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{{Short description|1973 war between Israel and a coalition of Arab states}} {{Short description|1973 war between Israel and a coalition of Arab states}}{{very long|words=22,000|date=September 2021}}
{{pp-30-500|small=yes}} {{pp-extended|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=July 2021}} {{use dmy dates|date=July 2021}}
{{too long|rps=155|date=September 2021}}
{{Infobox military conflict {{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Fourth Arab–Israeli War | conflict = Yom Kippur War
| partof = the ] and the ] | partof = the ] and the ]
| image = Yom Kippur War Montage.png | image = Yom Kippur War Montage.png
| image_size = 300px | image_size = 300px
| caption = '''Clockwise from top-left:'''{{flatlist| | caption = Clockwise from top-left:{{flatlist|
* Israeli tanks crossing the ] * Israeli tanks crossing the ]
* Israeli ] variant of the ] fighter jet flying over the ] * Israeli ] variant of the ] fighter jet flying over the ]
Line 16: Line 15:
* Egyptian soldiers with a portrait of ] * Egyptian soldiers with a portrait of ]
}} }}
| date = 6–25 October 1973<br/>({{Age in months, weeks and days |month1=10|day1=06|year1=1973|month2=10|day2=25|year2=1973}}) | date = 6–25 October 1973<br />({{Age in months, weeks and days |month1=10|day1=06|year1=1973|month2=10|day2=25|year2=1973}})
| place = ], ], ] (both banks) and surrounding regions | place = ], ], ] (both banks) and surrounding regions
| cause = ]'s retention of territory seized from ] and ] during the ] of 1967 | cause = ]'s retention of territory seized from ] and ] during the ] of 1967
| territory = {{plainlist| | territory = {{plainlist|
* Egyptian forces occupy the eastern bank of the ], with the exception of the Israeli crossing point near the ]<ref name=Morris2011p437>Morris, 2011, Righteous Victims, p. 437</ref> * Egyptian forces occupy the eastern bank of the ], with the exception of the Israeli crossing point near the ]{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=437}}
* Israeli forces occupy {{convert|1600|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of territory on the southwestern coast of the Suez Canal within {{convert|100|km|mi|-1|abbr=on}} of the Egyptian capital of ], and encircle an Egyptian enclave on its eastern bank<ref name=Morris2011p437/> * Israeli forces occupy {{convert|1600|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of territory on the southwestern coast of the Suez Canal within {{convert|100|km|mi|-1|abbr=on}} of the Egyptian capital of ], and encircle an Egyptian enclave on its eastern bank{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=437}}
* Israeli forces occupy {{convert|500|km2|sqmi|abbr=on|0}} of the ] region on top of the ], bringing them within {{convert|32|km|mi|0|abbr=on}} of the Syrian capital of ]<ref name=Morris2011p433>Morris, 2011 p. 433, "Bashan ... 500 square kilometers ... which brought it within {{convert|20|mi|km|disp=sqbr}} of Damascus"</ref> * Israeli forces occupy {{convert|500|km2|sqmi|abbr=on|0}} of the ] region on top of the ], bringing them within {{convert|32|km|mi|0|abbr=on}} of the Syrian capital of ]<ref>{{harvp|Morris|2011|p=433}}: "Bashan ... 500 square kilometers ... which brought it within {{convert|20|mi|km|disp=sqbr}} of Damascus"</ref>
}}
| result = See {{slink||Aftermath}}
| combatant1 = {{flag|Israel}}
| combatant2 = {{ubl|
| {{flagicon image|Flag of Egypt (1972–1984).svg}} ]
| {{flagicon image|Flag of Syria (1972–1980).svg}} ]
}}{{bdl|wrap=
; ]
: {{flag|Saudi Arabia}}{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}
: {{flag|Algeria}}{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=278}}
: {{flag|Jordan}}
: {{flagicon image|Flag of Iraq (1963–1991).svg|link=}} ]
: {{flag|Kuwait}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=464-465}}
: {{flag|Tunisia|1959}}<ref name="tlas" />
: {{flag|Morocco}}<ref name=tobji>{{cite book |title=Les officiers de Sa Majesté: Les dérives des généraux marocains 1956–2006 |year=2006 |publisher=Fayard |page=107 |isbn=978-2-213-63015-1 |author=Mahjoub Tobji |language=fr}}</ref>
: {{flag|Cuba}}<ref name="Ra'anan"/>
: {{nowrap|{{flag|North Korea|1948}}}}{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=83–84}}<ref name="david2013">{{Cite web|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-north-korea-dogfight-yom-kippur-war-2013-6|title=Israeli F-4s Actually Fought North Korean MiGs During the Yom Kippur War|first=David |last=Cenciotti|website=Business Insider}}</ref>{{sfnp|Nicolle|Cooper|2004}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Aloni|2001}}{{pn|date=January 2025}}
}} }}
| result = Israeli victory{{refn|See<ref>{{cite book |last=Herzog |title=The War of Atonement |url=https://archive.org/details/warofatonementoc00herz |url-access=registration |publisher=Little, Brown and Company |year=1975|isbn=9780316359009 }}. Foreword.</ref><ref name="autogenerated450">Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', p. 450.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Luttwak |last2=Horowitz |title=The Israeli Army |url=https://archive.org/details/israeliarmy0000lutt |url-access=registration |place=Cambridge, MA |publisher=Abt Books |year=1983|isbn=9780890115855 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Rabinovich |title=The Yom Kippur War |publisher=Schocken Books |year=2004 |page=498}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Revisiting The Yom Kippur War |first=PR |last=Kumaraswamy |pages=–2 |isbn=978-0-7146-5007-4 |date= 2000 |url=https://archive.org/details/revisitingyomkip00pkum |url-access=registration }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Johnson |last2=Tierney |title=Failing To Win, Perception of Victory and Defeat in International Politics |pages= 177, 180}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|first=Charles |last=Liebman |url=http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/10011.pdf |title=The Myth of Defeat: The Memory of the Yom Kippur war in Israeli Society |journal=Middle Eastern Studies |volume=29 |date=July 1993 |publisher=Frank Cass |place=London |page=411 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/00263209308700958 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130507055718/http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/10011.pdf |archive-date=May 7, 2013 }}</ref><ref>"Israel's victory came at the cost of heavy casualties, and Israelis criticized the government's lack of preparedness." at </ref><ref>"The 1973 war thus ended in an Israeli victory, but at great cost to the United States." at of ]</ref><ref>
{{cite book |last1=Simon Dunstan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-glXraIMt8gC|title=The Yom Kippur War: The Arab-Israeli War of 1973|page= 205|isbn=978-1846032882|date=September 18, 2007}}</ref><ref name="Siniver2013p6">{{cite book|author=Asaf Siniver|title=The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GS4DBQAAQBAJ|year=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-933481-0|page=6|quote=(p. 6) "For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory—militarily as well as politically ... The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt." (p. 11) "Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as 'the earthquake' or 'the blunder'"}}</ref><ref name="Bickerton2012p128">{{cite book|author=Ian Bickerton|title=The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Perplexed|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jf5GAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA128|date=2012|publisher=A&C Black|isbn=978-1-4411-2872-0|page=128|quote=the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1973}}</ref><ref name="Kumaraswamy2013p184">{{cite book|author=P.R. Kumaraswamy|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=R_YrBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA184|date= 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-32888-6|page=184|quote=(p. 184) "Yom Kippur War ... its final outcome was, without doubt, a military victory&nbsp; ... " (p. 185) " ... &nbsp;in October 1973, that despite Israel's military victory"}}</ref>}}{{bulletedlist|Political gains for Egypt and Israel<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.nationalreview.com/article/360505/how-we-used-do-it-mario-loyola|title=How We Used to Do It – American diplomacy in the Yom Kippur War|last=Loyola|first=Mario|date=October 7, 2013|work=]|page=1|access-date=December 2, 2013}}</ref>|]|]}}
| combatant1 = '''{{flag|Israel}}'''<br/>'''Supported by:'''<br/>{{flag|United States}}<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g1TkFQgzp5cC|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|last=Kumaraswamy|first=P. R.|date=2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1136328954|page=235|language=en}}</ref>
| combatant2 = '''{{flagicon image|Flag of Egypt (1972–1984).svg|link=}} ]'''<br/>'''{{flagicon image|Flag of Syria (1972–1980).svg|link=}} ]'''<br/>''']:'''{{bulletedlist|{{flag|Saudi Arabia}}<ref name="O'Ballance">{{cite book |last=Edgar O'Ballance |title=No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War |edition=1979 |pages=28–370 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0214206702 |year=1979}}</ref>|{{flag|Algeria}}<ref name="Shazly p.278" />|{{flag|Jordan}}|{{flagicon image|Flag of Iraq (1963–1991).svg|link=}} ]|{{flagicon image|Flag of Libya (1972–1977).svg|link=}} ]<ref>{{cite news |url=http://theaviationist.com/2013/06/24/iaf-f-4-vs-nk-mig21/# |title=An unknown story from the Yom Kippur war: Israeli F-4s vs North Korean MiG-21s |work=The Aviationist |date=June 24, 2013 |access-date=June 27, 2015}}</ref>|{{flag|Kuwait}}<ref name=Rabinovich464-465/>|{{flag|Tunisia}}<ref name="tlas" />|{{flag|Morocco}}<ref name=tobji>{{cite book |title=Les officiers de Sa Majesté: Les dérives des généraux marocains 1956–2006 |year=2006 |publisher=Fayard |location=107 |isbn=978-2213630151 |author=Mahjoub Tobji}}</ref>|{{flag|Cuba}}<ref name="Perez, Cuba p. 377-379">Perez, Cuba, ''Between Reform and Revolution'', pp. 377–79. Gott, Cuba, ''A New History'', p. 280.</ref>|{{flag|Sudan}}}}'''Supported by:'''<br/>{{flag|Soviet Union}}<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gacKmnNCTygC |title=Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War |last=Israelyan |first=Victor |date=2010 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0271041186 |page=101}}</ref><br/>{{flag|East Germany}}<ref>{{cite news|last1=Fisher|first1=Marc|title=E. Germany Ran Antisemitic Campaign in West in '60s|work=]|date=February 28, 1993}}</ref><br/>{{nowrap|{{flag|North Korea}}}}<ref name="Shazly, pp.83–84">Shazly, pp. 83–84.</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-north-korea-dogfight-yom-kippur-war-2013-6|title=Israeli F-4s Actually Fought North Korean MiGs During the Yom Kippur War|first=David Cenciotti, The|last=Aviationist|website=Business Insider}}</ref><ref name=nicolle/><ref name="Aloni" /><br/>{{flag|Pakistan}}<ref name="Chengappa2004">{{cite book|author=Bidanda M. Chengappa|title=Pakistan: Islamisation Army And Foreign Policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iDoMlBd4dYsC&pg=PA42|date= 2004|publisher=APH Publishing|isbn=978-81-7648-548-7|page=42}}</ref><ref name="Dunstan2003">{{cite book|author=Simon Dunstan|title=The Yom Kippur War 1973 (2): The Sinai|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1BYk_sXT6tsC&pg=PA39|access-date=February 22, 2013|date=2003|publisher=Osprey Publishing|isbn=978-1-84176-221-0|page=39}}</ref><ref name="Kumaraswamy2013">{{cite book|author=P. R. Kumaraswamy|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g1TkFQgzp5cC&pg=PT75|date=2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-32895-4|page=75}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2009-04-05|title=Bhutto's foreign policy legacy|url=http://beta.dawn.com/news/845159/bhutto-s-foreign-policy-legacy|access-date=2021-07-07|website=DAWN.COM|language=en}}</ref>
| commander1 = {{plainlist| | commander1 = {{plainlist|
* {{Flagicon|Israel}} ''']''' * {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Israel}} ] * {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Israel}} ] * {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]
Line 39: Line 52:
* {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]{{KIA}} * {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]{{KIA}}
* {{Flagicon|Israel}} ] * {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Israel}} ]
}} }}
| commander2 = {{plainlist| | commander2 = {{plainlist|
* {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ''']''' * {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ]
* {{flagicon|Syria|1972}} ''']'''
* {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ] * {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Syria|1972}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ] * {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Syria|1972}} Yusuf Shakkour * {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ] * {{Flagicon|Egypt|1972}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Syria|1972}} ] * {{flagicon|Syria|1972}} ]
* {{Flagicon|Syria|1972}} Omar Abrash{{KIA}}}} * {{Flagicon|Syria|1972}} ]
}}
| strength1 = {{plainlist| | strength1 = {{plainlist|
* 375,000<ref name="Rabinovich, p54" />–415,000 troops * 375,000{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=54}}–415,000 troops
* 1,700 tanks<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 372–73.</ref> * 1,700 tanks<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 372–373.</ref>
* 3,000 armored carriers * 3,000 armored carriers
* 945 artillery units<ref name=100mm>The number reflects artillery units of caliber 100&nbsp;mm and up</ref> * 945 artillery units{{efn|name="100mm"|The number reflects artillery units of caliber 100&nbsp;mm and up}}
* 440 combat aircraft}} * 440 combat aircraft}}
| strength2 = '''Egypt''':{{plainlist| | strength2 = {{udl|class=dt-vpad|wrap=
; Egypt
* 650,000<ref name="Rabinovich, p54" />–800,000<ref>{{cite book |last=Herzog |page=239}}</ref> troops (200,000 crossed)<ref>{{cite web|title=Yom Kippur War|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military///world/war/yom-kippur.htm|website=globalsecurity.org}}</ref>
: 650,000{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=54}}–800,000{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|p=239}} troops (200,000 crossed){{citation needed|date=February 2023}}
* 1,700 tanks (1,020 crossed)<ref name="Shazly p.244" />
: 1,700 tanks (1,020 crossed){{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=244}}
* 2,400 armored carriers
: 2,400 armored carriers
* 1,120 artillery units<ref name=100mm/>
: 1,120 artillery units{{efn|name="100mm"}}
* 400 combat aircraft
: 400 combat aircraft
* 140 helicopters<ref>Shazly, p. 272.</ref>
: 140 helicopters{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=272}}
* 104 naval vessels
: 104 naval vessels
* 150 surface-to-air missile batteries (62 in the front line)<ref name="Haber & Schiff, p 30 31">Haber & Schiff, pp. 30–31.</ref>}}
: 150 surface-to-air missile batteries (62 in the front line){{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|pp=30–31}}
'''Syria''':{{plainlist|
; Syria
* 150,000<ref name="Rabinovich, p54" /> troops
: 150,000{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=54}} troops
* 1,200 tanks<br />800–900 armored carriers
: 1,200 tanks
* 600 artillery units<ref name=100mm/><ref name=Jordan1973 /><ref name=knapp />}}
: 800–900 armored carriers
'''Expeditionary Forces'''*:{{plainlist|
: 600 artillery units{{efn|name="100mm"}}<ref name=knapp />
* 120,000 troops<ref name="Rabinovich, p54" />
; Expeditionary forces
* 500–670 tanks<ref name="Rabinovich, 314" /><ref>{{cite book |last=Bar-On |first=Mordechai |title=A Never Ending Conflict |publisher=Greenwood Publishing |year=2004 |page=170}}</ref>
: 120,000 troops{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=54}}
* 700 armored carriers<ref name="Rabinovich, 314" />}}
: 500–670 tanks{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=314}}{{sfnp|Bar-On|2004|p=170}}
'''Saudi-Arabia:'''{{plainlist|
: 700 armored carriers{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=314}}
23,000 troops (3,000 crossed)<ref name=Rabinovich464-465/><ref>{{cite web|title=بطولات السعوديين حاضرة.. في الحروب العربية|url=https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1756574|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216061810/https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1756574|archive-date=16 February 2021|work=Okaz|date=17 November 2019|access-date=13 August 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Saudi Arabian Military Activity Against Israel|url=http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=475577|work=CMU|date=May 1978|access-date=19 November 2021|archive-date=20 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211120001418/http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=475577|url-status=dead}}</ref>}}
; Saudi Arabia
'''Cuba''':{{plainlist|
: 23,000 troops (3,000 crossed)<ref name=sauditw>{{cite book|author=Neil Partrick|title=Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LeiKDwAAQBAJ|year=2016|publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-0-85772-793-0|page=183}}</ref>{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=464–465}}<ref name="okaz2019">{{cite web|title=بطولات السعوديين حاضرة.. في الحروب العربية|url=https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1756574|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216061810/https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1756574|archive-date=16 February 2021|work=Okaz|date=17 November 2019|access-date=13 August 2021}}</ref><ref name="cmu1978" />
* 2 tank brigades (1,500<ref name="Perez, Cuba p. 377-379"/>–4,000<ref>] (1986). ''Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro''. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.{{page needed|date=September 2012}}</ref> troops)}}
'''Morocco''':{{plainlist| ; Morocco
* 5,500 troops<ref name=temps>{{cite news|title=Le jour où Hassan II a bombardé Israël |url=http://letempsmag.com/Articles/14/Le+jour+o%C3%B9+Hassan+II++a+bombard%C3%A9+Isra%C3%ABl/568 |access-date=December 25, 2013 |newspaper=Le Temps |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131014191251/http://letempsmag.com/Articles/14/Le%2Bjour%2Bo%C3%B9%2BHassan%2BII%2B%2Ba%2Bbombard%C3%A9%2BIsra%C3%ABl/568 |archive-date=October 14, 2013 }}</ref> : 5,500 troops<ref name=afrique>{{cite web |last1=Touchard |first1=Laurent |title=Guerre du Kippour: quand le Maroc et l'Algérie se battaient côte à côte |date=7 November 2013 |url=https://www.jeuneafrique.com/167404/politique/guerre-du-kippour-quand-le-maroc-et-l-alg-rie-se-battaient-c-te-c-te/ |publisher=] |access-date=4 December 2022 |language=fr}}</ref><ref name=temps>{{cite news|title=Le jour où Hassan II a bombardé Israël |url=http://letempsmag.com/Articles/14/Le+jour+o%C3%B9+Hassan+II++a+bombard%C3%A9+Isra%C3%ABl/568 |access-date=25 December 2013 |newspaper=Le Temps |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131014191251/http://letempsmag.com/Articles/14/Le%2Bjour%2Bo%C3%B9%2BHassan%2BII%2B%2Ba%2Bbombard%C3%A9%2BIsra%C3%ABl/568 |archive-date=14 October 2013 |language=fr}}</ref>
* 30 tanks<ref name=temps/> : 30 tanks provided by Syria<ref name=afrique/><ref name=temps/>
; Cuba
* 52 combat aircraft<ref name=temps/>}}
: 500<ref name="auto3">{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1988/08/cuba-havanas-military-machine/305932/|title=Cuba: Havana's Military Machine|first=John Hoyt|last=Williams|date=1 August 1988|magazine=]|access-date=19 September 2022}}</ref>–1,000<ref>{{cite book |title=The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991 |date=2004 |page=47 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-26933-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gcR_AgAAQBAJ}}</ref> troops
'''Total:'''{{plainlist|
; Total
* 914,000–1,067,500 troops
: 914,000–1,067,500 troops
* 3,430–3,600 tanks
: 3,430–3,600 tanks
* 3,900–4,000 armored carriers
: 3,900–4,000 armored carriers
* 1,720 artillery units
: 1,720 artillery units
* 452 combat aircraft
: 452 combat aircraft
* 140 helicopters
: 140 helicopters
* 104 naval vessels
: 104 naval vessels
* 150 surface-to-air missile batteries}}
: 150 surface-to-air missile batteries
}}
| casualties1 = {{plainlist| | casualties1 = {{plainlist|
* 2,521<ref name="autogenerated6" />–2,800<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" /><ref>Journal "الأهرام","Al Ahram". October 14, 1974</ref> dead * 2,521{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|p=328}}–2,800{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}}<ref>Journal "الأهرام","Al Ahram". 14 October 1974</ref> dead
* 7,250<ref>{{cite book |last=Rabinovich |title=The Yom Kippur War |page=497}}</ref>–8,800<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" /> wounded * 7,250{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=497}}–8,800{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}} wounded
* 293 captured * 293 captured
* 1,063 tanks destroyed, damaged, or captured<ref name="Rabinovich, 496" /> * 400 tanks destroyed, 663 damaged or captured{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=496}}
* 407 armored vehicles destroyed or captured * 407 armored vehicles destroyed or captured
* 102–387 aircraft destroyed<ref name="White House Military Briefing" /><ref>"القوة الثالثة، تاريخ القوات الجوية المصرية." ''Third Power: History of Egyptian Air Force'' Ali Mohammed Labib. pp. 187</ref>}} * 102–387 aircraft destroyed<ref name="White House Military Briefing" /><ref>"القوة الثالثة، تاريخ القوات الجوية المصرية." ''Third Power: History of Egyptian Air Force'' Ali Mohammed Labib. pp. 187</ref>
}}
| casualties2 = {{plainlist| | casualties2 = {{udl|class=dt-vpad|wrap=
; Egypt
'''Egypt:''' 5,000<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" />–15,000<ref name="autogenerated87" /> dead
* 8,372 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />}} : 5,000{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}}–15,000<ref name="autogenerated87" /> dead
: 8,372 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />
'''Syria:'''{{plainlist|
; Syria
* 3,000<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" />–3,500<ref name="autogenerated87" /> dead
* 392 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />}} : 3,000{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}}–3,500<ref name="autogenerated87" /> dead
: 392 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />
'''Iraq:'''{{plainlist|
; Morocco
* 278 dead
* 898 wounded<ref name="Dunstan, p. 200">Dunstan, p. 200.</ref> : 6 dead<ref name="tobji"/>
* 13 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />}} : 6 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />
; Iraq
'''Cuba:'''{{plainlist|
: 278 dead
* Unknown}}
: 898 wounded<ref name="Dunstan, p. 200">Dunstan, p. 200.</ref>
'''Jordan:'''{{plainlist|
: 13 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />
* 23 dead
; Cuba
* 77 wounded<ref name="Dunstan, p. 200"/>}}
: 180 dead
'''Morocco:'''{{plainlist|
: 250 wounded<ref name="Ra'anan">Ra’anan, G. D. (1981). ''The Evolution of the Soviet Use of Surrogates in Military Relations with the Third World, with Particular Emphasis on Cuban Participation in Africa''. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. p. 37</ref>
* 6 captured<ref name="autogenerated2004" />}}
; Jordan
----
: 23 dead
'''Total casualties:'''{{plainlist|
* 8,000<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" />–18,500<ref name="autogenerated87" /> dead : 77 wounded<ref name="Dunstan, p. 200"/>
; Total
* 18,000<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" />–35,000<ref>Rabinovich p. 497</ref> wounded
: 8,000{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}}–18,500<ref name="autogenerated87" /> dead
* 8,783 captured
: 18,000{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}}–35,000{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=497}} wounded
* 2,250<ref name="Rabinovich, 496-7" />–2,300<ref name="Garwych p 244" /> tanks destroyed
: 8,783 captured
* 341<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" />–514<ref name="Herzog, 260" /> aircraft destroyed
: 2,250{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=496–497}}–2,300{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=244}} tanks destroyed
* 19 naval vessels sunk<ref name="Herzog, War of Atonement, p 269" />}}
: 341{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}}–514<ref name="Herzog, 260" /> aircraft destroyed
: 19 naval vessels sunk{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|p=269}}
}}
| notes = | notes =
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Yom Kippur War}}
}} }}
The '''Yom Kippur War''', also known as the '''Ramadan War''', the '''October War''',<ref>({{Langx|he|מלחמת יום הכיפורים}}, {{transliteration|he|Milẖemet Yom HaKipurim}}, or {{lang|he|מלחמת יום כיפור}}, {{transliteration|he|Milẖemet Yom Kipur}}; {{Langx|ar|حرب أكتوبر}}, {{transliteration|ar|DIN|Ḥarb ʾUktōbar}}, or {{lang|ar|حرب تشرين}}, {{transliteration|ar|DIN|Ḥarb Tišrīn}}),</ref> the '''1973 Arab–Israeli War''', or the '''Fourth Arab–Israeli War''', was fought from 6 to 25 October 1973 between ] and a coalition of ] led by ] and ]. Most of the fighting occurred in the ] and ], territories ]. Some combat also took place in ] and ].{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=260}}{{sfnp|Herzog|1975}}{{page needed|date=July 2023}} Egypt aimed to secure a foothold on the eastern bank of the ] and use it to negotiate the return of the ].<ref name="auto1">{{cite web |url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442407.pdf |title=Anwar al-Sadat's grand strategy in the Yom Kippur War |author=James Bean and Craig Girard |publisher=National War College |year=2001 |pages=1, 8 |access-date=11 June 2018 |archive-date=28 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170228051313/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442407.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref>
{{Campaignbox Yom Kippur War}}
The '''Yom Kippur War''', also known as the '''Ramadan War''', the '''October War''',<ref> ({{Lang-he|מלחמת יום הכיפורים}}, {{transl|he|Milẖemet Yom HaKipurim}}, or {{lang|he|מלחמת יום כיפור}}, {{transl|he|Milẖemet Yom Kipur}}; {{Lang-ar|حرب أكتوبر}}, {{transl|ar|DIN|Ḥarb ʾUktōbar}}, or {{lang|ar|حرب تشرين}}, {{transl|ar|DIN|Ḥarb Tišrīn}}),</ref> the '''1973 Arab–Israeli War''' or the '''Fourth Arab–Israeli War''', was an armed conflict fought from 6 to 25 October 1973 between ] and a coalition of ] led by ] and ]. The majority of combat between the two sides took place in the ] and the ]—both of which were ] in 1967—with some fighting in ] and ].<ref name="Rabinovich 2004 260">{{cite book |last=Rabinovich |first=Abraham|date=2004 |title=The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=n_9gIR6Fi3UC&pg=PA260 |publisher=Schoken Books |page=260 |isbn=0-8052-1124-1}}</ref><ref name="auto">{{cite book |last=Herzog |first=Chaim |date=1998 |title=War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War, 1973 |publisher=Greenhill Books |isbn=1-85367-307-2}}</ref> Egypt's initial objective in the war was to seize a foothold on the eastern bank of the ] and subsequently leverage these gains to negotiate the return of the rest of the ].{{sfn|Herzog|1975|p=37}}{{sfn|Insight Team of the London Sunday Times|1974|p=15}}{{sfn|Herzog|1982|p=321}}<ref name="auto1">{{cite web |url=http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442407.pdf |title=Anwar al-Sadat's grand strategy in the Yom Kippur War |author=James Bean and Craig Girard |publisher=National War College |year=2001 |pages=1, 8 |access-date=June 11, 2018 |archive-date=28 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170228051313/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442407.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>


