Misplaced Pages

Revision as of 16:49, 30 September 2009

The neutrality of this article is disputed. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until conditions to do so are met. (July 2009) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Falun Gong
The swastika is an ancient Buddhist and Hindu symbol; the yin/yang symbol is from Taoism
Traditional Chinese	法輪功
Simplified Chinese	法轮功
Literal meaning	Practice of the Wheel of Law
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Fǎlún Gōng Yue: Cantonese Jyutping fat2 lun4 gung1
Falun Dafa
Traditional Chinese	法輪大法
Simplified Chinese	法轮大法
Literal meaning	Great Law of the Wheel of Law
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Fǎlún Dàfǎ Yue: Cantonese Jyutping fat2 lun4 daai6 fat2

Falun Gong (alternatively Falun Dafa) is a spiritual practice founded in China by Li Hongzhi in 1992. The movement emerged at the end of China's "qigong boom" as a traditional qigong cultivation practice. Its teachings are influenced by both Taoism and Buddhism.

The number of Falun Gong practitioners is unknown, and the group has no organized membership system. In 1998, the Chinese government published a figure of 70 million practitioners in China. Falun Gong asserts over 100 million practitioners of Falun Dafa in "114 countries and regions around the world". The movement distributes large amounts of material via the Internet free-of-charge.

Falun Gong differs from competing qigong schools through its absence of daily rituals of worship, its self-consciousness about outside critics, its greater emphasis on morality and the apparently theological nature of its teachings. There is on-going debate about Falun Gong's classification as a religion, cult, or new religious movement (NRM).

In April 1999, over ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners gathered at Communist Party of China headquarters, Zhongnanhai, in a silent protest following an incident in Tianjin. Two months later the Chinese government banned the practice through a crackdown and began a large propaganda campaign. Since 1999, Falun Gong practitioners in China have been reportedly subject to torture, illegal imprisonment, beatings, forced labor, organ harvesting, and psychiatric abuses. Falun Gong has responded with their own media campaign, and have emerged as a notable voice of dissent against the Communist Party of China, by founding organizations such as the Epoch Times, NTDTV and the Shen Yun Performing Arts to publicize their cause.

Beliefs and teachings

Falun Gong was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi(李洪志) in Changchun, China, in 1992. Its teachings cover spiritual, religious, mystical and metaphysical topics. Falun Gong is an introductory book that discusses qigong, which introduces the principles and provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises involved in Falun Gong practice.

The main body of teachings is articulated in the core book Zhuan Falun (轉法輪), published in late 1994. According to the texts, Falun Gong (or Falun Dafa) is a "complete system of mind-body cultivation practice" (修煉). 'Truthfulness' (眞), 'Compassion' (善), and 'Forbearance' (忍) are regarded as the fundamental characteristics of the cosmos—an omnipresent nature that permeates and encompasses everything. In the process of cultivation, the practitioner is supposed to assimilate himself or herself to these qualities by letting go of "attachments and notions," thus returning to the "original, true self." In Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi said that "As a practitioner, if you assimilate yourself to this characteristic, you are one that has attained the Tao—it's just such a simple principle."

Falun Gong draws on Oriental mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes self-imposed limits of modern science, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid knowledge system, according to Yuezhi Zhao, professor in the University of California. Concomitantly, it borrows the language of modern science in representing its cosmic laws. Zhao says: "Falun gong is not conceptualized as a religious faith; on the contrary, its practitioners, which include doctorate holders from prestigious American universities, see it as 'a new form of science.'"

Theoretical background

Qigong refers to a wide variety of traditional "cultivation" practices that involve movement and/or regulated breathing designed to be therapeutic. Qigong is practiced for health maintenance purposes, as a therapeutic intervention, as a medical profession, a spiritual path, or a component of Chinese martial arts. Unlike in the West, where many may believe that qigong is a socially neutral, subjective, New Age-style concept incapable of scientific proof, much of China's scientific establishment believes in the existence of qi. Controlled experiments by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, "actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration."

Falun Gong also borrows from Buddhist and Taoist teachings. Theories about the cultivation of elixir (dan), "placement of the mysterious pass" (xuanguan shewei), among others, are also found in ancient Chinese texts such as The Book of Elixir (Dan Jing), Daoist Canon (Tao Zang) and Guide to Nature and Longevity (Xingming Guizhi). Falun Gong's teachings tap into a wide array of phenomena and cultural heritage that has been debated for ages. However, the definitions of many of the terms used differ somewhat from Buddhist and Daoist traditions. Francesco Sisci says that Falun Gong "re-elaborated old, well-known Taoist and Buddhist routines, used the old vocabulary that people found familiar, and revamped them in a simple, persuasive way."

