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For other uses of "Operation Citadel", see Operation Citadel (disambiguation)

Battle of Kursk Operation Citadel
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
SS Panzergrenadiers with a Tiger I of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich during the Battle of Kursk
Date German offensive: 5–16 July 1943 Soviet offensive: 12 July – 23 August 1943 Location Kursk, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Result Decisive Soviet victory Germany's offensive power in the Eastern Front is crippled Territorial changes Soviets retake some territory along a 2,000 km (1,200 mi) broad front
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein Günther von Kluge Hermann Hoth Werner Kempf Walther Model Erich-Heinrich Clößner Walter Weiß Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen Robert Ritter von Greim Hans Seidemann Paul Deichmann	Georgy Zhukov Konstantin Rokossovsky Nikolay Vatutin Aleksandr Vasilevsky Ivan Konev
Strength
912,460 men 2,928 tanks 9,966 guns and mortars 2,110 aircraft	1,910,361 men 5,128 tanks 25,013 guns and mortars 2,792 to 3,549 aircraft
Casualties and losses
Operation Citadel: 54,182 men 323 tanks and assault guns 159 aircraft ~500 guns Battle of Kursk: 203,000 casualties 760 tanks and assault guns 681 aircraft	Operation Citadel: 177,847 men 1,614 – 1,956 tanks and assault guns 459 – 1,961 aircraft 3,929 guns Battle of Kursk: 863,303 casualties 6,064 tanks and assault guns 1,626 aircraft 5,244 guns

The Battle of Kursk was a World War II engagement between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front near the city of Kursk, (450 kilometers or 280 miles southwest of Moscow) in the Soviet Union in July and August 1943. The German offensive was code named Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle) and would lead to both one of the largest armoured clashes, the battle of Prokhorovka, in history. The German offensive eventually provoked two Soviet counteroffensives code-named Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev (Template:Lang-ru) and Operation Kutuzov (Template:Lang-ru). The battle saw the final strategic offensive the Germans were able to mount in the east, and the decisive Soviet victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative for the rest of the war.

The Germans hoped to shorten their lines by eliminating the Kursk Salient (also known as the Kursk Bulge), which had been created in the aftermath of their defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad. They envisioned pincers breaking through its northern and southern flanks to encircle the Soviet forces in the salient. The Soviets, however, had intelligence of the German intentions, provided in part by the British. This, and German delays in waiting for new weapons, mainly the Tiger heavy tank and the new Panther medium tank, gave the Red Army plenty of time to construct a series of defensive lines and gather large reserve forces for a strategic counteroffensive.

Aware that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient months in advance, the Soviets designed a plan to slow, exhaust, and progressively wear down the powerful German panzer spearheads by forcing them to attack through a vast interconnected web of minefields, and defensive strong points, which included pre-sighted artillery fire zones and anti-tank strong points comprising progressively spaced defensive belts approximately 300 km (190 mi) deep.

When the German forces exhausted themselves, the Soviets responded with counter-offensives, which allowed the Red Army to retake Orel and Belgorod on 5 August and Kharkov on 23 August and push the Germans back across a broad front. Although the Red Army had some successes in previous winters, the later stage of this battle was the first successful Soviet strategic summer offensive of the war. The Battle of Kursk was the first time in which a German strategic offensive had been defeated before it could break through enemy defences and into its strategic depths.

Background

In the winter of early 1943, the Red Army emerged victorious in the Battle of Stalingrad after encircling and destroying the 6th Army and elements of the 4th Panzer Army. The battle cost the Germans and Axis about 800,000 casualties (killed, wounded or captured) and around 1.1 million for the Soviets. Following the defeat at Stalingrad, in addition to the relentless Soviet offensives that had started in the winter of late 1942, the Germans were pushed onto the strategic and operational defensive along the entire eastern front. With the destruction of the 8th Italian and 2nd Hungarian Armies during Operation Little Saturn, by January 1943 a huge hole – 160 to 300 km (99 to 186 mi) wide – was torn between Army Group B and Army Group Don. This threatened to isolate all the German troops south of the Don River, including Army Group A. On 8 February Kursk fell to the Soviets, Rostov on the 14th and Kharkov on the 18th. In the sector of Army Group Center, the newly created Central Front – formed through the release of forces after the victory at Stalingrad – made preparations for an offensive in cooperation with the Bryansk and Western Fronts, which envisioned a gigantic encirclement of Army Group Center extending from Bryansk to Smolensk.

By February 1943 the situation had approached a crisis point for the Wehrmacht. On 12 February the chain of command in the south was restructured. Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South, and Army Group B together with its area of responsibility was abolished and divided between Army Group Center and the new Army Group South. With this restructuring, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, (who became commander of Army Group South), inherited the responsibility for the gaping hole in the German line. Divisions were scraped together by thinning out non-threatened sectors and ad-hoc units were formed which attempted to blunt the Soviet advance.

In January 1943, the SS Panzer Corps had arrived from France, fresh and up to strength. Other armoured units from the 1st Panzer Army, which had just barely escaped from the Caucasus, arrived from Army Group A to reinforce Mainstein's forces.

Just hours before the fall of Kharkov to the Soviets, a severely perturbed Adolf Hitler arrived at the headquarters of the newly designated Army Group South at Zaporizhia to discuss the unravelling situation. Joseph Goebbels's diary suggests that Hitler had intended to sack Manstein for withdrawing from Kharkov without orders. In the meeting, Manstein argued for a counterstroke aimed at exploiting the Soviets' overstretched lines, and eventually retake Kharkov and then Kursk. The attack began on 19 February, spearheaded by the three SS-panzergrenadier divisions. A brilliantly conceived and executed thrust first stabilized the front by demolishing the Soviet spearhead, then encircled and destroyed the main body of the attacking troops before advancing to retake Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod on the 18th.

By the end of March, an end to the offensive was necessitated by the spring rasputitsa and exhaustion of the Wehrmacht, which in many aspects mirrored the general situation of the Red Army as well. The Germans had failed to retake the town of Kursk, and left a massive salient centered around the town and bulging into the German lines. However, the offensive succeeded in wresting the initiative from the Soviets and also spoiled the planned attack of the Central Front against Army Group Center, which had actually been launched on 25 February with considerable success but was quickly abandoned on 7 March, since forces had to be redeployed to the south to counter the threat posed by the advance of Manstein's forces. In the pause both sides began planning and making preparations for their summer campaigns.

German plans and preparation

In view of the exposure of Army Group South, Manstein had proposed the German army take the strategic defensive. In February he proposed awaiting the pending Soviet offensive and then deliver a series of counterattacks into their exposed flanks. This was rejected by Hitler as he was concerned of political implications of taking the defensive stance, and he was pre-occupied with the economic potential of holding the Donetz basin. On 10 March Manstein presented Hitler with an alternative plan whereby the German forces pinched off the Kursk Salient that had developed as a result of the winter attacks towards Kharkov and Belgorod. The offensive was to commence as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided. On 13 March, Operational Order No. 5 was signed by Hitler, which outlined the intention to launch a number of offensives, including one against the Kursk salient. On 14 March, as the SS Panzer Corps mopped up the last enemy resistance in Kharkov, Manstein attmpted to persuad Field Marshal Günther von Kluge of Army Group Centre to immediately attack the Central Front holding the northern face of the Kursk salient. Kluge refused, noting that his forces were too weak to launch such an attack. Manstein's SS Panzer Corps pushed on northwards and took Belgorod on 18 March but was stalled by the appearance of Soviet forces that had been rushed down from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod. Bad weather and the exhaustion of the German forces ensured that no further operations were possible. By mid-April, with the weather still poor and the German forces still in need of refitting, the offensives of Operational Order No. 5 could not be undertaken.

A new operational order, Operational Order No. 6, was released dated 15 April. It called for the offensive to begin by 3 May, as it was deemed critically important to attack before the Soviets had a chance to dig-in or launch their own offensive. The offensive was to cut off Soviet forces massing in the salient for offensive operations. The northern pincer was formed by the 9th Army, under the command of General Walter Model, which was to cut through the northern face of the salient and drive south toward Kursk. Meanwhile Army Group South, commanded by Manstein, would use the 4th Panzer Army (Hermann Hoth) and Army Detachment "Kempf" (Werner Kempf) to penetrate the southern face of the salient, driving northwards to Kursk. The western face of the salient was to be kept in check by the 2nd Army (commanded by Walter Weiß).

Hitler and OKW (German Supreme Headquarters) were hopeful that the offensive would revitalize German strategic fortunes in the East. As the start date of the operation approached, Hitler postponed the operation to await the arrival of new weapons that he believed were the key to victory, namely the Panzerkampfwagen VI (Tiger I), the Panzerjäger Tiger (P) (Elefant or Ferdinand), and the ']. After failing to commence the operation on 3 May, a conference from 3 to 4 May decided upon 12 June as the new launch date. This date would also not be met due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy and delays in deliveries of new tanks; hence Hitler again postponed the launch date to 20 June. On 17–18 June, following a discussion with the OKW Operations Staff to abandon the offensive, he further postponed it until 3 July. It was not until 1 July that Hitler announced 5 July, as the final launch date.

According to Friedrich von Mellenthin, "Model produced air photographs which showed that the Russians were constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and had withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk." On 27 April Model met with Hitler to review the reconnasiance and express his concerns. Model argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the justification for launching the offensive. He recommended Citadel be completely abandoned, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive. Failing that he believed the Citadel operation should be radically revised.Glantz & House (2004, p. 387)}}

Kurt Zeitzler (Chief of the OKH General Staff) was the nominal author of the Citadel plan, and as such was in full support of the offensive. Hitler acknowledged both Zeitzler's plan and Model's objections to it as worthy of consideration; and therefore, in the conference of senior officers and Eastern Front commanders held from 3 to 4 May, he presented both proposals. The opinions of the audience was divided between three main options: an immediate offensive, a delayed offensive to enable better preparation, and a complete cancellation of the Citadel offensive for a defensive operation or a radically revised offensive operation. Manstein, Model and Heinz Guderian, among others, favoured the third option. Hans Jeschonnek (Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff) argued for the first option, which several others present in the conference supported. Kluge and some others strongly argued for the second option, Wilhelm Keitel (Chief-of-Staff at OKW), later insisted that any of the options besides the third would suffice. Ultimately, the conference ended without reaching a unanimous consensus, but the Citadel plan remained in effect.

Though in mid April Manstein had considered the Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings. He more strongly believed that the German forces should now go on onto the strategic defensive to allow the anticipated Soviet offensive to weaken their forces on German defences and then deliver strong counterblows with flanking attacks against the Soviet penetration. He was convinced that the Red Army would deliver its main effort against Army Group South and therefore proposed to keep the left wing of the army group strong while retreating the right wing to the Dnieper River, followed by massive counter-blows to the flank of the Red Army advance. This idea was rejected by Hitler, as he did not want to give up so much terrain, even temporarily.

Guderian, just like many German senior officers, believed that resources should be conserved for the defence of Western Europe. Therefore in a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked: "Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?" Hitler replied: "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach." Guderian concluded "In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it alone."

Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. As the challenges offered by the operation increased he came to focus more and more on the new weapons. The Germans received reports of powerful Soviet concentrations in the Kursk area and hence delayed the offensive to allow for more of the new tanks to reach the front. The weeks leading up to the attack saw a massive build-up of troops and resources by both sides, and simultaneously the frequency of partisan attacks on German supply lines reached new heights. For June 1943 alone, in the occupied area behind Army Group Centre, 298 locomotives, 1,222 rail wagons and 44 bridges were destroyed by partisans; in the Kursk sector there were 1,092 partisan attacks against railways in the same month.

The total German forces that were slated for Operation Citadel (under 4th Panzer Army, Army Detachment "Kempf", 2nd Army and 9th Army), numbered around fifty divisions, including 12 panzer and five panzergrenadier divisions. By the time the German buildup was completed for the final launch date, it amounted to about 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and assault guns (70% of German armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mortars.{{refn|group=nb|According to Zetterling & Frankson (2000, p. 18) these figures are for 1 July 1943 and accounts for only units that eventually fought in Operation Citadel (4th Panzer Army, part of Army Detachment "Kempf", 2nd Army and 9th Army); the figure for German manpower refers to ration strength (which includes non-combatants and wounded soldiers still in medical installations; the figure for guns and mortars are estimates based on the strength and number of units slated for the operation; the figure for tanks and assault guns include those in workshops.) It was the largest assemblage of German armour yet brought together for a single offensive.

Soviet plans and preparation

In spring 1943, the Red Army, specifically the Central, Bryansk and Western Fronts, had made preparations for a spring offensive against Army Group Centre which was eventually abandoned in early March shortly after it began, when the southern flank of the Central Front was threatened by Army Group South. Several senior officers, like Nikolai Vatutin and Mikhail Malinin, argued for a resumption of the offensives that were snuffed out by the Germans in March once the rasputitsa ended.

However, any plans of an offensive were put on hold as Moscow received warnings from Soviet intelligence about the massive German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an intended German offensive in the Kursk sector through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland and also from the Government Code and Cypher School operating at Bletchley Park in the United Kingdom. The Soviets also verified the intelligence with their spy in the Government Code and Cypher School – John Cairncross – who routinely forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow via clandestine means. Anastas Mikoyan wrote in his memoirs that on 27 March 1943 he was notified by Stalin in general details about a possible German attack in the Kursk sector. Georgiy Zhukov, the Deputy Supreme Commander, had already predicted the site of the German attack as early as 8 April, recommending to Stalin and Stavka (the Red Army General Staff), a defensive strategy:

The first phase of the enemy's plan will be to collect the best of their forces, including 13-15 tank divisions, and with the support of a large number of aircraft would envelop Kursk from the northeast with their Kromskom-Orel grouping and also from the southeast with their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping.

Although Stalin and some of the senior officers in Stavka were eager to strike first, the majority, including Zhukov, advised a more cautious approach. In the same letter to Stavka and Stalin on 8 April, Zhukov also wrote:

I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to an offensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force.

At first, Stalin did not accept Zhukov's conclusion for a defensive strategy. However, from 12 to 15 April 1943, Stalin consulted the opinions of the Soviet Front commanders and senior officers of the General Staff, and by the end of the meeting Stavka had agreed that Kursk was the likely German target. The final decision arrived-at by Stavka was to meet the enemy attack in a well-prepared defensive bridgehead, bleed the attacking German groupings dry, and then launch a general offensive. Hence before the end of April, systematic preparation of defences and fortifications had begun, and this work continued until the German attack in early July.

Stalin frequently expressed concerns that the decision to defend was tantamount to handing the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov later commented that going to the defensive did not relinquish the initiative to the Germans, but instead they were being drawn into a carefully devised trap, which aimed to destroy their armoured power and create the conditions for a major Soviet offensive.

The pattern of the war up to this point had been one of German offensive success in spring or summer. Operation Citadel was to be another demonstration of the 'blitzkrieg', a demonstration that had occurred annually every spring or summer since the start of World War II, and had reaped immediate victories against all opponents including the Red Army. Every one of the past annual demonstrations, even if they had not all resulted in strategic success, at least produced astonishing operational and tactical success in their early and intermediate stages. But in 1943, for the first time, the Red Army confidently envisioned stopping the 'blitzkrieg' in its early stages. In order to achieve this, immense defensive preparations were made in the salient. The two-month delay of the launch of the offensive gave the Red Army ample time to thoroughly prepare the salient. The Voronezh Front (commanded by Vatutin), was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front (commanded by [[Konstantin Rokossovsky), the northern face of the salient. Waiting in reserve deep behind the salient for the Germans, should they breach the defences manned by the Central and Voronezh Fronts, was the Steppe Front (commanded by Ivan Konev).

The Central Front had been reconstructed from the Don Front in February 1943, which itself had been part of the northern pincer of Operation Uranus and was responsible for the reduction of the 6th Army in the Stalingrad pocket. Hence, some of the troops of the Central Front assigned to the defence of the northern face of the Kursk salient were veterans of the latter stage of the Battle of Stalingrad.

To meet the German attack, with the labour of over 300,000 civilians, the Central and Voronezh Fronts, each constructed three main (or army) defensive echelons (or lines or belts) in their sectors, with each echelon subdivided into several layers (or zones) of strong fortifications. Fortifying each echelon were an interconnected web of minefields, barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches, deep entrenchments for infantry, anti-tank obstacles, dug-in armoured vehicles and machine gun bunkers. Behind the three main defensive belts were three rear (or front) more belts, of which the first was not fully occupied nor heavily fortified like the main defensive positions; the last two belts, although sufficiently fortified, were not occupied at all with the exception of a small area in the immediate environs of Kursk. The combined depth of the three main defensive zones on each face of the salient were about 40 kilometres; and in addition to the three succeeding rear defensive sectors, all six defensive positions on either side of Kursk were 130-150 kilometres deep. But even if the Germans did break-in all the way to Kursk, they would still be confronted by additional defensive belts to the east of the salient manned by the Steppe Front; these belts brought the total depth of defences on the path of the hypothetical German advance to nearly 300 kilometers.

The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army combat engineers was thorough. 503,663 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid, mostly in the first main defensive belt, more than 3,000 miles of trenches were dug,; they were laid out in criss-cross pattern for the defenders to move easily about. The minefields at Kursk achieved densities of about 1,700 anti-personnel and 1,500 anti-tank mines per kilometer of front, which is about four times that used in the defence of Moscow; the highest density of mines were in the first defensive belt. For example, The 6th Guards Army (of the Voronezh Front), spread out on nearly 40 miles of front, was protected in its first defensive belt by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines, and another 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt.

In addition to the mines laid in advance, mobile obstacle detachments were tasked with laying more mines directly in the path of advancing armoured formations, which would paralyse the enemy's manoeuvrability. The mobile obstacle detachments functioned as anti-tank reserves at every level of command, consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with mines at division level and one company of combat engineers normally equipped with 500-700 mines at corps level.

In the same letter to Stavka and Stalin on 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germans would attack the salient with a very strong armoured force:

We can expect the enemy to put greatest reliance in this year's offensive operations on his tank divisions and air force since his infantry appears to be far less prepared for offensive operations than last year... In view of this threat, we should strengthen the anti-tank defences of the Central and Voronezh fronts, and assemble as soon as possible.

So much attention was given to anti-tank defences that nearly all artillery, whether howitzer, gun, rocket, or anti-aircraft, was tasked with the role of anti-tank defence. In addition, dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns further strengthened the anti-tank defences. The anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level of command, and the majority of ant-itank units were organized and deployed as strongpoints and anti-tank regions (i.e. several anti-tank strongpoints packed into a narrow front), concentrated on likely attack routes and amply spread out in the rest of the defence belts. Each anti-tank strongpoint typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles, five to seven heavy and light machine guns, they were supported by combat engineers of the mobile obstacle detachments as well as infantry equipped with automatic weapons; and typically, an anti-tank region was centered around an artillery battalion (a group of artillery batteries). In addition to these, independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry for counterattacks.

To psychologically equip the infantry manning the defences, special training to overcome the notorious tank phobia that had been evident since the German invasion were conducted in every front-line formation in the salient. Soldiers were packed into trenches and tanks were driven over it, it was then repeated until all signs of fear was gone; and in real combat, the soldiers would then spring up in the midst of the supporting infantry to separate them from the spearheading armoured vehicles which could then be disabled or destroyed at pointblank range. These tactics would be used very successfully against Ferdinands, which once isolated from its supporting infantry, become hopelessly vulnerable – due to its lack of secondary armament like machine guns – to infantry armed with anti-tank rifles, demolition charges and Molotov cocktails.

In preparation for the attack, the Soviets employed a number of maskirovka or deception techniques to mask defensive positions, troop dispositions and to conceal the movement of men and materiel. These included camouflaging gun implacements, constructing dummy airfields, generating false radio traffic to create the appearance of false troop concentrations, and spreading rumours among the Soviet front line troops and the civilian population in the German held areas. Movement of forces to and from the salient was carried out only at night. The same was true of supplies, and ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with the landscape. Radio transmission was forbidden. No fires were permitted, and all command posts were hidden or placed in villages, with daytime movement to them forbidden. The result was not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.

So succesful were Soviet efforts at deception that German estimates issued immediately prior to the offensive placed total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks. Without including their deeper reserve forces organized under the Steppe Front, the Soviets had massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft in the defence of the salient. This amounted to 26% of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26% of its mortars and artillery, 35% of its aircraft, and 46% of its tanks. The appearance of fresh Soviet formations a week into the heavy fighting which had worn down their own strength proved extremely discouraging to German panzer crews.

State of the Luftwaffe and Soviet Air Force

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In the early stages of the war, the Red Air Force, while numerically superior, suffered from a lack of training, poor operational management and obsolete aircraft. By 1943 Allied actions in Western Europe were beginning to have an impact on German military strength. Although actions in North Africa hardly constituted Stalin's much demanded second front, the operations in the Mediterranean and Africa did begin to take a toll on German strength. Air losses in the Luftwaffe were significant, with 40% of their air casualties in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943 occurring in the battles over Malta and Tunisia. German air superiority, a tenuous proposition from the outset, was no longer a certainty over the area of operation. The Soviet Air Force outnumbered the Luftwaffe and was gaining in quality as well. Both air forces possessed effective ground-attack aircraft capable of destroying armour: the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the German Junkers Ju 87G Stuka (Initially the Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added Bordkanone 3,7 cm calibre cannon in underslung podss).

The Red Air Force improved throughout the war, and by the Battle of Kursk neither side had anything other than local air supremacy. With the coming of 1943, more modern aircraft were available to Soviet pilots, such as the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 fighters. Pilot training also improved to some degree. In the battle, both German and Soviet formations suffered from many air attacks.

