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{{Geobox River
<!-- *** Name section *** -->
| name =River Jordan
| native_name =
| other_name =]: نهر الأردن, ''nahr al-urdun''
| other_name1 =]: נהר הירדן, ''nehar hayarden''
<!-- *** Image *** --->
| image =
| image_size =
| image_caption =
<!-- *** Etymology *** --->
| etymology = Greek: Ιορδάνης < Hebrew: ירדן (''yardén'', "descender") < ירד
<!-- *** Country etc. *** -->
| country = Israel
| country1 = Jordan
| country2 = West Bank
| state =
| state1 =
| region =
| region1 =
| district =
| district1 =
| city = Jericho
| city1 =
| landmark = Sea of Galilee
| landmark1 =
<!-- *** Geography *** -->
| length = 251
| watershed =
| discharge_location = Dead Sea
| discharge =
| discharge_max =
| discharge_min =
| discharge1_location =
| discharge1 =
<!-- *** Source *** -->
| source_name = Hasbani
| source_location =
| source_district =
| source_region =
| source_state =
| source_country = Lebanon
| source_lat_d =
| source_lat_m =
| source_lat_s =
| source_lat_NS =
| source_long_d =
| source_long_m =
| source_long_s =
| source_long_EW =
| source_elevation =
| source_length =
<!-- *** Mouth *** -->
| mouth_name =
| mouth_location =
| mouth_district =
| mouth_region =
| mouth_state =
| mouth_country =
| mouth_lat_d =
| mouth_lat_m =
| mouth_lat_s =
| mouth_lat_NS =
| mouth_long_d =
| mouth_long_m =
| mouth_long_s =
| mouth_long_EW =
| mouth_elevation =
<!-- *** Tributaries *** -->
| tributary_left = Banias
| tributary_left1 = Dan
| tributary_left2 =Jalud
| tributary_right = Yarmouk
| tributary_right1 = Jabbok
| tributary_right2 =Jabesh (Wadi Yabis)
<!-- *** Free fields *** -->
| free_name =
| free_value =
<!-- *** Map section *** -->
| map =
| map_size =
| map_caption =
}}
'''Water politics in the Jordan River basin''' involves the issue of ] as it applies to the Jordan River basin, an area situated in a ] in the ], where water resources are scarce. The ] is a ] {{km to mi|251}} in length, that rises to the foothills of the ], flows along the ] and discharges into the ].
Below the ], which is the point at which the main tributaries enter the ], the river's plain spreads to a width of approximately {{mi to km|15}}. This area of terraces is known as the ''Ghor'' (or ''Ghawr'') and is cut by ]s or rivers into towers, pinnacles and badlands. These form a maze of ravines alternating with sharp crests and rises.

From this point, the Jordan River floodplain, the ''Zur'', is a widely winding course, which accounts for the excessive length of the river flow in comparison to the area it traverses to reach the Dead Sea. Dams were built along the river in the Zur region, turning the former thickets of reeds, tamarisk, willows, and white poplars into irrigated fields. After flowing through the Zur, the Jordan drains into the Dead Sea through a broad, gently sloping delta.

The Jordan river basin includes:

* The ] ({{lang-ar|الحاصباني}}), ''senir'' ({{lang-he|שניר}}), which flows from Lebanon.
* The ] ({{lang-ar|بانياس }}), ''hermon'' ({{lang-he|חרמון}}), arising from a spring at Banias at the foot of ].
* The ] ({{lang-he|דן}}), ''leddan'' ({{lang-ar|اللدان}}), whose source is also at the base of Mount Hermon.
* ''derdara'' ({{lang-ar|دردره}}), or ''braghith'' ({{lang-ar|براغيث}}), The Iyon or Ayoun ({{lang-he|עיון}}, which flows from Lebanon.

The Jordan River tributaries includes:

*The Jalud in the Beth Shean valley
*] which begins in the ] and flows to the Jordan River below the Sea of Galilee.
*]
*Jabesh (Wadi Yabis) named after ]

===Hydrography of the Jordan River===
The riparian rights to the Jordan River are shared by 5 different countries: ], ], ], ] and ]; although Israel as an occupying authority has refused to give up any of the water resources to the ].<ref>''Palestine is characterised by limited surface and groundwater water resources. The main surface water system in the region is the Jordan River basin which begins in three headwaters. The hasbani River originates in Lebanon and has at least parts of its flow in Lebanon with an average flow of 138mcm/yr. The Dan and Banias (Nahal Hermon in Israel) Rivers originate in the Golan Heights and both flow into the Jordan above Tabariyya Lake having an average flow of 1300 mcm/yr. The Jordan River Basin is considered under international law as an international river with water shared by; Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestine.'' Daibes-Murad, Fadia (2005) A New Legal Framework for Managing the World's Shared Groundwaters: A Case Study from the Middle East IWA Publishing, ISBN 1843390760 pp 37-39</ref> The Jordan River originates on the border of three countries, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, in a mountainous region. Three springs converge to make up the northern headwaters of the Jordan:
# The ], which rises in south Lebanon and with an average annual flow of 138 million cubic meters (mcm)/yr,
# The ] River, in Israel averaging 245 mcm/yr, and
# The ] River from the Golan Heights, averaging also 121 mcm/yr. These streams converge six kilometres within Israel and flow south to the Sea of Galilee, wholly within Israel.<ref>Lowi, Miriam R. (1995) Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521558360 p 25</ref>