History

Beginnings

Falon Gong was founded by Li Hongzhi. In his spiritual biography in early versions of Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi claims that he was taught ways of "cultivation practice" (xiulian) by several masters of the Dao and Buddhist schools of thought starting at a very young age. The biography indicates that he was trained by Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, at age four. He was then trained by a Taoist master at age eight. This master left him at age twelve, and from then on, he was trained by a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist, who came from the Changbai Mountains. Li also claimed numerous supernatural feats, including invisibility, levitation, and weather modification.

Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public in May 1992, in Changchun, Jilin. Early versions of Zhuan Falun claims that the system was tested extensively before its introduction, between 1989 and 1992, while the Chinese government claims that Falun Gong was based on existing Qigong systems, namely Chanmi Gong and Jiugong Bagua Gong. Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. Falun Gong websites say that during this time, Li was granted several awards by Chinese governmental organizations. Neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning. Li and the Falun Dafa Research Society were welcomed into the Scientific Qigong Research Association.

In 1994, Falun Gong was taught at the Chinese consulate in New York as part of the Party's "cultural propaganda to the West", alongside Chinese silk craft and cooking. The consulate at that time also set up Falun Gong clubs at MIT and Columbia University which are active to this day. Starting in 1995, Li himself taught the practice outside of China, chairing a series of conferences at the Chinese embassy in Paris, upon invitation by China's ambassador to France.

Growth in China

Falun Gong's growth in China took place to the backdrop of contradictions in China's "technocratic-oriented modernization drive" and comparative lack of spiritual fulfillment. Following the suppression of pro-democracy forces during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China experienced deep and widespread ideological and identity crises. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping called for an end to debates about the political and social meaning of the economic reforms, urging the populace to participate in commercialism and the pursuit of material wealth. Falun Gong, in contrast, "insisted on the search for meaning and called for a radical transcendence of materialism in both the mundane and philosophical senses." In this context, Falun Gong was a Chinese manifestation of "a worldwide backlash against capitalist modernity" Though it is grounded in Chinese cultural traditions and responds to unique post-1989 Chinese realities, Falun Gong also addressed wider concerns, asking for a re-examination of existing the value system.

While Chinese authorities condemn Falun Gong as having "fallen prey to premodern superstitions," the practice "articulates a mixture of premodern, modern, and postmodern sensibilities." In Zhao Yuezhi's view, Falun Gong has established a 'resistance identity', resisting prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality and "the entire value system associated with the project of modernization". Zhao points out that Falun Gong's spread and popularity was reflective of the wider social transformation in happening in China.

After teaching publicly in Changchun, Li began to make his lectures more widely accessible and affordable, charging less than competing qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books. On 4 January 1995, Zhuan Falun, the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China. In the face of Falun Gong's rise in popularity, a large part of which was attributed to its low cost, competing qigong masters accused Li of unfair business practices. The qigong society under which Li and other qigong masters belonged asked Li to hike his tuition, but Li refused. Due to political in-fighting in the qigong Association, Li withdrew Falun Gong's membership.

From 1995 on, Falun Gong had established a clear competitive advantage over alternative qigong groups in its emphasis on morality and life philosophies, low cost, and its benefits to practitioners' health, and rapidly spread via word-of-mouth. In a reversal from the 1989 outpouring of desire for political participation, many Chinese turned to Falun Gong precisely because they saw it as an apolitical response to existing individual and social concerns. Its rapid growth within China was also related to family ties and community relationships, which still retain great power in contemporary China. Falun Gong attracted a wide range of adherents from all walks of life.

The Economist asserts that much of Falun Gong's success in the 1990s was due to claims that it could heal without costly medicine, as many citizens had lost medical benefits and services due to changing economic conditions. Some in China maintained that Falun Gong was the most popular qigong practice in the country, and that many professors from Peking University practiced the exercises every day on the campus grounds until the crackdown in 1999.

