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{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2014}} {{Use dmy dates|date=September 2014}}
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{{Hindu philosophy}}
'''{{IAST|Cārvāka}}''', originally known as '''{{IAST|Lokāyata}}''' and '''{{IAST|Bṛhaspatya}}''', is the ancient school of Indian ]. Cārvāka holds ], ], and conditional inference as proper sources of knowledge, embraces ] and rejects ], ] and ].<ref>KN Tiwari (1998), Classical Indian Ethical Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120816077, page 67;<br>Roy W Perrett (1984), , Philosophy East and West, 34(2): 161-174;<br>{{harv|Bhattacharya|2011|pp=21–32}};<br>{{harv|Radhakrishnan|1957|pp=187, 227–234}};<br>Robert Flint, {{Google books|7es0AQAAIAAJ|Anti-theistic theories|page=463}}, Appendix Note VII - Hindu Materialism: The Charvaka System; William Blackwood, London;</ref><ref name=vvraman>V.V. Raman (2012), Hinduism and Science: Some Reflections, Zygon - Journal of Religion and Science, 47(3): 549–574, Quote (page 557): "Aside from nontheistic schools like the ], there have also been explicitly atheistic schools in the Hindu tradition. One virulently anti-supernatural system is/was the so-called Carvaka school.", {{doi|10.1111/j.1467-9744.2012.01274.x}}</ref> '''{{IAST|Cārvāka}}''', originally known as '''{{IAST|Lokāyata}}''' and '''{{IAST|Bṛhaspatya}}''', is the ancient school of Indian ]. Cārvāka holds ], ], and conditional inference as proper sources of knowledge, embraces ] and rejects ], ] and ].<ref>KN Tiwari (1998), Classical Indian Ethical Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120816077, page 67;<br>Roy W Perrett (1984), , Philosophy East and West, 34(2): 161-174;<br>{{harv|Bhattacharya|2011|pp=21–32}};<br>{{harv|Radhakrishnan|1957|pp=187, 227–234}};<br>Robert Flint, {{Google books|7es0AQAAIAAJ|Anti-theistic theories|page=463}}, Appendix Note VII - Hindu Materialism: The Charvaka System; William Blackwood, London;</ref><ref name=vvraman>V.V. Raman (2012), Hinduism and Science: Some Reflections, Zygon - Journal of Religion and Science, 47(3): 549–574, Quote (page 557): "Aside from nontheistic schools like the ], there have also been explicitly atheistic schools in the Hindu tradition. One virulently anti-supernatural system is/was the so-called Carvaka school.", {{doi|10.1111/j.1467-9744.2012.01274.x}}</ref>


Brihaspati is usually referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy.<ref>Johannes Quack (2014), Disenchanting India: Organized Rationalism and Criticism of Religion in India, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199812615, page 50 with footnote 3</ref> Much of the primary literature of Cārvāka, the ] (ca. 600 BCE), are missing or lost.<ref name=r79>{{harv|Radhakrishnan|1957|pp=227–249}}</ref> Its teachings have been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the ]s, ]s and the ] as well as in the dialogues of ] and from ].<ref name=r79/><ref>{{harv|Bhattacharya|2011|pp=21–44, 65–74}}</ref> ] is credited as the forerunner of the Carvakas,<ref>Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2011), Studies on the Carvaka/Lokayata, Anthem Press, ISBN 978-0857284334, pages 26-29</ref> while Brihaspati is usually referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy.<ref>Johannes Quack (2014), Disenchanting India: Organized Rationalism and Criticism of Religion in India, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199812615, page 50 with footnote 3</ref> Much of the primary literature of Cārvāka, the ] (ca. 600 BCE), are missing or lost.<ref name=r79>{{harv|Radhakrishnan|1957|pp=227–249}}</ref> Its teachings have been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the ]s, ]s and the ] as well as in the dialogues of ] and from ].<ref name=r79/><ref>{{harv|Bhattacharya|2011|pp=21–44, 65–74}}</ref>


One of the widely studied principles of Cārvāka philosophy was its rejection of ] as a means to establish valid, universal knowledge, and ] truths.<ref name="page5">Cowell and Gough, p. 5.</ref><ref>{{harv| Bhattacharya|2011|p=58}}</ref> In other words, the Cārvāka epistemology states that whenever one infers a truth from a set of observations or truths, one must acknowledge doubt; inferred knowledge is conditional.<ref name=kamal>MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16</ref> One of the widely studied principles of Cārvāka philosophy was its rejection of ] as a means to establish valid, universal knowledge, and ] truths.<ref name="page5">Cowell and Gough, p. 5.</ref><ref>{{harv| Bhattacharya|2011|p=58}}</ref> In other words, the Cārvāka epistemology states that whenever one infers a truth from a set of observations or truths, one must acknowledge doubt; inferred knowledge is conditional.<ref name=kamal>MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16</ref>
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The Cārvāka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception to be the valid and reliable source of knowledge.<ref name="page3">Cowell and Gough. p. 3</ref> The Cārvāka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception to be the valid and reliable source of knowledge.<ref name="page3">Cowell and Gough. p. 3</ref>


===Ontology=== ===Epistemology===
The Carvaka epistemology holds perception as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as prone to being either right or wrong and therefore conditional or invalid.<ref name=kamal/><ref>Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2010), What the Cārvākas Originally Meant?, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 529-542</ref> Perception are of two types, for Carvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.<ref name=kamal/> Inference is described as deriving a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths. To Carvakas, inference is useful but prone to error, as inferred truths can never be without doubt.<ref name=b5567>{{harv|Bhattacharya|2011|pp=55–67}}</ref> Inference is good and helpful, it is the validity of inference that is suspect – sometimes in certain cases and often in others. To the Cārvākas there were no reliable means by which the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could be established.<ref name="page5"/>

Carvakas epistemological argument can be explained with the example of fire and smoke. Kamal states, that when there is smoke (]), one's tendency may be to leap to the conclusion that it must be caused by fire (] in logic).<ref name=kamal/> While this is often true, it need not be universally true, everywhere or all the times, stated the Carvaka scholars. Smoke can have other causes. In Carvaka epistemology, as long as the relation between two phenomena, or observation and truth, has not been proven as unconditional, it is an uncertain truth. Such methods of reasoning, that is jumping to conclusions or inference, is prone to flaw in this Indian philosophy.<ref name=kamal/><ref name=b5567/> Carvakas further state that full knowledge is reached when we know all observations, all premises and all conditions. But the absence of conditions, state Carvakas, can not be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may be hidden or escape our ability to observe.<ref name=kamal/> They acknowledge that every person relies on inference in daily life, but to them if we act uncritically, we err. While our inference sometimes are true and lead to successful action, it is also a fact that sometimes inference is wrong and leads to error.<ref>Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2013), The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing and Understanding the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Argument, 3 (1):133-149</ref> Truth then, state Carvaka, is not an unfailing character of inference, truth is merely an accident of inference, and one that is separable. We must be skeptics, question what we know by inference, question our epistemology.<ref name=kamal/><ref name=jmk/>

This epistemological proposition of Carvakas was influential among various schools of in Indian philosophies, by demonstrating a new way of thinking and re-evaluation of past doctrines. Hindu, Buddhist and Jain scholars extensively deployed Carvaka insights on inference in rational re-examination of their own theories.<ref name=kamal/><ref>D Chatterjee (1977), , Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 195-209</ref>