Water quality is variable in the river basin. The three tributaries of the upper Jordan (the Dan, Hasbani, and Banyas) have a low salinity of about 20 ppm.<ref name="TAWRM">John D. Keenan, Technological Aspects of Water Resources Management: Euphrates and Jordan, in Country Experiences with Water Resources Management 37-49, at 37 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 175, 1992) (Guy Le Moigne & Shakwi Barghouti eds.).</ref> The salinity of the Yarmouk River is also satisfactory, at 100 ppm.<ref name="TAWRM"/>The salinity of water in Lake Tiberias ranges from 240 ppm in the upper portion of the lake (marginal for irrigation water), to 350 ppm (too high for sensitive citrus fruits) where it discharges into the Jordan River. <ref name="TAWRM"/> The salt comes from the saline subterranean springs. These springs pass through the beds of ancient seas and then flow into Lake Tiberias, as well as the groundwater sources that feed into the lower Jordan. The lower Jordan river becomes progressively more saline as it flows south, reaching twenty-five percent (250,000 ppm), when it ends in the Dead Sea which is about seven times saltier than the ocean. <ref name="ISWR">Aaron Wolf & John Ross, The Impact of Scarce Water Resources on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 32 Nat. Resources J. 919, 922 (1992). The Dead Sea receives an average flow from the Jordan River of 1,850 mcm/yr.</ref>

As a resource for freshwater it is vital for most of the population of Palestine, Israel, Jordan also to a lesser extent with Lebanon and Syria who are able to utilise water from other sources. Although Syrian riparian rights to the ] has been severely restricted by ]'s dam building programme, a series of 21 dams and 17 hydroelectric stations built on the Euphrates and ] rivers, in the 1980s, '90s and projected to be completed in 2010, in order to provide irrigation water and hydroelectricity to the arid area of southeastern Turkey.<ref>Turkey.Clive Agnew, Ewan W. Anderson (1992) ''Water Resources in the Arid Realm'' Routledge, ISBN 0415043468 pp 198-199</ref> The CIA analysis in the 1980’s placed the Middle East on the list of possible conflict zones through water issues. The 20% of the region’s population is are lacking access to adequate potable water and 35% of the population lack appropriate sanitation.<ref>Swain, Ashok (2004) Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East Routledge, ISBN 071465566X p 79</ref>

Sharing water resources involves the issue of water use, water rights, and distribution of amounts. The ] wished to expand and develop the agricultural sector in the West Bank to decrease their dependency on the Israeli labour market, while Israel have prevented an increase in the irrigation of the West bank.<ref>Shapland Greg (1997) Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, ISBN 1850652147 p 52</ref> Jordan also wishes to expand its agricultural sector so as to be able to achieve food security.<ref>Shapland Greg (1997) ibid p 53</ref>

On May 21, 1997 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a ].<ref name="Convention"> Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997 </ref> <ref> McCaffrey Stephen C. (2001) The Law of International Watercourses: Non-navigational Uses Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198257872 Annex A pp 446-464</ref>

The articles establish two principles for the use of international watercourses (other than navigation): "equitable and reasonable utilization".<ref name="Convention"/> and "the ‘due diligence’ obligation not to cause significant harm."<ref name="Convention"/> Equitable and reasonable utilization requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including:
*(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character;
*(b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
*(c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
*(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States;
*(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
*(f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
*(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use. <ref>36 I.L.M. 700 (1997). Was passed by a vote of 103 in favour, to 3 against (Burundi, China, Turkey), with 27 abstentions (Andorra, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Israel, Mali, Monaco, Mongolia, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Spain, Tanzania and Uzbekistan). The Convention has been signed by Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal, South Africa, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela. .</ref><ref>Shine, Clare and de Klemm, Iucn, Cyrille (1999) Wetlands, Water and the Law: Using Law to Advance Wetland Conservation and Wise Use IUCN, ISBN 2831704782, pp 273-275</ref>

==Historical background==
In the late 1930s and mid 1940s, Transjordan and the ] commissioned mutually exclusive competing water resource studies. The Transjordanian study, performed by Michael G. Ionides, concluded that the available water resources are not sufficient to sustain a Jewish state which would be the destination for Jewish immigration. The Zionist study, by the American engineer Walter Clay Lowdermilk, concluded that by diverting water from the Jordan basin to support agriculture and residential development in the ], a Jewish state supporting 4 million new immigrants would be sustainable.<ref>Water Resources in Jordan, Munther J. Haddadin, pp. 237–238, Resources for the Future, 2006</ref> At the end of the ] with the signing of the General Armistice Agreements in 1949, both Israel and Jordan embarked on implementing their competing initiatives to utilize the water resources in the areas under their control.