Lowe acknowledges sociological "macro-issues," such as economic insecurity, free time, the collapse of moral standards, worries about health and medical care, the desire for existential certitude, and other factors as explanations for Falun Gong's rise. He constests, however, that these were secondary considerations to the growth of Falun Gong. Falun Gong appeals to individuals on several levels of understanding, he says: "For beginners, health benefits seem to be a primary concern. Over time, as good health comes to be a given and as their study of Master Li’s books deepens, the metaphysical system of Falun Gong seems to take precedence as cultivators work to shed their attachments and move to higher levels..." Over time, followers appear to find in the teachings an "intricate, orderly, and internally consistent understanding of the cosmos," he writes. Other qigong practices were unable to provide "clear, unambiguous explanations of life’s deepest mysteries" and such a "complete and intellectually satisfying picture of the universe," as practitioners see it, he says.

Skeptics, Tianjin, and Zhongnanhai

Falun Gong's rapid growth in China garnered widespread attention from the media, academics, and members of China's religious community. As early as 1995, critics called Falun Gong "superstitious" and were skeptical of its claimed health benefits. By 1996, the Buddhist Association and Buddhist journals were issuing in-depth critiques of Falun Gong.

Skeptic and journalist Sima Nan spoke out against Falun Gong in 1999. In his critiques, Sima alleged that Li Hongzhi used psychological manipulation and a questionable mixture of traditional thought and modern science to sustain his teachings. In April 1999, physicist and pseudoscience critic He Zuoxiu published an article in the Tianjin Normal University’s Youth Reader magazine, entitled “I Do Not Agree with Youth Practicing qigong,” and criticized Falun Gong, raising concerns about the practice's teachings and its negative effects on practitioners' health, and about Li Hongzhi's psychological control over practitioners. Practitioners regarded the treatment unfair and subsequently gathered in large numbers to protest the article in Tianjin. Falun Gong organizers sent an appeal to the Tianjin Municipal party headquarters and government. Subsequently the police were called.

Dissatisfied with the treatment received in Tianjin, on 25 April, around ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners lined the streets near Zhongnanhai in silence, seeking legal recognition and protection of the practice in light of the alleged beatings and arrests in Tianjin. A few months later, on 20 July 1999, thousands of practitioners were arrested in the middle of the night, the media campaign to vilify the practice began.

At the time of the Zhongnanhai Incident, Falun Gong had evolved to become a politicized and highly mobilized form of social dissent. While Falun Gong's pre-1999 political involvement is difficult to verify, no other disenfranchised social group has ever staged a mass protest near the Zhongnanhai compound in PRC history. The incident raised questions about the Communist Party's control over the country, and led to fear, animosity and suppression of the movement. A World Journal article suggested that certain high-level Party officials had wanted to crack down on the practice for several years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai—which it claims may have been partly orchestrated by Luo Gan, a long-time opponent of Falun Gong. There was also reportedly rifts in the Politburo at the time of the incident. Some reports indicate that Premier Zhu Rongji had met with Falun Gong representatives and gave them satisfactory answers, but was criticized by General Secretary and President Jiang Zemin for being too soft. Jiang Zemin is held by Falun Gong to be largely personally responsible for the final decision. Cited motives include suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi, anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle.

The ban

On 20 July 1999, the Chinese government declared the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control to be illegal for having been "engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability." Xinhua further declared that Falun Gong was a highly organised political group "opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition." Xinhua also affirmed that "the so-called 'truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by Li has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve."

In response, Li Hongzhi declared that Falun Gong did not have any particular organization, nor any political objectives. "We have never been involved in any anti-government activities... We are not against the government now, nor will we be in the future."

A nationwide crackdown ensued with the exception of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw "heterodox religions" and applied to Falun Gong retroactively. The Chinese authorities branded Falun Gong, along with some other practices, movements or organizations xiejiao (Chinese: 邪教), which was given in English as "cult" or "evil cult", and introduced a barrage of media material criticizing Falun Gong.

The campaign against Falun Gong extended to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces. An extra-constitutional body, the "6-10 Office" was created, charged with monitoring and taking action against various religious groups. The effort was allegedly driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet. Families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government's position on Falun Gong, while practitioners themselves were subject to severe coercive measures to have them recant.

Since the ban in China, Falun Gong has alleged torture, backed up by Amnesty International; The United Nations has taken up their allegations of illegal imprisonment including forced labour, and psychiatric abuses. Falun Gong related cases comprise 66% of all reported torture cases in China, and at least half of the labour camp population. China's policies on Falun Gong are considered human rights abuses by Amnesty International.