Opposing forces

Wehrmacht

Red Army

Comparison of strength

German offensive phase

For their attack, the Wehrmacht used three armies and a large proportion of their tanks on the eastern front. The 9th Army in the north had 335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers), and in the south the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 223,907 men (149,271) and 100,000 men (66,000) respectively, a grand total of 778,907 men (518,271) for all three armies.

The Red Army used two Fronts (the equivalent of Army Groups) for the defence, and one Front as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts fielded 12 armies. The Central Front had 711,575 men (510,983 combat soldiers), the Voronezh Front had 625,591 men (446,236) and the Steppe Front had 573,195 men (449,133) for a grand total of 1,910,361 (1,426,352).

Soviet offensive phase

When the Red Army launched their counteroffensive in the north, the German 2nd Panzer Army was attacked by two Soviet Fronts: Bryansk and Western Front. The 107,000 men of the 2nd Panzer Army and some reinforcements in the south brought the Wehrmacht troops to approximately 950,000 men (approximately 650,000 combat soldiers). The two Soviet Fronts brought the Red Army to 2,629,458 men (1,987,463 combat soldiers).

Overview of sub-operations

For the Wehrmacht, the Battle of Kursk was the strategic offensive Operation Citadel (Template:Lang-de).

For the Soviets, the Battle of Kursk was a part of the series of operations conducted during the Summer–Autumn Campaign of 1943 (1 July – 31 December) and it is subdivided as:

• Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation (includes the German Operation Citadel) (5–23 July 1943)

Orel-Kursk Defensive Operation (5–11 July)

Belgorod-Kursk Defensive Operation (5–23 July)

Battle of Prokhorovka (12 July 1943)

Aerial operations over the Kursk Bulge (5–23 July)

• Orel Strategic Counter-Offensive Operation (Operation Kutuzov) (12 July – 18 August 1943)

Volkhov-Orel Offensive Operation (12 July – 18 August)

Kromy-Orel Offensive Operation (15 July – 18 August)

Aerial operations in Operation Kutuzov

• Belgorod–Kharkov Counter-Offensive Offensive Operation (Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev) (3–23 August 1943)

Belgorod–Bogodukhov Offensive Operation (3–23 August)

Belgorod–Kharkov Offensive Operation (3–23 August)

Zmiyev Offensive Operation (12–23 August)

Aerial operations in Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

The exact definition of the battle varies. The Germans saw it only as Operation Citadel (4 to 16 July), while Soviet and Russian historians continue today to combine Citadel and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives, Operation Kutsuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, as a single strategic event (4 July to 23 August).

Prelude

It took two months of delay before the Germans were ready to attack, by which time the they had added 90 Ferdinand Panzerjägers (tank destroyers), all 79 flyable Henschel Hs 129, as well as 270 Tigers, late-model Panzer Mark IVs and even a number of captured T-34s. In total, they assembled some 3,000 tanks and assault guns, 2,110 aircraft and 777,000 men.

The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on 1 July, Hitler announced 5 July as the start date. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from the Red Orchestra spy ring, the Government Code and Cypher School (as well as a Soviet spy in it) operating at Bletchley Park in the UK0, and the Lucy spy ring whose sources allegedly included officers in the German aviation ministry and other parts of the Nazi administration. Moscow was alerted just hours after Hitler's announcement, and the following day on 2 July, Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, warned the Front commanders (Vatutin, Rokossovsky and Konev) that the long-awaited German offensive would begin no later than 6 July.

Preliminary actions

Preliminary fighting started in the southern face of the salient on the evening of 4 July 1943, as was customary to any major offensive, the German forces launched a reconnaissance-in-force in preparation for the main assault scheduled for 5 July. The XLVIII Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army elected to storm Soviet command and observation posts positioned on the high ground of the first main belt of defence manned by men from the 6th Guards Army, and by 1600 hours on 4 July, elements of the Panzergrenadier Division (Großdeutschland), the 11th and 3rd Panzer Divisions had seized the village of Butovo (about 3–5 km beyond the initial front line) and stormed Gertsovka, (about 7–10 km beyond the initial front line), which was eventually secured before the first hour of 5 July. These preliminary attacks as well as troop movements and other preparatory activities were a confirmation that the main offensive was imminent. Also that evening of 4 July, a German private from the 168th Infantry Division captured by a Soviet combat patrol from the 6th Guards Army confessed that the offensive would begin at dawn on 5 July. Vatutin, having received these reports that indicated the German offensive was impendng, ordered the Voronezh Front to bombard the German positions, particularly the II SS Panzer Corps, on the night of 4 July at around 2230 hours with 600 guns, mortars, and katyushas of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies. A second shorter barrage was launched at 0130 hours on 5 July, and also targeted [[German Army Detachment Kempf.

In Central Front headquarters, reports of the anticipated attack continued to come in, and after midnight a captured German combat engineer from the 6th Infantry Division confessed that the main attack would be launched at around 0300 to 0330 hours 5 July. At around 0200 hours, Zhukov authorized the planned preemptive artillery bombardment to begin, and in less than 30 minutes the entire front line of the Central Front was lit up. The Soviet bombardment caused some casualties and destruction, but Zhukov later confessed that its effect was limited: " had expected that its impact would be greater... When observing the course of the fighting and questioning prisoners, I came to the conclusion that the Central and Voronezh Fronts had started the counter preparation too early. The German soldiers were asleep in their trenches, dugouts, and ravines and the tank units were under cover in the waiting areas." The bombardment delayed most German attacking formations by as much as 40 minutes to three hours, but still failed in its goal of completely disrupting the German schedule as intended. As the Soviet artillery went silent, the Germans launched their own preliminary bombardment which lasted 80 minutes in the northern sector and 50 minutes in the south, after which the ground forces began to advance with close air support from the Luftwaffe.

Earlier that morning, during the German preliminary bombardment, the Red Air Force launched a massive raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground, but this failed and the Soviets took considerable losses. That morning, the Soviet Air Force lost 176 aircraft, whereas the Luftwaffe lost 26. The 16th Air Army, which was the air unit attached to the Central Front, suffered lighter losses in the preemptive attack than the 2nd Air Army attached to the Voronehz Front; and therefore, unlike in the southern face of the salient where the Luftwaffe had gained and maintained air superiority on 5 July, the control for the skies over the northern face was even. In the days immediately following the first day of the offensive, the Red Air Force began to assert its dominance as the Luffwaffe's chronic shortage of fuel, lubricants and spare parts began to hamper serviceability. Also the strong Soviet resistance met by the ground forces obliged air-support missions to take precedence over the ongoing battle for air superiority, giving the much more preponderant Red Air Force the opportunity to seize control of the air space. The grim consequences of the overwhelming preponderance of the Red Air Force over the Luftwaffe had been further aggravated by the fact that by the summer of 1943, the Luftwaffe could no longer boast the significant technical superiority it once held over its adversary.

Operation at the northern face

German offensive

Model's main attack was delivered by XLVII Panzer Corps, to which was also attached 45 Tigers of the 505 Heavy Tank Battalion. Covering the left flank of the main attacking corps was XLI Panzer Corps, to which was attached a regiment of 83 operational Ferdinand tank destroyers, and covering the right flank was XLVI Panzer Corps, which was a panzer corps just in name – consisting of four infantry divisions and just nine tanks and 31 assault guns. To the left of XLI Panzer Corps was XXIII Army Corps which consisted of a reinforced assault infantry division – the 78th – with two regular infantry divisions. The corps had no tanks, but it did have 62 assault guns. Therefore from west to east, the 9th Army's attacking force was positioned as follows: XLVI Panzer Corps, XLVII Panzer Corps, XLI Panzer Corps and XXIII Army Corps. Opposing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed in three main heavily fortified defensive belts.

Model had decided not to employ his armoured force at the start of the offensive in order to prevent it from being worn out while breaking the Soviet defences and being unable to exploit any breakthrough. Therefore his initial attack force, tasked with breaking the first line of defence, consisted of mostly infantry and artillery with Luftwaffe support. His plan was that once a breakthrough was achieved, the panzer divisions would then be released for a drive straight to Kursk. Jan Möschen, a major on Model's staff, later commented that Model expected a breakthrough on the second day and that the corps commanders thought it would be extremely unlikely, given Model's tactics of infantry first and then armour, and even if it did occur, the briefest delay in waiting for the panzer divisions to be brought up to exploit the breakthrough would only give the Soviets more time to react and plug the gap.

As the German preliminary bombardment on the early morning of 5 July ended, by 05:00 the 9th Army was attacking the northern face of the salient with one panzer division – the 20th, (of XLVII Panzer Corps) – and nine infantry divisions equipped with assault guns, a regiment of Ferdinands and two companies of Tigers from the 505 Heavy Tank Battalion. Both companies of Tigers were attached to the 6th Infantry Division (of XLVII Panzer Corps), and would be the largest single group of Tigers employed on that day. Dug-in in the path of the attack were the 70th and 13th Armies of the Central Front.

The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions, operating in tight cooperation, spearheaded the advance of the XLVII Panzer Corps, with the remaining two panzer divisions following behind at a safe distance and poised to exploit any breakthrough. But the mine-infested terrain overlooking the carefully positioned artillery and tanks, and the fortified positions of the troops of the 15th Rifle Division (of the 29th Rifle Corps), immediately slowed the attack down. It was not until 08:00 that safe lanes were cleared through the minefield. That morning information from the intelligence staff of the attacking divisions, obtained via prisoner interrogation, had identified a weakness at the boundary of the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions caused by the German preliminary bombardment. The Tigers quickly struck towards the area. The armoured attack provoked a Soviet counterattack delivered by about 90 T-34s. In the resulting three-hour battle, the Soviets lost 42 tanks for two destroyed Tigers and five more immobilized due to damaged tracks. Although the counter-attack was defeated, resulting in the breach of the Soviet first defensive belt, it succeeded in stalling the German advance for the duration of the battle and buying time for the rest of 29th Rifle Corps lodged beyond the first belt to adequately prepare itself. By the time the attacking forces of the XLVII Panzer Corps had reorganized and attacked the positions beyond the first defensive belt, Soviet resistance had stiffened and had indeed become unbreakable. The attack faltered after a bloody confrontation and at 6 to 8 miles (9.7 to 12.9 km) into the Soviet defences, XLVII Panzer Corps was held for the rest of the day.

The 9th Army attacked on a 45-kilometer (28 mi) wide front. The Germans soon found themselves delayed in the extensive minefields the Russians had laid in preparation for the attack. Engineer units were brought up to clear paths through the fields, but were hampered by Russian fire. A few Goliath and Borgward IV remote-controlled engineer vehicles were used to clear lanes through the minefields, with limited success. These vehicles lacked marking systems to show the following tanks where the cleared lanes lay. Red Army units covering the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delayed the German engineer teams clearing the mines manually, and losses amongst the engineers were high. The end of the day found the 9th Army far short of its objectives for 5 July.

The 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion began the attack with 45 Ferdinands. All but 12 of them were immobilized in unmarked German and Soviet minefields before 17:00 on 5 July. Most of these were later repaired and returned to service. During the first day of the offensive, German units penetrated 8 kilometers (5.0 mi) into the Soviet lines, for the loss of 1,287 killed and missing and 5,921 wounded.

