Misplaced Pages

Revision as of 03:45, 24 June 2010

This is the talk page for discussing improvements to the Six-Day War article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject.

Put new text under old text. Click here to start a new topic. New to Misplaced Pages? Welcome! Learn to edit; get help. Assume good faith Be polite and avoid personal attacks Be welcoming to newcomers Seek dispute resolution if needed Article policies Neutral point of view No original research Verifiability

Find sources: Google (books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL

Archives: Index, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14Auto-archiving period: 3 months

	Six-Day War was a good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There may be suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake.
Article milestones Date Process Result September 28, 2006 Good article nominee Not listed March 12, 2008 Good article nominee Not listed
Current status: Former good article nominee

This article and its editors are subject to Misplaced Pages general sanctions.

This article has not yet been rated on Misplaced Pages's content assessment scale. It is of interest to the following WikiProjects:

Please add the quality rating to the {{WikiProject banner shell}} template instead of this project banner. See WP:PIQA for details. Syria High‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Syria, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Syria on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.SyriaWikipedia:WikiProject SyriaTemplate:WikiProject SyriaSyria High This article has been rated as High-importance on the project's importance scale. Please add the quality rating to the {{WikiProject banner shell}} template instead of this project banner. See WP:PIQA for details. Israel High‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Israel, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Israel on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.IsraelWikipedia:WikiProject IsraelTemplate:WikiProject IsraelIsrael-related High This article has been rated as High-importance on the project's importance scale. Project Israel To Do: edit history watch purge Here are some tasks awaiting attention: Assess : Rate the Unassessed Israel-related articles and Unknown-importance Israel-related articles. Cleanup : Cleanup listing for this project is available. See also the list by category and the tool's wiki page. Collaborate : Participate in WikiProject Israel Palestine Collaboration. Copyedit : Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 2005 Deletion sorting : Participate in discussions at WikiProject Deletion sorting/Israel. Expand : Ayala Procaccia, Diamond industry in Israel, Edna Arbel, Levin Kipnis, Rami Kleinstein, Sephardic Haredim, Zman Tel Aviv, Nachum Heiman, Public Defence (Israel), Prisoner of Zion, Trial of Benjamin Netanyahu, Day to Mark the Departure and Expulsion of Jews from the Arab Countries and Iran, Pre-Modern Aliyah See also Articles needing translation from Hebrew Misplaced Pages. Geographical coordinates : Add geographic coordinates to Israel articles missing geocoordinate data. Infobox : Add infoboxes to Israel articles needing infoboxes. Maintain : See Israel articles needing attention. Map : See discussion at Module:Location map/data/Israel. Add maps to articles in Misplaced Pages requested maps in Israel. NPOV : Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries Photo : Add pictures to articles in Misplaced Pages requested photographs in Israel. Stubs : See Israel stubs. Update : Basic Law proposal: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People Other : Translate to Hebrew : David Bar-Hayim, Guy Bavli, and Guy Oseary. Please add the quality rating to the {{WikiProject banner shell}} template instead of this project banner. See WP:PIQA for details. Palestine Top‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Palestine, a team effort dedicated to building and maintaining comprehensive, informative and balanced articles related to the geographic Palestine region, the Palestinian people and the State of Palestine on Misplaced Pages. Join us by visiting the project page, where you can add your name to the list of members where you can contribute to the discussions.PalestineWikipedia:WikiProject PalestineTemplate:WikiProject PalestinePalestine-related Top This article has been rated as Top-importance on the project's importance scale. Please add the quality rating to the {{WikiProject banner shell}} template instead of this project banner. See WP:PIQA for details. Arab world High‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Arab world, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of the Arab world on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.Arab worldWikipedia:WikiProject Arab worldTemplate:WikiProject Arab worldArab world High This article has been rated as High-importance on the project's importance scale. Jewish history This article is within the scope of WikiProject Jewish history, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Jewish history on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.Jewish historyWikipedia:WikiProject Jewish historyTemplate:WikiProject Jewish historyJewish history-related ??? This article has not yet received a rating on the project's importance scale. Please add the quality rating to the {{WikiProject banner shell}} template instead of this project banner. See WP:PIQA for details. Egypt Mid‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Egypt, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Egypt on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.EgyptWikipedia:WikiProject EgyptTemplate:WikiProject EgyptEgypt Mid This article has been rated as Mid-importance on the project's importance scale. Please add the quality rating to the {{WikiProject banner shell}} template instead of this project banner. See WP:PIQA for details. Jordan High‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Jordan, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Jordan on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.JordanWikipedia:WikiProject JordanTemplate:WikiProject JordanJordan High This article has been rated as High-importance on the project's importance scale. Tasks YOU can help with: edit history watch purge Here are some tasks awaiting attention: Article requests : 1958 Jordan crisis, Mohammad Hamed, Abdul Qader al-Taneer (composer of national anthem), Illegal drug trade in Jordan Assess : by quality and by importance - Harrana, Jordanian general election, 1951, Desert castle Cleanup : International rankings of Jordan, Jordan–Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Copyedit : Culture of Jordan, Nabataeans, Princess Sarvath al-Hassan, 'Umayri Expand : Six-Day War, Crown Prince of Jordan, Jordan University of Science and Technology, 1944 Jordan League, Medical education in Jordan Merge : Jordanian protests (2011–12), November 2012 Jordanian protests NPOV : Dabke, King's Academy, The Children's Museum Jordan Stubs : Jordan-related stubs - As-Salam al-Malaki al-Urduni, Transjordan (region), Flag of Jordan, Abdullah Ensour's cabinet, Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River) Update : Jordanian protests (2011–12), Agriculture in Jordan, Jordanian Communist Toilers Party, Jordan–Syria relations, Jordanians in the United Arab Emirates Wikify : Jordanian art, Jordanian cuisine Other : Category:Jordan articles missing geocoordinate data Tip: #section links are case-sensitive on most browsers Links from this article with broken #section links : ] You can remove this template after fixing the problems | FAQ | Report a problem Military history: Middle East This article is within the scope of the Military history WikiProject. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the project and see a list of open tasks. To use this banner, please see the full instructions.Military historyWikipedia:WikiProject Military historyTemplate:WikiProject Military historymilitary history This article has been checked against the following criteria for B-class status: Referencing and citation: criterion met Coverage and accuracy: criterion met Structure: criterion met Grammar and style: criterion met Supporting materials: criterion met Associated task forces: /  Middle Eastern military history task force Please add the quality rating to the {{WikiProject banner shell}} template instead of this project banner. See WP:PIQA for details. Lebanon Mid‑importance This article is within the scope of WikiProject Lebanon, a collaborative effort to improve the coverage of Lebanon-related articles on Misplaced Pages. If you would like to participate, please visit the project page, where you can join the discussion and see a list of open tasks.LebanonWikipedia:WikiProject LebanonTemplate:WikiProject LebanonLebanon Mid This article has been rated as Mid-importance on the project's importance scale.

A fact from this article was featured on Misplaced Pages's Main Page in the On this day section on June 5, 2004, June 5, 2005, and June 5, 2006.

This is the talk page for discussing improvements to the Six-Day War article. This is not a forum for general discussion of the article's subject.

Put new text under old text. Click here to start a new topic. New to Misplaced Pages? Welcome! Learn to edit; get help. Assume good faith Be polite and avoid personal attacks Be welcoming to newcomers Seek dispute resolution if needed Article policies Neutral point of view No original research Verifiability

Find sources: Google (books · news · scholar · free images · WP refs) · FENS · JSTOR · TWL

Archives: Index, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14Auto-archiving period: 3 months

Archives

Index Archive 1 Archive 2 Archive 3

This page has archives. Sections older than 90 days may be automatically archived by Lowercase sigmabot III when more than 5 sections are present.

"preemptive attack" needs to be qualified

In the third paragraph of this article, it states "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt." There is a reference to a footnote that contains many quotes from a wide variety of sources characterizing the Israeli attack by the adjective "preemptive". This is a subjective use of the adjective, and a qualification of it as such should be inserted into the article, particularly given that the following sentence states that "The Arab countries denied planning to attack Israel and asserted that Israel's strike was not preemptive but an unwarranted and illegal act of aggression" (emphasis added).

A reasonable alteration of the text of this article would read:

"On June 5, 1967 Israel launched an attack on Egypt it claims was an act of preemption against an imminent military threat from Egypt."

