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=== NHTSA investigation === | === NHTSA investigation === | ||
In April, 1974, safety advocate Byron Bloch and the ] petitioned the ] (NHTSA) to recall Ford Pintos to address fuel system design defects after reports from attorneys of three deaths and four serious injuries in rear-end collisions at moderate speeds.<ref name=Graham>{{cite journal|last1=Graham|first1=John D.|editor1-last=Huber|editor1-first=Peter W.|editor2-last=Litan|editor2-first=Robert E.|title=Does liability promote the safety of motor vehicles?"|journal=The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Rules on Innovation and Safety|date=1991|page=132|pages=128-137|accessdate=March 11, 2016|publisher=Brookings Institution|location=Washington DC}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Business Ethics: A Stakeholder and Issues Management Approach |first=Joseph W. |last=Weiss |publisher=] |year=2014 |isbn=9781626561410}}</ref> The NHTSA found there was not enough evidence to warrant a defect investigation.<ref name=Graham/> '']'' magazine obtained Ford's cost-benefit analysis document. In September, 1977 ''Mother Jones'' magazine said that Ford was aware of the tank's design flaw, was unwilling to pay for a redesign, and decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits.<ref name="mother">{{cite web |title=Pinto Madness |work=] |first=Mark |last=Dowie |date=September 1977 |url=http://motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness |accessdate= January 17, 2014}}</ref> The Center for Auto Safety re-submitted their petition to the NHTSA.<ref>{{harvnb|The Center for Auto Safety|2009}}</ref> On August 10, 1977, consumer advocate ] and the author of the ''Mother Jones'' article held a news conference on the dangers of the Pinto design flaws.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.</ref> |
In April, 1974, safety advocate Byron Bloch and the ] petitioned the ] (NHTSA) to recall Ford Pintos to address fuel system design defects after reports from attorneys of three deaths and four serious injuries in rear-end collisions at moderate speeds.<ref name=Graham>{{cite journal|last1=Graham|first1=John D.|editor1-last=Huber|editor1-first=Peter W.|editor2-last=Litan|editor2-first=Robert E.|title=Does liability promote the safety of motor vehicles?"|journal=The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Rules on Innovation and Safety|date=1991|page=132|pages=128-137|accessdate=March 11, 2016|publisher=Brookings Institution|location=Washington DC}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Business Ethics: A Stakeholder and Issues Management Approach |first=Joseph W. |last=Weiss |publisher=] |year=2014 |isbn=9781626561410}}</ref> The NHTSA found there was not enough evidence to warrant a defect investigation.<ref name=Graham/> '']'' magazine obtained Ford's cost-benefit analysis document. In September, 1977 ''Mother Jones'' magazine said that Ford was aware of the tank's design flaw, was unwilling to pay for a redesign, and decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits.<ref name="mother">{{cite web |title=Pinto Madness |work=] |first=Mark |last=Dowie |date=September 1977 |url=http://motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness |accessdate= January 17, 2014}}</ref> The Center for Auto Safety re-submitted their petition to the NHTSA.<ref>{{harvnb|The Center for Auto Safety|2009}}</ref> On August 10, 1977, consumer advocate ] and the author of the ''Mother Jones'' article held a news conference on the dangers of the Pinto design flaws.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.</ref> According to Matthew T. Lee, at the time a graduate student at the ], and M. David Ermann, professor of sociology and criminal justice at the University, writing in a sociology journal in 1999, the ''Mother Jones'' labeling of the Pinto as a "firetrap" and accusations that the NHTSA was buckling to industry pressure as well as the public interest created by sensationalized new stories "forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that the NHTSA would be under the microscope for its duration."<ref>{{harvnb|Lee|1999}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Schwartz|1991}}</ref> | ||
On August 11, 1977, the day after the Nader and ''Mother Jones'' press conference, the NHTSA initiated an investigation.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims.</ref> On May 8, 1978 the NHTSA informed Ford of their determination that the Pinto fuel system was defective.<ref>{{harvnb|Stuart|1980}}: In the Pinto case, the highway safety agency made an ''initial determination'' in May 1978 that a defect existed in the fuel tank system.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: But NHTSA, a Department of Transportation agency, informed Ford on May 8 about results of the new investigation, which concluded that Pintos had a safety defect.</ref> The NHTSA concluded | On August 11, 1977, the day after the Nader and ''Mother Jones'' press conference, the NHTSA initiated an investigation.<ref>{{harvnb|Dardis|Zent|1982}}: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims.</ref> On May 8, 1978 the NHTSA informed Ford of their determination that the Pinto fuel system was defective.<ref>{{harvnb|Stuart|1980}}: In the Pinto case, the highway safety agency made an ''initial determination'' in May 1978 that a defect existed in the fuel tank system.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Jones|1978}}: But NHTSA, a Department of Transportation agency, informed Ford on May 8 about results of the new investigation, which concluded that Pintos had a safety defect.</ref> The NHTSA concluded |
Revision as of 16:30, 11 March 2016
This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Ford Pinto" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (April 2015) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
Ford Pinto | |
---|---|
Ford Pinto | |
Overview | |
Manufacturer | Ford |
Production | September 1970–1980 |
Model years | 1971–1980 |
Assembly | Edison, New Jersey Milpitas, California St. Thomas, Ontario, Canada |
Designer | Robert Eidschun |
Body and chassis | |
Class | Subcompact car |
Body style | 2-door coupe 2-door sedan delivery 2-door station wagon 3-door hatchback |
Layout | FR layout |
Related | Mercury Bobcat Ford Mustang II |
Powertrain | |
Engine | |
Transmission |
|
Dimensions | |
Length | 163 in (4,100 mm) |
Width | 69.4 in (1,760 mm) |
Height | 50 in (1,300 mm) |
Curb weight | 2,015–2,270 lb (914–1,030 kg) (1971) |
Chronology | |
Predecessor | Ford Cortina (captive import) |
Successor | Ford Escort |
The Ford Pinto is a subcompact that was manufactured and marketed by Ford for model years (MY) 1971–1980. The 1971 two-door sedan was followed by hatchback and wagon models for MY 1972. With over 3 million produced over a 10-year model run, the Pinto outproduced the combined totals of its domestic rivals, the Chevy Vega and the AMC Gremlin.
In 1977 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration determined that the Pinto fuel system was defective and had resulted in fatalities and injuries. 1.5 million Ford Pintos were recalled, one of the largest recalls in automotive history at that time, to install a modification to reduce the risk of fire. A number of lawsuits were brought against Ford, including a $127 million jury award in 1978, the largest product liability and negligence award in history at that time. This was reduced on appeal to $6 million. Ford was indicted on criminal charges of reckless homicide in 1980, the first time a corporation faced criminal charges for a defective product, and the first time a corporation was charged with murder. A subsequent analysis of the Pinto's overall safety indicated its safety was comparable to other cars of its class. The Pinto has been cited widely as a business ethics as well as tort reform case study.
