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Xa Loi Pagoda raids
Xa Loi Pagoda, the focal point of the attacks
Location	Many Buddhist temples across South Vietnam, most notably Xa Loi Pagoda in Saigon.
Date	August 21, 1963
Target	Buddhist protestors
Attack type	Shootings, beatings, temple demolitions
Deaths	Estimates range up to hundreds
Injured	Hundreds
Perpetrators	Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces under orders from Ngo Dinh Nhu

The Xa Loi Pagoda raids were a series of synchronized attacks on various Buddhist pagodas in the major cities of South Vietnam shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963. The raids were executed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces under Colonel Le Quang Tung, and combat police, both of which took their orders directly from Ngo Dinh Nhu, the younger brother of the Roman Catholic President Ngo Dinh Diem. The Xa Loi Pagoda, the largest in the South Vietnamese capital, Saigon, was the most prominent of the raided temples. Over 1,400 Buddhists were arrested, and estimates of the death toll and missing ranged up to the hundreds.

In response to the Hue Vesak shootings and a ban on the Buddhist flag in early May, South Vietnam's Buddhist majority rose in widespread civil disobedience and protest against the religious bias and discrimination of the Catholic-dominated Diem government. Buddhist temples in major cities, most prominently the Xa Loi Pagoda, became focal points for protesters and assembly points for Buddhist monks from rural areas.

In August, several Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) generals proposed the imposition of martial law, ostensibly to break up the demonstrations, but in reality to prepare for a military coup. However, Nhu—who was already looking to arrest Buddhist leaders and crush the protest movement—used the opportunity to pre-empt the generals and embarrass them. He disguised Tung's Special Forces in army uniforms and used them to attack the Buddhists, thereby causing the general public and South Vietnam's US allies to blame the army, diminishing the generals' reputations and ability to act as future national leaders.

Soon after midnight on August 21, Nhu's men attacked the pagodas using automatic firearms, grenades, battering rams and explosives, causing widespread damage. Some religious objects were destroyed, including a statue of Gautama Buddha in Tu Dam Pagoda in Hue; the temple was partially leveled by explosives. The temples were looted and vandalized, with the remains of self-immolated Buddhist monks confiscated, and in Hue, violent street battles erupted between government forces and rioting pro-Buddhist, anti-Diem civilians.

At first, the Ngo family claimed that the army had carried out the raids, something their US allies initially believed. However, this was later debunked, and the incident prompted the United States to turn against the regime and begin exploring alternative leadership options, eventually leading to Diem's overthrow in a coup. In South Vietnam itself, the raids stoked widespread anger. Several high-ranking public servants resigned, and university and high school students boycotted classes and staged riotous demonstrations, resulting in further mass incarcerations. As most of the students were from middle-class children from public service and military families, the arrests caused further upset among the Ngo family's power base.

Background

In South Vietnam, a country where the Buddhist majority was estimated to comprise between 70 and 90 percent of the population in 1963, President Ngo Dinh Diem's pro-Catholic policies antagonized many Buddhists. A member of the Catholic minority, his government was regarded as being biased towards Catholics in public service and military promotions, as well as in the allocation of land, business favors and tax concessions. Diem once told a high-ranking officer, forgetting that he was a Buddhist, "Put your Catholic officers in sensitive places. They can be trusted." Many officers in the ARVN converted to Catholicism in the belief that their career prospects depended on it, and many were refused promotion if they did not do so. Additionally, the distribution of firearms to village self-defense militias intended to repel Vietcong guerrillas was done so that weapons were only given to Catholics. Some Catholic priests ran private armies, and in some areas forced conversions, looting, shelling and demolition of pagodas occurred. Some Buddhist villages converted en masse to receive aid or avoid being forcibly resettled by Diem's regime.

The Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country, and the "private" status that was imposed on Buddhism by the French, which required official permission to conduct public activities, was not repealed by Diem. The land owned by the church was exempt from land reform, and Catholics were also de facto exempt from the corvée labor that the government obliged all other citizens to perform; public spending was disproportionately distributed to Catholic majority villages. Under Diem, the Catholic Church enjoyed special exemptions in property acquisition, and in 1959, he dedicated the country to the Virgin Mary. The Vatican flag was regularly flown at major public events in South Vietnam.

