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| {{distinguish|Enaction|Enactivism}} | |||
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| '''Enaction''' is a theory that cognition depends on interaction between the cognitive agent and the environment.<ref name=Rowlands/> It claims is that our environment is one which we selectively create through our capacities to interact with the world.<ref name=Rowlands1/> It has been suggested that it forms a ] in our thinking about many areas of knowledge, including our mind and consciousness.<ref>Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M. and De Jaegher, H., (2010). ''Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play.'' In J. Stewart, O. Gapenne and E. A. Di Paolo (eds), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 33 – 87. ISBN 9780262014601</ref> | |||
| The term ''enaction'' came into widespread use<ref>Torrance, S (2005) In search of the enactive: Introduction to special issue on Enactive Experience Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4) December 2005, pp. 357-368</ref> after the landmark publication in 1991 by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch.<ref name="Varela">Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.</ref> Enaction is used in an interdisciplinary sense, It puts emphasis upon the idea that our cognitive experience of the world is a product of mutual interaction between our sensorimotor capacities and the environment.<ref name=RWilson/> | |||
| Enaction is seen as central to our cognition and perception <ref name=Ward/> It is one of a wider set of post-cartesian, anti-dualist theories of the mind. It opposes the separation of the mind from the body, holding that consciousness is a distributed function of the brain, body, its artefacts, their environment, and their interactions. The theory also sees an essential role for feelings, emotions and affect: "perceiving requires not only the ability to probe and explore the world...it also requires exercise of the ability" making motivation intrinsic to our cognitive processes.<ref name=Rowlands3/> | |||
| ==Psychology== | |||
| {{main|Enactivism (psychology)}} | |||
| ] | |||
| As a subject in philosophy, enaction involves ] insofar as it concerns how knowledge can be acquired. As a subject in psychology, enaction has been about what is sometimes called "low-level cognition", things like ], design of the ], ], and ], but the developments of enaction in philosophy are finding wider application in psychology, extending to "high-level cognition" like reasoning, problem-solving, and planning.<ref name=Stewart/><ref name=McGann/> | |||
| The theory emphasises interaction with the environment in contrast with a view of mental processes as simply the operation of the brain as a computer manipulating symbols encoding representations of the world.<ref name=Rowlands/> The issue is not just that cognition involves structures outside the brain proper, but that cognition is a ''process'' of interaction, an activity.<ref name=Smith/><ref name=Lau/> | |||
| ==An enactive view of perception== | |||
| ] put forward an enactive view of perception.<ref name=Noe/> He wished to address the following issue. We perceive three-dimensional objects, on the basis of two-dimensional input, in a visual image which is clearly not three dimensional. How are we able to directly perceive their solidity and volume, not just their two dimensional outline or image? | |||
| Noë explains how we perceive this solidity (or 'volumetricity') by appealing to patterns of sensorimotor expectations. These arise from our agent-active 'movements and interaction' with objects, or 'object-active' changes in the object itself. The solidity is perceived through our expectations and skills in knowing how the object's appearance would change with changes in how we relate to it. He saw all perception as an active exploration of the world, rather than being a passive process, something which happens to us. | |||
| His theory has been opposed by several philosophers, notably by ].<ref name=AClark1/> Clark points to difficulties of the enactive approach in saying that action constitutes perception, rather than causes it. He also points to internal processing of visual signals, e.g. in the ventral and dorsal pathways, ]. This results in an integrated perception of objects (their recognition and location, respectively) yet this processing cannot be described as an action or actions. | |||
| ==See also== | |||
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| ==References== | |||
| {{reflist |refs= | |||
| <ref name=AClark1> | |||
| {{cite journal |author=Andy Clark |title=Vision as Dance? Three Challenges for Sensorimotor Contingency Theory |journal= Psyche |volume=12 |issue=1 |date=March 2006 |url= https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/1842/1444/1/Psyche%20Clark.pdf}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Lau> | |||
| {{cite web |author=Joe Lau, Max Deutsch |title=Externalism About Mental Content |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) |editor= Edward N. Zalta, ed |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/content-externalism/ |date=Jan 22, 2014}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=McGann> | |||