The first "Master Plan for Irrigation in Israel" was drafted in 1950 and approved by a Board of Consultants (of the U.S.A) on March 8, 1956. The main features of the Master Plan was the construction of the Israeli ] (NWC), a project for the integration of all major regional projects into the Israeli national grid. Tahal - Water Planning for Israel Ltd., an Israeli public corporate body, was established in 1952, being largely responsible for planning of water development, drainage, etc., at the national level within Israel, including the NWC project which was commissioned in 1965.

In 1953, Israel began construction of a ] to take water from the ] to the populated center and agricultural south of the country, while Jordan concluded an agreement with Syria, known as the Bunger plan, to dam the ] river near Maqarin, and utilize its waters to irrigate Jordanian territory, before they could flow to the Sea of Galilee<ref>Water Resources in Jordan, Munther J. Haddadin, p. 239, Resources for the Future, 2006</ref>. Military clashes ensued, and ] ] dispatched ambassador Johnston to the region to work out a plan that would regulate water usage.<ref>Water Resources in Jordan, Munther J. Haddadin, p. 32, Resources for the Future, 2006</ref>

==Jordan Basin==

===Banias===
The Syria-Lebanon-Palestine boundary was a product of the post-World War I Anglo-French partition of Ottoman Syria.<ref> Fromkin, David (1989). A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. New York: Owl, ISBN 0-8050-6884-8.</ref><ref name="MMPTPC">MacMillan, Margaret (2001) Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War J. Murray, ISBN 0719559391 pp 392-420</ref> British forces had advanced to a position at ] against Turkish troops in 1918 and wished to incorporate all the sources of the Jordan River within the British controlled Palestine. Due to the French inability to establish administrative control, the frontier between Syria and Palestine was fluid. Following the ], and the unratified and later annulled ], stemming from the ], the 1920 boundary extended the British controlled area to north of the ] line, a straight line between the mid point of the ] and ]. In 1920 the French managed to assert authority over the Arab nationalist movement and after the ], ] was deposed.<ref>Shapira, Anita (1999) Land and Power; The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948. Stanford University press, ISBN 0-8047-3776-2 pp 98-110</ref> The international boundary between Palestine and Syria was finally agreed by Great Britain and France in 1923 in conjunction with the ], after Britain had been given a ] ] in 1922.<ref> Constituting an Agreement respecting the boundary line between Syria and Palestine from the Mediterranean to El Hammé. Paris, March 7, 1923.</ref> Banyas (on the ]/Tyre road) was within in the French Mandate of Syria. The border was set 750 metres south of the spring.<ref>Wilson John F (2004) Ibid pp 177-178</ref><ref name="MMPTPC"/>

In 1941 Australian forces occupied Banyas in the ] during the ];<ref> Australian war memorials department, Official Histories – Second World War Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953)</ref> ] and Indian forces also invaded Syria in the ].<ref>, Australian war memorials department, Official Histories – Second World War Volume II – Greece, Crete and Syria (1st edition, 1953), Chapter 16, The Syrian Plan, See Map p 334</ref> Banias's fate in this period was left in a state of limbo since Syria had come under British military control. After the cessation of ] hostilities, and at the time Syria was granted Independence (April 1946), the former mandate powers, France and Britain, bilaterally signed an agreement to pass control of Banias to the British mandate of Palestine. This was done against the expressed wishes of the Syrian government who declared France's signature to be invalid. While Syria maintained its claim on Banias in this period, it was administered from Jerusalem.<ref></ref><ref>Wilson John F (2004) ISBN 1850434409, p 178 ''Syria claimed that France’s signature on the border agreement was invalid, but the British would not discuss the situation. A ‘Demilitarised zone’ was created at the three disputed points along the border, one of which was the territory around Banias, with Syria withdrawing troops, but continuing to lay claim to the territory within the zone. Thus from the beginning of the Syrian state to the Six Day War, there was no settled border.''</ref>

Following the ], and the signing of the ] in 1949, and DMZs included in the Armistice with Syria in July 1949, were "not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements." Israel claimed sovereignty over the Demilitarised zones (DMZs), on the basis that, "it was always part of the British Mandated Territory of Palestine." ] and Yosef Tekoah adopted a policy of Israeli control of the DMZ and water sources at the expense of Israel’s international image.<ref>Shlaim, Avi (2000) The Iron Wall; Israel and the Arab World Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-140-28870-4 p 69</ref> The Banias spring remained under Syrian control, while the Banias River flowed through the contested Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and into Israel.<ref> Armistice Agreement UN Doc S/1353 20 July 1949</ref>

===Hasbani===
The ] River derives most of its discharge from two ] in ]<ref>] (Water Resources section) <Blockquote>Overall, there are about 40 major streams in Lebanon and, based on the hydrographic system, the country can be divided into five regions: … the Hasbani river basin in the south-east. <Blockquote></ref><ref>] The Jordan River <Blockquote>The Dan spring, the largest of the sources of the upper Jordan, lies wholly within Israel close to the border with Syria. The spring sources of the Hasbani River lie entirely within Lebanon. The spring source of the Banias River is in Syria. These three small streams unite 6 km inside Israel at about 70 m above sea level to form the upper Jordan River. <Blockquote></ref>, the ] and the ], the latter being a group of springs on the uppermost Hasbani.<ref>] The Jordan River </ref> The Hasbani runs for 25 miles in Lebanon before crossing the border and joining with the ] and ]s at a point in northern Israel, to form the River Jordan. <ref>] Heightened Israeli-Lebanese Tensions Over Jordan's Headwaters </ref> For about four kilometers downstream of Ghajar, the Hasbani forms the border between Lebanon and northern Israel.