A rarely enforced 1958 law—known as Decree Number 10—was invoked in May 1963 to prohibit the display of religious flags. This disallowed the flying of the Buddhist flag on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. The application of the law caused indignation among Buddhists on the eve of the most important religious festival of the year, as a week earlier Catholics had been encouraged to display Vatican flags at a government-sponsored celebration for Diem's brother, Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, the most senior Catholic cleric in the country. On May 8, in Hue, a crowd of Buddhists protested against the ban on the Buddhist flag. The police and army broke up the demonstration by firing guns at and throwing grenades into the gathering, leaving nine dead.

Diem's denial of governmental responsibility for the incident—he instead blamed the Vietcong—led to growing discontent among the Buddhist majority. The incident spurred a protest movement against the religious discrimination of the Roman Catholic-dominated Diem regime, resulting in widespread and large-scale civil disobedience among the South Vietnamese public, persisting throughout May and June. This period of political instability was known as the Buddhist crisis. The objective of the protests was to have Decree Number 10 repealed, and to force Diem to implement religious equality.

On June 11, the Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc self-immolated in downtown Saigon. Images were shown by news outlets across the world, embarrassing Diem's government and bringing negative global attention. A few days later, under mounting American pressure, Diem signed the Joint Communique with senior Buddhist leaders, making various concessions to the Buddhists, who in turn agreed to stop the civil unrest and return to normal life.

Neither the Ngo family nor the Buddhists were happy with the agreement however, and it failed to solve the dispute. Both sides accused the other of failing to uphold their obligations; the government accused the Buddhists of continuing to vilify them in demonstrations, while the Buddhists accused Diem of stalling and not acting on his commitments to religious reform, and continuing to detain arrested Buddhist dissidents. The demonstrations and tension continued throughout July and August, with more self-immolations and an altercation (known as the Double Seven Day scuffle) between secret police and American journalists reporting on a Buddhist protest.

Xa Loi Pagoda

The hub of Buddhist activism in Saigon was Xa Loi Pagoda. Built in the late 1950s, it was the largest Buddhist temple in the capital and was located in the city center. Many monks from outside Saigon—including prominent Buddhist leaders—had congregated at Xa Loi since the dispute began and it was used as a venue for press conferences, media interviews, publication of pamphlets and to plan and organize mass demonstrations.

At the time, Ngo Dinh Nhu was known to favor a stronger line against the Buddhists. Nhu was the younger brother of President Diem and his main confidant, and was regarded as the real power behind the Ngo family's rule. Nhu had made statements calling for the suppression of the protests through his English language newspaper, the Times of Vietnam. There were persistent reports that Nhu was seeking to usurp power from his elder brother and to attack the Buddhists. Nick Turner of Reuters approached Nhu and interviewed him about these rumors. Nhu said that if the Buddhist crisis was not resolved, he would stage a coup, demolish Xa Loi in two hours, and head a new anti-Buddhist government. The news was promptly published, but the American Embassy was unconvinced as to whether Nhu was serious.

In the meantime, Nhu prepared the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces commanded by Colonel Le Quang Tung—who took his orders directly from Nhu and not the senior generals—for the raids. An American-trained outfit created to fight the Vietcong, the Special Forces were better equipped, trained and paid than the regular army, but were used by the Ngo family as a private army for repressing dissidents and protecting their rule, rather than fighting for the national interest. As such, they spent the majority of their time in Saigon warding off coup attempts. Tung brought two more Special Forces battalions into Saigon, meaning that a total of four were in the capital.

On Sunday, August 18, the Buddhists staged a mass protest at Xa Loi, attracting around 15,000 people, undeterred by rain. The attendance was approximately three times higher than that at the previous Sunday's rally. The event lasted for several hours, as speeches by the monks interspersed religious ceremonies. A Vietnamese journalist said that it was the only emotional public gathering in South Vietnam since Diem's rise to power almost a decade earlier. David Halberstam of The New York Times speculated that by not exploiting the large crowd by staging a protest march towards Gia Long Palace or other government buildings, the Buddhists were saving their biggest demonstration for the scheduled arrival of new US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. in the following week. As a government attack on Xa Loi was anticipated, Halberstam concluded that the Buddhists were playing "a fast and dangerous game". He wrote that "the Buddhists themselves appeared to be at least as much aware of all the developments, and their protest seemed to have a mounting intensity".

Planning

On the evening of August 18, ten senior ARVN generals met to discuss the situation regarding the Buddhist unrest and decided that martial law was needed. They wanted to disperse the monks who had gathered in Saigon and other regional cities and return them to their original pagodas in the rural areas.

