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This article focuses on the ethnic politics of Khuzestan, an oil-rich province in southwestern Iran

Historical background

Ethnic politics in Khuzestan revolves primarily around the issue of local control of resources. Unlike most other Iranian provinces, Khuzestan is ethnically diverse, home to a number of distinct peoples and tribal groups.

Arabs

Local Arab rule in Khuzestan began during the middle of the 15th century under the Msha'sha'iya, a Shi'a sect founded and first led by Muhammad ibn Falah (1400-1461), an Iraqi theologian who believed himself to be the earthly representative of Imam Ali and the Mahdi. Falah and his followers captured the city of Hoveizeh in 1441, which became his primary base of ideological dissemination. His spiritual teachings were later set down in the text, Kalam al-Mahdi. The Arab population in western Khuzestan thereafter began increasing significantly, and the region thus came to be referred to as Arabistan. By the time of Mozaffareddin Shah, the name Arabistan had come to completely refer to all of Khuzestan (also see Origin of the name Khuzestan#Arabistan), as ibn Falah and his son, Ali ibn Muhammad Msha'sha'iya, increased their influence over the area, including Lorestan, Kohgiluyeh, Kermanshah, Bahrain and southern Iraq.

Beginning in the 16th century, the Bani Kaab, an Arab tribe originating from what is now Kuwait, came to settle in western Khuzestan. By the mid-18th century, they dominated much of the area. After Nader Shah's death in 1747, they refused to pay taxes to the Persian and Ottoman empires alike, blockading the Arvand/Shatt al-Arab and attacking Basra; Karim Khan Zand, the Ottoman army, and the British East India Company all responded by attacking them in the 1760s. However, following the death of their strongest leader, Sheikh Salman, the tribe declined.

In 1837, the city of Mohammarah, the center of a local sheikhdom, was taken and in 1847 the Second Treaty of Erzurum between the Ottomans and Iran, confirmed it and all territory on the east bank of the Arvand/Shatt al-Arab as Iranian. Sheikh Jabir al-Kaabi, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, effectively became a provincial ruler under the command of Nassereddin Shah Qajar, the Shah of Persia. Under orders from the Shah, Sheikh Jabir fought the British to maintain Iranian sovereignty over the region. Upon Sheikh Jabir's death, his son, Sheikh Maz'al, succeeded him as tribal leader and Sheikh of Mohammerah. He strengthened and expanded commercial and political ties with Tehran. In 1897, Maz'al was murdered (some accounts state he was assassinated) by his brother, Sheikh Khaz'al Khan, who then not only assumed the position of Kaabide tribal leadership, but also proclaimed himself the ruler of the entire province. This was soon accepted by the Qajar court of Tehran, and his position as Sheikh was made official.

The rest of the province (the eastern and northern regions) remained dominated by Bakhtiari Khans, Lur tribal leaders, and Persian groups. Several of the Bakhtiari Khans, in particular, had entered into alliances with Khaz'al.

The Pahlavi era

In 1925, having dissolved the Qajar dynasty and establishing himself as the new Shah of Iran, Reza Shah had Sheikh Khaz'al arrested, who had by this time lost the support and protection of the British colonialists. Khaz'al was sent to Tehran and spent the rest of his life there under house arrest until his death in 1936. It is said that he did not die of natural causes, but was murdered by a low-level guard on the orders of Reza Shah. The areas which had comprised his emirate were returned to the province, and the name of Mohammerah was changed to Khorramshahr, while Naseriyeh reverted to Ahvaz.

Reza Shah then embarked upon an overall campaign to forcibly settle all the nomads of Iran among others the Arab, Bakhtiari, and Luri nomadic tribes of southwestern Iran. This created great resentment amongst tribal leaders who viewed such actions as an attempt to suppress and destroy their cultures and way of life. Reza Shah countered their arguments by claiming that some of these nomadic tribes were dangerous and had engaged in criminal activities such as highway robbery and banditry. The Lurs, in particular, were considered to be one of the fiercest Iranian tribes. Similar claims were used to justify actions taken against the Baluch tribes of eastern Iran. These initial attempts by the central government to settle the nomadic peoples were ultimately unsuccessful, as when the era of Reza Shah ended, many of the tribes returned to their nomadic ways. Under the reign of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, attempts were again made to settle these tribes using less forceful methods and which met with greater success.

In addition to the nomadic issue, Reza Shah had also promoted an aggressive campaign to bring the whole of Iran into the modern age, and to accomplish this it was felt that the entire nation would have to be brought under a single cultural and linguistic banner. Persian language and modern dialect were stressed over minority languages such as Azeri, Baluchi, Khuzestani Arabic and Kurdish, and over distinct Persian dialects such as Bakhtiari, Behbahani, Dezfuli, Luri, and Shushtari. The Arabs of southern Iran were, in particular, singled out by the Pahlavi governments for increased scrutiny in these efforts, which they widely considered as constituting evidence of state-sponsored racism and cultural suppression. As with other Iranian ethnic groups, the Arabs of Iran wished to retain not only their Iranian identity, but also the identity of their own distinct languages, cultures and heritage, though in recent decades increased migration to the urban centres and assimilation into Persian culture has tended to reduce these sentiments.