The war began on 6 October 1973, when the Arab coalition jointly launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holy day of ], which had occurred simultaneously with the Islamic holy month of ] in that year.<ref name="El-Gamasy 1993 181" /> Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed their corresponding ceasefire lines with Israel and invaded the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, respectively. Following the outbreak of hostilities, both the ] and the ] initiated massive resupply efforts to their respective allies during the war, which led to a near-confrontation between the ].<ref name="Quandt">{{cite book |last1=Quandt |first1=William |title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967 |date=2005 |publisher=] |location=California |isbn=978-0520246317 |pages=104–05 |edition=third |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MVXxUGe9qEkC}}</ref> The war started on 6 October 1973, when the Arab coalition launched a surprise attack on Israel during the Jewish holy day of ], which coincided with the 10th day of ].{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} The ] and ] engaged in massive resupply efforts for their allies (Israel and the Arab states, respectively),<ref name="GutfeldVanetik2016" /><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Rodman |first1=David |date=29 July 2015 |title=The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2013.11446570 |journal=] |volume=7 |issue=3 |pages=107–114 |doi=10.1080/23739770.2013.11446570 |s2cid=141596916 |access-date=20 February 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Levey |first1=Zach |date=7 October 2008 |title=Anatomy of an airlift: United States military assistance to Israel during the 1973 war |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682740802373552 |journal=] |volume=8 |issue=4 |pages=481–501 |doi=10.1080/14682740802373552 |s2cid=154204359 |access-date=20 February 2023}}</ref> which heightened tensions between the two superpowers.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|pp=104–105}}


Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed their respective ceasefire lines with Israel, advancing into the Sinai and Golan Heights. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal in ] and advanced into the Sinai, while Syrian forces gained territory in the Golan Heights. After three days, Israel halted the Egyptian advance and pushed most of the Syrians back to the ]. Israel then launched a counteroffensive into Syria, shelling the outskirts of ].
The fighting commenced with a massive and successful ]; Egyptian forces crossed the ceasefire lines with Israel and advanced virtually unopposed into the Sinai Peninsula. However, Israel mobilized most of its forces three days later and halted the Egyptian offensive, resulting in a military stalemate. The Syrians coordinated their attack on the Golan Heights to coincide with the Egyptian offensive and initially made threatening gains into Israeli-held territory. After three days of heavy fighting, Israeli forces had pushed the Syrians back to the pre-war ceasefire lines. The Israeli military then launched a four-day-long counter-offensive deep into Syria. Within a week, Israeli artillery began to shell the outskirts of the Syrian capital of ], and Egyptian president ] began to worry about the deteriorating integrity of ]. Sadat believed that capturing two strategic mountain passes deeper within the Sinai Peninsula would make the Arab position stronger during post-war negotiations with Israel, and subsequently ordered Egyptian forces to mount another offensive against the Israelis, which was quickly repulsed. Israeli forces subsequently counter-attacked at the seam between the two Egyptian formations, crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt, and slowly began advancing southward and westward towards ] in over a week of heavy fighting that resulted in large casualties on both sides.<ref>Hammad (2002), pp. 237–76</ref><ref name="Gawrych 1996, p.60">Gawrych (1996), p. 60</ref>


Egyptian forces attempted to push further into Sinai but were repulsed, and Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal, advancing toward Ismailia City on 18 October. Israeli forces were then defeated in the ] and accepted a UN-brokered ceasefire.{{sfnmp|Hammad|2002|1pp=237–276|Gawrych|1996|2p=60}} On 22 October, the ceasefire broke down. Initially both sides accused each other of violations, however declassified documents revealed the United States had given Israel permission to breach the ceasefire and encircle the ] and Suez City.<ref>{{cite web|url= https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/press.htm | title= Kissinger Gave Green Light for Israeli Offensive Violating 1973 Cease-Fire;
On 22 October, an initial ceasefire brokered by the ] unravelled, with each side blaming the other for the breach. By 24 October, the Israelis had improved their positions considerably and completed their encirclement of the ] and Suez City, bringing them within {{Convert|100|km|mi}} of the Egyptian capital of ]. This development led to dangerously heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union (allied with Israel and with the Arab states, respectively) and a second ceasefire was imposed cooperatively on 25 October to officially end the war.
| date= 17 October 2024|work= The National Security Archive}}</ref> Israeli forces then advanced on Suez City, but were successfully repulsed in the ensuing ] amid stiff Egyptian resistance.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Geroux |first=John Spencer, Jayson |date=2022-01-13 |title=Urban Warfare Project Case Study #4: Battle of Suez City |url=https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-4-battle-of-suez-city/ |access-date=2024-09-28 |website=Modern War Institute |language=en-US}}</ref> A second ceasefire was imposed on 25 October, officially ending the war.


The Yom Kippur War had far-reaching implications; the Arab world had experienced humiliation in the lopsided rout of the Egyptian–Syrian–] alliance in 1967, but felt psychologically vindicated by early successes in the 1973 conflict. The Israelis recognized that, despite impressive operational and tactical achievements on the battlefield, there was no guarantee that they would always dominate the Arab states militarily, as they had done consistently throughout the ], the ] and the ]; these changes paved the way for the ]. The ] that followed the war saw Israel return the entire Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and the subsequent ], which marked the first instance of an Arab country ]. Following the achievement of peace with Israel, Egypt continued its drift away from the Soviet Union and eventually left the ] entirely. The Yom Kippur War had significant consequences. The Arab world, humiliated by the 1967 defeat, felt psychologically vindicated by its early and late successes in 1973. Meanwhile, Israel, despite battlefield achievements, recognized that future military dominance was uncertain. These shifts contributed to the ], leading to the 1978 ], when Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, and the ], the first time an Arab country ]. Egypt drifted away from the Soviet Union, eventually leaving the ].


