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"Methods"?

In the section on Buss's "methods" of working out if something is an adaptation or not. I looked at this to see if the ugly bold type could be lost. But these aren't methods are they? They don't look like any scientific research methods you will find in the textbooks. "Criteria" is the correct word, isn't it? Itsmejudith (talk) 14:16, 8 September 2011 (UTC)

I agree, and I've changed the word "methods" to "strategies." Also, changed the bold type to italic. Memills (talk) 00:34, 9 September 2011 (UTC)

section possibly lacking neutrality

Under the "Initial response" section there are some lines that seems very dogmatic in tone, and I'm wondering if it sohuld be worded in such a way.

"For example, eugenics and social darwinism were political philosophies of the early 20th Century that were largely based on the naturalistic fallacy -- the erroneous idea that what is necessarily implies what ought."

I'm not saying I agree with those things, but saying they are wrong with such certainty doesn't seem very neutral to me; it would make more sense to say that it is widely accepted that they are wrong. Of course, I may be reading it wrong and missing what was actually meant. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.186.139.223 (talk) 08:33, 24 October 2011 (UTC)

I made a couple of minor edits improve neutrality. Eugenics and Social Darwinism are largely of historical interest now -- extremely few academics endorse these political philosophies today. Memills (talk) 05:31, 26 November 2011 (UTC)

Also, the "naturalist fallacy" is widely known as a fallacy - we are invoking a well-known principle, it is not WP that is saying it is a "fallacy." Can anyone find any citation from a significant philosopher claiming that what is necessary is also what is ought? Slrubenstein | Talk 14:15, 26 November 2011 (UTC)

Evolved human traits-- all or some are evolutionarily adaptive?

" It seeks to identify which human psychological traits are evolved adaptations, that is, the functional products of natural selection or sexual selection."

Should it not be how, and not which?

Isn't the entirety of a human, psychological traits included -- a product of evolved adaptation? Might I ask also what the alternative would be if it is not evolved adaptations? Cheers. Averylongdream (talk) 19:38, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

We also have vestigial traits or traits that get thrown up on the sputum of the genetic sea that are survival-neutral or not harmful enough to be strongly selected against. Or a trait could become widespread by virtue of being on the same gene as a beneficial trait. These are incidental rather than functional products of natural or sexual selection. There is also the whole nature/nurture question - is "likes red" selected for, or is "has a favorite colour" selected for, with red being the culturally determined choice? Adaptationism probably says it better.

Could we change the second sentence to avoid this confusion? FiveColourMap (talk) 20:05, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I think the problem is that the sentence implies that everything that is 'evolved' is 'functional' - a logical error that evolutionary psychology often seems to fall into. AndyTheGrump (talk) 20:13, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

What you both say makes sense, my only concern now is that now it reads as though some traits are evolved, and the others are due to some other mysterious force. Is there a way to rephrase it to avoid this confusion? Averylongdream (talk) 07:05, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

We could mostly drop the second and third sentences of the first paragraph, moving the last sentence up. This puts the link to psychological adaptation right at the top, which is far more useful in this context than the links to natural/sexual selection. The third sentence just recapitulates evolutionary biology.

Evolutionary psychology (EP) is an approach in the social and natural sciences that examines psychological traits such as memory, perception, and language from a modern evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary psychologists argue that much of human behavior results from psychological adaptations that evolved to solve recurrent problems in human ancestral environments. Evolutionary psychology applies the adaptationist model to psychology, arguing that the mind has a modular structure similar to that of the body, with different modular adaptations serving different functions.

Copy that into the article if you like it, or make a counterproposal if I have missed anything important. FiveColourMap (talk) 14:33, 6 December 2011 (UTC)

The question posed at the outset of this section is discussed in detail in the article itself. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/Evolutionary_psychology#Products_of_evolution:_adaptations.2C_exaptations.2C_byproducts.2C_and_random_variation

So, yes, one important objective of EP is to identify which traits are psychological adaptations, and which traits are not. Although this is sometimes misunderstood, those in the field are well aware that many traits are not adaptations. Memills (talk) 02:43, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