JRHammond (talk) 07:57, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

I agree, this would be better wording. Go ahead and change.BorisG (talk) 08:13, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Pre-emption should be judged on the objective facts not subjective statements. It is a fact that Egypt closed the Tiran Straits, thus closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. It is a fact that Egypt massed 100,000 or more soldiers on Israel's border. It is a fact that Egypt expelled U.N. Peacekeepers from Sinai thus depriving Israel of an important buffer. It is a fact that Syria and Jordan mobilized their respective armies and were joined by contingents from Iraq, among other Arab countries. It is a fact that anti-Israeli war rhetoric reached a fever pitch in Arab capitals just prior to commencement of hostilities. Judging by objective facts and not by revisionist post-war interviews, it is clear that the Arabs were bent on war. Therefore, the term pre-emption or "pre-emptive attack" is not only more appropriate, it is more accurate. Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:11, 5 February 2010 (UTC)

I have no doubts Arabs prepared for war. However I disagree with the statement "Pre-emption should be judged on the objective facts not subjective statements". In my dictionary, pre-emption is about motivation for the attack, and therefore is inherently subjective. Alas, maybe the very fact that it is inherently subjective means that the wording 'launched a pre-emptive attack' is ok, because all it means is that Israelis meant it as pre-emptive.BorisG (talk) 07:35, 7 February 2010 (UTC)

For an attack to be "preemptive", there must have been an imminent threat of attack from Egypt. But no imminent attack is evidenced, as acknowledged by two former Israeli prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin, both of whom acknowledged that Nasser had not intended to actually initiate a first strike against Israel.

To say Israel's attack was "preemptive" is itself subjective. And I agree 100%, as I already indicated, that the use of this adjective to describe Israel's attack should therefore, for that very reason, be eliminated.

To address each evidence given that the attack was "preemptive":

1) Israel's closing of the straits was not a military attack. Israel's attack did not "preempt" the closing of the straits. So this example is totally irrelevant. Whether or not this action justified Israel's attack is also an irrelevant question for our purposes here. Even if we assume this justified Israel's attack, it doesn't make Israel's attack "preemptive".

2) Egyptian troop movements don't prove intent. A very persuasive argument can be made that Egypt's positioning was defensive, an argument supported by Rabin and Begin (as noted above), who both acknowledge that Nasser never intended a first strike. Both U.S. and Israeli intelligence prior to the war also assessed that it was unlikely Nasser would actually strike first. Israel had already attacked Samu. Israel was planning an attack on Syria and had already attempted to provoke Syrian belligerency in the Golan Heights, and Israeli leaders were making similarly belligerent remarks as Nasser had. Israel also moved troops to the border.

So by this same reasoning, had Egypt actually launched the first military attack, it was have been an act of "preemption". Unless we can accept that this was the case, the logic must be rejected.

3) There are numerous alternative explanations for the belligerent nature of Egyptian officals' statements, including attempting to deter an Israeli attack through rhetorical exaggeration of the Egyptian force of arms. As both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed prior to the war, Nasser wasn't going to attack -- but even if he did, Israel would win the war in two weeks. If Israel attacked first, it could win in one week, such was the great superiority of its arms.

Judging by the objective facts can only lead to the conclusion that the use of the adjective "preemptive" to describe the Israeli attack is a subjective one, and therefore inappropriate for a Misplaced Pages entry.--JRHammond (talk) 10:24, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

As for alternative explanations for Egypt's bellicose talk, it doesn't negate the fact that such talk reached a crescendo and as Michael Oren points out, carried with it a momentum from which there was no return. In addition, your analyses curiously omits the expulsion of U.N. peacekeepers from Sinai. What was Israel to discern from that move? Also, your claim that Israel was massing forces along the Syrian border is false. As Zeev Schiff and others well-regarded in the field note, this was a false Soviet claim designed to further ignite Arab (particularly Egyptian) passions and put them into a frenzy.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:51, 12 February 2010 (UTC)

"1) Israel's closing of the straits": I think you mean Egypt here? If so, could you please repair it? If so, you can delete my notice here.Mpvdm (talk) 14:16, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

The bottom line here is that there is no evidence Israel was under imminent threat of attack by Egypt. That is an interpretation of facts, not a fact itself. As a matter for debate, the use of the adjective "preemptive" here is subjective and should have a caveat included or be removed.JRHammond (talk) 10:58, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

We will never know if Nasser planned to attack first, or was just bluffing. But his behaviour was sufficiently threatening and aggressive for the Israelis to take the chance of an Egyptian attack seriously. The Israelis thus launched an attack to pre-empt the attack by the Egyptians. Thus the attack was preemptive. BorisG (talk) 16:06, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

"We will never know if Nasser planned to attack first . . . Thus the attack was preemptive."

I think that pretty much speaks for itself. Your argument is a non sequitur. An attack is "preemptive" if it is an action taken against a real imminent threat. It is not "preemptive" if it is an action taken against only a perceived threat. The fact that you acknowledge whether Egypt actually presented an imminent threat or not is debatable is all anyone need to recognize that the use of the word "preemptive" is subjective, and thus should be removed or qualified.JRHammond (talk) 16:01, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

Interestingly, in 1973, when informed (rather late) of an imminent attack by Egypt and Syria, the Israeli government considered a pre-emptive attack, but decided against it, fearing international outcry. This resulted in heavy loss of life. I am sure if they launched a pre-emptive attack, we would have a similar debate over the nature of that attack.BorisG (talk) 16:06, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

Irrelevant.JRHammond (talk) 16:01, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

I'd note in addition the difference between a "preemptive" and a "preventive" attack. One could argue that Israel's attack on Egypt was "preventive". That at least might be debatable. But to say it was "preemptive", there's absolutely no evidence to support. To say it's "subjective" is actually a serious understatement, but it being subjective is enough that this needs to be revised on Misplaced Pages.JRHammond (talk) 16:01, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

It is obvious that the phrase "Israel launched a preemptive attack" is POV, and therefore out of place in Misplaced Pages. Paul kuiper NL (talk) 02:52, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

I agree (that presenting the Israeli attack as objectively preemptive is an indefensibly subjective value judgment, at least according to what seems to be the current state of historical scholarship on the set of events); it doesn't belong in its present form.Historian932 (talk) 01:10, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

"Pre-emptive" is a later formulation. The Israeli government maintained originally that Egypt had attacked Israel. You will still find this version in many books. Ian Pitchford (talk) 09:05, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

I disagree with those who argue that the Israeli attack was not "preemptive". They are attempting to impose their subjective view that the threat was not imminent enough to be called "preemptive." By JR Hammond's definition, there could be no such thing as a preemptive strike, because you can never know for sure if an attack is imminent until it starts to happen. The question is not whether an attack was actually imminent, but whether the person engaged in a the "preemptive" strike (in this case the Israelis) could reasonably have feared that one was imminent. My dictionary defines "preemptive" as "taken as a measure against something possible, anticipated, or feared; preventive; deterrent." By that definition, the Israeli attack objectively qualifies. The Egyptians had blockaded the Straights of Tiran, expelled the UN peacekeepers, and massed troops and tanks on the border. An Egyptian attack was certainly possible, very likely feared, and the Israeli first strike prevented any such attack from happening. The word is used correctly. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 167.102.231.183 (talk) 16:26, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

According to a substantial body of mainstream historical opinion Israel did NOT believe Egypt was going to attack. It's therefore wrong for the article to baldly state that it was a pre-emptive strike; it should reflect the disagreement. The current formulation reflects badly on Misplaced Pages's reputation, especially on such an important and sensitive issue. 82.12.113.64 (talk) 17:35, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

if history is the best judge of events, then let us see what happened in 1973 (the Yom Kippur War). israel was warned by America and other large powers NOT to initiate a pre-emptive strike. and so it did not. Egypt crossed the canal (Suez), started the war, and caught Israel waiting for instructions. the troops in the front line deployment were not ready for battle. israel lost many soldiers in the war, and many soldiers were taken prisoner. It was Ariel Sharon who turned the tide with his tank corps. in view of the utmost importance to air supremacy, israel took out the Egyptian airforce, thus enabling its groundforces to advance beyond israel's borders, a tactic that was imperative to protect its civilians. considering the above, clearly, had israel not taken out the enemy airforce on the ground, the result would have been catrastophical for the jewish state. therefore, the term "pre-emptive (defensive) strike" should stand, and not be subject to historiography. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.109.218.215 (talk) 18:57, 8 June 2010 (UTC)

As expressed by "popular" opinion, (majority of comments made on talkpage), the word preemptive itself is subjective. Even Bush claimed "preemptive" war against Iraq, which still had to develop technology, building nuclear and biological weapons, and also the missiles to deploy them, before making any attack. In 1967, we only know that the two sides were both hostile to each other, and went to war as a show of strength. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Atif.hussain (talk • contribs) 04:45, 9 June 2010 (UTC)

Belligerents

Sending some aircraft to the war does not warrant the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, etc... The infobox should not include providers of token forces. --Sherif9282 (talk) 13:06, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Why not? If a token show of solidarity deserves to be mentioned anywhere it's in a historical summary. I mean isn't that the point? To be able to say in the end, we were there. We helped. It ended differently than they hoped but that doesn't mean that they now get to take it back right? --68.41.80.161 (talk) 01:06, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Does the death of troops constitute more than a show of support? http://elderofziyon.blogspot.com/2010/03/algeria-reveals-extent-of-its.html —Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.71.113.103 (talk) 12:04, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

General Hod said at a press conference given in Tel Aviv in June 1967: "For 16 years we lived with the plan, we slept with the plan, we ate with the plan ... ." — Preceding unsigned comment added by The Fifth Column (talk • contribs) 18 March 2010 23:15

no citation

"U.S ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, did not deliver it in a timely manner.." can anyone find a source for this or should it be removed? --68.41.80.161 (talk) 01:06, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