Response in China

Protests in Beijing were frequent for the first few years following the 1999 edict, though they have largely been silenced since. Practitioners' presence in mainland China has become more low-profile, as they opt for alternative methods of informing the citizenry, such as through overnight letterbox drops of CD-ROMs.

According to the Chinese government, Falun Gong activists have launched attacks against Sinosat satellites and jammed television signals, replacing regular state television boardcasts with Falun Gong material.

Response outside China

Template:Image stack Due to its ban in mainland China, Falun Gong practitioners have taken to their cause internationally, especially in Australia, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Britain. Practitioners engage in promotional activities aimed by handing out flyers in busy intersections, in the subway or at the mall, leaving Falun Gong literature in stores, libraries, laundries etc. Although some of the literature deal with Falun Gong's situation in China, other publications also include the Nine Commentaries of the Communist Party, a critical editorial of the Communist Party of China, which are distributed by practitioners in both DVD and book form. Falun Gong members also openly participate in activities such as marches, parades, and celebrations of Chinese culture.. Response to these appeals have been mixed.

Practitioners also utilize various parade venues around the world to publicize their group and its message. These have included large events such as the Independence Day Parade in Washington, D.C. to smaller events such as the Auckland New Zealand's Santa Parade. These parades also offer an opportunity for the group to disseminate promotional literature. The response to Falun Gong involvements in some parades have also been mixed.

FG has also been active in establishing university chapters, which offer free exercise and teaching sessions.

Since 2006, a central part of the Falun Gong campaign focused on alleged organ harvesting from living practitioners. The Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, alongside Canadian parliamentarian David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas, produced a report on the allegations. The Christian Science Monitor considered the evidence is circumstantial, but persuasive, and criticized the Chinese government for a lack of openness in investigating the claims. Likewise, U.N. special rapporteur Manfred Nowak, said the report "shows a coherent picture that causes concern." The United States Congressional Research Service regarded the report as inconsistent with the findings of other investigations, and Chinese dissident Harry Wu also voiced doubts. In November 2008, the United Nations Committee Against Torture noted that an increase in organ transplant operations coincided with “the beginning of the persecution of ” and demanded an explanation. The Chinese government has repeatedly denied these allegations, saying that the report was based on "rumors and false allegations".

Organizational Structure

Falun Gong denies having an organizational structure, and maintains that it is merely a spiritual group that practices a brand of qigong. It does not have an organized membership system, and eschews the term 'membership'. As a result, estimates vary over Falun Gong's membership numbers. At the time of the ban, the government estimated between 2 million to 70 million Falun Gong practitioners in China. Falun Gong website clearwisdom.net claims over 100 million practitioners in 114 countries around the world.

Institutionally, Falun Gong was a part of the Scientific Qigong Research Association until 1994 as the Falun Dafa Research Society, then applied to be listed as an organization under the National Minority Affairs Commission, to which it was denied. It subsequently applied to the China Buddhist Federation as a cultural organization to study Buddhism, and was also rejected. Its final attempt at registering under a Party-sanctioned organization was an application to the United Front Department as a "non-religious, academic organization", to which it was also rejected. In early 1997, Falun Gong began pursuing a more decentralized and loose organizational structure, with its main bases in Beijing and Wuhan. Chinese state media claimed that at the time, the Beijing national office was led by Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, Ji Liewu and Yao Jie; Li and Wang were members of the Communist Party. Their communication with founder Li Hongzhi is unclear. In addition, regional offices diverged in their organizational structures. Each office generally maintained a "propaganda department", logistics department, and "doctrine" committee, or variations of those functions thereof.

At the time of the movement's suppression in July 1999, Falun Gong websites claim that the movement had no "national organization", no regulations or by-laws, and that practitioners were free to join or leave at any time, and there were no membership rosters. The Chinese government, in contrast, claims that Falun Gong was a highly organized group, with 39 "main stations", 1,900 "guidance stations", and 28,263 practice sites nation-wide, overseeing a total of 2.1 million practitioners. A number of "Falun Dafa Associations" now exist around the world, of which the Falun Dafa Association of Canada is one of the most prominent. Not all practitioners are members of an association.