| {{cite journal |title=Enaction and psychology |author=McGann, Marek; De Jaegher, Hanne; Di Paolo, Ezequiel |journal=Review of General Psychology |volume= 17 |issue=2 |date=June 2013 |pages=203–209 |doi= 10.1037/a0032935 |url=http://ezequieldipaolo.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/mcgann-et-al_2013_enaction-and-psychology.pdf}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Noe> | |||
| {{cite book |title=Action in perception |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=kFKvU2hPhxEC&printsec=frontcover |author=Alva Noë |isbn=978-0262140881 |publisher=MIT Press |year=2004}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Rowlands> | |||
| {{cite book |author=Mark Rowlands |chapter=Chapter 3: The mind embedded |pages=51 ''ff'' |year=2010 |isbn=0262014556 |publisher=MIT Press |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=AiwjpL-0hDgC&pg=PA51 |title=The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Rowlands1> | |||
| {{cite book |author=Mark Rowlands |chapter=Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted |pages=70 ''ff'' |year=2010 |isbn=0262014556 |publisher=MIT Press |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=AiwjpL-0hDgC&pg=PA70 |title=The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology}} Rowlands attributes this idea to {{cite book |author=D M MacKay |year=1967 |chapter=Ways of looking at perception |title=Models for the perception of speech and visual form (Proceedings of a symposium) |editor=W Watthen-Dunn |publisher=MIT Press |pages=25 ''ff'' |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Ts9JAAAAMAAJ&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=MacKay+Ways+of+looking+at+perception}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Rowlands3> | |||
| {{cite book |author=Mark Rowlands |chapter=Chapter 3: The mind embedded §5 The mind enacted |page=79 |year=2010 |isbn=0262014556 |publisher=MIT Press |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=AiwjpL-0hDgC&pg=PA79 |title=The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=RWilson> | |||
| {{cite web |author=Robert A Wilson, Lucia Foglia |title=Embodied Cognition: §2.2 Enactive cognition |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/embodied-cognition/#EnaCog |date=July 25, 2011}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Smith> | |||
| {{cite web |author=Basil Smith |title=Internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind and language |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-ex-ml/#H4 |work=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Stewart> | |||
| {{cite book |title=Enaction |author=John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A DiPaolo |chapter=Introduction |editor=John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A DiPaolo, eds |publisher=MIT Press |year=2014 |isbn=978-0-262-52601-2 |edition=Paperback |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=UtFDJx-gysQC&pg=PR7}} | |||
| </ref> | |||
| <ref name=Ward> | |||
| {{cite book |author= Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton |year=2012 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Y1E7FogqvJ0C&pg=PA89 |chapter=Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended |editor= Fabio Paglieri, ed |title=Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness |publisher=John Benjamins Publishing |pages=89 ''ff'' |isbn=978-9027213525}} . | |||
| </ref> | |||
| }} | |||
| ==Further reading== | |||
| *{{cite web |title=Embodied cognition |date=July 2011 |author=Robert A. Wilson, and Lucia Foglia |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/embodied-cognition/}} | |||
| *{{cite web |title=Embodied cognition |date= |author=Monica Cowart |work=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/embodcog/ }} | |||
| *{{cite web |author=Joe Lau, Max Deutsch |title=Externalism About Mental Content |work=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta, ed |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/content-externalism/ |date= Jan 22, 2014}} | |||
| *{{cite web |title=Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language |date= |author=Basil Smith |work=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-ex-ml/ }} | |||
| *{{cite book |author=Mark Rowlands |chapter=Chapter 3: The mind embodied, enacted and extended |pages=51 ''ff'' |year=2010 |isbn=0262014556 |publisher=MIT Press |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=AiwjpL-0hDgC&pg=PA51 |title=The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology}} | |||
| ==External links== | |||
| *{{cite web |title=Consciousness as the emergent property of the interaction between brain, body, & environment: the crucial role of haptic perception |author=Pietro Morasso |url=http://www.consciousness.it/iwac2005/Material/Morasso.pdf |year=2005 }} Slides related to a chapter on ] (recognition through touch): {{cite book |editor=Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti, eds |author=Pietro Morasso |chapter=Chapter 14: The crucial role of haptic perception |pages=234 ''ff'' |title= Artificial Consciousness |publisher= Academic |pages=234-255 |year=2007 |isbn=978-1845400705 |url=https://www.google.com/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=isbn:1845400704&num=10}} | |||
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