Nhu summoned 7 of the 10 generals to Gia Long Palace on August 20 for consultations. They presented their request for martial law and discussed how to disband the groups of monks and their supporters from the temples in Saigon. Nhu sent the generals to see Diem. The president listened to the group of seven, led by General Tran Van Don. The group also included Army Chief General Tran Thien Khiem and General Nguyen Khanh, commander of the II Corps in the central highlands. Khiem and Khanh were two of the officers who were responsible for helping to put down the attempted coup against Diem in 1960. Also present was General Le Van Kim, head of the military academy and Don's brother-in-law, General Do Cao Tri, commander of I Corps, which oversaw the northernmost region around Hue. The final two men present were favorites of the Diem regime. General Ton That Dinh, the brash paratrooper who was South Vietnam's youngest ever general, commanded the III Corps surrounding Saigon. General Huynh Van Cao was the commander of the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta and the only one of the septet that was not involved in plotting against Diem. Dinh and Cao controlled the two corps regions closest to Saigon and therefore the two areas most crucial in the success or failure of a coup. Cao had used the Seventh Division of his IV Corps to storm the capital in 1960 to save Diem.

Don claimed that communists had infiltrated the monks at Xa Loi and warned that ARVN morale was deteriorating because of the civil unrest and consequent disruption of the war effort. He claimed that it was possible that the Buddhists could assemble a crowd to march on Gia Long Palace. Hearing this, Diem agreed to declare martial law effective on the next day, without consulting his cabinet, and troops were ordered into Saigon to occupy strategic points. Don was appointed as the acting Chief of the Armed Forces in place of General Le Van Ty, who was terminally ill with cancer and having medical treatment abroad. Don noted that Diem was apparently concerned for the welfare of the monks, telling the generals that he did not want any of them hurt. The martial law orders were then signed and authorized by Don.

The real purpose of Don asking for martial law was to maneuver troops in readiness for a coup, and he had no concrete plans to send the regular army into the pagodas. However, Nhu sidestepped him and took the opportunity to discredit the army by using Tung's Special Forces and the combat police to attack the pagodas. With the action occurring in his military region, Dinh, the officer most trusted by the Ngo family, was the only general who was given advance notice of the raids.

With the approval of Diem, Nhu used the declaration of martial law to order armed men into the Buddhist pagodas. Nhu purposely chose a time when the American Embassy was leaderless. Frederick Nolting had returned to the United States and his successor Lodge was yet to arrive. As the high command of the ARVN worked closely with American military advisers deployed in the country, Nhu used the combat police and Tung's Special Forces, who took their orders directly from him. The men were dressed in standard army uniforms, such as paratroop attire, to frame the regulars for the raids. Nhu's motive was to avoid responsibility for a violent operation—which would anger the Vietnamese public and the American leadership. In falsely implicating the army in the attacks, Nhu intended to dent the confidence of the Vietnamese populace and the Americans in the senior officers who were plotting against him. Nhu hoped that the Buddhist majority and the Americans would blame the army for the raids and become less inclined to support a coup by the generals. In the past, Nhu's Machiavellian tactics in playing the generals against one another had kept conspirators off-balance and thwarted coup attempts. The raids were not unexpected, as the Buddhists had prepared themselves for the attacks, as had journalists, who were watching military installations for signs of movement.

Raids

Saigon

The Buddhists in Saigon were aware that a raid on the pagodas was imminent. Buddhist relatives of Special Forces and combat police personnel had tipped off the monks, and Buddhists who lived near pagodas had observed them move into the region in the lead-up. American journalists were tipped off and traveled through Saigon to visit the pagodas ahead of the raids. The pagodas had been locked by the monks in preparation for the attacks and the doors were barricaded with furniture and reinforced by nailing wooden planks across them. The monks told members of the US press corps in Saigon that the raids were coming, allowing them to be more prepared for the event than the US embassy.

In the afternoon before the raids, trucks filled with soldiers headed past the offices of media outlets—from where the journalists saw them—destined for An Quang Pagoda. More troops were seen congregating at the police headquarters, ready to board trucks moving towards Xa Loi Pagoda. The American-made trucks had been provided as part of the US military aid program for South Vietnam. Late at night, the convoys arrived and surrounded Xa Loi from several sides, causing a traffic jam in the city center. Several thousand personnel were estimated to have been present. Journalists were informed as soon as the attacks began, even as Nhu's men cut communications lines almost immediately, and rushed to Xa Loi.