==Background== ==Background==
{{See also|Closure of the Suez Canal (1967–1975)|Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula}}
The war was part of the ], an ongoing dispute that has included many battles and wars since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948. During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel had captured Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, roughly half of Syria's Golan Heights, and the territories of the ] which had been ].<ref>{{cite book|author=Shlomo Ben-Ami |title=Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy |year=2005 |publisher=Phoenix |isbn=978-0-7538-2104-6}}</ref>


=== Arab–Israeli conflict ===
On June 19, 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories.<ref>Herzog, ''Heroes of Israel'', p. 253.</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Seth S. King |title=Israeli aims tied to 6 vital areas |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/30/83128870.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=June 30, 1967 |access-date=September 21, 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Drew Middleton |title=Latin nations bid Israel withdraw |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/01/83130813.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=June 1, 1967 |access-date=September 21, 2015}}</ref> It rejected a full withdrawal to the boundaries and the situation before the war,{{citation needed|date=July 2019}} and also insisted on direct negotiations with the Arab governments as opposed to accepting negotiation through a third party.<ref>{{cite news |last=Smith |first=Terrebce |date=August 15, 1967 |title=A Mediated Peace Rejected by Eban |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/08/15/90390826.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=New York Times |access-date=September 16, 2015}}</ref>
The war was part of the ], an ongoing dispute that has included many battles and wars since the ] in 1948. During the ] of 1967, Israel had captured Egypt's ], roughly half of Syria's ], and the territories of the ] which had been ].{{sfnp|Ben-Ami|2005}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}


This decision was not made public at the time, nor was it conveyed to any Arab state. Notwithstanding Abba Eban's (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1967) insistence that this was indeed the case, there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim. No formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply.<ref>{{cite book |last=Shlaim |first=Avi |date=2014 |title=The Iron Wall – Israel and the Arab World |publisher=Penguin Books |edition=paperback 2014 |page=270 |isbn=978-0-141-03322-8 |quote=The decision of 19 June read, "Israel proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt based on the international border and the security needs of Israel." The international border placed the Gaza strip within Israel's territory. ... it makes no mention of a request by Eban to transmit these terms to Egypt and Syria. ... One is left with the impression that Eban was more interested in using the cabinet decision of 19 June to impress the Americans than to engage the governments of Egypt and Syria in substantive negotiations}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=Shlomo Ben-Ami |title=Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli–Arab Tragedy |year=2005 |publisher=Phoenix |isbn=978-0-7538-2104-6 |page=125 |quote="But was there on 19 June 1967 an Israeli peace overture towards Syria and Egypt? Did the Israeli cabinet end its deliberations on that day with a decision to convey concrete peace proposals to its Arab neighbors along the lines as discussed in the Cabinet, or perhaps ask the American administration to do so on its behalf? Notwithstanding Abba Eban's (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1967) insistence that this was indeed the case, there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim. No formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply. At the meeting of 19 June the Israeli government developed policy guidelines; it did not discuss a peace initiative, nor did it ever formalise it as such."}}</ref> On 19 June 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories.{{sfnp|Herzog|1989|p=253}}<ref>{{cite news |author=Seth S. King |title=Israeli aims tied to 6 vital areas |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/30/83128870.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=30 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Drew Middleton |title=Latin nations bid Israel withdraw |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/07/01/83130813.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=1 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015}}</ref> This decision was not made public at the time, nor was it conveyed to any Arab state. Israeli Foreign Minister ] has said that it had been conveyed, but there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim; no formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Raz |first=Avi |date=2013 |title=The Generous Peace Offer that was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of June 19, 1967 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44254276 |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=85–108 |doi=10.1093/dh/dhs004 |jstor=44254276 |issn=0145-2096}}</ref> The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply.<ref>{{cite book |last=Shlaim |first=Avi |date=2014 |title=The Iron Wall – Israel and the Arab World |publisher=Penguin Books |edition=paperback 2014 |page=270 |isbn=978-0-14-103322-8 |quote=The decision of 19 June read, "Israel proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt based on the international border and the security needs of Israel." The international border placed the Gaza strip within Israel's territory. ... it makes no mention of a request by Eban to transmit these terms to Egypt and Syria. ... One is left with the impression that Eban was more interested in using the cabinet decision of 19 June to impress the Americans than to engage the governments of Egypt and Syria in substantive negotiations}}</ref><ref>{{harvp|Ben-Ami|2005|p=125}}: "But was there on 19 June 1967 an Israeli peace overture towards Syria and Egypt? Did the Israeli cabinet end its deliberations on that day with a decision to convey concrete peace proposals to its Arab neighbors along the lines as discussed in the Cabinet, or perhaps ask the American administration to do so on its behalf? Notwithstanding Abba Eban's (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1967) insistence that this was indeed the case, there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim. No formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply. At the meeting of 19 June the Israeli government developed policy guidelines; it did not discuss a peace initiative, nor did it ever formalise it as such."</ref> Eban rejected the prospect of a mediated peace, insisting of the need for direct negotiations with the Arab governments.<ref>{{cite news |last=Smith |first=Terrebce |date=15 August 1967 |title=A Mediated Peace Rejected by Eban |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/08/15/90390826.html?pageNumber=1 |newspaper=New York Times |access-date=16 September 2015}}</ref>


The Arab position, as it emerged in September 1967 at the ], was to reject any peaceful settlement with the State of Israel. The eight participating states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan—passed a resolution that would later become known as the "three no's": there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. Prior to that, King ] had stated that he could not rule out a possibility of a "real, permanent peace" between Israel and the Arab states.<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Eban rejects aid in settling crisis |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/26/83125500.html?pageNumber=3 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=June 27, 1967 |access-date=September 21, 2015|page=3}}</ref> The Arab position, as it emerged in September 1967 at the ], was to reject any peaceful settlement with the State of Israel. The eight participating states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan—passed a resolution that would later become known as the "three nos": there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. Prior to that, King ] had stated that he could not rule out a possibility of a "real, permanent peace" between Israel and the Arab states.<ref>{{cite news |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |title=Eban rejects aid in settling crisis |url=http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/26/83125500.html?pageNumber=3 |newspaper=The New York Times |date=27 June 1967 |access-date=21 September 2015|page=3}}</ref>


Armed hostilities continued on a limited scale after the Six-Day War and escalated into the ], an attempt to wear down the Israeli position through long-term pressure.<ref>{{cite book|last=Gavriely-Nuri|first=Dalia|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Qc-xfP6b3gsC&q=%2522War%2520of%2520Attrition%2522%25201967&pg=PA107|title=The Normalization of War in Israeli Discourse, 1967–2008|date=2013|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-7391-7260-5|page=107|language=en}}</ref> In December 1970, Egyptian President ] had signaled in an interview with '']'' that, in return for a total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was ready "to recognize the rights of Israel as an independent state as defined by the ]."<ref name="Podeh" /> On 4 February 1971, Sadat gave a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly outlining a proposal under which Israel would withdraw from the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula along with other occupied Arab territories.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gazit |first=Mordechai |date=January 1997 |title=Egypt and Israel – Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971? |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002200949703200107 |journal=] |language=en |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=97–115 |doi=10.1177/002200949703200107 |s2cid=159846721 |issn=0022-0094 |access-date=13 October 2023}}</ref>
Armed hostilities continued on a limited scale after the Six-Day War and escalated into the ], an attempt to wear down the Israeli position through long-term pressure. A ceasefire was signed in August 1970.


President ] of Egypt died in September 1970. He was succeeded by ]. A peace initiative led by both Sadat and UN intermediary ] was tabled in 1971. Sadat set forth to the Egyptian Parliament his intention of arranging an interim agreement as a step towards a settlement on February 4, 1971, which extended the terms of the ceasefire and envisaged a reopening of the Suez Canal in exchange for a partial Israeli pullback. It resembled a proposal independently made by ].{{citation needed|date=July 2019}} Sadat had signaled in an interview with '']'' in December 1970 that, in return for a total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was ready "to recognize the rights of Israel as an independent state as defined by the Security Council of the United Nations." Gunnar Jarring coincidentally proposed a similar initiative four days later, on February 8, 1971. Egypt responded by accepting much of Jarring's proposals, though differing on several issues, regarding the ], for example, and expressed its willingness to reach an accord if it also implemented the provisions of ]. This was the first time an Arab government had gone public declaring its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel.<ref name="Podeh">{{cite book |last1=Podeh |first1=Elie |title=Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict |date=2015 |publisher=] |location=Austin, TX |isbn=978-1477305614 |pages=104–05 |edition=first |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ecyGCgAAQBAJ}}</ref> Swedish diplomat ] coincidentally proposed a similar initiative four days later, on 8 February 1971. Egypt responded by accepting much of Jarring's proposals, though differing on several issues, regarding the ], for example, and expressed its willingness to reach an accord if it also implemented the provisions of ]. This was the first time an Arab government had gone public declaring its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel.<ref name="Podeh">{{cite book |last1=Podeh |first1=Elie |title=Chances for Peace: Missed Opportunities in the Arab-Israeli Conflict |date=2015 |publisher=] |location=Austin, TX |isbn=978-1-4773-0561-4 |pages=104–105 |edition=first |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ecyGCgAAQBAJ}}</ref>


In addition, the Egyptian response included a statement that the lasting peace could not be achieved without "withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967." Golda Meir reacted to the overture by forming a committee to examine the proposal and vet possible concessions. When the committee unanimously concluded that Israel's interests would be served by full withdrawal to the internationally recognized lines dividing Israel from Egypt and Syria, returning the Gaza Strip and, in a majority view, returning most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Meir was angered and shelved the document.<ref>Podeh, p. 106.</ref> The United States was infuriated by the cool Israeli response to Egypt's proposal, and ] informed ] that "Israel would be regarded responsible for rejecting the best opportunity to reach peace since the establishment of the state." Israel responded to Jarring's plan also on February 26 by outlining its readiness to make some form of withdrawal, while declaring it had no intention of returning to the ].<ref name="auto2">Podeh p. 107.</ref> Explicating the response, Israeli Foreign Minister ] told the ] that the pre-June 5, 1967 lines "cannot assure Israel against aggression", i.e., were not defensible.<ref>{{cite news |title=Sinai Pull-Back Rejected |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2002&dat=19710215&id=27EiAAAAIBAJ&pg=981,4282183 |access-date=July 4, 2019 |agency=Beaver County Times |date=February 15, 1971}}</ref> Jarring was disappointed, and blamed Israel for refusing to accept a complete pullout from the Sinai peninsula.<ref name="auto2"/> Israeli Prime Minister ] reacted to the overture by forming a committee to examine the proposal and vet possible concessions. When the committee unanimously concluded that Israel's interests would be served by full withdrawal to the internationally recognized lines dividing Israel from Egypt and Syria, returning the Gaza Strip and, in a majority view, returning most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Meir was angered and shelved the document.<ref>Podeh, p. 106.</ref>


The United States was infuriated by the cool Israeli response to Egypt's proposal, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs ] informed Israeli ambassador ] that "Israel would be regarded responsible for rejecting the best opportunity to reach peace since the establishment of the state." Israel responded to Jarring's plan on 26 February by outlining its readiness to make some form of withdrawal, while declaring it had no intention of returning to the ].<ref name="auto2">Podeh p. 107.</ref> Explicating the response, Eban told the ] that the pre-5 June 1967 lines "cannot assure Israel against aggression".<ref>{{cite news |title=Sinai Pull-Back Rejected |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2002&dat=19710215&id=27EiAAAAIBAJ&pg=981,4282183 |access-date=4 July 2019 |agency=Beaver County Times |date=15 February 1971}}</ref> Jarring was disappointed and blamed Israel for refusing to accept a complete pullout from the Sinai Peninsula.<ref name="auto2" />
Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israelis, the status quo could be altered. ], the leader of Syria, had a different view. He had little interest in negotiation and felt the retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. After the Six-Day War, Assad had launched a massive military buildup and hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states. With the aid of Egypt, Assad felt that his new army could win convincingly against Israel and thus secure Syria's role in the region. Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan Heights had been retaken by force, which would induce Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza, and make other concessions.


The U.S. considered Israel an ally in the ] and had been supplying the Israeli military since the 1960s. U.S. National Security Advisor ] believed that the regional ] hinged on maintaining Israel's military dominance over Arab countries and that an Arab victory in the region would strengthen Soviet influence. Britain's position, on the other hand, was that war between the Arabs and Israelis could only be prevented by the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and a return to the pre-1967 boundaries.<ref>{{cite journal |issn=1531-3298 |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=3–40 |last=Hughes |first=Geraint |s2cid=57566713 |title=Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 |journal=] |access-date=2 July 2018 |date=11 June 2008 |url=http://muse.jhu.edu/article/237150 |doi=10.1162/jcws.2008.10.2.3}}</ref>
Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office ... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history. ... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option."<ref>Rabinovich, p. 13.</ref> In his biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli argued that Sadat felt the root of the problem was the great shame over the Six-Day War, and before any reforms could be introduced, he believed that that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was in shambles, but Sadat knew that the deep reforms that he felt were needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the population. A military victory would give him the popularity he needed to make changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war to reclaim the Sinai and was highly upset that Sadat had not launched one in his first three years in office.


Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office ... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history. ... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=13}} Almost a full year before the war, in a meeting on 24 October 1972, with his ], Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=25}}
The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a new war. Jordanian King Hussein feared another major loss of territory, as had occurred in the Six-Day War, in which Jordan lost all of the West Bank, territory it had conquered and annexed in 1948–49, which had doubled its population. Sadat also backed the claim of the ] (PLO) to the West Bank and Gaza and, in the event of a victory, promised ] that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom. Moreover, during the ] of 1970, a near civil war had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that war, Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO, estranging Hussein.


In February 1973, Sadat made a final peace overture that would have included Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula that he relayed to Kissinger via his adviser ], which Kissinger made known to Meir. Meir rejected the peace proposal despite knowing that the only plausible alternative was going to war with Egypt.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bar-Joseph |first=Uri |date=July 2006 |title=Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022009406064668 |journal=] |language=en |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=545–556 |doi=10.1177/0022009406064668 |s2cid=154116645 |issn=0022-0094 |access-date=13 October 2023}}</ref>
Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, and the Iraqis refused to join the initial offensive. ], which shared a border with Israel, was not expected to join the Arab war effort because of its small army and already evident instability. During the months before the war, Sadat engaged in a diplomatic offensive to try to win support for military action. By the fall of 1973, he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states. These were most of the countries of the ], ], and ].


===Lead up to the war===
The US considered Israel an ally in the ] and had been supplying the Israeli military since the 1960s. ] believed that the regional ] hinged on maintaining Israel's military dominance over Arab countries, and that an Arab victory in the region would strengthen ] influence. Britain's position, on the other hand, was that war between the Arabs and Israelis could only be prevented by the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and a return to the pre-1967 boundaries.<ref>{{Cite journal| issn = 1531-3298| volume = 10| issue = 2| pages = 3–40| last = Hughes| first = Geraint| s2cid = 57566713| title = Britain, the Transatlantic Alliance, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973| journal = Journal of Cold War Studies| access-date = July 2, 2018| date = June 11, 2008| url = http://muse.jhu.edu/article/237150| doi = 10.1162/jcws.2008.10.2.3}}</ref>
]]]
Four months before the war broke out, Kissinger made an offer to Ismail, Sadat's emissary. Kissinger proposed returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control and an Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai, except for some strategic points. Ismail said he would return with Sadat's reply, but he never did. Sadat was already determined to go to war. Only an American guarantee that the United States would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded Sadat.<ref name="Kissinger2011p254"/>


Sadat declared that Egypt was prepared to "sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover its lost territory.{{sfnp|Morris|2001|p=390}} From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving ] jet fighters, ], ], ] and ] antiaircraft missiles, ] and ] tanks, ] antitank weapons, and the ] ] from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics, based on Soviet battlefield doctrines. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.{{sfnp|Heikal|1975|p=22}}
===Events leading up to the war===
Four months before the war broke out, Henry Kissinger made an offer to Ismail, Sadat's emissary. Kissinger proposed returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control and an Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai, except for some strategic points. Ismail said he would return with Sadat's reply, but never did. Sadat was already determined to go to war. Only an American guarantee that the United States would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded Sadat.<ref name="Kissinger2011p254"/>


The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez Canal would incur massive losses. Both the Soviets and Americans were at that time pursuing ] and had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting with American President ], Soviet leader ] had proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=39}}
Sadat declared that Egypt was prepared to "sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover its lost territory.<ref name=morris2001_p390>Morris 2001, p. 390.</ref> From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving ] jet fighters, ], ], ] and ] antiaircraft missiles, ] and ] tanks, ] antitank weapons, and the ] ] from the Soviet Union and improving its ], based on Soviet battlefield doctrines. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.<ref>Heikal, 22.</ref>


Between May and August 1973, the Egyptian Army conducted military exercises near the border, and ] inaccurately warned that Egypt and Syria would launch a surprise attack in the middle of May. The Israeli Army mobilized with their Blue-White Alert, in response to both the warnings and exercises, at considerable cost. These exercises led some Israelis to dismiss the actual war preparations—and Marwan's warning right before the attack was launched—as another exercise.<ref name="Uri">{{cite book |last1=Bar-Joseph |first1=Uri |title=The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel |date=2016 |publisher=HarperCollins |location=New York |isbn=978-0-06-242013-8 |pages=166–176, 221–222}}</ref>
The role of the superpowers, too, was a major factor in the outcome of the two wars. The policy of the Soviet Union was one of the causes of Egypt's military weakness. President Nasser was only able to obtain the ]<!-- This word is correct, not a typo; follow the link if you don't know what it means. Do ''not'' change it to material. That has a different meaning than intended --> for an ] defense wall after visiting Moscow and pleading with Kremlin leaders. He said that if supplies were not given, he would have to return to Egypt and tell the Egyptian people Moscow had abandoned them, and then relinquish power to one of his peers who would be able to deal with the Americans. The Americans would then have the upper hand in the region, which Moscow could not permit.


