units, and indeed held the strongest defensive positions in the entire salient. A major planning error by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff was their expectation that the main weight of the German attack would come in the north on the Central Front. Thus they concentrated more strength there. Also, the Central front chose to defend the tactical zone (to a depth of 20 km) very heavily, leaving far fewer units in the depths of the defense. Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and the 9th Army also committed major units piecemeal due to some disruption caused by the Soviet pre-emptive artillery barrage. Finally, the 9th Army led with reinforced ] divisions that were already in the line facing the Red Army, rather than attacking with uncommitted units.


Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration shows clearly that the Soviet defensive tactics were succeeding. Beginning with a 45-kilometer-wide attack frontage on ], on the 6th, Ninth Army attacked on a 40-kilometer front. This dropped to 15 kilometers wide by ], and only 2 kilometers each on ]-]. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: 5 kilometers on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each succeeding day. By the 10th, Ninth Army was stopped in its tracks. Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration shows clearly that the Red Army defensive tactics were succeeding. Beginning with a 45-kilometer-wide attack frontage on ], on the 6th, the 9th Army attacked on a 40-kilometer front. This dropped to 15 kilometers wide by ], and only 2 kilometers each on ]-]. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: 5 kilometers on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each succeeding day. By the 10th, Ninth Army was stopped in its tracks.


After a week, the Wehrmacht had moved only 12 km forward, and on the 12th the Soviets launched their own offensive against the ] and the German Ninth Army at Orel. The situation became critical for the German forces, the 11th Guards Army could cut off both German Armies. After a week, the Wehrmacht had moved only 12 km forward, and on the 12th the Soviets launched their own offensive against the ] and the German Ninth Army at Orel. The situation became critical for the German forces, the 11th Guards Army could cut off both German Armies.
The ''Luftwaffe'' was called upon to halt the offensive, and its actions proved decisive to saving the German armies from encirclement. The ''Luftwaffe'' organised a massive aerial offensive to blunt the threat. On 16 July the ''Luftwaffe'' flew 1,595 sorties, double that of the previous days.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 102.</ref> In daylight hours the ''Sturzkampfgeschwader'' and ''Schlachtgeschwader'' attacked Soviet armoured units while the '']'' targeted the rear-supply lines. Another 1,100 sorties were flown on 18 July. The Junkers Ju 87G units took a heavy toll of Soviet Armour. So heavy were Soviet losses, the air attacks forced a Soviet retreat. The Soviet tanks that had managed to reach German positions had been quickly routed. The 1st Tank Corps had only 33 tanks remaining on 20 July.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 109.</ref>.<ref>Figures from Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris Solovyev: ''Kurskaya bitva'', 1970. Bergström p. 109</ref> Model sent a message to von Greim thanking him, "the ''Luftwaffe's '' intervention was absolutely decisive to prevent a second, more disastrous Stalingrad".<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 109.</ref> The ''Luftwaffe'' was called upon to halt the offensive, and its actions proved decisive to saving the German armies from encirclement. The ''Luftwaffe'' organised a massive aerial offensive to blunt the threat. On 16 July the ''Luftwaffe'' flew 1,595 sorties, double that of the previous days.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 102.</ref> In daylight hours the ''Sturzkampfgeschwader'' and ''Schlachtgeschwader'' attacked Red Army armoured units while the '']'' targeted the rear-supply lines. Another 1,100 sorties were flown on 18 July. The Junkers Ju 87G units took a heavy toll of Red Army tank forces. So heavy were Soviet losses, the air attacks forced a Soviet retreat. The Soviet tanks that had managed to reach German positions had been quickly routed. The 1st Tank Corps had only 33 tanks remaining on 20 July.<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 109.</ref>.<ref>Figures from Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris Solovyev: ''Kurskaya bitva'', 1970. Bergström p. 109</ref> Model sent a message to von Greim thanking him, "the ''Luftwaffe's '' intervention was absolutely decisive to prevent a second, more disastrous Stalingrad".<ref>Bergström 2007, p. 109.</ref>
Ninth Army had to withdraw, their part in the offensive over. Because the German armor was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the South, the German armor losses were comparatively light - 143 armored vehicles were total losses in the period July 5 -] ].<ref>''Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North'', by Restayn and Moller, pages 333-336</ref> However, this failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and '']'' for the ]. Few Soviet guns were captured, and those Soviet units that did retreat did so on orders. The German attack failed to penetrate beyond the Soviet tactical zone. The 9th Army had to withdraw, their part in the offensive over. Because the German armor was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the South, the German armor losses were comparatively light - 143 armored vehicles were total losses in the period July 5 -] ].<ref>''Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North'', by Restayn and Moller, pages 333-336</ref> However, this failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and '']'' for the ]. Few Red Army guns were captured, and those Red Army units that did retreat did so on orders. The German attack failed to penetrate beyond the Red Army tactical zone.


====Southern Face==== ====Southern Face====
] ]
In the south, the ] fared less well against the ] with its ], ] and ]. The II SS Panzer Corps attacked on a narrower frontage against two Soviet rifle regiments. The ] of ]'s Fourth Panzer Army forced its way forward, and by the 6th had reached some 15 km past the lines. Again, Soviet planning played a big role. In the south the Soviets had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses more evenly. For example, three of the four Armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometer of front; this contrasts sharply with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which was twice as heavy in the active sectors. Also, the Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tactical zone much more thinly, leaving a much higher proportion of units in deeper positions compared to the Central Front. Finally, the Voronezh Front was weaker than the Central Front, yet it faced much stronger German forces. In the south, the ] fared less well against the ] with its ], ] and ]. The II SS Panzer Corps attacked on a narrower frontage against two Red Army rifle regiments. The ] of ]'s 4th Panzer Army forced its way forward, and by the 6th had reached some 15 km past the lines. Again, Red Army planning played a big role. In the south the Red Army had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses more evenly. For example, three of the four Armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometer of front; this contrasts sharply with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which was twice as heavy in the active sectors. Also, the Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tactical zone much more thinly, leaving a much higher proportion of units in deeper positions compared to the Central Front. Finally, the Voronezh Front was weaker than the Central Front, yet it faced much stronger German forces.