Although excellent against any Soviet tank, the Ferdinand had some problems. Guderian noted in his diary:

Incapable of close-range fighting since they lacked sufficient ammunition (armour-piercing and high-explosive) for their guns and this defect was aggravated by the fact that they had no machine-guns. Once they had broken through into the enemy's infantry zone, they literally had to go quail-shooting with cannon. They did not manage to neutralise, let alone destroy, the enemy's rifle and machine guns, so that our own infantry was unable to follow up behind them. By the time they reached the Soviet artillery they were on their own.

On the second day, the Central Front under Rokossovsky started a counterattack against the German 9th Army, directed against the XLVI Tank Corps. The Red Army attacked with the 2nd Tank Army and the XIX Tank Corps. Soviet tanks there sustained heavy losses in their first combat with the Tiger tanks of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. The 107th and 164th Tank Brigade lost 69 tanks and the Soviet counterattack was stopped. After the encounter with the German Tigers, Rokossovsky decided to dig-in most of his remaining tanks to minimize their exposure.

The next two days of the attack saw heavy fighting around the strong point of Ponyri (on the Orel–Kursk railway), which was one of the most fortified positions in the northern sector. Both sides saw this area as a vital point. The Soviets had placed 70 anti-tank guns per kilometer in this region. The German 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions attacked Ponyri and captured the town after intense house-to-house fighting on 7 July. A Soviet counterattack forced a German withdrawal and a series of counterattacks ensued by both sides, with control of the town being exchanged many times. By the evening of 8 July the German units had secured most of the town. The Ferdinands were called into action to take Hill 253.5 and succeeded on 9 July. This attack developed into a battle of attrition, with heavy casualties on both sides. The historian John Keegan called Ponyri "the new Douaumont", (A reference to Fort Douamount - a central part of the battle of Verdun in World War I). The German frontline units were exhausted, while the Soviet brought up their reserves.

Model paused to rearrange his units and renewed his attack on 10 July with additional air support, but his gains were small. Fresh Soviet formations repelled German attacks and only limited penetrations were achieved; the diary of the 9th Army describes the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attrition battle". Model called off the new attack.

With the cancellation of the attack came a change in German plans. Model accepted that his forces did not have enough power to advance directly through the Soviet defensive strongpoints. He decided to bypass the heights of Ol'chovatka and shift the schwerpunkt to XLVI Panzer Corps. He also decided to use the uncommitted 12th Panzer Division. For the first time in the northern sector, a heavy concentration of tanks was planned. By 12 July the German northern forces had lost only 63 tanks and assault guns.

Soviet formations, including the 3rd Tank Army and the 11th Guards Army, commenced a flanking attack against the German 2nd Panzer Army, positioned to the left (north) and rear of 9th Army. The Soviet forces established a deep penetration and threatened German supply routes to the forward 9th Army units and a successful Soviet advance on Orel threatened to encircle the 9th Army.

The end of Citadel in the north

With the threat of being cut off, the 9th Army was compelled to withdraw. Their part in the offensive was over. Because the German armour was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the south, the German armour losses were comparatively light – 143 vehicles between 5 and 14 July. Central Front losses were 526 tanks. This failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and materiél arriving for the Red Army. Few Red Army guns were captured, and those Russian units that retreated did so on orders. The German attack failed to break through the main Soviet defence zones, and with their counter-offensive, Model was compelled to withdraw.

Northern analysis

A number of factors explain the 9th Army's lack of progress, mainly the combination of Soviet defensive planning and German lack of concentration of force. German armour was committed piecemeal rather than in strength, and often without sufficient infantry support. Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovsky had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had fortified those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The 13th Army, which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and anti-tank guns than the other Central Front units and held the strongest defensive positions in the salient.

Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and the German 9th Army committed major units piecemeal because Model was afraid of the Bryansk Front, which stood ready for a counterattack to the north of his army. Model decided to place his most powerful corps, Gruppe "Esebeck" (2 Panzer Division and 10 Panzer Grenadier Division), far behind the frontline to use it as a "fire brigade" against a possible onslaught by the Bryansk Front. Model's decision not to use his Panzer divisions as a concentrated force can be seen as the most significant reason for the poor penetration of the northern pincer. Finally, the 9th Army led with reinforced infantry divisions that were already in the line facing the Red Army, rather than attacking with uncommitted formations.

A review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration clearly shows the success of the Red Army defensive tactics. While it began with a 45-kilometer-wide (28 mi) attack front on 5 July, the next day the German 9th Army's front was reduced to 40 km. This dropped to 15 km wide by 7 July and to only 2 km on 8–9 July. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: five km on the first day, four on the second, never more than two km on each succeeding day. By 10 July the 9th Army had been stopped.

Much of the Soviet defensive success is attributable to its method of fire control, known to the Germans as Pakfront. This relied upon a group of 10 or more anti-tank guns under a commander, which would fire at one target at a time. These positions were protected with heavy concentrations of mortar and machine gun nests, which were ordered to fire only on German infantry.

Operation at the southern face

German offensive

Von Manstein's troops (Army Group South) were equipped with more armoured vehicles, infantry and artillery than Model's in the north (Army Group Centre). The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Army possessed 988 tanks and assault guns.

At around 0400 hours the German attack commenced with a preliminary bombardment. Mainstein's main attack was delivered by the 4th Panzer Army (commanded by Hermann Hoth), of which its right flank was covered by Army Detachment "Kempf" (commanded by Werner Kempf). The strike of the 4th Panzer Army was spearheaded by the XLVIII Panzer Corps (commanded by Otto von Knobelsdorff), which was actively supported on its right by the II SS Panzer Corps (commanded by Paul Hausser); its left flank was covered by the LII Corps. Directly in the path of the XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps was the Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and 23rd Guards Rifle Corps. The defence of the southern face of the salient by the Voronezh Front was deployed in three main heavily fortified defensive belts, with the third line composed of front reserves. The Voronezh Front headquarters had not been able to pinpoint where the Germans would place their offensive weight and this forced them to spread out their defences. And also Manstein, unlike his northern counterpart, had organized his tanks into densely concentrated spearheads; this proved more successful.

The Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland (commanded by Walter Hörnlein), was the main attacking force of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, and was supported at its flanks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions. Großdeutschland was allotted 384 tanks in total, but not all were operational on the first day of the offensive. In addition to the usual Panzer IIIs and IVs, the tanks allotted to the division included a company of 15 Tigers and 200 Panthers of the 51st and 52nd Panzer Battalions; both units were attached to the Panzerfüsilier Regiment of Großdeutschland, and had arrived at the front line on 1 July and 30 June respectively, leaving little opportunity for them to orientate themselves and conduct much needed reconnaissance. And although well trained at the platoon-level of combat, the two battalions had no large-unit combat experience. The new Panthers also proved unreliable and failed to perform to expectations, 45 out of the 200 new tanks experienced mechanical problems requiring repair. On the morning of 5 July, eight Panthers would be lost to mechanical failure, only 192 would reach the front line.

At dawn on 5 July, Großdeutschland, backed by heavy artillery support and led by its tank units, advanced on a two-mile front straight into the 67th Guards Rifle Division (of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps), towards the villages of Gertsovka and Butovo. That morning, the Panzerfüsilier Regiment, advancing as the left wing of the division, after initial rapid progress stalled, when it plunged into a minefield and 36 Panthers were disabled. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage of Soviet anti-tank and artillery fire. Combat engineers were moved up immediately to clear paths through the minefield but a constant barrage made it very costly. Heavy casualties were sustained in the ensuing battle, including the commander of the Panzerfüsilier Regiment, Colonel Kassnitz. However, attempts by the Red Air Force to impede the advance of the XLVIII Panzer Corps were repulsed by the Luftwaffe. Therefore, although XLVIII Panzer Corps reported on the morning of 5 July: "The entire corps sector is under heavy attack by Soviet Il-2 ground-attack planes and bombers," this was only relative to what it was used to facing. Ultimately, many more enemy aircraft were repelled than managed to break through the Luftwaffe defence cordon.

Meanwhile, the Panzergrenadier Regiment of Großdeutschland, advancing as the right wing of the division, pushed through more successfully to the village of Butovo. Leading the way were the Tigers, which were employed in a classic arrow formation, with the lighter Panzer IIIs, Panzer IVs and assault guns fanning out to the rear. They were followed by infantry and combat engineers. The Panzerfüsilier Regiment also resumed its advance towards Gertsovka once safe paths were cleared through the minefields, but it was bogged down again just south of the village by the marshy ground surrounding the Berezovyy stream. The Red Air Force made another attempt to cripple the advancing forces, leading the commander of XLVIII Panzer Corps, Otto von Knobelsdorff, to report to Manstein:

Soviet air forces repeatedly attack the large concentrations of tanks and infantry near the crossings at Berezovyy. There are heavy losses, especially among officers. Großdeutschland's Command Post received a direct hit, killing the adjutant of the grenadier regiment and two other officers.

The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left flank of Großdeutschland, made good progress and by the end of 5 July had taken Gertsovka and advanced past it to reach Mikhailovka. The 167th Infantry Division on the right flank of the 11th Panzer Division also made sufficient progress, advancing to the vicinity of Tirechnoe by the end of the day (5 July). These successes meant that by the end of the first day a wedge had been speared deep into the Soviet first line of defence by the XLVIII Panzer Corps.

More German attacks

At dawn on 5 July, the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps (commanded by Paul Hausser) – SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (commanded by Theodor Wisch), 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich (commanded by Walter Krüger) and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf (commanded by Hermann Prieß) – attacked the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps, of the 6th Guards Army). All three SS divisions were elite formations with fearsome reputations. During the night of 4–5 July, SS combat engineers had infiltrated no-man's land and cleared lanes through the Soviet minefields. The main assault of the corps was led by a panzerkeil headed by 42 Tigers; in total 494 tanks and assault guns attacked across a seven and half mile front. The 3rd SS Division Totenkopf, the strongest of the three divisions, screened the right flank of the attack by advancing towards Gremuchhi, with the 1st SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler on the left flank, advanced towards Bykovka and the 2nd SS Panzer Division moved in-between. The advance, although it was not seriously impeded by minefields, was met with a massive barrage of artillery and anti-tank fire but the corps was supremely well supported by the Luftwaffe, which greatly aided in softening up the Soviet positions. The infantry and combat engineer units followed the armoured spearhead closely, demolishing obstacles and emptying trenches.