Iran-Iraq War

In 1980, Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, tried to take advantage of the revolution in Iran. Gambling that the new government would be too weak to resist him, and that the Arabic-speaking minority of Khuzestan would support Iraq, his armies invaded Khuzestan, initiating the Iran-Iraq war. He was proved wrong when the Iranians successfully defended the province, and the Arab minority remained firmly with Iran. Around 16,000 Khuzestanis died fighting in the war, 12,000 of them Arabs. The brutal eight-year-long war devastated Khuzestan, most especially the important port city of Khorramshahr, and the province is still recovering.

Demographics

The Khuzestani population is predominantly divided between Arabic and Persian speaking groups. How much of the population is ethnically Arab and Arabic-speaking no one knows for certain, and definitions and estimates are often disputed, as the Iranian central government does not release any ethnic-related census figures. According to the 2004 CIA World Factbook, Iranian Arabs comprise 3% of the overall population, while Arabic-speakers comprise 1%.

The Minorities At Risk (MAR) project states that there are approximately 690,000 Bakhtiaris in Iran, most of them centered in the provinces of Khuzestan and Isfahan.

According to Human Rights Watch,

Precise figures on the ethnic composition of Iran's population are impossible to obtain. The last census in which such data was compiled was carried out in 1956.

Amir Taheri reports that less than 40% of the province's population are ethnic Arab.

Iranian Arab journalist and writer Yusef Azizi Bani-Torof, in a lecture at the Industrial University of Isfahan in 1999, claims that

the population of Arabs in southwestern Iran is 4,548,240. And the ratio to Iran's total population is: 4,548,240/65,000,000 = 6.997%.

The following table, reportedly based on unofficial provincial census data gathered in 1996 by the Centre for Iran Studies and published in 1997, accompanied his lecture: These claims and the existence of the Centre for Iran Studies have not been verified:

Iranian constitution and minorities

There are three articles in the constitution of Iran pertaining to ethnicities of Iran, their languages, and resources. These are:

Article 15:

"The Official Language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian."

Article 19:

"All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege."

Article 48:

"There must be no discrimination among the various provinces with regard to the exploitation of natural resources, utilization of public revenues, and distribution of economic activities among the various provinces and regions of the country, thereby ensuring that every region has access to the necessary capital and facilities in accordance with its needs and capacity for growth."

However, human rights groups have accused the Iranian government of violating constitutional guarantees of equality. In a report entitled Iran: New government fails to address dire human rights situation, published in February 2006, Amnesty International says:

Despite constitutional guarantees of equality, individuals belonging to minorities in Iran, who are believed to number about half of the population of about 70 millions, are subject to an array of discriminatory laws and practices. These include land and property confiscations, denial of state and para-statal employment under the gozinesh criteria and restrictions on social, cultural, linguistic and religious freedoms which often result in other human rights violations such as the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, grossly unfair trials of political prisoners before Revolutionary Courts, corporal punishment and use of the death penalty, as well as restrictions on movement and denial of other civil rights.

Ethnic grievances

It is claimed by some sources that oil revenues from the province are spent in other areas of Iran favoured by the Islamic Republic, while they and other Khuzestanis struggle to repair extensive war damage with little revenue or support from the central government. While poverty is rampant amongst all native Khuzestani groups, it is most especially evident amongst the Arabs.

Alleged racism

Some Arabs feel that they are suspected, unfairly, of complicity in Saddam Hussein's invasion, and stigmatized as outsiders and interlopers.

One traveler cites several conversations with an ethnic Persian who was showing him the sights of Khuzestan:

The local Arabs sit on the ground behind their wares, the women clad in black with their faces tattooed, the men in their long robes and eghals on their heads. Mina whispers with distaste: "These Arabs were excited at the thought of an Iraqi invasion."

Mina tells me that during the black-outs, when the population were implored not to let any light escape into the night, the Arabs would be flashing torches out of their windows. "To try and guide the Iraqi planes," she goes on. "I don’t know if Saddam had promised them something, but they were very keen to let him in."

While this may be evidence that some ethnic Persians distrust Arabs, no account of the Iraq-Iran war, academic or otherwise, mentions any Arab minority support for the invasion. Khuzestani Arabs, as well as the Azeris and Lurs, were among the bravest and most courageous soldiers during the war against Iraq, particularly during the battle of the Liberation of Khorramshahr, and the sacrifices they made in sacred defense (shahaadat) of the homeland are well documented. If there is prejudice, it is unfounded. If anything can be said for certain, it is the fact that Ali Shamkhani, an Iranian Arab from Ahvaz, held Iran's sensitive top military post of Minister of Defense for 8 years from 1997 to 2005. So are Iran's current Minister of Agriculture Mohammad Reza Eskandari , Mohsen Rezaee (secretary of Iran's powerful Expediency Discernment Council), and several parliamentary committee chairs, all from Khuzestan.

