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1953 coup d'état
Tank-riding anti-Mosaddeq demonstrators in Tehran on August 19 1953.
Date 1953 Location Iran Result Overthrow of the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq, and his subsequent replacement by Fazlollah Zahedi on August 19 1953.

The 1953 Iranian coup d'état saw the overthrow of the democratically-elected administration of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq and his cabinet from power by British and American intelligence operatives working together with Iranian agents and elements of the Iranian army. Bribing Iranian officials, news media and others with British and American funds, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), organized the covert operation aiding retired Iranian General Fazlollah Zahedi and Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri. The project to overthrow Iran's government was codenamed Operation Ajax.

The coup has been called "a critical event in post-war world history." It re-installed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, replacing an elected, nationalist government with a more dictatorial pro-Western monarchy, and is thought to have contributed to the 1979 overthrow of the Shah and his replacement with the anti-Western Islamic Republic.

It was originally considered a triumph of covert action in America but is now thought by many by many to have left "a haunting and terrible legacy." In 2000, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, during the administration of President Bill Clinton, called it a "setback for democratic government" in Iran.

Reasons given for why the coup occured include CIA bribes, and domestic dissatisfaction with the Mossadegh government. Motivations given for the foreign coup planners include desire to control Iranian oil fields, contempt for democracy in non-European states, and more benign concerns over Iran's coming under the control of the Soviet bloc of Iran's traditional enemy Russia.

Background

One of, if not the principle cause(s) of the coup was the dispute over the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company between the British and Iranian governments.

Early oil development

In May 1901 Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar, the Shah of Iran, sought to partially alleviate debts he owed to Britain by granting a 60-year concession to search for oil to William Knox D'Arcy. Although the oil exploration took seven years in a very punishing environment and was almost called off before oil was found, it discovered a huge oil field for which Iran received only 16% of future profits.

The company grew slowly until World War I when its strategic importance led the British Government to acquire controlling interest in the company, essentially nationalizing British oil production in Iran for a short period of time, becoming the Royal Navy's chief source of fuel oil in defeating the Central Powers during World War I. During this period, British troops occupied strategic parts of Iran.

Post-World War I

There was growing dissatisfaction within Persia with the oil concession and royalty terms, whereby Iran received 16 percent of net profits. This dissatisfaction was exacerbated by British involvement in the Persian Constitutional Revolution as well as the British Empire's use of Iranian routes to invade Russia in an attempt to reverse the October Bolshevik Revolution.

In 1921, a military coup, thought to have been financed by the British, placed Reza Pahlavi on the throne as Shah of Iran. The new Shah undertook a number of modernization measures, many of which were advantageous not only to the British but the Iranians as well, such as the Persian Corridor railroads for military and other transportation.

In the 1930s, Nazi Germany heavily courted the Shah in order to secure access to oil, for use in their war effort. The Shah terminated the APOC concession. The concession was resettled within a year, covering a reduced area with an increase in the Persian government's share of profits.

In 1935, the Shah insisted that the name Iran be used instead of Persia and, so, APOC became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

In 1941, following the German invasion of the USSR, the British and Commonwealth forces and the Soviet Union invaded Iran, to secure supply lines (see Persian Corridor) for the Soviets fighting against Germany on the Eastern Front and Iranian oil fields for the allies. They deposed Reza Shah, who was considered sympathetic to the Nazis, and installed Reza's 22-year-old son Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to replace him.

Post-World War II

In Iran, a constitutional monarchy since 1906, nationalist leaders were becoming increasingly powerful as they sought to reduce the long-time foreign intervention in their country, including the highly-profitable British oil arrangements.

A particular point of contention was the refusal of the AIOC to allow an audit of the accounts to determine whether the Iranian government received the royalties it was due. Intransigence on the part of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company led the nationalist government to escalate its demands, requiring an equal share in oil revenues. A final crisis was precipitated when the oil company ceased operations in Iran rather than accepting the Iranian government's interference in its business affairs.

AIOC and the Iranian government resisted nationalist pressure to come to a renewed deal in 1949.

1950s

Support for nationalization

By 1951, AIOC resistance to negotiating and increasing payment to Iran had created support for nationalization of that company among Iranians that was not just strong but passionate.