By 0900 hours on 5 July, the II SS Panzer Corps had advanced deep into the Soviet first line of defence along its entire front. While probing positions between the first and second Soviet defensive belts, at 1300 hours, the 2nd SS Panzer Division's vanguard came under fire from two T-34 tanks, which were quickly dispatched, but soon 40 more engaged the division. It was not long before a ferocious battle between units of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 2nd SS Panzer Division was underway. The battle lasted four hours, ending with the withdrawal of the 1st Guards Tank Army. However, the battle bought time for units of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rifle Corps lodged in the Soviet second line to prepare itself and be reinforced with more anti-tank guns. By the early evening of 5 July, 2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the minefields that marked the outer perimeter of the Soviet second line of defence. The 1st SS Division, operating on the 2nd SS Panzer Division's left, had secured Bykovka at 1610 hours and pushed forward towards the second line of defence at Yakovlevo, but attempts to breakthrough were rebuffed. By the end of the day, the 1st SS Division had sustained 97 dead, 522 wounded, 17 missing and lost about 30 tanks. Together with the 2nd SS Panzer Division, it had forced a wedge far into the defences of the 6th Guards Army.

The 3rd SS Division, operating as the right flank of II SS Panzer Corps made very limited progress, which meant that the corps' developing penetration was precarious. The division managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps) from the rest of its parent division, but attempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the flank of the neighbouring 375th Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps), failed when the regiment was reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade. Furthermore, the northern movement of the 3rd SS Division was stifled by a tributary of the Lipovyi-Donets river. Paul Hausser, the commander of II SS Panzer Corps, called on III Panzer Corps (commanded by Hermann Breith) (of the Army Detachment "Kempf") on his right flank to lend some support, but his request was refused because the Army Detachment "Kempf" was facing serious challenges of its own. By the end of 5 July, the 3rd SS Division's attainment was far short of expectation, leaving the right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Division exposed.

Facing the Army Detachment "Kempf" was the 7th Guards Army, dug in on the high ground on the eastern bank of the Northern Donets. The III Panzer Corps and Corps "Raus" (commanded by Erhard Raus) (both of Army Detachment "Kempf"), were tasked wih crossing the Northern Donets, smash through the 7th Guards Army and support the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion – equipped with 45 Tigers – was also attached to the III Panzer Corps, split up so that one company of 15 Tigers was attached to each of the three panzer divisions of the III Panzer Corps. Although the river was bridged during the night of 4 July by combat engineers, the crossing points were targeted by the Soviet artillery during the preemptive bombardment.

At the Milkhailovka bridgehead just south of Belgorod, eight infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division (of the III Panzer Corps) assembled there were subjected to heavy artillery fire during the Soviet preliminary bombardment. Eventually most of the infantry got across to the eastern banks, but when a company of the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion began to cross the bridge in order to support the infantry, it too was targeted by Soviet artillery and the bridge was destroyed. Although some of the tanks of the company managed to get across, the rest of the 6th Panzer Division had to be redeployed southward to another crossing. Clemens Graf Kageneck, battalion commander, described it thus:

Suddenly, a red sunrise arose on the far side as hundreds of Stalin's organs hurled their rockets exactly onto the crossing site. The bridge was totally demolished and the engineers, unfortunately, suffered heavy losses. Never have I hugged the dirt so tightly as when these terrible shells sprayed their thin fragments just above the ground.

With the need for redeployment of the remnants of the 6th Panzer Division to another crossing, it became clear that the division was falling behind the agreed schedule. But the predicament was further aggravated when it was reported to Walther von Hünersdorff, commander of the 6th Panzer Division, that the designated crossing was already clogged with traffic. Failing to find another crossing, the remnants of the 6th remained on the western bank of the river for 5 July. Meanwhile, units of the 6th Panzer Division that had succeeded in getting onto the eastern bank of the river through the original crossing launched an attack led by Tigers on Stary Gorod, but it stalled due to poorly cleared minefields and strong resistance.

To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer Division (of III Panzer Corps) successfully crossed the river but immediately ran into Soviet mines, which stalled the Tigers spearheading the advance. The division later recovered and managed to advance to a depth of about five miles by the end of 5 July.

To the south of the 19th Panzer Division, the infantry and light and medium tanks of 7th Panzer Division managed to cross the bridges but the Tigers could not, due to their weight. Attempts were made to drive the Tigers across the river to relieve the infantry and lighter tanks that were already taking a tremendous pounding on the opposite bank, but that was unsuccessful due to their weight and the massive Soviet artillery bombardment. Eventually, combat engineers constructed bridges strong enough to take the Tigers across, where they relieved the beleaguered infantry. Despite a poor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke into the first line of the Soviet defence and pushed on between Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing about 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) by the end of 5 July, which was the best achieved in Army Detachment "Kempf"'s sector for the day.

Operating to the south of 7th Panzer Division, were the two infantry divisions – 106th and 320th Infantry Divisions – of Corps "Raus". The two formations advanced across a 20 mile front, and devoid of tanks, apparently only made little progress. The advance began well with the successful crossing of the river and a swift advance against the 72nd Guards Rifle Division. The Soviet defenders were taken by surprise with the speed of the advance. Erhard Raus, later wrote:

The advancing infantry surprised them and had no difficulty ferreting them out. But when the infantry reached the two to three mile deep zone of the battle positions prepared in the preceding months, they had to make extensive use of hand grenades in order to mop up maze of densely dug-in trenches and bunkers, some of which were a dozen or more feet deep. At the same time, artillery and flak fired counter-battery missions against the enemy heavy weapons that had resumed fire from rear positions. They also fired on reserves infiltrating through the trench system, as well as against Russian medium artillery.

After a fierce battle involving some hand-to-hand fighting, Corps "Raus" took the village of Maslovo Pristani, punching a hole in the first Soviet line of defence. However, the lodgement was nearly lost when a Soviet counterattack supported by about 40 tanks crashed into the corps. The counterattack was eventually rebuffed with the assistance of artillery and flak batteries; however, having suffered about 2,000 casualties since the start of the offensive that morning and still facing considerable resistance, the corps could penetrate no further and therefore dug-in for the night of 5 July.

By the end of 5 July, Army Group South's attack against the Voronezh Front had failed to dislodge the Soviet defenders. Although several of the divisions of the 4th Panzer Army had blown large holes in the Soviet first line of defence, they still remained short of cracking the second line, and even so, exposed vulnerable flanks; many other attacking units had barely breached the first line. Along the entire southern face of the salient, the German thrust had been slowed, allowing the Soviets time to prepare their second line of defence to meet the German attack on 6 July. The 7th Guards Army, which had soaked up the attack of III Panzer Corps and Corps "Raus", was reinforced with two rifle divisions from the reserve, the 15th Guards Rifle Division was also moved up to the second line of defence right in the path of III Panzer Corps. The 6th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack by XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps, was reinforced with about 1,000 tanks from the independent 2nd Guards and the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 1st Tank Army. The 51st and 90th Guards Rifle Division were moved up to the vicinity of Pokrovka (not to be confused with Prokhorovka 25 miles to its northeast,) right in the path of the 1st SS Division. And right behind them, the 93rd Guards Rifle Division was spread out on the road leading to Prokhorovka from Pokrovka.

The Soviets counter-attack

The steady progress of the German units forced the Soviet leaders to commit some of their strategic reserves, as nearly all operational reserves were in action. The Steppe Front had been formed in the months leading up to the operation as a central reserve. As early as 6 July, Stavka decided to send the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army to the southern sector; a day later, other formations got their marching orders. Vatutin planned an operational counterstrike against the German units, but decided to cancel it after the failure of the northern counterattack. Instead of seeking open battle against the German tanks, Vatutin let his tanks dig in, as Rokossovsky did in the north. Zhukov protested against this use of tanks, but Vatutin's decision stood.

German officers reported that they were slowed down by the "silent tanks" (Schweigepanzer) – tanks dug into fortified emplacements – because it cost much time to overcome these camouflaged "bases". Despite the order to dig-in many of their tanks, the Soviet units still had enough tanks to launch some counterattacks. On 7 July a German Tiger I commanded by SS Unterscharführer Franz Staudegger met a group of about 50 T-34s. In the ensuing battle, Staudegger knocked out 22 T-34s; he was the first Tiger commander to be awarded the Knight's Cross.

The Germans' advance was slowed. The first German units reached the Psel River on 9 July. The next day the first infantry units crossed the river. By 10 July, German units in the south had lost 166 tanks. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses were remarkably low. 11 July was a successful day for German units; Army Detachment "Kempf" achieved a breakthrough, and its III Panzer Corps penetrated deep into the Soviet lines. The next night the 6th Panzer Division took a bridge over the Donets with a swift surprise attack. III Panzer Corps then advanced on Prokhorovka from the south and the II SS Panzer Corps from the west, almost trapping the Soviet 69th Army. At this moment Manstein thought the final breakthrough was achieved, and now free of the minefields, could operate freely and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in the open. The Soviets, indeed, began moving their tank reserves toward the spearheads of Army Group South.

Prokhorovka

The Red Army did enough, at great cost, to stop a German breakthrough. In that sense Prokhorovka remains a crucial turning point of the battle and of the Eastern Front.

On the morning of 12 July, Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough, grouped the armoured formations on the right wing of the 4th Panzer Army and advanced on Prokhorovka. At the same time the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of a larger counteroffensive in an attempt to throw the Germans off balance. The opposing forces clashed south and west of Prokhorovka.

In stifling heat, an eight-hour battle began. The German forces found themselves heavily outnumbered by the 5th Guards Tank Army; who, moving mainly at night, had brought 593 tanks and 37 self-propelled guns into position at Stary Oskol.

The Soviet 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf to a standstill by getting in close to the German armour and attacking the more vulnerable sides of the Tigers. The II SS Panzer Corps was soon forced onto the defensive. Although the German formation held, it lost half of its armour in a prolonged engagement; although many of these losses were repairable, and hence temporary. By the night of 11–12 July, the only success the Germans had to show for their losses was a captured bridgehead over the Donets river at Rzavets. The 1st SS Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler had been stopped by the Soviet 18th Tank Corps, while III Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Division were checked by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and two other Soviet reserve corps.

The Luftwaffe had complete air superiority over Prokhorovka, due to the VVS being concentrated against the units flanking II SS Panzer Corps. Waves of Hs 129s and Ju 87s inflicted losses on the 5th Guards Tank Army. Although Soviet tank losses are unknown, a report from the 29th Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery . due to continuous air attacks, they were unable to advance further and shifted to the defence".

The battle can best be described as a costly tactical loss for the Red Army but an operational draw. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives that day. After the battle was over, the Soviets held the area and were able to recover their disabled tanks and wounded crews.

Tank losses in the battle have been a contentious subject. Red Army losses have been given from 200 to 822 tanks, but the records show about 300 complete losses and as many damaged. German losses have been reported to be as low as 80 and as high as several hundred. The Soviets claim the Germans lost 400 tanks in this battle and 3,500 soldiers killed, but newer research suggests only about 500 deaths and much lower tank losses, with only a few completely destroyed and about 40–80 damaged.

The end of Citadel in the south

While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 July, in the south the overall situation still hung in the balance, even after 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, had breached the first two defensive belts and believed that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial defences, some of them did not have troops deployed. Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major elements of their reserve forces had been committed. Nevertheless, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves.

On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely depleted, the Germans then had to face Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, a Soviet offensive to smash the German forces in the Belgorod–Kharkov area which was launched on 3 August. Belgorod fell on 5 August, and on 23 August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resistance from German forces. With the capture of Kharkov, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk over.