Human rights

Amnesty International

Amnesty International has highlighted a number of human rights abuses against Ahwazi Arabs in Khuzestan. In 2005, these included:

• The persecution of Arabs in Khuzestan
• The alleged killing of at least 31 people in unrest in April 2005
• The arbitrary arrest, possible torture and incommunicado detentention of Arab writer and journalist Yusef Azizi Bani-Torof
• The incommunicado detention of Taher Mahmoud Tamimi, Mohammad Jalali and at least 37 others in a government crack-down following unrest in April
• The incommunicado detention and possible torture of close relatives of Arab tribal leader Hajj Salem Bawi
• The incommunicado detention and possible torture of Hamid Qate'Pour (teacher), Emad Rafi'i (teacher) and Mohammad Hezbawi (also known as Hezbaee Zadeh) (newspaper editor)
• Four Arabs arrested during demonstrations during El Al-Fitr in 6 November

Amnesty has also claimed that "hundreds" of Arabs were arrested in 2005 during a crack-down on anti-government demonstrations.

Human Rights Watch

In 1997, Human Rights Watch reported that "Iranian Arabs, an ethnic minority centered in southwest Iran, have cited significant restrictions on their language and culture, and on their right to participate effectively in decisions affecting the area in which they live." . According to another report in the same year, "Arabic is not taught in elementary schools, and the Arabic teaching in secondary schools focuses exclusively on religious texts. The governor of Khuzestan is not an Arab" while "Arabs make up 70 percent of the three million inhabitants of Khuzestan province in the southwest of Iran." In 2005, there have been reports of unrest over grievances of local Arabs such as "inadequate attention to their culture and language by state media, facing discrimination in getting jobs, unfair distribution of Khuzestan's oil wealth." In January 2006, a third attempt by local Majlis members to redistribute 1.5% of revenues to Khuzestan's provincial government was voted down.

In 2005, HRW criticised the treatment of Khuzestani Arab writer and journalist Yusef Azizi Bani-Torof, who was arrested after he spoke out about the killing of local residents during the protests, which began on April 15. The organisation also criticised the killing of civilians by security forces in the unrest and quoted "government critics" as stating that "at least 50 people were killed." HRW said it had been provided with a list of names of those killed, including two boys aged eight and 12, by the US-based Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation. This contradicted government claims that no more than four people were killed.

HRW also said that the government was demanding a payment of 50,000,000 Iranian rials (US $6250) for each body, "allegedly to compensate for damages to public buildings sustained during the protests. This amount was later reduced to 15,000,000 rials (US$1875)."

Joe Stork, the director of HRW's Middle East division, said: "The Iranian authorities have again displayed their readiness to silence those who denounce human rights violations. We have serious allegations the government used excessive lethal force, arbitrary arrests and torture in Khuzistan."

Criticism

The Iranian government claims that efforts to disproportionately accentuate the problems in Khuzestan are by certain foreign media or political groups, particularly those based in the UK.

Further along this line, it is also believed that Khuzestani Arabs are not as disproportionately affected by poverty or ethnic marginalisation as is claimed, stating that there are poorer and more marginalised sections of Iranian society, including Khuzestani Persians. The governor's office of Khuzestan claims the provincial GDP to rank 3rd in the nation , yet to what extent the local population benefits from these fruits remains unclear.

Furthermore, contrary to the arguments put forward by human rights groups, Arabic is actually taught in public schools, with Classical Arabic (Quranic) and Modern Standard Arabic compulsory subjects on the school curriculum. Classical and Modern Arabic are taught for 7 years starting 6th grade into college. As such, the following are actual samples from textbooks taught throughout Iran, aside from the standard Islamic studies classes:

• 6th grade:
  • Modern Arabic (Click on files on row 114_1)
  • Quranic Arabic (Click on files on row 112) (also)
• 7th grade:
  • Modern Arabic: (Click on files on row 125) (also)
  • Quranic Arabic: (Click on files on row 126) (also)
• 8th grade:
  • Modern Arabic: (Click on files on row 141) (also)
  • Quranic Arabic: (Click)
• 9th grade:
  • Modern Arabic: (Click on files on row 204/1)

sources: General Bureau for Authoring Educational Textbooks of Iran and General Bureau for Textbooks Printing and Distribution

It is also contended that the rights of indigenous Persian and Iranian groups of Khuzestan, such as the nomadic Bakhtiari and Lur tribes, are often over-looked due to the publicity surrounding Khuzestani Arabs. However, others contend that the regional Khuzestani Arabic dialect is suppressed, local Arabic newspapers have been closed down and Khuzestani Arab political parties have been banned.

Khuzestani Arab refugees in Iraq

A report on Iraq published by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in November 2005 drew attention to the plight of Khuzestani Arab refugees in Iraq. The report says that there are around 2,500 Arab refugees in Iraq, most of whom fled the Iran-Iraq War. According to the UNHCR, "... they are predominantly of rural background, and live in local settlements in southern Iraq near the Dujailah area 45 kilometres west of al-Kut."

The refugees had been given land and housing by the regime of Saddam Hussein, but after his downfall in 2003 they were made homeless after being attacked by extremist Arab militias allied to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iraqi Shi'a party supported by the Iranian government. According to the UNHCR, around 80 Khuzestani Arab families were forced out of their homes by opponents of Saddam Hussein and have been relocated to the UNHCR transit centre near Basra. The UNHCR report states that "they were later evacuated by the Iraqi authorities and ever since have been scattered throughout the southern governorates. Many attempted to return to Iran, but came back to Iraq due to alleged harassment by the Iranian authorities and difficulties reintegrating following years in exile."