In March the pro-western Prime Minister Ali Razmara, who had spoken out against nationalization, was assassinated. The next month the Iranian parliament passed a bill to nationalize the oil industry, creating the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). This was undertaken with the guidance of western-educated Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq, at that time a member of the parliament, the leader of the nationalization movement. By May, Mosaddeq was appointed Prime Minister by the Shah.

That summer, American diplomat Averell Harriman came to Iran to try to negotiate a compromise between Mossedegh and the British. His plea for help from the Shah was met with the reply that "in the face of public opinion, there was no way he could say a word against nationalization." Harriman called a press conference in Tehran were he read a statement calling for "reason as well as enthusiasm" in confronting the crisis. "As soon as those words were out of his mouth, one journalist jumped to his feet and shouted, 'We and the Iranian people all support Premier Mosaddeq and oil nationalization!' The others began cheering and then marched out of the room. Harriman was left alone, shaking his head in dismay."

Nationalization

The newly state-owned oil company saw a dramatic drop in production as a result of Iranian inexperience and the AIOC-mandated policy that British technicians not work with the newly created National Iranian Oil Company. This resulted in the Abadan Crisis, a situation that was further aggravated by its export markets being closed when the British Navy imposed a blockade around the country in order to force the Iranian state to abandon the effort to nationalize its nation's oil. By September 1951 the British had all but closed down oil production from the Abadan oil fields, prohibited the export to Iran of key British commodities, including sugar and steel, and blocked Iran's access to its hard currency accounts in British banks.

The United Kingdom took a case against the nationalization to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Mossadegh vowed that at the hearing, the world would hear of a, "cruel and imperialistic country," stealing from a "needy and naked people." Britain, representing the AIOC, lost the case. Britain pointed out that Iran was violating the company's legal rights and spearheaded a worldwide boycott of Iran's oil that submerged the regime into financial crisis.

Political crises

In late 1951 Prime Minister Mosaddeq held a parliamentary election. "Realizing that the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats, Mossadeq stopped the voting as soon as 79 deputies - just enough to form a parliamentary quorum - had been elected." This was interpreted variously as a defensive action against subversive British agents by Mosaddeq supporters, and "as undemocratic and grasping for personal power" by his opponents.

In July 1952 Mosaddeq resigned after the Shah refused to accept his nomination for War Minister, a position traditionally filled by the Shah. Mosaddeq appealed to the general public for support and after five days of mass demonstrations, 29 killed in Tehran, and "signs of dissension in the army," the Shah backed down and asked Mosaddeq to form a new government. This was an enormous personal triumph for Mosaddeq vis-a-vis the Shah and Mosaddeq capitalized on it by asking the majlis (parliament) for "emergency powers for six months to decree any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms."

Mosaddeq dealt his opponents "not only at the Shah and the military but also at the landed aristocracy and the two Houses of Parliament ... a rapid succession of blows."

In early 1953 Mosaddeq successfully pressed Parliament to extend his emergency powers for another 12 months. With these powers, he decreed a land reform law that established village councils and increased peasants' shares of production.

By mid-1953 Mosaddeq's struggle with Parliament had resulted in a mass of resignation of his parliamentary supporters reducing parliament below its quorum, and a referendum to give the prime minister powers to legislate law. The referendum passed with 99% approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against, but was critized by opponents for its use of separately placed ballot boxes for yes or no ballots and a requirement that "each ballot must be clearly inscribed with the full name of the voter and the number and place of issue of his identity card."

However while Mosaddeq gained political power during this time, Britain’s boycott had cut off revenue to the Iranian government and devastated Iran's economy. Iranians were "becoming poorer and unhappier by the day". Former supporters of Mosaddeq, Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani, along with the three groups representing the bazaar - the Society of Muslim Warriors, the Toilers Party, and the Fadayan-e Islam - turned against him.

Origins

The government of Britain was concerned about its interests in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. It appealed to U.S. President Harry S. Truman but Truman refused. By 1953 however, both the US and UK had more conservative governments. General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the President of the United States, and the British under Churchhill convinced the new American administration to join them in overthrowing Mosaddeq and re-establishing control of Iranian oil.