Southern analysis

The German forces made steady progress, but, as in the north, attack frontage width and penetration depth dropped as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. A 30-kilometer-wide (19 mi) attack frontage on 5 July became 20 km (12 mi) wide by 7 July and 15 km (9.3 mi) by 9 July. Likewise, the depth of penetration dropped from 9 km (5.6 mi) on 5 July to 5 km (3.1 mi) on 8 July and 2–3 km (1.2–1.9 mi) each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled.

Red Army minefields and artillery were successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans allowed their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.

German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Division, which had began the operation with 118 tanks. On 10 July, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had three Tigers, six Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on 5 July.

Termination of Operation Citadel

On the night of 9–10 July, the Western Allies mounted an amphibious invasion of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned Günther von Kluge and Erich von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Citadel. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Citadel was on the brink of victory: "on no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves which he had committed were decisively beaten". In an uncommon reversal of their roles, Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 16 July, he ordered a withdrawal and cancelled the operation. The following day, on 17 July, OKH ordered the entire SS Panzer Corps to be withdrawn and transferred to Italy.

Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs, and by some historians. For example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Corps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.

Only one German division, the 1st SS Panzer (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler), departed for Italy, without their equipment. The remainder stayed to face the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.

Reasons for the failure of Citadel

Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser points out these reasons for the failure of Operation Citadel:

• The Soviets had numerical superiority. Frieser points out that the biggest problem of the OKW was the shortage of infantry. The OKH had no operational reserve, while the Red Army could field an entire front (Steppe Front) as reserve. That the Red Army had more tanks than the Wehrmacht had less influence on the outcome, according to Frieser.
• Repeated delays by Hitler gave the Red Army enough time to turn the bulge around Kursk into an enormous fortress. Senior officers like Manstein and Zeitzler pushed for a fast attack to catch the Red Army unprepared and low on morale after the third battle of Kharkov. The overlap with the Allied invasion of Sicily made Hitler's date for the attack the "most adverse possible".

Military historian and Soviet military expert David Glantz draws these conclusions:

• The German defeat at Kursk did not come about by the "often-exaggerated numerical superiority" of the Soviet armed forces. The principal factor at Kursk was the revolution in Soviet command, staff, operational and tactical techniques. The General Staff had learned lessons from previous battles and disseminated "war experience" based on an "exhaustive" analysis of battles, operations and campaigns. These lessons were added to Soviet doctrine (Soviet deep battle), producing new procedures. Glantz and House have asserted the tank strength was almost even, between 1:1 and 1.5:1 in the Soviets' favour.
• The Soviets introduced new operational and tactical techniques, and had solved many of the problems of integrating arms and services into "a true combined arms operation". He emphasizes "sophisticated understanding of intelligence, deception, and anti-tank defence". Similar improvements were made in the combined use of artillery, tanks, engineers and infantry to break German defences on a narrow front. At Prokhorovka, and in the Kutuzov operations, the Red Army gained experience with mobile armoured formations and mechanized corps that became the hallmark of Soviet deep operations. These formations demonstrated their ability to match the best efforts of the German Panzer force. Operations still needed to be perfected to reduce huge casualties. Nevertheless, the German command recognized that at Kursk they faced an entirely new and more competent Red Army than in earlier battles.
• Defensive tactics had improved. Skillful use of anti-tank artillery in strong points and the use of separate tank brigades, tank regiments and self-propelled gun units to support them offered mobile defence support. These units participated in wearing down tactical attacks against enemy spearheads. The transitional year of 1943 was decisive for the Soviet war effort. Operational and tactical techniques tested and smoothed out in 1943; they would be refined further and perfected in 1944 and 1945. "The elementary education the Red Army received in 1941–42 gave way to the secondary education of 1943. In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets would accomplish university-level and graduate study in the conduct of war"

Military expert Steven Zaloga offers these insights about the Red Army at Kursk:

• The popular perception of Soviet victory "by numbers" was a myth created by German generals in their memoirs written in the 1950s. He rejects the caricature of the Red Army relying on mass rather than tactical skill, but accepts that at the tactical end (the platoon and company level), the Red Army was not particularly impressive and received significantly poorer training. Zaloga points out that there were still many tactical lessons to be learned; however, by 1943 the gap between Soviet and German tank crew training had "narrowed greatly", and the Soviets were soon at a comparable level with the Germans.
• The Soviets, in terms of operational art, were adept at using mobile tank formations. Zaloga asserts that Soviet operational methods were superior, allowing Soviet field commanders to bluff, baffle and overwhelm their opponents.

Historian Richard Overy makes the following observations:

• The quality of the two air forces were even. The Soviets had introduced air-to-ground communications, radar, a proper maintenance system, and depots for forward fuel reserves. This allowed aircraft to fly twenty missions in the heat of the battle (while the Luftwaffe suffered shortages).
• The Soviet tanks were not inferior in quality. Although the T-34 model (with its 76 mm main gun) was out-ranged by the German Tiger I and the Panther, the T-34 was faster and more maneuverable than the Tiger, and the latter had too many mechanical difficulties at the Battle of Prokhorovka. To counter the Tiger tank, the Soviets used their tanks in a "hand-to-hand" combat role. Crews were ordered to close the distance so that range would not become an issue. According to Glantz and House, the Soviet tanks pressed home their initial attacks despite significant German advantages: the range of the German tanks' 88 mm gun, German air superiority and attacking a well-dug-in enemy in flat rolling terrain. Even so, the loss ratio was less than 2:1 - 320 German and 400 Soviet AFVs.

Sir Harry Hinsley, a World War II historian who worked at Bletchley Park during the war, has said:

• Information decrypted by Ultra was given to the Soviets, which helped them prepare for the offensive. The Soviets had a spy at Bletchley Park (John Cairncross), who was giving them decrypts of German Military communications. Hinsley said that some speculate that without Ultra, Germany would have won at Kursk, and "Hitler could have carved up Russia". Ultra decrypts were also given to the Soviets concerning German plans for Stalingrad.

Soviet counteroffensives

In the north: Operation Kutuzov

The Soviets had offensive operations of their own planned for the summer of 1943, one of which, Operation Kutusov, was launched on 12 July against the German forces (Army Group Centre) in the Orel salient north of Kursk. It kicked off before the German attack on Kursk had concluded. Two Soviet Fronts, the Bryansk Front under the command of Markian Popov and the Western Front commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky, attacked the eastern and northern faces of the Orel salient respectively, which was defended by the 2nd Panzer Army. The southern face of the salient was also attacked, and German forces were withdrawn from the Kursk offensive to meet Operation Kutuzov.

Operation Kutuzov was successful in diverting German reserves earmarked for Operation Citadel. In addition, the Soviets reduced the Orel salient and inflicted substantial losses on the German army, setting the stage for the liberation of Smolensk. Although Soviet losses in the operation were heavy, they were better able to replace them. Operation Kutuzov allowed the Soviets to seize the strategic initiative, which they held through the remainder of the war.

In the south: Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the main Soviet offensive for the summer of 1943. It's aim was to degrade the German 4th Panzer Army and cut off the extended southern portion of Army Group South. After the heavy losses sustained by the Voronezh Front during Operation Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and refit, delaying the start of the offensive until 3 August. Diversionary attacks launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and Mius Rivers into the Donets Basin drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces in the path of the main blow. The offensive was initiated by the Voronezh Front and Steppe Fronts against the northern wing of Army Group South. They drove through the German positions and made broad, deep penetrations past their lines. By 5 August the Soviets had taken Belgorod, and by the 12th they had reached the outskirts of Kharkov. The advance was finally checked by a counter-attack on 12 August by the 2nd SS "Das Reich" and 3rd SS  "Totenkopf" divisions. In the ensuing tank battles the Soviet armies were checked, suffering heavy losses in their armour. After this setback the Soviet troops focused on Kharkov and captured it after heavy fighting on 23 August. The battle is usually referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation by the Soviets.

Results

The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armour than in previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth Soviet defences, and were surprised by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This was an outcome that few had predicted, and it changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front. The victory had not been cheap; the Red Army, although preventing the Germans from achieving their goals, lost considerably more men and materiél than the Wehrmacht.

With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front... Needless to say the Russians exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative. — Heinz Guderian

From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed to the Red Army, while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting rather than attacking. A new front had opened in Italy, diverting some of Germany's resources and attention. Both sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive in the East.

The loss convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his OKH General Staff. His interference in military matters progressively increased, so that by the end of the war he was involved in tactical decisions. The German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted personally to micromanage the day-to-day operations of what soon became a three-front war. The opposite was true for Stalin. After seeing Stavka's planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more, and stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions. The Red Army gained more freedom and became more and more fluid as the war continued.

Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, but the Battle of Kursk was the beginning of the end — Winston Churchill

Casualties

German

According to German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, who interpreted German archives, the Wehrmacht suffered 54,182 casualties in total during Citadel (5–16 July). Of these 9,036 personnel were killed in action, another 1,960 were reported missing and 43,159 wounded. The German 9th Army (under the command of Army Group Centre) suffered 23,345 casualties while Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties.

For Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, Frieser states between 3 and 23 August, Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS units suffered 25,068 casualties, including 8,933 killed and missing. For Rumyantsev he estimated ~30,000 men were lost with 10,000 killed and missing. For Operation Kutuzov he gives 86,064 casualties with 14,215 killed, 11,300 missing and 60,549 wounded. Total casualties for the Battle of Kursk were ~170,000 men.

According to Frieser, the Wehrmacht lost 252 tanks and assault guns during Operation Citadel (until 16 July). Army Group South admitted losses of 161 tanks and 14 assault guns by 16 July. The 9th Army reported the loss of 41 tanks and 17 assault guns up to and including 14 July. Among these were 10 Tigers and 42 Panthers, as well as 19 Elefant heavy tank destroyers. Other losses included 109 Panzer IVs, 38 Panzer IIIs, three flame tanks and 31 assault guns.

The number of tank losses for Citadel and the Soviet counter offensives is hard to establish. Frieser gives the number of 1,331 tanks destroyed for the entire Eastern Front for July and August. He estimates the number of tanks destroyed during the Battle of Kursk as 760. Frieser explains that many of these tanks were beyond repair and abandoned.

David Glantz gives a total of 49,822 casualties. He asserts German losses during the Soviet counter offensives are unavailable.

Glantz estimates that 1,612 tanks and assault guns were knocked out and/or damaged, of which 323 were destroyed. Tank losses from counterattacks are uncertain, according to Glantz.

Aircraft losses, according to Frieser, totalled 524 planes. For Citadel (5–16 July) 159 were lost, while 218 were destroyed during Kutuzov and a further 147 during Polkovodets Rumyantsev.

According to the author Christer Bergström, the Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe reported 97 aircraft lost between 5 and 8 July (Fliegerkorps VIII–58 and Luftflotte 6–39). For the period 5–31 July, Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe gives figures of 681 lost from the two air fleets (335 for Fliegerkorps VIII and 346 for Luftflotte 6). Of this total 420 were written off; 192 from Fliegerkorps VIII and 229 from Luftflotte 6.