I find a lot of confusion in the above discussion. Everything about humans, our bodies, minds, behaviour, has evolved. The same is true for an ash tree; every characteristic it has, has evolved. And some of the things that are important to our lives as humans are also important for ash trees: we can't stand extreme heat or cold, prolonged immersion or drought, exposure to chemicals or radiation. These are evolved human traits that all scientists, social scientists and artists who examine the human condition have to bear in mind. But I think the evolved human traits that most interest social scientists in general and those who promote or critique EP in particular, are those traits that we don't share with ash trees, and don't even share with close relatives like chimps, bonobos or gorillas. Upright stature, opposable thumb, long childhood dependence, menstrual cycle and menopause... there is plenty to understand. Are all of these "adaptive"? That's still being discussed. What about psychological traits that are unique to humans? Before discussing which are adaptive, it would be useful to identify those traits. I don't think there is even consensus on that. Itsmejudith (talk) 19:56, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

Constructive and thoughtful. I would add, that natural selection can act on anything, not just heritable traits. This was anthropologist Julian Steward's basic claim in the 1930s and it has long had a major place in anthropology, most intro textbooks will say in the first or second chapter than one view of culture is as an adaptation, it is just extrasomatic i.e. learned rather than inherited. but natural selection still acts on it, and learned behaviors (in a word, "culture") that are non-adaptive will not survive; adaptive ones will. This is really old-hat in cultural anthropology and one reason why so few anthropologists have given EP much attention. Slrubenstein | Talk 21:22, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

This is so exciting. Humans as a learning species = humans as an evolved species. I don't fully have my head round it yet, but will try and read up. Itsmejudith (talk) 22:46, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

There are two dimensions: the first is, looking at how specific learned behaviors are the product of natural selection. If you are interested in reading an entire book, the classic case-study is Roy Rappaport's Pigs for the Ancestors, but almost any book by Marvin Harris consists of very accessible popular essays that reflect this view. I think there is a collection of Julian Steward's Theory of Culture Change which is more technical (like Rappaport) but the source for the ideas. The second question is how did a distinctively human capacity for learning evolve in the first place. The best book I know of on this is Terrance Deacon's phenomenal The Symbolic Species which is very technical but amazing. If a book is too much, look at the journal Current Anthropology - in the 1960s (1969?) Ralph Holloway wrote an article called "Culture: a Human Domain" which I think you would like. Slrubenstein | Talk 15:20, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

Can I suggest the following re-write: It seeks to examine the extent to which human psychology is evolved as a product of natural or sexual selection? I think this would be better because it points the reader away from the idea of atomic psychology and gene-psychology correspondence (e.g. there is a gene for being happy-go-lucky, there is a gene for fear of dogs) and towards the debate in reality about how much of our psychology is genetically determined. I think "traits" is bad in an overview, because evolutionary psychology does not restrict itself to anything narrower than psychology as a whole.--FormerIP (talk) 23:21, 14 December 2011 (UTC)

The article Adaptations, Exaptations, and Spandrels is a good place for further exploration of this topic. Also George_C._Williams 1966 book Adaptation and Natural Selection covered this material.

No one in EP argues for genetic determinism; rather EP is fully nature-nurture interactionist. To ask whether something is due to nature or nurture is asking the wrong question (see my blog post re this). The terms adaptation, byproduct and random variations have particular technical meanings. The belly button is a byproduct, but that doesn't mean that it is not too, ultimately, a product of evolution. And, that is why a section heading in this article is titled: "Products of evolution: adaptations, exaptations, byproducts, and random variation."

The sentence in the intro is accurate: "It seeks to identify which human psychological traits are evolved adaptations - that is, the functional products of natural selection or sexual selection." Note the term functional, which is a key part of the sentence. Adaptations have a function, while byproducts and random variation generally do not or did not in ancestral environments. For example, language acquisition by toddlers is a psychological adaptation, while reading and writing are byproducts (as evidenced by the fact that the former is done virtually without instruction, while the latter requires extensive training). Memills (talk) 04:05, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

The word "functional" does make a difference, that's true. But what it does is produce a poor definition of "evolved adaptations" IMO. Vestigial genetic information is evolved, in that is has arisen during a history of selection, in just the same way as any other genetic information.

I'm a little confused that you seem to agree that EP does not set out to sift genetically determined traits from those which are not (and you've even blogged about it). It's not just a question of technical accuracy (which, like I say, I don't think your preferred version has), but also about what choice of wording provides the most conceptually accurate picture. --FormerIP (talk) 14:28, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

Function (and lack thereof, respectively) is the the defining difference between an adaptation (e.g., language) and a byproduct (such as a "vestigial genetic information" -- e.g., the appendix -- assuming it was functional only in the distant past). Both are produced by the interaction of genes and environment. It is conceptually misleading and inaccurate to suggest that some traits are genetic while others are environmental. As noted in my blog post, as well as this one by a colleague, the question to ask is not whether is it nature or nurture, but rather whether a trait is likely to be an adaptation or not. And, if it is, is it generally obligate or facultative (which is about a close as we can get to a useful nature vs. nurture distinction). Memills (talk) 16:35, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