A rebadged variant, the Mercury Bobcat, debuted in 1974 in Canada and in March 1975 in the US. The Pinto/Bobcat and the smaller, imported Ford Fiesta were ultimately replaced by the front-wheel-drive Ford Escort and Mercury Lynx. Pintos were manufactured in St. Thomas, Ontario at St. Thomas Assembly; Edison, New Jersey at Edison Assembly; and in Milpitas, California at San Jose Assembly.
Background
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U.S. automakers had first countered imports such as the Volkswagen Beetle with compact cars including the Ford Falcon, Chevrolet Corvair and Plymouth Valiant, although these cars featured six-cylinder engines and comprised a larger vehicle class. As the popularity of smaller Japanese imports from Toyota and Datsun increased throughout the 1960s, Ford North America responded by introducing the Ford Cortina from Ford of Europe as a captive import. U.S. automakers would soon introduce their own subcompacts. The Pinto was in compliance with Japanese regulations concerning vehicle length and engine displacement, but exceeded width dimensions by 60 mm (2.4 in).
The Pinto was introduced on September 11, 1970. The AMC Gremlin was the first to arrive on the market six months before the Pinto, and the Chevrolet Vega was introduced the day before the Pinto. Both the Pinto and the Vega were new, but the Pinto used powertrains proven in Europe from the European Ford Escort, while the Vega's innovative aluminum engine would prove troublesome. The Gremlin was designed around a six-cylinder engine, and was derived largely by truncating the rear body from the compact-class AMC Hornet to achieve its short length.
Product development
Ford President Lee Iacocca wanted a 1971 model that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and that would be priced at less than $2,000. The Pinto product development, from conception through delivery, was completed in 25 months, when the automotive industry average was 43 months; the Pinto project was the shortest production planning schedule in automotive history up to that time. Some development processes usually conducted sequentially were conducted in parallel. Machine tooling overlapped with product development, which froze the basic design. Decisions which threatened the schedule were discouraged. The attitude of Ford management was to develop the Pinto as quickly as possible. Iacocca ordered a rush project to build the Pinto. The Pinto became known as "Lee's car."
The Pinto was designed by Robert Eidschun.
The Pinto offered an inline-4 engine, and bucket seats – The car's mechanical design was conventional, with unibody construction, a longitudinally mounted engine in front driving the rear wheels through either a manual or automatic transmission and live axle rear end. Suspension was by unequal-length control arms with front coil springs; the live rear axle was suspended on leaf springs. The rack and pinion steering had optional power assist, as did the brakes.
The nameplate "Pinto" derives from the distinctive white and solid pattern of coloration common in horses.
Production history
Ford introduced the Pinto under the tagline The Little Carefree Car.
After structural work on alternate body styles encountered obstacles, Ford offered the Pinto as a two-door sedan, with entry level models priced at around $1850, undercutting GM's Chevrolet Vega and directly targeting imported models — which included such new competitors as the Mazda 1200 in 1971, the Subaru DL in 1972, and the Honda Civic in 1973.
By January 1971, the Pinto had sold over 100,000 units and 352,402 for the entire 1971 production run. 1974 saw the most Pintos produced in a single model year with 544,209 units.
1971–1973
The Ford Pinto went on sale on September 11, 1970 in one bodystyle, a fastback sedan with trunk and metal trunklid. A hatchback became available on February 20, 1971, debuting at the Chicago Auto Show (also, in 1971, the Pinto brochure came with a paper cutout Pinto that one could fold together to make a 3D model). Marketed as the Runabout, the hatchback went on sale five days later, priced at $2,062. The hatch itself featured exposed chrome hinges for the liftgate and five decorative chrome strips, pneumatic struts to assist in opening the hatch, a rear window approximately as large as the sedan's, and a fold down seat — a feature which became simultaneously an option on the sedan. The hatchback model matched the sedan in all other dimensions and offered 38.1 cubic feet (1.08 m) of cargo space with its seat folded. By 1972, Ford redesigned the hatch itself, with the glass portion of the hatch enlarged to almost the entire size of the hatch itself, ultimately to be replaced with a rear hatch that was entirely glass.
On October 30, 1970, less than two months after introduction, 26,000 Pintos were recalled to address a possible problem with the accelerator sticking on once engaged at more than halfway. On March 29, 1971, Ford recalled 220,000 Pintos, all Pintos manufactured prior to March 19, 1971, to address a possible problem with fuel vapors in the engine air filter igniting by a backfire through the carburetor.
On February 24, 1972, the Pinto station wagon debuted with an overall length of 172.7 in (4,390 mm) and 60.5 cubic feet (1.71 m) of cargo volume. The first 2-door Ford station wagon since 1961, the Pinto wagon offered flip-open rear-seat windows as an option. Along with front disc brakes, the 2.0L engine was standard equipment. A Pinto Squire wagon featured faux wood side paneling similar to the full-size Country Squire.
1974–1978
In 1974, to meet federal regulations, 5 mph bumpers were added to both the front and rear. Unlike the majority of 1970s cars, the addition of larger bumpers to the Pinto would not necessitate major changes to the bodywork. While the underpowered Kent engine was dropped, the optional OHC engine was expanded to 2.3L. In various forms, this engine would go on to power a variety of Ford vehicles for 23 years. Mercury begins selling the Bobcat as a Canada-only model. With 544,209 units sold, 1974 would be the most popular model year for the Pinto.
In 1975, in a move to better compete with the AMC Gremlin, Ford introduced the 2.8L V6; while far less powerful than the Gremlin, the V6 gave the Pinto a feature unavailable in the Chevrolet Vega. Sales of the Mercury Bobcat are expanded to Lincoln-Mercury dealers in the United States; it is sold as a hatchback and wagon.
For the 1977 model year, Pinto wagons received a new option package. Dubbed the Pinto Cruising Wagon, it was the sedan delivery version of the Pinto styled to resemble a small conversion van, complete with round side panel "bubble windows".
Other appearance packages offered by Ford were similar to the Cosworth Vega and the 304 V8 Gremlin X; these were strictly appearance upgrades, not a factory performance package.
In 1978, the Pinto became the second-smallest Ford sold in the U.S., as the company introduced the Fiesta. Nearly two feet shorter than the Pinto, the German-designed Fiesta was the first front-wheel drive car sold by Ford in the USA.