;Comparison with other schools of Hinduism
''Carvaka'' epistemology represents minimalist '']'' (epistemological methods) in Hindu philosophy. The other schools of Hinduism developed and accepted multiple valid forms of epistemology.<ref name=eliottjag/> To Carvakas, ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception) was the one valid way to knowledge and other means of knowledge were either always conditional or invalid. Advaita ] scholars considered six means of valid knowledge and to truths: ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception), ''Anumāṇa'' (inference), ''Upamāṇa'' (comparison and analogy), ''Arthāpatti'' (postulation), ''Anupalabdi'' (non-perception, cognitive proof) and ''Śabda'' (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).<ref name=eliottjag/><ref>], An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0521438780, page 225</ref> While ''Carvaka'' school accepted just one, the valid means of epistemology in other schools of Hinduism ranged between 2 to 6.<ref name=eliottjag>
*Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245-248;
*John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238</ref>

===Metaphysics===
Since none of the means of knowing were found to be worthy to establish the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, Cārvākas concluded that the inference could not be used to ascertain metaphysical truths. Thus, to Cārvākas, the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of something to infer the knowledge of something else could be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being in error. Cases where inference was justified by the result were seen only to be mere coincidences.<ref>Cowell and Gough, p. 9.</ref> Since none of the means of knowing were found to be worthy to establish the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, Cārvākas concluded that the inference could not be used to ascertain metaphysical truths. Thus, to Cārvākas, the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of something to infer the knowledge of something else could be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being in error. Cases where inference was justified by the result were seen only to be mere coincidences.<ref>Cowell and Gough, p. 9.</ref>


Therefore, Cārvākas denied metaphysical concepts like rebirth, extra-corporeal soul, efficacy of ], other worlds (heaven and hell), karma and accumulation of ] or demerit through the performance of certain actions.<ref name="Bhatta2"/> Cārvākas also rejected the use of supernatural causes to describe natural phenomena. To them all natural phenomena was produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.<ref name="page10">Cowell and Gough. p. 10</ref> Therefore, Cārvākas denied metaphysical concepts like ], extracorporeal soul, efficacy of ], other worlds (heaven and hell), fate and accumulation of ] or demerit through the performance of certain actions.<ref name="Bhatta2"/> Cārvākas also rejected the use of supernatural causes to describe natural phenomena. To them all natural phenomena was produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.<ref name="page10">Cowell and Gough. p. 10</ref>
{{Quote|The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;<br/>By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.<ref name="page10"/>}} {{Quote|The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;<br/>By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.<ref name="page10"/>}}


==== Rejection of afterlife ==== ===Consciousness and afterlife===
{{expand section|date=July 2015}}
Carvaka school of Hinduism did not believe in ], ] or an ]. The ''Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha'' states the Carvaka position as follows,<ref name=rbill44>Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 44</ref>
Carvaka school of Hinduism did not believe in karma, rebirth or an ]. To them, all attributes that represented a person, such a thinness, fatness etc., resided in the body. The ''Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha'' states the Carvaka position as follows,<ref name=rbill44>Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 44</ref>
{{Quote| {{Quote|
There is no other world other than this;<br> There is no other world other than this;<br>
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|Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha| Verse 8<ref name=rbill44/>}} |Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha| Verse 8<ref name=rbill44/>}}


==== Svabhava Vada ==== ===Pleasure===

The '']'' describes several views belonging to heretics. One of these is ''Yadrccha Vada''; another is ''Svabhava Vada''. ] translates ''Yadrrcha Vada'' as "accidentalism" and ''Svabhava Vada'' as "naturalism". According to Hiriyanna: {{Quote|While the one maintains that the world is a chaos and ascribes whatever order is seen in it to mere chance the other recognizes that 'things are as their nature makes them'. While the former denies causation altogether, the latter acknowledges its universality, but only traces all changes to the thing itself to which they belong. Everything is unique and its entire history is predetermined by that uniqueness. Hence according to the Svabhava Vada, it is not a lawless world in which we live; only there is no external principle governing it. It is self-determined, not undetermined...Both the doctrines are at one in rejecting the idea that nature reveals a divine power working behind it or indeed any transcendental being which controls it or is implicated in it. Nor does either school seek for its views any supernatural sanction.<ref>{{cite book|title=Outlines of Indian Philosophy |author=M. Hiriyanna|pages=103-4|year=1993}}</ref>}}

Hiriyanna goes on to suggest that the Charvakas believe in Yadrccha Vada.<ref>{{cite book|title=Outlines of Indian Philosophy |author=M. Hiriyanna|pages=104|year=1993}}</ref> In his ''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'', Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya presents evidence for the alternate view. Starting from the ''Mahabharata'' onwards, there exist writings attributing the theory of Svabhava Vada to the Charvakas, writes Chattopadhyaya. Thus ] writes: {{Quote|The Lokayatas claim that the cause of the world is ''svabhava''. From ''svabhava'' arises the multiplicity of the things of the world and because of ''svabhava'' these are eventually destroyed.}}

] makes the Charvakas express views defending ''svabhava vada'' in his ''Sarva Darsana Samgraha''; and Agnicit Purusottama declares that "according to the Charvakas, ''svabhava'' itself is the cause."

In view of evidence such as the above, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya observes: {{Quote|It has become practically a part of the convention of the modern scholars to look at the theory of ''svabhava'' as the theory of the Lokayatas in particular. As ] has put it, "The earliest representatives of the extreme form of ''svabhava-vada'' seem to have been a set of free-thinkers in ancient India, who were originally called the Lokayatas but subsequently came to be more widely known under the name of the Carvakas. Rank materialism, an absence of belief in the unseen and of regard for authority, an uncompromising rationalism...were their original characteristics. <ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=458-9|year=2010}}</ref>}}

===Epistemology===
The Carvaka epistemology holds perception as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as prone to being either right or wrong and therefore conditional or invalid.<ref name=kamal/><ref>Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2010), What the Cārvākas Originally Meant?, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 529-542</ref> Perception are of two types, for Carvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.<ref name=kamal/> Inference is described as deriving a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths. To Carvakas, inference is useful but prone to error, as inferred truths can never be without doubt.<ref name=b5567>{{harv|Bhattacharya|2011|pp=55–67}}</ref> Inference is good and helpful, it is the validity of inference that is suspect – sometimes in certain cases and often in others. To the Cārvākas there were no reliable means by which the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could be established.<ref name="page5"/>

Carvakas epistemological argument can be explained with the example of fire and smoke. Kamal states, that when there is smoke (]), one's tendency may be to leap to the conclusion that it must be caused by fire (] in logic).<ref name=kamal/> While this is often true, it need not be universally true, everywhere or all the times, stated the Carvaka scholars. Smoke can have other causes. In Carvaka epistemology, as long as the relation between two phenomena, or observation and truth, has not been proven as unconditional, it is an uncertain truth. Such methods of reasoning, that is jumping to conclusions or inference, is prone to flaw in this Indian philosophy.<ref name=kamal/><ref name=b5567/> Carvakas further state that full knowledge is reached when we know all observations, all premises and all conditions. But the absence of conditions, state Carvakas, can not be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may be hidden or escape our ability to observe.<ref name=kamal/> They acknowledge that every person relies on inference in daily life, but to them if we act uncritically, we err. While our inference sometimes are true and lead to successful action, it is also a fact that sometimes inference is wrong and leads to error.<ref>Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2013), The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing and Understanding the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Argument, 3 (1):133-149</ref> Truth then, state Carvaka, is not an unfailing character of inference, truth is merely an accident of inference, and one that is separable. We must be skeptics, question what we know by inference, question our epistemology.<ref name=kamal/><ref name=jmk/>