Alleged forced displacement

A frequent complaint among Khuzestani Arabs is their forced displacement and the settlement of Azeris and Persians from outside Khuzestan on their land. The problem was highlighted by UN Special Rapporteur for Adequate Housing, following a visit to Khuzestan in July 2005.

In an interview with IRINnews, Kothari said:

"When you visit Ahwaz, in terms of the very adverse conditions in the neighbourhoods, there are thousands of people living with open sewers, no sanitation, no regular access to water, electricity and no gas connections.

In Khuzestan ... we drove outside the city about 20 km and we visited the areas where large development projects are coming up - sugar cane plantations and other projects along the river - and the estimate we received is that between 200,000-250,000 Arab people are being displaced from their villages because of these projects.

The third issue in Khuzestan, which is very disturbing, is that there is an attempt being made by the government to build new towns and bring in new people from other provinces. For example, there is the new town of Shirinshah where most of the people being brought into that town are people from Yazd province - non-Arabs. So the question then is that these people who are being brought there, perhaps for work and lots of incentives, why is it that those jobs are not going to the locals?

We looked in detail in some areas on the issue of compensation and, for example, in Khuzestan the compensation being offered to the Arab villagers who were being displaced is sometimes one fortieth of the market value - and there's nothing they can do about it. It's a fait accompli. That's how it is. And all of these phenomena are continuing. It's something that is happening almost every day."

Underlining the marginalisation of Khuzestani Arabs from the mainstream economy, Khotari said that in Khuzestan's slums, which are dominated by Arabs, "you can actually see the towers of the oil refineries and the flares and all of that money, which is a lot, and it is going out of the province. Even a small percentage would significantly improve things in terms of development."

Kothari also drew attention to the situation facing the Laks, who are an Iranian people indigenous to Khuzestan. He called them "... a very deprived group ... living in conditions of high density, again without access to adequate sanitation and water. And just nearby, you see other neighbourhoods with much better services."

Kothari's description of the position of the Laks suggests that economic marginalisation in Khuzestan is not only experienced by Khuzestani Arabs, but also ethnic Persian groups who are indigenous to the area.

Kothari's findings led to condemnation of forced displacement of Khuzestani Arabs in a European Parliament resolution, passed in October 2005. The resolution, supported by centre-right European People's Party and European Democrats, centre-left Party of European Socialists, centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, the Greens and the left-wing European United Left,

condemns the treatment of minorities such as ... the inhabitants of the area around Ahwaz city, the provincial capital of the ethnic Arab dominated Khuzestan province, who are being displaced from their villages according to statements by Miloon Kothari, UN Rapporteur on Adequate Housing.

Addressing the European Parliament, European Commissioner Jan Figel, speaking on behalf of Benita Ferrero-Waldner (European Commissioner for External Relations), underlined the "excessive use of force to suppress unrest in the provinces of Khuzestan and Kurdistan" as a matter of "deep concern."

Arvand Free Zone

Some Ahwazi Arab groups have drawn attention to the creation of the 155 square km Arvand Free Zone project, around the cities of Khorramshahr, Abadan, and Minoo Island, which they claim will intensify the forced displacement of Khuzestani Arabs along the Arvand/Shatt al-Arab, which forms the southern border between Khuzestan and Iraq's Basra province. The website of the Arvand Free Zone Organisation lists some of its goals, including:

• Commercial and industrial development
• Job creation
• Increasing national income
• Stabilization of national security

Investment for the Zone has been secured from China, with the manufacturing of "electronic and home appliances, as well as textiles and shoes."

According to a letter published by the Arvand Free Zone Organisation, land falling under its jurisdiction will be expropriated. Ahwazi Arab groups have reacted strongly to the way in which the local population is being treated, claiming that this amounts to ethnic cleansing.

A report in the Daily Telegraph , published in October 2005, called the Arvand Free Zone a "sinister development" with

tens of thousands of ethnic Ahwazi Arabs, who populate the area bordering southern Iraq, ... expected to be displaced to make way for an expanded military-industrial complex.

The British Ahwazi Friendship Society (BAFS), an advocacy group for Khuzestani Arabs in the UK, claims it will help Iran's Revolutionary Guards to influence the Shi'a areas of Iraq.

A BAFS spokesman said: "Apart from being a serious human rights issue, any development that involves people being displaced by force obviously has a security element to it as they clearly do not want people being too near. The fact that they are deciding to put this huge complex right up against the border is significant. We think this is to enable them to train and send militias over the border."

The Hamsahyeha newspaper in Ahvaz, which covers Khuzestan, reported that residents of Minoo Island were complaining of bullying tactics by employees of the Arvand Free Zone Organisation. Mostafa Motowarzadeh, the parliamentary representative for Khorramshahr, also said that the Iranian authorities pressing forward land acquisitions ahead of the end of the official consultation period.

Place names

Many of the towns and cities in Khuzestan had Arabic names which have since been changed to Persian names. Some Khuzestani Arabs contend that the change of place names is intended to wipe out the local Arab heritage and Persianize the province. However, some of these names have their origins in pre-Islamic Khuzestan. Arvandrud for example is mentioned in the Shahnama, and Andimeshk is the name of medieval Dezful.(E.I., p26) The following are a selection of place names that have been re-changed from Arabic back to Persian.

