Kiev offensive (1920): Difference between revisions

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	== Before the Battle ==		== Before the Battle ==
			On ] Poland signed a ] with the exiled Ukrainian government of ], who ended up in the Polish exile after the multiple military defeats, from the Bolshevik forces in central Ukraine and from the Polish army who succeeded in gaining control of the largely ethnically Ukrainian territories in ] and ]. In exchange for the recognition of Polish territorial gains with the border along the ], Petliura was promised the military help in regaining the control of Kiev for his government that was supposed to join the Polish-dominated ] Federation''.

		⚫	The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the ] in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign had to be abandoned due to lack of time. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war and the Ukrainian Army never exceeded two divisions largely due to the ambivalent attitude of Ukrainians towards the alliance.
	On ] Poland signed a ] with the ] of ], who had found ] in Poland after the defeat of his government from the Bolsheviks' hands. The treaty defined the borders between Poland and Ukraine, recognized each country's independence and guaranteed respecting cultural and ethnic minority rights within each country. It was followed by a Polish-Ukrainian ] signed on ].
	On the same day Poland and ] begun the ''Kiev Operation'', aimed at creating an independent Ukraine, possibly intended to become a member of ]'s ''] Federation''.

⚫	The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the ] in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign had to be abandoned due to lack of time. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war and the Ukrainian Army never exceeded two divisions.

	The plan of ''Kiev Operation'' was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Polish southern flank and establish a friendly government in Ukraine. The main task of the advancing Polish armies was to outflank the Bolsheviks and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the South, the Polish General Staff planned a speedy withdrawal of the 3rd Army and strengthening of the northern front where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. As is often the case, the actual course of events was different than envisioned.		The plan of ''Kiev Operation'' was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Polish southern flank and establish a friendly government in Ukraine. The main task of the advancing Polish armies was to outflank the Bolsheviks and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the South, the Polish General Staff planned a speedy withdrawal of the 3rd Army and strengthening of the northern front where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. As is often the case, the actual course of events was different than envisioned.
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	== Bolshevik counterattack ==		== Bolshevik counterattack ==
		⚫	The Polish-Ukrainian military thrust soon met with ] ]. On ], ], the Polish-Ukrainian forces were engaged for the first time by ] and his famous ]. Two days later, Budionny's cavalry, with two major units from the Russian 12th Army, opened an assault on the Polish forces centered around Kiev. After a week of heavy fighting south of the city, the Russian assault was repulsed and the front line restored. On ], ], another Russian assault began north of the city.

		⚫	Meanwhile Polish ] was aware of Russian preparations for an all-out effort to repulse the invasion, and Polish commander-in-chief ] ordered the commander of Polish forces on the Ukrainian Front, General ], to prepare for a strategic withdrawal. From the perspective of staff maps in ], it was clear that the renascent Polish Army was too weak to withstand both the offensive in the southern, Ukrainian sector and the spring offensive being prepared by the Bolsheviks in ] and north of the ]. However, the commander of the Polish 3rd Army in the vicinity of Kiev, General ], was seeking a way to repulse the upcoming Russian assault rather than withdraw, and even proposed to the ] regrouping all his forces at ] and defending there until relieved. His plan was turned down by Piłsudski, who knew that no relief force could be prepared any time soon. He repeated his order to withdraw the Polish 3rd and 6th Armies from the Kiev area.
⚫	The Polish-Ukrainian military thrust soon met with ] ]. On ], ], the Polish-Ukrainian forces were engaged for the first time by ] and his famous ]. Two days later, Budionny's cavalry, with two major units from the Russian 12th Army, opened an assault on the Polish forces centered around Kiev. After a week of heavy fighting south of the city, the Russian assault was repulsed and the front line restored. On ], ], another Russian assault began north of the city.