U.S. Collusion with Israel

It's well-documented. George Lenczowski, for example, found that as early as May 23, President Johnson secretly authorized supplying Israel by air with a variety of arms systems, even when an embargo on weapons shipments were placed on the Middle East. Stephen Green's research proves in his book that the U.S. sent reconnaissance aircraft to track nighttime movement of Egyptian forces. 76.191.230.178 (talk) 20:26, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

If by "well-documented" you mean "a conspiracy theory that refuses do die out", then yes, it's well-documented. Green's assertion has been shown to be false by a serious scholar who published it in a respected academic journal. Richard Bordeaux Parker was, among other things, the American ambassador to Algeria and Lebanon, not some trivial "observer". If anyone should be dismissed in this dispute, it is Green rather than Parker. Lenczowski's account, even if true, means nothing in regards to the planing or execution of the war, especially when there's a plethora of evidence that shows that the U.S. and Israel were in disagreement on a great many things and hardly aware of each others plans'. There's not a single shred of evidence to connect it to Green's account and nothing to show that this supposed "collusion" ever extended beyond "authorization". But hey, what's evidence when you can always juxtapose two facts to arrive at some sinister conclusion?

The question is whether we want this to be a serious article about the Six Day War, or the dumping ground for every fable that keeps poping up. Talk of "collusion" has no place here, just as you will not find it in serious scholarly debate. Poliocretes (talk) 21:42, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

Parker, who is not a professor at a university, carries no more authority than Stephen Green and far less than Professor Lenczowski. I don't have any problem with including Parker's views, but attempts to exclude accounts of American support to Israel in 1967 are unhelpful. Although Green's work has been disputed, there does not appear to be consensus that it's all a hoax as suggested by Parker. 76.191.230.178 (talk) 00:09, 2 March 2010 (UTC)

Parker is legitimate, and although about another war, I found this note in a ref, which says: For the proceedings of a major conference on the October War involving scholars and major players from all sides, see Richard Parker, ed., The October War: A Retrospective (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001). Green tends to be less-so, and use of his material must be well written to survive; I have two of his books, and have yet to use either as a ref in Wiki. The anon's mentioning of LBJ's 5/23 secret authorization, however, made me at my copy of Lenczowski (p110). For the anon, I would suggest being a little more circumspect in what you attempt to insert here, concerning notability, relevance and phrasing. That paragraph in particular speaks of American military behavior just before and during the actual war, with "Johnson's dualism" being "the most important feature" of his pro-Israel US tilt, by secretly sending supplies to Israel, while publicly declaring an embargo on all arms to the entire region. Put that in the article. You will find by choosing a user name and learning how to edit well, you can become more productive for the project and NPOV. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 01:25, 2 March 2010 (UTC)

I was rather intrigued by the addition made by 76.191.230.178, "that on June 5th, the United States sent Israel ammunition and jet fighters", taken from Quigley's "The Case for Palestine" (p. 162). Quigley's book can be viewed on both Google Books and Amazon, where this exact statement appears with a reference to page 216 in Donald Neff's "Warriors For Jerusalem" (1984). I troubled myself to the library and found the relevant paragraphs. In an episode titled "June 5: Israel Attacks", Neff says the following about president Johnson (top of page 216):

"He also received a message from his friend Arthur Krim. A memorandum to the President that day read: "Arthur Krim reports that many arms shipments are packed and ready to go to Israel, but are being held up. He thinks it would be most helpful if these could be released."

Under the message the President had scribbled: "1,000 rounds of 105mm artillery shells cleared. 2,000 fuses - availability, Gas masks. New Requests: A-4 jet fighter-bombers Hawk antiaircraft missiles."

Before the day was out, Krim was informed that gas masks had already been dispatched to Israel and he left a message for Johnson expressing his appreciation."

That's it. The rest of the page deals with various people he met and communicated with, and has nothing to do with arms shipments of any kind. In short, Quigley's assertion that "on June 5th, the United States sent Israel ammunition and jet fighters" is unsupported by the evidence he provides. The only thing documented as sent are gas masks. There's no indication if and when any ammunition had even been dispatched and an Israeli request for jet fighters, possibly made on June 5, somehow becomes jet fighters sent to Israel. In light of this I am deleting the sentence from the article. Poliocretes (talk) 18:17, 4 March 2010 (UTC)

That indeed shows admirable inquisitiveness for the project’s good and for those near a library; but I am not near one, though similarly motivated by the project. I am however, unsure exactly how definitive your conclusions might be, regarding the specificity of June 5. Lenczowski uses different wording; he says (about LBJ's 5/23 secret authorization) that “these items were sent just on the eve of the June 5 invasion…” He refs it to a cite that says: “National Security File, NSC History---Middle East Crisis, May 12—June 19, 1967. The May 23 memo signed by H.H.S (Harold H. Sanders) and the attached table, “President’s Decisions, Israeli Aid Package 23 May 1967,” signed by W.W. Rostow are in vol.1. A note to the President about a delay in some shipments, signed by Marvin (Watson), dated June 5, 1967, 6:55 P.M., is in vol.4. These originally Top Secret materials were declassified on January 6, 1982 and May 9, 1982. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin Texas.

Green’s book Taking Sides (1984), uses somewhat similar wording ("These were packed and sent just prior to the June 5 invasion, in preparation for it,...") He also cites the first of those (vol1) as the source. His mention notes the following on the attached table: “armored personnel carriers, tank spare parts, spare parts for Hawk missile air defense system, bomb fuses, artillery ammunition, and gas masks, among many other items. (Parts of the list have been excised.)” It is likely we will never know just what was asked for and sent to Israel before June 5. Green also mentions Krim’s note, but writes “that certain of the “armed shipments” due to leave that day by chartered airline had been delayed.” Green also quotes the “most helpful if these could be released", but also says “believe it or not” that a note to this effect is in the National Security File of the LBJ Library. Green also notes more about Krim than his wiki-page, noting that he was the “Chairman of the New York State Democratic party and an active Zionist.”

I do not object to the deletion; it seems unsufficiently sourced, and besides, the title seems too emotive and so pre-Dershowitz. On the other hand, I do not believe that LBJ’s 5/23 secret supply authorization is given its due weight, certainly in the light of how Lenczowski presents it. Mansur’s mention of it doesn’t make it for notability and weight NPOV. I’ll change the wording, as I get to it, to reflect Lencz’s more reliable, notable and nuanced mention. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 15:23, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

Proposed Change

It's clear from numerous quotations and references throughout the article and discussion pages that a substantial body of respected opinion does not agree that Israel's attack was "pre-emptive". I therefore propose changing the lead to:

"On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a bombing raid on Egyptian airfields. Initially it told the UN that Egypt had attacked first, but later described the strikes as preemptive. Egypt denied planning to attack Israel, and asserted that Israel's strike was not preemptive but an unwarranted and illegal act of aggression."

Any thoughts? Phersu (talk) 13:10, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

The Arab states' words and actions make it clear what their plans were. Their rhetoric was "We'll destroy Israel", their actions were to expel the UN peacekeepers from Sinai, and move the Egyptian army into it, close the straits, and form a unified military command with Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Jordan allowed the Iraqi forces to enter its realm, in preparation for their attack. As Henry Shue and David Rodin say in their "Preemption: military action and moral justification", "A classic example of a preemptive war is Israel's Six Day War of 1967."

What I see on this page is some out-of-context quotes, interpreted by Wikipedians. Sources, however, seem to very much support the phrasing "preemptive"; you don't have to go far - search for something like "1967 war Israel preemptive" in Google books, and see what the sources say. (A search string such as this will equally find sources contesting the "preemptive" claim). It seems it is widely accepted that this was a preemptive strike, and is commonly quoted as an example of one. okedem (talk) 18:52, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

I don't think it's Misplaced Pages's role to interpret the meaning or significance of Egypt's words and actions, merely to reflect significant bodies of opinion. In this respect, it's clear that views over "preemptive" vs "not-preemptive" tend to break down along entrenched pro-Israel vs pro-Arab lines.