Squads of Special Forces and combat police flattened the gates and smashed their way into the pagoda at around 00:20 on August 21, as Xa Loi's brass gong was struck to signal the attack. Nhu's men were armed with pistols, submachine guns, carbines, shotguns, grenades and tear gas. The red-bereted Special Forces were joined by truckloads of steel-helmeted combat police in army camouflage uniforms. Two of Nhu's senior aides were seen outside Xa Loi directing the operation, while Nhu and his wife, Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, watched the action from a nearby tank. Monks and nuns who barricaded themselves behind wooden shields were attacked with rifle butts and bayonets. The sound of the pagoda's gong was largely masked by that of automatic weapons fire, exploding grenades, battering rams, shattering glass and human screaming. The military personnel shouted as they attacked, as did the occupants, in fear.

Tung's men charged forward in a V-shaped riot formation. According to Halberstam, "they pranced into the pagoda, looking something like a smart football team coming up to the line of scrimmage". In the end, it took around two hours to complete the raids because many of the occupants had entrenched themselves inside the various rooms in anticipation of the attacks and doors had to be unhinged to reach them. According to journalist Neil Sheehan, who was at the scene, "The raid on Xa Loi, like those on the pagodas elsewhere in South Vietnam, was flawlessly executed. It reminded me of a scene from a movie of the French Resistance—the scene when the Gestapo arrive at the Resistance hideout in Paris. William Prochnau said that "Using the elite guard against the Buddhists was analogous to using Green Berets to put down Negro protests at home. It was outrageous."

One monk was thrown from a balcony down to the courtyard six meters below. Nhu's men vandalized the main altar and confiscated the intact charred heart of Thich Quang Duc, which had failed to burn during his re-cremation. However, some of the Buddhists were able to flee the pagoda with a receptacle containing his ashes. Two monks jumped the back wall of Xa Loi to enter the grounds of the adjoining United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission, where they were given asylum, despite the presence of troops behind the pagoda walls who opened fire with automatic weapons on any monks who tried to flee by jumping the fence.

Thich Tinh Khiet, the 80-year-old Buddhist patriarch, was seized and taken to a military hospital on the outskirts of Saigon. As commander of the III Corps, General Dinh soon announced military control over Saigon, canceling all commercial flights into the city and instituting press censorship. Later, Thich Quang Do, one of leading arrested monks, who later went on to become one of the leaders of the now-banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam, explained the protest strategy. After being released following the deposal of Diem, he was asked why the Buddhist leaders had not fled to avoid arrest. He said that "We had done nothing wrong; therefore we could not flee. If we had, it would have been an admission that we were guilty."

Hue

The violence was worse in Hue, where the approach of government forces was met by the beating of Buddhist drums and cymbals to alert the populace. The townsfolk left their homes in the middle of the night in an attempt to defend the city's pagodas. At Tu Dam Pagoda, which was the temple of Buddhist protest leader Thich Tri Quang, monks attempted to burn the coffin of a monk who had self-immolated recently. Government soldiers, firing M1 rifles, overran the pagoda and confiscated the coffin. They also demolished a statue of Gautama Buddha and looted and vandalized the pagoda. They then set off an explosion, leveling much of the pagoda. Many Buddhists were shot or clubbed to death.

The most determined resistance to the Diem regime occurred outside the Dieu De Pagoda. As troops attempted to stretch a barbed wire barricade across a bridge leading to the pagoda, the crowd tore it down with their bare hands. The protestors then fought the heavily armed military personnel with rocks, sticks and their bare fists, throwing back the tear gas grenades that were fired at them. After a five-hour battle, the military finally won control of the bridge by driving armored cars through the angry crowd at sunrise. The defense of the bridge and Dieu De left an estimated 30 dead and 200 wounded.

Ten truckloads of bridge defenders were taken to jail and an estimated 500 people were arrested in the city. Seventeen of the 47 professors at Hue University, who had resigned earlier in the week in protest against the dismissal of the rector Cao Van Luan, a Catholic priest and opponent of Diem's brother Archbishop Thuc were also arrested. The raids were repeated in cities and towns across the country. The total number of dead and disappeared was never confirmed, but estimates range up to several hundred. At least 1,400 were arrested.