			General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories in the areas of ], where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the ], which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its ] regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's ] cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on ] and on ] Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale,{{fact}} the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On ] Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets. Before withdrawal from Kiev the Polish army destroyed much of its infrastructure including the objects that served purely civilian needs thus making a city practically unlivable. The Polish army destroyed the city electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations<!--info from Meltyukhov below---> and a unique for its time 770 metres long chain bridge across the ], one of the largest and most beautiful bridges in Europe and the source of pride for the city. The Polish army also heavily damaged the Kiev's ], one of three greatest ] cathedrals built in the 19th century decorated with priceless ]'s frescoes.<!--again from Meltyukhov--->
⚫	Meanwhile Polish ] was aware of Russian preparations for an all-out ~~attack~~ on ~~Poland~~, and Polish commander-in-chief ] ordered the commander of Polish forces on the Ukrainian Front, General ], to prepare for a strategic withdrawal. From the perspective of staff maps in ], it was clear that the renascent Polish Army was too weak to withstand both the offensive in the southern, Ukrainian sector and the spring offensive being prepared by the Bolsheviks in ] and north of the ]. However, the commander of the Polish 3rd Army in the vicinity of Kiev, General ], was seeking a way to repulse the upcoming Russian assault rather than withdraw, and even proposed to the ] regrouping all his forces at ] and defending there until relieved. His plan was turned down by Piłsudski, who knew that no relief force could be prepared any time soon. He repeated his order to withdraw the Polish 3rd and 6th Armies from the Kiev area.

	General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories in the areas of ], where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the ], which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its ] regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's ] cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on ] and on ] Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale, the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On ] Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets. As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the ] during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of ].		As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the ] during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of ].

	== Opposing forces ==		== Opposing forces ==
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	== Notes ==		== Notes ==
	# {{note\|myref-25}} The outcome of the Polish and Bolshevik operations in Ukraine is sometimes disputed. Neither the Poles nor the Russians forced their opponent to fight a major battle or outflanked his forces and destroyed them, which was the main military goal of operations for both sides. However, the Polish retreat from ] marked an end to ]'s political plans to create a "] ~~federation~~." As such, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski.		# {{note\|myref-25}} The outcome of the Polish and Bolshevik operations in Ukraine is sometimes disputed. Neither the Poles nor the Russians forced their opponent to fight a major battle or outflanked his forces and destroyed them, which was the main military goal of operations for both sides. However, the Polish retreat from ] marked an end to ]'s political plans to create a pro-Polish government in Kiev. As such, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski.

	== See also ==		== See also ==
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	* "Dramas of Ukrainian-Polish Brotherhood" (]), a review in '']'' (Mirror Weekly), March 13-19, 1999, available .		* "Dramas of Ukrainian-Polish Brotherhood" (]), a review in '']'' (Mirror Weekly), March 13-19, 1999, available .
	* {{cite book		* {{cite book
	\| author=Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Mel'tiuhov)		\| author=Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Mel'tiuhov)
	\| title=Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939)		\| title=Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939)
	\| publisher= Moscow: Вече (Veche)		\| publisher= Moscow: Вече (Veche)
	\| year = 2001		\| year = 2001
	\| id = ISBN 5-699-07637-9		\| id = ISBN 5-699-07637-9
	\| url = http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/index.html }} (in Russian).		\| url = http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov2/index.html }} (in Russian).

	]		]

Revision as of 02:46, 4 March 2006

Kiev Offensive (1920)

Part of Polish-Soviet War

Polish bomber in Kiev
Polish Breguet 14 operating from Kiev airfield

Date	April-June, 1920
Location	Ukraine
Result	Polish defeat

Belligerents

Poland

Soviet Russia

Commanders and leaders

Józef Piłsudski,
Edward Rydz-Śmigły

Aleksandr Yegorov, Semyon Budionny

Strength

8 Infantry Divisions, 1 Cavalry Division, 2 understrength Ukrainian divisions

8 Infantry Divisions, 2 Cavalry Divisions, later also 1st Cavalry Army

Casualties and losses

Polish–Soviet War

1919
List of battles
Soviet westward offensive 1st Vilnius Bereza Kartuska Lida Pińsk 2nd Vilnius Minsk Sieliszcze Berezina Byteń
1920
Daugavpils Latyczów Koziatyn Kiev offensive Berezina Wołodarka Bystrzyk Grodno Boryspol Głębokie Dęblin and Mińsk Mazowiecki Nasielsk Radzymin Ossów Warsaw Cyców Lwów Zadwórze Białystok Komarów Kobryń Dytiatyn Niemen River