Nor do I think it's fair or accurate to dismiss the argument against preemption as "out-of-context quotes interpreted by Wikipedians". I would draw your attention to reference number 22 in the main article, which cites numerous notable commentators who believe the attack was not pre-emptive. I could add more examples, but it seems pointless. The fact remains that a substantial body of respected opinion does not agree that Israel's attack was "pre-emptive", and I submit that the lead should therefore be changed to state (as in this example from the BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7875000/7875655.stm ) that Israel claimed or said the attack was preemptive, not to take one side of the argument by stating that it was preemptive. Phersu (talk) 02:43, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Actually, it seems the view that it wasn't preemptive is quite limited to "pro-Arab" commentators, whereas the view that it was is quite general. Let's look at the quotes in ref 22:

• De Gaulle - okay, that's his opinion, in a rather round-about way (seems to be before the actual events).
• Cattan - rejects the very idea of a preemptive strike, so is obviously irrelevant to this question. He also falsely claims "None of the Arab States had attacked or threatened to attack Israel" (their threats are well documented). As our wiki article about him notes, Cattan "was a member of the delegation which represented the Arab Higher Committee before the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 and 1948." This is hardly an impartial expert.
• Fisher - the quote is quite unclear, and I can't get to the source, which is a letter to the editor.
• Quigley - the quote does not question the designation of the strike as "preemptive", but the legality of such action in general ("Even if Israel had expected Egypt to attack, it is not clear a preemptive strike is lawful.").
• Al-Ahram - bizarre. Has nothing to do with the question of preemptive strike.
• Hinnebusch - the quote doesn't say the Israelis knew Nasser wouldn't attack, but that they were confident of victory; it doesn't reject the preemptive claim, but actually strengthens it - "For the Israeli hawks, the crisis was less a threat than an opportunity - to smash Nasserish Egypt and the Pan-Arab movement while Israel still had military superiority." (my bold).
• Shlaim, Bailey - basically the same one; says the Americans didn't think Egypt would attack. Says nothing of the Israelis' beliefs (which are the relevant ones). The Americans have been wrong before. Many, many times. The fact that the quote speaks of McNamara is just ironic.
• Finkelstein - A failed academic, getting fired from so many universities it's hard to keep count. I don't even know what he does now. One of the most partial commentators I've ever heard of.
• Begin - Unclear. Begin was only a Minister without Portfolio at the time, and I have no idea when these words were said. The quote has no source.
• Chomsky - quite a lazy quote, from a book by a linguist and political activist. Not the best source.
• Rabin - maybe, but one can easily say that this was the right time to attack, before Nasser sent in any more divisions.
• Dayan - says nothing of the preemptive strike, and doesn't even mention Egypt, the main adversary. Remember that the four Arab states formed a joint military command before the war (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq).

So, in actuality, the sources of ref 22 are of very low quality, and few actually support the claim they're attached to. okedem (talk) 09:14, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Neither the Arab states' words nor their actions made it clear what their intentions were. There was a continuing power struggle between conservative Arab states, such as Jordan, and radical ones like Egypt. The threats against Israel must be seen in this context.

As for Arab (i.e. Egypt) intentions to attack Israel Tom Segev in his Book "1967" says outright that Egypt was not about to attack. --Frederico1234 (talk) 09:31, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Okedem - I think it's inaccurate to say the sources of ref 22 are "of very low quality, and few actually support the claim they're attached to". Excuse me for going through this in some detail (your comments in light, my comments in bold):

1. De Gaulle - okay, that's his opinion, in a rather round-about way (seems to be before the actual events). De Gaulle (correctly) feared Israel would strike, and was making it clear that he would not consider such a move justified. Clearly a notable commentator.
2. Cattan - rejects the very idea of a preemptive strike, so is obviously irrelevant to this question. He also falsely claims "None of the Arab States had attacked or threatened to attack Israel" (their threats are well documented). As our wiki article about him notes, Cattan "was a member of the delegation which represented the Arab Higher Committee before the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 and 1948." This is hardly an impartial expert. Cattan – “a renowned international jurist and writer” - also said Israel was the aggressor. He stated: “In fact, Israel, as we have seen, created the crisis and attacked its neighbours.” This addresses the pre-emptive issue directly.
3. Fisher - the quote is quite unclear, and I can't get to the source, which is a letter to the editor. Misplaced Pages describes Roger Fisher (I’m assuming it’s the same one!) as “Samuel Williston Professor of Law emeritus at Harvard Law School”. His quote is perfectly clear – he says that in his opinion Egypt had a strong legal case for closing the Strait of Tiran (Israel, by contrast, portrayed it as a casus belli and justification for their attack). He also says that – again in his opinion – Israel’s attack was unlawful. His statement, published in the New York Times, has been widely quoted over the years.
4. Quigley - the quote does not question the designation of the strike as "preemptive", but the legality of such action in general ("Even if Israel had expected Egypt to attack, it is not clear a preemptive strike is lawful."). You’re right. However, if you go to Quigley’s book you see that immediately before this discussion Quigly addresses the issue of preemption directly. He writes: “Israeli officials later admitted that 'Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt when it struck June 5'”. According to Misplaced Pages, Quigley is Professor of Law at Ohio State University, where he is also the Presidents’ Club Professor of Law and was recipient of the Ohhio State University Distinguised Scholar Award.
5. Al-Ahram - bizarre. Has nothing to do with the question of preemptive strike. The quote speaks to the motivation for Israel’s attack, implying that Israel sought wars (“at least every decade”) in order to prevent “the emergence of any genuine Arab military force..” It suggests that rather than reacting preemptively to a real and sudden emergency, “the Israelis were preparing for the 1967 War a decade in advance”.
6. Hinnebusch - the quote doesn't say the Israelis knew Nasser wouldn't attack, but that they were confident of victory; it doesn't reject the preemptive claim, but actually strengthens it - "For the Israeli hawks, the crisis was less a threat than an opportunity - to smash Nasserish Egypt and the Pan-Arab movement while Israel still had military superiority." (my bold). I don’t think we should expect every quote to address every issue (in this case, Israeli perceptions of Nasser’s intentions). The reference does, however, explicitly state, that “Nasser had no intention of striking first”. This is in direct contradiction to those who claim he did. The second half of the quote suggests that – rather than a pre-emptive strike against a real and imminet threat of invasion – Israeli hawks saw the attack as a move calculated to undermine an emergent rival. That’s preventive war, not pre-emptive; two very different things.
7. Shlaim, Bailey - basically the same one; says the Americans didn't think Egypt would attack. Says nothing of the Israelis' beliefs (which are the relevant ones). Again, every quote doesn’t have to address every issue. The point here is that the US President told Eban “it was the unanimous view of his military experts that there was no sign that the Egyptians were planning to attack Israel”. In discussing whether or not Egypt WAS planning to attack Israel (which the pro-preemption side frequently argue), this is surely highly relevant. The argument that Israel may have mistakenly thought Egypt was planning to attack is interesting and valid, though it’s undermined by subsequent quotes from senior Israeli leaders (eg Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin).
8. Finkelstein - A failed academic, getting fired from so many universities it's hard to keep count. I don't even know what he does now. One of the most partial commentators I've ever heard of. You are entitled to your views. On the question of Finkelstein, Noam Chomsky, Avi Shlaim and Raul Hilberg disagree with you.
9. Begin - Unclear. Begin was only a Minister without Portfolio at the time, and I have no idea when these words were said. The quote has no source. The quote from Begin ( “In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him”) The statement was made in a speech delivered on August 8, 1982, before the Israeli National Defense College and cited in New York Times, August 21, 1982. It’s one of the most-quoted statements on the issue. The fact that he did not have a portfolio isn’t relevant; he was a full cabinet member. Moreover, at the time he made the speech he was Prime Minister of Israel.
10. Chomsky - quite a lazy quote, from a book by a linguist and political activist. Not the best source. Chomsky is one of the world’s leading intellectuals. And what on earth is “lazy” about quoting Israel’s former Commander of the Air Force stating that there was “no threat of destruction” but that the attack was nevertheless justified so that Israel could “exist according to the scale, spirit, and quality she now embodies”?
11. Rabin - maybe, but one can easily say that this was the right time to attack, before Nasser sent in any more divisions. Rabin states: "I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to The Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it." You are entitled to argue this was the “right” time to strike (at least in terms of a “preventive” war) but the quote strongly suggests the war was not preemptive (ie in the face of imminent attack).
12. Dayan - says nothing of the preemptive strike, and doesn't even mention Egypt, the main adversary. Remember that the four Arab states formed a joint military command before the war (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq). It isn’t directly relevant, however the Dayan quote speaks to the context of the times. It suggests Israel had an aggressive and expansionist mindset. This of course is one of the theses put forward by some of those who believe 1967 was a war of choice rather than a preemptive war.

