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The Kurdistan Workers Party (Template:Lang-ku or PKK, Template:Lang-tr), also known as KADEK and Kongra-Gel, is an armed militant group, whose stated aim is to create an independent Kurdish state in a territory (sometimes referred to as Kurdistan) that consists of parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran. Its ideological foundation is revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. It is an ethnic secessionist organization that uses force and the threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations, including the USA and the EU, and Turkey blames it for the death of more than 30,000 people. The Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK) based in northern Iraq and operating in Iran is associated with the PKK.

PKK was founded and led by Abdullah Öcalan. It emerged as an organization during the 1970s and developed into a paramilitary organization which rendered much of southeastern Turkey a war zone in the late 1980s and 1990s. Its actions have taken place mainly in Turkey and against Turkish targets in other countries, although it has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in neighbouring states, such as Iraq and Iran. The PKK argued that its violent actions were justified by the need to defend Kurds in the context of what it considered as the massive cultural suppression of Kurdish identity and cultural rights carried out by the governments of the region. However, in its campaign, the PKK has been accused of carrying out atrocities against both Turkish and Kurdish civilians and its actions have been criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. To a lesser extent, some actions of the Turkish state in the past have been criticised by these same groups.

The degree of support for the PKK among Turkish Kurds is disputed: In some of the strongholds of Kurdish nationalism in the Tigris valley and mountainous regions on the Iranian border, PKK-linked parties have consistently polled close to or over 50% of votes cast in elections. However, PKK-linked parties have polled at most approximately one-third of the Kurdish vote (between 5% and 8% of the total Turkish vote), with the majority of Kurds voting for mainstream parties. In some of the more assimilated Kurdish areas, claimed by the PKK as being part of 'Kurdistan', support for PKK-linked parties is at 10% or less. There is some electoral support for PKK-linked parties among Kurdish migrants in cities in Western and Southern Turkey such as Adana, Mersin and İzmir.

Resources

The organization's annual budget has been estimated at $86 million USD.

The PKK receives a proportion of its funding in the form of private donations, from both organisations and individuals from around the world. Some of these supporters are Kurdish businessmen in south-eastern Turkey, sympathisers in Syria and Iran, and Kurdish drug cartels in European countries. Parties and concerts are organized by branch groups. Additionally, it is believed that the PKK earns money through the sale of various publications, as well as receiving revenues from legitimate businesses owned by the organization. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) also has been financing its separatist movement by "taxing" narcotic traffickers and engaging in the trade themselves. The PKK is heavily involved in the European drug trade, especially in Germany and France. French law enforcement estimates that the PKK smuggles 80 percent of the heroin in Paris.

At the height of its campaign, the PKK received support from other countries, most notably Syria, but also Greece, Iran, the Soviet Union and according to the Turkish government, Denmark allows Kurdish satellite television stations (such as ROJ-TV), which Turkey claims has links with the PKK, to operate in Denmark and broadcast into Turkey in violation of Turkish broadcasting law, which restricts broadcasting in languages other than the country's official language Turkish, including the indigenous Kurdish language. It has also been argued that The Netherlands and Belgium have also supported PKK by allowing its training camps to function on their respective territories. On 22 November 1998, the criminal police of Hanover reported that 3 children had been trained by the PKK for guerrilla warfare in camps in the Netherlands and Belgium. After the death of Theo van Gogh, with increasing attention on domestic security concerns, the Dutch police raided the 'PKK paramilitary camp' in the Dutch town of Liempde and arrested 29 people in November 2004. The PKK has also developed links with paramilitary groups among other ethnic groups which has harboured historic grievances against Turkey such as the ethnic Armenian ASALA, as well as groups which shared its left-wing nationalist ideology such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ETA, and to a lesser degree the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Through the large Kurdish immigration in Germany, it has also formed close contacts with violent left-wing political groups in that country. From early 1979 to 1999 Syria had provided valuable safe havens to PKK in the region of Beqaa Valley. During 1990s, Iran has provided PKK with supplies in the form of weapons and funds and Greece has allowed PKK camps to function on its soil. In addition, the retired Greek army general Dimitris Matafias has paid numerous visits and offered assistance. Greek Cyprus also supported PKK by allowing its leaders to travel freely by providing them with passports. Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of PKK, has been caught with a Cypriot passport to the name of Mavros Lazaros. Currently, Syria has placed restrictions on PKK activity on its soil, after the undeclared war with Turkey. Turkey is expecting positive developments in its cooperation with Syria in the long term, but even during the course of 2005, there were PKK operatives of Syrian nationality operating in Turkey. Iran listed PKK as a terrorist organization after Iran's supply of resources to the PKK began be to used in its own soil.