Hezbollah

As with the rest of Iran, anti-government protests, demonstrations, and worker's strikes do occur from time to time in Khuzestan. However, unlike other provinces, the Lebanese Hezbollah, under the direct command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), are used in place of riot police to violently quell Iranian Arab dissent. The Islamic Republic, being one of the primary financiers of the Hezbollah, operates several training camps for the militant Islamist group in western Khuzestan under the jurisdiction and supervision of the IRGC. The IRGC has also been known to utilize the Hezbollah against the civilian population in other parts of Iran on occasion. Iranian journalists and observers who attempt to raise concerns regarding these activities typically risk imprisonment.

April 2005 riots

In April 2005, riots broke out in several Khuzestani cities, following the circulation of a letter marked "top secret" from President Khatami's office and written in 1999, which was broadcast on Al-Jazeera and Al-Ahwaz television stations. The letter outlined a plan to encourage Persians to settle in Khuzestan, thereby changing the ethnic composition of the province. Central government officials say that the letter is a blatant forgery. Nevertheless, Arab youths rioted and some four hundred were arrested in Ahvaz.

Government officials say that the youth were misled by foreign agitators, with accusations made against Saudi Arabia, Canada and the United Kingdom. On 26 April 2005, the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Rapporteur Kazem Jalali accused British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw of interfering in Khuzestan and backing Arab opposition parties, which are illegal in Iran. This claim followed revelations that Straw had met with an Iranian Arab exile in March. Given that fomenting internal unrest is a millennia-old, tried-and-true technique for subverting enemy regimes, it is possible that this claim is true. It is also true that in many cases unrest has been blamed on outside agitators even though no foreigners were involved; most governments do not wish to believe that their policies could be contributing to internal unrest. There were also claims that the letter was published by a political faction to influence the outcome of the presidential elections.

Members of the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, have raised concerns that ethnic tensions and the violent clashes in April 2005 are the result of economic inequalities and the lingering effects of the Iran-Iraq war. A petition signed by 180 Iranian MPs was sent to President Khatami condemning the behaviour of "executive officials," who they claim have failed in their duties to Iran's Arab population and have done little to address the root socio-economic causes that led to the uprising. Many MPs were unhappy at the government crack-down against Arab demonstrators in Khuzestan following the riots, indicating that the Iranian establishment was divided on policies towards the Arab minority and that the issue of ethnic minorities was assuming a higher priority ahead of the presidential elections.

Prominent Iranian Arab journalist Yusef Azizi Bani-Torof was also arrested on 25 April 2005 at his home in Tehran, in connection with the riots. He was released without charge in June 2005.

Terrorist attacks in Khuzestan

In 2005, Ahvaz witnessed a number of terrorist attacks. The first came ahead of the presidential election on 12 June. Interior Ministry official Mohammad Hussein Motahar said at the time:

Two bombs were hidden in toilets within the building of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and at the Office of Construction and Civil Engineering. The third bomb exploded in front of the house of the governor of Khuzestan Province. All three of these explosions were in the city center of Ahvaz. Another bomb was hidden in the doorway of the house of a radio and television official in Ahvaz. The bomb went off when the door was opened.

On 16 October, two bombs exploded in a shopping mall killing at least four people. The bombs were placed in bins. Two days later, the authorities claimed that they had foiled an attempt to bomb Abadan refinery and Kianpars bridge in Ahvaz. Attacks on oil pipelines were reported by the authorities throughout the year, particularly in September when five oil wells caught alight.

The Iranian government has pointed the blame for the bomb attacks on a number of groups and foreign governments. The government initially blamed the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) and the separatist Ahwazi Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front (ADPF), with support from the American and British governments. Both groups denied responsibility. At least three Arab groups claimed responsibility for the June bombings, including the Canada-based Party of the Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party (AARP) (aka Hizba al-Nahdah al-Arabi al-Ahwazi) . Sabah al-Musawi of AARP - which was created in Damascus by the Syrian Ba'ath Party - also appeared to justify the killing of civilians, stating: "These people came from outside Ahvaz. These are settlers.... They came to Ahvaz and they must bear the consequences. The regime must bear its responsibilities towards the people it brought as settlers to Ahwaz." The AARP had claimed responsibility for an attack on the Abadan-Ma'shuur pipeline in May 2005.

However, the Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz condemned all killing of civilians, suggesting that many of those killed were Khuzestani Arabs themselves. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, British Ahwazi Friendship Society (BAFS) spokesman Nasser Bani-Assad dismissed the claims of responsibility by various foreign-based separatist groups, alleging that they did not have the ability to carry out an attack and were seeking publicity and notoriety. In a statement on the BAFS website, Bani-Assad said:

If you want to know who is behind the attacks, you only have to think about who would benefit the most - and it is not the Arabs. Certainly, the more extreme hard-line elements of the Iranian establishment will benefit greatly from the nationalist and religious fervour and anti-Arab sentiments that will arise as a result of these bomb attacks.

