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Battle of the Kasserine Pass
Part of The Tunisia Campaign
The 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry marching through the Kasserine Pass
Date February 19, 1943 - February 25, 1943 Location Kasserine Pass, Tunisia Result Decisive German victory
Belligerents
United States	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Lloyd Fredendall	Erwin Rommel
Strength
30,000	22,000
Casualties and losses
6,054 dead or wounded 3,700 captured 315 tanks 706 vehicles	352 dead or wounded 258 captured 34 tanks

The Battle for Kasserine Pass took place in World War II during the Tunisia Campaign. It was, in fact, a series of battles fought around Kasserine Pass (a 2 mile wide gap in the Grand Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains) in west central Tunisia. The Axis forces involved were primarily from Germany's Panzer Army Africa led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the Fifth Panzer Army led by General Hans-Jürgen Von Arnim. Allied forces involved came mostly from the US Army's II Corps under Major General Lloyd Fredendall. Significant as the first large scale meeting of American and German forces in World War II, the green and untested American troops suffered heavy casualties and were pushed back over fifty miles from their original positions west of Faid Pass in a humiliating rout. However, Kasserine became a turning point for the US Army in Africa. At the conclusion of fighting around Kasserine, the Americans were able to regroup and repulse veteran German troops at Thala, Sbiba, and Djebel el Hamra.

Background

American and British forces landed at several points along the coast of French Morocco and Algeria on November 8, 1942 during Operation Torch. This came only days after General Bernard Montgomery's breakout in the east following the Second Battle of El Alamein. Understanding the danger of a two-front war, German and Italian troops were ferried in from Sicily to occupy Tunisia, one of the few easily defended areas of North Africa, and only one night's sail from bases in Sicily.

Even after the Torch landings by the Allies, there was little organized defense in the western desert. More importantly, no effort was made by allied naval or air forces to interdict the flow of Axis men and material into Tunis until later in the campaign after sizeable forces had already come ashore. In addition, the Allies moved very slowly to make and maintain contact with the Germans as they tried to negotiate with local Vichy French commanders. Several attempts were made to cut off Tunis before the German troops could arrive in strength, but poor coordination and the excellent defensive terrain allowed the small numbers of German and Italian troops landed there to hold them off.

On January 23, 1943 Montgomery's 8th Army took Tripoli, thereby cutting off Rommel's main supply base. Rommel had planned for this eventuality, intending to block the southern approach to Tunisia by occupying an extensive set of defensive works known as the Mareth Line that the French had constructed in order to fend off an Italian attack from Libya. With their lines steadied by the Atlas Mountains on the west and Gulf of Sidra on the east, even small numbers of German/Italian troops should be able to hold off the Allied forces.

Faïd

Upsetting this plan was the fact that some American troops had already crossed the Atlas Mountains and had set up a forward base of operations at Faïd, in the foothills on the eastern arm of the mountains. This put them in an excellent position to cut Rommel off from the forces further north, and cut his line of supplies. Obviously, this could not be allowed to stand.

The Afrika Korps forces reached the lines on January 30, with the 21st Panzer Division meeting the French defenders at Faïd and rolling over them with little effort. Several attempts were made to stop their advance by the US 1st Armored Division, but all three "Combat Commands" found themselves faced with the classic blitzkrieg, every time they were ordered into position, they would find those positions overrun and were attacked by German defenders with heavy losses. After three days, the US gave up, and the lines were withdrawn into the foothills.

At this point most of Tunisia was now in German hands, and the entrances into the coastal lowlands were all blocked. The US still held the interior of the roughly triangular Atlas range, but this seemed like nothing to worry about and the exits eastward were all blocked. For the next two weeks, Rommel and his commanders further north debated what to do next. Given his later actions, this delay may have proven costly.

Rommel eventually decided that he could improve his supply situation and further erode the American threat to his flank by attacking towards two US supply bases just to the west of the western arm of the mountains in Algeria. Although he had little interest in holding the mountain's interior plains, a quick thrust would gain the supplies, as well as further disrupt any US actions.

On February 14 the 21st Panzer Division once again started moving west, attacking Sidi Bou Zid, about 10 miles from Faïd in the interior plain of the Atlas Mountains. The battle raged for a day, but poor use of armor by the US led to their defeat, and by the end of the day, the field was won by the Afrika Korps. A counterattack the next day was beaten off with ease, and on February 16, the Germans started forward again to take Sbeitla.

With no defensive terrain left, the US forces retreated to set up new lines at the more easily defended Kasserine Pass on the western arm of the mountains. By this point, the US forces had lost 2,546 men, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, 3 anti-tank guns, and an entire anti-aircraft battery.

Kasserine

On February 19, Rommel launched several probes, and decided that the Kasserine Pass remained the easiest place for an assault. The next day he personally led the attack by the recently formed-up 10th Panzer Division, hoping to take the supply dumps, while the 21st Panzer Division continued attacks northward through the Sbiba gap.