On 30 September, 1995 Damascus opened new contacts with high ranking German CDU MP Heinrich Lummer and German intelligence officials. The PKK has also strong ties with influential persons around the world. Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the former President of France has active connections with elements of the PKK's leadership.

Activities

The PKK operates in Turkey, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. One pattern is apparent after 1984, PKK began to use Maoist theory of people's war. There are three phases in this theory. The militant base during the initial years was coming from different sources, so the first two phases were diffused to each other.

In the first phase (1978-1984), the PKK tried to gain the support of the population. It attacked the machinery of government and distributed propaganda in the region. PKK tactics were based on ambush, sabotage, riots, protests, and demonstrations against the Turkish government. PKK has also been accused of violent attacks on individual civilians or residential areas (Kurds and non-Kurds alike), who refused to co-operate with the PKK or were suspected of collaborating with the Turkish authorities. During these years, the PKK fought a turf war against other dominantly Kurdish organisations in Turkey. The PKK effectively used the prison force to gain appeal among the population.

In the second phase (1984-1999), which is called the terrorism stage, escalating attacks were made on the government's military and vital institutions all over the country. The objective was to destabilise Turkish authority through a long, low-intensity confrontation. In addition to skirmishing with Turkish military and police forces and local village guards, the PKK has conducted suicide bombing on government and police installations, as well as at local tourist sites. Kidnapping and assassination against government officials and Kurdish tribal leaders who were named as puppets of the state were performed as well. Widespread sabotages were continued from the first stage. PKK performed kidnapping western tourists, primarily in Istanbul but also at different resorts. PKK has also attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities across Western Europe.

In the third phase, which is called guerrilla stage, conventional fighting was used to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country. PKK seized cities during the highest activity period, and it also had consequences on the functioning of the Turkish parliament through Turkey's own election system, but there was no case during an active conflict that PKK manage to sustain its flag in a region within the borders of Turkey.

Tactics

The areas in which the group operates are generally mountainous rural areas and dense urban areas. The mountainous terrain offers an advantage to members of the PKK by allowing them to hide in a network of caves and making military air operations, especially helicopter use, hazardous for the Turkish Armed Forces. While in urban areas, PKK members are often able to blend in with the local population.

The group has been accused of planting mines. Use of these mines has led to civilian deaths, in part due to accidental triggering by civilian trucks and buses rather than the intended military armoured vehicles.

History

The PKK's core was originally a group called the "Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher Education" or Apocus, which was made up largely of students, lead by Abdullah Öcalan. Although originally from Ankara, the group soon moved its focus to south-east Turkey, and its large Kurdish population, where they began organising. With the official release of the "Proclamation of Independence of PKK" on 27 October, 1978, the group became known as the Kurdistan Workers Party. With its largely communist ideology, the PKK soon found itself in conflict with right-wing entities.

In 1979 Mehmet Celal Bucak was condemned for "exploiting the peasants," and "collaborating". The PKK attempted to assassinate him, but failed. This was the first violent high-profile public action undertaken by the PKK, and it marked a period of intense urban warfare between radical political elements in Turkey. From 1978 to 1982, the Turkish National Security Council recorded 43,000 incidents it described as terrorism. As part of the conflict, ex-prime minister Nihat Erim was assassinated in 1980. The military coup that same year largely ended the conflict, with members of the PKK going to prison, or fleeing to Syria.

Starting in 1984, the PKK transformed itself into a paramilitary organisation (largely based in and supported by Iran, Iraq and Syria), as it launched conventional attacks as well as bombings against Turkish governmental installations, military and civilian targets, many of whom were connected to the Southeastern Anatolia Project. The PKK also moved to a less centralized format, taking up operations in a variety of European and Middle Eastern countries.