Mercury Bobcat (1974–1980)
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Lincoln-Mercury dealers marketed a rebadged variant of the Pinto, as the Mercury Bobcat, beginning with model year 1974 in Canada and 1975 in the United States. The Bobcat was marketed as a hatchback and as a station wagon, under the Villager nameplate, and both featured a modified grille. The hatchback featured modified tail lights.
In total, 224,026 Bobcats were produced from 1975 to 1980.
1979–1980
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For the 1979 model year, the Pinto saw its first significant styling update. Taking on square headlights, the Pinto shed its styling borrowed from the Maverick. Wearing larger taillights, the Pinto now wore a square, sloping grille.
1980 marked the end of the Pinto's production run. For 1980, the V6 engine was discontinued, leaving the 2.3L as the sole engine.
calendar year | units |
---|---|
1971 | 352,402 |
1972 | 480,405 |
1973 | 484,512 |
1974 | 544,209 |
1975 | 223,763 |
1976 | 290,132 |
1977 | 225,097 |
1978 | 188,899 |
1979 | 199,018 |
1980 | 185,054 |
total production = 3,173,491 |
The Pinto would be later complemented by the German built, smaller front-wheel-drive Ford Fiesta, and formally replaced by the Escort for the 1981 model year.
Powertrain
Except for 1980, the Pinto was available with a choice of two engines. For the first five years of production, only four-cylinder inline engines were offered. Ford changed the power ratings almost every year.
Of particular note is the introduction in 1974 of the 2.3 litres (140 cu in) OHC I4 engine. This engine would be updated and modified several times, allowing it to remain in production into 1997. Among other Ford vehicles, a turbocharged version of this engine would later power the performance based Thunderbird Turbo Coupe, Mustang SVO, and the European-built Merkur XR4Ti.
Initial Pinto deliveries in the early years used the English (1,600 cc (98 cu in)) and German (2,000 cc (120 cu in)) engines tuned for performance (see below). The 2,000 cc engine used a two barrel carburetor where just one bore was bigger than that used on the Maverick. With the low weight (not much above 2,000 lb (910 kg)) and the SOHC engine it rated a 10.8 second 0-60 time. With the advent of emission control requirements, Ford moved from the European sourced to domestically sourced engines, using new or modified designs. New safety legislation impacted bumpers and other parts adding to the weight of the car, reducing performance.
Revised SAE standards in 1972 dropped the Pinto's 1.6 L (98 cu in) engine to 54 bhp (40 kW) — and the 2.0 L (120 cu in) engine to 86 hp (64 kW).
Engine Name | Years Available | Displacement | Horsepower† | Torque† |
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Inline-four engine | ||||
Ford Kent I4 | 1971-1973 | 98 cu in (1.6 L) |
|
|
Ford EAO I4 | 1971-1974 | 122 cu in (2.0 L) |
|
|
Ford OHC I4 | 1974-1980 | 140 cu in (2.3 L) |
|
|
V6 engine | ||||
Ford Cologne V6 | 1975-1979 | 170 cu in (2.8 L) |
|
|
†Horsepower and torque ratings are net output after 1971 model year. |
Reception and criticism
Road & Track faulted the suspension and standard drum brakes, calling the latter a "serious deficiency," but praised the proven 1.6 L Kent engine, adapted from European Fords. The larger 2300 inline-4 found in the Chevrolet Vega was an innovative, brand new design using an aluminum alloy block and iron head, but needed more development work as initially released. Consumer Reports rated the 1971 Pinto below the Vega but above the Gremlin.
In 2004, Forbes included the Pinto among its fourteen Worst Cars of All Time, saying "When people talk about how bad American small cars created an opportunity for the Japanese to come in and clean house in the 1970s and ’80s, they are referring to vehicles like this." In 2008, Pulitzer Prize-winning automotive critic Dan Neil writing in Time magazine included the Pinto in The Fifty Worst Cars of All Time, citing the Pinto's "rather volatile nature. The car tended to erupt in flame in rear-end collisions."
Motorsport
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The Pinto was entered in the Trans Am Series during the 1972 season. After suffering several problems throughout the season, and finishing only one race, it was withdrawn from the series. The Pinto had also been entered in one race in the 1971 season.
Fuel system fires, recalls, and litigation
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The safety of the design of the Pinto's fuel system led to fire fatalities and injuries, a recall, lawsuits, and a criminal prosecution.
The Ford Pinto has been cited and debated in numerous business ethics as well as tort reform case studies.
Scholarly work published in the decades after the Pinto’s release have offered summations of the general understanding of the Pinto and the controversy regarding the car's safety performance and risk of fire. Lee and Ermann summarized the popular yet largely erroneous understanding of the issues surrounding the Pinto and related fires.
Conventional wisdom holds that Ford Motor Company decided to rush the Pinto into production in 1970 to compete with compact foreign imports, despite internal pre-production tests that showed gas tank ruptures in low-speed rear-end collisions would produce deadly fires. This decision purportedly derived from an infamous seven-page cost-benefit analysis (the "Grush/Saunby Report" ) that valued human lies at $200,000. Settling burn victims’ lawsuits would have cost $49.5 million, far less than the $137 million needed to make minor corrections. According to this account, the company made an informed, cynical, and impressively coordinated decision that "payouts" (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:311) to families of burn victims were more cost-effective than improving fuel tank integrity. This description provides the unambiguous foundation on which the media and academics have built a Pinto gas tank decision-making narrative.
Additional misunderstanding surrounds the actual number of fire related deaths related to the fuel system design, "wild and unsupported claims asserted in 'Pinto Madness' and elsewhere", the facts of the two most significant Pinto related legal cases, Grimshaw vs Ford Motor Company and State of Indiana vs Ford Motor Company, the applicable safety standards at the time of design, and the nature of the NHTSA investigations and subsequent vehicle recalls.
Fuel system design
The first federal standard for automotive fuel system safety, known as Section 301 in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, was in 1968, and only applied to front-end collisions at over 30 miles per hour (48 km/h). In 1970 and 1973, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued notices regarding fuel system integrity, fuel spillage, and fire-related casualties. The NHTSA proposed stricter standards for fuel system safety, encompassing side and rear-end collisions, to take effect in 1976 and 1977.
The Pinto's design positioned its fuel tank between the rear axle and the rear bumper, a standard practice in US subcompact cars at the time. The Pinto's vulnerability to fuel leakage and fire in a rear-end collision was exacerbated by reduced rear "crush space," a lack of structural reinforcement in the rear, and an "essentially ornamental" rear bumper. Ford's routine internal crash testing showed that in a low-speed crash, the filler neck could tear away from the tank, spilling fuel beneath the car, and the tank itself could also be punctured by the bolts protruding from the differential. Ford was not in violation of federal fuel system safety regulations at the time. Ford also tested several different vehicle modifications which passed the tests. Beginning in 1973, field reports of Ford Pintos consumed by fire after low-speed rear-end collisions were received by Ford's recall coordinator office.