Within minutes, the US lines were broken. Their light guns and tanks had no chance against the heavier German equipment, and they had little or no experience in armoured warfare. The German Panzer IVs and Tiger tanks fended off all attacks with ease; the M3 Lee and M3 Stuart tanks they faced were inferior in firepower and their crews were far less experienced. Meanwhile US commanders radioed higher command for permission to arrange a counterattack or artillery barrage, often receiving a go-ahead after the lines had already passed them. Once again, the 1st Armored Division found itself ordered into useless positions and by the second day of the offensive two of their three Combat Commands had been mauled while the third was generally out of action.

After breaking into the pass, the German forces divided into two groups, each advancing up one of the two roads leading out of the pass to the northwest. Rommel stayed with the main group of the 10th Panzer Division on the northern of the two roads towards Thala, while a composite Italian/German force took the southern road toward Haidra. To combat the southern force, the remaining Combat Command B of the 1st Armored drove 20 miles to face them on February 20, but found themselves unable to stop the advance the next day.

Morale among the US troops started to fall precipitously, and by the evening, many troops had pulled back, leaving their equipment on the field. The Pass was now completely open, and it appeared the dump at Tébessa was within grasp. Desperate defenses by isolated groups left behind in the action seriously slowed the German advance however, and on the second day cleanup, operations were still underway while the armored spearhead continued up the roads.

By the night of February 21, the 10th Panzer Division was just outside the small town of Thala, with two road links to Tébessa. If the town fell and the German division decided to move on the southernmost of the two roads, the US 9th Infantry Division to the north would be cut off from their supplies, and Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division would be trapped between the 10th Panzer division and their supporting units moving north along the second road. That night small units of British, French and US forces freed from the line to the north were sent into the lines at Thala piecemeal. The entire divisional artillery of the US 9th Infantry Division, 48 guns strong, was enplaced that night. When the battle reopened the next day, the defenses were much stronger; the frontline was held largely by British infantry with exceptionally strong backing by US artillery.

Overextended and undersupplied, Rommel decided to end the offensive. Fearing that the approaching British 8th Army would be able to cross the Mareth Line unless it was reinforced, he disengaged from the operation and started to retreat east. On February 23, a massive US air attack on the Pass hastened the German retreat, and by the end of February 25, the pass had been retaken.

Aftermath

After the battle, both sides studied the results. Rommel was contemptuous of both the US equipment and fighting ability, and considered them a non-threat. The US studied the results in even more depth, and immediately started improvements in its forces. Most importantly, the Corps commander, Lloyd S. Fredendall, was relieved and sent to a non-combat assignment. General George S. Patton was placed in command of II Corps with the explicit task of improving performance. General Omar N. Bradley was appointed assistant Corps Commander and would eventually command II Corps himself. Several other officers were removed or promoted. General Stafford Leroy Irwin, who commanded the 9th Division artillery at Kasserine, became a successful Division commander. Commanders were given greater latitude to make on-the-spot decisions without having to ask higher command, and were urged to keep command posts well forward. In contrast, Fredendall had built an elaborate, fortified headquarters a great distance behind the front. Efforts were made to allow for massed on-call artillery and air support which had previously been difficult to coordinate. While US on-call artillery practices improved dramatically, the problem of coordinating close air support was not satisfactorily resolved until the Battle of Normandy over a year later. Emphasis was also placed on keeping units together, rather than assigning elements of each Division to separate tasks as Fredendall had done.

Equipment was also to be addressed. The Sherman tank had always been planned as the standard medium tank, and the older M-3 Lee was phased out by the end of the campaign. The M-3 halftrack based Tank Destroyers were seen as too vulnerable to enemy fire, and were gradually phased out in favor of the better-armed and more mobile M-10 Tank destroyer. The T-48 half-track anti-aircraft vehicle performed well, leading to greatly-increased production of additional M-15, M-15A1, and M-16 AA halftracks. Personnel-carrying halftracks such as the M3 and M-2 were not popular with all troops and commanders. General Omar N. Bradley was told by one soldier that they were "purple heart boxes", and some commanders considered the high maintenance burden of the halftracks to be unjustified when compared to ordinary trucks. However, the US Army concluded that the halftracks had been mis-used and mis-understood, and armored halftracks remained in US Armored Infantry battalions for the remainder of the war. US artillery performed well and remained one of the strongest combat arms for the remainder of the war. By the time US forces fought at El Guettar and later in Sicily, performance had greatly improved.

For the immediate battle, Eisenhower decided to place most of the US troops under British command of Harold Alexander. The arrival of George S. Patton returned command to the US, and soon their forces were improving dramatically. By the middle of March, they resumed offensive operations with considerably greater effectiveness, slowly pushing the German forces out of their defenses, until they decided to retreat to northern Tunisia in early May.

Popular Culture

In the Academy Award winning film Patton, the opening scene (following the famous pre-credits opening speech by Patton) shows General Omar Bradley (played by Karl Malden) surveying the American losses after the Battle of Kasserine Pass.

In Saving Private Ryan, Sgt. Horvath mentions that he has been with the captain (Captain John H. Miller) since Kasserine Pass.

References

• Martin Blumenson. Kasserine Pass. ISBN 0815410999.
• George F. Howe (1957). Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. Center for Military History, United States Army.

External links

• Entry in the Leaders & Battles Database
• Kasserine Pass Battles ( eBook hosted by the U.S. Army)

• Tunisia Campaign
• Battles of the United States