The Wazzani's and the Haqzbieh's combined discharge averages 138 million m³ per year.<ref></ref>. About 20% of the Hasbani flow<ref>Lebanon (]Water Resources section)<Blockquote> Lebanon being at a higher elevation than its neighbours has practically no incoming surface water flow…. Surface water flow to Israel is estimated at 160 million m³/year, of which about 138 million m³ through the Hasbani river including a contribution of 30 million m³ from its tributary, the Wazzani spring.<Blockquote></ref> emerges from the Wazzani Spring at ], close to the Lebanese Israeli border, about 3 kilometers west of the base of ]. The contribution of the spring is very important, because it is the only continuous year-round flow in the river in either Lebanon or Israel.<ref> ] Heightened Israeli-Lebanese Tensions Over Jordan's Headwaters
<Blockquote>In the hot summer months, the Wazzani springs are the only source of flowing water in the Hasbani. Upstream from the Wazzani, the river is dry. <Blockquote></ref>

Utilization of water resources in the area, including the Hasbani, has been a source of conflict and was one of the factors leading to the 1967 ].<ref> ] Heightened Israeli-Lebanese Tensions Over Jordan's Headwaters
</ref><ref>Harik, Judith Palmer (2005) ''Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism'' I.B.Tauris, ISBN 1845110242 p 159</ref> The Hasbani was included in the ], proposed in 1955 by special US envoy Eric Johnston. <ref>Cronin, Patrick M. (2008) ''The Evolution of Strategic Thought'' Routledge, ISBN 0415459613 p 189</ref> Under the plan, Lebanon was allocated usage of 35 million mcm annually from it. The plan was rejected by the ].

In 2001 the Lebanese government installed a small pumping station with a 10cm bore to extract water to supply Ghajar village.<ref> Over Israeli Objections, Lebanon Opens Pumping Station on River March 29, 2001</ref> In March 2002 Lebanon also diverted part of the Hasbani to supply Wazzani village. An action that ] said was a "causus belli" and could lead to war.<ref> 28 March 2002. Lebanon hails 'liberation of water'</ref><ref> 10 September 2002 Israel warns of war over water</ref> <ref> 16 September 2002. US wades into Mid-East water dispute</ref><ref> 17 September 2002. Israel hardens stance on water.</ref>

===Dan===
largest ] of the ], whose source is located at the base of ].<ref>Fred Pearce (2007) When the Rivers Run Dry: Water, the Defining Crisis of the Twenty-first Century Beacon Press, ISBN 0807085731 p 169</ref> Until the ], the Dan River was the only source of the river Jordan wholly within ]i territory. Its flow provides up to 238 million cubic meters of water annually to the ]. In 1966 this was a cause of dispute between water planners and conservationists, with the later prevailing after three years of court appeals and adjudication. The result was a conservation project of about {{convert|120|acre|km2}} at the source of the river called the ].<ref></ref>

===Huleh marshes===
In 1951 the tensions in the area were raised when, in the lake Huleh area (10 km from Banias), Israel initiated a project to drain the marsh land to bring 15,000 acres into cultivation. The project caused a conflict of interests between the Israeli government and the ] Arab villages in the area and drew Syrian complaints to the ].<ref>''The first Arab summit conference ratified the Arab strategy to thwart Israel’s NWC Plan . The strategy was designed to divert Jordan’s tributaries and prepare the Arab armies for the defence of the engineering operations.'' Shemesh, Moshe (2008) Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957-1967 Sussex Academic Press, ISBN 1845191889 p 67</ref><ref name="ASp71">Shlaim, Avi (2000) ibid pp 71-73 ''The experts concluded that it was not just unnecessary but actually damaging to Israel’s agriculture and ecology''</ref> On 30 march in a meeting chaired by ] the Israeli government decided to assert Israeli sovereignty over the DMZs, consequently 800 inhabitants of the villages were ] from the DMZ.<ref name="ASp71"/><ref name="UNDOC">Security Council resolution 93 of 18 May 1951: Noting the complaint with regard to the evacuation of Arab residents from the demilitarised zone: (a) Decides that Arab civilians who have been removed from the demilitarised zone by the Government of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should supervise their return and rehabilitation in a manner to be determined by the Commission; (b) Holds that no action involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers, across armistice lines or within the demilitarised zone should be undertaken without prior decision of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission;</ref> From 1951 Israel refused to attend the meetings of the ]. This refusal on the part of Israel not only constituted a flagrant violation of the General Armistice Agreement, but also contributed to an increase of tension in the area. The Security Council itself strongly condemned the attitude of Israel, in its resolution of 18 May 1951, as being "inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the Armistice Agreement"<ref name="UNDOC"/>