US reaction and sanctuary for monks

The United States became immediately embroiled in the attacks following the escape of the two monks over the back wall of Xa Loi Pagoda into the adjacent USAID compound. Saigon's police chief, disguised as a member of Nhu's Republican Youth, cordoned off the building. He ordered all Vietnamese inside to leave the area and threatened to storm the building when the Americans denied him entry. Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau rushed to the scene to stop any physical confrontation, but demanded the Americans turn over the monks. William Trueheart, the deputy of the recently relieved US ambassador Nolting, arrived at the building. As the leading American diplomat in Vietnam in the transition period between ambassadors, Trueheart refused to take action until he received instructions from Washington, but warned Mau against violating the diplomatic immunity of the USAID offices. Trueheart knew that handing over the monks would imply American approval of the regime's action. The confrontation soon died down, and the US State Department ordered Trueheart not to release the two monks and to regard the USAID building as being equivalent to the embassy. More monks went on to find sanctuary in the US embassy, which became known as the "Buddhist Hilton".

Lodge was in Honolulu for last minute briefings with Nolting when news filtered through of the pagoda raids. He was given directions to proceed directly to Saigon, and arrived after sunset on August 22. In the meantime, the State Department denounced the raids as a "direct violation by the Vietnamese government of assurances that it was pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the Buddhists".

On August 23, Lodge's first day in Saigon, he visited the two monks who had taken refuge in the USAID building, and ordered that vegetarian food be made available for them. The meeting was a means of showing where American government policy stood on the attacks against the Buddhists.

Diem reaction

At 06:00 on August 21, President Ngo Dinh Diem broadcast a statement on Radio Saigon in which he said: "under Article 44 of the constitution, I declare a state of siege throughout the national territory. I confer upon the Army of the Republic of Vietnam the responsibility to restore security and public order so that the state may be protected, Communism defeated, freedom secured, and democracy achieved." Under martial law, the army was given blanket search-and-arrest powers and was empowered to ban all public gatherings, enforce a curfew, restrict press freedom and stop the circulation of all "printed material and other documents harmful to public order and security". The military were given orders to shoot anybody who violated the curfew on sight, and the secret police used the increased powers to raid and vandalize the premises of anyone who was thought to be unfriendly towards the regime.

Government sources claimed that in Xa Loi, An Quang, and various Theravada pagodas, soldiers had found machine guns, ammunition, plastic explosives, homemade mines, daggers, and Vietcong documents. It was later discovered that they had been planted there by Nhu's men. A few days later, Madame Nhu said in an interview that the raids were "the happiest day in my life since we crushed the Binh Xuyen in 1955", and assailed the Buddhists as "communists". On August 29, General Dinh held a press conference in which he accused the Americans of trying to launch a coup in South Vietnam and took credit for the raids, despite Tung having been the chief military officer in charge.

Confusion over culpability and army denials

On the surface, the driving force behind the government assault on the Buddhists appeared to have come from senior military commanders acting without consulting the civilian government. Immediately after the attacks, posters were erected across Saigon under the aegis of ARVN, but the language used was more reminiscent of Nhu.

The Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan and Interior Minister Bui Van Luong were caught off guard by the attacks. The initial perception was that the military establishment had suddenly cracked down on the Buddhists because they were deemed to be a threat to the war effort. The government propagated a theory which held that the military felt compelled to take action after pro-Buddhist student unrest on August 17 and 18. In Hue, student protestors had turned on an ARVN officer after he fired in their direction. The attacks were also preceded by a large rally at Xa Loi Pagoda during which some monks had called for the overthrow of the Diem regime and denounced the anti-Buddhist statements of the de facto first lady Madame Nhu. These arguments were dismissed by observers, along with government claims that the raids were spontaneous.

Diem had long distrusted his generals and frequently played them against each other in a divide and conquer strategy to weaken any chance of a coup attempt. The army also contained substantial numbers of soldiers from the Buddhist majority, heightening skepticism that they would have attacked the pagodas and monks in such a violent manner. The synchronized military operations throughout the country, the speed at which banners were erected declaring the ARVN resolve to defeat communism, and doctored propaganda photos purporting to show Vietcong infiltration of the Buddhists suggested that the actions were long premeditated. In an attempt to maintain secrecy, special printing presses had produced propaganda materials only hours before the raids.

The initial government line was that the regular army had taken the actions. ARVN radio broadcasts bore the influence of Nhu's abrasive tone in directing the Republican Youth to cooperate with the government. Nhu accused the Buddhists of turning their pagodas into headquarters for plotting anti-government insurrections. He claimed that the Buddhist Intersect Committee operated under the control of "political speculators who exploited religion and terrorism". Lodge believed that Diem remained in control but that Nhu's influence had risen to unprecedented levels. He thought that Nhu's divide and conquer tactics had split the military into three factions, respectively led by Generals Don and Dinh and Colonel Tung. Don was believed not to have the allegiance of Dinh and Tung, who took their orders directly from Gia Long Palace. The two loyalists were reputed to have detested one another but had support from various Diemist elements. Lodge predicted that if the army deposed Diem, fighting could break out within the ARVN.