Following the collapse of the USSR, the PKK largely abandoned its communist roots, attempting to better accommodate Islamic beliefs. In the mid 1990s, they also began to shift from conventional bombing to suicide bombing, launching fifteen such attacks between 1995 and 1999. Interestingly, the majority (11 of 15) of the suicide bombers were women.

In the late 1990s, the Turkish army began to gain the upper hand in its ground war with the PKK and post-Cold War shifts in international politics resulted in the group losing much of its support among other states. With downgraded security concerns, the Turkish parliament began a controlled process of dismantling the legal control, using the term "normalization" or "rapprochement" depending on the sides of the issue. Ban on publishing using Kurdish language (1983) was dropped in 1991, with more thorough reforms, such as the lifting of the ban on broadcasting in Kurdish, adopted in the 2000s with the decrease in PKK's activities.

In 1999 Turkish authorities captured Öcalan while he was being transferred by the Greek security system from Greek Embassy in Kenya to a local airport, in a joint operation between the CIA and Turkey's MIT. He was tried in Turkey and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Following a call by the captured Öcalan for a peaceful solution, the PKK found itself blacklisted in many countries. Consequently, the PKK went through a series of name changes and implemented a unilateral truce, which ended in 2004. On 2 April of that year, the Council of the European Union added the PKK to its list of terrorist organisations. Later in 2004, the US Treasury moved to freeze assets of branches of the PKK.

Effects

As a revolutionary left-wing organization PKK claimed there was a "mass violence by Turkish state on the Kurd identity" to justify its activities. In its activities main goal was to alienate the people from the state through pushing security forces into more and more overt and repressive counter-measures. The Political-Justice section extends the results of this ideology and methods of the democratic processes and the justice system in Turkey. In a democratic system, an ideology that questions the state's legitimacy, will of its population and its security apparatus was difficult to be accepted as a political view, which was shaped under HEP/DEP/HADEP story. Turkish government authorities did not negotiate with the organization, so regional NGOs there were no communication channels between the sides. Ill-formed language ban of 1983 and Terrorism Act of 1991 were significant events. Also, amnesties were happened to be interesting events during the conflict time, as each amnesty gave more human resources to the organization. The prison as a rehabilitation concept was a failure. The people who were jailed for non-violent activities were becoming militants during their jail time. Government's military operations against the prisons were the highest point in this failure.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK perceived Turkish society as one that was deformed by capitalism and imperialism. The PKK unleashed its aggression on enemies spanning all classes (farmers, business, etc.) and those that it considered puppets of the state. The cost of PKK's actions are significant. PKK had drastic effects on regional economy, as targeted infrastructure of the region. Regions' inability to join the economical activities were associated with the work force, costs (insurance premiums, facility costs, loss of trained personnel etc.), and productivity (loss of work time, travel restrictions, inability to move rapidly etc). The region has had a very high historical tourism potential and it has been dormant because of the terrorism threat for many years.

The integration into social and economical activities are developed within the education system. Educational activities were targeted by the PKK. Because the majority of the people are very resilient to the effects of political violence, young people form a high risk group because of their undeveloped personalities. The effects of political violence on the newer generations is an important issue because, at the moment, the new generation in areas affected by the conflict have no experience living under what would be considered normal conditions.

PKK specifically targeted its activities among intelligent, young and inexperienced people. When these ideas were falsified, either this realization pushes them to become a member of the group or generate tendencies towards suicide, feelings of insecurity, problems with authority and lack of social integration . PKK is known to use children in their protests; causing Turkish authorities having to act with less force .

Current status

After his capture in 1999, the group's leader Abdullah Öcalan has urged the PKK to work peacefully to attain its objectives, and the PKK declared a ceasefire in that year. It changed its name to KADEK to reflect moves towards peaceful politics and co-operation with a wider range of ideologies, but it is claimed that this change was aimed to skirt itself from the legal implications of being listed as a terrorist organization. A PKK/KADEK spokesman stated that its armed wing, The People’s Defense Force, would not disband or surrender its weapons, to maintain its capability of self-defense. PKK/KADEK avowing not lay down its arms underscores that the organization maintains its capability to carry out terrorist operations. Abdullah Öcalan, has declared his own guerrillas as "murderers".