This epistemological proposition of Carvakas was influential among various schools of in Indian philosophies, by demonstrating a new way of thinking and re-evaluation of past doctrines. Hindu, Buddhist and Jain scholars extensively deployed Carvaka insights on inference in rational re-examination of their own theories.<ref name=kamal/><ref>D Chatterjee (1977), , Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 195-209</ref>

====Consciousness====

In his commentary on the ], the eighth century philosopher ] refers to the Charvaka/Lokayata view of consciousness on three separate occasions in which he writes: {{Quote|The vulgar mob (''prakrta-jana'') as well as the Lokayatikas consider the soul to be nothing but the body with the attribute of consciousness...The Lokayatikas, who see the soul in the body itself, argue that there is nothing called soul apart from the body. According to them, consciousness--though not observed in the material elements like earth etc. either in their separateness or in their mere togetherness--does emerge in them when transformed into the form of the body, and hence consciousness originates only from them. Consciousness is thus like the intoxicating power of the alcoholic drink, though it is produced from certain ingredients none of which has the intoxicating power. Man is nothing but body qualified by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no soul separate from the body capable of going to heaven or of obtaining liberation, because of the presence of which in the body the body is supposed to acquire consciousness. On the contrary, the body itself is conscious; it is the soul. In the ''Brahma Sutra'', the argument in defense of the ''Lokayata'' view is stated as: 'On account of its existence where a body is'. Wherever something exists if some other thing also exists, and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine the former to be a mere quality of the latter. Thus, for example, heat and light are determined to be qualities of fire. And since life, volition, consciousness, remembrance and so on--which, by the upholders of an independent soul are considered to be the qualities of the soul--are observed only as confined to the body and never outside the body, and since any substratum of these qualities outside the body cannot be proved, it follows that these must be the qualities of the body only. Therefore the soul is not different from the body.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=423-4|year=2010}}</ref>}}

Several other ancient and medieval Indian philosophers have commented on the Charvaka view of consciousness; a common feature of these commentaries is the motif of the alcoholic drink with intoxicating power (''mada sakti'') which, according to the commentators, was used as an illustrative example by the Charvakas to explain their theory of consciousness. Thus the ninth century philosopher ] writes in his book ''Nyaya Manjari'': {{Quote|The Lokayatikas, who deny the other world, argue that there exists no soul apart from the body in which consciousness is found embedded...Because of some peculiar transformation, the material elements themselves acquire a great deal of power or potency and as such become endowed with consciousness, i.e.knowledge or consciousness originates only in them. Just as molasses, rice-powder, etc., though formerly devoid of intoxicating power, acquire the intoxicating power when transformed into alcoholic drink, so also the material elements, though without consciousness in their former state of earth, etc., acquire consciousness when transformed into the body.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=427-31|year=2010}}</ref>}}

=====Attempts to refute the Charvaka view of Consciousness=====
Several prominent Indian philosophers, including Adi Shankara, ], and Gunaratna have written rebuttals to the Charvaka view of consciousness. The crux of these rebuttals commonly features giving the Charvaka view in a terse form, and then giving the rebuttal. The Charvaka view (''purva paksa'' or view of the opponent) is understood as following two propositions:

1.Body and consciousness are characterized by their ''anvaya'' (meaning universal co-presence of the cause and the effect). Presence of body implies presence of consciousness.

2. Body and consciousness are also characterized by their ''vyatireka'' (meaning universal co-absence of the cause and the effect). Absence of body implies absence of consciousness.

For a comprehensive rebuttal of the Charvaka view of consciousness, it is therefore understood that the following two counter propositions need to be established:

1. Body can exist with absence of consciousness.

2. Consciousness can exist with absence of body.

Since it is difficult to establish the truth of the second counter proposition through logic, the primary focus of the opponents of the Charvakas is the first counter proposition, namely that the body can exist with consciousness being non-existent. The common example given by philosophers like Adi Shankara, Jayanta Bhatta, and Gunaratna in this connection is that of the corpse.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=425,436-44|year=2010}}</ref>Thus Gunaratna writes: {{Quote|After death, the body remains, though it has no longer any consciousness.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=443|year=2010}}</ref>}}

Arguing on behalf of the Charvakas, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya comments that the opponents of the Charvakas are committing a fallacy when they seek to assume that the corpse is no different from the body. Explaining the Charvaka viewpoint, Chattopadhyaya writes: {{Quote|The body, they argue, is the result of some peculiar transformation of the material elements. Hence it exists in the full sense of the term only so long as the transformed state of the material elements remains intact. What, then, is meant by death from this point of view? It simply means the beginning of the process of disintegration of the peculiar transformation of the material elements resulting in the body. This disintegration--called decomposition or decay--eventually results in the return of the material elements to their original state of pre-transformation. And if so, the corpse is not the same as the body; it is the very opposite of the body--or, more strictly, the beginning of this opposite.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=444|year=2010}}</ref>}}

=====Comparing the Charvaka view of Consciousness with the Nyaya-Vaisesika view of Consciousness=====
According to the ]-] philosophers, the soul is inherently unconscious or ''jada''; it is categorized as ''dravya'' or substance. There are seven other substances placed in this category with the same ontological status; these are: earth, water, fire, air, time, space, and ''manas'' (internal sense organs).<ref>{{cite book|title=Outlines of Indian Philosophy |author=M. Hiriyanna|pages=229,259-60|year=1993}}</ref> <ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=406|year=2010}}</ref>"The doctrine treats all dravyas alike," writes Hiriyanna.<ref>{{cite book|title=Outlines of Indian Philosophy |author=M. Hiriyanna|pages=229|year=1993}}</ref>

Explaining the relationship between the soul and consciousness in the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya makes three points. First, consciousness in this view is knowledge (jnana) in an empirical sense. Second, consciousness is one of the multiple qualities of the soul. Third, consciousness is a transient quality, not a permanent quality. By itself, the soul is without consciousness; consciousness is produced in the soul only when it is conjoined with certain other entities.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=406-7|year=2010}}</ref> Hiriyanna, commenting on this point, notes: {{Quote|A peculiar feature of the system is that it makes ''jnana'' or knowledge an attribute of the self, and that too, not an essential, but only an adventitious one...The self thus differs from matter only in that it ''may'' become conscious and not that it is itself mental in nature. The two other attributes of it, viz. desire(''iccha'') and volition (''yatna'') are conceived more or less similarly. They, like knowledge, refer to an object(''savi-sayaka'') and are meaningless without such a reference. The really mental or spiritual element in the doctrine accordingly is not the self, but these three attributes which are all transient.<ref>{{cite book|title=Outlines of Indian Philosophy |author=M. Hiriyanna|pages=230|year=1993}}</ref>}}