Initially, the American embassy believed the Ngo family's claims that the regular army was responsible for the raids. The Voice of America, which was widely listened to in South Vietnam as the only non-Diemist news source, initially aired Nhu's version of events, much to the dismay of the generals. However, the American media thought otherwise and began to debunk this theory, pointing out that the Ngos constantly sought to undermine the army, and that Madame Nhu's joy over the events would suggest that the family had not ceded power to or had their hand forced by the military. Furthermore, they identified Nhu's aides at the site, his idiosyncratic style in the announcements supposedly made by the ARVN, and the fact that the army had little motive to attack the Buddhists. The New York Times printed two versions of the raids on its front page, one by David Halberstam implicating Nhu for the attacks, and another with the official government version. Sheehan of United Press International also claimed that Nhu was responsible for the attacks, and foreign journalists had to smuggle their stories out by asking people leaving the country at the airport to carry documents for them. At the time, Sheehan and Halberstam were on a Ngo family hit list along with political dissidents because of their exposes of the regime's human rights abuses, and following the raids, they slept at the home of US official John Mecklin. They also received information that the Ngos were going to plant bombs in their offices and blame the deaths on the communists.

The Central Intelligence Agency went on to report that the ARVN officers resolutely denied any involvement in the pagoda raids. They held that Tung's Special Forces had disguised themselves in ARVN uniforms before attacking the pagodas. Further unsubstantiated rumors had spread within the army that the Americans, who trained the Special Forces, had helped to plan the attack. The ARVN leaders were unsure of how to proceed and Don called a staff meeting on the morning of August 23 to discuss impending demonstrations against the raids by university students and the anger of junior ARVN officers about the pagoda attacks. General Duong Van Minh noted that the ongoing presence of armed military personnel had alienated society by creating an "aura of suppression".

Later in the day, Don privately met with CIA agent Lucien Conein and reiterated that the Americans were mistaken in believing that the ARVN was responsible. Don insisted that Diem remained in control although Nhu had to approve all of the generals' meetings with Diem. Don insisted that Nhu had orchestrated the raids, fearing that the generals had too much power. He asserted that Nhu used the cover of martial law to discredit the generals by dressing the Special Forces in ARVN uniforms. Don insisted that he was unaware of the plans and was at Joint General Staff headquarters with Khiem when he received a radio message informing him of the assaults. Police Commissioner Tran Van Tu, supported by Tung's men, were in charge of the operation at ground level, and by the time Don arrived, the mission had been completed. Kim had also had his own meeting with Rufus Phillips at the US Embassy. He bitterly confided that Nhu had tricked the army into imposing martial law and becoming his "puppet".

Kim asserted that Dinh, Don and the other generals were not aware of the raids in advance and revealed that the arms and explosives that Nhu claimed were found in the pagodas had been planted. As a result, the Vietnamese people had expressed anger at the army and their US backers, strengthening Nhu's position.

Martial law and riots

Following the raids, tensions were high in the streets of the cities. Police were ordered to shoot those who defied the 21:00 to 05:00 curfew, and troops in full camouflage battle dress guarded every major intersection and bridge with automatic weapons bearing fixed bayonets. The empty pagodas were ringed by troops and armored cars. All outgoing news was censored, forcing reporters to smuggle their copy out with travelers flying to foreign countries. The telephone lines in the homes and offices of all US military and embassy staff were disconnected. The head of the USAID mission, Joe Brant, was stopped and searched while commuting to work, and other American officials had their meetings with Vietnamese officials and applications for permits to travel after the curfew hours delayed. The 14,000 US military advisers in the country were given orders to stay in their homes, and all leave was canceled.

The pagoda raids provoked widespread disquiet among the usually apolitical Saigon public. At midnight on August 22, Generals Don, Dinh and Khiem informed Nhu that student demonstrations were planned for three consecutive days. They recommended that the schools be closed, but when Nhu took them to see Diem, the president refused to close the educational institutions. Diem decided that the students, not usually known for political activism, should be allowed to voice their opinions. Taking advantage of the opportunity, students at Saigon University boycotted classes and rioted, which was met with arrests, imprisonment, and the closure of the campus. These events were repeated at Hue University, which was likewise shut down.