I repeat, it isn't Misplaced Pages's job to decide who's right and who's wrong. We must reflect notable and significant bodies of opinion. It seems clear to me that in light of this, for Misplaced Pages to baldly state that the war was preemptive is clearly wrong. Phersu (talk) 14:06, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Forgive me, but for clarity, I'll number the sections of your response. Revert me if you don't want this. Response follows. okedem (talk) 16:23, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

1. De Gaulle - according to the source, this was his position "As late as May 24"; the war started on June 5; De Gaulle couldn't possibly know everything about Arab actions and intentions even at that timepoint, but things were changing so quickly it doesn't matter. If after the events he said "it wasn't preemptive", that would be notable. The current quote isn't (for this discussion).
2. Cattan:
   1. If you have access to the book, present the right quote in ref 22, and not the current one speaking to the general legality of preemption, and not whether it was preemption.
   2. With all due respect to Cattan, he is far from an impartial expert.
3. Fisher - irrelevant; if we accept Israel's position that the closing of the straits was an act of war, then its subsequent actions were self defense following an attack, and the preemption claim becomes irrelevant. His quote isn't clear enough to understand if he rejects the general legality of a preemptive strike, or thinks this isn't one; this quote does not qualify the designation "preventative". I would think a better source could be obtained; letters to the editor are hardly appropriate.
4. Quigley - again, then present the correct quote for this point. Quigley is a respected scholar, but does not represent the mainstream (you can especially see this in claims like that the British mandate for Palestine was a state, or claims to that effect. Interesting, but far from accepted).
5. Al-Ahram - not only irrelevant, but - this newspaper is owned by the Egyptian government! I mean, seriously...
6. Hinnebusch - actually, I do expect every source to address the issue it's posted to. If this one doesn't directly address the preemption question (which depends on beliefs), it has no place here. The border between preemption and prevention is blurred, and the time-scales are unclear.
7. Shlaim, Bailey - again, if it doesn't address the issue, it doesn't belong here. In any case, these things change extremely quickly. The quote is from the May 27 meeting, more than a week before the war. Things change.
8. Finkelstein - certainly, he has supporters. However, I'd prefer to consults actual experts, not unemployed commentators.
9. Begin - I say unclear, because the timescales are unknown; did not intend to attack within a few days? Weeks? Would additional forces prove it? And I have no idea how much information he was privy to at the time. He and his party was never trusted by Mapai people.
10. Chomsky - he's a linguist, not a historian or political scientist. It's lazy, because one should cite the actual source of these quotes, and surely we can find an actual expert to comment on them. A "threat of destruction" is not a requirement for justifying a preemptive strike. The high likelihood of an enemy attack is enough, even if such an attack won't completely destroy you (perhaps just kill thousands of soldiers and civilians).
11. Rabin - suggests, but again - the line between preemptive and preventative is far from clear.
12. Dayan - not directly relevant - doesn't belong here. We're not discussing anyone's mindset.

So we had a few irrelevant quotes, an Egyptian government owned newspaper, and the opinions of the same old bunch who always seem to take the position that casts Israel in a bad light (Quigley, Finkelstein, Chomsky). On the other hand, we have a ridiculously long list of uninvolved reliable sources, such as CNN, BBC (generally critical of Israel), Encarta, Economist, and various books (ref 21), calling it a "preemptive strike". Many more such sources can be found in a couple of seconds of searching.

It seems quite clear what the mainstream formulation is. The opposing view is notable, and is currently mentioned right there in the lede. I think it's enough for such a minority (perhaps fringe) view. okedem (talk) 17:17, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

I suspect we could argue these points back and forth all week without coming to an agreement. Let me try to move the discussion on.

It’s clear that a good many newspapers, broadcasters, commentators and magazines regularly repeat – unqualified – that it was a “pre-emptive war”. Misplaced Pages is held to different standards however. When faced with a situation in which TWO former Israeli Prime Ministers (Rabin and Begin), Noam Chomsky (“Perhaps the most feted liberal intellectual in the world”, according to the BBC) and a host of other notable (despite your personal opinions!) academics and commentators clearly DON’T believe it was a pre-emptive war, it is incumbent on Misplaced Pages to avoid baldly stating that it WAS.

One further point: Pre-emptive war has a precise meaning. It is launched “in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression”. It is clear that even the most respectable newspapers and magazines, however, frequently use the term in a quite different way (more akin to “preventive” war). Just type “Israel”, “Iran” and “Pre-emptive” into Google. Countless mainstream sources discuss the possibility or advisability of Israel or the US launching a pre-emptive attack against Iran, yet it’s clear that what they mean is a PREVENTIVE attack (I doubt anyone in the US or Israel believes an attack from Iran to be imminent, though they may feel it is a future possibility). I’d therefore be particularly wary of arguing that Misplaced Pages should adopt the unqualified term “pre-emptive strike” in relation to 1967 on the basis that many mainstream media sources use it.

The article lead currently reads: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt”. What we are explicitly saying is: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched an attack on Egypt because it believed Egypt was about to attack it”.

My question is this: Should Misplaced Pages baldly state that Israel DID believe Egypt was about to attack? Even when one Israeli Prime Minister states: “"I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to The Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it,” and another states: ““In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him”.

Wouldn’t it be far more encyclopedic to state: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it claimed was (or 'described as') a pre-emptive attack on Egypt”?

I note, incidentally, that the BBC’s most highly-respected documentary strand, Panorama, itself uses the word “claimed”. It states: “On June 5 1967 Israel launched a strike against Syria, Egypt and Jordan which became known as the Six Day War. Israel claimed it was a pre-emptive strike in the face of a planned invasion of Israel by these countries”

(see http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7875000/7875655.stm) Phersu (talk) 05:50, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

I know it might be tiring, but I would like you to reply to those points, since they require action, like deleting some, or changing quotes in others.

Not just "newspapers, broadcasters, commentators and magazines", but a host of serious books as well. The few people on the list above actually rejecting the "preemptive" designation belong to a small, I-dare-say fringe, group, with a well known political agenda; Chomsky, for instance, is an extremely important linguistics expert, but has no expertise in the other matters, and even if he had - show me some impartial experts, not people happily meeting with genocidal murderers.

I can list many more books, using the "preemptive" formulation, but that's a waste of space. Go to Google books, and just run the search string "Israel 1967 preemptive". You'll see books by a great variety of authors, using this phrasing, like "World Politics in the 21st Century", "Israel and Palestine", "Philosophical perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict", etc. I'm not even listing people like Dershowitz, despite his accurate books, since he's considered a "pro-Israel" advocate. Re: BBC - I guess some have different tastes there... okedem (talk) 12:56, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

The view that the Israeli strike was preventive in character rather than strictly pre-emptive is hardly a fringe view among historians. As stated above, Segev even explicitly says that Egypt was not about to attack. The Israeli government knew this so it wasn't anything really pre-emptive about it in the strict sense of the word. What non-historians say is not relevant. --Frederico1234 (talk) 13:25, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

There's a large variety of sources using the word "preemptive", including history books (see ref 21).

And if "what non-historians say is not relevant", we should disregard the quotes from Cattan (Jurist), Fisher (Jurist), Quigley (Jurist), Al-Ahram (government propaganda vessel), Hinnebusch (International Relations and Middle East Politics), Finkelstein (unemployed political scientist) and Chomsky (linguist). okedem (talk) 16:45, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Exactly. I really fail to see the point of using any other source than professional historians as sources when describing historical events. --Frederico1234 (talk) 17:10, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Consensus of mainstream sources agree that attack on Egypt was pre-emptive. Any attempt to indicate otherwise is revisionist propaganda.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:03, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

A major problem is that the statement above "Pre-emptive war has a precise meaning" is quite false. "Pre-emptive" is a word sometimes used even with opposite meanings - the opposition preemptive vs. preventative used mostly above is sometimes characterized as anticipatory self-defense vs. pre-emptive attack respectively (especially in legal literature). So compiling lists of how many sources use this word may not be too helpful if it isn't clear how they are using it; some sources use it pretty loosely. The idea that Egypt was not going to attack is not revisionism, but just one side of an argument, and probably the majority view.John Z (talk) 07:44, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

No one can know for sure what Egypt would have done, had things gone differently. One can only know what they did - threaten, expel peace-keepers, move forces, close the straits, and form a unified military command with their allies. In face of such acts, Israel's actions are most commonly characterized as "pre-emptive". Please read Jiujitsuguy's comment carefully - he's not saying that Egypt would have attacked, but that Israel's action was preemptive (the first is objective, the second depends on subjective perception). okedem (talk) 09:14, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

Professional historians are qualified to determine how likely an Egyptian attack was. They are also qualified to investigate if the Israeli government thought that an Egyprian attack was imminent. We should stay with what the historians say about the matter and not engage in original research. --Frederico1234 (talk) 11:32, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

Okedem – Fair enough; I’ll reply to the specific points you raised (again, your points in light, my replies in bold).

1. De Gaulle - according to the source, this was his position "As late as May 24"; the war started on June 5; De Gaulle couldn't possibly know everything about Arab actions and intentions even at that timepoint, but things were changing so quickly it doesn't matter. If after the events he said "it wasn't preemptive", that would be notable. The current quote isn't (for this discussion).

From Ian Buruma, writing in the New York Times in 2003: “Gen. Charles de Gaulle... warned (Israel) against going to war. As he put it to the Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban: You will be considered the aggressor by the world, and by me.”

You state, correctly that although this was his position “as late as May 24”, the war itself did not begin until June 5. However, by May 24 Nasser had already moved troops into Sinai, ordered UN troops out and closed the Straits of Tiran. As these were the major justifications cited by Israel for its attack, what difference does it make to the significance we attach to De Gaulle’s statement that the bombardment of Egyptian airfields itself did not begin until June 5? Whether or not De Gaulle subsequently stated “it wasn’t pre-emptive”, I think it is obtuse not to recognise the significance of what he DID say.