The German forces made steady progress against the Soviet defenses, but, as in the north, attack frontages (width) and penetration depth tended to drop as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. Beginning with a 30-kilometer-wide attack frontage on ], this dropped to 20-kilometers wide by ] and 15 km by ]. Likewise, the depth of the penetration dropped from 9 km on ] to 5 km on ] and 2-3 km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled. The German forces made steady progress against the Red Army defenses, but, as in the north, attack frontages (width) and penetration depth tended to drop as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. Beginning with a 30-kilometer-wide attack frontage on ], this dropped to 20-kilometers wide by ] and 15 km by ]. Likewise, the depth of the penetration dropped from 9 km on ] to 5 km on ] and 2-3 km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled.


Soviet minefields and artillery were again successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans was vital to allow their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the battle by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, again indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order. Red Army minefields and artillery were again successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans was vital to allow their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, again indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.


German losses can be seen in the example of the ], which began the battle with 118 tanks. On ], after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on ]. German losses can be seen in the example of the ], which began the operation with 118 tanks. On ], after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on ].


Nevertheless, it was obvious that the threat of a German breakthrough in the south had to be reckoned with. The ] had been formed in the months prior to the battle as a central reserve for such an eventuality. Units of the Steppe Front began movement to the south as early as ]. This included the ] and other combined-arms armies. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the threat of a German breakthrough in the south had to be reckoned with. The ] had been formed in the months prior to the operation as a central reserve for such an eventuality. Units of the Steppe Front began movement to the south as early as ]. This included the ] and other combined-arms armies.


The German flank, however, stood unprotected as the Soviet ] stalled ]'s divisions, aided by heavy rain, after the Germans had crossed the ]. The Fifth Guards Tank Army, reinforced with two additional Tank Corps, moved into positions to the east of Prokhorovka and had started to prepare a counterattack of their own when II SS Panzer Corps arrived and an intense struggle ensued. The Soviets managed to halt the SS—but only just. Little now stood in the way of the Fourth Panzer Army, and a German breakthrough looked like a very real possibility. The Soviets therefore decided to deploy the rest of 5th Guards Tank Army. The German flank, however, stood unprotected as the Red Army ] stalled ]'s divisions, aided by heavy rain, after the Germans had crossed the ]. The 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced with two additional Tank Corps, moved into positions to the east of Prokhorovka and had started to prepare a counterattack of their own when II SS Panzer Corps arrived and an intense struggle ensued. The Red Army managed to halt the SS—but only just. Little now stood in the way of the 4th Panzer Army, and a German breakthrough looked like a very real possibility. The Soviets therefore decided to deploy the rest of 5th Guards Tank Army.


=====Prokhorovka===== =====Prokhorovka=====
Line 140: Line 161:
On the morning of ], ] advanced on ] at the same time that ] launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive scheduled for July 12 and in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives. On the morning of ], ] advanced on ] at the same time that ] launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive scheduled for July 12 and in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives.


The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss but an operational draw for the Soviets. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day. Tank losses have been a contentious subject ever since. Soviet losses have been claimed as low as 200 or as high as 822 tanks, but the loss records now show that they were probably from 150 to 300 complete losses, with a similar number damaged. Likewise, German loss claims have reached as low as 80 or into the hundreds, including "dozens" of Tigers. This number is impossible to establish because of the German philosophy in counting lost tanks. The number of complete losses for the period ]-] for the ''LSSAH'' and ''Das Reich'' divisions was three. Additional to that is an unknown number of damaged tanks, many of which would have been lost in repair depots during the subsequent retreat as a consequence of the Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive ]. Nipe puts the number of operational tank reductions in the whole Corps at 70-80, but it is unclear how many of these would have been in short-term or long-term repair. In any event, the losses for both the II SS Panzer Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army in the “greatest tank battle of all time,” fell short of the mythic proportions sometimes attributed to the Prokhorovka engagement. The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day. Tank losses have been a contentious subject ever since. Red Army losses have been claimed as low as 200 or as high as 822 tanks, but the loss records now show that they were probably from 150 to 300 complete losses, with a similar number damaged. Likewise, German loss claims have reached as low as 80 or into the hundreds, including "dozens" of Tigers. This number is impossible to establish because of the German philosophy in counting lost tanks. The number of complete losses for the period ]-] for the ''LSSAH'' and ''Das Reich'' divisions was three. Additional to that is an unknown number of damaged tanks, many of which would have been lost in repair depots during the subsequent retreat as a consequence of the Red Army post-Kursk counteroffensive ]. Nipe puts the number of operational tank reductions in the whole Corps at 70-80, but it is unclear how many of these would have been in short-term or long-term repair. In any event, the losses for both the II SS Panzer Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army in the “greatest tank battle of all time,” fell short of the mythic proportions sometimes attributed to the Prokhorovka engagement.


=====The End in the South===== =====The End in the South=====
Significantly, earlier in the battle the attacking German units had been squeezed into ever-narrowing frontages by the defenders. Elite Soviet Guards Airborne units were holding firm on the flanks of the very narrow German penetration. The Germans could not squeeze many units into this narrow front, nor did they have the combat power to widen the penetration. Thus as the attacking Corps moved forward, they continually lost strength due to the need to hold their own flanks. Significantly, earlier in the operation the attacking German units had been squeezed into ever-narrowing frontages by the defenders. Elite Red Army Guards Airborne units were holding firm on the flanks of the very narrow German penetration. The Germans could not squeeze many units into this narrow front, nor did they have the combat power to widen the penetration. Thus as the attacking Corps moved forward, they continually lost strength due to the need to hold their own flanks.


While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by ], in the south the overall battle (of Kursk) still hung in the balance, even after ]. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, nevertheless had breached the first two defensive belts and believed (wrongly) that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts (and some of them did not have troops deployed). Soviet defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves. While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by ], in the south the overall operation of Citadel still hung in the balance, even after ]. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, nevertheless had breached the first two defensive belts and believed (wrongly) that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts (and some of them did not have troops deployed). Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves.


==Hitler cancels the operation== ==Hitler cancels the operation==
Line 151: Line 172:
On the night of July 9/10, the ] mounted an ] of ]. Three days later, ] summoned ] and ] to his '']'' headquarters in ] and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory. Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 17 July he cancelled the operation and ordered the entire SS Panzer Korps to be transferred to Italy. On the night of July 9/10, the ] mounted an ] of ]. Three days later, ] summoned ] and ] to his '']'' headquarters in ] and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory. Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 17 July he cancelled the operation and ordered the entire SS Panzer Korps to be transferred to Italy.


Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs, and also by some historians. For example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Korps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.<ref>Carell, Paul - ''Hitler Moves East, Volume 2 Scorched Earth''.</ref> Other scholars, however, are of the opinion that Zitadelle had already clearly failed and that Hitler was right in canceling the operation, if not for the right reasons.{{Fact|date=June 2007}} Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs, and also by some historians. For example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Korps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.<ref>Carell, Paul - ''Hitler Moves East, Volume 2 Scorched Earth''.</ref> Other scholars, however, are of the opinion that Zitadelle had already clearly failed and that Hitler was right in canceling the operation, if not for the right reasons.{{Fact|date=June 2007}}
In any event, only one German division, ], departed for Italy without their equipment, the others remaining behind in the USSR to try and stem the Soviet counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive. In any event, only one German division, ], departed for Italy without their equipment, the others remaining behind in the USSR to try and stem the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.


==Soviet counteroffensives== ==Red Army counteroffensives==
{{main|Operation Kutuzov|Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev}} {{main|Operation Kutuzov|Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev}}


], the Soviet counteroffensive at ], decisively changed the situation. German Ninth Army units had to be redeployed to resist this attack instead of continuing their own offensive; units from the southern pincer were given warning orders on ] to withdraw back to the start lines held on ]. The purpose of the withdrawal was to shorten the front, enabling the Germans to re-form a reserve. ], the Red Army counteroffensive at ], decisively changed the situation. German Ninth Army units had to be redeployed to resist this attack instead of continuing their own offensive; units from the southern pincer were given warning orders on ] to withdraw back to the start lines held on ]. The purpose of the withdrawal was to shorten the front, enabling the Germans to re-form a reserve.


To the south the Red Army needed more time to re-group after the losses sustained in July, and could not launch their counteroffensive again until ] when Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced. Aided by diversionary attacks on the ] river further south, they took von Manstein's hard-won ]. ] in ] marked the capture of Belgorod and Orel, a celebration that henceforward became an institution with the recapture of each Soviet city. On ] the Red Army reached Kharkov, a city Hitler had sworn to defend at all costs. The German units had reduced manpower and shortages of equipment. To the south the Red Army needed more time to re-group after the losses sustained in July, and could not launch its counteroffensive again until ] when Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced. Aided by diversionary attacks on the ] river further south, the Red Army took von Manstein's hard-won ]. ] in ] marked the capture of Belgorod and Orel, a celebration that henceforward became an institution with the recapture of each Soviet city. On ] the Red Army reached Kharkov, a city Hitler had sworn to defend at all costs. The German units had reduced manpower and shortages of equipment.


==Battle ends== ==Counter offensives end==
] ]
Field Marshal ] believed the outcome of the offensive phase of Kursk to be much more grey than black and white. For although the Germans were forced to withdraw, the Germans “managed to, at least, partly destroy the mobile units of the enemy’s operational reserves.” However, despite the losses it suffered in the defensive phase of the battle of Kursk, the Red Army managed to go over to a very successful offensive within two weeks, pushing the Germans back to the ] and towards western Ukraine, and Manstein saw the overall campaign as a disaster for the Germans. Field Marshal ] believed the outcome of the offensive phase of Kursk to be much more grey than black and white. For although the Germans were forced to withdraw, the Germans “managed to, at least, partly destroy the mobile units of the enemy’s operational reserves.” However, despite the losses it suffered in the defensive phase of the Kursk operations, the Red Army managed to go over to a very successful offensive within two weeks, pushing the Germans back to the ] and towards western Ukraine, and Manstein saw the overall campaign as a disaster for the Germans.


By ], utter exhaustion had affected both sides and the battle of Kursk ended. It was followed by a series of successful Red Army operations that led to the ], and the liberation of Kiev during the autumn of 1943. By ], utter exhaustion had affected both sides, and the operations of the Kursk Bulge ended. It was followed by a series of successful Red Army operations that led to the ], and the liberation of Kiev during the autumn of 1943.


The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped prior to achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armor than previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth defenses of the Red Army, and were surprised by the significant operational reserves available to the Soviets in this battle. This was an outcome that few confidently predicted, and it changed the pattern of operation on the eastern front. The victory had not been cheap however. The ], although preventing the Germans from achieving the goals of Citadel, lost considerably more men and ''matériel'' than the ]. The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped prior to achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armor than previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth defenses of the Red Army, and were surprised by the significant ] available to the Red Army in these operations. This was an outcome that few confidently predicted, and it changed the pattern of operation on the eastern front. The victory had not been cheap however. The ], although preventing the Germans from achieving the goals of Citadel, lost considerably more men and ''matériel'' than the ].


German casualties listed in German sources during the battle proper (as opposed to the following Soviet counter-offensives north and south of the salient) in the period 5 to 20 July 1943 were between 50,000<ref>Glantz & House,page 275</ref> and 57,000.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, page 112</ref> German tank write-offs were between 278<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, adding tables 8.8 and 8.10 on pages 121-122</ref> and 323.<ref>Glantz & House, page 276</ref> Yet the numbers of destroyed tanks alone does not tell the entire story. For example, Zetterling and Frankson list only 33 tanks destroyed for the three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps as of 17 July, but the number of operational tanks on 17 July as of 19:15 had dropped by 139, leading one to assume that 106 tanks were damaged and not able to take part in the battle, at least temporarily.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 187-188</ref> Soviet casualties were 177,847 as listed in Krivosheev.<ref>quoted in Glantz & House at 275 and Restayn & Moller, Volume II, at page 341</ref> However, Restayn and Moller point out<ref>page 341 of Vol II</ref> that Krivosheev's figures for Central Front strength show a decline in strength during the period 5 to 11 July 1943 of approximately 92,700, of which only 33,897 are accounted for as dead or wounded with no explanation given for the further 58,893 losses. Restayn and Moller consider that the missing 58,893 should be accounted for as casualties, in which case total Soviet casualties in this period would be approximately 235,000 (ie 177,847 plus 58,893). Soviet armor losses, again according to Krivosheev, were 1,614 tanks and assault guns destroyed.<ref>cited in both Glantz & House at 275 and Mawdsely, at page 267</ref> German casualties listed in German sources during the operation-proper (as opposed to the following Red Army counter-offensives north and south of the salient) in the period 5 to 20 July 1943 were between 50,000<ref>Glantz & House,page 275</ref> and 57,000.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, page 112</ref> German tank write-offs were between 278<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, adding tables 8.8 and 8.10 on pages 121-122</ref> and 323.<ref>Glantz & House, page 276</ref> Yet the numbers of destroyed tanks alone does not tell the entire story. For example, Zetterling and Frankson list only 33 tanks destroyed for the three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps as of 17 July, but the number of operational tanks on 17 July as of 19:15 had dropped by 139, leading one to assume that 106 tanks were damaged and not able to take part in the battle, at least temporarily.<ref>Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 187-188</ref> Red Army casualties were 177,847 as listed in Krivosheev.<ref>quoted in Glantz & House at 275 and Restayn & Moller, Volume II, at page 341</ref> However, Restayn and Moller point out<ref>page 341 of Vol II</ref> that Krivosheev's figures for Central Front strength show a decline in strength during the period 5 to 11 July 1943 of approximately 92,700, of which only 33,897 are accounted for as dead or wounded with no explanation given for the further 58,893 losses. Restayn and Moller consider that the missing 58,893 should be accounted for as casualties, in which case total Red Army casualties in this period would be approximately 235,000 (ie 177,847 plus 58,893). Red Army armor losses, again according to Krivosheev, were 1,614 tanks and assault guns destroyed.<ref>cited in both Glantz & House at 275 and Mawdsely, at page 267</ref>