Presidential candidate Mostafa Moeen also suggested that those responsible for the Ahvaz attacks were also linked to similar attacks in Tehran and Zahedan. In an interview with the Guardian newspaper, Moeen suggested that the violence could have been aimed at encouraging people to vote for a hardline militarist candidate. When asked by the Guardian whether the attacks had the government's approval, he said: "I do not consider it improbable."

In the months after the June attacks, government officials and the pro-government media alleged that the UK, US, Canada, Saudi Arabia and the Shell Oil Company all had a role in the bombings, but none published any conclusive evidence. Despite claiming to have arrested those responsible for the attacks, no-one has been charged or put on trial.

Following the October attacks, the head of the judiciary for Khuzestan province, Sayyed Khalil Akbar al-Sadat, blamed "British spies," while the conservative Kayhan newspaper claimed the terrorists were "British soldiers." Deputy Interior Minister Mohammad Hossein Mousapour told state-run Mehr news agency:

Most probably those involved in the explosion were British agents who were involved in the previous incidents in Ahvaz and Khuzestan.

The British Embassy in Tehran denied any responsibility in a statement released after the attacks:

There has been speculation in the past about alleged British involvement in Khuzestan. We reject these allegations. Any linkage between the British Government and these terrorist outrages is completely without foundation.

Various officials repeated the claim of British involvement, repeating that they had reliable intelligence and confessions from those arrested after the attacks. However, no-one has been tried in connection to the attacks. Senior members of the Bawi (Bavi) tribe were arrested and two were sentenced to death, but it is not known whether this is in connection with the attacks.

Political organisations

There are a number of Iranian Arab political parties operating in exile, but no known political party representing other ethnic groups in Khuzestan. The ideology of Arab parties varies, although most are secular in their political outlook. Ideology, tactics, tribal loyalties and personal ambition have prevented these parties from forming a united front. Some advocate armed resistance, while others believe in non-violent action. Most refer to Khuzestan as al-Ahwaz or Arabistan, although some define Arabistan as also including territory along the Gulf coast to the Straight of Hormuz. Whether these views are popular or even accepted amongst most Iranian Arabs is uncertain. Khuzestan's deputy governor Rahim Fazilatpur claimed that the Arab Martyrs of Khuzestan, the Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front (AADPF) and the Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party (AARP) were given support by the British and US governments to carry out the bomb attacks of June 2005.

The Ahwazi political parties are divided into two camps: those seeking a separate state and those seeking regional autonomy within a federal Iran. Critics of these parties claim that separatism has no support among Arabs, pointing to the decision by many Ahwazi Arabs to defend Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. They also contend that separatism has always been instigated by foreign governments - particularly the British - to weaken Iran in order to control the country's natural resources and extend their influence over the Middle East. Many make no distinction between separatists and federalists, claiming that those seeking federalism have a separatist agenda and that the devolution of power to regional ethnic groups would lead to the break-up of Iran.

Some Iranian opposition parties operating abroad launched a campaign to stop the American Enterprise Institute hosting a conference entitled "The Unknown Iran: Another Case for Federalism?" in October 2005. A petition to stop the event attracted more than 1,000 signatures from members of the Iranian diaspora. Some added that the meeting indicated a new alliance between US neo-conservatives and Iranian separatists, ahead of a possible invasion of Iran by the US and its allies. Dr Ali Al-Taie, a member of the Democratic Solidarity Party of Ahwaz which upholds a federalist agenda for Iran, said at the debate: "When it comes to ethnic rights, Persian opposition groups are on the same side as the terrorist Islamic Republic. If this continues, we will see the Balkanization of Iran." But he added that: "Despite the long history of persecution, the Arabs of Khuzestan/al-Ahwaz are Iranian. There will never be, nor should there be, disintegration or separatism in Iran. Rather, all Iranian people, regardless of their ethnic background, should live under a pluralistic, tolerant, and federal society."

Islamic Wefagh Party

The Islamic Wefagh Party is the only known Arab group to have been tolerated by the Iranian government. Jasem Shadidzadeh Al-Tamimi is the party's secretary general. He was a member of the Sixth Majlis (2000-04), representing Ahwaz as a member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, but was barred from standing for election in 2004. Following the unrest in Khuzestan in April 2005, Al-Tamimi wrote to the then President Khotami calling on him to remove the "wall of mistrust between the proud Iranian ethnicities, so that the infected wounds of the Arab people of Ahwaz may heal." He added that "our wishful thinking about reforms in Arab affairs by the Reformists has been only a mirage," indicating that he no longer had faith in the Participation Front. He listed a number of grievances, including:

• violence against Arab demonstrators by security forces
• land confiscation
• the destruction of Arab residential compounds
• the high level of drug abuse among Ahwazi Arabs, which he claims is rooted in poverty
• racial discrimination and the official view of Arabs as a security threat
• the government's failure to issue activity permits for the Islamic Wefagh Party and affiliated non-governmental organisations

He indicates that he opposes separatism and the ideology of "extreme Persian nationalism" he associates with the previous monarchist government. The Islamic Wefagh Party claims to have an "extensive" base of support in Khuzestan, although the government's failure to give it an activity permit means that it cannot test this in any election held in the province.

Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front

The Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front (AADPF) is based in London and is led by Mahmud Ahmad Al-Ahwazi, aka Abu Bashar. The group calls for human rights and democracy for Ahwazi Arabs and believes that Al-Ahwaz was occupied by Iran in 1925. The ADPF has a number of activists in Iranian custody. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the Minster of Defense and Logistic Affairs of the Armed Forces, accused Mahmud Ahmad Al-Ahwazi of involvement in the April 2005 unrest, while simultaneously claiming that his group had "zero popularity" amongst Arabs in Khuzestan . The ADPF has also claimed it led what it calls an "intifada" in Khuzestan. Shamkhani added that Mahmud Ahmad Al-Ahwazi was a

"merciless and brutal member of the SAVAK (the Shah's secret police) before the revolution ... During the years of the Sacred Defense, too, he was an un-uniformed member of the (Iraqi) Ba'ath Party ... During the years of the (Iraqi) imposed war, Al-Ahwazi made a futile effort aimed at boosting the popularity of the aggressor and occupier forces of the Ba'thi forces among Khuzestani Arabs, but to no avail ... Al-Ahwazi has no influence among Khuzestani Arabs, who consider him a person devoid of any personality, and one who makes much ado about nothing, which proves how cheap a personality he is."

It is not known how much, if any, of Shamkhani's claims are true.

Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party

The AARP is another separatist group advocating armed resistance to the Iranian government. It was originally set up in the 1990s by the Syrian government, but has since moved its leadership to Canada. In April 2005, it claimed on a pro-Iraqi Ba'athist website that it had exploded a bomb on the Ahwaz-Tehran pipeline. It also claimed responsibility for the June 2005 bombings in Ahwaz City. Two other groups also separately claimed responsibility for the attacks. It is led by Sabah al-Musawi, a Canadian resident.

Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz

The Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz (DSPA), based in the US and the UK, has risen to prominance in recent years through its membership of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO), where it represents the 'Ahwazi' people. The DSPA's ideology is different from the separatists in that it explicitly rejects the use of violence and advocates what it calls "internal self-determination". It also limits its territorial focus on Khuzestan, making no stand on Arab-populated living outside the province.

The DSPA claims that Khuzestan's historical Arab identity means that the province should be given autonomy within a federal political system, but it says it respects Iran's territorial integrity. To achieve its ends, it has formed a coalition with like-minded parties representing Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis, Turkmen, Bakhtiaris and Lurs, some of which have been in armed conflict with the Iranian state. Formed in London in March 2005, the Congress of Iranian Nationalities for a Federal Iran (CINFI) brought together the DSPA, the Baluchistan United Front, Federal Democratic Movement of Azarbaijan, Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Baluchistan People's Party, Organization for Defense of the Rights of Turkmen People and Komalah, a Kurdish opposition party.

The DSPA also began a campaign of intensive lobbying to raise the international profile of its cause. The BAFS, the Ahwaz Human Rights Organisation and the Ahwaz Education and Human Rights Foundation regularly co-operate with the DSPA in its lobbying activities.

The DSPA's most prominent members include Mansour Silawi Al-Ahwazi, a journalist and broadcaster and the treasurer of the BAFS, and Dr Ali Al-Taie, an associate professor of sociology at Shaw University.

Ahwaz Liberation Organisation

The Ahwaz Liberation Organisation (ALO), based in Maastricht in the Netherlands, was formed out of the remnants of three Iraqi-backed groups - the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan (DRFLA), People's Front for Liberation of Arabistan (PFLA) and the Arab Front for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz (AFLA). The DRFLA was the most notorious, having been sponsored by Saddam Hussein. It was founded after the newly-installed Islamic government fired on Arab demonstrators in Khorramshahr, killing many of them. The DRFLA was behind the May 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege in London, taking a number of hostages in an effort to draw attention to its demands for the self-determination of the Arab population of Khuzestan. The British Special Air Service (SAS) stormed the building and freed the hostages. The one surviving hostage-taker was brought to trial and imprisoned.

The ALO's constituent groups operated as a mercenary force on behalf of Saddam's regime during the Iran-Iraq War, carrying out assassinations and attacking oil facilities. Bomb attacks on oil and power facilities have continued since the end of the Iraq War, although the ALO has not formally claimed responsibility. The ALO's leader, Faleh Abdallah Al-Mansouri, has been living in exile in the Netherlands since 1989, shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. He has declared himself to be the "President" of Al-Ahwaz, which he claims extends beyond Khuzestan, including much of the coast of Iran. His perceived influence amongst his Arab supporters in Khuzestan has largely diminished following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, which led to a radical reduction in Iraqi funds.

Media

Newspapers

The editor of Ahvaz's Persian language Hamsayeha newspaper, Mohammad Hezbawi (also known as Hezbaee Zadeh), was arrested in September 2005 but later released.