Cold War

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Among the controversies involved in the coup is the importance and/or legitimacy of American and British fears of Communist influence in Iran.

In the decades following the October Revolution, Iran's huge neighbor, the Soviet Union, had expanded its domain to rule over tens of millions of Muslim in Central Asia, and following World War II over much of Eastern Europe. On June 26, 1950, as the movement for oil nationalization was gathering steam in Iran, soldiers of the North Korean Communist regime with the backing of the Soviets, crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea, beginning the Korean War. Three years later, just before the coup in Iran, Soviet tanks crushed an anti-Communist uprising of strikes and protests in East Germany. In Iran itself, the well-organized, pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) Party, greatly exceeded the National Front in the sized of its rallies as the crisis became worse.

In the view of American mainstream public and elite opinion, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world." Consequently,

the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge.

According to Sam Falle, a young British diplomat at the time of the coup,

1952 was a very dangerous time. The Cold War was hot in Korea. The Soviet Union had tried to take all Berlin in 1948. Stalin was still alive. On no account could the Western powers risk a Soviet takeover of Iran, which would almost certainly have led to World War III

In addition to fear of the Soviet influence in Iran, the Cold War influenced American support for, or at least lack of opposition to, Britain's policies there. Hardline British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddeq. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect `Anglo-American unity` on Iran."

A pro-American Iran under the Shah would give the U.S. a double strategic advantage in the ensuing Cold War, as a NATO alliance was already in effect with the government of Turkey, also bordering the USSR.

Operation Ajax

Planning

The organizer of Operation Ajax was Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., a senior CIA officer, and grandson of the former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt. While formal leadership was vested in Kermit Roosevelt, the project was designed and executed by Donald Wilber, a career CIA agent and acclaimed author of books on Iran, Afghanistan and Ceylon.

The CIA operation centered around having the Shah dismiss Prime Minister Mosaddeq and replace him with General Fazlollah Zahedi with the assistance of Colonel Abbas Farzanegan, a choice agreed on by the British and Americans after careful examination for his likeliness to be anti-Soviet.

The BBC spearheaded Britain's propaganda campaign, broadcasting the code word to start the coup.

Attempted Nasiri coup

Colonel Nasiri of the Imperial Guards arrived at the Mosaddeq's doorstep late the night of August 15-16 with a number of Imperial Guards and "a royal decree replacing Mossadeq with Zahedi as premier". Mosaddeq had been tipped off by the Tudeh military network however, and a pro-Mosaddeq army contingent surrounded and arrested Nasiri. With this failure, the Shah fled to Iraq and then Italy.

With planned coup a failure, Roosevelt choose to stay in Iran and improvise another coup, find another coup leader. This turned out to be retired General Fazlollah Zahedi. Mossadegh forces mistakenly believed Shah was behind coup and with him gone relaxed their guard.

In Tehran, the next two days riots are started by "black" mobs, i.e. paid for by the CIA to "loot shops, destroy pictures of the Shah, ransack offices of royalist groups". They also include sincere supporters of Mossedeq who have joined in the rioting.

Zahedi coup

On August 19 Sha'yban the Brainless, a south Tehran strongman paid by Roosevelt, led a noisy demonstration from the red light district to the bazaar. The gendarmerie also transported 800 farm hands from the royal stables in Veramin to central Tehran. Many anti-Mosaddeq demonstrators were killed attempting to overrun Mosaddeq's house by armed defenders, but in the afternoon General Zahedi, commanding 35 Sherman tanks surrounded the premier's residence. A nine-hour battle ended with 300 people dead, Mossadeq fleeing and his house burnt.

Zahedi was installed to succeed Prime Minister Mosaddeq. The deposed Mosaddeq was arrested, given what some have alleged to have been a show trial where he defends himself brilliantly, and is sentenced to death before the Shah commutes this sentence to three years in a military prison and house arrest for life. After prison Mosaddeq was confined to the village of Ahmad Abad of his country estate. He stayed in his estate compound running his farm for the rest of his life.

As a condition of restoring the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the U.S. required that the AIOC's oil monopoly lapse. Five major U.S. oil companies, plus Royal Dutch Shell and French Compagnie Française des Pétroles, were designated to operate in the country alongside AIOC after a successful coup.