In the week leading up to ], the Egyptian Army staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were also detected, as were the cancellation of leaves and a call-up of reserves in the Syrian army. These activities were considered puzzling but not a threat because Israeli intelligence suggested they would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt would not attack until the weaponry they wanted arrived. Despite this belief, Israel sent reinforcements to the Golan Heights. These forces were to prove critical during the early days of the war.<ref name=Uri/>{{rp|190–191, 208}}
]]]


On 27 to 30 September, two batches of reservists were called up by the Egyptian Army to participate in these exercises. Two days before the outbreak of the war, on 4 October, the Egyptian command publicly announced the demobilization of part of the reservists called up during 27 September to lull Israeli suspicions. Around 20,000 troops were demobilized, and subsequently some of these men were given leave to perform the '']'' (pilgrimage) to Mecca.{{sfnmp|Shazly|2003|1p=207|Gawrych|1996|2p=24}}
Nasser's policy following the 1967 defeat conflicted with that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets sought to avoid a new conflagration between the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with the United States. The reality of the situation became apparent when the superpowers met in ] and agreed to maintain the status quo. This was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders, and when it was discovered that the Egyptian preparations for crossing the canal were being leaked, it became imperative to expel the Soviets from Egypt. In July 1972, Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisers in the country and reoriented the country's foreign policy to be more favourable to the United States. The Syrians remained close to the Soviet Union.


According to Egyptian General El-Gamasy, "On the initiative of the operations staff, we reviewed the situation on the ground and developed a framework for the planned offensive operation. We studied the technical characteristics of the Suez Canal, the ebb and the flow of the tides, the speed of the currents and their direction, hours of darkness and of moonlight, weather conditions, and related conditions in the Mediterranean and Red sea."{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} He explained further by saying: "Saturday 6 October 1973 (10 Ramadan 1393) was the day chosen for the September–October option. Conditions for a crossing were good, it was a fast day in Israel, and the moon on that day, 10 Ramadan, shone from sunset until midnight."{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=181}} The war coincided that year with the Muslim month of ], when many Muslim soldiers ]. On the other hand, the fact that the attack was launched on Yom Kippur may have ''helped'' Israel to more easily marshal reserves from their homes and synagogues because roads and communication lines were largely open, easing the mobilization and transportation of the military.{{sfnp|Schiff|2013|p=12}}
The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez Canal would incur massive losses. Both the Soviets and Americans were at that time pursuing ] and had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting with American President ], Soviet leader ] had proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 39.</ref>


Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=51}}
In an interview published in '']'' (April 9, 1973), Sadat again threatened war with Israel. Several times during 1973, Arab forces conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli military on the highest level of alert, only to be recalled a few days later. The Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the ] (IAF) could repel it.


On the night of 25 September, Hussein secretly flew to ] to warn Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they would cooperate.{{'"}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=50}} This warning was ignored, and Israeli intelligence indicated that Hussein had not said anything that was not already known. Throughout September, Israel received eleven warnings of war from well-placed sources. However, ] Director-General ] continued to insist that war was not an Arab option, even after Hussein's warning.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=57}} Zamir would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable ."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=57}}
Almost a full year before the war, in a meeting on October 24, 1972 with his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 25.</ref> Planning had begun in 1971 and was conducted in absolute secrecy—even the upper-echelon commanders were not told of the war plans until less than a week prior to the attack, and the soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand. The plan to attack Israel in concert with Syria was code-named ] (] for "]"), after the ], in which Muslims under ] defeated the ] tribe of Mecca.


Several days before the war began, Lieutenant Colonel Aviezer Ya'ari, head of the Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq desk of Israeli military intelligence, suggested that the Egyptian and Syrian military exercises which were underway might be preparations for a combined attack. He was reprimanded and later told the ] that he subsequently became more cautious in his estimates.<ref name=tomatoes></ref>
===War objectives and areas of combat===
Egypt's initial war objective was to use its military to seize a limited amount of Israeli-occupied Sinai on the east bank of the Suez Canal. This would provoke a crisis which would allow it to bring American and Soviet pressure to bear on Israel to negotiate the return of the rest of Sinai, and possibly other occupied territories, from a position of relative strength.{{sfn|Herzog|1975|p=37}}{{sfn|Insight Team of the London Sunday Times|1974|p=15}}{{sfn|Herzog|1982|pp=315, 321}}<ref name="auto1"/> Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's publicly stated position was "to recover all Arab territory occupied by Israel following the 1967 war and to achieve a just, peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442407.pdf|title=Anwar al-Sadat's grand strategy in the Yom Kippur war|author=James Bean and Craig Girard|publisher=National War College|year=2001|access-date=June 11, 2018|archive-date=28 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170228051313/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442407.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> Similarly, Syria intended to seize back some or all of the Golan and to then negotiate its retention via great power pressure.{{sfn|Insight Team of the London Sunday Times|1974|p=15}}{{sfn|Herzog|1982|p=315}} Both Egypt and Syria expected that the use of the ] would assist them in post-conflict negotiations, once their attacks had generated a reason for its use.{{sfn|Herzog|1975|p=26}}{{sfn|Herzog|1982|p=229}}


On the day before the war, General ] was shown aerial photographs and other intelligence by ], his divisional intelligence officer. Sharon noticed that the concentration of Egyptian forces along the canal was far beyond anything observed during the training exercises, and that the Egyptians had amassed all of their crossing equipment along the canal. He then called General ], who had replaced him as head of Southern Command, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent.{{sfnp|Sharon|2011}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}
Other than ] on Ramat David airbase and surrounding civilian settlements during the first days of the war,<ref name="Rabinovich 2004 260"/> the fighting took place in ] and the ], territories that had been occupied by Israel since the end of the ] of 1967, and in the later stages, on the west side of the Suez canal in Egypt and in areas of the Golan beyond those held by Israel prior to the outbreak of war.<ref name="auto"/><ref name="SullivanJones2008p9"/><ref name="Morris2011p396"/>


Zamir's concern grew on 4–5 October, as additional signs of an impending attack were detected. Soviet advisers and their families left Egypt and Syria, transport aircraft thought to be laden with military equipment landed in ] and ], and aerial photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were at an unprecedented high. According to declassified documents from the Agranat Commission, Brigadier General Yisrael Lior (Meir's military secretary/attaché) claimed that Mossad knew from Marwan that an attack was going to occur under the guise of a military drill a week before it occurred, but the process of passing along the information to the prime minister's office failed.<ref name=mishandle>{{cite web |url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/newly-released-papers-detail-depth-of-mishandling-of-yom-kippur-war-warnings/ |title=Mossad's tip-off ahead of Yom Kippur War did not reach prime minister, newly released papers show |first=Mitch |last=Ginsburg |website=The Times of Israel}}</ref>
===Lead-up to the surprise Arab offensive===
The ] (IDF) ]'s (abbreviated as "Aman") ] was responsible for formulating Israel's intelligence estimate. Their assessments on the likelihood of war were based on several assumptions. First, it was assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt did so as well. Second, the department learned from ], former President Nasser's son-in-law and also a senior ] agent,<ref name=mishandle/> that Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would not go to war until they were supplied ] ]s to neutralize the Israeli Air Force and ] missiles to be used against Israeli cities as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on Egyptian infrastructure.


On the night of 5–6 October, Marwan incorrectly informed Zamir that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack would take place at sunset.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/opinion/13iht-edblum.1.6645021.html |work=The New York Times |first=Howard |last=Blum |title=Who killed Ashraf Marwan? |date=13 July 2007}}</ref> It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli High Command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli ].<ref name="Agranat">{{cite web|publisher=The Jewish Agency for Israel|url=http://www.jafi.org.il/education/juice/service/week11.html|date=27 November 2005|title=Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War of 1973|author=Doron Geller|series=Inside the Israeli Secret Service|access-date=14 November 2016|archive-date=13 May 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080513121838/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/juice/service/week11.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Since they had not received MiG-23s and Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt from Bulgaria in late August and it would take four months to train the Egyptian ground crews, Aman predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's strategic plans, known as "the concept", strongly prejudiced the department's thinking and led it to dismiss other war warnings.


===Israeli preparation===
By mid-1973, Aman was almost completely aware of the Arab war plans. It knew that the Egyptian Second and Third Armies would attempt to cross the Suez Canal and advance ten kilometres into the Sinai, followed by armored divisions that would advance towards the ] and ] Passes, and that naval units and paratroopers would then attempt to capture ]. Aman was also aware of many details of the Syrian war plan. However, Israeli analysts, following "the concept", did not believe the Arabs were serious about going to war.<ref name="intelligence">{{cite web|url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intel73.html |title=Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 |publisher=Jewishvirtuallibrary.org |access-date=May 31, 2012}}</ref>
] ] made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike.]]
Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Defense ] and Chief of General Staff ] met at 8:05&nbsp;am on the morning of Yom Kippur, six hours before the war began.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=89}} Elazar proposed a mobilization of the entire air force and four armored divisions, or 100,000 to 120,000 troops, while Dayan favored a mobilization of the air force and two armored divisions, or around 70,000 troops. Meir chose Elazar's proposal.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|p=27}} Elazar argued in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00&nbsp;pm, and Syrian ground forces at 5:00&nbsp;pm:
{{blockquote|When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it would not be blamed for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody,' she said.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=89}}}}


Prior to the war, Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Meir that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war,<ref name="Quandt1977">{{cite book |author=William B. Quandt |title=Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 |url=https://archive.org/details/decadeofdecision00will |url-access=registration |date=1977 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-03469-3 |page= |quote=Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Israel that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war}}</ref> and on 6 October 1973, Kissinger sent a further dispatch discouraging a preemptive strike.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf|title=The national security archive, declassified archival records, The October War and U.S. Policy.}}</ref><ref name=Sachar755>Sachar, Howard M. ''A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time''. Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 755.</ref> Israel was totally dependent on the United States for military resupply and sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. At 10:15&nbsp;am, Meir met with American ambassador ] to inform him that Israel did not intend to preemptively start a war and asked that American efforts be directed at preventing war.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|pp=104–105}}<ref>{{cite web |url=https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=77417&dt=1573&dl=823 |title=Government of Israel Concern about possible Syrian and Egyptian attack today |access-date=11 August 2010 |publisher=] |date=6 October 1973}}</ref>
The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of ] regarding maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The Egyptians made repeated misleading reports about lack of spare parts that made their way to the Israelis. Sadat had so long engaged in ] that his frequent war threats were being ignored by the world.


Kissinger urged the Soviets to use their influence to prevent war, contacted Egypt with Israel's message of non-preemption, and sent messages to other Arab governments to enlist their help on the side of moderation. These late efforts were futile.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=105}} According to Kissinger, had Israel struck first it would not have received "so much as a nail".{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=454}}<ref>{{cite news|last1=Rabinovich|first1=Abraham|title=Three years too late, Golda Meir understood how war could have been avoided|url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/three-years-too-late-golda-meir-understood-how-war-could-have-been-avoided/|access-date=15 April 2017|work=The Times of Israel|date=12 September 2013}}</ref>
In April and May 1973, Israeli intelligence began picking up clear signals of Egypt's intentions for war, recognizing that it had the necessary divisions and bridging equipment to cross the Suez Canal and a missile umbrella to protect any crossing operation from air attack. However, Aman Chief ] was still confident that the probability of war was low.<ref name="intelligence" />


==Sinai front==
Between May and August 1973, the Egyptian Army conducted military exercises near the border, and Ashraf Marwan inaccurately warned that Egypt and Syria would launch a surprise attack in the middle of May. The Israeli Army mobilized with their Blue-White Alert, in response to both the warnings and exercises, at considerable cost. These exercises led some Israelis to dismiss the actual war preparations, and Marwan's warning right before the attack was launched, as another exercise.<ref name="Uri">{{cite book |last1=Bar-Joseph |first1=Uri |title=The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel |date=2016 |publisher=HarperCollins |location=New York |isbn=978-0062420138 |pages=166–76, 221–22}}</ref>
{{overly detailed|date=June 2024}}
] shot down over the Sinai on 6 October, ]]]


The Egyptians had prepared for an assault across the canal and deployed five divisions totaling 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks and 2,000 guns and heavy mortars for the onslaught. Facing them were 450 soldiers of the ], spread out in 16 forts along the length of the canal. There were 290 Israeli tanks in all of Sinai, divided into three armored brigades,{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|loc=Prologue}} only one of which was deployed near the canal when hostilities commenced.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=62}}
====Egyptian and Syrian military exercises====
For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptian army staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were also detected, as were the cancellation of leaves and a call-up of reserves in the Syrian army. These activities were considered puzzling, but not a threat because, Aman believed, they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the weaponry they wanted arrived. Despite this belief, Israel sent reinforcements to the Golan Heights. These forces were to prove critical during the early days of the war.<ref name=Uri/>{{rp|190–91, 208}}


Large ]s were established on the east bank on 6 October. Israeli armoured forces launched counterattacks from 6 to 8 October, but they were often piecemeal and inadequately supported and were beaten back principally by Egyptians using portable anti-tank missiles. Between 9 and 12 October, the American response was a call for a cease-fire in place.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=109}} The Egyptian units generally would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing the protection of their SAM batteries, which were situated on the west bank of the canal. In the Six-Day War, the Israeli Air Force had pummeled the defenseless Arab armies; this time, Egypt had heavily fortified their side of the ceasefire lines with SAM batteries provided by the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite web|last=Abudi |first=Joseph |title=The missile did not bend the wing |work=Journal of the Israeli Air Force |language=he |date=1 October 2003 |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/1213-21478-he/IAF.aspx |access-date=15 February 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110513095613/http://www.iaf.org.il/1213-21478-he/IAF.aspx |archive-date=13 May 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Abudi |first=Joseph |title= |publisher=The Fisher Institute |language=he |date=October 2005 |url=http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/num27.pdf |access-date=15 February 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511232617/http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/num27.pdf |archive-date=11 May 2011}}</ref>
On September 27 to 30, two batches of reservists were called up by the Egyptian army to participate in these exercises. Two days before the outbreak of the war, on October 4, the Egyptian command publicly announced the demobilization of part of the reservists called up during September 27 to lull Israeli suspicions. Around 20,000 troops were demobilized, and subsequently some of these men were given leave to perform the '']'' (pilgrimage) to Mecca.<ref>Shazly, p. 207.</ref><ref>Gawrych 1996, p. 24.</ref> Reports were also given instructing cadets in military colleges to resume their courses on October 9.<ref name="intelligence" />


