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| ⚫ | ==Background and development== | ||
| ] | |||
| A precursor of modern public choice theory was ] (1896),<ref>Knut Wicksell (1896 ). "A New Principle of Just Taxation," J.M. Buchanan, trans., in ] and ], ed. (1958). ''Classics in the Theory of Public Finance'', Palgrave Macmillan, an essay from Wicksell (1896), ''Finanzthcoretische Untersuchungen'', Jena: Gustav Fischer.</ref> which treated government as political exchange, a '']'', in formulating a ] linking taxes and expenditures.<ref>• ] (1976). "Public Choice: A Survey," ''Journal of Economic Literature'', 14(2), p. 396. ]<br /> • James M. Buchanan(1986). IV. Politics as Exchange & V. The Constitution of Economic Policy, Nobel Prize lecture. Republished in 1987, ''American Economic Review'', 77(3), pp. -250.</ref> | |||
| ⚫ | ==Background== | ||
| A notable precursor to modern public choice theory was ] (1896) who treated government as political exchange '']''.<ref>] (1976). "Public Choice: A Survey," ''Journal of Economic Literature'', 14(2), p. 396. </ref> Still, subsequent work was described as treating government as though attempting "to maximize some sort of welfare function" and as apart from considerations driving ], such as businessmen.<ref name="Tullock2008"/> This contrasted with public choice theory in modeling perspective of government bureaucrats and politicians who compose them on the assumption that they acted in a self-interested way for the purpose of enhancing their own power and influence, for example based on a ] or game-theoretic framework. | |||
| Some subsequent economic analysis has been described as treating government as though it attempted "to maximize some kind sort of welfare function for society" and as distinct from characterizations of ], such as those in business.<ref name="Tullock2008">], ]] 2008, "public choice," '']''. .</ref> In contrast, public choice theory modeled government as made up of officials who, besides pursuing the public interest, might act to benefit themselves, for example in the ] of ], possibly at the cost of ]<ref name="Niskanen">William A. Niskanen ( 1994). ''Bureaucracy and Public Economics'', Elgar. Expanded ed. Description and review and review .</ref><ref name="Tullock2008"/> | |||
| There are also Austrian variants of public choice theory (suggested by ], ], ], Lopez, and ]) in which it is assumed that bureaucrats and politicians may be benevolent but have access to limited information. The assumption that such benevolent political agents possess limited information for making decisions often results in conclusions similar to those generated separately by means of the rational self-interest assumptions. ] and ] have also developed the notion of "]".{{citation needed|date=June 2012}} | |||
| Modern public-choice theory has been dated from the work of ]. In a series of papers from 1948, which culminated in ''The Theory of Committees and Elections'' (1958),<ref>Duncan Black (1958). ''The Theory of Committees and Elections'', Cambridge. and </ref> and later, Black outlined a program of unification toward a more general "Theory | |||
| ==Development== | |||
| of Economic and Political Choices" based on common formal methods, developed underlying concepts of what would become ], and rediscovered earlier works on voting theory.<ref>Duncan Black (1948a). "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, ''Journal of Political Economy'', 56(1), pp. -34.<br /> • _____ (1948b). "The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority," ''Econometrica'',16(3), pp. -261.<br /> • _____ (1950). "The Unity of Political and Economic Science," ''Economic Journal'', 60(239), pp. -514.<br /> • _____ (1969). "Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games," ''American Economic Review'', 59(2), pp. .</ref><ref>Bernard Grofman ( 2008). "Black, Duncan (1908–1991)", ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics'', 2nd Edition. Preview . </ref><ref name="Tullock2008"/> | |||
| Work on public choice theory began with ], who in 1948 identified the underlying concepts of what would become ]. He also wrote ''The Theory of Committees and Elections'' in 1958. ] refers to him as the "father of public choice theory".<ref name="Tullock2008"/> | |||
| ⚫ | ]'s '']'' (1951) influenced formulation of the theory. Among other important works are ] (1957) '']'' and ] (1965) '']'' .<ref name="Olson">Mancur Olson, Jr. ( 1971). ''The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups'', 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, , , and .</ref> | ||
| ⚫ | ] and Gordon Tullock coauthored '']'' (1962), considered one of the landmarks in public choice |
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| ⚫ | ] and Gordon Tullock coauthored '']'' (1962), considered one of the landmarks in public choice. In particular, the Preface describes the book as "about the ''political organization''" of a free society. But its methodology, conceptual apparatus, and analytics "are derived, essentially, from the discipline that has as its subject the ''economic'' organization of such a society" (1962, p. ). The book focuses on ] analysis as to the development of constitutional democracy but in an ethical context of consent. The consent takes the form of a ] like ] for making a policy change and unanimity or at least no opposition as a point of departure for social choice. | ||
| ⚫ | ]'s '']'' (1951) influenced formulation of the theory. Among other important works are ] |
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| Somewhat later, the ] started to displace the median voter theory in showing how to find ] in multidimensional space. The theory was later formalized further by Peter Coughlin.<ref>Peter J. Coughlin (1991). ''Probabilistic Voting Theory'', Cambridge. and chapter-preview .</ref> | |||
| ==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
Latest revision as of 01:40, 1 March 2013
Background and development
A precursor of modern public choice theory was Knut Wicksell (1896), which treated government as political exchange, a quid pro quo, in formulating a benefit principle linking taxes and expenditures.