In explaining how the soul, despite being intrinsically without consciousness, comes to gain the quality of consciousness, in the Nyaya-Vaisesika view, Chattopadhaya draws a schematic diagram:{{Quote|Soul + body + internal sense + external sense + external object --> Consciousness<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=409|year=2010}}</ref>}}

In explaining the diagram, Chattopadhyaya writes that the soul, in order to gain consciousness, needs to first become conjoined with a body and next, through the conjunction with the body, the soul gets conjoined with the internal sense organs or ''manas'' which in turn conjoins with the five organs of external sense which conjoins with the external objects which finally results in the production of consciousness. If there is any break in this chain of conjunctions there is no production of consciousness in the soul. So the soul remains without consciousness if there is an absence of body, internal sense, external sense, and external object. None of these entities, writes Chattopadhyaya, is inherently spiritual or endowed with the attribute of consciousness. The body, the five external sense organs, and the external object are all material in nature. With respect to the internal sense organ, or ''manas'', this is neither material not spiritual. It is an inert entity and was postulated by the Nyaya-Vaisesikas primarily to explain the difference between attention and inattention.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=409-10|year=2010}}</ref>With respect to external objects, these refer to the "things of the physical world...for all practical purposes", writes Chattopadhyaya.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=408|year=2010}}</ref>

Hiriyanna expresses his perplexity in reviewing the Nyaya-Vaisesika view of consciousness, and then comes out with a comment equating this view with the Charvaka view of consciousness: {{Quote|We know the manner in which knowledge arises according to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, though it is hard to understand how when the aid to its genesis--the self, ''manas'', senses, and object--are wholly inert (''jada''), it can be knowledge at all...The position is scarcely distinguishable from that of the Charvakas.<ref>{{cite book|title=Outlines of Indian Philosophy |author=M. Hiriyanna|pages=259-60|year=1993}}</ref>}}

Hiriyanna's sense of unease when reflecting on the striking similarity of the Charvaka and the Nyaya-Vaisesika view of consciousness springs from his firm commitment to the Vedanta philosophy, writes Chattopadhyaya, who goes on to note that Hiriyanna's comment equating the Nyaya-Vaisesika view of consciousness with the Charvaka view of consciousness is 'devastating' both for those modern interpretations of the Nyaya-Vaisesikas which seek to interpret the Nyaya-Vaisesika as an essentially idealist philosophy, and also for the later Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers who attempted to construct "some idealist superstructure" over a "materialistic subsoil".<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=411|year=2010}}</ref>

=====Comparing the Charvaka view of Consciousness with a view of Consciousness found in the Upanishads=====
In his ''Nyaya Manjari'', the Nyaya philosopher Jayanta Bhatta puts forward several arguments which the Charvakas could potentially make to defend the claim that matter produces consciousness. One of these is:

1. When the body is well nourished, it has a positive affect on consciousness (''anvaya'' or universal co-presence).

2. When the body is malnourished, it has a negative affect on consciousness ( ''vyatireka'' or universal co-absence).

In the entire corpus of Indian philosophy, writes Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, there is only one other text that mentions this argument, or more accurately, the prototype of this argument and therefore "it is to be presumed that Jayanta Bhatta takes it from there".<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=475|year=2010}}</ref> This is the ] where the same argument is mentioned by Uddalaka Aruni who also insists on an experimental validation of his claim. While having a philosophical discussion with his son Svetaketu, Uddalaka instructs his son not to eat any food for fifteen days but to drink as much water as he wanted. He then asks Svetaketu to recite some Vedic hymns; Svetaketu is unable to do so. Uddalaka then instructs his son to consume food, and return and this time Svetaketu is able to answer his father's questions. Commenting on the relationship between food and the mind, Uddalaka states that the "subtlest constituent" of food is transformed into the mind, and "mind consists of food".<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=473-80|year=2010}}</ref>

According to Chattopadhyaya: {{Quote|Mind...is thus viewed by him as having a distinct material origin. It is nothing but the subtlest part of food consumed so that--as he experimentally demonstrates--in the absence of food in the body there is marked deterioration of consciousness, while in the presence of food in the body there is marked improvement of consciousness. Apart from the mind that he speaks of, Uddalaka knows nothing called consciousness. This aspect of his discourse is so overtly materialistic that even the later Vedantic idealists prefer on the whole to keep it under a blanket of silence.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=481|year=2010}}</ref>}}

In addition, Chattopadhyaya gives the story featured in the Chandogya Upanishad of Uddalaka Aruni meeting the king Asvapati Kaikeya where Uddalaka's conception of the soul is revealed: {{Quote|The king said to Uddalaka Aruni: 'Gautama! Whom do you reverence as the ''atman'' (soul)?'

'The earth indeed, Sir, Oh King', said he.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=484|year=2010}}</ref>}}

Finally, Chattopadhyaya argues that the term ''sat'' used by Uddalaka represents a material first cause <ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=477-9,481-9|year=2010}}</ref> noting that: {{Quote|What is still more important is to note that Uddalaka is the first philosopher who offers positive proofs for the origin of consciousness from matter, and therefore it is only logical for a sophisticated later philosopher like Jayanta Bhatta to see in these proofs a possible defense of the Lokayata materialism.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=490|year=2010}}</ref>}}

====Comparison with other schools of Hinduism====
''Carvaka'' epistemology represents minimalist '']'' (epistemological methods) in Hindu philosophy. The other schools of Hinduism developed and accepted multiple valid forms of epistemology.<ref name=eliottjag/> To Carvakas, ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception) was the one valid way to knowledge and other means of knowledge were either always conditional or invalid. Advaita ] scholars considered six means of valid knowledge and to truths: ''Pratyakṣa'' (perception), ''Anumāṇa'' (inference), ''Upamāṇa'' (comparison and analogy), ''Arthāpatti'' (postulation), ''Anupalabdi'' (non-perception, cognitive proof) and ''Śabda'' (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).<ref name=eliottjag/><ref>], An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0521438780, page 225</ref> While ''Carvaka'' school accepted just one, the valid means of epistemology in other schools of Hinduism ranged between 2 to 6.<ref name=eliottjag>
*Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245-248;
*John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238</ref>

===Sensual pleasure===
{{Hedonism}}Cārvāka believed that there was nothing wrong with ] pleasure. Since it is impossible to have pleasure without pain, Cārvāka thought that wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible. Unlike many of the Indian philosophies of the time, Cārvāka did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure out of fear of pain and held such reasoning to be foolish.<ref name="page3"/> {{Hedonism}}Cārvāka believed that there was nothing wrong with ] pleasure. Since it is impossible to have pleasure without pain, Cārvāka thought that wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible. Unlike many of the Indian philosophies of the time, Cārvāka did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure out of fear of pain and held such reasoning to be foolish.<ref name="page3"/>


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|Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha| Verses 9-12<ref name=rbill45/>}} |Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha| Verses 9-12<ref name=rbill45/>}}


===Religion===
===Comparing Charvaka views with views found in the Upanishads and Rig Veda===
In the later history of Indian philosophy, the school known as ] claims to adopt its philosophical position from the ]. According to the Advaita Vedantists, an appropriate description of their philosophy is conveyed by the term ''Sariraka Mimamsa'' or ''Sariraka''. The word ''sariraka'' is derived from the word ''sarira'' (meaning 'body'); it means a filthy body. Upanishadic philosophy is sought to be described by this epithet because the dominant theme in the Upanishads is the philosophy of the pure spirit or soul which remains entrapped in the defiled body.