On 9 October, the IDF chose to concentrate its reserves and build up its supplies while the Egyptians remained on the strategic defensive. Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full-scale resupply of arms to Israel. Short of supplies, the Israeli government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on 12 October, but Sadat refused to do so.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=112}} The Soviets started an airlift of arms to Syria and Egypt. The American global interest was to prove that Soviet arms could not dictate the outcome of the fighting, by supplying Israel. With an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until Israeli success on the battlefield might persuade the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=114}}
On October 1, an Aman researcher, Lieutenant Binyamin Siman-Tov, submitted an assessment arguing that the Egyptian deployments and exercises along the Suez Canal seemed to be a camouflage for an actual crossing of the canal. Siman-Tov sent a more comprehensive assessment on October 3. Both were ignored by his superior.<ref name="intelligence" />
]


The Israelis decided to counterattack once Egyptian armor attempted to expand the bridgehead beyond the protective SAM umbrella. The riposte, codenamed ], was launched on 15 October. IDF forces spearheaded by Ariel Sharon's division broke through the Tasa corridor and crossed the Suez Canal to the north of the ]. After intense fighting, the IDF progressed towards Cairo and advanced southwards on the east bank of the Great Bitter Lake and in the southern extent of the canal right up to ].{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=116}} Israeli progress towards Cairo was brought to a halt by a fresh ceasefire on 24 October.{{citation needed|date=June 2022}}
According to Egyptian General El-Gamasy, "On the initiative of the operations staff, we reviewed the situation on the ground and developed a framework for the planned offensive operation. We studied the technical characteristics of the Suez Canal, the ebb and the flow of the tides, the speed of the currents and their direction, hours of darkness and of moonlight, weather conditions, and related conditions in the Mediterranean and Red sea."<ref name="El-Gamasy 1993 181">{{cite book |last=El-Gamasy |title=The October War: Memoirs of Field Marshal El-Gamasy of Egypt |publisher=The American University in Cairo Press |year=1993 |page=181}}</ref> He explained further by saying: "Saturday 6 October 1973 (10 Ramadan 1393) was the day chosen for the September–October option. Conditions for a crossing were good, it was a fast day in Israel, and the moon on that day, 10 Ramadan, shone from sunset until midnight."<ref name="El-Gamasy 1993 181"/> The war coincided that year with the Muslim month of ], when many Arab Muslim soldiers ]. On the other hand, the fact that the attack was launched on Yom Kippur may have ''helped'' Israel to more easily marshal reserves from their homes and synagogues because roads and communication lines were largely open, easing the mobilization and transportation of the military.<ref>Schiff, p. 12</ref>


===Egyptian attack===
Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."<ref>Rabinovich, p. 51.</ref>
{{main|Operation Badr (1973)}}
]
Anticipating a swift Israeli ] by three armored divisions,{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=224–225}} the Egyptians had armed their assault force with large numbers of man-portable ] weapons—]s and the less numerous but more advanced ] guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armored counterattacks. Each of the five infantry divisions that were to cross the canal had been equipped with RPG-7 rockets and ] grenades and reinforced with an anti-tank guided missile battalion, as they would not have any armor support for nearly 12 hours.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=225–226}} In addition, the Egyptians had built separate ramps at the crossing points, reaching as high as {{convert|21|m|ft}} to counter the Israeli sand wall, provide covering fire for the assaulting infantry and to counter the first Israeli armored counterattacks.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=189}}


The Egyptian Army put great effort into finding a quick and effective way of ]. The Israelis had built large 18-metre (59&nbsp;foot) high sand walls with a 60-degree slope and reinforced with concrete at the water line. Egyptian engineers initially experimented with explosive charges and bulldozers to clear the obstacles, before a junior officer proposed using high pressure water cannons. The idea was tested and found to be a sound one, and several high pressure water cannons were imported from Britain and East Germany. The water cannons effectively breached the sand walls using water from the canal.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=55–56}}
On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to ] to warn Israeli Prime Minister ] of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they would cooperate.'"<ref>Rabinovich, p. 50.</ref> This warning was ignored, and Aman concluded that the king had not told anything that was not already known. Throughout September, Israel received eleven warnings of war from well-placed sources. However, Mossad Director-General ] continued to insist that war was not an Arab option, even after Hussein's warning.<ref name="Rabinovich">Rabinovich, p. 57.</ref> Zamir would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable ."<ref name="Rabinovich" />
] on display in Egypt's war museum.]]
] fighter jets conducting air strikes over the ] on 6 October]]
At 2:00&nbsp;pm on 6 October, ] began with a large airstrike. More than 200 Egyptian aircraft conducted simultaneous strikes against three airbases, ] missile batteries, three command centers, artillery positions, and several radar installations.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=28}} Airfields at ] and Bir Tamada were temporarily put out of service, and damage was inflicted on a Hawk battery at Ophir. The aerial assault was coupled with a barrage from more than 2,000 artillery pieces for a period of 53 minutes against the Bar Lev Line and rear area command posts and concentration bases.<ref name="Ramadan">{{cite book |first=Hamdy Sobhy |last=Abouseada |url=http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA379531&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf |title=The Crossing of the Suez Canal, 6 October 1973 (The Ramadan War) |page=9 |series=USAWC strategy research project |year=1980 |publisher=U.S. Army War College |isbn=978-0-89141-043-0 |oclc=45004992 |access-date=4 October 2008 |archive-date=29 July 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090729084424/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA379531&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref>


Author Andrew McGregor claimed that the success of the first strike negated the need for a second planned strike.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=232}}{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=90–92, 108}}<ref>{{cite book |last=McGregor |first=Andrew |title=A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War |publisher=Praeger Security International |location=Westport, Conn |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-275-98601-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/militaryhistoryo00andr}}, p. 278.</ref> Egypt acknowledged the loss of five aircraft during the attack. ] wrote that 18 Egyptian aircraft were shot down, and that these losses prompted the cancellation of the second planned wave.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=108}} In ] during this period, a pair of Israeli ] challenged 28 Egyptian MiGs over Sharm el-Sheikh and within half an hour, shot down seven or eight MiGs with no losses.{{sfnmp|Rabinovich|2004|1p=115|Pollack|2002|2p=125}} One of the Egyptian pilots killed was Captain ], President Sadat's half-brother.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=81}}
On the day before the war, General ] was shown aerial photographs and other intelligence by Yehoshua Saguy, his divisional intelligence officer. General Sharon noticed that the concentration of Egyptian forces along the canal was far beyond anything observed during the training exercises, and that the Egyptians had amassed all of their crossing equipment along the canal. He then called General ], who had replaced him as head of Southern Command, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent.<ref name="sharon life" />


Simultaneously, 14 Egyptian ] bombers attacked Israeli targets in the Sinai with ], while another two Egyptian Tupolevs fired two Kelt missiles at a radar station in central Israel.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=115}} One missile was shot down by a patrolling Israeli Mirage fighter, and the second fell into the sea. The attack was an attempt to warn Israel that Egypt could retaliate if it bombed targets deep within Egyptian territory.<ref>''The Yom Kippur War 1973: The Sinai''&nbsp;– Simon Dunstan and Kevin Lyles.</ref>
Zamir's concern grew on October 4–5, as additional signs of an impending attack were detected. Soviet advisers and their families left Egypt and Syria, transport aircraft thought to be laden with military equipment landed in ] and ], and aerial photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles were at an unprecedented high. According to declassified documents from the ], Brigadier General Yisrael Lior, Prime Minister Golda Meir's military secretary/attaché, claimed that Mossad knew from Ashraf Marwan that an attack was going to occur under the guise of a military drill a week before it occurred, but the process of passing along the information to the Prime Minister's office failed. The information ended up with Mossad head Zvi Zamir's aide, who passed it along to Zamir at 12:30&nbsp;am on October 5. According to the claim, an unfocused and groggy Zamir thanked the aide for the information and said he would pass it along to the Prime Minister's office in the morning.<ref name=mishandle>{{cite web |url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/newly-released-papers-detail-depth-of-mishandling-of-yom-kippur-war-warnings/ |title=Mossad's tip-off ahead of Yom Kippur War did not reach prime minister, newly released papers show |first=Mitch |last=Ginsburg |website=The Times of Israel}}</ref> On the night of October 5/6, Zamir personally went to Europe to meet with Marwan at midnight. Marwan informed him that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack was imminent,<ref name="intelligence" /> but incorrectly said that the attack would take place at sunset.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/opinion/13iht-edblum.1.6645021.html |work=The New York Times |first=Howard |last=Blum |title=Who killed Ashraf Marwan? |date=July 13, 2007}}</ref>


] shot down by an Egyptian MiG-21]]
It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli High Command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli ].<ref name="library">Doron Geller, " November 27, 2005. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080513121838/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/juice/service/week11.html |date=May 13, 2008 }}</ref>


Under cover of the initial artillery barrage, the Egyptian assault force of 32,000 infantry began crossing the canal in twelve waves at five separate crossing areas, from 14:05 to 17:30, in what became known as ].{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=228}} The Egyptians prevented Israeli forces from reinforcing the Bar Lev Line and proceeded to attack the Israeli fortifications. Meanwhile, engineers crossed over to breach the sand wall.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=229}}<ref>{{cite news|first=Galal |last=Nassar |url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/oct12.htm |title=Into the breach, dear friends |work=Al-Ahram Weekly |issue=398 |date=8–14 October 1998 |location=Cairo |at=para. 10 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030506231103/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/oct12.htm |archive-date=6 May 2003}}</ref> The Israeli Air Force conducted ] operations to try to prevent the bridges from being erected, but took losses from Egyptian SAM batteries. The air attacks were ineffective overall, as the sectional design of the bridges enabled quick repairs when hit.{{sfnp|Cohen|1994|p=354}}
The attack by the Egyptian and Syrian forces caught the United States by surprise. According to future ] and Defense Secretary ], he was briefing an American arms negotiator on the improbability of armed conflict in the region when he heard the news of the outbreak of war on the radio. On the other hand, the ] learned about the attack in advance, probably from its intelligence sources in Egypt.<ref>Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, ''The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World'', Basic Books, 2006.{{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref>


Despite fierce resistance, the Israeli reserve brigade garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts was overwhelmed. According to Shazly, within six hours, fifteen strongpoints had been captured as Egyptian forces advanced several kilometres into the Sinai. Shazly's account was disputed by Kenneth Pollack, who noted that for the most part, the forts only fell to repeated assaults by superior forces or prolonged sieges over many days.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=11}} The northernmost fortification of the Bar Lev Line, code-named ']', withstood repeated assaults and remained in Israeli hands throughout the war. Once the bridges were laid, additional infantry with the remaining portable and recoilless anti-tank weapons began to cross the canal, while the first Egyptian tanks started to cross at 20:30.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=233}}
===Lack of Israeli pre-emptive strikes===
] ] made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike.]]
The Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that if war was imminent, Israel would launch a ]. It was assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, in the worst case, about 48 hours notice prior to an Arab attack.


The Egyptians also attempted to land several heli-borne commando units in various areas in the Sinai to hamper the arrival of Israeli reserves. This attempt met with disaster as the Israelis shot down up to 20 helicopters, inflicting heavy casualties.{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=32}}{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|pp=291–294}} Israeli Major General (res.) ] placed Egyptian helicopter losses at 14.{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|p=156}} Other sources claim that "several" helicopters were downed with "total loss of life" and that the few commandos that did filter through were ineffectual and presented nothing more than a "nuisance".<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 169, 170.</ref> Kenneth Pollack asserted that despite their heavy losses, the Egyptian commandos fought exceptionally hard and created considerable panic, prompting the Israelis to take precautions that hindered their ability to concentrate on stopping the assault across the canal.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=110}}
Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and Chief of General Staff ] met at 8:05&nbsp;am on the morning of Yom Kippur, six hours before the war began. Dayan opened the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar then presented his argument in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00&nbsp;pm, and Syrian ground forces at 5:00&nbsp;pm:
{{quote|When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it would not be blamed for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody,' she said.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 89.</ref>}}
Prior to the war, Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Meir that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war.<ref name="Quandt1977">{{cite book |author=William B. Quandt |title=Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 |url=https://archive.org/details/decadeofdecision00will |url-access=registration |date=1977 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-03469-3 |page= |quote=Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Israel that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war}}</ref> On October 6, 1973, the war opening date, Kissinger told Israel not to go for a preemptive strike, and Meir confirmed to him that Israel would not.<ref></ref>


Egyptian forces advanced approximately {{convert|4|to|5|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}} into the ] with two armies (both corps-sized by western standards, included the ] in the northern Second Army). By the following morning, some 850 tanks had crossed the canal.<ref name="Ramadan" /> In his account of the war, ] noted that by the morning of 7 October, the Egyptians had lost 280 soldiers and 20 tanks, though this account is disputed.<ref name="autogeneratedil">{{cite web |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/FlightLog/FlightLog.aspx?lang=EN&lobbyID=40&folderID=48&subfolderID=322&docfolderID=939&docID=13279&docType=EVENT |title=Israel Air Force |publisher=Iaf.org.il |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref>{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=108}}
Other developed nations,{{who|date=May 2017}} being more dependent on ] oil, took more seriously the threat of an Arab ] and trade ], and had stopped supplying Israel with ]s. As a result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States for military resupply, and particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. After Meir had made her decision, at 10:15&nbsp;am, she met with American ambassador ] in order to inform the United States that Israel did not intend to preemptively start a war, and asked that American efforts be directed at preventing war. An electronic telegram with Keating's report on the meeting was sent to the United States at 16:33 GMT (6:33&nbsp;pm local time).<ref name=Quandt /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=77417&dt=1573&dl=823 |title=Government of Israel Concern about possible Syrian and Egyptian attack today| access-date=August 11, 2010 |publisher=]| date=October 6, 1973}}</ref>


] shot down during the ]]]
A message arrived later from ] Henry Kissinger saying, "Don't preempt."<ref name=Sachar755>Sachar, Howard M. ''A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time''. Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 755.</ref> At the same time, Kissinger also urged the Soviets to use their influence to prevent war, contacted Egypt with Israel's message of non-preemption, and sent messages to other Arab governments to enlist their help on the side of moderation. These late efforts were futile.<ref>William B. Quandt, ''Peace Process'', p. 105.</ref> According to Henry Kissinger, had Israel struck first, it would not have received "so much as a nail".<ref>Rabinovich, p. 454.</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Rabinovich|first1=Abraham|title=Three years too late, Golda Meir understood how war could have been avoided|url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/three-years-too-late-golda-meir-understood-how-war-could-have-been-avoided/|access-date=April 15, 2017|work=The Times of Israel|date=September 12, 2013}}</ref>


Most Israeli soldiers defending the Bar Lev Line became casualties, and some 200 were taken prisoner.{{sfnmp|Shazly|2003|1p=244|Hammad|2002|2p=133|3a1=Nicolle|3a2=Cooper|3y=2004|3p=40}} In the subsequent days, some defenders of the Bar Lev Line managed to break through the Egyptian encirclement and return to their lines or were extracted during later Israeli counterattacks. For the next several days, the IAF played a minimal role in the fighting, largely because it was needed to deal with the simultaneous, and ultimately more threatening, Syrian attack in the Golan Heights.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=112}}
David Elazar proposed a mobilization of the entire air force and four armored divisions, a total of 100,000 to 120,000 troops, while Dayan favored a mobilization of the air force and two armored divisions, totaling around 70,000 troops. Meir chose Elazar's proposal.<ref>Gawrych 1996, p. 27.</ref>


Egyptian forces then consolidated their initial positions. On 7 October, the bridgeheads were enlarged an additional {{convert|4|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}}, at the same time repulsing Israeli counterattacks. In the north, the Egyptian 18th Division attacked the town of ], engaging Israeli forces in and around the town. The fighting there was conducted at close quarters, and was sometimes hand-to-hand. The Egyptians were forced to clear the town building by building. By evening, most of the town was in Egyptian hands. El-Qantarah was completely cleared by the next morning.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=712–714}}
==Course of the war==


Meanwhile, the Egyptian commandos airdropped on 6 October began encountering Israeli reserves the following morning. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the commandos were at times successful in delaying the movement of Israeli reserves to the front. These special operations often led to confusion and anxiety among Israeli commanders, who commended the Egyptian commandos.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=717–722}}<ref>{{harvp|Gawrych|1996|p=38}}. In his memoirs, Adan, commenting on one of the commando operations in the north, noted that "Natke's experience fighting the stubborn Egyptian commandos who tried to cut off the road around Romani showed again that this was not the Egyptian Army we had crushed in four days in 1967. We were now dealing with a well-trained enemy, fighting with skill and dedication."</ref> This view was contradicted by another source that stated that few commandos made it to their objectives, and were usually nothing more than a nuisance.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 169–170.</ref> According to ], only the commandos near Baluza and those blocking the road to Fort Budapest had measurable success. Of the 1,700 Egyptian commandos inserted behind Israeli lines during the war, 740 were killed—many in downed helicopters—and 330 taken prisoner.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=354}}
===Sinai Front===
]
] shot down over the Sinai on October 6, on display at the ]]]