From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed to the Soviets, while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting to their moves. A new front had opened in ], diverting some of Germany's resources and attention. Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive in the East. From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed to the Red Army , while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting to their moves. A new front had opened in ], diverting some of Germany's resources and attention. Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive in the East.


Moreover, the loss further convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his ]. He continued his interference in military matters progressively, so that by war's end he was involved in tactical decisions. The opposite applied to Stalin, however. After seeing ]'s planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more, and stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions. Moreover, the loss further convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his ]. He continued his interference in military matters progressively, so that by war's end he was involved in tactical decisions. The opposite applied to Stalin, however. After seeing ]'s planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more, and stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions.


Predictable results ensued for both sides: the German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted personally to ] the day-to-day operations of what soon became a three-front war, while the Soviet Army gained more freedom and became more and more fluid as the war continued. Predictable results ensued for both sides: the German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted personally to ] the day-to-day operations of what soon became a three-front war, while the Red Army gained more freedom and became more and more fluid as the war continued.


==Notes== ==Notes==
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Revision as of 12:37, 30 April 2008

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"Battle of Kursk" or the Kursk Bulge (see article)
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
File:Sovietic T34 battle of kursk.jpg
Disabled Soviet T-34 being towed by a turretless armored recovery tank, under enemy fire.
DateGerman Kursk :July 4July 20, 1943
Soviet Kursk : July 4August 23, 1943
Location51°30′4″N 36°3′5″E / 51.50111°N 36.05139°E / 51.50111; 36.05139 (Battle of Kursk) Coordinates: Parameter: "type=" should be "type:"

Kursk, USSR
Result Decisive Soviet strategic victory
Belligerents
 Nazi Germany  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein
Günther von Kluge
Hermann Hoth
Walther Model
Hans Seidemann
Robert Ritter von Greim
Georgiy Zhukov
Konstantin Rokossovskiy
Nikolay Vatutin
Ivan Konyev
Strength
2,700 tanks
800,000 infantry
2,109 aircraft
3,600 tanks
20,000 guns
1,300,000 infantry and supporting troops
2,792 aircraft
Casualties and losses
German Kursk :
50,000 dead, wounded, or captured
300 tanks
200 aircraft ,
Soviet Kursk :
500,000 dead, wounded, or captured
900 tanks
200 aircraft
German Kursk :
180,000 dead, wounded, or captured
1,600 tanks
1,000 aircraft ,
Soviet Kursk :
607,737 dead, wounded, or captured
1,500 tanks
1,000 aircraft

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Eastern Front
Naval warfare
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

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Battle of Kursk

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The eastern front at the time of Operation Citadel. Orange areas show the destruction of an earlier Soviet breakthrough that ended with the Kharkov offensive operation. Green areas show German advances on Kursk.

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The Battle of Kursk (Template:Lang-ru) is the misnamed title given to a series of German and Soviet operations which for Wehrmacht's OKH were a part of the strategic offensive Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle); it was one of the major strategic operations on the Eastern Front of World War II. It was also the last German blitzkrieg offensive in the east executed by the German forces on a strategic scale during the war.

For the Soviet historians the series of operations conducted as part of the Summer-Autumn Campaign of 1943 (1 July - 31 December) include:

Orel-Kursk Defensive Operation (5 July 1943 - 11 July 1943)
Belgorod-Kursk Defensive Operation (5 July 1943 - 23 July 1943)
Denial air operations over the Kursk Bulge (5 July 1943 - 23 July 1943)
Interdiction air operations over the Kursk Bulge (5 July 1943 - 12 July 1943)
Air superiority operations in Operation Kutuzov
Volkhov-Orel Offensive Operation (12 July 1943 - 18 August 1943)
Kromy-Orel Offensive Operation (15 July 1943 - 18 August 1943)
Air superiority operations in Operation Rumyantsev
Belgorod-Bogodukhov Offensive Operation (3 August 1943 - 23 August 1943)
Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation (3 August 1943 - 23 August 1943)
Battle of Prokhorovka (12 July 1943)
Zmiyev Offensive Operation (12 August 1943 - 23 August 1943)

The exact definition of the operations varies. The Germans saw it only as the Operation Citadel offensive, while the Soviet and Russian historians continue today to combine Citadel and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives, Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev as a single strategic event.

Overall, the operations, which included the famous battle at Prokhorovka, remains both the largest armored engagement and the most costly single day of aerial warfare to date.

Kursk is further notable for the deliberately defensive operation strategy on the Red Army's part. Having good intelligence on Hitler's intentions, the Red Army established and managed to conceal elaborate layered defense works, mine fields, and stage and disguise large reserve forces poised for a tactical and strategic counter-attack typical of defensive battle plans. Though the Germans planned and initiated an offensive strike, the well-planned defense not only frustrated their ambitions, but also enabled the Soviets to follow up with counter-offensives that exhausted the German abilities in the Theater, thereby seizing the initiative for the remainder of the war. In that sense it may be seen as the second phase of the turning point that began with the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad, whose aftermath set the scene by establishing the Kursk Salient (also known as the "Kursk Bulge"), the reduction of which was the objective of the German armies entering in July. The subsequent counter-attacks retook Orel and Belgorod on August 5, and Kharkov on August 23, pushing back the Germans across a broad front. This was the first successful strategic Soviet summer offensive of the war.