According to Soviet claims, the Red Army smashed thirty German divisions, inflicting the following casualties between 5 July and 23 August 1943: 500,000 dead, wounded and captured soldiers; 1,500 tanks and 3,700 planes destroyed.

Soviet

David Glantz quotes Grigoriy Krivosheyev as the most reliable source. According to Glantz's interpretation of Krivosheyev's work, which interpreted Soviet archives, Soviet losses at Kursk during Citadel (known to the Soviets as the 'Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation', 5–16 July) amounted to 177,877 casualties. The Central Front suffered 15,336 irrecoverable casualties and 18,561 medical casualties, for a total of 33,897. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 irrecoverable casualties and 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892. The Steppe Front suffered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties with 42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.

Glantz estimates Soviet losses during Operation Kutuzov (12 July –18 August) at 112,529 irrecoverable casualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total of 429,890; the Western Front as losing 25,585 irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical casualties; the Bryansk Front suffered 39,173 irrecoverable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. The Central Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and 117,271 medical casualties. Total casualties for the "Battle of Kursk" were 863,303 men.

The Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev (3–23 August), according to Glantz and official Soviet sources, were 255,566, including 71,611 irrecoverable casualties and 183,955 medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339 irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties, for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 irrecoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, for a total of 98,273.

Soviet materiel losses for Citadel (5–16 July) amounted to 2,586 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 3,925 committed to combat (well over 50 percent). This was roughly seven times the number of German losses. Total materiel losses for Kutuzov totalled 2,349 tanks and self-propelled guns out of an initial strength of 2,308, well over 100 percent. The materiel losses in the Polkovodets Rumyantsev operation were also heavy. Glantz quotes Krivosheyev's numbers of 1,864 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 2,439 engaged, well over 50 percent. The loss ratio was roughly 5:1 in the Germans' favour.

Frieser also supports Krivosheyev's casualty figures for men and armour.

According to Christer Bergström, Red Air Force losses amounted to 677 aircraft on the northern flank and 439 on the southern flank of the bulge during Citadel. In the north, 5–11 July, Soviet losses amounted to 430 planes destroyed. The 2nd Air Army suffered 433 casualties in total in the north during July 1943. Total losses for the 17th Air Army were 244 during the same period. Other unit casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates total Soviet air losses were 1,104 between 12 July and 18 August, covering Operations Citadel and Kutuzov.

Notes

1. With the final destruction of German forces at Kharkov, the Battle of Kursk came to an end. Having won the strategic initiative, the Red Army advanced along a 2,000 kilometers (1,200 mi) front.
2. After Kursk, Germany could not even pretend to hold the strategic initiative in the East.
3. The breakdown as shown in Bergström (2007, pp. 127–128) is as follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Army and 611 of 17th Air Army on the southern sector (Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern sector (Central Front).
4. The breakdown as shown in Zetterling & Frankson (2000, p. 20) is as follows: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army (Central Front), 881 of 2nd Air Army (Voronezh Front), 735 of 17th Air Army (only as a secondary support for Voronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army (Steppe Front) and 320 of Long Range Bomber Command
5. ^ Operation Citadel refers to the German offensive from 4 to 16 July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 5–23 July
6. The breakdown as shown in Frieser (2007, p. 154) is as follows: 9,063 KIA, 43,159 WIA and 1,960 MIA
7. ^ The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the German offensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent Soviet counteroffensives, from 4 July to 23 August.
8. The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, pp. 132–134) is as follows: Kursk-defence: 177,847; Orel-counter: 429,890; Belgorod-counter: 255,566
9. The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev (1997, p. 262) is as follows: Kursk-defence; 1,614. Orel-counter; 2,586. Belgorod-counter; 1,864.
10. Source includes: German Nation Archive microfilm publication T78, Records of the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) Roll 343, Frames 6301178–180, which confirms Hitler's teleprinter messages to Rommel about reinforcing southern Italy with armoured forces that were already destined to be used for Citadel.
11. over 105,000 in April and as much as 300,000 in June, according to Zetterling & Frankson (2000, p. 22)
12. This order of battle does not show the complete composition of the Steppe Front. In addition to the units listed below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd Armies. Perhaps the order of battle below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel
13. The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The German Freya radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel.
14. KTB AOK9 9 July (Daily war diary of the 9th Army)
15. 651 knocked out tanks, 526 write offs, primary source: CAMO (Ministry of Defence of Russia)

Citations

1. ^ Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171.
2. Glantz & House 1995, p. 175.
3. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 338.
4. ^ Glantz & House 1995, p. 165.
5. ^ Bergström 2007, pp. 123–125. Figures are from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin. Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEBergström2007123–125" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
6. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 337.
7. Bergström 2007, p. 127–128, figures are from Russian archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow..
8. Bergström 2007, p. 21.
9. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 20.
10. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 154.
11. Glantz & House 2004, p. 276.
12. Clark 2012, p. 408.
13. Frieser 2007. A rough estimation by Frieser since no specific numbers are available
14. ^ Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 116, 117. For all participating German armies in the Kursk area, there were 203,000 casualties for July and August Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEZetterlingFrankson2000116, 117" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
15. Frieser 2007, p. 201. Exact numbers are unknown; the entire German eastern front lost 1,331 tanks and assault guns for July and August, so the number of 760 is an estimate.
16. ^ Bergström 2008, p. 120. Figures for 5–31 July, as given by the Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe. Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEBergström2008120" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
17. Krivosheev 2001, Kursk.
18. ^ Krivosheev 2001, Kursk equipment Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEKrivosheev2001" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
19. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 150.
20. Krivosheev 1997, p. 132-134.
21. Krivosheev 1997, p. 262.
22. Dunn 1997, p. 94-Google Books preview
23. Kasdorf 2000, p. 16.
24. Glantz 1989, p. 149–159.
25. Glantz & House 2004, p. 64–67.
26. Glantz 1986, p. 66: "When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived infallibility of Blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the hopes of the German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east... Kursk announced to the world that for every offensive theory there is a suitable defensive one available to those who devote enough thought to develop it."
27. ^ Glantz & House 1995, p. 167.
28. ^ Glantz 2013, p. 184.
29. Clark 2012, p. 165.
30. Clark 2012, p. 168.
31. ^ Kasdorf 2000, p. 7.
32. Clark 2012, p. 167.
33. Clark 2012, p. 176.
34. Glantz & House 2004, p. 11.
35. ^ Kasdorf 2000, p. 8.
36. ^ Dunn 1997, p. 61.
37. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 13.
38. ^ Clark 2012, p. 177.
39. ^ Clark 2012, p. 178.
40. Kasdorf 2000, p. 10.
41. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 11, 13.
42. Manstein p. 445
43. Manstein p. 446
44. Clark 2012, p. 184.
45. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 14.
46. ^ Clark 2012, p. 186.
47. Glantz & House 2004, p. 354.
48. ^ Clark 2012, p. 187.
49. Glantz & House 2004, p. 25.
50. Mannstein p. 446
51. Clark 2012, p. 194,196.
52. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 51-53.
53. ^ Clark 2012, p. 194.
54. Healy Zitadelle p. 86
55. ^ Clark 2012, p. 192.
56. ^ Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 170.
57. Glantz & House 2004, p. 55.
58. ^ Mulligan 1987, p. 329.
59. ^ Clark 2012, p. 223.
60. ^ Clark 2012, p. 193.
61. Healy Zitadelle p. 79
62. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 1-3.
63. Glantz & House 2004, p. 3.
64. ^ Manstein 1983, pp. 480–482.
65. Healy Zitadelle p. 23
66. Clark 1966, p. 327.
67. Clark 2012, p. 208, Clark states 300 locomotives instead of 298.
68. Barbier 2002, p. 58.
69. ^ Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 22.
70. Dunn 1997, p. 63.
71. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 18.
72. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 28-29.
73. http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/tunny-code-breaker-nazi-secrets-2020/
74. http://www.colossus-computer.com/colossus1.html
75. Clark 2012, p. 188, 190-191.
76. "ВОЕННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА -[ Мемуары ]- Микоян А.И. Так было". Militera.lib.ru. Archived from the original on 4 July 2010. Retrieved 6 August 2010. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
77. "Разгром фашистских войск на Курской дуге". на первом этапе противник, собрав максимум своих сил, в том числе до 13–15 танковых дивизий, при поддержке большого количества авиации нанесёт удар своей орловско-кромской группировкой в обход Курска с северо-востока и белгородско-харьковской группировкой в обход Курска с юго-востока. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
78. Google Books preview - The memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. This is for the verification of the presented English translation of the original Russian text. Retrieved 8 May 2013. {{cite book}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
79. ^ Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 168.
80. ^ Clark 2012, p. 189.
81. ^ Рокоссовский Константин Константинович, Солдатский долг. — М.: Воениздат, 1988 Template:Ru icon
82. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 28.
83. Clark 2012, p. 190.
84. ^ Glantz 1986, p. 24.
85. Glantz 1986, p. 25.
86. ^ Clark 2012, p. 204.
87. Glantz 2013, p. 195.
88. Clark 2012, p. 202.
89. The Front's history.
90. ^ Clark 2012, p. 203.
91. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 64-65.
92. ^ Clark 2012, p. 211.
93. ^ Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 41, 49.
94. Glantz 1986, p. 19, it was given as 1,500 anti-tank mines per kilometer and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer..
95. Glantz & House 2004, p. 65, it was also given as 2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile..
96. Osprey 1992, p. 31, it was given as 2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile.. sfn error: no target: CITEREFOsprey1992 (help)
97. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 39.
98. Glantz & House 2004, p. 67.
99. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 290.
100. ^ Glantz 1986, p. 20.
101. Glantz & House 1995, p. 90.
102. ^ Clark 2012, p. 267.
103. Nikolai Litvin, 800 Days on the Eastern Front: A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II, 2007, p. 12-13. Nikolai Litvin was a Soviet anti-tank gunner present at the battle of Kursk and he recalls his experience during the special training to overcome tank phobia as follows: "The tanks continued to advance closer and closer. Some comrades became frightened, leaped out of the trenches, and began to run away. The commander saw who was running and quickly forced them back into the trenches, making it sternly clear that they had to stay put. The tanks reached the trench line and, with a terrible roar, clattered overhead... it was possible to conceal oneself in a trench from a tank, let it pass right over you, and remain alive."
104. ^ Clark 2012, p. 268.
105. Clark 2012, p. 210.
106. Gerwehr & Glenn & Johnson & Flanagan. The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations. p. 33. Retrieved 8 May 2013. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
107. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 241.
108. Healey Zitadelle p. 78
109. ^ Healy Zitadelle p. 77
110. Bergström 2007, pp. 79–81, 102, 106, 114, 118.
111. Clark 2012, p. 475-477, The 2nd Panzer Army and 2nd Army are not included in the order of battle in the source. The 2nd Panzer Army did not take part in Operation Citadel, but played a significant part in Operation Kutuzov. The 2nd Army was tasked with pushing the western face of the salient once the encirclement was completed, but never got do so since the northern and southern pincers failed to meet at Kursk.
112. Clark 2012, p. 475-477.
113. ^ Clark 2012, p. 478-484.
114. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 100.
115. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 91.
116. Glantz & House 2004, p. 346.
117. Glantz & House 2004, p. 345.
118. Glantz 1990, p. 82–113.
119. Bergström 2007, p. 124–125.
120. Töppel 2002, p. 33-34. sfn error: no target: CITEREFTöppel2002 (help)
121. Mulligan 1987, p. 236, 254.
122. ^ Glantz 2004, p. 81. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz2004 (help)
123. ^ Barbier 2002, p. 59.
124. Clark 2012, p. 224.
125. Clark 2012, p. 226.
126. Clark 1966, p. 329.
127. ^ Clark 2012, p. 227.
128. ^ Glantz 2004, p. 84. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz2004 (help)
129. Glantz 2004, p. 85. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz2004 (help)
130. Clark 2012, p. 233.
131. Glantz 2004, p. 86. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz2004 (help)
132. Bergström 2007, pp. 26–27.
133. ^ Clark 2012, p. 236.
134. Clark 2012, p. 236, 263.
135. ^ Clark 2012, p. 281.
136. Clark 2012, p. 201.
137. ^ Clark 2012, p. 195.
138. ^ Clark 2012, p. 261.
139. ^ Clark 2012, p. 264.
140. ^ Clark 2012, p. 308-309.
141. ^ Clark 2012, p. 265.
142. Clark 2012, p. 266.
143. Clark 2012, p. 266, 120.
144. Münch 1997, pp. 50–52.
145. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 108.
146. Clark 1966, p. 333.
147. Glantz & House 2004, p. 93.
148. Rokossovsky, p. 266.
149. Piekalkiewice, Unternehmen Zitadelle, p. 154.
150. Keegan 2006, p. 72.
151. Frieser 2007, p. 110.
152. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 111.
153. Overy 1995, p. 205.
154. Restayn & Moller 2002, pp. 333–336.
155. Overy 1995, pp. 204–205.
156. Restayn & Moller 2002, p. 333.
157. Frieser 2007, p. 107.
158. Overy 1995, p. 204.
159. Clark 1966, pp. 331–332.
160. Clark 2012, p. 196.
161. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 112.
162. ^ Clark 2012, p. 197.
163. ^ Clark 2012, p. 237.
164. ^ Osprey 1992, p. 41. sfn error: no target: CITEREFOsprey1992 (help)
165. Frieser 2007, p. 113.
166. Clark 2012, p. 238.
167. Clark 2012, p. 240.
168. Clark 2012, p. 241.
169. ^ Clark 2012, p. 242.
170. Clark 2012, p. 68.
171. ^ Clark 2012, p. 246.
172. ^ Clark 2012, p. 247.
173. Clark 2012, p. 248.
174. Clark 2012, p. 250.
175. Clark 2012, p. 252-253.
176. ^ Clark 2012, p. 254.
177. ^ Clark 2012, p. 255.
178. ^ Clark 2012, p. 256.
179. ^ Clark 2012, p. 257.
180. Clark 2012, p. 258.
181. ^ Clark 2012, p. 259.
182. ^ Clark 2012, p. 260.
183. Glantz & House, p. 102. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantzHouse (help)
184. Frieser 2007, p. 116.
185. Wendt p.18
186. Geheime Kommandosache
187. Frieser 2007, p. 118.
188. Manstein 1983, p. 500.
189. Bergström 2007, p. 77.
190. Healy 1992, pp. 84–87.
191. Bergström 2007, pp. 79–80.
192. Clark 1966, p. 337.
193. Healy 1992, pp. 76–77.
194. "чпеообс мйфетбфхтб -[ чПЕООБС ЙУФПТЙС ]- уБНУПОПЧ б.н. лТБИ ЖБЫЙУФУЛПК БЗТЕУУЙЙ 1939–1945". Militera.lib.ru. Retrieved 6 August 2010.
195. Bergström 2007, p. 81.
196. Dieter Brand Generalmajor a.D : "Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil II)"
197. Frieser 2007, p. 130, 132.
198. Glantz 1999, p. 275. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz1999 (help)
199. Clark 1966, pp. 337–338.
200. Glantz & House 2004, p. 218.
201. Manstein 1983, p. 504.
202. Engelmann, Zitadelle p. 5.
203. Carell & Osers 1966–1971, p. .
204. Frieser 2007, p. 149.
205. Krivosheev 1997, p. 132–134.
206. Magenheimer, die Militärstrategie Deutschlands 1940–1945 p.244
207. ^ Glantz & House 1995, p. 176.
208. Glantz & House 1995, pp. 149–150.
209. Glantz 1991, p. 132–133. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz1991 (help)
210. Glantz 1991, p. 136–137. sfn error: no target: CITEREFGlantz1991 (help)
211. Zagola 1989, p. 6.
212. ^ Zagola 1989, p. 18.
213. Zagola 1989, p. 7.
214. Bergström 2007, pp. 48–49.
215. Overy 1995, p. 192.
216. Overy 1995, p. 207.
217. Overy 1995, pp. 207–209.
218. Hinley, Sir Harry (1998 ). "The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War". cl.cam.ac.uk. Retrieved 17 November 2011. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
219. Frieser 2007, p. 188.
220. Glantz & House 1995, p. 297.
221. Glantz & House 2004, p. 241.
222. Glantz & House 2004, p. 245.
223. Frieser 2007, p. 196.
224. Glantz & House 2004, p. 249.
225. Glantz & House 1995, p. 70.
226. Bergström 2007, p. 121.
227. Frieser 2007, p. 82.
228. ^ Frieser 2007, p. 202.
229. Frieser 2007, p. 151.
230. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 338.
231. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 345.
232. ^ Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 276.
233. Frieser 2007, p. 204.
234. "Основные операции Советских Вооруженных Сил в ВОВ, начавшиеся в 1943 году". MilitaryMaps.narod.ru. Retrieved 6 August 2010.
235. Пигарев Ростислав Владимирович. "Курская Битва". Biograph-soldat.ru. Retrieved 6 August 2010.
236. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 274.
237. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 275.
238. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, pp. 276–277.
239. Frieser 2007, pp. 150, 200, and the pages onward.
240. Bergström 2008, p. 121.