===Failed Israeli counter-attack===
The Sinai was once again the arena of conflict between Israel and Egypt. The Egyptians had prepared for an assault across the canal and deployed five divisions totaling 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks and 2,000 guns and heavy mortars for the onslaught. Facing them were 450 soldiers of the ], spread out in 16 forts along the length of the canal. There were 290 Israeli tanks in all of Sinai, divided into three armored brigades,<ref>Rabinovich, prologue.</ref> only one of which was deployed near the canal when hostilities commenced.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 62.</ref>
] tank destroyed in the Sinai]]


On 7 October, David Elazar visited Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli ]—who had only taken the position three months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—and met with Israeli commanders. The Israelis planned a cautious counterattack for the following day by ]'s ].{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=41–42}} The same day, the IAF carried out ], aiming to neutralize ] bases and its missile defense shield.<ref name="Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64">Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64.</ref><ref name="israeled.org"> {{dead link|date=February 2016}}</ref>
Large ]s were established on the east bank on October 6. Israeli armoured forces launched counterattacks from October 6 to 8, but they were often piecemeal and inadequately supported and were beaten back principally by Egyptians using portable anti-tank missiles. Between October 9 and 12, the American response was a call for a cease-fire in place.<ref name="Quandt2005p109"/> The Egyptian units generally would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing the protection of their SAM batteries, which were situated on the west bank of the canal. In the Six-Day War, the Israeli Air Force had pummeled the defenseless Arab armies. Egypt (and Syria) had heavily fortified their side of the ceasefire lines with SAM batteries provided by the Soviet Union, against which the Israeli Air Force had no time to execute a ] operation, due to the element of surprise.<ref>{{cite web|last=Abudi |first=Joseph |title=The missile did not bend the wing |work=Journal of the Israeli Air Force |language=he |date=October 1, 2003 |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/1213-21478-he/IAF.aspx |access-date=February 15, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110513095613/http://www.iaf.org.il/1213-21478-he/IAF.aspx |archive-date=May 13, 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Abudi |first=Joseph |title= |publisher=The Fisher Institute |language=he |date=October 2005 |url=http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/num27.pdf |access-date=February 15, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511232617/http://www.fisherinstitute.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/num27.pdf |archive-date=May 11, 2011 }}</ref> Israel, which had invested much of its defense budget building the region's strongest air force, would see the effectiveness of its air force curtailed in the initial phases of the conflict by the SAM presence.


Seven Egyptian airbases were damaged, with the loss of two ]s and their pilots. Two more planned attacks were called off because of the increasing need for air power on the Syrian front. The IAF carried out additional air attacks against Egyptian forces on the east bank of the canal, reportedly inflicting heavy losses. Israeli jets had carried out hundreds of sorties against Egyptian targets by the following day, but the Egyptian SAM shield inflicted heavy losses. IAF aircraft losses amounted to three aircraft for every 200 sorties, an unsustainable rate. The Israelis responded by rapidly devising new tactics to thwart the Egyptian air defenses.<ref name="Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64" /><ref name="israeled.org" />
On October 9, the IDF chose to concentrate its reserves and build up its supplies while the Egyptians remained on the strategic defensive. Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full-scale resupply of arms to Israel. Short of supplies, the Israeli government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on October 12, but Sadat refused to do so.<ref name="Quandt2005p112"/> The Soviets started an airlift of arms to Syria and Egypt. The American global interest was to prove that Soviet arms could not dictate the outcome of the fighting, by supplying Israel. With an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until Israeli success on the battlefield might persuade the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end.<ref name="Quandt2005p114"/> The Israelis decided to counterattack once Egyptian armor attempted to expand the bridgehead beyond the protective SAM umbrella. The riposte, codenamed ], was launched on October 15. IDF forces spearheaded by Ariel Sharon's division broke through the Tasa corridor and crossed the Suez Canal to the north of the ].


]
After intense fighting, the IDF progressed towards Cairo and advanced southwards on the east bank of the Great Bitter Lake and in the southern extent of the canal right up to ]. It was important for the Americans that the fighting should be ended, when all parties could still emerge from the conflict with their vital interests and self-esteem intact. Hence they indicated an acceptance of Israeli advance while violating the ceasefire, but the United States would not accept the destruction of the Egyptian 3rd Army Corps.<ref name="Quandt2005p116"/> Israeli progress towards Cairo was brought to a halt when the ceasefire was declared on October 24.
On 8 October, after Elazar had left, Gonen changed the plans on the basis of unduly optimistic field reports. Adan's division was composed of three brigades totaling 183 tanks. One of the brigades was still en route to the area, and would participate in the attack by noon, along with a supporting mechanized infantry brigade with an additional 44 tanks.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=43–44}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=234}} The Israeli counterattack was in the direction of the Bar Lev strongpoints opposite the city of ], against entrenched Egyptian infantry. In a series of ill-coordinated attacks which were met by stiff resistance from Egyptian tanks, artillery, and infantry armed with anti-tank rockets, the Israelis were repulsed with heavy losses.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=44–52}}


An initial Israeli attack by some 25 tanks broke through the first Egyptian troops and managed to come within {{convert|800|m|ft}} of the canal before coming under withering fire. The Israelis lost 18 tanks within minutes and most of the commanders were killed or wounded. This was followed by a second attack by elements of two Israeli brigades, which had communication and coordination problems. The Egyptians allowed the Israelis to advance and then encircled them in a prepared ] before opening fire, wiping out most of the Israeli force within 13 minutes. The Egyptians destroyed over 50 Israeli tanks and captured eight intact.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=44–52}}
====Egyptian attack====
{{main|Operation Badr (1973)}}
]


That afternoon, Egyptian forces advanced once more to deepen their bridgeheads, and as a result the Israelis lost several strategic positions. Further Israeli attacks to regain the lost ground proved futile.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=44–52}} Towards nightfall, an Egyptian counterattack was repulsed with the loss of 50 Egyptian tanks by the Israeli 143rd Armored Division, which was led by Ariel Sharon, who had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. Gawrych, citing Egyptian sources, documented Egyptian tank losses up to 13 October at 240.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|pp=192, 208}}
Anticipating a swift Israeli ] by three armored divisions,<ref>Shazly, pp. 224–25.</ref> the Egyptians had armed their assault force with large numbers of man-portable ] weapons—]s and the less numerous but more advanced ] guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armored counterattacks. Each of the five infantry divisions that were to cross the canal had been equipped with RPG-7 rockets and ] grenades and reinforced with an anti-tank guided missile battalion, as they would not have any armor support for nearly 12 hours.<ref>Shazly, pp. 225–26.</ref>


===Temporary stabilization===
In addition, the Egyptians had built separate ramps at the crossing points, reaching as high as {{convert|21|m|ft}} to counter the Israeli sand wall, provide covering fire for the assaulting infantry and to counter the first Israeli armored counterattacks.<ref>Shazly, p. 189.</ref> The scale and effectiveness of the Egyptian strategy of deploying these anti-tank weapons coupled with the Israelis' inability to disrupt their use with ] (due to the SAM shield) greatly contributed to Israeli setbacks early in the war.


] operating in the Sinai]]
The Egyptian Army put great effort into finding a quick and effective way of ]. The Israelis had built large 18-metre (59&nbsp;foot) high sand walls with a 60-degree slope and reinforced with concrete at the water line. Egyptian engineers initially experimented with explosive charges and bulldozers to clear the obstacles, before a junior officer proposed using high pressure water cannons. The idea was tested and found to be a sound one, and several high pressure water cannons were imported from Britain and East Germany. The water cannons effectively breached the sand walls using water from the canal.<ref>Shazly, pp. 55–56.</ref>
According to Herzog, by 9 October the front lines had stabilized. The Egyptians were unable to advance further, and Egyptian armored attacks on 9 and 10 October were repulsed with heavy losses.{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|pp=255–256}} However, this claim was disputed by Shazly, who claimed that the Egyptians continued to advance and improve their positions well into 10 October. He pointed to one engagement, which involved elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, attached to the 19th Division, which captured Ayoun Mousa, south of Suez.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=241}}


The Egyptian 1st Mechanized Brigade launched a failed attack southward along the ] in the direction of ]. Leaving the safety of the SAM umbrella, the force was attacked by Israeli aircraft and suffered heavy losses.{{sfnmp|Shazly|2003|1p=241|Herzog|1982|2p=256}}
] on display in Egypt's war museum.]]
] fighter jets conducting air strikes over the ] on October 6]]


]
At 2:00&nbsp;pm on October 6, ] began with a large airstrike. More than 200 Egyptian aircraft conducted simultaneous strikes against three airbases, ] missile batteries, three command centers, artillery positions, and several radar installations.<ref>Garwych, p. 28.</ref> Airfields at ] and Bir Tamada were temporarily put out of service, and damage was inflicted on a Hawk battery at Ophir. The aerial assault was coupled with a barrage from more than 2,000 artillery pieces for a period of 53 minutes against the Bar Lev Line and rear area command posts and concentration bases.<ref name="Ramadan">{{cite book |first=Hamdy Sobhy |last=Abouseada |url=http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA379531&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf |title=The Crossing of the Suez Canal, October 6, 1973 (The Ramadan War) |page=9 |series=USAWC strategy research project |year=1980 |publisher=U.S. Army War College |isbn=9780891410430 |oclc=45004992 |access-date=4 October 2008 |archive-date=29 July 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090729084424/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA379531&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Between 10 and 13 October, both sides refrained from any large-scale actions, and the situation was relatively stable. Both sides launched small-scale attacks, and the Egyptians used helicopters to land commandos behind Israeli lines. Some Egyptian helicopters were shot down, and those commando forces that managed to land were quickly destroyed by Israeli troops. In one key engagement on 13 October, a particularly large Egyptian incursion was stopped and close to a hundred Egyptian commandos were killed.{{sfnp|Sharon|2011}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}


===Battle of the Sinai===
Author Andrew McGregor claimed that the success of the first strike negated the need for a second planned strike.<ref>Shazly, p. 232</ref><ref>Hammad, pp. 90–92, 108.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=McGregor |first=Andrew |title=A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War |publisher=Praeger Security International |location=Westport, Conn |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-275-98601-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/militaryhistoryo00andr }}, p. 278.</ref> Egypt acknowledged the loss of five aircraft during the attack. ] wrote that 18 Egyptian aircraft were shot down, and that these losses prompted the cancellation of the second planned wave.<ref>''Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness'' (Pollack), p. 108.</ref> In ] during this period, a pair of Israeli ] challenged 28 Egyptian MiGs over Sharm el-Sheikh and within half an hour, shot down seven or eight MiGs with no losses.<ref name="Rabinovich, p. 115">Rabinovich, p. 115.</ref><ref>Pollack, p. 125.</ref> One of the Egyptian pilots killed was Captain ], President Sadat's half-brother.<ref>Gawrych, p. 81.</ref>


On 14 October, an engagement now known as the ] took place. In preparation for the attack, Egyptian helicopters set down 100 commandos near the Lateral Road to disrupt the Israeli rear. An Israeli reconnaissance unit quickly subdued them, killing 60 and taking numerous prisoners. Still bruised by the extensive losses their commandos had suffered on the opening day of the war, the Egyptians were unable or unwilling to implement further commando operations that had been planned in conjunction with the armored attack.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=353}}
Simultaneously, 14 Egyptian ] bombers attacked Israeli targets in the Sinai with ], while another two Egyptian Tupolevs fired two Kelt missiles at a radar station in central Israel.<ref name="Rabinovich, p. 115" /> One missile was shot down by a patrolling Israeli Mirage fighter, and the second fell into the sea. The attack was an attempt to warn Israel that Egypt could retaliate if it bombed targets deep within Egyptian territory.<ref>''The Yom Kippur War 1973: The Sinai''&nbsp;– Simon Dunstan and Kevin Lyles.</ref>


General Shazly strongly opposed any eastward advance that would leave his armor without adequate air cover. He was overruled by General Ismail and Sadat, whose aims were to seize the strategic Mitla and Gidi Passes and the Israeli nerve centre at Refidim, which they hoped would relieve pressure on the Syrians (who were by now on the defensive) by forcing Israel to shift divisions from the Golan to the Sinai.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1982|1p=258|Shazly|2003|2p=317}}
] shot down by an Egyptian MiG-21]]
]
The 2nd and 3rd Armies were ordered to attack eastward in six simultaneous thrusts over a broad front, leaving behind five infantry divisions to hold the bridgeheads. The attacking forces, consisting of 800–1,000 tanks would not have SAM cover, so the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was tasked with their defense against Israeli aerial attacks. Armored and mechanized units initiated the attack on 14 October with artillery support. They were up against 700–750 Israeli tanks.{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|p=310}}<ref name="abc-clio1" />


In the event, the Egyptian armored thrust suffered heavy losses. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the ] thrust, Egyptian units launched head-on-attacks against the waiting Israeli defenses.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=335}} At least 250 Egyptian tanks and some 200 armored vehicles were destroyed.{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=144}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=117}}<ref>{{cite book|first=Martin |last=Van Creveld |url=http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |title=Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives |publisher=Sage |year=1975 |page=17 |isbn=978-0-8039-0562-7 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140513183257/http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |archive-date=13 May 2014}}</ref><ref name="autogenerated260">Herzog, ''The Arab–Israeli Wars'', Random House, p. 260.</ref> Egyptian casualties exceeded 1,000.<ref name="autogenerated260" /> Fewer than 40 Israeli tanks were hit, and all but six of them were repaired by Israeli maintenance crews and returned to service,{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=117}} while Israeli casualties numbered 665.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-embattled-israeli-bridgehead-at-chinese-farm.htm|title=Yom Kippur War: Embattled Israeli Bridgehead at Chinese Farm|date=21 August 2006 |website=HistoryNet}}</ref>
Under cover of the initial artillery barrage, the Egyptian assault force of 32,000 infantry began crossing the canal in twelve waves at five separate crossing areas, from 14:05 to 17:30, in what became known as ].<ref>Shazly, p. 228.</ref> The Egyptians prevented Israeli forces from reinforcing the Bar Lev Line and proceeded to attack the Israeli fortifications. Meanwhile, engineers crossed over to breach the sand wall.<ref>Shazly, p. 229.</ref><ref>{{cite news|first=Galal |last=Nassar |url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/oct12.htm |title=Into the breach, dear friends |work=Al-Ahram Weekly |issue=398 |date=October 8–14, 1998 |location=Cairo |at=para. 10 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030506231103/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/398/oct12.htm |archive-date=May 6, 2003 }}</ref> The Israeli Air Force conducted ] operations to try to prevent the bridges from being erected, but took losses from Egyptian SAM batteries. The air attacks were ineffective overall, as the sectional design of the bridges enabled quick repairs when hit.<ref>Cohen, ''Israel's Best Defense'', p. 354.</ref>


Kenneth Pollack credited a successful Israeli commando raid early on 14 October against an Egyptian signals-intercept site at Jebel Ataqah with seriously disrupting Egyptian command and control and contributing to its breakdown during the engagement.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=116, 126 & 129}} Israeli intelligence had also detected signs that the Egyptians were gearing up for a major armored thrust as early as 12 October.{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|pp=257–258}}
Despite fierce resistance, the Israeli reserve brigade garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts was overwhelmed. According to Shazly, within six hours, fifteen strongpoints had been captured as Egyptian forces advanced several kilometres into the Sinai. Shazly's account was disputed by Kenneth Pollack, who noted that for the most part, the forts only fell to repeated assaults by superior forces or prolonged sieges over many days.<ref>Pollack, p. 11.</ref> The northernmost fortification of the Bar Lev Line, code-named ']', withstood repeated assaults and remained in Israeli hands throughout the war. Once the bridges were laid, additional infantry with the remaining portable and recoilless anti-tank weapons began to cross the canal, while the first Egyptian tanks started to cross at 20:30.<ref>Shazly, p. 233.</ref>