Under ] auspices and with encouragement from the ] 9 meetings took place between 15 January and 27 January 1953, to regularise administration of the 3 DMZs.<ref> Shlaim, Avi (2000) ibid p 75</ref> At the eighth meeting Syria offered to adjust the armistice lines, and cede to Israel's 70% of the DMZ, in exchange for a return to the pre 1946 International border in the Jordan basin area, with Banias water resources returning uncontested to Syrian sovereignty. On 26 April, the Israeli cabinet met to consider the Syrian suggestions; with head of Israel’s Water Planning Authority, Simha Blass, in attendance. Blass noted that while the land to be ceded to Syria was not suitable for cultivation, the Syrian map did not suit Israel’s water development plan. Blass explained that the movement of the International boundary in the area of Banias would affect Israel’s water rights.<ref name="ASIW">Shlaim, Avi (2000) Ibid pp 75-76 At the eighth meeting on 13 April, the Syrian delegates seemed very anxious to move forward and offered Israel around 70% of the DMZ’s. Significant results were achieved and a number of suggestions and summaries put in writing, but they required decisions by the two governments. The Israeli cabinet convened on 26 April to consider the Syrian suggestions for the division of the DMZs. Simha Blass, head of Israel’s Water Planning Authority, was invited to the meeting. Dayan showed Blass the Syrian suggestions on the map. Blass told Dayan that although most of the lands that Israel was expected to relinquish were not suitable for cultivation, the map did not suit Israel’s irrigation and water development plans...Although phrased in a positive manner, this decision appears to have killed the negotiations. It involved changes to the preliminary accord and new conditions that made it difficult to go forward. At the last two meetings, on 4 and 27 May Israel presented its new conditions. These were rejected by Syria, and the negotiations ended without agreement...That a set of proposals that had the support of the political and military elite was emasculated because it did not satisfy the requirements of a water expert seems surprising. it suggests lack of leadership and lack of statesmanship on Ben Gurion's part when it came to the crunch. In the final analysis, it was Israel's insistence on exclusive and unfettered rights over the lakes and the Jordan river that seems to have upset the apple cart. An opportunity for an agreement with a major adversary existed and was allowed to slip away. Yet the fact that the negotiations came so close to success is in it self significant because it shows that, contrary to popular Israeli perceptions, Syria was capable of behaving in a practical, pragmatic and constructive fashion. There was definitely someone to talk to on the other side.</ref> The Israeli cabinet rejected the Syrian proposals but decided to continue the negotiations by making changes to the accord and placing conditions on the Syrian proposals. The Israeli conditions took into account Blass’s position over water rights and Syria rejected the Israeli counter offer.<ref name="ASIW"/>

On 4 June 1953 Jordan and Syria concluded a bilateral plan to store surface water at Maqarin (completed in 2006 as Al Wehdah Dam, <!-- Official Spelling -->), so as to be able to utilise the water resources of the Yarmouk river in the Yarmouk-Jordan valley plan, funded through the Technical Cooperation Agency of the United States of America, the ] and Jordan.<ref>Haddadin, Munther J. (2006) Water Resources in Jordan: Evolving Policies for Development, the Environment, and Conflict Resolution Resources for the Future, ISBN 1933115327 p 239</ref>

Part of the Hula marshes were re-flooded in 1994 due to the negative effects from the original drainage plan.<ref> Conservation of Wetlands in Israel, Israel National Report on the Implementation of the Ramsar Convention February 1999</ref>