Buruma, incidently was Foreign Editor of The Spectator and has been a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin, the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C., St. Antony's College, Oxford, and Remarque Institute, NYU. He was voted as one of the Top 100 Public Intellectuals by the Foreign Policy/Prospect magazines (May/June 2008).

2. Cattan: If you have access to the book, present the right quote in ref 22, and not the current one speaking to the general legality of preemption, and not whether it was preemption. With all due respect to Cattan, he is far from an impartial expert.

I do not have the book, but previous posters give the reference as Henry Cattan, The Palestine Question, p.106 Pre-emptive strike by Israel. The full quote is given as: “After the discovery of the true facts about Israel's aggression, Israel invoked two arguments to justify its launching the war. Its first argument was that it acted by way of a preventative strike which, in its view, is equivalent to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Such argument has no basis in fact or in law. In fact, Israel, as we have seen, created the crisis and attacked its neighbours.”

As far as his “impartiality” is concerned, I suppose his direct, high-level involvement in the politics of the time mean you’re right – he wasn’t “impartial”. Nevertheless, he was a highly-respected international jurist, academic, legal expert and author of frequently-cited books on the issue. His contribution to the argument is unarguably valid, relevant and notable.

3. Fisher - irrelevant; if we accept Israel's position that the closing of the straits was an act of war, then its subsequent actions were self defense following an attack, and the preemption claim becomes irrelevant. His quote isn't clear enough to understand if he rejects the general legality of a preemptive strike, or thinks this isn't one; this quote does not qualify the designation "preventative". I would think a better source could be obtained; letters to the editor are hardly appropriate.

Fisher questions the legality of “the preventive war which Israel launched”. Note his description of the attack – preventive, not pre-emptive (a distinction which, as noted above, is crucial). As Samuel Williston Professor of Law emeritus at Harvard Law School and a leading expert in international law, his designation of the strike as preventive rather than pre-emptive is highly relevant.

His letter to the New York Times was published a few days after Israel’s attack. It has subsequently been cited numerous times in academic and other texts (including Finkelstein, Image and Reality). Moreover, United Nations Secretary General U Thant subsequently cited Fisher’s letter, describing it as “a powerful statement” in defense of Egypt’s position (Finkelstein, p.138)

4. Quigley - again, then present the correct quote for this point. Quigley is a respected scholar, but does not represent the mainstream (you can especially see this in claims like that the British mandate for Palestine was a state, or claims to that effect. Interesting, but far from accepted).

I gave you the quote. It is: “Various Israeli officials said later, however, that 'Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt when it struck June 5'”. (Quigley, p164. The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective) This goes to the heart of the matter – if Israel did not anticipate an imminent attack, then their strike was not pre-emptive. Quigley is indeed a (highly) respected scholar, and his views on the issue at hand are both relevant and notable.

5. Hinnebusch - actually, I do expect every source to address the issue it's posted to. If this one doesn't directly address the preemption question (which depends on beliefs), it has no place here. The border between preemption and prevention is blurred, and the time-scales are unclear. Shlaim, Bailey - again, if it doesn't address the issue, it doesn't belong here. In any case, these things change extremely quickly. The quote is from the May 27 meeting, more than a week before the war. Things change.

Let me add an extended quote in relation to Johnson’s meeting with Eban in order to clarify these points: “President Johnson told Eban that even after instructing his ‘experts to assume all the facts that the Israelis had given them to be true’, it was still their ‘unanimous view that there is no Egyptian intention to make an imminent attack’ – a conclusion according to Eban, also reached by Israeli intelligence”. (Finkelstein, Image and Reality, p.134]

To put this in context, the meeting took place AFTER the closure of the Strait, the expulsion of UN troops and the mobilisation of Egyptian troops. The relevant pieces were already in place, yet neither American nor Israeli intelligence believed an attack was imminent.

In a similar vein:

“Reporting from Cairo for the New York Times on the eve of Israel’s assault, James Reston observed that Egypt ‘does not want war and it is certainly not ready for war’”. (ibid p.134)

“Mossad chief Meir Amit (stated) ‘Egypt was not ready for a war’ and Nasser did not want a war’”. (ibid p.134)

“The Israeli-compiled Middle East Record stated that ‘most observers agree’ that Nasser did not intend to launch an attack ‘and that his pledges to U Thant and to the Great Powers not to start shooting should, therefore, be accepted at their face value’.” (ibid p.134)

“Yet it is generally agreed Nasser was sincere when he later said that he had no intention of launching an attack against Israel; on the contrary as he said in his 23 July speech, he believed that ‘any attack on Israel would expose us to great dangers.”`` (Cockburn and Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison, 1991, p.137)

6. Finkelstein - certainly, he has supporters. However, I'd prefer to consults actual experts, not unemployed commentators.

He has very prominent and respected supporters. Moreover I don’t think his worst enemy would deny he is an “expert” in this particular field, no matter how strongly they might disagree with his conclusions.

7. Begin - I say unclear, because the timescales are unknown; did not intend to attack within a few days? Weeks? Would additional forces prove it? And I have no idea how much information he was privy to at the time. He and his party was never trusted by Mapai people.

Begin’s (extended) statement is worth quoting: “We had three wars which we fought without an alternative. The first, the war of independence, which began on Nov. 30, 1947 and lasted until January 1949. What happened in that war, which we went off to fight with no alternative? Six thousand of our fighters were killed. We were then 650,000 Jews in Eretz Israel, and the number fallen amounted to about 1 percent of the Jewish population.

"The second war of no alternative was the Yom Kippur War and the war of attrition that preceded it. Our total casualties in that war of no alternative were 2,297 killed, 6,067 wounded. Together with the war of attrition—which was also a war of no alternative—2,659 killed, 7,251 wounded. The terrible total: almost 10,000 casualties.

"Our other wars were not without an alternative. In November 1956 we had a choice. The reason for going to war then was the need to destroy the fedayeen, who did not represent a danger to the existence of the state. Thus we went off to the Sinai campaign. At that time we conquered most of the Sinai Peninsula and reached Sharm el Sheikh. Actually, we accepted and submitted to an American dictate, mainly regarding the Gaza Strip (which Ben-Gurion called 'the liberated portion of the homeland'). John Foster Dulles, the then-secretary of state, promised Ben-Gurion that an Egyptian army would not return to Gaza. The Egyptian army did enter Gaza .... After 1957, Israel had to wait 10 full years for its flag to fly again over that liberated portion of the homeland.

"In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”

When he made this frequently-quoted statement, he was Prime Minister of Israel, and certainly in full possession of all and any relevant information.

8. Chomsky - he's a linguist, not a historian or political scientist. It's lazy, because one should cite the actual source of these quotes, and surely we can find an actual expert to comment on them. A "threat of destruction" is not a requirement for justifying a preemptive strike. The high likelihood of an enemy attack is enough, even if such an attack won't completely destroy you (perhaps just kill thousands of soldiers and civilians).

Chomsky’s notability cannot seriously be argued. The fact that he first came to prominence as a linguist does not detract from the fact that he has written countless highly-respected books and papers on the Arab-Israeli conflict. “The Fateful Triangle” in particular is widely-regarded as a standard text and cites Begin’s famous quote (above) as evidence that the Israeli’s themselves did not consider the attack pre-emptive.

9. Rabin - suggests, but again - the line between preemptive and preventative is far from clear.

Just look at the quote: “I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to The Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it."

How clear can you get? He did not think Nasser wanted war. The divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient. And – crucially – “He knew it and we knew it”. I repeat; Yitzhak Rabin was Israel’s Chief of Staff at the time of the attack, and went on to become Prime Minister.

10. Dayan - not directly relevant - doesn't belong here. We're not discussing anyone's mindset.

You said yourself (above) that on the question of pre-emption, it is Israel’s own beliefs which matter. To that extent I’d have thought the “mindset” of the Israelis is relevant (ie did they feel genuinely threatened and vulnerable or did they not? Dayan’s quote tends to support the latter view, given that they pursued aggressive tactics in order to expand into valuable agricultural land.)

11. Re BBC - I guess some have different tastes there.

Not sure what you mean by that. The fact is that BBC Panorama is using the phrase “Israel claimed the attack was pre-emptive” rather taking sides one way or the other.

I therefore disagree that all we have are “a few irrelevant quotes, an Egyptian government owned newspaper, and the opinions of the same old bunch who always seem to take the position that casts Israel in a bad light”.

As I wrote earlier, the article lead currently reads: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt”. What we are explicitly saying is: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched an attack on Egypt because it believed Egypt was about to attack it”.