It is instructive to note that the sariraka philosophy is not subscribed to by the poets in the ]. These poets give supreme importance to nourishing the body with food and drink; they even conceive of food--which they call ''Pitu''--as a deity. The way these poets praise ''Pitu'' makes it clear that they have nothing to do with the Sariraka philosophy. From the Rig Veda i.187: {{Quote| Savoury food, honeyed food, we welcome thee; be our protector. Come to us, beneficial food, we welcome thee; be our protector. Come to us, beneficial food--a source of delight, a friend of the well-respected, and having no enemy. Your flavours, oh food, are diffused through regions, as the winds are spreading through the sky. These men, oh food, who are your distributors--oh most sweet food--they who are eaters of thee and thy juices, increase like you with elongated necks. The minds of the mighty deities, oh food, are fixed upon thee...Oh food, the wealth which is associated with the mountains went to thee. Oh sweet one, listen to us and be accessible to our eating. And since we enjoy the abundance of the waters and plants, therefore, oh body may thou grow fat. And since we enjoy the drink ''soma'', thy mixture with boiled milk and boiled barley, therefore oh body may thou grow fat.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=138|year=2010}}</ref>}}

The refrain 'Oh body, may thou grow fat' (''vatape piva it bhava'') clearly indicates a philosophical point of view which is diagrammatically opposite to the sariraka view. This view is typical of the songs in the Rig Veda as a whole.

In the later history of Indian philosophy, one comes across the Charvakas who declare that there is no soul over and above the body. They are despised by their philosophical rivals who claim that the Charvakas only care about eating and drinking, and not about lofty philosophical ideals. This is a fanciful accusation, according to a section of modern scholars, but even if it were to be true, the Rig Vedic poets are clearly closer to the Charvaka world view rather than the sariraka world view when we take into account their elation over food for the reason that it makes the body fat.<ref>{{cite book|title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition|author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya|pages=138-9|year=2010}}</ref>

===Rejection of religion===
{{Hindu philosophy}}
Cārvākas rejected many of the standard religious conceptions of Hindus, Buddhists and Jains, such as ], ], ], ] and ]s. They were critical of the ], as well as Buddhist scriptures.<ref name=rhayes>Richard Hayes (2000), The Question of Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemologists, in Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy (Editor:Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 187-212</ref> Cārvākas rejected many of the standard religious conceptions of Hindus, Buddhists and Jains, such as ], ], ], ] and ]s. They were critical of the ], as well as Buddhist scriptures.<ref name=rhayes>Richard Hayes (2000), The Question of Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemologists, in Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy (Editor:Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 187-212</ref>


Line 165: Line 94:


==Works== ==Works==
No independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found except for a few ]s composed by Brihaspati. The 8th century ''Tattvopaplavasimha'' of ] with ] influence is a significant source of Carvaka philosophy according to some scholars; however, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in his ''Carvaka/Lokayata'' has dismissed it as the work of a skeptic owing allegiance to ''Yadrrcha Vada''. Shatdarshan Samuchay and ] of ] are a few other works which elucidate Cārvāka thought.<ref>Joshi, Dinkar. Glimpses of Indian Culture. Star Publications (P) Ltd, Delhi. P. 37. ISBN 81-7650-190-5.</ref> No independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found except for a few ]s composed by Brihaspati. The 8th century ''Tattvopaplavasimha'' of ] with ] influence is a significant source of Carvaka philosophy. Shatdarshan Samuchay and ] of ] are a few other works which elucidate Cārvāka thought.<ref>Joshi, Dinkar. Glimpses of Indian Culture. Star Publications (P) Ltd, Delhi. P. 37. ISBN 81-7650-190-5.</ref>


In the epic ], Book 12 Chapter 39, an individual who gives certain advise to ] is named ''Cārvāka''.<ref> The Mahabharata, KM Ganguli (Translator), pages 121-122</ref> In the epic ], Book 12 Chapter 39, a villain who dresses up like a scholar, self appoints himself as spokesperson for all scholars, and who then advises ] to act unethically, is named ''Cārvāka''.<ref> The Mahabharata, KM Ganguli (Translator), pages 121-122</ref>


One of the widely studied references to the Cārvāka philosophy is the '']'' (etymologically all-philosophy-collection), a famous work of 14th century ] philosopher ] from ], which starts with a chapter on the Cārvāka system. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods ] and ] ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Vidyāraṇya asks, in the first chapter:<ref name="page2">Cowell and Gough, p. 2.</ref> One of the widely studied references to the Cārvāka philosophy is the '']'' (etymologically all-philosophy-collection), a famous work of 14th century ] philosopher ] from ], which starts with a chapter on the Cārvāka system. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods ] and ] ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Vidyāraṇya asks, in the first chapter:<ref name="page2">Cowell and Gough, p. 2.</ref>
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* Bhattacharya, Ramakrishna (2011) ''Studies on the Carvaka/Lokayata'' (Cultural, Historical and Textual Studies of Religions). Anthem ISBN 0857284339 * Bhattacharya, Ramakrishna (2011) ''Studies on the Carvaka/Lokayata'' (Cultural, Historical and Textual Studies of Religions). Anthem ISBN 0857284339
* {{cite journal|last1=Bhattacharya|first1=Ramakrishna|title=Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection|journal=Journal of Indian Philosophy|date=2002 |volume=30| issue = =6 |pages=597–640 |ref=harv}} * {{cite journal|last1=Bhattacharya|first1=Ramakrishna|title=Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection|journal=Journal of Indian Philosophy|date=2002 |volume=30| issue = =6 |pages=597–640 |ref=harv}}
* ] (1959) '']''. New Delhi: People's Publishing House. * ] (1959) ]. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
* Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1964) ''Indian Philosophy: A Popular Introduction''. New Delhi: People's Pub. House. * Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1964) ''Indian Philosophy: A Popular Introduction''. New Delhi: People's Pub. House.
* {{cite book | last = Chattopadhyaya | first = Debiprasad | year = 1994 | title = Carvaka/Lokayata: An Anthology of Source Materials and Some Recent Studies |ref= | publisher = People's Publishing House | location = New Delhi| id = }} * {{cite book | last = Chattopadhyaya | first = Debiprasad | year = 1994 | title = Carvaka/Lokayata: An Anthology of Source Materials and Some Recent Studies |ref= | publisher = People's Publishing House | location = New Delhi| id = }}
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* , Karl Potter, University of Washington * , Karl Potter, University of Washington


{{Belief systems}}
{{Philosophy topics |state=collapsed}}
{{Indian Philosophy}} {{Indian Philosophy}}


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Cārvāka, originally known as Lokāyata and Bṛhaspatya, is the ancient school of Indian materialism. Cārvāka holds direct perception, empiricism, and conditional inference as proper sources of knowledge, embraces philosophical skepticism and rejects Vedas, Vedic ritualism and supernaturalism.

Ajita Kesakambali is credited as the forerunner of the Carvakas, while Brihaspati is usually referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy. Much of the primary literature of Cārvāka, the Barhaspatya sutras (ca. 600 BCE), are missing or lost. Its teachings have been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras, sutras and the Indian epic poetry as well as in the dialogues of Gautama Buddha and from Jain literature.