The refusal of the Turkish government to issue a general amnesty to PKK operatives, the failure of the PKK-linked Democratic People's Party to make an electoral breakthrough and profound ideological disputes within the movement led to the ceasefire becoming ragged in 2003, before breaking down completely in 2004. Since the declaration of cease-fire on August 2000, aside from a few isolated incidents, the armed conflict had come to a complete halt. Recently, however, there has been an increase in PKK activity. There is an increase in PKK attacks on the Turkish military, police, and governmental targets near the Iraqi border in the last months. While PKK claims it is only acting in self-defense, Ankara is increasing its pressure on the US to obtain the go-ahead for a military strike to the PKK installations in northern Iraq.

With the end of its unilateral cease-fire in August 2004 (the cease-fire had lasted for five years), on the claims that Ankara's reforms are "cosmetic", PKK leaders seem to favour a return to the armed guerilla warfare. The increase in PKK attacks on Turkish military, civilians, police and governmental targets seem to further prove this fact. The PKK claims it is only acting in self-defense and for the protection of the Kurds.

During the period 2003-2004-2005 period; the total security personnel lost (soldier, police (21), village guard (22)) is 246. The total number of personnel wounded and disabled is 147. The total armed militants captured: 1325 (359 dead, 377 live, 589 amnesty) (116 among 377 through exchange of criminals with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, Azerbaijan and Ukraine). The TBMM report also expects an increase in the number of militants captured through exchange of criminals in the coming years. These numbers are presented as part of the fight on terror activities. Report also mentions growing efforts in mobilizing the criminal intelligence exchange.

The PKK has declared ceasefire on September 28, 2006. The cease fire call has been rejected by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Chief of Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt. Erdoğan was quoted as saying; "A ceasefire is done between states. It is not something for the terrorist organisation,"

See also

• Freedom fighter
• PJAK
• Casualties of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict
• Tara Whelan
• Village guards

Footnotes

1. "Council Decision", Council of the European Union, December 21 2005
2. Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Anthony H Cordesman
3. "Turkish General Election Results 2002". Retrieved November 3. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
4. ^ "Section based on material published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs unless specified otherwise". Retrieved December 1. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
5. ^ "Counter-Terrorism Studies". Retrieved November 3. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
6. GWU
7. Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, the section: Turkey-Greece Relations
8. Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts, by Amikam Nachmani
9. The Land of Many Crossroads: The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics, by Svante E. Cornell, in Foreign Policy Research Institute (2001)
10. Denmark, again? Now it's under fire for hosting Kurdish TV station.
11. GlobalMarch report
12. Dutch police raid 'PKK paramilitary camp'
13. ^ The Roots of Islamic Terrorism: How Communists Helped Fundamentalists, by Antero Leitzinger (2005)
14. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, edited by Robert Olson
15. ^ Cite error: The named reference militaryacts was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
16. The rise and fall of the PKK, By Michael Radu, Orbis (Winter 2001)
17. The politics of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party): a balance sheet, By Ute Reissner and Justus Leicht, World Socialist (1999)
18. Immigration Appeals: 2nd - 3rd Quarter (2004), by Great Britain Immigration Appeal Tribunal
19. ^ Landmine Monitor
20. The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, by Ferhad Ibrahim, Gulistan Gurbey
21. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism, by Daniel Byman
22. "Ocalan renounces armed struggle". Retrieved December 14. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
23. "Kurdish rebel boss in truce plea". BBC. September 28, 2006.
24. "Kurdish rebels declare ceasefire". BBC. September 30, 2006.
25. "Turkish army rejects rebel truce". BBC. October 2, 2006.
26. "Turkish PM rejects ceasefire call". BBC. September 29, 2006.

Sources

• http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1482808,00.html
• http://www.ict.org.il/organizations/orgdet.cfm?orgid=20

External links

Support

• PKK.ORG (official website)
• PKK
• U.S. Naval Military School's PKK profile
• United States Department of the Treasury (www.treas.gov) - Office of Foreign Assets Control
• No security without human rights - Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org)
• Amnesty International - facts
• Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org) - Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

• Kurdistan Workers Party
• Irregular military
• Secessionist organizations
• Terrorism in Kazakhstan
• 1978 establishments
• Suicide bombing
• Crime in Turkey
• Designated terrorist organizations
• Secession in Turkey