When high school students followed the lead of their elders and demonstrated, Diem had them arrested as well. Two of the detained students were paraded at a press conference in which they falsely admitted to being communists who had brainwashed their entire school, having been tortured to force their confession. At Trung Vuong, an elite girls' high school, the students hung up banners attacking Diem and the Nhus, while students from the corresponding boys' schools became violent, smashing school windows and erecting banners that insulted Madame Nhu in explicit language. More than 1,000 students from Saigon's leading high school, most of them children of public servants and military officers, were sent to re-education camps. The result was that many army officers and senior civil servants had to lobby to have their children or younger siblings released from jail, causing a further drop in morale among government and military officials. In more extreme cases, brawls broke out between the police officers who were arresting students and military officers and public servants whose children were being taken away.

Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau resigned, shaving his head like a Buddhist monk in protest. As Mau had decided to leave the country for a religious pilgrimage to India, the diplomatic and press corps assembled at the airport to see him off. He never arrived, as the Ngos had him arrested. However, General Dinh softened the punishment at the behest of a fellow officer, and put the former diplomat under house arrest instead of placing him in jail.

Tran Van Chuong, the ambassador to the United States and father of the de facto first lady Madame Nhu, resigned in protest, along with all but one of the staff members at the embassy. Chuong charged Diem with having "copied the tactics of totalitarian regimes", and said that as long as Diem and the Nhus were in power, there was "not once chance in a hundred for victory" against the communists. Madame Chuong—who was South Vietnam's observer at the United Nations—resigned and spoke of mass executions and a reign of terror under Diem and Nhu. She predicted that if Diem and the Nhus did not leave Vietnam then they would be killed in some sort of uprising. The Voice of America announced that Chuong had resigned in protest against the Ngo family's policies, but this was denied by the Saigon government, which asserted that the Chuongs had been sacked. Diem's officials claimed that Chuong's last telegram had been so critical of the regime that it was determined to be "inadmissible in form and substance". After years of privately complaining about his ambassador, Diem dismissed him.

In the meantime, the brothers made selective payments to some generals, hoping to cause resentment and division within the army. Vietnamese civil servants also became more reluctant to do their jobs, especially in conjunction with American advisers. They reasoned that as the Americans were funding Tung's men, they must have been involved in the attacks.

Change in US policy

Once the US government realized the truth about who was behind the raids, they reacted with disapproval towards the Diem regime. The Americans had pursued a policy of quietly and privately advising the Ngos to reconcile with the Buddhists while publicly supporting the partnership, but following the attacks, this route was regarded as untenable. Furthermore, the attacks were carried out by American-trained Special Forces personnel funded by the CIA, and presented Lodge with a fait accompli. One Western ambassador thought that the raids signaled "the end of the gallant American effort here". The State Department issued a statement declaring that the raids were a "direct violation" of the promise to pursue "a policy of reconciliation".

On August 24, the Kennedy administration sent Cable 243 to Lodge at the embassy in Saigon, marking a change in American policy. The message advised Lodge to seek the removal of the Nhus from power, and to look for alternative leadership options if Diem refused to heed American pressure for reform. As the probability of Diem sidelining Nhu and his wife was seen as virtually nil, the message effectively meant the fomenting of a coup. The Voice of America also broadcast a statement blaming Nhu for the raids and absolving the army of responsibility. Aware that the Americans would neither oppose a coup nor respond with aid cuts or sanctions, the generals deposed the Ngo brothers, who were arrested and assassinated the next day, November 2.