Television

Television broadcasting in Arabic language in Khuzestan is state-owned (e.g.) as is the case in other parts of the country, but many inhabitants also watch foreign Arabic language satellite channels. The Qatar-based Al-Jazeera news channel was blamed by the Iranian government for its coverage of anti-government protests by Arabs in April 2005. It was also angered by Al-Jazeera's interview with a member of the separatist Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front (ADPF) who spoke of "80 years of Iranian occupation in Khuzestan". Following the ban, Aidan White, the General Secretary of the International Federation of Journalists, said:

This closure is a spiteful act of censorship and a blatant attempt by the authorities to make media the scapegoat for civil unrest. If Iran has complaints about media standards it should seek professional redress, not take action that undermines press freedom and pluralism ... It looks as though the authorities are seeking a scapegoat for their own troubles.

In recent years, Ahwazi Arab groups have broadcast to Khuzestan. A report by BBC Monitoring published in January 2006 stated that there were two Ahwazi Arab satellite channels: Ahwaz TV and Al-Ahwaz TV. The differences between the two stations appear to reflect the ideological schism between those groups that advocate an independent Arab state and those calling for greater autonomy within Iran.

Ahwaz TV is affiliated to the Canada-based "National Liberation Movement of Ahwaz" and describes itself as "the television of occupied Ahwaz", "the voice of Arab strugglers in Ahwaz" and "the voice of the Arab Ahwazi revolution". According to the BBC, "it calls for independence, an end to 80 years of 'occupation' and integration into the greater Arab nation." Recent programmes broadcast by Ahwaz TV appear to indicate that it also has the backing of the ADPF. The archived footage can be access from the channel's website.

Al-Ahwaz TV is affiliated to the UK-based Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz (DSPA) and funded by the British Ahwazi Friendship Society (BAFS). BBC Monitoring says the station is broadcast on the Assyrian Betnahrain satellite channel (http://www.assyriasat.org/sat/default.htm), on Hot Bird 6 at 11585 MHz. Al-Ahwaz TV's website stated that it is "an independent, grass-roots broadcaster transmitting to the Ahwazi Arab homeland" and claims to promote

non-violent opposition to the Iranian regime and advocates democratic change, focussing on the Ahwazi Arabs, who are indigenous to south-west Iran. Al-Ahwaz TV seeks to hand the media back to the Ahwazis, who are oppressed, marginalised and discriminated against.

It states that it is "not supported by any government or government-funded institution" and is "run, staffed and owned by Ahwazi Arabs and run by a democratic editorial collective." BBC Monitoring also quotes BAFS as stating that "it does not support separatism and upholds the territorial integrity of Iran as a multi-ethnic country with regional autonomy."

Historical references

• Tarikh-e Pahnsad Saal-e Khuzestan (Five Hundred Year History of Khuzestan) by Ahmad Kasravi
• Jang-e Iran va Britannia dar Muhammereh (The Iran-British War in Muhammereh) by Ahmad Kasravi
• Tarikh-e Bist Saal-e Iran (Twenty Year History of Iran) by Hossein Maki (Tehran, 1945-47)
• Hayat-e Yahya (The Life of Yahya) by Yahya Dolatabadi (Tehran, 1948-52)
• Tarikh-e Ejtemai va Edari Doreieh Qajarieh (The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Era) by Abdollah Mostofi (Tehran, 1945-49) ISBN 1-56859-041-5 (for the English translation)
• Mosha'sha'iyan, by Muhammad Ali Ranjbar. ISBN 964-329-068-9

See also

• Ethnic minorities in Iran
• History of Khuzestan
• Origin of the name Khuzestan
• Arabs of Khuzestan

External links

• Ahwaz Explosions: Britain or Not Britain by Arash Motamed, Rooz Online
• Khuzestan: The First Front in the War on Iran? by Zoltan Grossman
• "The Identity and Ancestry of the Indigenous Khuzestani Arabs of Iran: A Nation or Ethnic Group" - speech delivered by Yossef Azizi Bani-Turoof at the Industrial University of Isfahan, Iran
• Democracy, Ethnicity and Repression in Iran: The Plight of the Ahwazi Arabs - by Daniel Brett, Henry Jackson Society
• Domestic Threats to Iranian Stability: Khuzistan and Baluchistan by Michael Rubin, JCPA Jerusalem Issue Brief
• Amnesty International on civil unrest in Khuzestan
• Issues and Perspectives: Ethnic Tension in Khuzestan
• Ethnic Cleansing and Dictatorship vs. Pluralism and Democracy
• "Al-Ahwaz: Al-Fiction"
• Iranian newspaper on the recent unrest
• AsiaTimesOnline on the recent unrest
• Personal memoir of a visit to Khuzestan
• Election report from Khuzestan
• Details on April unrest from RFE/RL Iran Report
• Iran accuses Britain of complicity in unrest
• Asia Times: British Arabism and the bombings in Iran
• Ethnic minorities singled out for attack in Iran

Ahwazi Political Groups

• ALO "Ahwaz Liberation Organisation" - ARC "Al-Ahwaz Revolutionary Council"
• UASE "United Ahwazian Students in Europe"
• Ahwaz Studies Center
• British Ahwazi Friendship Society - Advocacy group for Iran's Arab minority
• Democratic Solidarity Party of Ahwaz
• Al-Ahwaz TV
• Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front
• Arabistan Online Network (in Arabic)
• Arabistan.org (in Arabic)
• Ahwazi Arab Renaissance Party (Hizb al-Nahda al-Arabi al-Ahwazi) (in Arabic)

• History of Iran
• Politics of Iran