The Kiev Offensive (or Kiev Operation) was a Piłsudski-led attempt by the Second Polish Republic to wrest control of central and eastern Ukraine, or of a substantial part of it, from warring Ukrainian factions and Soviet Russia. The stated goal of the operation was to create an independent Ukraine allied with Poland, though many ethnic Ukrainians viewed it as a Polish effort to seize Ukraine and rallied to fight in the ranks of the Red Army. An initial major military operation in the Polish-Soviet War, this campaign was conducted from April to June 1920 by the Polish Army in alliance with Ukrainian People's Republic forces under the nationalist leader Symon Petliura, opposed by the Bolshevik-led Red Army, likewise with Ukrainian participation.

Initially successful for the Polish army, which captured Kiev in May, 1920, the campaign was dramatically reversed, due partly to the ambivalence of the Ukrainian population, but mainly due to mounting pressure from a Red Army counteroffensive. Polish forces and Petlyura's Ukrainians were forced into retreat.

Before the Battle

On April 21 Poland signed a treaty with the exiled Ukrainian government of Symon Petliura, who ended up in the Polish exile after the multiple military defeats, from the Bolshevik forces in central Ukraine and from the Polish army who succeeded in gaining control of the largely ethnically Ukrainian territories in Volhynia and Galicia. In exchange for the recognition of Polish territorial gains with the border along the Zbruch river, Petliura was promised the military help in regaining the control of Kiev for his government that was supposed to join the Polish-dominated Międzymorze Federation.

The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the Soviets in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign had to be abandoned due to lack of time. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war and the Ukrainian Army never exceeded two divisions largely due to the ambivalent attitude of Ukrainians towards the alliance.

The plan of Kiev Operation was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Polish southern flank and establish a friendly government in Ukraine. The main task of the advancing Polish armies was to outflank the Bolsheviks and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the South, the Polish General Staff planned a speedy withdrawal of the 3rd Army and strengthening of the northern front where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. As is often the case, the actual course of events was different than envisioned.

Polish assault

The 3rd Army easily won border clashes with the Soviets and the combined Polish-Ukrainian forces captured Kiev on May 7, encountering only token resistance. However the Bolshevik army, although badly mauled, avoided total destruction. The Polish offensive stopped at Kiev and only a small bridgehead was established on the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

Bolshevik counterattack

The Polish-Ukrainian military thrust soon met with Red Army counterattack. On May 24, 1920, the Polish-Ukrainian forces were engaged for the first time by Semyon Budionny and his famous First Cavalry Army. Two days later, Budionny's cavalry, with two major units from the Russian 12th Army, opened an assault on the Polish forces centered around Kiev. After a week of heavy fighting south of the city, the Russian assault was repulsed and the front line restored. On June 3, 1920, another Russian assault began north of the city.

Meanwhile Polish military intelligence was aware of Russian preparations for an all-out effort to repulse the invasion, and Polish commander-in-chief Józef Piłsudski ordered the commander of Polish forces on the Ukrainian Front, General Antoni Listowski, to prepare for a strategic withdrawal. From the perspective of staff maps in Warsaw, it was clear that the renascent Polish Army was too weak to withstand both the offensive in the southern, Ukrainian sector and the spring offensive being prepared by the Bolsheviks in Belarus and north of the Pripyat Marshes. However, the commander of the Polish 3rd Army in the vicinity of Kiev, General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, was seeking a way to repulse the upcoming Russian assault rather than withdraw, and even proposed to the General Staff regrouping all his forces at Kiev and defending there until relieved. His plan was turned down by Piłsudski, who knew that no relief force could be prepared any time soon. He repeated his order to withdraw the Polish 3rd and 6th Armies from the Kiev area.