One of the widely studied principles of Cārvāka philosophy was its rejection of inference as a means to establish valid, universal knowledge, and metaphysical truths. In other words, the Cārvāka epistemology states that whenever one infers a truth from a set of observations or truths, one must acknowledge doubt; inferred knowledge is conditional.

Carvaka is categorized as a heterodox school of Indian philosophy. It is considered an example of atheistic schools in the Hindu tradition.

Etymology and meaning

The etymology of Cārvāka (Sanskrit: चार्वाक) is uncertain. Some believe it to mean "agreeable speech" or pejoratively, "sweet-tongued" (from Sanskrit's cāru "agreeable" and vāk "speech"). Others contend that it derives from the root charv meaning to eat possibly alluding to the philosophy's hedonistic precepts of "eat, drink, and be merry". Yet another theory believes it to be eponymous in origin, with the founder of the school being Carvaka, a disciple of Brihaspati.

Bhattacharya notes that the word Cārvāka is of irregular construction, as cara as an adjective means "agreeable, pleasant", but as a noun is another name of Brihaspati, and both derivations are plausible.

As Lokayata

According to Chattopadhyaya, the traditional name of Carvaka is Lokayata. It was called Lokayata because it was prevalent (ayatah) among the people (lokesu), and meant the world-outlook of the people. The dictionary meaning of Lokāyata (लोकायत) signifies "directed towards, aiming at the world, worldly".

In early to mid 20th century literature, the etymology of Lokayata has been given different interpretations, in part because the primary sources are unavailable, and the meaning has been deduced from divergent secondary literature. The name Lokāyata, for example, is found in Chanakya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (अन्वीक्षिकी, literally, examining by reason, logical philosophies) – Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. However, Lokāyata in the Arthashastra is not anti-Vedic, but implies Lokāyata to be a part of Vedic lore. Lokāyata here refers to logic or science of debate (disputatio, "criticism"). Rudolf Franke translated Lokayata in German as "logisch beweisende Naturerklärung", that is "logically proving explanation of nature".

In 8th century CE Jaina literature, Saddarsanasamuccaya by Haribhadra, Lokayata is stated to be the Hindu school where there is "no God, no samsara (rebirth), no karma, no duty, no fruits of merit, no sin."

The Buddhist Sanskrit work Divyavadana (ca. 200–350 CE) mentions Lokayata, where it is listed among subjects of study, and with the sense of "technical logical science". Santaraksita and Adi Shankara use the word lokayata to mean materialism, with the latter using the term Lokāyata, not Cārvāka. The terms Lokayata and Brhaspatya have been used interchangeably for the Carvaka philosophy of materialism.

Origin

The origins of the Cārvāka can be traced to the Rigveda, but substantial discussions on the Cārvāka is found in post-Vedic literature. The primary literature of Cārvāka, such as the Brhaspati Sutra is missing or lost. Its theories and development has been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras (such as the Arthasastra), sutras and the epics (the Mahabharata and Ramayana) of Hinduism as well as from the dialogues of Gautama Buddha and Jain literature.

Substantial discussions about the Cārvāka doctrines are only found in texts after 600 BCE. Bhattacharya posits that Cārvāka may have been one of several atheistic, materialist schools that existed in ancient India. Though there is evidence of its development in Vedic era, Cārvāka emerged as an alternative to the Āstika schools as well as a philosophical predecessor to subsequent or contemporaneous nāstika philosophies such as Ājīvika, Jainism and Buddhism in the classical period of Indian philosophy.

The earliest documented Carvaka scholar in India is Ajita Kesakambali. Although materialist schools existed before Cārvāka, it was the only school which systematised materialist philosophy by setting them down in the form of aphorisms in the 6th century BC. There was a base text, a collection sūtras or aphorisms and several commentaries were written to explicate the aphorisms.

E. W. Hopkins, in his The Ethics of India (1924) claims that Cārvāka philosophy was contemporaneous to Jainism and Buddhism, mentioning "the old Cārvāka or materialist of the 6th century BC". Rhys Davids assumes that lokāyata in ca. 500 BC came to mean "skepticism" in general without yet being organised as a philosophical school. Its methodology of skepticism is included in the Ramayana, Ayodhya kanda, chapter 108, where Jabāli tries to persuade Rāma to accept the kingdom by using nāstika arguments (Rāma refutes him in chapter 109):

O, the highly wise! Arrive at a conclusion, therefore, that there is nothing beyond this Universe. Give precedence to that which meets the eye and turn your back on what is beyond our knowledge. (2.108.17)

There are alternate theories behind the origins of Carvaka. Bṛhaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy. Billington states that a philosopher named Carvaka lived in or about the 6th century BC, who developed the premises of this Indian philosophy in the form of Brhaspati Sutra. These sutras predate 150 BC, because they are mentioned in the Mahābhāṣya (7.3.45).

A.L. Basham, citing the Buddhist Samaññaphala Sutta, suggests six schools of heterodox, pre-Buddhist and pre-Jain, atheistic Indian traditions in 6th century BCE, that included Carvakas and Ajivikas. Cārvāka was a living philosophy up to the 12th century in India's historical timeline, after which this system seems to have disappeared without leaving any trace.

Philosophy

The Cārvāka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception to be the valid and reliable source of knowledge.

Epistemology

The Carvaka epistemology holds perception as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as prone to being either right or wrong and therefore conditional or invalid. Perception are of two types, for Carvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. Inference is described as deriving a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths. To Carvakas, inference is useful but prone to error, as inferred truths can never be without doubt. Inference is good and helpful, it is the validity of inference that is suspect – sometimes in certain cases and often in others. To the Cārvākas there were no reliable means by which the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could be established.

Carvakas epistemological argument can be explained with the example of fire and smoke. Kamal states, that when there is smoke (middle term), one's tendency may be to leap to the conclusion that it must be caused by fire (major term in logic). While this is often true, it need not be universally true, everywhere or all the times, stated the Carvaka scholars. Smoke can have other causes. In Carvaka epistemology, as long as the relation between two phenomena, or observation and truth, has not been proven as unconditional, it is an uncertain truth. Such methods of reasoning, that is jumping to conclusions or inference, is prone to flaw in this Indian philosophy. Carvakas further state that full knowledge is reached when we know all observations, all premises and all conditions. But the absence of conditions, state Carvakas, can not be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may be hidden or escape our ability to observe. They acknowledge that every person relies on inference in daily life, but to them if we act uncritically, we err. While our inference sometimes are true and lead to successful action, it is also a fact that sometimes inference is wrong and leads to error. Truth then, state Carvaka, is not an unfailing character of inference, truth is merely an accident of inference, and one that is separable. We must be skeptics, question what we know by inference, question our epistemology.

This epistemological proposition of Carvakas was influential among various schools of in Indian philosophies, by demonstrating a new way of thinking and re-evaluation of past doctrines. Hindu, Buddhist and Jain scholars extensively deployed Carvaka insights on inference in rational re-examination of their own theories.

Comparison with other schools of Hinduism

Carvaka epistemology represents minimalist pramāṇas (epistemological methods) in Hindu philosophy. The other schools of Hinduism developed and accepted multiple valid forms of epistemology. To Carvakas, Pratyakṣa (perception) was the one valid way to knowledge and other means of knowledge were either always conditional or invalid. Advaita Vedanta scholars considered six means of valid knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation), Anupalabdi (non-perception, cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). While Carvaka school accepted just one, the valid means of epistemology in other schools of Hinduism ranged between 2 to 6.