Kursk was a further demonstration that the conflict in the East contained the largest scale of warfare in history, in terms of manpower involved. So well designed was the Soviet defensive planning, that when entering the archetypal counter-attack phase, the Soviets were able to attack along four separate axes of advance, and execute a planned stop at a phase line, thus avoiding the pitfalls of overextending during the counter-attack and earning this operation's deserved place as a model strategic operation in a war college curricula. Keegan comments Although often thought of as a tank battle, Kursk as a whole arguably demonstrated the triumph of artillery, infantry and engineers over armour. The Soviet plan was to soak up the German assault in a colossal web of defensive positions, and only then launch their armoured counter-attack. It was also an important air battle, in which the balance now shifted in the favour of the Soviets.

Background

In the winter of 19421943 the Red Army conclusively won the Battle of Stalingrad. One complete German army had been lost, along with about 800,000 German and Axis troops, seriously depleting Axis strength in the east. With an Allied invasion of Europe clearly looming, Hitler realized an outright defeat of the Soviets before the Western Allies arrived had become unlikely, and he decided to force the Soviets to a draw.

In 1917, the Germans had built the famous Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, shortening their lines and thereby increasing their defensive strength. They planned on repeating this strategy in Russia and started construction of a massive series of defensive works known as the Panther-Wotan line. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated.

In February and March of 1943, German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had completed an offensive during the Third Battle of Kharkov, leaving the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. In the middle lay a large 200km (120mi) wide and 150km (90mi) deep Soviet-held salient (bulge) in the lines between German forward positions near Orel in the north, and Von Manstein's recently captured Kharkov in the south.

German plans

Von Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had just successfully pursued at Kharkov, when he cut off an overextended Red Army offensive. He suggested tricking the Red Army into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, leading them into the Donets Basin in the eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the Donets River towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov.

OKH did not approve von Manstein's plan, and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Three Red Army armies occupied the ground in and around the salient, and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line, and capture the strategically useful railway town of Kursk located on the main north-south railway line running from Rostov to Moscow.

In March the plans crystallized. Walter Model's Ninth Army would attack southwards from Orel while Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk, but if the offensive went well they would have permission to continue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to create a new line at the Don River far to the east.

Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the General Staff considerable control over the planning of the operation. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping the entire German line of practically anything remotely useful for deployment in the upcoming operation. They first set the attack for May 4, but then delayed it until June 12, and finally until July 4 in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new Panther tanks.

The basic concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and, for the Germans, hitherto usually successful) double-envelopment, or Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a Cannae-style method, and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics even more effective. Blitzkrieg depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a major pitched battle.

However, such breakthroughs were easier to achieve if they hit an unexpected location, as the Germans had achieved attacking through the Ardennes in 1940, and towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated the principle of surprise: anyone who could read a map could confidently predict the obvious point of attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian, who asked Hitler:

Was it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east that year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front? Perhaps more surprisingly Hitler replied: I know. The thought of it turns my stomach.

The interview ended inconclusively; Operation Citadel was postponed until mid-June.

The German force numbered 50 divisions, including 17 panzer and panzergrenadier, among them the elite Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Division, and the Waffen-SS divisions 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzer Das Reich, and 3rd SS Panzer Totenkopf grouped into the II SS Panzer Corps. The High Command concentrated all their armor, the Tiger and new Panther tanks, and the new Elefant tank destroyer, being used as assault guns. They also massed a high proportion of their available air units and artillery, and despite the problems of the German plan it was a formidable concentration of armor.

Soviet plans

File:Na zapad.jpg
To the West! calls this Soviet poster, while a Soviet soldier destroys the German To the East! sign

The Red Army had also begun planning for their own upcoming summer offensives, and had settled on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkov would flatten out the line, and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes. However, Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans.

The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Red Army by surprise, but in this case Kursk seemed the obvious target. Moscow received warning of the German plans through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. This was almost unnecessary, since Marshal Zhukov had already correctly predicted the site of the German attack as early as April 8, when he wrote his initial report to Stavka (the Red Army General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the Red Army.

Stalin and a handful of Stavka officers wanted to strike first. The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success. Blitzkrieg had worked against all opposing armies, including the Red Army. None had succeeded in stopping a German breakthrough. On the other hand, Soviet offensive actions during both winters showed their own offensives now worked well. However, the overwhelming majority of Stavka members, most notably Zhukov himself, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves, first. Zhukov's opinion swayed the argument.

The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Red Army four months in which to prepare, and with every passing day they turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended points on earth. Two Fronts, the Central and Voronezh, manned the defensive lines, and the Steppe Front was available to act as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million land mines and dug about 5000km (3000mi) of trenches, to a depth of 175km (95mi). In addition, they massed a huge army of their own, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,400 aircraft. The Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month they pulled further ahead in men and material.

Many of the troops assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the Stalingrad battle, but the Red Army also added over one million new men to its ranks in the first half of 1943. Thus, the Red Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive gave the new units an unusually long time to train.

The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from howitzers would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from 45mm (1.7"), 57mm (2.24"), and 85mm (3.3") towed anti-tank guns and 76.2mm (3") divisional field guns would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German Ninth Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometer of defended front. In the 6th and 7th Guards Army sectors in the south, the density was lower at about 10 guns per kilometer.

At Kursk, the Red Army committed more than a million men, more than 3,275 tanks and 25,000 guns and mortars. Red Army riflemen like these had to hold off "tank fists" and German assault infantry supported by dive-bombers and heavy artillery fire. Soviet losses at Kursk amounted to 177,847 men killed, missing or wounded.

The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 antitank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometer of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometer and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometer. Red Army engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid barbed wire, built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Dummy positions were built to attract German artillery fire. Camouflaging of these positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units would have of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns would be their own vehicles exploding.

Set in the larger vista of the war on the Eastern Front, Kursk is significant because it demonstrated the Soviet high command and staff now worked more effectively than OKH—largely due to Stalin finally being prepared to act on the advice of his professional intelligence and staff officers, while Hitler was systematically ignoring his. This was evidenced by the defeat of the Blitzkrieg in summer campaigning weather (albeit at a very high price) and the ability of the Red Army forces to move from defensive to offensive operations due to better staff work, larger reserves and better planning. In these senses Kursk, and not Stalingrad, can be viewed as the turning point in the war: certainly the initiative passed decisively from Wehrmacht to the Red Army.