Some subsequent economic analysis has been described as treating government as though it attempted "to maximize some kind sort of welfare function for society" and as distinct from characterizations of economic agents, such as those in business. In contrast, public choice theory modeled government as made up of officials who, besides pursuing the public interest, might act to benefit themselves, for example in the budget-maximizing model of bureaucracy, possibly at the cost of efficiency.
Modern public-choice theory has been dated from the work of Duncan Black. In a series of papers from 1948, which culminated in The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958), and later, Black outlined a program of unification toward a more general "Theory of Economic and Political Choices" based on common formal methods, developed underlying concepts of what would become median voter theory, and rediscovered earlier works on voting theory.
Kenneth J. Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) influenced formulation of the theory. Among other important works are Anthony Downs (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy and Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action .
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock coauthored The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962), considered one of the landmarks in public choice. In particular, the Preface describes the book as "about the political organization" of a free society. But its methodology, conceptual apparatus, and analytics "are derived, essentially, from the discipline that has as its subject the economic organization of such a society" (1962, p. v). The book focuses on positive-economic analysis as to the development of constitutional democracy but in an ethical context of consent. The consent takes the form of a compensation principle like Pareto efficiency for making a policy change and unanimity or at least no opposition as a point of departure for social choice.
Somewhat later, the probabilistic voting theory started to displace the median voter theory in showing how to find Nash equilibria in multidimensional space. The theory was later formalized further by Peter Coughlin.
Notes
- Knut Wicksell (1896 ). "A New Principle of Just Taxation," J.M. Buchanan, trans., in Richard A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, ed. (1958). Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Palgrave Macmillan, an essay from Wicksell (1896), Finanzthcoretische Untersuchungen, Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- • Dennis C. Mueller (1976). "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, 14(2), p. 396.
• James M. Buchanan(1986). "The Constitution of Economic Policy," IV. Politics as Exchange & V. The Constitution of Economic Policy, Nobel Prize lecture. Republished in 1987, American Economic Review, 77(3), pp. 243-250. - ^ Gordon Tullock, 2008, "public choice," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Abstract.
- William A. Niskanen ( 1994). Bureaucracy and Public Economics, Elgar. Expanded ed. Description and review links and review excerpts.
- Duncan Black (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge. Description and preview.
- Duncan Black (1948a). "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), pp. 23-34.
• _____ (1948b). "The Decisions of a Committee Using a Special Majority," Econometrica,16(3), pp. 245-261.
• _____ (1950). "The Unity of Political and Economic Science," Economic Journal, 60(239), pp. 506-514.
• _____ (1969). "Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games," American Economic Review, 59(2), pp. 206-210.. - Bernard Grofman ( 2008). "Black, Duncan (1908–1991)", The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Preview link.
- Mancur Olson, Jr. ( 1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 2nd ed. Harvard University Press, Description, Table of Contents, and preview.
- Peter J. Coughlin (1991). Probabilistic Voting Theory, Cambridge. Description and chapter-preview links.