==Regional Projects==
===Lowdermilk===

===McDonald plan===

===Israeli National Water Carrier project===
In September 1953, Israel unilaterally started a water diversion project within the Jordan River basin to divert water from the Jordan River at ] (B'not Yacov) to help irrigate the coastal Sharon Plain and eventually the Negev desert. The diversion project consisted of a nine-mile channel midway between the ] and Lake Galilee (Lake Tiberias) in the central DMZ to be rapidly constructed. Syria claimed that it would dry up 12,000 acres of Syrian land. The UNTSO Chief of Staff Major General ] of Denmark noted that the project was denying water to two Palestinian water mills, was drying up Palestinian farm land and was a substantial military benefit to Israel against Syria. The US cut off aid to Israel. The Israeli response was to increase work. UN Security Council Resolution 100<ref> UN Security Council Resolution 100 of 27th October 1953</ref> “deemed it desirable” for Israel to suspend work started on the 2nd September “pending urgent examination of the question by the Council”. Israel finally backed off by moving the intake out of the DMZ and for the next three years the US kept its economic sanctions by threatening to end aid channelled to Israel by the Foreign Operations Administration and insisting on tying the aid with Israel's behaviour.<ref>Sosland, Jeffrey (2007) ''Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin'' SUNY Press, ISBN 0791472019 p 70</ref> The Security Council ultimately rejected Syrian claims that the work was a violation of the Armistice Agreements and drainage works were resumed and the work was completed in 1957.<ref> Letter dated 25 February 1960 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council 25 February 1960</ref> This caused shelling from Syria and friction with the Eisenhower Administration; the diversion was moved to the southwest to Eshed Kinrot into the ] project, designed by ] and constructed by ].<ref name="UNU"> In 1955 the Unified (Johnston) Plan to develop a multilateral approach to water management failed to be ratified, which reinforced unilateral development. Nevertheless, both Jordan and Israel undertook to operate within their allocations, and two major successful projects were undertaken: the Israeli National Water Carrier and Jordan's East Ghor Main Canal.... Design of the East Ghor canal was begun by Jordan in 1957. It was intended as the first section of a much more ambitious plan known as the Greater Yarmouk project. Additional sections included (1) construction of two Dams on the Yarmouk (Mukheiba and Maqarin) for storage and hydroelectricity, (2) construction of a 47-km West Ghor canal, together with a siphon across the Jordan River near wadi Faria to connect it with the East Ghor Canal, (3) construction of seven dams to utilise seasonal flow on side wadis flowing into the Jordan, and (4) construction of pumping stations, lateral canals, and flood protection and drainage facilities. In the original Greater Yarmouk project the East Ghor Canal was scheduled to provide only 25% of the total irrigation scheme.... Construction of the Canal began in 1959. By 1961 its first section was completed; sections two and three, down Wadi Zarqa, were in service by June 1966. Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters. Two options were considered: either the diversion of the Hasbani to the Litani and the diversion of the Banias to the Yarmouk, or the diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk. The latter was chosen, with the diverted waters to be stored behind the Mukhaiba dam.... The Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion Project in 1965. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to the estimates completion of the project would have deprived Israel of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one ninth of Israel's annual water budget. Murakami, Masahiro (1995) Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East: Alternative Strategies, ISBN 92-808-0858-3 pp.295-297</ref><ref> The National Water Carrier By Shmuel Kantor</ref><ref name="JSCR">Sosland, Jeffrey (2007) ''Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin'' SUNY Press, ISBN 0791472019 p 70</ref>

===Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan===
1955 US ambassador ] negotiated the ].<ref>Cronin, Patrick M. (2008) ''The Evolution of Strategic Thought'' Routledge, ISBN 0415459613 p 189</ref> The plan was for the unified development of the ] water resources based on an earlier plan commissioned by ] (UNRWA). Modeled upon the ] development plan, it was approved by technical water committees of all the regional ] countries - ], ], ] and ].<ref name="shapland">The UNRWA commissioned a plan for the development of the Jordan River; this became widely known as “The Johnston plan”. The plan was modelled on the ] development plan for the development of the Jordan River as a single unit. Greg Shapland, (1997) Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, ISBN 1850652147 p 14</ref> Though the plan was un-ratified by Israel and rejected by the Arab Higher Committee, Jordan undertook to abide by their allocations under the plan. Israel, after the US linked the Johnston plan to aid, also agreed to accept the allocation provisions.<ref></ref><ref>Sosland, Jeffrey (2007) Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin SUNY Press, ISBN 0791472019 p 45</ref><ref name="JSCR"/>

{| class="wikitable sortable"
|Source
|]
|]
|]
|]
|-
|]
|35
|
|
|
|-
|]
|
|20
|
|
|-
|] (main stream)
|
|22
|100
|**
|-
|]
|
|90
|377*
|25
|-
|Total
|35
|132
|477
|25
|}
:<small>except for the above withdrwals</small>
:<small>*the waters of the Yarmouk River will be available for the unconditional use of the Kingdom of the Jordan</small>
:<small>** and the waters of the Jordan River will be for unconditional use of Israel.<ref>Sosland,Jeffrey (2007) ''Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin'' SUNY Press, ISBN 0791472019 p 52</ref></small>

The East Ghor canal formed part of a larger project - the Greater Yarmouk project - which envisioned two storage dams on the Yarmouk, and a West Ghor Canal, on the West Bank of the Jordan. These projects were never built, due to Israel's occupation of the ] of the Jordan River during the ]. After the Six-day war, The ] operated from bases within Jordan, and launched several attacks on Israeli settlements in the Jordan valley, including attacks on water facilities. Israel responded with raids in Jordan, in an attempt to force ] of Jordan to rein in the PLO. The canal was the target of at least 4 of these raids, and was virtually knocked out of commission. The United states intervened to resolve the conflict, and the canal was repaired after Hussien undertook to stop PLO activity in the area.<ref>McCaffrey, Stephen C. (2001) The Law of International Watercourses: Non-navigational Uses, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198257872 pp.271-274</ref>

===Headwater Diversion Plan===
First summit of Arab Heads of State was convened in Cairo between January 13-17 1964, called by ] the Egyptian president, to discuss a common policy to confront Israel's national water carrier project which was nearing completion. The second Arab League summit conference voted on a plan which would have circumvent and frustrated it. The Arab and North African states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters rather than the use of direct military intervention. The heads of State of the Arab League considered two options:

# The diversion of the Hasbani to the Litani combined with the diversion of the Banias to the Yarmouk,
# The diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk.