Operation Citadel

Both sides had collected large forces to be committed for what was a strategically significant sector of the Eastern Front.

Main article: Battle of Kursk order of battle

Preliminary Actions

It took four months before the Germans felt ready, by which time they had collected 200 of the new Panther tanks (only 40 were available at the beginning of the operation due to technical problems with the new type), 90 Elefant Panzerjägers and every flyable Henschel Hs 129 ground attack aircraft, as well as 270 Tigers, late model Panzer Mark-IVs and even a number of captured T-34s. In total they assembled some 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft and 800,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy.

By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on German military strength. Although actions in North Africa hardly constituted the Red Army's longed-for second front, the operation there did begin to tell on the Germans, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of Luftwaffe losses occurred in the battles over Malta and Tunisia. German air superiority was no longer guaranteed. The Soviet Air Forces far outnumbered the Luftwaffe, and were quickly gaining in technology as well. Both Air Forces possessed very effective series of ground-attack aircraft capable of decimating armour; the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the German Junkers Ju 87G (Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added Bordkanone 37mm gunpods).

File:Totenkopf-Kursk-01.jpg
Waffen-SS panzergrenadiers and Wehrmacht Tiger tanks during the start of Operation Citadel

The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on July 1 the orders to attack on July 5 were issued. The following day, Marshal Vasilyevskiy warned the Front commanders (N. F. Vatutin, K. K. Rokossovskiy and I. S. Konyev) that the long-awaited German offensive would begin sometime between July 3 and July 6. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from their Red Orchestra (German: Rote Kapelle) espionage organization, whose sources included officers in the Nazi administration, among others in Hermann Göring’s aviation ministry.

Preliminary fighting started on 4 July 1943 in the south, as Fourth Panzer Army had elected to try to take the Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on July 5. Thus they deliberately sacrificed tactical surprise. However, the Red Army forward positions were on small hills overlooking German assembly areas, so it is likely surprise would have been lost in any case.

In the afternoon, Stuka dive bombers blew a two-mile-wide gap in the front lines on the north in a short period of 10 minutes, and then turned for home while the German artillery opened up to continue the pounding. Hoth's armored spearhead, the III Panzer Corps, then advanced on the Soviet positions around Zavidovka. At the same time, the Großdeutschland Division attacked Butovo in torrential rain, and the 11th Panzer Division took the high ground around Butovo. To the west of Butovo the going proved tougher for Großdeutschland and the 3rd Panzer Division, which met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. The II SS Panzer Corps launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts, and again met with stiff resistance until assault troops equipped with flamethrowers cleared the bunkers and outposts.

At 22:30, the Red Army hit back with an artillery bombardment in the north and south. This barrage, by over 3,000 guns and mortars, expended up to one-half of the artillery supply for the entire operation. The goal was to delay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly against German artillery positions and managed to suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they targeted. The result was much weaker German artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. Also, German units attacked at staggered times on July 5 due to the disruption caused by this bombardment. In the south, the Red Army chose to fire largely against the German infantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially successful in delaying the German attack, but caused few casualties.

Main operations

The Northern Face

The real operation opened on 5 July 1943. The Red Army, now aware even of the exact time of the planned German offensive, launched a massive attack by the Soviet Air Force on the Luftwaffe airbases in the area, in an attempt to counter the classic German tactic of eliminating local air support within the first hour of operation. The next few hours turned into possibly the largest air operation ever fought.

The Red Army co-ordination of the attack had failed. Red Air Force fighters were dispatched too soon, arriving over German airbases before the arrival of the Red Air Force bomber forces, eventually retiring due to lack of fuel. The German fighters had nothing to prevent them from taking off and engaging the approaching attackers..The Red Air Force suffered the loss of 120 aircraft.

File:Kursk Soviet Artilery.JPG
At Kursk, the Red Army constructed an elaborate defensive system. The core of each Red Army defensive position was its anti-tank defenses, organized into a network covered by the interlocking fires of multiple anti-tank guns.

The Luftwaffe directed an all out effort against Red Army positions on the northern flank during first day of the operation, while Soviet deployment errors granted the Luftwaffe initial air-superiority. General-Leytenant Rudenko, unsure whether this was the major German attack, ordered only one-third of his fighter strength to engage the masses of German aircraft, while the rest stood down. The out-numbered Red Army units were engaged over their own rear-areas and suffered heavily. The German fighters had flown ahead of the bomber and Stuka units to prevent Red Army intervention over the battlefield. The unprotected Stuka and Kampfgruppen then began their assault on the Red Army positions unhindered. The Soviets fed their aerial strength in piecemeal and it suffered heavy losses. In the first three days of fighting over the northern flank Luftflotte 6 lost a total of 39 aircraft against Soviet losses of 386.

The 9th Army attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on July 5. The attack sector had been correctly anticipated by the Red Army Central Front. Attacking on a 45-kilometer-wide front, the Germans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive minefields, and needed engineering units to come up and clear them under artillery fire. Although a few Goliath and Borgward remote-control engineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields, they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles cleared mines, they had no on-board marking system to show following tanks where the cleared lanes were. Red Army units covered the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delaying and inflicting losses on German engineers clearing mines manually. Thus German losses in the Red Army minefields were high. For example, the German 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion began the attack with 49 Ferdinand self-propelled guns; 37 of them had been lost in the minefields before 17:00 on July 5. Although most of the lost vehicles were mobility kills rather than permanent losses, they were out of action until they could be repaired. While idle they added nothing to German combat power and were easier for Red Army artillery to knock out permanently. Since the Germans were advancing, any repairable vehicles could be fixed and put back into action.

There are a number of factors that explain the 9th Army’s lack of progress. The combination of Soviet defensive planning and, on the German side, the lack of concentration of force were the main factors. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength and often without sufficient infantry support. Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovskiy had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had fortified those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The 13th Army, which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and anti-tank guns than the other Central Front units, and indeed held the strongest defensive positions in the entire salient. A major planning error by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff was their expectation that the main weight of the German attack would come in the north on the Central Front. Thus they concentrated more strength there. Also, the Central front chose to defend the tactical zone (to a depth of 20 km) very heavily, leaving far fewer units in the depths of the defense. Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and the 9th Army also committed major units piecemeal due to some disruption caused by the Soviet pre-emptive artillery barrage. Finally, the 9th Army led with reinforced infantry divisions that were already in the line facing the Red Army, rather than attacking with uncommitted units.

Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration shows clearly that the Red Army defensive tactics were succeeding. Beginning with a 45-kilometer-wide attack frontage on July 5, on the 6th, the 9th Army attacked on a 40-kilometer front. This dropped to 15 kilometers wide by July 7, and only 2 kilometers each on July 8-9. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: 5 kilometers on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each succeeding day. By the 10th, Ninth Army was stopped in its tracks.

After a week, the Wehrmacht had moved only 12 km forward, and on the 12th the Soviets launched their own offensive against the Second Panzer Army and the German Ninth Army at Orel. The situation became critical for the German forces, the 11th Guards Army could cut off both German Armies. The Luftwaffe was called upon to halt the offensive, and its actions proved decisive to saving the German armies from encirclement. The Luftwaffe organised a massive aerial offensive to blunt the threat. On 16 July the Luftwaffe flew 1,595 sorties, double that of the previous days. In daylight hours the Sturzkampfgeschwader and Schlachtgeschwader attacked Red Army armoured units while the Kampfgruppen targeted the rear-supply lines. Another 1,100 sorties were flown on 18 July. The Junkers Ju 87G units took a heavy toll of Red Army tank forces. So heavy were Soviet losses, the air attacks forced a Soviet retreat. The Soviet tanks that had managed to reach German positions had been quickly routed. The 1st Tank Corps had only 33 tanks remaining on 20 July.. Model sent a message to von Greim thanking him, "the Luftwaffe's intervention was absolutely decisive to prevent a second, more disastrous Stalingrad".

The 9th Army had to withdraw, their part in the offensive over. Because the German armor was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the South, the German armor losses were comparatively light - 143 armored vehicles were total losses in the period July 5 -14 1943. However, this failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and matériel for the Red Army. Few Red Army guns were captured, and those Red Army units that did retreat did so on orders. The German attack failed to penetrate beyond the Red Army tactical zone.

Southern Face

German advance in the South

In the south, the Voronezh Front fared less well against the 4th Panzer Army with its LII Corps, XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps. The II SS Panzer Corps attacked on a narrower frontage against two Red Army rifle regiments. The armored spearhead of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army forced its way forward, and by the 6th had reached some 15 km past the lines. Again, Red Army planning played a big role. In the south the Red Army had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses more evenly. For example, three of the four Armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometer of front; this contrasts sharply with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which was twice as heavy in the active sectors. Also, the Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tactical zone much more thinly, leaving a much higher proportion of units in deeper positions compared to the Central Front. Finally, the Voronezh Front was weaker than the Central Front, yet it faced much stronger German forces.

The German forces made steady progress against the Red Army defenses, but, as in the north, attack frontages (width) and penetration depth tended to drop as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. Beginning with a 30-kilometer-wide attack frontage on July 5, this dropped to 20-kilometers wide by July 7 and 15 km by July 9. Likewise, the depth of the penetration dropped from 9 km on July 5 to 5 km on July 8 and 2-3 km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled.

Red Army minefields and artillery were again successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans was vital to allow their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, again indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.

German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Division, which began the operation with 118 tanks. On July 10, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on July 5.

Nevertheless, it was obvious that the threat of a German breakthrough in the south had to be reckoned with. The Steppe Front had been formed in the months prior to the operation as a central reserve for such an eventuality. Units of the Steppe Front began movement to the south as early as July 9. This included the 5th Guards Tank Army and other combined-arms armies.

The German flank, however, stood unprotected as the Red Army 7th Guards Army stalled Kempf's divisions, aided by heavy rain, after the Germans had crossed the Donets River. The 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced with two additional Tank Corps, moved into positions to the east of Prokhorovka and had started to prepare a counterattack of their own when II SS Panzer Corps arrived and an intense struggle ensued. The Red Army managed to halt the SS—but only just. Little now stood in the way of the 4th Panzer Army, and a German breakthrough looked like a very real possibility. The Soviets therefore decided to deploy the rest of 5th Guards Tank Army.

Prokhorovka
Main article: Battle of Prokhorovka
Memorial on Prokhorovka Field

On the morning of July 12, II SS Panzer Corps advanced on Prokhorovka at the same time that 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive scheduled for July 12 and in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives.

The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day. Tank losses have been a contentious subject ever since. Red Army losses have been claimed as low as 200 or as high as 822 tanks, but the loss records now show that they were probably from 150 to 300 complete losses, with a similar number damaged. Likewise, German loss claims have reached as low as 80 or into the hundreds, including "dozens" of Tigers. This number is impossible to establish because of the German philosophy in counting lost tanks. The number of complete losses for the period 10 July-13 July for the LSSAH and Das Reich divisions was three. Additional to that is an unknown number of damaged tanks, many of which would have been lost in repair depots during the subsequent retreat as a consequence of the Red Army post-Kursk counteroffensive Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. Nipe puts the number of operational tank reductions in the whole Corps at 70-80, but it is unclear how many of these would have been in short-term or long-term repair. In any event, the losses for both the II SS Panzer Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army in the “greatest tank battle of all time,” fell short of the mythic proportions sometimes attributed to the Prokhorovka engagement.

The End in the South

Significantly, earlier in the operation the attacking German units had been squeezed into ever-narrowing frontages by the defenders. Elite Red Army Guards Airborne units were holding firm on the flanks of the very narrow German penetration. The Germans could not squeeze many units into this narrow front, nor did they have the combat power to widen the penetration. Thus as the attacking Corps moved forward, they continually lost strength due to the need to hold their own flanks.

While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by July 10, in the south the overall operation of Citadel still hung in the balance, even after July 12. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, nevertheless had breached the first two defensive belts and believed (wrongly) that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts (and some of them did not have troops deployed). Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves.

Hitler cancels the operation

On the night of July 9/10, the Western Allies mounted an amphibious invasion of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned von Kluge and von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory. Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 17 July he cancelled the operation and ordered the entire SS Panzer Korps to be transferred to Italy.

Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs, and also by some historians. For example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Korps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital. Other scholars, however, are of the opinion that Zitadelle had already clearly failed and that Hitler was right in canceling the operation, if not for the right reasons.