My central question is this: Given that a real dispute exists over this crucial question, should Misplaced Pages baldly state that Israel did believe Egypt was about to attack? Wouldn’t it be far more encyclopedic to state: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it claimed was (or 'described as') a pre-emptive attack on Egypt”? 82.12.113.64 (talk) 10:59, 31 May 2010 (UTC) 82.12.113.64 (talk) 11:03, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

1. De Gaulle - things that were said more than a week before the events are of little value for this question. Surely you can provide quotes from after it (I believe his position didn't change, but for the sake of good sourcing).
2. Cattan - then please insert the right quote into the article; and while his opinion may be notable, it doesn't by itself represent a more general opinion, being so partial.
3. Fisher - I've seen plenty of discussions about how to differentiate between preventative and preemptive, but sometimes those words are used interchangeably.
4. Quigley - I don't think you understood me - please insert that quote (the relevant one) into the article, replacing the currently irrelevant one.
5. Hinnebusch, American meeting - Judging the exact requirements for a preemptive strike is not our job, and that includes points about "imminent", which is not even a well defined word. Oh, and things changed every day, including the Israelis discovering the Egyptian plan to capture Eilat, which led to the plan's cancellation (following messages between the Americans and Soviets). By the way, not wanting war, doesn't mean you won't start a war. Often the sides are drawn into war for a variety of reasons (mistakes, miscalculations, bad intelligence, honor).
6. Finkelstein - then I don't think you've read what his critics say of him. Let's find someone who wasn't repeatedly fired from a wide variety of universities.
7. Begin - "do not prove", but that doesn't mean the threat wasn't real. Israel could have chosen to wait; perhaps Egypt wouldn't attack. But due to various reasons, mostly the the heavy economic cost of keeping the army mobilized (with all the reserve troops), it had to make a choice, or pay a very heavy price if Egypt would attack when the army wasn't at the ready. This doesn't not change the preemptive designation. Going by your standard, the only way to attack preemptively, would be after the other side has already attacked...
8. Chomsky - sorry, I don't care how many books he wrote. He is not an expert in this field.
9. Rabin - same as above (Hinnebusch). The Arabs made bad choices before. Find me a quote where he directly rejects the "preemptive" designation, not one that depends on your interpretation.
10. Dayan - so, they were trying to expand into the agricultural land of Sinai? We're not discussing the many border skirmishes between the parties here, but the war.
11. BBC - what I mean is that we have two different phrasings of this in two BBC sources, so I guess the website people have a different opinion from the Panorama people.

If such a huge variety of sources use the "preemptive" designation with no problem, I see no problem using it here. Whereas on the "preemptive" side we have mainstream, objective, sources, you present partisan sources, people who, in any matter, write against Israel. The balance is clear in this matter, unless you find other mainstream sources. okedem (talk) 18:24, 1 June 2010 (UTC)

On the one hand you say a “huge variety of sources use the ‘preemptive’ designation with no problem,” on the other you say that “preemptive” and “preventive” are sometimes used interchangeably. On the latter point you are correct. As I said earlier, it is common for mainstream media to discuss the possibility of a “preemptive” Israeli or US strike on Iran, for example, yet they clearly don’t believe an attack by Iran on Israel is imminent. Given the potential for confusion, why not write “The Israelis attacked Egypt because they believed Egypt was about to launch an attack on them”. That is, after all, what we are saying when we use the word “preemptive” and makes the statement much clearer. I suspect, however, that making the meaning explicit would expose the POV nature of such a bald, unqualified statement.

It is clear that a substantial body of respected opinion does not believe the attack was preemptive. The authors do not believe Israel thought an Egyptian attack was imminent. Moreover, their opinions are supported by explicit statements and admissions made after the events by leading Israeli figures, such as Prime Ministers Begin and Rabin.

To be clear: I am not suggesting that we say the attack was not preemptive. I am merely suggesting we write that the Israelis claim it was (or describe it as) preemptive. For Misplaced Pages to baldly state it was preemptive, despite substantial opposition to that view from notable, academically-respected sources, means we are endorsing a particular point of view. That goes against the core philosophy of the encyclopedia.

I would be interested to hear the views of other editors on the matter. Phersu (talk) 02:26, 2 June 2010 (UTC)

Unqualified use of "preemptive"

Please do not revert this article to previous versions which push a particular POV on the "preemptive" issue. We should be making it more, not less neutralPhersu (talk) 19:47, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

It is neutral as both side's views are represented in a concise paragraph. Your phrasing is awkward and inaccurate.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:19, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

Just a few more points on the issue of pre-emption. It is undisputed that Tiran Straits were closed by Egypt to Israeli shipping, that UN buffer forces were expelled by Egypt from Sinai, that Egypt deployed more than 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 tanks in Sinai, that Iraqi and Egyptian forces deployed in Jordan, that war rhetoric reached fever pitch in Arab countries to the point of hysteria and that the entire Arab world, led by Egypt mobilized for war. Consensus of mainstream sources agree that attack was pre-emptive in nature despite your revisionist WP:FRINGE sources. Nonetheless, the Arab perspective is still given deference in the lede.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:30, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

For Misplaced Pages to state, without qualification, that "Israel launched a preemptive war" is not neutral, given that a substantial body of academic opinion believes that the strike was not preemptive because a) An Egyptian attack on Israel was not imminent and b) The Israeli government did not believe an Egyptian attack was imminent. The sources for this point of view are numerous, notable and well-referenced. If you find the phrasing awkward, please fix it. If there are inaccuracies, please state - specifically - what they are.

Your points regarding the Tiran Straits, UN buffer forces etc are irrelevant. We aren't here to argue the case for one side or the other, merely to ensure that the article conforms to Misplaced Pages standards and is not POV.

The sources which disagree with the "preemptive" designation cannot be dismissed as fringe, as can be seen by a reading of the earlier discussions. Here are some more:

“The Israeli decision to strike was taken not for military reasons but rather to prevent a diplomatic solution which might have entailed disadvantages for the Israeli side” – Roland Popp, The Middle East Journal, March 22, 2006.

Ersun Kurtulus of Kent University, in “a critical assessment of the widespread conceptualization of the June 1967 War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states as a pre-emptive war” argues that “the circumstances surrounding the Six Day War did not fulfil some of these necessary conditions”. Kurtulus, Ersun, The Middle East Journal, March 22, 2007

“In short, Israel was not pre-empting an impending attack when it struck the first blow on June 5, 1967. Instead, it was launching a preventive war – a war aimed at affecting the balance of power over time. “ - Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, p. 85

One of the leading proponents of the “preemptive” thesis, Michael Oren, acknowledges that the "non-preemptive" view has significant support among academics, even within Israel. Oren, who as well as being a historian is Israeli ambassador to the United States, writes: “According to this school, the Six Day War erupted not as a result of Arab belligerency but in reaction to socioeconomic factors within Israel, as a tactic by the nation’s leaders to distract attention from their failed domestic policies...”

He summarises their position as being “that Israel wanted the war, did little or nothing to avert it, or even instigated it.” ( see: http://www.azure.org.il/article.php?id=313 )

To be clear: Oren doesn’t agree with this interpretation (he very much disagrees with it) but neither does he try to minimise its significance. Indeed, he sees it as a continuation of work done by the “New Historians” of which he writes (regretfully) : “Published by leading academic presses and widely acclaimed by reviewers, the new historians’ radical interpretations have largely supplanted traditional Zionist histories.”Phersu (talk) 06:19, 21 June 2010 (UTC)

This article must strive to maintain a neutral point of view. There are numerous notable sources supporting the view that Israel's attack was preemptive, however there are also numerous notable sources supporting the opposite view, as is clear from the references given and information contained in the discussion above. Phersu (talk) 19:17, 21 June 2010 (UTC)

The consensus of mainstream sources concur that Israel’s strike was pre-emptive. For example Churchill notes that on May 26 Nasser addressed the leaders of the Pan-Arab Federation of Trade Unions and said that if war came “it will be total and the objective will be to destroy Israel. We feel confident that we can win and are ready now for war with Israel.” This was followed by an order from the Ministry of Religious Affairs that all Imams and preachers make “Jihad” the subject of their sermons, with the objective of whipping up war fever in Cairo. Churchill further notes that, “The great powers were alarmed by Nasser’s recklessness. He appeared to be losing his balance.” (Churchill, Randolph, S., Churchill, Winston S. Six Day War, Houghton Mifflen Co. (1967), p.46.)

According to Churchill Nasser himself initially may not have wanted a showdown but got carried away with events that he himself created. Citing Eban, Churchill notes that “Nasser was like a man who had gone to Monte Carlo with £100 and staked it at the roulette wheel. Each time his number came up he became more courageous – he felt that Fortune was smiling at him.” (Id p.49)

Churchill states that there were four developments that individually would have been of great concern to Israel but collectively proved to be existential threats. These were the closure of the Straits of Tiran, the deployment of 100,000 soldiers and 800 tanks in Sinai (after UNEF expulsion), the Jordanian-Egyptian military pact just days before the war and the deployment of Iraqi forces in Jordan. The confluence of these four developments left Israel with little choice but to act decisively and pre-emptively.