===Israeli breakthrough and crossing of the Suez Canal===
The Egyptians also attempted to land several heli-borne commando units in various areas in the Sinai to hamper the arrival of Israeli reserves. This attempt met with disaster as the Israelis shot down up to 20 helicopters, inflicting heavy casualties.<ref>Haber & Schiff, p. 32.</ref><ref>Schiff, p. 294.</ref> Israeli Major General (res.) ] placed Egyptian helicopter losses at 14.<ref>Herzog, ''The War of Atonement'', Little, Brown and Company, 1975, p. 156.</ref> Other sources claim that "several" helicopters were downed with "total loss of life" and that the few commandos that did filter through were ineffectual and presented nothing more than a "nuisance".<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 169, 170.</ref> Kenneth Pollack asserted that despite their heavy losses, the Egyptian commandos fought exceptionally hard and created considerable panic, prompting the Israelis to take precautions that hindered their ability to concentrate on stopping the assault across the canal.<ref>Pollack, ''Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991'', University of Nebraska Press, p. 110</ref>
]
At this point, General Sharon advocated an immediate crossing at Deversoir at the northern edge of Great Bitter Lake. Earlier, on 9 October, a reconnaissance force attached to Colonel ]'s Brigade had detected a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies in this sector.<ref name="abc-clio1">{{cite web |first=David T. |last=Zabecki |url=http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1281396&currentSection=1271019&productid=16 |title=Arab–Israeli Wars: 60 Years of Conflict |at=Chinese Farm, Battle of The |publisher=Historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com |date=3 December 2008 |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref> According to General Gamasy, the gap had been spotted by an American ] spy plane.{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=276}}


The Israelis followed the Egyptian failed attack of 14 October with a multidivisional counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. Sharon's 143rd Division, now reinforced with a paratroop brigade commanded by Colonel ], was tasked with establishing bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the canal. The 162nd and 252nd Armored Divisions, commanded by Generals Avraham Adan and Kalman Magen, respectively, would then cross through the breach to the west bank of the canal and swing southward, encircling the 3rd Army.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=118}}
Egyptian forces advanced approximately {{convert|4|to|5|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}} into the ] with two armies (both corps-sized by western standards, included the ] in the northern Second Army). By the following morning, some 850 tanks had crossed the canal.<ref name="Ramadan" /> In his account of the war, ] noted that by the morning of October 7, the Egyptians had lost 280 soldiers and 20 tanks, though this account is disputed.<ref name="autogeneratedil">{{cite web |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/Templates/FlightLog/FlightLog.aspx?lang=EN&lobbyID=40&folderID=48&subfolderID=322&docfolderID=939&docID=13279&docType=EVENT |title=Israel Air Force |publisher=Iaf.org.il |access-date=March 28, 2010 }}</ref><ref name="autogenerated108">Pollack, ''Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991'', University of Nebraska Press, p. 108.</ref>


On the night of 15 October, 750 of Colonel Matt's paratroopers crossed the canal in rubber dinghies.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=374–375}} They were soon joined by tanks, ferried on motorized rafts, and additional infantry. The force encountered no resistance initially and fanned out in raiding parties, attacking supply convoys, SAM sites, logistic centers and anything else of military value, with priority given to the SAMs. Attacks on SAM sites punched a hole in the Egyptian anti-aircraft screen and enabled the IAF to strike Egyptian ground targets more aggressively.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=389–391}}
] shot down during the ].]]


On the night of 15 October, 20 Israeli tanks and seven ] under the command of Colonel Haim Erez crossed the canal and penetrated {{convert|12|km}} into Egypt, taking the Egyptians by surprise. For the first 24 hours, Erez's force attacked SAM sites and military columns with impunity, including a ] on 16 October, in which three Egyptian missile bases were destroyed, along with several tanks, for no Israeli losses. On the morning of 17 October, the force was attacked by the 23rd Egyptian Armored Brigade, but managed to repulse the attack. By this time, the Syrians no longer posed a credible threat and the Israelis were able to shift their air power to the south in support of the offensive.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=511}} The combination of a weakened Egyptian SAM umbrella and a greater concentration of Israeli fighter-bombers meant that the IAF was capable of greatly increasing sorties against Egyptian military targets, including convoys, armor and airfields. The Egyptian bridges across the canal were damaged in Israeli air and artillery attacks.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}
Most Israeli soldiers defending the Bar Lev Line became casualties, and some 200 were taken prisoner.<ref name="Shazly p.244">Shazly, p. 244.</ref><ref>Hammad, p. 133.</ref><ref>Nicolle & Cooper p. 40.</ref> In the subsequent days, some defenders of the Bar Lev Line managed to break through the Egyptian encirclement and return to their lines or were extracted during later Israeli counterattacks. For the next several days, the IAF played a minimal role in the fighting, largely because it was needed to deal with the simultaneous, and ultimately more threatening, Syrian invasion of the Golan Heights.<ref>Pollack, p. 112.</ref>


Israeli jets began attacking Egyptian SAM sites and radars, prompting General Ismail to withdraw much of the Egyptians' air defense equipment. This in turn gave the IAF still greater freedom to operate in Egyptian airspace. Israeli jets also attacked and destroyed underground communication cables at ] in the ], forcing the Egyptians to transmit selective messages by radio, which could be intercepted. Aside from the cables at Banha, Israel refrained from attacking economic and strategic infrastructure following an Egyptian threat to retaliate against Israeli cities with ]s. Israeli aircraft bombed Egyptian Scud batteries at ] several times.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=124–125}}
Egyptian forces then consolidated their initial positions. On October 7, the bridgeheads were enlarged an additional {{convert|4|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}}, at the same time repulsing Israeli counterattacks. In the north, the Egyptian 18th Division attacked the town of ], engaging Israeli forces in and around the town. The fighting there was conducted at close quarters, and was sometimes hand-to-hand. The Egyptians were forced to clear the town building by building. By evening, most of the town was in Egyptian hands. El-Qantarah was completely cleared by the next morning.<ref>Hammad, pp. 712–14.</ref>


The Egyptian Air Force attempted to interdict IAF sorties and attack Israeli ground forces, but suffered heavy losses in dogfights and from Israeli air defenses, while inflicting light aircraft losses. The heaviest air battles took place over the northern Nile Delta, where the Israelis repeatedly attempted to destroy Egyptian airbases.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=124–125}} Although the Israelis tended to come out on top in aerial battles, one notable exception was the ], when an Israeli raid against the Egyptian airbases of ] and ] was repulsed by Egyptian fighter aircraft.<ref>{{cite web |title=Battle of el-Mansourah |url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_266.shtml |author=Dr. David Nicolle & Sherif Sharmy |publisher=Air Combat Information Group (ACIG) |date=24 September 2003 |access-date=2009-05-01 |df=dmy-all |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090414094408/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_266.shtml |archive-date=14 April 2009 |url-status=live}}</ref>
Meanwhile, the Egyptian commandos airdropped on October 6 began encountering Israeli reserves the following morning. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the commandos were at times successful in delaying the movement of Israeli reserves to the front. These special operations often led to confusion and anxiety among Israeli commanders, who commended the Egyptian commandos.<ref name=Hammad717-22>Hammad, pp. 717–22</ref><ref>Gawrych 1996, p. 38. In his memoirs, Adan, commenting on one of the commando operations in the north, noted that "Natke's experience fighting the stubborn Egyptian commandos who tried to cut off the road around Romani showed again that this was not the Egyptian Army we had crushed in four days in 1967. We were now dealing with a well-trained enemy, fighting with skill and dedication."</ref> This view was contradicted by another source that stated that few commandos made it to their objectives, and were usually nothing more than a nuisance.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 169–70.</ref> According to ], only the commandos near Baluza and those blocking the road to Fort Budapest had measurable success. Of the 1,700 Egyptian commandos inserted behind Israeli lines during the war, 740 were killed—many in downed helicopters—and 330 taken prisoner.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 354.</ref>


====Failed Israeli counter-attack==== ===Securing the bridgehead===
]
] tank destroyed in the Sinai.]]
Despite the success the Israelis were having on the west bank, Generals Bar-Lev and Elazar ordered Sharon to concentrate on securing the bridgehead on the east bank. He was ordered to clear the roads leading to the canal as well as a position known as the ], just north of Deversoir, the Israeli crossing point. Sharon objected and requested permission to expand and break out of the bridgehead on the west bank, arguing that such a maneuver would cause the collapse of Egyptian forces on the east bank. But the Israeli high command was insistent, believing that until the east bank was secure, forces on the west bank could be cut off. Sharon was overruled by his superiors and relented.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=393}}


On 16 October, he dispatched Amnon Reshef's Brigade to attack the Chinese Farm. Other IDF forces attacked entrenched Egyptian forces overlooking the roads to the canal. After three days of bitter and close-quarters fighting, the Israelis succeeded in dislodging the numerically superior Egyptian forces. The Israelis lost about 300 dead, 1,000 wounded, and 56 tanks. The Egyptians suffered heavier casualties, including 118 tanks destroyed and 15 captured.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=425}}{{sfnp|Sharon|2011}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}{{sfnmp|Rabinovich|2004|1p=427|Pollack|2002|2pp=118–119|Hammad|2002|3pp=335–408|Gawrych|1996|4pp=62–64}}
On October 7, David Elazar visited Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli ]—who had only taken the position three months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—and met with Israeli commanders. The Israelis planned a cautious counterattack for the following day by ]'s ].<ref>Gawrych 1996, pp. 41–42.</ref> The same day, the IAF carried out ], aiming to neutralize ] bases and its missile defense shield.<ref name="Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64">Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64.</ref><ref name="israeled.org">{{dead link|date=February 2016}}</ref>


===Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing===
Seven Egyptian airbases were damaged, with the loss of two ]s and their pilots. Two more planned attacks were called off because of the increasing need for air power on the Syrian front. The IAF carried out additional air attacks against Egyptian forces on the east bank of the canal, reportedly inflicting heavy losses. Israeli jets had carried out hundreds of sorties against Egyptian targets by the following day, but the Egyptian SAM shield inflicted heavy losses. IAF aircraft losses mounted to three aircraft for every 200 sorties, an unsustainable rate. The Israelis responded by rapidly devising new tactics to thwart the Egyptian air defenses.<ref name="Dunstan and Lyles, p. 64"/><ref name="israeled.org"/>
]. One of them has a captured Egyptian ].]]


The Egyptians, meanwhile, failed to grasp the extent and magnitude of the Israeli crossing, nor did they appreciate its intent and purpose. This was partly due to attempts by Egyptian field commanders to obfuscate reports concerning the Israeli crossing{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=129}} and partly due to a false assumption that the canal crossing was merely a diversion for a major IDF offensive targeting the right flank of the Second Army.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=119}} Consequently, on 16 October General Shazly ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward and the T-62-equipped 25th Independent Armored Brigade to attack northward in a pincer action to eliminate the perceived threat to the Second Army.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=119–120}}
On October 8, after Elazar had left, Gonen changed the plans on the basis of unduly optimistic field reports. Adan's division was composed of three brigades totaling 183 tanks. One of the brigades was still en route to the area, and would participate in the attack by noon, along with a supporting mechanized infantry brigade with an additional 44 tanks.<ref>Gawrych, 1996, pp. 43–44.</ref><ref>Rabinovich, p. 234.</ref> The Israeli counterattack was in the direction of the Bar Lev strongpoints opposite the city of ], against entrenched Egyptian infantry. In a series of ill-coordinated attacks which were met by stiff resistance from Egyptian tanks, artillery, and infantry armed with anti-tank rockets, the Israelis were repulsed with heavy losses. An initial Israeli attack by some 25 tanks broke through the first Egyptian troops and managed to come within {{convert|800|m|ft}} of the canal before coming under withering fire. The Israelis lost 18 tanks within minutes and most of the commanders were killed or wounded. This was followed by a second attack by elements of two Israeli brigades, which had communication and coordination problems. The Egyptians allowed the Israelis to advance and then encircled them in a prepared ] before opening fire, wiping out most of the Israeli force within 13 minutes. The Egyptians destroyed over 50 Israeli tanks and captured eight intact.<ref name="Gawrych 1996, pp. 44–52">Gawrych 1996, pp. 44–52.</ref>


The Egyptians failed to scout the area and were unaware that by now, Adan's 162nd Armored Division was in the vicinity. Moreover, the 21st and 25th failed to coordinate their attacks, allowing General Adan's Division to meet each force separately. Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division, destroying 50–60 Egyptian tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. He then turned southward and ambushed the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs, while losing three tanks.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|pp=119–120}}
That afternoon, Egyptian forces advanced once more to deepen their bridgeheads, and as a result the Israelis lost several strategic positions. Further Israeli attacks to regain the lost ground proved futile.<ref name="Gawrych 1996, pp. 44–52"/> Towards nightfall, an Egyptian counterattack was repulsed with the loss of 50 Egyptian tanks by the Israeli 143rd Armored Division, which was led by Ariel Sharon, who had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. Garwych, citing Egyptian sources, documented Egyptian tank losses up to October 13 at 240.<ref>Gawrych 2000, pp. 192, 208.</ref>


] tanks on the banks of the Suez Canal]]
====Temporary stabilization====
] operating in the Sinai.]]


Egyptian artillery shelled the Israeli bridge over the canal on the morning of 17 October, scoring several hits. The Egyptian Air Force launched repeated raids, some with up to 20 aircraft, to take out the bridge and rafts, damaging the bridge. The Egyptians had to shut down their SAM sites during these raids, allowing Israeli fighters to intercept the Egyptians. The Egyptians lost 16 planes and seven helicopters, while the Israelis lost six planes.<ref>Boyne, p. 181</ref>
According to Herzog, by October 9 the front lines had stabilized. The Egyptians were unable to advance further,<ref>Herzog, 1982, pp. 255–56.</ref> and Egyptian armored attacks on October 9 and 10 were repulsed with heavy losses. However, this claim was disputed by Shazly, who claimed that the Egyptians continued to advance and improve their positions well into October 10. He pointed to one engagement, which involved elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, attached to the 19th Division, which captured Ayoun Mousa, south of Suez.<ref name="Shazly p. 241">Shazly, p. 241.</ref>


The bridge was damaged, and the Israeli Paratroop Headquarters, which was near the bridge, was also hit; its commander and his deputy were wounded. During the night, the bridge was repaired, but only a trickle of Israeli forces was able to cross. According to Chaim Herzog, the Egyptians continued attacking the bridgehead until the ceasefire, using artillery and mortars to fire tens of thousands of shells into the area of the crossing. Egyptian aircraft attempted to bomb the bridge every day, and helicopters launched suicide missions, making attempts to drop barrels of napalm on the bridge and bridgehead.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}
The Egyptian 1st Mechanized Brigade launched a failed attack southward along the ] in the direction of ]. Leaving the safety of the SAM umbrella, the force was attacked by Israeli aircraft and suffered heavy losses.<ref name="Shazly p. 241" /><ref name=h256>Herzog 1982, p. 256.</ref> Shazly cited this experience as a basis to resist pressure by the Minister of War, General ], to attack eastward toward the Mitla and Gidi Passes.