In planning the operation, the CIA organized a guerrilla force in case the communist Tudeh Party seized power as a result of any chaos created by Operation Ajax. According to formerly "Top Secret" documents released by the National Security Archive, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith reported that the CIA had reached an agreement with Qashqai tribal leaders in southern Iran to establish a clandestine safe haven from which U.S.-funded guerrillas and intelligence agents could operate.

Media report

In 2000, The New York Times made partial publication of a leaked CIA document titled, "Clandestine Service History – Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran – November 1952-August 1953." This document describes the planning and execution conducted by the American and British governments. The New York Times published this critical document with the names censored. The New York Times also limited its publication to scanned image (bitmap) format, rather than machine-readable text. This document was eventually published properly – in text form, and fully unexpurgated. The complete CIA document is now web published. The word 'blowback' appeared for the very first time in this document.

Aftermath

Iran

One of immediate after effects of the coup was a crackdown on the National Front opposition and especially on the Tudeh party and a concentration of political power in the hand of the Shah and his court. Another effect was a sharp improvement in Iran's economy. Not only did the embargo end but oil revenue increased significantly over pre-nationalization levels. Although Iran did not get national control of the oil, the Shah signed an agreement replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium of British Petroleum, and eight other European and American oil companies. As a result of the agreement oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954-55 to $181 million in 1956-57 and continued on up in later years. In addition America provided development aid to Iran.

The sight of the Shah fleeing the country until a military coup with its covert conspiring of foreign powers returned him to the throne, is often credited with being a major cause of his overthrow in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The occupation of the U.S. embassy also took place during the 1979 revolution, which caused diplomatic relations to be severed between the new Iranian government and the United States. The role that the U.S. embassy had played in the 1953 coup led the revolutionary guards to suspect that it might be used to play a similar role in suppressing the revolution, some revolutionary guards reported.

Jacob G. Hornberger, the founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation, commented that "U.S. officials, not surprisingly, considered the operation one of their greatest foreign policy successes -- until, that is, the enormous convulsion that rocked Iranian society with the violent ouster of the Shah and the installation of a virulently anti-American Islamic regime in 1979." According to Hornberger, "the coup, in essence, paved the way for the rise to power of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and all the rest that's happened right up to 9/11 and beyond."

The monarchy supported by the U.S. and Britain invited western oil companies back into Iran. "The crushing of Iran's first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah, who relied heavily on US aid and arms," Dan De Luce wrote in The Guardian in a review of All the Shah's Men by Stephen Kinzer, a reporter for The New York Times, who for the first time revealed details of the coup.

Internationally

The 1953 coup was the first time the United States had overthrown a government. Operation Ajax was seen as a unalloyed success there, with "immediate and far-reaching effect. Overnight, the CIA became a central part of the American foreign policy apparatus, and covert action came to be regarded as a cheap and effective way to shape the course of world events." A coup against the Guatemalan regime of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán which had expropriate land owned by the United Fruit Company followed the next year.

Conspiracy theories

The Islamic Republic of Iran, the main expose of the 1953 coup, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, by Stephen Kinzer, has been censored to exclude descriptions of the late Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities in the coup. Mahmood Kashani, the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani and described as "one of the top members of the current ruling elite" who has been approved twice to run for the presidency by the Council of Guardians, denies there was a coup in 1953 and says Mosaddeq himself was following British plans and carrying out their dictates. In his words:

In my opinion, Mosaddeq was the director of the British plans and implemented them. .... Without a doubt Mosaddeq had the primary and essential role

in the August 1953 coup. Kashani says Mosaddeq, the British and the United States were working together against Ayatollah Kashani to undermine the role of Shia clerics. According to Masoud Kazemzadeh, this theory is contradicted by the fact that "the second person who spoke on Radio Tehran announcing and celebrating the overthrow of Mossadegh was Ayatollah Kashani’s son, who was hand-picked by Kermit Roosevelt."