Metaphysics

Since none of the means of knowing were found to be worthy to establish the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, Cārvākas concluded that the inference could not be used to ascertain metaphysical truths. Thus, to Cārvākas, the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of something to infer the knowledge of something else could be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being in error. Cases where inference was justified by the result were seen only to be mere coincidences.

Therefore, Cārvākas denied metaphysical concepts like reincarnation, extracorporeal soul, efficacy of religious rites, other worlds (heaven and hell), fate and accumulation of merit or demerit through the performance of certain actions. Cārvākas also rejected the use of supernatural causes to describe natural phenomena. To them all natural phenomena was produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.

Consciousness and afterlife

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (July 2015)

Carvaka school of Hinduism did not believe in karma, rebirth or an afterlife. To them, all attributes that represented a person, such a thinness, fatness etc., resided in the body. The Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha states the Carvaka position as follows,

There is no other world other than this;
There is no heaven and no hell;
The realm of Shiva and like regions,
are invented by stupid imposters.

— Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verse 8

Pleasure

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Cārvāka believed that there was nothing wrong with sensual pleasure. Since it is impossible to have pleasure without pain, Cārvāka thought that wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible. Unlike many of the Indian philosophies of the time, Cārvāka did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure out of fear of pain and held such reasoning to be foolish.

The Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha states the Carvaka position on pleasure and hedonism as follows,

The enjoyment of heaven lies in eating delicious food, keeping company of young women, using fine clothes, perfumes, garlands, sandal paste... while moksha is death which is cessation of life-breath... the wise therefore ought not to take pains on account of moksha.

A fool wears himself out by penances and fasts. Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings.

— Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verses 9-12

Religion

Cārvākas rejected many of the standard religious conceptions of Hindus, Buddhists and Jains, such as afterlife, reincarnation, samsara, karma and religious rites. They were critical of the Vedas, as well as Buddhist scriptures.

The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha with commentaries by Madhavacharya describes the Carvakas as critical of Vedas, materialists without morals and ethics. To Carvakas, the text states, the Vedas suffered from several faults – errors in transmission across generations, untruth, self-contradiction and tautology. The Carvakas pointed out the disagreements, debates and mutual rejection by karmakanda Vedic priests and jñānakanda Vedic priests, as proof that either one of them is wrong or both are wrong, as both cannot be right.

Carvakas, according to Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha verses 10 and 11, declared the Vedas to be incoherent rhapsodies whose only usefulness was to provide livelihood to priests. They also held the belief that Vedas were invented by man, and had no divine authority.

Carvakas rejected the need for ethics or morals, and suggested that "while life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt".

The Jain scholar Haribhadra, in the last section of his text Saddarsanasamuccaya, includes Carvaka in six darśanas of Indian traditions, along with Buddhism, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Jainism and Jaiminiya. Haribhadra notes that Carvaka's assert that there is nothing beyond the senses, consciousness is an emergent property, and that it is foolish to seek what cannot be seen.

The accuracy of these views, attributed to Carvakas, has been contested by scholars.

Works

No independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found except for a few sūtras composed by Brihaspati. The 8th century Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa with Madhyamaka influence is a significant source of Carvaka philosophy. Shatdarshan Samuchay and Sarvadarśanasaṅ̇graha of Vidyaranya are a few other works which elucidate Cārvāka thought.

In the epic Mahabharata, Book 12 Chapter 39, a villain who dresses up like a scholar, self appoints himself as spokesperson for all scholars, and who then advises Yudhisthira to act unethically, is named Cārvāka.

One of the widely studied references to the Cārvāka philosophy is the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (etymologically all-philosophy-collection), a famous work of 14th century Advaita Vedanta philosopher Mādhava Vidyāraṇya from South India, which starts with a chapter on the Cārvāka system. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods Shiva and Vishnu ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Vidyāraṇya asks, in the first chapter:

...but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, the crest-gem of the atheistic school, the follower of the doctrine of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain:

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?

Ain-i-Akbari, a record of the Mughal Emperor Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence. In the text, the Mughal historian Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak summarizes Charvaka philosophy as "unenlightened" and that their literature as "lasting memorials to their ignorance". He notes that Charvakas considered paradise as "the state in which man lives as he chooses, without control of another", while hell as "the state in which he lives subject to another's rule". On state craft, Charvakas believe, states Mubarak, that it is best when "knowledge of just administration and benevolent government" is practiced.

Sanskrit poems and plays like the Naiṣadha-carita, Prabodha-candrodaya, Āgama-dambara, Vidvanmoda-taraṅgiṇī and Kādambarī contain representations of the Cārvāka thought. However, the authors of these works were thoroughly opposed to materialism and tried to portray the Cārvāka in unfavourable light. Therefore, their works should only be accepted critically.

Loss of original works

Main article: Barhaspatya sutras

There was no continuity in the Cārvāka tradition after the 12th century. Whatever is written on Cārvāka post this is based on second-hand knowledge, learned from preceptors to disciples and no independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found. Chatterjee and Datta explain that our understanding of Cārvāka philosophy is fragmentary, based largely on criticism of its ideas by other schools, and that it is not a living tradition:

"Though materialism in some form or other has always been present in India, and occasional references are found in the Vedas, the Buddhistic literature, the Epics, as well as in the later philosophical works we do not find any systematic work on materialism, nor any organised school of followers as the other philosophical schools possess. But almost every work of the other schools states, for refutation, the materialistic views. Our knowledge of Indian materialism is chiefly based on these."

Controversy on reliability of sources

Bhattacharya states, that the claims against Cārvāka of hedonism, lack of any morality and ethics, disregard for spirituality is from texts of competing religious thoughts (Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism). Its primary sources, along with commentaries by Carvaka scholars is missing or lost. This reliance on indirect sources raises the question of reliability and whether there was a bias and exaggeration in representing the views of Carvakas. Bhattacharya points out that multiple manuscripts are inconsistent, with key passages alleging hedonism and immorality missing in many manuscripts of the same text.

The Skhalitapramathana Yuktihetusiddhi by Āryadevapāda, in a manuscript found in Tibet, discusses the Cārvāka philosophy, but attributes a theistic claim to Carvakas - that happiness in this life, and the only life, can be attained by worshipping gods and defeating demons. Toso posits that as Carvaka philosophy's views spread and were widely discussed, non-Carvakas such as Āryadevapāda added certain points of view that may not be of Carvakas.

Buddhists, Jains, Advaita Vedantins and Nyāya philosophers considered the Cārvākas as one of their opponents and tried to refute their views. These refutations are indirect sources of Cārvāka philosophy. The arguments and reasoning approach Carvakas deployed were significant that they continued to be referred to, even after all the authentic Cārvāka/Lokāyata texts had been lost. However, the representation of the Cārvāka thought in these works is not always firmly grounded in first-hand knowledge of Cārvāka texts and should be viewed critically.

Likewise, states Bhattacharya, the charge of hedonism against Cārvāka might have been exaggerated. Countering the argument that the Cārvākas opposed all that was good in the Vedic tradition, Dale Riepe states, "It may be said from the available material that Cārvākas hold truth, integrity, consistency, and freedom of thought in the highest esteem."