Cost benefit analysis
In 1973, Ford's Environmental and Safety Engineering division developed a cost-benefit analysis entitled Fatalities Associated with Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires. Cost-benefit analysis was a tool in the evaluation of safety design decisions accepted by the industry and the NHTSA at the time. The analysis compared the cost of repairs to the cost of settlements for burn deaths, serious burn injuries, and vehicle burnouts. The analysis was specific to rollover tests rather than rear-end collisions, and not specific to the Pinto. Ford estimated the cost of repairs to be $11 per car, for a total of $137 million, and estimated that settlements would cost $49.5 million. The report recommended deferring the fixes until the more strict fuel safety regulations came into effect. The analysis was distributed internally by Ford's director of automotive safety.
The document became known as Ford's Pinto Memo. In 2007 Time magazine said the memo was one of the automotive industry's "most notorious paper trails."
NHTSA investigation
In April, 1974, safety advocate Byron Bloch and the Center for Auto Safety petitioned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to recall Ford Pintos to address fuel system design defects after reports from attorneys of three deaths and four serious injuries in rear-end collisions at moderate speeds. The NHTSA found there was not enough evidence to warrant a defect investigation. Mother Jones magazine obtained Ford's cost-benefit analysis document. In September, 1977 Mother Jones magazine said that Ford was aware of the tank's design flaw, was unwilling to pay for a redesign, and decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits. The Center for Auto Safety re-submitted their petition to the NHTSA. On August 10, 1977, consumer advocate Ralph Nader and the author of the Mother Jones article held a news conference on the dangers of the Pinto design flaws. According to Matthew T. Lee, at the time a graduate student at the University of Delaware, and M. David Ermann, professor of sociology and criminal justice at the University, writing in a sociology journal in 1999, the Mother Jones labeling of the Pinto as a "firetrap" and accusations that the NHTSA was buckling to industry pressure as well as the public interest created by sensationalized new stories "forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that the NHTSA would be under the microscope for its duration."
On August 11, 1977, the day after the Nader and Mother Jones press conference, the NHTSA initiated an investigation. On May 8, 1978 the NHTSA informed Ford of their determination that the Pinto fuel system was defective. The NHTSA concluded
1971-1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries...The fuel tank design and structural characteristics of the 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat which render it identical to contemporary Pinto vehicles, also render it subject to like consequences in rear impact collisions.
In testing to determine in the Pinto tank design warranted a recall, the NHTSA for forewent the 1977 rear impact crash test standard and created a "worst-case" test. A large "bullet car" was used instead of a standard moving barrier. Weights were placed in the nose of the car to help it slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. The vehicle headlights were turned on to provide a possible ignition source. The fuel tank was completely filled with gasoline rather than partially filled with non-flammable Stoddard fluid as was the normal test procedure. In a later interview the NHTSA engineer was asked why the NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing a 35 mph test given that most small cars of the time would not have passed. "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too."
NHTSA scheduled a public hearing for June, 1978, and NHTSA negotiated with Ford on the recall. Though Ford could have requested a formal recall hearing, fearing additional damage to the company's public reputation the company agreed to a voluntary recall program.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ultimately directed Ford to recall the Pinto. Initially, the NHTSA did not feel there was sufficient evidence to demand a recall due to incidents of fire. 27 deaths were attributed to Pinto fires (the same number of deaths attributed to a Pinto transmission problem ) and in 1974 the NHTSA ruled that the Pinto had no "recallable" problem.
Recall
On June 9, 1978, days before the NHTSA was to issue Ford a formal recall order, Ford recalled 1.5 million Ford Pintos and Mercury Bobcats, one of the largest recalls in automotive history at the time. Ford disagreed with the NHTSA finding of defect, and said the recall was to "end public concern that has resulted from criticism of the fuel systems in these vehicles." Ford's recall provided a plastic protective shield to be dealer-installed between the fuel tank and the differential bolts, another to deflect contact with the right-rear shock absorber, and a new fuel-tank filler neck that extended deeper into the tank and was more resistant to breaking off in a rear-end collision. After the recall, but before parts were made available, six more people died in Pinto fires.
The recall was included in Time magazine's 2009 top ten product recalls, Popular Mechanics magazine's 2010 five most notorious recalls of all time, and NBC News' 2013 twelve famous recalls. Time said "The Ford Pinto was a famously bad automobile, but worse still might be Ford's handling of the safety concerns."
Civil lawsuits
Approximately 117 lawsuits were brought against Ford in connection with rear-end accidents in the Pinto, with some cases bringing both compensatory damages and punitive damages.
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.
Main article: Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.A 1972 Pinto rear-end accident resulted in the court case Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.. The jury awarded $127.8 million in damages; $125 million in punitive damages and $2,841,000 in compensatory damages to passenger Richard Grimshaw and $665,000 in compensatory damages to the family of the deceased driver, Lily Gray. The jury award was said to be the largest ever in US product liability and personal injury cases. The jury award was the largest against an automaker until $150 million in Hardy vs. General Motors in 1996. The judge reduced the jury's punitive damages award to $3.5 million, which he later said was "still larger than any other punitive damage award in the state by a factor of about five." The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District upheld compensatory damages of $2.5 million and punitive damages of $3.5 million against Ford, partially because Ford had been aware of the design defects before production began but had decided against changing the design. According to the appellate court decision, "Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety." According to the Los Angeles Times in 2010, the award "signalled to the auto industry that it would be harshly sanctioned for ignoring known defects."
Indiana v. Ford
On August 10, 1978 three teenage girls of the Urlich family of Winamac, Indiana were killed in the explosion of a 1973 Pinto after a rear-end collision. Ford sent the Urlichs a recall notice for the Pinto in 1979. A grand jury indicted Ford on three counts of reckless homicide. Indiana v. Ford was a landmark in product liability law, the first time a corporation faced criminal charges for a defective product, and the first time a corporation was charged with murder. If convicted, Ford faced a maximum fine of $30,000 under Indiana's 1978 reckless homicide statute. Ford's legal defense was led by James F. Neal with a staff of 80 and a budget of about $1 million; the Elkhart County state's attorney had a budget of about $20,000 and volunteer law professors and law students. A former head of the NHTSA, testifying on Ford's behalf, said the Pinto’s design was no more or less safe than that of any other car in its class. In 1980 Ford was found not guilty. In 1980 a civil suit was settled for $7500 to each plaintiff. According to Automotive News in 2003, the indictment was a low point in Ford's reputation.