Media branches and PR strategies

Falun Gong practitioners have also set up international media organizations to promote their cause and criticize policies of the Communist Party of China. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, NTDTV, Sound of Hope radio station. Maria H. Chang of the University of Nevada, says these organisations seem to be " front organisations to influence public opinion via a concerted information-PR-propaganda campaign". She argues that, like the Chinese state, Falun Gong has to create organisations that are publicly unaffiliated with it for the organization to survive.

Together these organizations also promote the Chinese New Year Spectacular, performed by the FG affiliated Shen Yun Performing Arts troupe. In addition, Falun Gong has a considerable presence on the Internet, with websites such as clearwisdom.net, faluninfo.net, mingui, pureinsight etc., which they use not only to spread Li's teachings, but also to publicise the plight of practitioners with graphic testimonials.

While Chinese media has launched an unrelenting assault on Falun Gong since 1999, Falun Gong's response through its various media organizations has earned the practice considerable public relations clout in the West. According to Kavan, Western media obtain much of their information through Rachlin media group, a public relations firm for Falun Gong, managed by Gail Rachlin, one of Li’s inner circle. Kavan also notes Falun Gong's similarities to the Communist Party in its media strategies: intolerance of criticism, issuing denials when accused, exaggerating and sensationalizing claims, and deflecting blame by charging the other of the same offense.

Falun Gong have set up groups CIPFG and WOIPFG to lobby foreign governments/legislators, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who now expressed their concerns over allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in China. They have also urged the United Nations and international governments to intervene and bring an end to the ongoing persecution. Friends of Falun Gong USA is a non-profit corporation domiciled in New Jersey which raises funds for FLG causes.

Public Debate

Litigation

Falun Gong practitioners in the United States routinely file cases in U.S. federal courts against Chinese leaders once they step upon foreign soil. According to International Advocates for Justice, Falun Gong has filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century and the charges are among the most severe international crimes defined by international criminal laws.

The 'cult' label

Since the 1999 ban the Chinese government has repeatedly labelled Falun Gong as xiejiao, a term which means "evil cult" in English, and is used to refer to groups deemed "harmful to social stability." The government claimed that Falun Gong's "malicious concepts" led to "physical and mental injuries." The characterization of Falun Gong as a cult, however, is dismissed by leading researchers in the field. David Ownby argues that "The entire issue of the supposed cultic nature of Falun Gong was a red herring from the beginning, cleverly exploited by the Chinese state to blunt the appeal of Falun gong and the effectiveness of the group’s activities outside of China." Ian Johnson also rejects the label, writing that it "put Falun Gong on the defensive, forcing it to prove its innocence, and cloaked the government's crackdown with the legitimacy of the West's anticult movement." Practitioners of Falun Gong say they are engaged in merely a "practice system."

In scholarship calling Falun Gong a "cult" depends on how the term is defined, and many scholars refrain from using the label. However, following the stance taken by the Chinese government, the western Anti-cult movement and Margaret Singer regarded Falun Gong a cult based upon on their perception that the group is authoritarian and that practitioners are influenced by forms of psychological coercion. Most social scientists and scholars of religion reject "brainwashing" theories as unfounded, however, and do not subscribe to the definition of "cult" used by Singer or Kavan.

Other scholars avoid the term "cult" because "of the confusion between the historic meaning of the term and current pejorative use" These scholars prefer terms like "spiritual movement" or "new religious movement" to avoid the negative connotations of "cult" or to avoid mis-categorizing those which do not fit mainstream definitions. Others see political ramifications in the term: Edelman and Richardson argue that, over the years, the CCP has become sensitive to criticism of its human rights record and in this context the anti-cult movement have been "useful tools," helping create the illusion that the rule-of-law has been upheld: "By applying the label and embracing theories that posit passive followers under the mental control of a dangerous leader, the government can aggressively destroy the group, all the while claiming to be protecting religious freedom."