Notes

1. Moyar, pp. 215–216.
2. "The Religious Crisis". Time. 1963-06-14. Retrieved 2007-08-21. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
3. Tucker, pp. 49, 291, 293.
4. Maclear, p. 63.
5. "The Situation In South Vietnam – SNIE 53-2-63". The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2. 1963-07-10. pp. 729–733. Retrieved 2007-08-21. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
6. Tucker, p. 291.
7. ^ Gettleman, pp. 280–282.
8. "South Vietnam: Whose funeral pyre?". The New Republic. 1963-06-29. p. 9. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
9. Warner, p. 210.
10. Fall, p. 199.
11. Buttinger, p. 993.
12. Karnow, p. 294.
13. Buttinger, p. 933.
14. Jacobs p. 91.
15. "Diệm's other crusade". The New Republic. 1963-06-22. pp. 5–6. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
16. Hammer, pp. 103–105.
17. Jacobs, p. 142.
18. Jacobs, p. 143.
19. Hammer, pp. 113–114.
20. Jacobs, pp. 144–147.
21. Jones, pp. 252–260.
22. ^ Halberstam, pp. 125–129.
23. Jones, pp. 275–277.
24. Jacobs, pp. 150–151.
25. Prochnau, pp. 328–332.
26. Langguth, pp. 218–219.
27. ^ Karnow, p. 301.
28. Ray and Yanagihara, p. 332.
29. Jacobs, p. 145.
30. Jacobs, pp. 86–88.
31. ^ Halberstam, p. 139.
32. ^ Halberstam, p. 140.
33. Jacobs, p. 167.
34. Karnow, pp. 306, 309.
35. ^ Sheehan, p. 354.
36. Hammer, p. 164.
37. ^ Dommen, p. 524.
38. Halberstam, p. 141.
39. ^ Hammer, p. 166.
40. ^ Jones, p. 300.
41. Jacobs, pp. 168–169.
42. Hammer, pp. 285–286.
43. Halberstam, pp. 144–145.
44. Halberstam, p. 181.
45. ^ Hammer, p. 167.
46. ^ Halberstam, p. 145.
47. Halberstam, pp. 139–142.
48. Halberstam, p. 142.
49. ^ Jones, p. 297.
50. Prochnau, p. 366.
51. Halberstam, pp. 142–143.
52. ^ Halberstam, p. 143.
53. ^ Sheehan, p. 355.
54. Prochnau, p. 367.
55. ^ Jacobs, p. 153.
56. Prochnau, p. 368.
57. ^ "The Crackdown". Time. 1963-08-31. Retrieved 2007-08-18. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
58. ^ Sheehan, p. 356.
59. ^ Hammer, p. 168.
60. Jones, p. 298.
61. Halberstam, pp. 143–144.
62. Dommen, pp. 508–511.
63. ^ Jacobs, pp. 152–153.
64. ^ Halberstam, p. 144.
65. ^ Jones, p. 299.
66. ^ Hammer, p. 171.
67. ^ Jones, pp. 298–299.
68. ^ Halberstam, p. 146.
69. Moyar, p. 460.
70. Halberstam, pp. 181–182.
71. Karnow, p. 317.
72. Jones, p. 305.
73. ^ Jones, p. 306.
74. ^ Karnow, p. 302.
75. Halberstam, pp. 145–146.
76. Halberstam, p. 148.
77. Sheehan, pp. 356–357.
78. Prochnau, p. 374.
79. Prochnau, pp. 364–365.
80. Jones, pp. 307–308.
81. ^ Jones, p. 309.
82. ^ Hammer, p. 173.
83. ^ Halberstam, p. 153.
84. ^ Sheehan, p. 357.
85. Jacobs, pp. 153–154.
86. Halberstam, p. 154.
87. Sheehan, p. 358.
88. ^ Jacobs, p. 154.
89. ^ Halberstam, p. 151.
90. Halberstam, p. 147.
91. Jacobs, pp. 162–163.
92. Karnow, pp. 303–304.
93. Halberstam, pp. 157–158.
94. Halberstam, p. 152.
95. Jacobs, pp. 165–175.

References

• Buttinger, Joseph (1967). Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. New York City, New York: Praeger Publishers.
• Dommen, Arthur J. (2001). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-33854-9.
• Fall, Bernard B. (1963). The Two Viet-Nams. London: Praeger Publishers.
• Gettleman, Marvin E. (1966). Vietnam: History, documents and opinions on a major world crisis. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
• Halberstam, David (2008). The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-6007-4. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Hammer, Ellen J. (1987). A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York City, New York: E. P. Dutton. ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
• Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
• Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation: how the assassinations of Diem and JFK prolonged the Vietnam War. New York City, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
• Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York City, New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
• Langguth, A. J. (2000). Our Vietnam: the war, 1954–1975. New York City, New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
• Maclear, Michael (1981). Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War. New York City, New York: Methuen Publishing. ISBN 0-423-00580-4.
• Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-86911-0.
• Prochnau, William (1995). Once Upon a Distant War. New York City, New York: Times Books. ISBN 0-8129-2633-1.
• Ray, Nick (2005). Vietnam. Footscray, Victoria: Lonely Planet. ISBN 1-74059-677-3. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Sheehan, Neil (1988). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York City, New York: Random House. ISBN 0-679-72414-1.
• Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-9.
• Warner, Denis (1964). The Last Confucian: Vietnam, South-East Asia, and the West. Sydney: Angus and Robertson.

• 1963 in Vietnam
• Buddhist crisis
• Conflicts in 1963
• History of Ho Chi Minh City
• History of South Vietnam