I think functionality is crucial. From what I have read, EP is often most controversial when it claims that a behavior that some people consider disfunctional was once functional (which some people interpret, rightly or wrongly, to mean: might still be functional). I think another crucial issue is universality. A ehavior or behavioral disposition that evolved a million years ago is presumably shared by all humans; conversely, if a behavior is shared by all humans, it may likely be an evolved trait. I think another source of controversy is whn some people (rightly or wrongly) believe that EP is claiming that a certain behavior or behavioral disposition is universal, and some people believe that it is not. Slrubenstein | Talk 19:34, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

Keep in mind that EP focuses on putative underlying emotional / motivational / cognitive psychological adaptations, and much less so on overt behavior. Because behavior is such a complex interaction of nature (psychological adaptations) and nurture (environment/culture), a psychological adaptation (such as language acquisition) can lead to great diversity in behavior (such as the specific language spoken in a given culture). A psychological adaptation (unlike a byproduct or random variation) should show evidence of species universality, mechanism reliability, adaptive functionality, and complexity. Memills (talk) 19:44, 15 December 2011 (UTC)

Memills, you seem to be to be referencing concepts that ought to go against the current wording in order to defend it. Obviously, all aspects of human psychology are informed both genetically and environmentally. This is uncontroversial. So why are you supporting wording that suggests that some psychological traits are (note: "are" - not even "the result of" or "related to") evolutionary adaptations (whereas some, presumably, are not)? This is the wrong dividing line. Your supposition that adaptations can refer only to recent adaptations is wrong, IMO. For the latter, we say "recent adaptations". But I don't think that makes a difference because, even in that case, the sentence does not give an accurate description of EP. Its job is not simply to sort recent adaptations from distant ones.--FormerIP (talk) 02:42, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

Some of these ideas are subtle and complex. However, the distinction between traits that are adaptations (e.g., the umbilical cord) and those that are not (e.g., the belly button) is a foundational idea in evolutionary science. I have provided references that explore some of these distinctions in more detail, and I would suggest that you read them to help to clarify some of the issues under discussion here. Again, see the article Adaptations, Exaptations, and Spandrels as well George_C._Williams 1966 book Adaptation and Natural Selection which is a classic. Also, any introductory evolutionary psychology textbook covers these concepts (e.g., Buss, 'Evolutionary Psychology,' 2012). Memills (talk) 17:30, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

Memills, you are trying to get the article to reflect the EP that you teach. Of course you try to teach the most coherent and up to date version of EP. But the article can't do that; it has to reflect EP as a whole. If you want to carry on contributing to Misplaced Pages, you will have to distinguish between User:Memills and Professor Memills. I appreciate that isn't easy. Itsmejudith (talk) 11:53, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

Judith, please AGF. My goal is not to present my own OR or POV. It is to help to improve the article so that it accurately represents the current theories and empirical findings of the discipline (including divergent hypotheses and perspectives within it). Many folks first arrive here with a very meager background or training in EP, and have some preconceptions or misunderstandings about EP. As always, I encourage such folks to read up on the current literature, or, at minimum, have ready access to a current evolutionary psychology textbook. And, again, that is why I routinely offer 'suggestions for additional reading' and provide refs. I most encourage others to do so too. Memills (talk) 17:30, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

I am assuming good faith, sorry if it didn't come out like that. In terms of what editors have or haven't read, well I haven't read a lot about EP as such, but I have read a lot of other very relevant stuff. At the moment, I am not seeing EP as having a model of humans as a learning species. What are we evolved to do? We're evolved to walk upright, use our thumbs, use tools etc. etc. Above all else, we're evolved to learn. And that presents a methodological difficulty that isn't there when a biologist is looking at the behaviour of an earthworm. Trying to put it simply, it is in our nature to nurture. I could go on and probably will. Itsmejudith (talk) 23:36, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

It is great that you are well read in general, and have an interest in EP. A bit more reading of EP may surprise you.

This comes as a surprise to those with a passing familiarity with EP: Learning is actually a core interest of EP. But, with a special twist, one that differentiates EP from traditional behaviorism / social learning theory / social constructionism (which assume that learning is derived from a "general purpose, domain general learning mechanism"). In contrast, EP suggests that learning is not general purpose and domain general, and it could not be (due to the frame problem, but, instead learning is based on a multitude of evolved adaptations -- special-purpose cognitive information processing mechanisms, each specialized to solve particular types of problems (the Wason selection task is the classic example).