References

1. "Falun Gong: Popular spiritual practice". San Francisco Chronicle. 6 April 2008. Retrieved 21 July 2009.
2. ^ Benjamin Penny, The Past, Present, and Future of Falun Gong, 2001, accessed 16/3/08, Quote: "The best way to describe Falun Gong is as a cultivation system. Cultivation systems have been a feature of Chinese life for at least 2 500 years //"
3. Statement of Professor David Ownby, Unofficial Religions in China: Beyond the Party's Rules, 2005. Quote: "The history of Falun Gong, and of the larger qigong movement from which Falun Gong emerged (...) The Falun Gong emerged in 1992, toward the end of the boom, and was in fact one of the least flamboyant of the schools of qigong"
4. Ownby, David, "A History for Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the Chinese State Since the Ming Dynasty", Nova Religio, Vol. ,pp. 223-243
5. Joseph Kahn (27 April 1999). "Notoriety Now for Movement's Leader". New York Times.
6. ^ Falun Dafa Has Been Spread to 114 Countries and Regions (Photos)
7. "Answers to Commonly Asked Questions about Falun Gong", Falun Dafa Clearwisdom.net, retrieved 10 June 2006
8. Haar, Barend ter, Evaluation and Further References, quote: "One difference between the Falun Gong and traditional groups is the absence of rituals of daily worship or rites of passage (...) Striking differences are also the degree of self-consciousness about outside critics already preceding the persecutions from April 1999 onwards".
9. Falun Gong: Cult or Culture?, ABC Radio National, 22 April 2001. Quote: "That the teacher, the leader, is regarded as being greater and more powerful than normal human beings; that the things that that teacher says are taken as truer and more real and more powerful than anything else, anybody else says, and that there is a well developed, I would call theology, but possibly doctrine, that includes morality, practice and a whole complete world view. So it looks like a religion to me."
10. Craig S. Smith (30 April 2000). "THE WORLD: Rooting Out Falun Gong; China Makes War on Mysticism". New York Times.
11. Frank, Adam. (2004) Falun Gong and the threat of history. in Gods, guns, and globalization: religious radicalism and international political economy edited by Mary Ann Tétreault, Robert Allen Denemark, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1588262537, pp 241-243
12. Controversial New Religions, The Falun Gong: A New Religious Movement in Post-Mao China, David Ownby P.195 ISBN 0195156838
13. Reid, Graham (29 Apr-5 May 2006) "Nothing left to lose", New Zealand Listener, retrieved 6 July 2006
14. ^ Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or Evil Cult?, Akashic books: New York, 2001, p. 66 Cite error: The named reference "Schechter" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
15. (23 March 2000) The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called heretical organizations, Amnesty International
16. Thomas Lum (25 May 2006). "CRS Report for Congress: China and Falun Gong" (PDF). Congressional Research Service.
17. ^ Johnson, Ian, Wild Grass: three portraits of change in modern china, Vintage (8 March 2005)
18. ^ United Nations (4 February 2004) Press Release HR/CN/1073, retrieved 12 September 2006
19. ^ Leung, Beatrice (2002) 'China and Falun Gong: Party and society relations in the modern era', Journal of Contemporary China, 11:33, 761 – 784
20. Sunny Y. Lu, MD, PhD, and Viviana B. Galli, MD, “Psychiatric Abuse of Falun Gong Practitioners in China”, J Am Acad Psychiatry Law, 30:126–30, 2002
21. Robin J. Munro, "Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Political Abuses", Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Columbia University, Volume 14, Number 1, Fall 2000, p 114
22. Wall Street Journal: Chinese dissidents take on Beijing via Media Empire
23. Zhuan Falun, Zhuan Falun, accessed 31/12/07
24. Characteristics of Falun Dafa, Zhuan Falun, accessed 31/12/07
25. ^ Zhao, Yuezhi, "Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China", pp209-223 in Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World, ed. Nick Couldry and James Curran, Rowman & Littlefield publishers, inc.: 2003. Quote: "the most dramatic episode in the contestation over media power in the Chinese language symbolic universe."
26. David Aikman, American Spectator, March 2000, Vol. 33, Issue 2
27. Falungong Part 1: From Sport to Suicide, Francesco Sisci, Asia Times, 27 January 2001
28. ^ A Short Biography of Mr. Li Hongzhi, Chinese Law and Government v. 32 no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1999) p. 14-23 ISSN: 0009-4609
29. A Chronicle of Major Historic Events during the Introduction of Falun Dafa to the Public