The Arab league plan selected was for the Hasbani and Banias waters to be diverted to Mukhaiba and stored.<ref name="UNU"/>

After the 2nd Arab summit conference in Cairo of January 1964 (with the backing of all 13 ] members), Syria in a joint project with Lebanon and Jordan, started the development of the water resources of Banias for a canal along the slopes of the Golan toward the ]. While Lebanon was to construct a canal form the Hasbani River to Banias and complete the scheme.<ref>The diversion consisted of:-

# Diversion of tributaries in Lebanon.
:A The upper Hasbani- the excavation of a canal from the Hasbani springs in the hasbaya region and a canal from the wadi Shab’a for carrying water to the kawkaba tunnels and from there to the Litani River. (This project would transport 40-60 million cubic metres of water annually).
:B. The Middle hasbani-two diversion points-the first in the hasbani riverbed; the second in wadi Sarid. The Hasbani and Sarid would flow in a canal to the Banias and from there to the Yarmuk. According to the plan, 20-30 million cubic metres of water would flow annually to Syria (if Lebanon did not divert the hasbani’s floodwater to the Litani, the Sarid canal could transport up to 60 million cubic metres of water a year).
:C. The Wazani Spring in the Lower Hasbani Riverbed-this would include an irrigation canal (carrying 16 million cubic metres of water a year) for local use in Lebanon; an irrigation canal in Syria (8 million cubic metres a year); and three pumping units to transport the Wanzani’s overflow to Syria via the Sarid-Banias canal at a rate of 26 million cubic metres a year.
:2. Diversions in Syrian territory
:A. Diversion of the Banias-The diversion plan for the banias called for a 73 kilometre long canal to be dug 350 metres above sea level that would link the banias with the Yamuk. The canal would carry the Banias’s fixed flow plus the overflow from the hasbani (including water from the Sarid and Wazani). The Banias diversion would provide 90 million cubic metres of water for irrigation of riverine areas. The designers calculated that eighteen months would be sufficient for executing the plan. The cost was estimated at five million Pounds Sterling (including two tunnels), that is, approximately two million pounds more than the Arab plan.
:B. The butayha Project-The Syrians feared that if the Arabs implemented their diversion plan, Israel would block the batayha Valley inhabitants, annual pumping of 22 million cubic metres from the Jordan as proposed in the Johnston plan. In order to guarantee the villagers their vital water supply, the Arab plan contained a proviso designed to incorporate primary and secondary canals from the Sea of Galilee.
:3. The water plans in Jordan.
:The construction of a dam in the Kingdom of Jordan (the Mukheiba dam on the Yarmuk River) was designed to hold 200 million cubic metres of water. Work on the dam would take 30 months at a cost of ten and one quarter million Pounds Sterling. The Mukheiba Dam (and the Makarin Dam) would hurt Israel if it was incorporated into the diversion plans for the Jordan River’s northern sources, and without the Mukheiba dam all of the diverted water would flow back to the Yarmuk and return to the Jordan’s riverbed south of the Sea of galilee. Excluding this plan, the rest of the Jordan’s water projects correspond with the main parts of the Johnson Plan.

Shemesh, Moshe (2008) Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957-1967 Sussex Academic Press, ISBN 1845191889 pp 49-50</ref><ref name="AS229"> Shlaim, Avi (200) ibid pp 229-230 In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was the threat posed by israel's diversion of water from the north to irrigate the south and the expected reduction in the water supplies available to Syria and Jordan. The reaction of the summit to this threat was deadly serious. The preamble to its decision stated,
:'''The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel.'''</ref> The project was to divert 20 to 30 million cubic metres of water from the river Jordan tributaries to Syria and Jordan for the development of Syria and Jordan.<ref>Political Thought and Political History: Studies in Memory of Elie Kedourie By Elie Kedourie, M. Gammer, Joseph Kostiner, Moshe Shemesh, Routledge, (2003) ISBN 0714652962 p 165</ref><ref name="AS229"/> The Syrian construction of the Banias to Yarmouk canal got under way In 1965. Once completed, the diversion of the flow would have transported the water into a dam at Mukhaiba for use by Jordan and Syria before the waters of the Banias Stream entered Israel and the Sea of Galilee. Lebanon also started a canal to divert the waters of the Hasbani, whose source is in Lebanon, into the Banias. The Hasbani and Banias diversion works would have had the effect of reducing the capacity of Israel's carrier by about 35% and Israel's overall water supply by about 11%. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. The Finance of the project was through contributions by Saudi Arabia and Egypt.<ref name="UNU"/> This led to military intervention from Israel, first with tank and artillery fire and then, as the Syrians shifted the works further southwards, with airstrikes.

==Six day War==
On June 10th, 1967, the last day of the Six Day War, Golani Brigade forces quickly invaded the village of Banias where a caliphate era Syrian fort stood. Eshkol's priority on the Syrian front was control of the water sources.<ref>Eshkol reiterated his position: he really only wanted to control the northern Golan and the water sources. Segev, Tom (2007) 1967; Israel and the war that transformed the Middle East Little, Brown ISBN 978-0-316-72478-4 p 399</ref>

==subsequent developments==

In 1980 Syria unilaterally started a programme of dam building along the Yarmouk.

The southern slopes of Mount Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh) as well as the Golan Heights, were unilaterally annexed by Israel in 1981.