Again, for example, humans presumably have an evolved language acquisition device (LAD) that makes learning a language easy for toddlers. But reading and writing are not adaptations, and so these are so hard to learn.

Don't know if you have read Pinker's The Blank Slate, but it is a good intro to this type of thinking, and you might find an interesting read. Memills (talk) 00:17, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

• You're discussing the lead, right? What I find to be missing is the way in which this school interacts with the other schools of thought in psychology. Is it taught and studied as a completely separate branch? Does it have some synergy with other types of explanatory scheme? One can't really grasp the context and power of the field without comparing it with the alternatives.

Another point. There was a study publicised recently which suggested that there are natural limits to traits such as memory and concentration. So, if you're too strong in these areas, your mind will tend to be dysfunctional in some ways, like the absent-minded professor. So, we forget things and get distracted to help us keep some balance in our thinking. The key phrase would be trade-offs but I'm not finding this in the article - only in the title of one of the sources.

Warden (talk) 17:10, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

As noted in the lead, EP is becoming increasingly integrated into the the larger field of psychology, and, adaptationist informed articles are regularly appearing now in top psychological science publications. Those working in the field of EP suggest (also noted in the lead) that eventually EP will no longer be a "sub-field" but rather will be integrated into the larger discipline, and serve as a foundational meta-theory that integrates all social sciences; much as evolutionary theory (as related to understanding the bodies of organisms) has done for the biological sciences.

EP is well aware of cost-benefit trade-offs, and the resulting evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). I don't think this merits mention in the lead (?), however, perhaps more should be added to the article re this. Memills (talk) 17:44, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

I'm scratching my head over the point of this conversation. Obviously all of our physical characteristics (including cerebral structures) are products of natural selection, but that hardly means that all human psychological traits are thereby products of natural selection. I mean, to take the obvious case, we are obviously evolved to use language (there is clear survival/breeding advantage in language use among humans), but we can't be said to have evolved to use any particular language, or to use language in any particular way. This conversation has a lot of hand-waving going on over the concept of 'psychological traits' - is the fact that I don't like Jello a 'psychological trait' that has evolved for some specific function? How many millions of humans had to die off to affix that antipathy for Jello in the human genome? 'Natural selection' is a narrow concept, let's not exaggerate it.

However, if you want to clarificatory rewrite on that line, try this: "It seeks to discover the evolutionary origins of various aspects of human psychology." Leave the 'natural and sexual selection' aspects out of it for the lead and cover them in the body. This phrasing doesn't make any particular assertions about anything questionable. --Ludwigs2 19:43, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

I agree with this sensible summary and suggestion. Slrubenstein | Talk 20:05, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

A psychological adaptation for a preference for sugary foods does not a preference for jello make.  :-) Here is where a psychological adaptation does not equal behavior, which can be influenced by environmental/developmental situations. Just like a child locked in a closet from age 1 - 6 will never learn a language, despite it being an adaptation. Under typical situations, most folks will like jello, given its high sugar content.

Again, I prefer the current phrase, which I see as more accurate an informative: "It seeks to identify which human psychological traits are evolved adaptations - that is, the functional products of natural selection or sexual selection." EP is generally only secondarily interested in studying functions that are not putative psychological adaptations (such as why someone does or does not like jello), and this sentence makes that clear. Memills (talk) 23:22, 16 December 2011 (UTC)

Actually, children who miss the language acquisition stage can and do learn language; what they end being unable to master is the full range of grammatical constructions. It's similar to what happens to adults who learn a second language (who tend to import grammar constructs from their native tongue), only more extreme. But that's a quibble.

I'm not strongly opposed to your preferred version, but I do think it's a bit misleading on the following points:

• The words 'trait' and 'adaptation' have distinctly different meanings in psychology and evolutionary biology, and that distinction is being glossed over that in a way that is unduly suggestive. Radio stations and cars both have transmissions, but one is not interchangeable with the other. This phrasing seems to suggest that mental traits and physical traits are interchangeable, and that biological and psychological adaptation are functions of the same process.
• Natural/sexual selection is not 'functional' in the normal sense of the term. that's a product of teleological thinking, which assumes that the outcome is implicit in the origin. Genetic change is opportunistic, not strategic.