References

• Bergström, Christer (2007). Kursk — The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-903223-88-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Bergström, Christer (2008). Bagration to Berlin — The Final Air Battle in the East: 1941–1945. Burgess Hill: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-903223-91-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2002). Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943. Zenith Imprint. ISBN 978-0-760312-54-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Carell, Paul; Osers, Ewald (1966–1971). Hitler's War on Russia: V1: Hitler Moves East, V2: Scorched Earth. Translated from the German Unternehmen Barbarossa. London: Corgi. ISBN 978-0-552-08638-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Clark, Alan (1966). Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945. New York: William Morrow. ISBN 0-688-04268-6. OCLC 40117106. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943. London: Headline Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-7553-3639-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-275-95733-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2007). Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg – Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten (in German). München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt München. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathon (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, Kan: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 978-0-7006-0899-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glantz, David M.; Orenstein, Harold S. (1999). The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-4933-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (2004) . The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-070061335-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glantz, David M. (1990). The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II. Novato, CA: Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-380-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glantz, David M. (1989). Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-3347-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Glantz, David (2013). Soviet Military Intelligence in War. Routledge (Taylor & Francis). ISBN 9781136289347. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Glantz, David M. (1986). "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943" (PDF). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Soviet Army Studies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report No. 11). Ft. Belvoir. OCLC 320412485. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Healy, Mark (1992). Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the East. London: Osprey Publishers. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Kasdorf, Colonel Bruno (2000). "The Battle of Kursk – An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles" (PDF). U.S. Army War College. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Keegan, John, ed. (2006). Atlas of World War II. London: Collins. ISBN 0-00-721465-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Krivosheev, Grigoriy (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 1-85367-280-7. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Krivosheev, Grigoriy (2001). "Россия и СССР в войнах XX века: Потери вооруженных сил: Статистическое исследование" (in Russian). Moscow: Olma Press. ISBN 978-5-224-01515-3. {{cite web}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Liddell Hart, B.H., The German Generals Talk. New York, NY: Morrow, 1948.
• Manstein, Erich von (1983) . Verlorene Siege (in German). München: Monch. ISBN 978-3-7637-5051-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)
• Mawdsley, Evan (2007). Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941–1945. London: Hodder Arnold. ISBN 0-340-61392-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Mulligan, Timothy P. (1987). "Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943" (PDF). Journal of Contemporary History. 22 (2): 235–260. doi:10.1177/002200948702200203. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Münch, Karlheinz (1997). Combat History of Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653: Formerly the Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 197 1940–1942. Winnipeg, Manitoba: J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing. ISBN 0-921991-37-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Newton, Stephen H. (2003). Kursk: The German View. Cambridge, Mass: Westview Press. ISBN 0-306-81150-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Nipe, George (1996). Decision In the Ukraine, Summer 1943, II. SS and III. Panzerkorps. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz. ISBN 0-921991-35-5. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Overy, Richard (1995). Why the Allies Won. New York City: Norton Press. ISBN 978-0-393-03925-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Restayn, Jean; Moller, N. (2002). Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album, Volume 1: The South. Altona, Man: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing. ISBN 0-921991-70-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Restayn, Jean; Moller, N. (2006). Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album, Volume 2: The North. Altona, Man: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing. ISBN 0-921991-72-X. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Robbins, David L. (2004). Last Citadel. London: Orion. ISBN 0-7528-5925-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Taylor, A.J.P; Kulish, V.M (1974). A History Of World War Two. London: Octopus Books. ISBN 0-7064-0399-1. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Töppel, Roman (2001). "Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 – Legenden, Mythen, Propaganda". Dresden: Technical University. {{cite journal}}: |format= requires |url= (help); Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War. London: Frank Cass. ISBN 0-7146-5052-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

Further reading

• Healy, Mark. Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4–17 July 1943. Stroud: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5716-1.
• irbergui (YouTube id), German newsreels showing the Battle of Kursk, YouTube, Retrieved 2008-09-19
• Licari, Michael J. The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality, Mike Licari's Home Page, Retrieved 2008-09-19
• Licari, Michael J. A Review Essay: Books on the Battle of Kursk, Mike Licari's Home Page, Retrieved 2008-09-19
• Newton, Steven H., translator, editor, and annotator (2002). Kursk, the German view : eyewitness reports of Operation Citadel by the German commanders. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo. ISBN 978-0-306-81150-0. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Wilson, Alan Kursk – Raw Data to Download, 6 February 1999. —Information from the US Army KOSAVE II study on the southern face battle
• Wilson, Alan The Kursk Region, 5 July 1943 (map), 27 October 1999

External links

Media related to Battle of Kursk at Wikimedia Commons

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• 1943 in the Soviet Union
• Battles and operations of the Soviet–German War
• Battles involving the Soviet Union
• Battles of World War II involving Germany
• Conflicts in 1943
• Tank battles