1988 The Syrian/Jordanian agreement on development of the Yarmouk is blocked when Israel as a riparian right holder refuses to ratify the plan and the World Bank withholds funding. Israel's augments its Johnson plan allocation of 25 MCM/yr by a further 45-75 MCM/yr.

The water agreement forms a part of the broader political treaty which was signed between Israel and Jordan in 1994, and the articles relating to water in this agreement do not correspond with Jordan’s rights to water as they were originally claimed. The nature and significance of the wider 1994 treaty meant that the water aspect was forced to cede importance and priority in negotiations, giving way to areas such as borders and security in terms of armed force, which were perceived by decision-makers as being the most integral issues to the settlement.<ref>J. A. Allan, ‘The Jordan-Israel Peace Agreement – September 1994’, in Allan and J. H. O. Court, (1996) ''Water, Peace and the Middle East: Negotiating Resources in the Jordan Basin'' (I. B. Tauris Academic Studies, London, St. Martin's Press ), ISBN 1860640559 pp. 207/21</ref> Main points from the water sharing in the Jordan/Israel Peace treaty.<ref>*Water from the Yarmouk River
…Summer Period: May 15th to October 15th of each year, Israel pumps 12 MCM and Jordan gets the rest of the flow.
… Winter Period: October 16th to May 14th of each year, Israel pumps 13 MCM and Jordan is entitled to the ret of the flow.
*Water from the Jordan River
…Summer Period: May 15th to October 15th of each year, Israel concedes to transfer to Jordan in the summer period 20 MCM in return for the additional water that Jordan concedes to Israel in winter
… Winter Period: October 16th to May 14th of each year, Jordan is entitled to store for its use a minimum average of 20 MCM of the floods in the Jordan River.
Jordan is entitled to an annual quantitiy of 10 MCM of desalinated water fromm the desalination of about 20 MCM of saline springs now diverted to the Jordan River.
*Additional Water
…Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for the supply tp Jordan of an additional quantity of 50 MCM/yr of water of drinkable standards.
*Storage
…Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage dam on the Yarmouk River directly downstream of the Adassiya Diversion
…Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water storage on the Jordan River, along their common boundary</ref>

Jordan being a country that borders on the Jordan has riparian rights to water from the Jordan basin and upper Jordan tributaries. Due to the water diversion projects the flow to the river Jordan has been reduced from 1,300/1,500 million cubic metres (mcm) to 250/300 mcm. Where the water quality has been further reduced as the flow of the river Jordan is made of run-off from agricultural irrigation and saline springs.<ref>Amery, Hussein A. and Wolf, Aaron T. (2000) Water in the Middle East: A Geography of Peace University of Texas Press, ISBN 029270495X p 37</ref> Due to the water diversion projects the flow to the river Jordan has been reduced from 1,300/1,500 million cubic metres (mcm)to 250/300 mcm. Where the water quality has been further reduced as the flow of the river Jordan is made of run-off from agricultural irrigation and saline springs.<ref>Amery, Hussein A. and Wolf, Aaron T. (2000) Water in the Middle East: A Geography of Peace University of Texas Press, ISBN 029270495X p 37</ref><ref> 9 March 2005 ''Once mighty Jordan reduced to a trickle'' After decades of extracting water, Israel and its neighbour discuss how to avert ecological disaster in river kept alive by the flow of sewage</ref>

Israel's subsequent developments have been mainly aimed at enlarging the main distribution system of Israel, run-off interception, reclamation of waste-water, and increasing the operational efficiency of water distribution networks. Over the year, the irrigated area within Israel has increased from 28,000 ha in 1948 to some 220,000 ha in 1997.

Problems can be seen to have emerged in 1999, when the treaty’s limitations were revealed by events concerning ]s in the Jordan basin. A reduced supply of water to Israel due to drought meant that, in turn, Israel which is responsible for providing water to Jordan, decreased its water provisions to the country, provoking a diplomatic disagreement between the two and bringing the water component of the treaty back into question.<ref> Ha'aretz ‘A dry Israel must cut water flow to Jordan’ by A. Cohen, 15th March 1999 as quoted in ''Hydro-Peace in the Middle East: Why no Water Wars?: A Case Study of the Jordan River Basin'' SAIS Review - Volume 22, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2002, pp. 255-272 and Allan John Anthony, (2001) ''The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy'' I.B.Tauris, ISBN 1860648134 p 220</ref>

Israel's complaints that the reduction in water from the tributaries to the river Jordan caused by the Jordan/Syrian dam look to go unheeded due to the conflict of interest between Israel and her neighbours.<ref> 18 October 2006, ‘Environmentalists: New dam may cause Jordan River to dry up’ By Tzafrir Rinat,</ref>

==References==
===External links===
*
* Flow rates of the Jordan River and its tributaries 1953, with estimation of costs for the “Jordan Valley Unified Water Plan”.
===Footnotes===
{{reflist|2}}
===Bibliography===

*On the over pumping of Aquifers p 80
Swain, Ashok (2004) Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East Routledge, ISBN 071465566X

*Spiegel, Steven L. (1985) The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan University of Chicago Press, ISBN 0226769623



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Revision as of 10:14, 28 December 2008

article under construction