Subsequent analysis
A comprehensive analysis looking at road fatalities between 1976 and 1977 showed that accidents in the Pinto were more likely to cause fire deaths.
Burgess v. Ford
A passenger in a 1975 Pinto was seriously injured in a fiery collision. On August 30, 1979 Ford was served with a civil lawsuit Burgess v. Ford alleging defects including that the Pinto was structurally unsafe and that the Pinto fuel system was defective. In November, 1983, the suit was amended to include a claim of a lack of an airbag. Air bags were not legally required at the time. The suit was settled out of court in March, 1984 for $1.8 million, the largest known airbag litigation settlement. Ford said the injuries were due to driver negligence and that the settlement was unrelated to airbags. The court granted Ford a protective order on Ford documents obtained by the plaintiff via court order. The suit was widely publicized. The Today Show broadcast a consumer protection segment on the incident. The settlement was covered on the front page of The Wall Street Journal. According to the Center for Auto Safety, the settlement was a "landmark" in establishing that a lack of airbags may be considered negligent design.
Gallery
- 1972 Ford Pinto Wagon
- 1976 Mercury Bobcat Villager (poor condition)
- 1979 Pinto
- 1979 Pinto Panel Wagon
See also
Notes
- ^ Joseph, Damian (October 30, 2009). "Ugliest Cars of the Past 50 Years". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved March 6, 2016.
The Pinto doesn't seem so bad—that is, until you remember how sexy Fords from the 1960s were. The design devolved into hexagonal headlight housings, a grille that's only a few inches tall yet wide enough to become the car's focal point, and a rear end that apparently melted from the roof.
- ^ "Directory Index: Ford/1971_Ford/1971 Ford Pinto Brochure". Oldcarbrochures.com. Retrieved December 3, 2011.
- "Carfolio 1970 Pinto".
- Mays, James C. Ford and Canada: 100 Years Together (Montréal: Syam Publishing, 2003), p.116.
- Smith, Charles (March 25, 2006). "Lofty ambition / Developer revs up former Ford factory in Richmond for real live-work spaces". The San Francisco Chronicle.
- Gioia 1992: The Pinto was brought from inception to production in the record time of approximately 25 months (compared to the industry average of 43 months), a time frame that suggested the necessity for doing things expediently. In addition to the time pressure, the engineering and development teams were required to adhere to the production "limits of 2000" for the diminutive car: it was not to exceed either $2000 in cost or 2000 pounds in weight. Any decisions that threatened these targets or the timing of the car's introduction were discouraged. Under normal conditions design, styling, product planning, engineering, etc., were completed prior to production tooling. Because of the foreshortened time frame, however, some of these usually sequential processes were executed in parallel. As a consequence, tooling was already well under way (thus "freezing" the basic design)...
- Helms, Marilyn M.; Hutchins, Betty A. (1992). "Poor quality products: Is their production unethical?". Management Decision. 30 (5): 35.
When a decision was made to produce the Pinto, it was given the shortest production planning schedule in history. Tooling went on at the same time as product development so, when testing revealed a serious defect with the gas tank, the $200 million Pinto tooling machines were almost completely built. The directive came from the top, President Lee Iacocca, who emphasized that the Pinto was not to weigh an ounce over 2,000lb and not cost a cent over $2,000 and that safety was not a priority, because "safety doesn't sell".
- Wojdyla 2011: The genesis of the Ford Pinto came sometime in 1968, when Ford's then-president Lee Iaccoca decided that his company would not sit idly by as new Japanese competitors dominated the small-car segment. He pushed the board to greenlight the Pinto program, and by August 1968 the program was underway. It would have aggressive targets: no more than 2000 pounds, not a penny over $2000 and a delivery deadline of just 25 months, a record at the time and still impressive today.
- Wojdyla 2011: But at the time, management's attitude was to get the product out the door as fast as possible.
- Sherefkin 2003: Iacocca ordered a rush program to build the Pinto...The Pinto quickly became known as "Lee's car." He demanded that it weigh no more than 2,000 pounds and sell for $2,000...Iacocca was in a hurry. He wanted the car in showrooms for the 1971 model year. That meant one of the shortest production planning periods in modern automotive history: just 25 months, when the normal time span was 43 months. That also meant that the Pinto's tooling was developed at the same time as product development.
- "The Little Carefree Car". Milwaukee Sentinel. September 18, 1970. p. 5. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
- ^ "Birth of the Ford Pinto". Howstuffworks.com.
- "Quart in a Pinto". The Motor (magazine). Vol. 3558. August 26, 1970. pp. 26–27.
- "How Stuff Works Pinto".
- ^ Standard Catalog of Ford, 4th Edition, 2007, by John Gunnell. Krause Publications
- Jones 1978: Soon after the Pinto was introduced, 26,000 were recalled because accelerators were sticking.
- "Ford Recalls 26,000 Pinto Cars". Chicago Tribune. October 31, 1970. Retrieved March 6, 2016.
Ford Motor Co. announced today it is recalling 26,000 early production models of its 1971 Pinto equipped with the 1600 cubic centimeter engine because of an accelerator problem...The company found that when the throttle is opened more than half way, it is possible that it may not always return to the closed position when pressure on the accelerator pedal is removed
- Associated Press 1971 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAssociated_Press1971 (help): For many of the motorists, it's the second time around...Last October Ford recalled some 26,000 Pintos because of complaints about accelerator pedals sticking when the throttle was opened more than halfway.
- Jones 1978: 220,000 Pintos were recalled for modifications to prevent possible engine compartment fires.
- Mateja, James (March 30, 1971). "Ford Recalls 204,000 Pintos to Prevent Fuel Vapor Fires". Chicago Tribune.
Ford Motor Co. will recall about 204,000 subcompact 1971 Pintos for modification to prevent possible ignition of fuel vapors in the engine air cleaner, it announced yesterday. A Ford Spokesman declined to give the cost of the recall, but all Pintos produced thru March 19, including 204,000 in the United States, 13,000 in Canada and 2,500 overseas, are involved in the program...Ford said its investigation of complaints revealed that the possibility of a fire existed because the vapors in the air cleaner could be ignited by a backfire thru the carburetor.
{{cite news}}
:|access-date=
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(help) - Associated Press 1971 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFAssociated_Press1971 (help): About 165,000 American owners of Ford's new Pinto are affected by the automaker's announcement that virtually all the mini-cars are being recalled for an engine defect.
- ^ Gunnell, John A. and Lenzke, James T. (1995). Standard Catalog of Ford Cars, 1903–1990. Krause Publications. ISBN 0-87341-140-4.
{{cite book}}
: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - "HowStuffWorks "The Birth of the Ford Pinto"".