Churchill sums it up this way, “Israel....did not wait for her enemy to draw – she had seen the glint in Nasser’s eye.” (Id p. 75)

Incidentally, your sources are marginal at best. Finklestien is a failed academic who currently lectures on the Hezbollah/Hamas circuit. No one take him seriously either as an academic or historian. Same holds true for that linguist Chomsky whose views are extreme even for the extreme left. Quigley is hardly an objective observer/academic when it comes to his feelings about the foreign policies of western democracies. Throughout his "academic" career, he's promoted the hardcore pro-Soviet, pro-Third World viewpoint for every topic he has addressed. He is known as a virulently anti-West academic but saves most of his extreme vitriol for Israel. So it’s difficult to take these marginal, fringe sources seriously. On this basis I’m going to revert.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:15, 22 June 2010 (UTC)

You mention only three of the sources cited for the non-preemptive view – John Quigley, Norman Finkelstein and Noam Chomsky – and dismiss them all as “marginal” and “fringe”.

John B Quigley: Professor of Law at Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law – one of the leading public law schools in the United States (US News and World Report rankings, 2010). He is an internationally-renowned scholar and winner of the University’s Alumni Award for Distinguished Teaching. His book “Palestine and Israel” was described as “a classic” by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.

Norman Finkelstein: Author of five books which have been translated into more than 40 foreign editions. His work has been praised by the world’s leading Holocaust historian, Raul Hilberg; prominent Israeli historian Avi Shlaim of Oxford University and leading international academic Edward Said, as well as ABC Middle East Correspondent Charles Glass (“Anyone interested in seeing justice brought to the Middle East must read ‘Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict’”), William Quandt of Foreign Affairs (“Required reading”), The London Review of Books (“A searing but scholarly indictment”) and The Middle East Journal ("... a thought-provoking work which calls into question many of the accepted 'truths' associated with the Israel-Palestine conflict.")

Noam Chomsky: Described by the BBC as “perhaps the most feted liberal intellectual in the world”. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/3732345.stm). He is indeed a linguist; he is also a philosopher and political theorist. In fact he has written substantially more political books than he has written books on linguistics. He was voted the “leading living public intellectual” in the 2005 Global Intellectuals Poll and is described as “one of the most influential left-wing critics of American foreign policy” by the Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers. According to the Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Chomsky is the most frequently-cited person alive, and one of the eight most frequently-cited authors of all time.

You and others may disagree with these scholars (and indeed the many other sources you didn’t mention) and you may not like their politics, but “marginal” and “fringe”? I don’t think so.

The Misplaced Pages policy on neutral point of view means we must not “endorse or oppose specific viewpoints”. Where we want to state opinions, we convert them into a fact “by attributing the opinion to someone”. And we must avoid “implying that any one of the opinions is correct”.

By baldly stating that “Israel launched a preemptive attack”, we imply that the preemptive theory is correct. Many notable, respected scholars disagree with the preemptive theory. We must therefore phrase it differently. Phersu (talk) 00:56, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

You've relied on marginal sources that espouse fringe and revisionist theories. Finklestien himself acknowledges that he has no contact with the mainstream and does not publish in mainstream publications . Misplaced Pages is not a forum for failed academics and crackpot conspiracy theorists. I'm sure that if you look hard enough and overturn some large rocks, along with the creepy crawlers you'll also find those who believe that 9-11 was an "inside job" and that the CIA assassinated Kennedy. You've been provided with countless mainstream sources that state unequivocally that Israel's attack in the Six Day War was preemptive. This is the consensus view. There will always be marginal sources that take positions that are contrary to the mainstream. Sept 11, the Kennedy assassination and Roswell are just three examples where conspiracy loones have run amuck. It is certainly not appropriate to have these fringe opinions expressed prominently in the lede. Inclusion of these fringe sources diminishes the quality of Misplaced Pages as a mainstream encyclopedia. Below are just a few sources (found with ease) that state that Israel's attack exemplifies preemption. These are in addition to the countless ones that have already been provided and disregarded by you. I hope that this will put an end to this rediculous ferris wheel once and for all.

• Mark R. Amstutz writes that, "Preemptive attack is morally justified when three conditions are fulfilled: The existence of an intention to injure, the undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger, and the need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk. Since these conditions were met in Israel’s Six Day War, Israel’s preemptive attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967 was a legitimate act of self-defense." International ethics: concepts, theories, and cases in global politics

• Henry Shue and David Rodin write that the Six Day War is, "A classic example of preemptive war." Preemption: military action and moral justification

• Karl P. Mueller notes, "Classic examples of preemptive wars include the July Crisis of 1914 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel preemptively attacked Egypt…" Striking first: preemptive and preventive attack in U.S. national security

• Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond note that, “The Six Day War between Israel and alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq was an example of preemption.” And, “It exemplifies preemption.” The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:32, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

I’ll address your points one by one, your words in bold:

“You've relied on marginal sources that espouse fringe and revisionist theories. Finklestien himself acknowledges that he has no contact with the mainstream and does not publish in mainstream publications.”

When you follow the link provided, Finkelstein also states: “It is also true that my name comes up quite a lot in articles in mainstream publications; my writings on a variety of subjects are quite frequently cited.”

I decided to check this via Google Scholar (a citations index for “scholarly literature” which includes most peer-reviewed online journals in Europe and the US) and found that Finkelstein's “Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Question”, from which I took my quotes, receives 116 academic citations. For comparison, of your four sources Amstutz gets 63, Mueller gets 12 and Shue and Rodin get 2. I was unable to return a result for Kegley and Raymond. I’m not making any great claims for this – it is clearly a very blunt instrument – but at the very least it shows that Finkelstein is a notable source and frequently cited by mainstream publications.

“Misplaced Pages is not a forum for failed academics and crackpot conspiracy theorists.”

You can repeat your personal opinion as often as you like, but that doesn’t change the fact that Noam Chomsky is:

• "Perhaps the most feted liberal intellectual in the world" (BBC).
• "The leading living public intellectual" according to the 2005 Global Intellectuals Poll.
• "One of the most influential left-wing critics of American foreign policy" according to the Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers.
• The most frequently-cited person alive according to the Arts and Humanities Citation Index.

“I'm sure that if you look hard enough and overturn some large rocks, along with the creepy crawlers you'll also find those who believe that 9-11 was an "inside job" and that the CIA assassinated Kennedy.”

I’m sure I will, but what does that have to do with the issue under discussion?

“You've been provided with countless mainstream sources that state unequivocally that Israel's attack in the Six Day War was preemptive. This is the consensus view. There will always be marginal sources that take positions that are contrary to the mainstream. Sept 11, the Kennedy assassination and Roswell are just three examples where conspiracy loones have run amuck. It is certainly not appropriate to have these fringe opinions expressed prominently in the lede. Inclusion of these fringe sources diminishes the quality of Misplaced Pages as a mainstream encyclopedia. Below are just a few sources (found with ease) that state that Israel's attack exemplifies preemption. These are in addition to the countless ones that have already been provided and disregarded by you. I hope that this will put an end to this rediculous ferris wheel once and for all.”

To repeat, for Israel’s strike to be preemptive (as opposed to preventive) it must have believed that an attack by Egypt was imminent. There are many notable academic sources who believe that to be true. There are also many notable academic sources who believe it is not true. In addition, we have the words of two Israeli Prime Ministers:

Yitzhak Rabin (who served as Israel’s Chief of General Staff during the War) stated: “"I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it."

Menachem Begin stated: “The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him."

I am sure you can find countless examples where “conspiracy loones have run amuck.” I suggest that this is, self-evidently, not one of those cases. To be clear, I am not arguing that Misplaced Pages should state that the attack was NOT preemptive. I am arguing that, as per Misplaced Pages policy on neutral point of view, we should not “endorse or oppose specific viewpoints” and should avoid “implying that any one of the opinions is correct”Phersu (talk) 21:31, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

I find Jiujitsuguy's extensive sourcing overwhelmingly convincing and conclusive. There is variety among the many sources, yet a clear consensus for use of "preemptive". Neutrality does not demand ditching this consensus because there are a small number of skeptics or detractors with opposing views, especially as the qualifications of some of those authors are highly questionable. To do so would likely violate WP:UNDUE. The existence of opposing views could perhaps be given more prominent—but brief—mention, but preemptive needs and deserves no qualification. Hertz1888 (talk) 03:32, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

• Former good article nominees
• Misplaced Pages articles under general sanctions
• All unassessed articles
• B-Class Syria articles
• High-importance Syria articles
• WikiProject Syria articles
• B-Class Israel-related articles
• High-importance Israel-related articles
• WikiProject Israel articles
• WikiProject templates with unknown parameters
• B-Class Palestine-related articles
• Top-importance Palestine-related articles
• WikiProject Palestine articles
• B-Class Arab world articles
• High-importance Arab world articles
• WikiProject Arab world articles
• Unassessed Jewish history-related articles
• Unknown-importance Jewish history-related articles
• WikiProject Jewish history articles
• B-Class Egypt articles
• Mid-importance Egypt articles
• WikiProject Egypt articles
• B-Class Jordan articles
• High-importance Jordan articles
• WikiProject Jordan articles
• B-Class military history articles
• B-Class Middle Eastern military history articles
• Middle Eastern military history task force articles
• B-Class Lebanon articles
• Mid-importance Lebanon articles
• WikiProject Lebanon articles
• Selected anniversaries (June 2004)
• Selected anniversaries (June 2005)
• Selected anniversaries (June 2006)