General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories in the areas of Bila Tserkva, where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the Battle of Wołodarka, which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its cossack regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's cossack cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on June 5th and on June 10th Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale, the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On June 13 Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets. Before withdrawal from Kiev the Polish army destroyed much of its infrastructure including the objects that served purely civilian needs thus making a city practically unlivable. The Polish army destroyed the city electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations and a unique for its time 770 metres long chain bridge across the Dnieper, one of the largest and most beautiful bridges in Europe and the source of pride for the city. The Polish army also heavily damaged the Kiev's St. Volodymyr's Cathedral, one of three greatest Orthodox cathedrals built in the 19th century decorated with priceless Vasnetsov's frescoes.

As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the Auta River during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of Lwów.

Opposing forces

The following is the Order of Battle of Polish and Bolshevik forces taking part in the struggles in Ukraine, as of April 25, 1920. It should be noted that the command structure of both sides changed during the operation. Also, the Russian forces were joined by Budennyi's 1st Cavalry Army in the latter part of the operation, while a large part of the Polish forces was withdrawn by then to Belarus.

Among Polish Airforce was the 7th Kościuszko Squadron.

Poles/Ukrainians

Polish Army	Unit	Commander
General Command of the Polish Army - Gen. Józef Piłsudski
supporting armies
6th Army Wacław Iwaszkiewicz	5th Infantry	Waclaw Jędrzejewski
	12th Infantry	Marian Żegota-Januszajtis
	18th Infantry	Franciszek Krajowski
2nd Army Antoni Listowski	13th Infantry	Franciszek Paulik
	15th Infantry	Antoni Jasieński
	6th Ukrainian	Marko Bezruchko
Assault Group - Józef Piłsudski
Assault Group Józef Piłsudski	4th Infantry	Leonard Skierski
Assault Group Józef Piłsudski	Cavalry Division	Jan Romer
Rybak Operational Group Józef Rybak	1st Mountain Bde	Stanisław Wróblewski
Rybak Operational Group Józef Rybak	7th Cavalry Bde	Aleksander Romanowicz
Rydz-Śmigły Operational Group Edward Rydz-Śmigły	1st Legions	Edward Rydz-Śmigły
	7th Infantry	Eugeniusz Pogorzelski
	3rd Cavalry Bde	Jerzy Sawicki

Bolsheviks

Red Army	Unit	Remarks
South-Western Front - Gen. Aleksandr Yegorov
12th Army Miezheninov	7th Rifle
	44th Rifle
	47th Rifle
	58th Rifle
	17th Cavalry Division
14th Army Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich	21st Rifle
	41st Rifle
	45th Rifle
	60th Rifle
	8th Cavalry Division
13th Army		unknown composition

Notes

The outcome of the Polish and Bolshevik operations in Ukraine is sometimes disputed. Neither the Poles nor the Russians forced their opponent to fight a major battle or outflanked his forces and destroyed them, which was the main military goal of operations for both sides. However, the Polish retreat from Kiev marked an end to Józef Piłsudski's political plans to create a pro-Polish government in Kiev. As such, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski.

References

Lech Wyszczelski (1999). Kijów 1920. Warsaw: Bellona. ISBN 8311089639.
Norman Davies (2003). White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0712606947.
Józef Piłsudski (1937–1991). Pisma zbiorowe (Collected Works). Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza (reprint). ISBN 8303030590. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
Mikhail Tukhachevski (1989). Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7–10, 1923 in: Pochód za Wisłę. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie. ISBN 8321807771.
Janusz Cisek (1990). Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku. Wybór dokumentów. (Neighbours Attitude Towards the War of 1920. A collection of documents, English summary). London: Polish Cultural Foundation Ltd. ISBN 085065212X.

Online references

"Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 3-9, 2001, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
"Dramas of Ukrainian-Polish Brotherhood" (documentary film), a review in Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), March 13-19, 1999, available online (in Russian).
Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Mel'tiuhov) (2001). Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939). Moscow: Вече (Veche). ISBN 5-699-07637-9. (in Russian).

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