30. "Governmental Awards and Recognition of Falun Dafa". Falun Dafa ClearWisdom.net. Retrieved 1 August 2006.
31. ^ David Ownby, "The Falun Gong in the New World," European Journal of East Asian Studies, Sep2003, Vol. 2 Issue 2, p 306
32. ^ Phillip Adams, Media and Internet Censorship in China, Late Night Live, Radio National Australia
33. ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (2008) Oxford University Press
34. ^ Scott Lowe, Chinese and International Contexts for the Rise of Falun Gong, Nova Religio April 2003, Vol. 6, No. 2
35. Thomas Lum, Congressional Research Report #RL33437, Congressional Research Service, 11 August 2006
36. Religion in China - When opium can be benign, The Economist, 1 Feb 2007
37. ^ Julia Ching, "The Falun Gong: Religious and Political Implications," American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, no. 4, Winter 2001, p 2
38. Rahn, Patsy (2002) “The Chemistry of a Conflict: The Chinese Government and the Falun Gong” in Terrorism and Political Violence, Winter, 2002, Vol 14, No. 4 (London: Frank Cass Publishers) reprinted in Cultic Studies Review, subscription required
39. Penny, Benjamin, “The Falun Gong, Buddhism and ‘Buddhist qigong’”, Asian Studies Review March 2005, Vol 29, pp.35-46.
40. Taoism.hk: Wang Anlin, 1999
41. The Truth Behind the 25 April Incident (Abridged version) - Faluninfo.net
42. I do not agree with Youth Practicing Qigong Full text
43. Michael Lestz, Why Smash the Falun Gong?, Religion in the News, Fall 1999, Vol. 2, No. 3, Trinity College, Massachusetts
44. American Asian Review, Vol. XIX, no. 4, Winter 2001, p. 12
45. ^ Dean Peerman, China syndrome: the persecution of Falun Gong, Christian Century, 10 August 2004
46. ^ Tony Saich, Governance and Politics in China, Palgrave Macmillan; 2nd Ed edition (27 Feb 2004)
47. Xinhua, China Bans Falun Gong, People's Daily, 22 July 1999
48. ^ Xinhua Commentary on Political Nature of Falun Gong, People's Daily, August 2,1999
49. ^ Gayle M.B. Hanson, China Shaken by Mass Meditation - meditation movement Falun Gong, Insight on the News, 23 August 1999
50. Li Hongzhi, A Brief Statement of Mine, 22 July 1999, accessed 31/12/07
51. op.ed (1 July 2001). "揭穿李洪志及其"法轮功"的险恶政治用心 (uncovering Li Hongzhi's and Falun Gong's wicked political intentions)". People's Daily (in Chinese). {{cite web}}: |author= has generic name (help)
52. "Chinese Ambassador Defends Government Banning of Falun Gong". 13 May 2004. Retrieved 17 July 2008.
53. Congressional-Executive commission on China, Annual Report 2008.
54. Mickey Spiegel, "Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign Against Falungong", Human Rights Watch, 2002, accessed Sept 28, 2007
55. ^ China: Falun Gong deaths in custody continue to rise as crackdown worsens. 19 December 2000. Amnesty International index ASA 17/048/2000 - News Service Nr. 239.
56. China: Fear of torture or ill-treatment. 20 March 2007. Amnesty International index ASA 17/014/2007.
57. Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: MISSION TO CHINA, Manfred Nowak, United Nations, Table 1: Victims of alleged torture, p. 13, 2006, accessed 12 October 2007
58. International Religious Freedom Report 2007, US Department of State, Sept 14, 2007, accessed 28th Sept 2007
59. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-07/08/content_473926.htm
60. Crompton, Sarah (2008). 'Shen Yun: Propaganda as entertainment
61. Konigsberg, Eric (2008). 'A Glimpse of Chinese Culture That Some Find Hard to Watch'
62. (2009). 'United States: Falun Gong Group Participates in Ballwin Day Parade in Missouri', accessed 2 July 2009
63. (2009). Santa Parade spurns activists again
64. (2009). Falun Dafa barred from St. Patrick's Parade: Group claims discrimination
65. Falun Dafa at Stanford, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
66. Falun Dafa in Michigan, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
67. Falun Dafa at Columbia, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
68. Falun Dafa at UCLA, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
69. Falun Dafa at Caltech, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
70. Penn State Falun Dafa, retrieved 25 Sept 2009
71. Matas, David & Kilgour, David (2007). Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China
72. The Monitor's View, "Organ harvesting and China's openness", The Christian Science Monitor, 3 August 2006, retrieved 6 August 2006
73. An Interview with U.N. Special Rapporteur on Organ Harvesting in China
74. CRS Report for Congress (11 August 2006)
75. Canadian Press (7 July 2006) "Report claims China kills prisoners to harvest organs for transplant", canada.com, retrieved 8 July 2006