I don't want to say that phrase is wrong, but (to borrow language from a different science) it has a noticeable redshift towards a particular viewpoint that I don't think captures the scholarly norm. --Ludwigs2 12:18, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for your well articulated comment.

Here is the sentence in question: EP " ...seeks to identify which human psychological traits are evolved adaptations - that is, the functional products of natural selection or sexual selection."

• Is an "adaptation" a "trait" of an organism? Adaptationists would say "yes." Dictionary.com defines "trait" as: "a distinguishing characteristic or quality, especially of one's personal nature" -- an adaptation fits that description. Are *all* traits adaptations? No. (Again, to pick on the belly button -- no pun intended: the belly button is a trait, but it is not an adaptation. That is why EP "seeks to identify which psychological traits are evolved adaptations" and which are not. Language acquisition ability of toddlers is an adaptation; "writing acquisition" ability is not.
• Are "biological" ("physiological"?) and "psychological" adaptations products of natural and sexual selection? Again, evolutionists would say "yes" -- and, in fact that is the foundational premise of EP. Not only does the body have traits that are evolved adaptations, so does the mind/brain. Again, the nature (biology) vs. nurture (psychology) distinction is deeply misleading and results in unproductive thinking, and should be avoided. A better distinction is the degree to which an adaptation is generally obligate given typical environmental variation (say, the nose) or more facultative given typical environmental variation (tanning of the skin with exposure to sunlight).

Re the comment: "Natural/sexual selection is not 'functional' in the normal sense of the term. that's a product of teleological thinking, which assumes that the outcome is implicit in the origin." Correct in the sense that evolution has no goal or anticipated outcome -- evolutionists agree. However, biological evolution is indeed 'functional' in that it reliability produces complexity in the form of adaptations (a pretty special effect, given the universal increase in overall entropy). The specific outcomes of evolution cannot be predicted in advance, given random mutations and a blind walk through the adaptive landscape (although it is impressive the the eye has evolved independently in several species).

So the sentence accurately describes one of the foundational goals of EP: it "...seeks to identify which human psychological traits are evolved adaptations - that is, the functional products of natural selection or sexual selection." Memills (talk) 18:59, 17 December 2011 (UTC)

Memills' posture of ownership of this article

Memills has recently made reverts to constructive, well referenced edits to the article, that seek to clarify key issues and concepts. By his own concession, Memills used false justifications for his reverts - such as claiming the edits were 'original research' or 'controversial'. Against the background of Memills' other input to this article, my sense is that these reverts constitute another example of his posture of ownership of this article. For anyone unfamiliar with the problem of ownership, please see Misplaced Pages:Ownership of articles. I suggest that if Memills continues the posture of reverting edits that are well referenced and relevant, other contributors that wish to see this article prosper and unbiasedly reflect the subtlety of concepts involved, might get back in touch with an administrator like Sandstein to request that Memills be reminded of wiki policy, and if necessary blocked from editing the article for a period of time. Please contribute thoughts to this question over the openness of the article. Many thanks. DMSchneider (talk) 21:03, 28 January 2012 (UTC)

I noted here: "(This issue was) Discussed previously on Talk page. Pls discuss again there first." DmSchneider did not take it to the Talk page, but ignored my request and restored his edits again. I again asked that the issue be discussed on the Talk page here: "As I suggested, take to Talk page. Maybe not OR, but perhaps you are the ghost of David M. Schneider?"

Specifically, the paper by Maximilian Holland, which is an unpublished doctoral dissertation, was previously discussed on these Talk pages. Those discussions were prompted by Holland himself modifying this page, as well as the Inclusive fitness page. His edits were ultimately reverted due to concerns about OR and because the hypotheses were stated as fact, and that he had a conflict of interest.

If the issue of inclusive fitness is to be revisited -- that's fine by me. However, it would be helpful to first review previous discussion on the Talk pages here, as well as the Talk pages for Inclusive fitness.

In general, evolutionary biologists/psychologists disagree with some cultural anthropologists' (and Holland's) assertion that purely cultural factors determine identification of kin. Instead evolutionary biologists/psychologists suggest that that genetic kin can often also be identified by phenotypic resemblance, body scent, as well as other factors that have biological components. Memills (talk) 01:07, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I address these points in the section below.DMSchneider (talk) 14:50, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

*While I consider it polite in the course of BRD for the reverting editor to start the discussion on the talk page it definitely behooves the bold editor who was reverted to go there rather than initiate an edit war.

• Ownership issues are best addressed via an RfC/U.