- Lienert, Dan (January 27, 2004). "The worst cars of all time". Forbes. Retrieved March 6, 2016.
"You don't want to talk about the Pinto," said a Ford official. "Leave that one in the cemetery." Apparently, Ford has not forgotten the lawsuits and the public relations disasters forged by its Pinto hatchback and sedan. The Pinto's famous safety flaw, of course, was that it was prone to blowing up if rear-ended. When people talk about how bad American small cars created an opportunity for the Japanese to come in and clean house in the 1970s and '80s, they are referring to vehicles like this (and see Chevrolet Vega, second slide).
- ^ Neil, Dan (September 7, 2007). "1971 Ford Pinto - The 50 Worst Cars of All Time". Time.
Of course the Pinto goes on the Worst list, but not because it was a particularly bad car — not particularly — but because it had a rather volatile nature. The car tended to erupt in flame in rear-end collisions. The Pinto is at the end of one of autodom's most notorious paper trails, the Ford Pinto memo , which ruthlessly calculates the cost of reinforcing the rear end ($121 million) versus the potential payout to victims ($50 million). Conclusion? Let 'em burn.
- http://cms.scca.com/documents/Pro%20Racing/Archives/Trans-Am/1972.pdf
- http://cms.scca.com/documents/Pro%20Racing/Archives/Trans-Am/1973.pdf
- http://cms.scca.com/documents/Pro%20Racing/Archives/Trans-Am/1971.pdf
- Bazerman, Max H.; Tenbrunsel, Ann E. (April 2011). "Ethical Breakdowns". Harvard Business Review. Retrieved February 28, 2015.
- Birsch, Douglas; Fielder, John H. (October 25, 1994). The Ford Pinto Case: A Study in Applied Ethics, Business, and Technology. State University of New York Press. ISBN 9780791422342.
- Woodyard, Chris (March 28, 2011). "Case: Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure". USA Today.
- Kitman, Jamie (March 24, 2011). "Don't Like Government Regulation? How'd You Like Another Pinto?". Cartalk.com.
- ^ Lee, M.T.; Ermann, M.D. (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness," a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1).
- Danley, John R (2005). "Polishing Up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236.
- Schwartz 1990
- Center for Auto Safety 2009: Although the first Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 301 for fuel system intergrity took effect January 1, 1968, the standard only required passenger cars to meet a 30-mph fixed front barrier crash. 32 FR 24169 (Feb. 3, 1967). There was no requirement for side or rear impacts allowing Ford to claim the Pinto met all applicable safety standards for fuel system integrity.
- ^ Grush, E.S.; Saundy, C.S. Fatalities Associated With Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires (PDF) (Report). Ford Environmental and Safety Engineering. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
- Center for Auto Safety 2009: Not until the 1977 model year did the Pinto and other passenger cars have to meet a 30-mph rear moving barrier and a 20-mph side moving barrier test.
- ^ Wojdyla 2011: In low-speed rear-end crash testing, the fuel tank, positioned behind the rear axle and in front of the rear bumper, exhibited several flaws. Upon impact, the filler neck would tear away from the sheet-metal tank and spill fuel beneath the car. The tank was also easily punctured by bolts protruding from the differential and nearby brackets.
- Gladwell harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGladwell (help): It turns out, however, that most compacts of that era had fuel tanks behind the rear axle.
- Gioia 1992: The tank was positioned between the rear bumper and the rear axle (a standard industry practice for the time).
- Schwartz 1990
- The Ford Pinto Case. State University of New York Press, Douglas Birsch and John Fielder, 1994, page 3. October 1, 1994. ISBN 978-0-7914-2234-2.
- Gioia 1992: ...routine crash testing revealed that the Pinto's fuel tank often ruptured when struck from the rear at a relatively low speed...
- Gioia 1992:...at the time of the tests, Ford was not in violation of the law.
- Gioia 1992: Ford had in fact crash-tested 11 vehicles; 8 of these cars suffered potentially catastrophic gas tank ruptures. The only 3 cars that survived intact had each been modified in some way to protect the tank.
- Gioia 1992: I began to construct my own files of incoming safety problems. One of these new files concerned reports of Pintos "lighting up" (in the words of a field representative) in rear-end accidents. There were actually very few reports, perhaps because component failure was not initially assumed. These cars simply were consumed by fire after apparently very low speed accidents.
- Gladwell 2015: It first came to his notice in 1973, when he got a field report on one of Ford’s top-selling cars, a compact called the Pinto.
- Wojdyla 2011: Ford did a cost-benefit analysis. To fix the problems would cost an additional $11 per vehicle, and Ford weighed that $11 against the projected injury claims for severe burns, repair-costs claim rate and mortality. The total would have been approximately $113 million (including the engineering, the production delays and the parts for tens of thousands of cars), but damage payouts would cost only about $49 million, according to Ford's math. So the fix was nixed...
- Gioia 1992: The National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA, a federal agency) had approved the use of cost-benefit analysis as an appropriate means for establishing automotive safety design standards.
- ^ Dowie, Mark (September 1977). "Pinto Madness". Mother Jones. Retrieved January 17, 2014.
- ^ Graham, John D. (1991). Huber, Peter W.; Litan, Robert E. (eds.). "Does liability promote the safety of motor vehicles?"". The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Rules on Innovation and Safety. Washington DC: Brookings Institution: 132.
{{cite journal}}
:|access-date=
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and|page=
specified (help) - Weiss, Joseph W. (2014). Business Ethics: A Stakeholder and Issues Management Approach. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. ISBN 9781626561410.
- The Center for Auto Safety 2009 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFThe_Center_for_Auto_Safety2009 (help)
- Dardis & Zent 1982: On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.
- Lee 1999 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFLee1999 (help)
- Schwartz 1991 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFSchwartz1991 (help)
- Dardis & Zent 1982: On August 11, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began an investigation of the claims.
- Stuart 1980: In the Pinto case, the highway safety agency made an initial determination in May 1978 that a defect existed in the fuel tank system.
- Jones 1978: But NHTSA, a Department of Transportation agency, informed Ford on May 8 about results of the new investigation, which concluded that Pintos had a safety defect.
- Dardis & Zent 1982: In May 1978, NHTSA determined that pre-1977 model year Ford Pintos were subject to "fuel tank damage, Fuel leakage and fire occurrences which had resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries" when impacted at "moderate speeds," and that the "fire threshold" in those vehicles was reached at closing speeds of 30-35 MPH.