This allegation is also advanced in a book alleged to have been written by former SAVAK official Hossein Fardoust entitled Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust). According to it, Mohammad Mosaddeq was not a mortal enemy of the British, but had "always favored" them, and his campaign to nationalize the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had been inspired by `the British themselves.` Scholar Ervand Abrahamian has suggested that torture by Islamic Republican authorities is likely to have been used against Fardoust whose death was announced before the publication of the book.

See also

• Abadan Crisis
• Abadan Crisis timeline
• Asadollah Rashidian
• Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
• False flag operations

Footnotes

1. How to Overthrow A Government Pt. 1 on March 5, 2004
2. "A Very British Coup" (radio show). Document. British Broadcasting Corporation. 2005. Retrieved 2006-06-14.
3. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19, 1987, p.261
4. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.215
5. "U.S. Comes Clean About The Coup In Iran", CNN, 04-19-2000.
6. Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.124
7. Review by Jonathan Schanzer of All the Shah's Men by Stephen Kinzer
8. Mackay, Sandra, The Iranians, Plume (1997), p.203, 4
9. Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, 1981, p.140
10. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.48
11. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.106
12. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.106
13. ^ "The spectre of Operation Ajax". Article. Guardian Unlimited. 2003. Retrieved 04-02-2007. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
14. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.137
15. Abrahamian p.270
16. Mackey p.187-210
17. Abrahamian, 1982, p.273
18. Abrahamian, 1982, p.272
19. Abrahamian p.273
20. New York Times, July 28, 1953, p.6, "Mossadegh Voids Secret Balloting : Decrees `Yes` and `No` Booths for Iranian Plebiscite on Dissolution of Majlis" by Kennett Love
21. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.135-6
22. Abrahamian, 1982, p.278
23. The spectre of Operation Ajax | Guardian daily comment | Guardian Unlimited
24. Book review of Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men by CIA historian David S. Robarge
25. "Revolt of Islam" by Bernard Lewis, New Yorker, 11-19-2001, p.54
26. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.84
27. "Books And Arts: How to change a regime in 30 days; Iran", The Economist. London: Aug 16, 2003. Vol. 368, Iss. 8337; pg. 74
28. New York Times, "100,000 Red Rally in Iranian Capital", July 15, 1953
29. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.84
30. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.205
31. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.145
33. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
34. Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
35. Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
36. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.170
37. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California 1999)
38. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Revolutions, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p.419-20
39. ^ Washington's wise advice. Ralph R. Reiland. Pittsburgh Tribune Review July 30, 2007.
40. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.x
41. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.209
42. ISNA (Iranian Students News Agency) November 2003 interview in Farsi with Mahmood Kashani
43. Review Essay of Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men, By: Masoud Kazemzadeh, Ph.D., MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XI, NO. 4, WINTER 2004
44. See page 71 at: http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm Cryptome was unable to recover the redactions in the section that deals with the religious leaders. The following is page 20 of the secret history that can be found at: http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html
45. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California Press, 1999), p.160-1
46. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California Press, 1999), p.160-1

References

• Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-471-26517-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Kapuściński, Ryszard (1982). Shah of Shahs. Vintage. ISBN 0-679-73801-0. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Roosevelt, Kermit (1979). Countercoup: The struggle for the control of Iran. McGRAW-Hill Book Company. ISBN 0-07-053590-6. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

External links

• 50 Years Later—a look back at the 1953 U.S.-backed coup in Iran
• The C.I.A. in Iran—New York Times report based on uncovered CIA documents
• The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953—Provided by the National Security Archive
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran—new book from the National Security Archive reexamines the coup
• How to Overthrow a Government—interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
• US-Iranian Relations, the 1953 CIA Coup in Iran and the Roots of Middle East Terror—Interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men
• All The Shah’s Men—interview with Steven Kinzer
• Review of All the Shah's Men by David S. Robarge
• A Very Elegant Coup—critique of All the Shah’s Men
• The spectre of Operation Ajax by Guardian Unlimited

• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from April 2008
• Central Intelligence Agency operations
• United Kingdom intelligence operations
• History of Iran
• Conflicts in 1953
• 1953 in the United Kingdom
• 1953 in the United States
• History of the United States (1945–1964)
• United States-Iranian relations
• Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
• Battles involving Iran
• BP
• Coups