Jojalozzo 01:20, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

DMSchneider's edits / additions re inclusive fitness

If DMSchneider would like to re-open a discussion of these issues related to inclusive fitness here on the Talk page, that, again, is fine by me. A good start would be for him to add his proposed insertions/edits here to open the discussion. Aw, heck, I'll do it for him.

DMSchneider deleted most of this paragraph (which actually included a reference to Holland):

Psychological adaptations related to interactions with kin are facultative. Although it is generally true that humans tend to be more altruistic toward their kin than toward non-kin, there may be exceptions. Specific types of behavioral output are dependent on the interaction of both genetic and environmental influences. For example, John Bowlby and others have noted that patterns of attachment to others are dependent on early developmental experiences with caregivers. In any specific instance, the manifestation of emotional bonds into altruistic behaviour depends on early bonding experiences, and symbolic, economic and other cultural factors, which may or may not always coincide with consanguinity.

DMSchneider added the following paras:

{quote|In his original papers on inclusive fitness theory, Hamilton pointed out a sufficiently high relatedness to favour altruistic behaviours could accrue in two ways — kin discrimination or limited dispersal ( Hamilton, 1964, 1971,1972, 1975). There is a huge theoretical literature on the possible role of limited dispersal reviewed by Platt & Bever (2009) and West et al. (2002a), as well as experimental evolution tests of these models (Diggle et al., 2007; Griffin et al., 2004; Kümmerli et al., 2009 ). However, despite this, it is still sometimes claimed that kin selection requires kin discrimination (Oates & Wilson, 2001; Silk, 2002 ). Furthermore, a large number of authors appear to have implicitly or explicitly assumed that kin discrimination is the only mechanism by which altruistic behaviours can be directed towards relatives... here is a huge industry of papers reinventing limited dispersal as an explanation for cooperation. The mistakes in these areas seem to stem from the incorrect assumption that kin selection or indirect fitness benefits require kin discrimination (misconception 5), despite the fact that Hamilton pointed out the potential role of limited dispersal in his earliest papers on inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964; Hamilton, 1971; Hamilton, 1972; Hamilton, 1975). (West et al. 2010, p.243 and supplement)}}

To the extent that cues based on co-residence and familiarity play the major role in mediating social ties and cooperation (as they do for social mammals and primates), it may not be necessary to invoke active discrimination of relatedness as the main proximate mechanism. Hamilton himself had this to say on the point:

we do not expect anything describable as an innate kin recognition adaptation, used for social behaviour other than mating (Hamilton 1987, 425)

Following this line of argument, a synthesis has been made between inclusive fitness theory, psychological attachment theory and cultural anthropology's findings on human kinship patterns, which resolves the apparent lack of compatibility between the biological and cultural perspectives on human social behaviour. In this view, human bonding and social cooperation in many societies often continues to correlate with genetic relatedness, due to the fact that in most societies, circumstances usually place genetic relatives in close proximity from the earliest developmental stages. But the key proximate mechanisms - familiarity, nurture, bonding and cooperation - are non-deterministic in relation to genetic relatedness; in particular symbolic, historical, economic or other circumstances, certain societies may display patterns of social kinship that do not necessarily closely coincide with genetic relatedness. Inclusive fitness theory is compatible with both patterns.

The issue is whether these changes accurately represent the perspectives of most evolutionary biologists/psychologists (not just those of cultural anthropologists). While the evidence for the perspectives on both sides of the debate should be presented, it should be made clear what is the consensus of opinion of those in the fields of evolutionary biology and psychology, given that that is the topic of this article. Again, most adaptationists would suggest that there are additional non-cultural, biological kin-detection mechanisms that also help determine kin from non-kin (e.g., phenotypic matching, body scent, etc.). Inclusive fitness theory would of course state that non-cultural factors must be at play in non-human species (which do not have culture) to accurately identify genetic kin from non-kin.

See in particular The architecture of human kin detection, by Liberman, Tooby and Cosmides. Full text PDF is here. Also see The validity and value of inclusive fitness theory. Memills (talk) 02:02, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

The points made in this edit are not primarily about 'Holland's thesis' they are rather about important debates and interpretation of inclusive fitness theory which have bearing on how it can be applied to humans more or less parsimoniously. The theory and its relevance to humans' evolved behaviours is a central thread of EP of course.

The inclusive fitness (and kin selection) pages already reflect the general points over how the theory relates to mechanisms mediating altruism. The points made in the EP edit are very much in line with the position set out in those articles: that the respected theorists (Hamilton, Grafen, Dawkins, Frank, West and others) have long been clear about the relative parsimony of context & location based mechanisms relative to 'innate kin recognition adaptations'. Those pages have relevant quotes from the key theorists. This page here should surely reflect that theoretical position, in a shortened form if necessary.