In any event, only one German division, 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, departed for Italy without their equipment, the others remaining behind in the USSR to try and stem the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.

Red Army counteroffensives

Main articles: Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

Operation Kutuzov, the Red Army counteroffensive at Orel, decisively changed the situation. German Ninth Army units had to be redeployed to resist this attack instead of continuing their own offensive; units from the southern pincer were given warning orders on July 15 to withdraw back to the start lines held on July 4. The purpose of the withdrawal was to shorten the front, enabling the Germans to re-form a reserve.

To the south the Red Army needed more time to re-group after the losses sustained in July, and could not launch its counteroffensive again until 3 August when Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced. Aided by diversionary attacks on the Mius river further south, the Red Army took von Manstein's hard-won Belgorod. Fireworks in Moscow marked the capture of Belgorod and Orel, a celebration that henceforward became an institution with the recapture of each Soviet city. On 11 August the Red Army reached Kharkov, a city Hitler had sworn to defend at all costs. The German units had reduced manpower and shortages of equipment.

Counter offensives end

A cathedral on the Field of Prokhorovka. It commemorates the Red Army victory in the battle of the 5th Guards Tank Army

Field Marshal von Manstein believed the outcome of the offensive phase of Kursk to be much more grey than black and white. For although the Germans were forced to withdraw, the Germans “managed to, at least, partly destroy the mobile units of the enemy’s operational reserves.” However, despite the losses it suffered in the defensive phase of the Kursk operations, the Red Army managed to go over to a very successful offensive within two weeks, pushing the Germans back to the Dnieper and towards western Ukraine, and Manstein saw the overall campaign as a disaster for the Germans.

By 22 August, utter exhaustion had affected both sides, and the operations of the Kursk Bulge ended. It was followed by a series of successful Red Army operations that led to the crossing of the Dnieper, and the liberation of Kiev during the autumn of 1943.

The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped prior to achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armor than previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth defenses of the Red Army, and were surprised by the significant operational reserves available to the Red Army in these operations. This was an outcome that few confidently predicted, and it changed the pattern of operation on the eastern front. The victory had not been cheap however. The Red Army, although preventing the Germans from achieving the goals of Citadel, lost considerably more men and matériel than the Wehrmacht.

German casualties listed in German sources during the operation-proper (as opposed to the following Red Army counter-offensives north and south of the salient) in the period 5 to 20 July 1943 were between 50,000 and 57,000. German tank write-offs were between 278 and 323. Yet the numbers of destroyed tanks alone does not tell the entire story. For example, Zetterling and Frankson list only 33 tanks destroyed for the three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps as of 17 July, but the number of operational tanks on 17 July as of 19:15 had dropped by 139, leading one to assume that 106 tanks were damaged and not able to take part in the battle, at least temporarily. Red Army casualties were 177,847 as listed in Krivosheev. However, Restayn and Moller point out that Krivosheev's figures for Central Front strength show a decline in strength during the period 5 to 11 July 1943 of approximately 92,700, of which only 33,897 are accounted for as dead or wounded with no explanation given for the further 58,893 losses. Restayn and Moller consider that the missing 58,893 should be accounted for as casualties, in which case total Red Army casualties in this period would be approximately 235,000 (ie 177,847 plus 58,893). Red Army armor losses, again according to Krivosheev, were 1,614 tanks and assault guns destroyed.

From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed to the Red Army , while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting to their moves. A new front had opened in Italy, diverting some of Germany's resources and attention. Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive in the East.

Moreover, the loss further convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his General Staff. He continued his interference in military matters progressively, so that by war's end he was involved in tactical decisions. The opposite applied to Stalin, however. After seeing Stavka's planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more, and stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions.

Predictable results ensued for both sides: the German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted personally to micromanage the day-to-day operations of what soon became a three-front war, while the Red Army gained more freedom and became more and more fluid as the war continued.

Notes

  1. Bergström 2007, p. 123-125;figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Frieburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin
  2. There are variant numbers given depending on the stage of the operations which took place, and how they were calculated. Soviet sources include all guns, mortars, rocket and anti-aircraft artillery employed from the start of the Operation Citadel to the end of the Soviet counter-offensives. German sources also add tanks deployed in static dug-in positions.
  3. Bergström 2007, p. 127-128;figures from Russian archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow
  4. ^ Using the German dates of operation
  5. ^ Using the Soviet dates of operation
  6. pp.149-159, Glantz, Soviet Military Deception
  7. When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived infallibility of blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the future hopes of the German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east. Kursk announced to the world that for every offensive theory, there is a suitable defensive one available to those who devote the requisite thought necessary to develop it.Glantz, Colonel David M. "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943". U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Soviet Army Studies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report No. 11). {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  8. Atlas of World War II edited by John Keegan (2006, Collins, London) ISBN 10:0-00-721465-0
  9. Hans-Ulrich Rudel of StG 2 Immelmann had used the Ju 87 equppied with two 37 mm cannon over the Kuban front in the Spring of 1943. The Geschwaders Stukas were equipped with them on the very first day of the Kursk offensive. Rudel destroyed 12 Soviet tanks on 5 July. Bergstrom 2007 p. 79-81; 102; 106; 114; 118.
  10. The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The Freya radar stations established in Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet formations approaching from Belgorod and were not responsible for sealing the failure of the strike; Bergström 2007, p.26.
  11. Bergström 2007, p. 27.
  12. Bergström 2007, p. 38.
  13. Bergström 2007, p. 120.
  14. Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North, by Restayn and Moller, page 333
  15. Bergström 2007, p. 102.
  16. Bergström 2007, p. 109.
  17. Figures from Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris Solovyev: Kurskaya bitva, 1970. Bergström p. 109
  18. Bergström 2007, p. 109.
  19. Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North, by Restayn and Moller, pages 333-336
  20. Carell, Paul - Hitler Moves East, Volume 2 Scorched Earth.
  21. Glantz & House,page 275
  22. Zetterling & Frankson, page 112
  23. Zetterling & Frankson, adding tables 8.8 and 8.10 on pages 121-122
  24. Glantz & House, page 276
  25. Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 187-188
  26. quoted in Glantz & House at 275 and Restayn & Moller, Volume II, at page 341
  27. page 341 of Vol II
  28. cited in both Glantz & House at 275 and Mawdsely, at page 267

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