- Investigative Report: Alleged Fuel Tank and Filler Neck Damage in Rear-end Collisions of Subcompact Cars Passenger Cars, 1971-1976 Ford Pinto, 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat (PDF) (Report). Office of Defects Investigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. May 1978. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
Based upon the information either developed or acquired during this investigation, the following conlcusions have been reached: 1971-1976 Ford Pintos have experienced moderate speed, rear-end collisions that have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, and fire occurrences that have resulted in fatalities and non-fatal burn injuries.
- Lee 1999 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFLee1999 (help): Strickland's work group held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. And it completely filled gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978 NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971-1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1970s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 1980-81:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too."
- Jones 1978: A spokesman for NHTSA said that his agency and Ford began a "process of negotiation" after May 8 that led to Ford's announcement in Detroit yesterday.
- Danley 2005 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFDanley2005 (help)
- Lee 1999 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFLee1999 (help):Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products ) never became a social problem. Similarly, publics accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980), but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997).
- Stuart 1980: Days before a formal recall order was to be issued by the Government, Ford voluntarily recalled more than a million Pintos for modifications of the fuel tank system.
- Jones 1978: Ford Motor Co. yesterday recalled 1.5 million Pinto and Mercury Bobcat cars, to make alterations that will reduce the risk of fuel tank fires in rear-end accidents...Yesterday's recall, one of the largest in automotive history, was not the first involving the Pinto...
- Eckhold, J. C. (June 15, 1978). "1971-1976 Pinto and 1975-1976 Bobcat Fuel Systems (Except Station Wagons) Campaign no. 293" (PDF). Ford Motor Company, Office of Automotive Safety. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
- Jones 1978: In a prepared statement, Ford vice President Herbet L. Misch said: "Ford informed NHTSA that it does not agree with the agency's initial determination of May 8 that an unreasonable risk of safety is involved in the design of these cars..." Misch said Ford decided to offer the modifications "so as to end public concern that has resulted from criticism of the fuel systems in these vehicles".
- "NHTSA Recalls for the 1975 Ford Pinto".
- Center for Auto Safety 2009: Recall notices were mailed in September, 1978 and parts were to be at all dealers by September 15, 1978. However, between June 9, 1978, and the date when parts were available to repair the estimated 2.2 million vehicles, six people died in Pinto fires after a rear impact.
- ^ Spear, Gillian (June 18, 2013). "Take that back: Famous recalls, from Tylenol to Toyota". NBC News. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
Three people died before the recall and six died in Pinto fires during the time following the recall but before the parts to repair the vehicle were made available.
- ^ "Top 10 Product Recalls". Time. July 2, 2009. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
- Huffman, John Pearley (February 12, 2010). "5 Most Notorious Recalls of All Time". Popular Mechanics. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
- Sherefkin 2003: Ford customers filed 117 lawsuits, according to Peter Wyden in The Unknown Iacocca.
- Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 1981
- "Teen wins $127.8 million in car-fire suit". Chicago Tribune. Santa Ana, California. Associated Press. February 7, 1978. p. 6. Retrieved March 4, 2016.
- "Award in injury suit is over $127 million". The Globe and Mail. Toronto, Ontario. February 7, 1978. p. 10.
- ^ McLellan, Dennis (April 19, 2008). "Retired O.C. judge handled major cases". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved March 4, 2016.
- Christian, Nichole M; Henderson, Angelo B; Nomani, Asra Q (October 9, 1997). "Chrysler is Told to Pay $262.5 Million by Jurors in Minivan-Accident Trial". The Wall Street Journal. p. 1. Retrieved March 4, 2016.
- Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 1981: There was ample evidence to support a finding of malice and Ford's responsibility for malice. Through the results of the crash tests Ford knew that the Pinto's fuel tank and rear structure would expose consumers to serious injury or death in a 20- to 30-mile-per-hour collision. There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits. Ford's institutional mentality was shown to be one of callous indifference to public safety. There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted "conscious disregard" of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public...There is substantial evidence that management was aware of the crash tests showing the vulnerability of the Pinto's fuel tank to rupture at low speed rear impacts with consequent significant risk of injury or death of the occupants by fire. There was testimony from several sources that the test results were forwarded up the chain of command;...While much of the evidence was necessarily circumstantial, there was substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that Ford's management decided to proceed with the production of the Pinto with knowledge of test results revealing design defects which rendered the fuel tank extremely vulnerable on rear impact at low speeds and endangered the safety and lives of the occupants. Such conduct constitutes corporate malice.
- Williams, Carol J. (March 14, 2010). "Toyota is just the latest automaker to face auto safety litigation". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved March 4, 2016.
- ^ Dole, Charles E. (March 14, 1980). "Pinto verdict lets US industry off hook". The Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
An Indiana farm country jury in the 10-week landmark trial found Ford "not guilty" in the deaths of three teen-age girls whose 1973-model Pinto exploded when a speeding van struck it in the rear Aug. 10, 1978.
- Strobel, Lee Patrick (1980). Reckless homicide?: Ford's Pinto trial. And Books. ISBN 9780897080224.
- Sherefkin 2003: A 1979 landmark case, Indiana vs. Ford Motor Co., made the automaker the first U.S. corporation indicted and prosecuted on criminal homicide charges...Until then, criminal charges in product-liability cases were rare.
- Leviton, Joyce (February 4, 1980). "A Local D.A. Charges the Pinto with Murder—and Watergate's James Neal Comes to Its Defense". People. Vol. 13, no. 5. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
- Gladwell 2015: A former head of the N.H.T.S.A. testified on Ford’s behalf, stating that in his opinion the Pinto’s design was no more or less safe than that of any other car in its class, like the Chevrolet Vega or the A.M.C. Gremlin.
- "Settlement Reached in Pinto Case". The New York Times. Associated Press. August 6, 1980. p. 14.
- Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (2002). "State of Indiana v. Ford Motor Company revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2): 181–202. doi:10.1007/BF02887826.
- Sherefkin 2003: The low point for Ford came in 1979 when Indiana authorities charged the automaker with reckless homicide in a criminal trial.
- Schwartz 1990
- Olson, Walter (February 9, 1993). "The Most Dangerous Vehicle On the Road". The Wall Street Journal.
Remarkably, even the affair of the "exploding" Ford Pinto--universally hailed as the acme of product liability success--is starting to look like hype. In a summer 1991 Rutgers Law Review article Gary Schwartz demolishes "the myth of the Pinto case." Actual deaths in Pinto fires have come in at a known 27, not the expected thousand or more. More startling, Schwartz shows that everyone's received ideas about the fabled "smoking gun" memo are false. The actual memo did not pertain to Pintos, or even Ford products, but to American cars in general; it dealt with rollovers, not rear-end collisions; it did not contemplate the matter of tort liability at all, let alone accept it as cheaper than a design change; it assigned a value to human life because federal regulators, for whose eyes it was meant, themselves employed that concept in their deliberations; and the value it used was one that they, the regulators, had set forth in documents. In retrospect, Schwartz writes, the Pinto's safety record appears to have been very typical of its time and class.