The theory pages, and related articles make it clear that context-based mediation of social bonding and cooperation is both more parsimonious in relation to inclusive fitness theory, and much more strongly supported by the full body of experimental data from mammals & primates (the long literature in the tradition of Sherman & Holmes and others) in contrast to hypothesized 'innate kin recognition adaptations' (to use Hamilton's phrase). This aspect is in no way controversial with biological theorists, and indeed 'reflects the consensus'.

On the subsidiary matter of Holland's thesis - it demonstrates how this consensus on IFT as understood by biology theorists is indeed compatible with human social behaviour, universally across cultures. It is published according to wiki definitions - it does not at all assert that purely cultural factors determine identification of kin - that is an inaccurate characterisation. On the contrary, it asserts that biological theory should in principle be, and indeed is applicable to humans and non-humans alike, and that humans' social cooperation behaviours have indeed been shaped by evolution for inclusive fitness and that their form matches predictions/interpretations of inclusive fitness theory. In other words it strongly demonstrates both that and how IFT is indeed applicable to humans. One thus cannot characterise it to be an argument promoting 'purely cultural factors'! Perhaps your concern is that it interprets inclusive fitness theory in a way that even cultural anthropologists can have no objection to? If so, this is deeply worrying.

Perhaps some editors may wish to include additional examples of approaches that have a non-consensus interpretation of the theory regarding which possible mechanisms might mediate social behaviours, and are non-universal in respect of the evidence from across all human cultures. But we should use great caution with this - for readers it must be clearly preceded by the point that 'innate kin recognition adaptations' for social behaviour are not predicted by the evolutionary theory, as Hamilton makes clear. Since EP is about evolved adaptations that characterize the human species as a whole, and decidedly not about culturally-specific practices/values, this article should probably include only research that has been demonstrated as being compatible with a wide-range of cross-cultural data from around the world, not just a few select cultures. If we cannot do this, then those examples of research we do give should clearly be noted as being demonstrated only in specific cultures and and not universally demonstrated. For example, a difficulty with much of the 'face-similarity' research is that it is not shown to be universal across cultures, so it may only demonstrate cultural values - something that rigorous EP clearly distinguishes from universal evolved traits of the human species.

On the procedural side - the page discussing 'ownership' problems makes it clear that 'discussing things on the talk' page cannot be used as a diversionary tactic to prevent edits to the main article. Constructive, well-referenced editing which illuminates the key issues of the topic and summarizes the consensus theoretical position of Hamilton et al. should be encouraged, and it should certainly not be shot down for false reasons of 'controversial' or 'Original Research'. I am glad to see that as of this time Memills has not attempted to revert the edit again, and I hope Memills can come round to seeing the value of this edit.- DMSchneider (talk) 15:09, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

My concern with the edits/additions is exemplified by this sentence in particular:

"Following this line of argument, a synthesis has been made between inclusive fitness theory, psychological attachment theory and cultural anthropology's findings on human kinship patterns..."

The reference for this synthesis is the Holland doctoral dissertation, which is unpublished. A "synthesis" has been proposed (by Holland) -- it has not been confirmed or even published in a peer-reviewed journal. It is a proposal that is still under intense investigation and debate. Again, non-human animals have kin-detection devices that are wholly non-cultural, and most adaptationists believe that to be the case for humans as well.

Given the referencing of Holland, and because of the problems with Holland's previous edits here and elsewhere, I would ask DMSchneider to state here that he is not in fact Holland using DMSchneider as a sockpuppet account. Also, the fact that the account apparently is named after David M. Schneider, a cultural anthropologist who believed that kinship was purely culturally constructed, also raises some concerns that this topic is being approached by DMSchneider primarily from a cultural anthropology perspective. Again, that perspective should be noted, but it not should turn into an in-depth debate in this article subtopic, it should not be suggested that Holland's "synthesis" is the final word, and it should not crowd out adaptationist perspectives and research on kinship recognition that propose competing explanations. Memills (talk) 17:51, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

For the record, I am not a sockpuppet of Holland, I am a different individual, and have never met Holland. I came across Holland's thesis through google scholar following it's appearance in an online research depositary last year, and also checked that it corresponded with the published version available in digital form from the British library. Memills continues to claim that Holland's thesis is 'not published' - this is categorically wrong according to WP definitions, as Memills surely knows. A finished, accepted and approved PhD thesis such as Holland's is unambigously counted as 'published' according to these guidelines. The original version is available as a scanned PDF from the British Library, as mentioned. It is entirely disingenuous of Memills to attempt to cast doubt on the significance of the work by continuing to suggest that it is unpublished. I trust that this clarification will encourage him to proceed in good faith and concede that the work is indeed published.