See also

Notes

  1. KN Tiwari (1998), Classical Indian Ethical Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120816077, page 67;
    Roy W Perrett (1984), The problem of induction in Indian philosophy, Philosophy East and West, 34(2): 161-174;
    (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 21–32) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help);
    (Radhakrishnan 1957, pp. 187, 227–234);
    Robert Flint, Anti-theistic theories, p. 463, at Google Books, Appendix Note VII - Hindu Materialism: The Charvaka System; William Blackwood, London;
  2. V.V. Raman (2012), Hinduism and Science: Some Reflections, Zygon - Journal of Religion and Science, 47(3): 549–574, Quote (page 557): "Aside from nontheistic schools like the Samkhya, there have also been explicitly atheistic schools in the Hindu tradition. One virulently anti-supernatural system is/was the so-called Carvaka school.", doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2012.01274.x
  3. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2011), Studies on the Carvaka/Lokayata, Anthem Press, ISBN 978-0857284334, pages 26-29
  4. Johannes Quack (2014), Disenchanting India: Organized Rationalism and Criticism of Religion in India, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199812615, page 50 with footnote 3
  5. ^ (Radhakrishnan 1957, pp. 227–249)
  6. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 21–44, 65–74) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  7. ^ Cowell and Gough, p. 5.
  8. (Bhattacharya 2011, p. 58) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  9. ^ MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16
  10. (Radhakrishnan 1957, pp. 1–3, Contents)
  11. (Flood 1996, p. 224)
  12. R Thomas (2014), Hindu Perspectives on Evolution: Darwin, Dharma, and Design. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 75, No. 1, pages 164-165, Quote: "some of the ancient Hindu traditions like Carvaka have a rich tradition of materialism, in general, other schools..."
    V.V. Raman (2012), Hinduism and Science: Some Reflections, Zygon - Journal of Religion and Science, 47(3): 549–574, Quote (page 557): "Aside from nontheistic schools like the Samkhya, there have also been explicitly atheistic schools in the Hindu tradition. One virulently anti-supernatural system is/was the so-called Carvaka school."
  13. KN Tiwari (1998), Classical Indian Ethical Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120816077, page 67; Quote: "Of the three heterodox systems, the remaining one, the Cārvāka system, is a Hindu system.";
  14. Bill Cooke (2005), Dictionary of Atheism, Skepticism, and Humanism, ISBN 978-1591022992, page 84;
    For a general discussion of Carvaka and other atheistic traditions within Hindu philosophy, see Jessica Frazier (2014), Hinduism in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Editors: Stephen Bullivant, Michael Ruse), Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199644650, pages 367-378
  15. ^ N. V. Isaeva (1 January 1993). Shankara and Indian Philosophy. SUNY Press. p. 27. ISBN 978-0-7914-1281-7. Retrieved 31 December 2013.
  16. Sharma, Chandradhar (1987). A critical survey of Indian philosophy (Reprinted. ed.). Delhi: M. Banarsidass. p. 40. ISBN 9788120803657. Retrieved 7 July 2015.
  17. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 166–167) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  18. Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad (1992). Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism (7th ed.). New Delhi: People's Publishing House. p. 1. ISBN 81-7007-006-6.
  19. Monier-Williams' 'Sanskrit-English Dictionary See loka and ayata, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany; (लोक, loka which means "worlds, abode, place of truth, people", and आयत, āyata means "extended, directed towards, aiming at")
  20. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 187–192) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  21. Paul Hacker, Anviksiki, Kleine Schriften / hrsg. von Lambert Schmithausen (1978), OCLC 463106529, page 164, ISBN 978-3515026925
  22. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 188–190) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  23. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 27, 189–191) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  24. (Bhattacharya 2011, p. 188) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  25. CK Chapple and J Casey (2003), Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791458990, page 2
  26. Haribhadrasūri (Translator: M Jain, 1989), Saddarsanasamuccaya, Asiatic Society, OCLC 255495691
  27. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 193–195) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  28. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 196) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  29. ( & Bhattacarya 2002, p. 6) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacarya2002 (help)
  30. in hymn 10.129; John M. Koller (1977), Skepticism in Early Indian Thought, Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 155-164
  31. ^ John M. Koller (1977), Skepticism in Early Indian Thought, Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 155-164
  32. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 21–44, 65–74) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  33. Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120812932, pages 53-58
  34. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2013), The base text and its commentaries: Problem of representing and understanding the Carvaka / Lokayata, Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, Issue 1, Volume 3, pages 133-150
  35. A. K. Sinha (1994), Traces of Materialism in Early Vedic Thought: A Study, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 75, No. 1/4, pages 235-241
  36. (Bhattacharya 2011, p. 9) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  37. ^ Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. Materialism in India: A Synoptic View. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  38. ^ see Schermerhorn (1930).
  39. Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 43
  40. Arthur Basham (2009), History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: a Vanished Indian Religion, ISBN 978-8120812048, pages 11-17
  41. (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 65–74) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  42. ^ Cowell and Gough. p. 3
  43. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2010), What the Cārvākas Originally Meant?, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 529-542
  44. ^ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 55–67) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  45. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2013), The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing and Understanding the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Argument, 3 (1):133-149
  46. D Chatterjee (1977), Skepticism and Indian philosophy, Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 195-209
  47. ^
    • Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245-248;
    • John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238
  48. Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0521438780, page 225
  49. Cowell and Gough, p. 9.
  50. ^ Cowell and Gough. p. 10
  51. ^ Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 44
  52. ^ Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 44-45
  53. ^ Richard Hayes (2000), The Question of Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemologists, in Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy (Editor:Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 187-212
  54. ^ Original Sanskrit version:Sarva-darsana-sangraha, pages 3-7; English version: The Charvaka System with commentary by Madhava Acharya, Translators: Cowell and Gough (1882), pages 5-9
  55. The Charvaka System with commentary by Madhava Acharya, Translators: Cowell and Gough (1882), page 10
  56. ^ See verses 78-end (ET99-end) in Potter, Karl H. (2007). The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Buddhist philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publications. pp. 435–436. ISBN 978-81-208-1968-9.
  57. ^ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 10, 29–32) harv error: no target: CITEREFBhattacharya2011 (help)
  58. Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120812932
  59. Joshi, Dinkar. Glimpses of Indian Culture. Star Publications (P) Ltd, Delhi. P. 37. ISBN 81-7650-190-5.
  60. Shanti Parva, Chapter XXXIX The Mahabharata, KM Ganguli (Translator), pages 121-122
  61. ^ Cowell and Gough, p. 2.
  62. Ain-i-Akbari, Vol. III, translated by H. S. Barrett, pp 217–218 (also see Amartya Sen , pp 288–289)
  63. Henry Sullivan Jarrett (Translator), The Ain-i-Akbari, Volume 3, p. 217, at Google Books, Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak, 16th century, pages 217-218
  64. Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Eighth Reprint Edition. (University of Calcutta: 1984). p. 55.
  65. KD Toso (2010), The Stanzas on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata in the Skhalita pramathana yuktihetusiddhi, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 543-552
  66. Riepe, Dale. The Naturalistic Tradition of Indian Thought (Motilal Banarasidas, Varanasi) p.75

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