76. ^ James Tong: An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing* The China Quarterly, No. 171 (Sep., 2002), pp. 636-660
77. FAISON, SETH (27 April 1999). "In Beijing: A Roar of Silent Protesters". The New York Times. Retrieved 8 September 2009.
78. Renmin ribao, 15 August 1999, p. 1; Xinhua, Beijing, 27 October 2001
79. Michael Laris, "Chinese Sentence 4 Falun Leaders; Jail Terms Range Up to 18 Years," Washington Post, December 27, 1999;
80. People's Daily, 23 July 1999, "Li Hongzhi qirenqishi"
81. The gospel truth: Falun Gong, Sunday Star Times, March 2, 2008
82. ^ Morais, Richard C."China's Fight With Falun Gong", Forbes, 9 February 2006, retrieved 7 July 2006
83. Chen, Kathy. "Chinese Dissidents Take On Beijing Via Media Empire". Wall Street Journal.
84. ibid Kavan (2008), pg 6
85. ibid Kavan (2008), pg 16
86. China's Campaign Against Falungong, Human Rights Watch
87. The crackdown on Falun Gong and other so-called heretical organizations. The Amnesty International
88. Lawrence, Susan V. (14 April 2004). "Falun Gong Adds Media Weapons In Struggle With China's Rulers". Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition). p. B.2I.
89. David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, 2008
90. Legal Actions in Chronological Order, Justice for Falun Gong, Retrieved 16 August 2007
91. Chan 2004
92. ^ Irons, Edward. 2003 Falun Gong and the Sectarian Religion Paradigm Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Volume 6, Issue 2, pages 244-62, ISSN 1092-6690
93. The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law
94. Bromley, David G. (1998). "Brainwashing". Encyclopedia of Religion and Society. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira. pp. 61–62. ISBN 978-0761989561. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)
95. Lewis, James R. 2004 The Oxford handbook of new religious movements, Oxford University Press US, 2004, ISBN 0195149866
96. Don Lattin, Falun Gong Derided as Authoritarian Sect by Anti-Cult Experts in Seattle, San Francisco Chronicle, 29 April 2000.
97. Melton, J. Gordon (10 December 1999). "Brainwashing and the Cults: The Rise and Fall of a Theory". CESNUR: Center for Studies on New Religions. Retrieved 5 September 2009. Since the late 1980s, though a significant public belief in cult-brainwashing remains, the academic community-including scholars from psychology, sociology, and religious studies-have shared an almost unanimous consensus that the coercive persuasion/brainwashing thesis proposed by Margaret Singer and her colleagues in the 1980s is without scientific merit.
98. ^ Edelman and Richardson, Imposed Limitations on Freedom of Religion in China and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on Falun Gong and other "Evil Cults", Journal of Church and State, Spring 2005, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p265-267
99. Bainbridge, William Sims 1997 The sociology of religious movements, Routledge, 1997, page 24, ISBN 0415912024
100. Richardson, James T. (1993). "Definitions of Cult: From Sociological-Technical to Popular-Negative". Review of Religious Research. 34, No. 4: 348–356.
101. Cite error: The named reference frank2004 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

Further reading

• David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (Oxford University Press, 2008) ISBN 978-0-19-532905-6
• Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) ISBN 0-300-10227-5
• Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong (Law Wheel qigong) (1993)
• Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun (English translation 2000)
• Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China (Akashic Books, 2000) hardback ISBN 1-888451-13-0, paperback ISBN 1-888451-27-0

External links

Sites run by Falun Gong practitioners

• FalunDafa.org
• FalunInfo.net
• Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group

Critical sites

• Condemn Falun Gong Cult — a series of anti-Falun Gong articles of the state-run Xinhua news agency
• Falungong Part 1: From Sport to Suicide, Francesco Sisci, Asia Times, 27 January 2001

Other sites

• Articles by Ian Johnson (Pulitzer Prize winner), Wall Street Journal (2001)
• Falun Gong: Cult or Culture?, Produced by Chris Bullock, Radio National, 22 April 2001
• press archives, Center for Studies on New Religions
• Spiritual Society or Evil Cult?
• Falun Gong portal, Time

• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from July 2009
• Falun Gong
• Culture of the People's Republic of China
• New religious movements
• Religion in the People's Republic of China
• Society of the People's Republic of China