I consider Holland's thesis to be a significant contribution to understanding the biological influence on human social behaviour, and unusually non-partisan in its surveys of the biological theory as well as data on social mammals and primates, cultural anthropology's empirical findings on humans, and psychological attachment theory (which of course covers both primates and humans). Since seeing Memills reference to the discussion he had with Holland previously, I have looked back at that discussion, and it appears that Holland was effectively bullied into not pursuing his edits at that time. It unfortunate that Memills' entrenched perspective did not allow him to see the significance and unifying value of Holland's work, which apart from anything else, is the most significant application of Inclusive fitness theory to humans to date. As such it deserves to be celebrated by biologists, rather than bullied into hiding by a small minority.

Schneider did not claim that human social ties (what he called 'diffuse enduring solidarity') were purely cultural. He did however ask that any putative geneological basis to social ties should be investigated, illuminated and demonstrated (in a manner which is cross-culturally applicable), rather than unexaminedly assumed, as earlier generations of anthropologists had done. He left open the question of what the role of biological influences might be. I don't imagine Memills has read Schneider or taken his work as seriously as it warrants. It single-handedly transformed the study of social ties in anthropology. Holland's thesis is all the more remarkable in that it does full justice to Schneider's concerns whilst it also accurately reflects a rigorous interpretation of inclusive fitness theory.

On Memills other points - Holland's work is indeed a synthesis - and it has been published. This is what is meant by the sentence "a synthesis has been made". It has self evidently been peer reviewed and accepted - otherwise it would not have been approved by Holland's university (which was LSE, the same place Hamilton did his PhD work). There thus can be no reasonable objection to the sentence "a synthesis has been made between IFT..."(etc).

Again - if Memills wishes to also include in this section 'competing' approaches to applying IFT to humans, based on the interpretation that 'innate kin recognition adaptations' are in some way predicted by the theory (although Hamilton makes clear that this is not the case), there may be some merit in doing so, so long as this theoretical dissonance is made clear. But to the extent that Holland's approach both rigorously applies IFT universally to a vast body of human data (the ethnographic record), and at the same time is welcomed by socio/cultural anthropologists, it should be prominent here. Surely this is exactly the sort of successful general application of biological theory that EP seeks to achieve.

Memills seems to misunderstand what a contextually-cued proximate mechanism is, in writing "non-human animals have kin-detection devices that are wholly non-cultural". No one is claiming that social mammals have 'cultural' kin detection devices. Nor is it being claimed that kin-detection mechanisms cannot exist (there is significant selection pressure for avoiding inbreeding with close relatives, for example) - why Hamilton says - "we do not expect anything describable as an innate kin recognition adaptation, used for social behaviour other than mating". The question for interpreting IFT is whether the social behaviours of humans (and other primates/social mammals) is predicted to be governed by circumstantial (e.g. location-based) cues - to which the answer is yes, as Hamilton makes clear - and then, to look at the evidence from empirical studies - which also confirms the overwhelming influence of such circumstantial cues. I would suggest that if Memills does not understand these distinctions, then he should revisit the literature. He might start with Holland's thesis, which gives perhaps the most thorough review of the literature to date. Otherwise he might look at the West et al. work referenced in the edit. - DMSchneider (talk) 19:42, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

1. Bowlby, John "Attachment" 1982, P. 57
2. Holland, Maximilian, "Social Bonding and Nurture Kinship: Compatibility between Cultural and Biological Approaches", London School of Economics, PhD Thesis 2004
3. West et al. 2011. Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans. Evolution and Social Behaviour 32 (2011) 231-262
4. Holland, Maximilian, "Social Bonding and Nurture Kinship: Compatibility between Cultural and Biological Approaches", London School of Economics, PhD Thesis 2004
5. Hamilton, W.D. (1987) Discriminating nepotism: expectable, common and overlooked. In Kin recognition in animals, edited by D. J. C. Fletcher and C. D. Michener. New York: Wiley.
6. Holland, Maximilian, "Social Bonding and Nurture Kinship: Compatibility between Cultural and Biological Approaches", London School of Economics, PhD Thesis 2004

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