- ^ Amal, Nag (March 16, 1984). "Ford Settles Lawsuit Over Accident Victim For $1.8 Million Total". Wall Street Journal. p. 1.
Ford Motor Co. settled out of court for $1.8 million a lawsuit that safety advocates claim sets a precedent for auto makers to be held liable for the lack of air bags in cars. The suit resulted from a front-end collision involving a 1975 Ford Pinto. The plaintiff, Rebecca Burgess, then 18 years old, suffered permanent brain damage. The suit alleged, among other things, that the car was structurally unsafe and that it "was in a defective condition due to the failure of (the company) to provide and or offer air bags as a passive restraint designed to protect the occupant." "It's a landmark settlement," said Clarence Ditlow, director for the Center for Auto Safety in Washington. "It establishes that in a frontal collision you can bring in lack of air bags in a car as a negligent design." Ford disputed that interpretation of the case's significance. Car companies aren't bound by current law to install air bags...Mr. Pratt said Ford's internal documents on the company's crash tests of the Pinto "revealed that Ford knew about the weaknesses in Pinto's structure and that the car could be made much safer by (installing) air bags." He said those documents were obtained under a court order but details of Ford's test results couldn't be disclosed because the documents are under "protective order" at Ford's request.
- ^ Graham, John D. (2010). "Product liability and motor vehicle safety."". In Huber, Peter William (ed.). The liability maze: the impact of liability law on safety and innovation. Brookings Institution Press. p. 158. ISBN 9780815720188.
In March 1984 a settlement was reached in Burgess v. Ford that reportedly provided $1.8 million in compensation to the plaintiff. Front right passenger Rebecca Burgess, at age eighteen, was rendered a severely brain injured quadriplegic when her Ford Pinto was struck on the passenger side at a 45-degree angle by a Chevrolet Camaro. Although this case was served on Ford on August 30, 1979, and alleged various defects, the plaintiff did not make the lack-of-air-bag claim until November 1983...The Burgess case was highly publicized. The "Today Show" ran a consumer segment that highlighted the Burgess incident.
- ^ Waters, Frank (May 15, 1986). "Air Bag Litigation: Plaintiffs, Start Your Engines". Pepperdine Law Review. 13 (4): 5. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
In Burgess v. Ford Motor Co., Ford was sued by a woman who had suffered severe brain damage. The 1975 Ford Pinto in which she was riding as a front seat passenger, and which was not equipped with air bag safety restraints, was struck by a Camaro in a front-angle intersection collision. Plaintiff claimed that the lack of an air bag protection system had rendered the 1975 Pinto uncrashworthy...The settlement in this case is the largest to be divulged, amounting to $1.8 million. Ford has also persuaded a court to seal 5,000 pages of documents, cost studies, and crash tests which the plaintiff's attorney was using to show that Ford could have used air bags to avoid injuries like those suffered by the plaintiff.
- ^ "Man settles Pinto suit". The Gadsden Times. Birmingham, Alabama. Associated Press. March 16, 1984. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
An Anniston man reached a $1.8 million settlement with the Ford Motor Co. over the fiery crash of a Ford Pinto that seriously injured his daughter. W. E. Burgess of Anniston sued Ford in 1979 after his daughter, Rebecca Lynn Burgess, was injured when the Pinto in which she was a passenger collided with another car...According to the suit, Miss Burgess was burned and suffered a brain injury...The suit alleged that the car's fuel system was defective and that Ford knew or should have known it. An amendment to the suit contented that Ford should have installed protective air bags in the car. Ford contended Miss Burgess' injuries were caused by negligence on the part of the car's driver.
- Frank, Cheryl (August 1985). "Pumped-up issue: Clash seen on auto air bags". ABA Journal. 71 (8): 22.
Only a few air bag cases have been settled; none has gone to trial. The largest divulged settlement is Ford Motor Co.'s agreement in 1984 to pay Rebecca Burgess $1.8 million for severe brain damage and burns incurred when a Ford Pinto's fuel tank exploded. Burgess v. Ford, Civil Action No. CV 79-3515.
Bibliography
- "Recall to Affect 165,000 U.S. Pinto Owners". Reading Eagle. Associated Press. March 30, 1971. Retrieved March 7, 2016.
- Becker, Paul J.; Jipson, Arthur J.; Bruce, Alan S. (March 2002). "State of Indiana V. Ford Motor Company Revisited". American Journal of Criminal Justice. 26 (2).
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(help); Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - "Ford Pinto Fuel Tank". Center for Auto Safety. November 13, 2009. Retrieved March 5, 2016.
- Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236.
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(help) - Dardis, Rachel; Zent, Claudia (December 1, 1982). "The Economics of the Pinto Recall". Journal of Consumer Affairs. 16 (2): 261–277.
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(help) - Gladwell, Malcolm (May 4, 2015). "The Engineer's Lament". The New Yorker. Retrieved March 3, 2016.
{{cite news}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550.
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: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 CA3d 757 (Cal. App. 1981).
- Jones, William H. (June 10, 1978). "Ford Recalls 1.5 Million Small Cars. Ford Recalls 1.5 Million Pintos, Bobcats, Pintos, Bolcats Face Alteration To Cut Fire Risk". The Washington Post. Retrieved March 4, 2016.
{{cite news}}
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(help) - Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47.
{{cite journal}}
:|access-date=
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(help) - Schwartz, Gary T. (1990). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068.
{{cite journal}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Sherefkin, Robert (June 16, 2003). "Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure". Automotive News. Retrieved March 6, 2016.
{{cite news}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Stuart, Reginald (June 11, 1980). "Government notifies Ford of possible recall for 16 million autos". The New York Times.
{{cite news}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Wojdyla, Ben (May 20, 2011). "The Top Automotive Engineering Failures: The Ford Pinto Fuel Tanks". Popular Mechanics. Retrieved February 28, 2015.
{{cite web}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
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External links
- Template:Dmoz
- FordPinto.com
- Mother Jones magazine's 1977 expose on the Ford Pinto
- Ford Pinto at The Crittenden Automotive Library includes full 1973 brochure in JPG format
- Ford Pinto Specifications and Production figures
- Ford Pinto Introduction Commercial
« previous — Ford car timeline, United States & Canada, 1980–present | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Mercury passenger vehicle timeline, 1940–1979 — next » | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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« previous — Mercury passenger vehicle timeline, 1980–2011 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Ford vehicles | |||||||||||||||||||||||
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Current models |
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Former models (by date of introduction) |
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