The bridges were damaged multiple times, and had to be repaired at night. The attacks caused heavy casualties, and many tanks were sunk when their rafts were hit. Egyptian commandos and frogmen with armored support launched a ground attack against the bridgehead, which was repulsed with the loss of 10 tanks. Two subsequent Egyptian counterattacks were also beaten back.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}
Between October 10 and 13, both sides refrained from any large-scale actions, and the situation was relatively stable. Both sides launched small-scale attacks, and the Egyptians used helicopters to land commandos behind Israeli lines. Some Egyptian helicopters were shot down, and those commando forces that managed to land were quickly destroyed by Israeli troops. In one key engagement on October 13, a particularly large Egyptian incursion was stopped and close to a hundred Egyptian commandos were killed.<ref name="sharon life">Sharon, Gilad: ''Sharon: The Life of a Leader'' (2011).</ref>{{unreliable source?|date=May 2017}}


After the failure of the 17 October counterattacks, the Egyptian General Staff slowly began to realize the magnitude of the Israeli offensive. Early on 18 October, the Soviets showed Sadat satellite imagery of Israeli forces operating on the west bank. Alarmed, Sadat dispatched Shazly to the front to assess the situation first-hand. He no longer trusted his field commanders to provide accurate reports.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=120}} Shazly confirmed that the Israelis had at least one division on the west bank and were widening their bridgehead. He advocated withdrawing most of Egypt's armor from the east bank to confront the growing Israeli threat on the west bank. Sadat rejected this recommendation outright and even threatened Shazly with a court martial.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=401}} Ahmad Ismail Ali recommended that Sadat push for a ceasefire so as to prevent the Israelis from exploiting their successes.{{sfnp|Pollack|2002|p=120}}
====Failed Egyptian attack====
General Shazly strongly opposed any eastward advance that would leave his armor without adequate air cover. He was overruled by General Ismail and Sadat, whose aims were to seize the strategic Mitla and Gidi Passes and the Israeli nerve centre at Refidim, which they hoped would relieve pressure on the Syrians (who were by now on the defensive) by forcing Israel to shift divisions from the Golan to the Sinai.<ref>Herzog, 1982, p. 258.</ref><ref>Shazly, p. 317.</ref>


===Israeli forces across the Suez===
]
]
Israeli forces were by now pouring across the canal on two bridges, including one of Israeli design, and motorized rafts. Israeli engineers under Brigadier-General {{ill|Dan Even|he|דן אבן}} had worked under heavy Egyptian fire to set up the bridges, and over 100 were killed and hundreds more wounded.<ref>Dunstan, p. 107.</ref> The crossing was difficult because of Egyptian artillery fire, though by 4:00&nbsp;am, two of Adan's brigades were on the west bank of the canal. On the morning of 18 October, Sharon's forces on the west bank launched an ] toward Ismailia, slowly pushing back the Egyptian paratroop brigade occupying the sand rampart northward to enlarge the bridgehead.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=223}} Some of his units attempted to move west, but were stopped at the crossroads in Nefalia. Adan's division rolled south toward Suez City while Magen's division pushed west toward Cairo and south toward Adabiya.{{sfnmp|Herzog|1975|1pp=236–237|Pollack|2002|2p=122}}


On 19 October, one of Sharon's brigades continued to push the Egyptian paratroopers north towards Ismailia until the Israelis were within {{convert|8|or|10|km|mi|abbr=on|0}} of the city. Sharon hoped to seize the city and thereby sever the logistical and supply lines for most of the Egyptian Second Army. Sharon's second brigade began to cross the canal. The brigade's forward elements moved to the Abu Sultan Camp, from where they moved north to take Orcha, an Egyptian logistics base defended by a commando battalion. Israeli infantrymen cleared the trenches and bunkers, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat, as tanks moved alongside them and fired into the trench sections to their front. The position was secured before nightfall. More than 300 Egyptians were killed and 50 taken prisoner, while the Israelis lost 16 dead.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=428–429}}
The 2nd and 3rd Armies were ordered to attack eastward in six simultaneous thrusts over a broad front, leaving behind five infantry divisions to hold the bridgeheads. The attacking forces, consisting of 800<ref name="autogenerated1">Schiff, ''A History of the Israeli Army'', p. 310.</ref>–1,000 tanks<ref name="abc-clio1" /> would not have SAM cover, so the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was tasked with their defense against Israeli aerial attacks. Armored and mechanized units initiated the attack on October 14 with artillery support. They were up against 700<ref name="autogenerated1" />–750<ref name="abc-clio1" /> Israeli tanks.


The fall of Orcha caused the collapse of the Egyptian defensive line, allowing more Israeli troops to get onto the sand rampart. There, they were able to fire in support of Israeli troops facing Missouri Ridge, an Egyptian-occupied position on the ] that could pose a threat to the Israeli crossing. On the same day, Israeli paratroopers participating in Sharon's drive pushed the Egyptians back far enough for the Israeli bridges to be out of sight of Egyptian artillery observers, though the Egyptians continued shelling the area.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=428–429}}
Preparatory to the tank attack, Egyptian helicopters set down 100 commandos near the Lateral Road to disrupt the Israeli rear. An Israeli reconnaissance unit quickly subdued them, killing 60 and taking numerous prisoners. Still bruised by the extensive losses their commandos had suffered on the opening day of the war, the Egyptians were unable or unwilling to implement further commando operations that had been planned in conjunction with the armored attack.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 353.</ref> The Egyptian armored thrust suffered heavy losses. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the ] thrust, Egyptian units launched head-on-attacks against the waiting Israeli defenses.<ref name=Rabinovich335>Rabinovich, p. 355.</ref>


As the Israelis pushed towards Ismailia, the Egyptians fought a delaying battle, retreating into defensive positions further north as they came under increasing pressure from the Israeli ground offensive, coupled with airstrikes. On 21 October, one of Sharon's brigades was occupying the city's outskirts, but facing fierce resistance from Egyptian paratroopers and commandos. The same day, Sharon's last remaining unit on the east bank attacked Missouri Ridge. Shmuel Gonen had demanded Sharon capture the position, and Sharon had reluctantly ordered the attack. The assault was preceded by an air attack that caused hundreds of Egyptian soldiers to flee and thousands of others to dig in.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=120}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=445}}
The ] was decisively repelled. At least 250 Egyptian tanks<ref>Haber & Schiff, p. 144.</ref><ref name="autogenerated8">Pollack, p. 117.</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=Martin |last=Van Creveld |url=http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |title=Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives |publisher=Sage |year=1975 |page=17 |isbn=978-0-8039-0562-7 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140513183257/http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |archive-date=May 13, 2014 }}</ref><ref name="autogenerated260">Herzog, ''The Arab–Israeli Wars'', Random House, p. 260.</ref> and some 200 armored vehicles<ref name="autogenerated8" /> were destroyed. Egyptian casualties exceeded 1,000.<ref name="autogenerated260" /><ref name="globalsecurity1984">{{cite web|author=John Pike |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/ORL.htm |title=Operation Valiant: Turning the Tide in the Sinai 1973 Arab–Israeli War CSC 1984 |publisher=Globalsecurity.org |access-date=March 28, 2010}}</ref> Fewer than 40 Israeli tanks were hit, and all but six of them were repaired by Israeli maintenance crews and returned to service,<ref name="autogenerated8" /> while Israeli casualties numbered 665.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-embattled-israeli-bridgehead-at-chinese-farm.htm|title=Yom Kippur War: Embattled Israeli Bridgehead at Chinese Farm|date=August 21, 2006|website=HistoryNet}}</ref>


One Israeli battalion then attacked from the south, destroying 20 tanks and overrunning infantry positions before being halted by ] and minefields. Another battalion attacked from the southwest and inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians, but its advance was halted after eight tanks were knocked out. The surviving Israeli soldiers managed to hold off an Egyptian infantry assault while losing two soldiers before surrendering. Two of the Israeli soldiers managed to hide and escape back to Israeli lines. The Israelis managed to occupy one-third of Missouri Ridge. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan countermanded orders from Sharon's superiors to continue the attack.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=120}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=445}} However, the Israelis continued to expand their holdings on the east bank. According to the Israelis, the IDF bridgehead was {{convert|40|km|abbr=on}} wide and {{convert|32|km|abbr=on}} deep by the end of 21 October.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=121}}
Kenneth Pollack credited a successful Israeli commando raid early on October 14 against an Egyptian signals-intercept site at Jebel Ataqah with seriously disrupting Egyptian command and control and contributing to its breakdown during the engagement.<ref>Pollack, Kenneth, ''Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–91'', University of Nebraska Press, pp. 116, 126 & 129.</ref>


]
====Israeli planned counter-attack considerations====
On 22 October, Ismailia's Egyptian defenders were occupying their last line of defense. At around 10:00&nbsp;am, the Israelis renewed the attack, moving toward Jebel Mariam, Abu 'Atwa and Nefisha. The paratroopers at Jebel Mariam became engaged in intense fighting but, with their advantageous position, were able to repel the attack by late afternoon. Meanwhile, the Israelis concentrated artillery and mortar fire against the Sa'iqa positions at Abu 'Atwa and Nefisha. At noon, advance Israeli elements engaged with a Sa'iqa reconnaissance unit, and the Israelis lost two tanks and a half-track. At 1:00&nbsp;pm, an Israeli paratrooper company attacked Abu 'Atwa without first scouting ahead, and was ambushed and annihilated. The attack ended after paratroopers suffered over fifty casualties and lost four tanks.
With the situation on the Syrian front stabilizing, the Israeli High Command agreed that the time was ripe for an Israeli counterattack and strike across the canal.


At the same time, two tank companies and mechanized infantry attacked Nefisha, supported with close air support. The Egyptian Sa'iqa commando battalion in charge of Nefisha managed to repel the attack after prolonged, heavy fighting that closed to very short distances. The Israelis lost three tanks, two half-tracks, and a large number of men. For their part the Sa'iqa commandos at Nefisha lost 24 killed, including four officers, and 42 wounded, including three officers. ] mentions a counterattack by the Sa'iqa which took place during the afternoon and pushed some of Sharon's troops back along the Sweetwater Canal.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=249}} The Israeli attack had been thoroughly routed.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=220}}<ref name=Dupuy529>Dupuy (2002), p.529</ref>
General Sharon advocated an immediate crossing at Deversoir at the northern edge of Great Bitter Lake. On October 9, a reconnaissance force attached to Colonel ]'s Brigade detected a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies in this sector.<ref name="abc-clio1">{{cite web |first=David T. |last=Zabecki |url=http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1281396&currentSection=1271019&productid=16 |title=Arab–Israeli Wars: 60 Years of Conflict |at=Chinese Farm, Battle of The |publisher=Historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com |date=December 3, 2008 |access-date=March 28, 2010}}</ref> According to General Gamasy, the gap had been spotted by an American ] spy plane.<ref>El-Gamasy, p. 276.</ref> Chief of Staff Elazar and General ], who had by now replaced Gonen as Chief of Southern Command, agreed that this was the ideal spot for a crossing. However, given the size of the Egyptian armored reserves, the Israelis chose to wait for an opportunity that would allow them to weaken Egyptian armored strength before initiating any crossing.


Israeli forces failed to get behind Ismailia and encircle the city. The Israeli advance on Ismailia was stopped {{convert|10|km|mi|0|abbr=on}} south of the city. The IDF failed to cut supplies for the Egyptian Second Army or to occupy ]. The Egyptians registered a tactical and strategic victory in the defense of Ismailia, stopping an encirclement of their large forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal and ensuring their supply lines remained open.
The opportunity arrived on October 12, when Israeli intelligence detected signs that the Egyptians were gearing up for a major armored thrust.<ref>Herzog, 1982, pp. 257–58.</ref> This was precisely the moment the Israelis had been waiting for. They could finally utilize their advantages in speed, maneuver and tank gunnery, areas in which they excelled. Once Egyptian armored strength was sufficiently degraded, the Israelis would commence their own canal crossing.


On the northern front, the Israelis also attacked Port Said, facing Egyptian troops and a 900-strong ]n unit, who fought a defensive battle.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=122}} The Egyptian government claimed that the city was repeatedly bombed by Israeli jets, and that hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded.<ref>'']'', 25 October 1973, issue.</ref>
====Israeli breakthrough and crossing of the Suez Canal====
]
The Israelis immediately followed the Egyptian failed attack of October 14 with a multidivisional counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. Sharon's 143rd Division, now reinforced with a paratroop brigade commanded by Colonel ], was tasked with establishing bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the canal. The 162nd and 252nd Armored Divisions, commanded by Generals Avraham Adan and Kalman Magen, respectively, would then cross through the breach to the west bank of the canal and swing southward, encircling the 3rd Army.<ref>Pollack, p. 118.</ref> The offensive was code-named Operation Stouthearted Men or alternatively, Operation Valiant.


Adan and Magen moved south, decisively defeating the Egyptians in a series of engagements, though they often encountered determined Egyptian resistance, and both sides suffered heavy casualties.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=223}} Adan advanced towards the Sweetwater Canal area, planning to break out into the surrounding desert and hit the Geneifa Hills, where many SAM sites were located. Adan's three armored brigades fanned out, with one advancing through the Geneifa Hills, another along a parallel road south of them, and the third advancing towards Mina. Adan's brigades met resistance from dug-in Egyptian forces in the Sweetwater Canal area's ]. Adan's other brigades were also held by a line of Egyptian military camps and installations. Adan was also harassed by the Egyptian Air Force.<ref name="Boyne, p. 183">Boyne, p. 183.</ref>
On the night of October 15, 750 of Colonel Matt's paratroopers crossed the canal in rubber dinghies.<ref>Rabinovich, pp. 374–75.</ref> They were soon joined by tanks, ferried on motorized rafts, and additional infantry. The force encountered no resistance initially and fanned out in raiding parties, attacking supply convoys, SAM sites, logistic centers and anything else of military value, with priority given to the SAMs. Attacks on SAM sites punched a hole in the Egyptian anti-aircraft screen and enabled the IAF to strike Egyptian ground targets more aggressively.<ref>Rabinovich, pp. 389–91.</ref>


The Israelis slowly advanced, bypassing Egyptian positions whenever possible. After being denied air support due to the presence of two SAM batteries that had been brought forward, Adan sent two brigades to attack them. The brigades slipped past the dug-in Egyptian infantry, moving out from the greenbelt for more than {{convert|8|km|mi|0|abbr=on}}, and fought off multiple Egyptian counterattacks. From a distance of {{convert|4|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}}, they shelled and destroyed the SAMs, allowing the IAF to provide Adan with close air support.<ref name="Boyne, p. 183"/> Adan's troops advanced through the greenbelt and fought their way to the Geneifa Hills, clashing with scattered Egyptian, Kuwaiti and Palestinian troops. The Israelis clashed with an Egyptian armored unit at Mitzeneft and destroyed multiple SAM sites. Adan also captured ], which was subsequently prepared by Israeli crews to serve as a supply base and to fly out wounded soldiers.<ref>Hoyne, p. 205.</ref>
On the night of October 15, 20 Israeli tanks and seven ] under the command of Colonel Haim Erez crossed the canal and penetrated {{convert|12|km}} into Egypt, taking the Egyptians by surprise. For the first 24 hours, Erez's force attacked SAM sites and military columns with impunity, including a ] on October 16, in which three Egyptian missile bases were destroyed, along with several tanks, for no Israeli losses. On the morning of October 17, the force was attacked by the 23rd Egyptian Armored Brigade, but managed to repulse the attack. By this time, the Syrians no longer posed a credible threat and the Israelis were able to shift their air power to the south in support of the offensive.<ref>Pollack, p. 511.</ref> The combination of a weakened Egyptian SAM umbrella and a greater concentration of Israeli fighter-bombers meant that the IAF was capable of greatly increasing sorties against Egyptian military targets, including convoys, armor and airfields. The Egyptian bridges across the canal were damaged in Israeli air and artillery attacks.<ref name="O'Ballance"/>


{{convert|10|mi|km|order=flip|spell=In}} west of the Bitter Lake, Colonel Natke Nir's brigade overran an Egyptian artillery brigade that had been participating in the shelling of the Israeli bridgehead. Scores of Egyptian artillerymen were killed and many more taken prisoner. Two Israeli soldiers were also killed, including the son of General ]. Meanwhile, Magen's division moved west and then south, covering Adan's flank and eventually moving south of Suez City to the Gulf of Suez.<ref>Boyne, p. 214</ref>
Israeli jets began attacking Egyptian SAM sites and radars, prompting General Ismail to withdraw much of the Egyptians' air defense equipment. This in turn gave the IAF still greater freedom to operate in Egyptian airspace. Israeli jets also attacked and destroyed underground communication cables at ] in the ], forcing the Egyptians to transmit selective messages by radio, which could be intercepted. Aside from the cables at Banha, Israel refrained from attacking economic and strategic infrastructure following an Egyptian threat to retaliate against Israeli cities with Scud missiles. Israeli aircraft bombed Egyptian Scud batteries at ] several times. The Egyptian Air Force attempted to interdict IAF sorties and attack Israeli ground forces, but suffered heavy losses in dogfights and from Israeli air defenses, while inflicting light aircraft losses. The heaviest air battles took place over the northern Nile Delta, where the Israelis repeatedly attempted to destroy Egyptian airbases.<ref name="O'Ballance"/><ref>Pollack, pp. 124–25</ref> Although the Israelis tended to come out on top in aerial battles, one notable exception was the ], when an Israeli raid against the Egyptian airbases of ] and ] was repulsed by Egyptian fighter aircraft.


===The ceasefire and further battles===
====Securing the bridgehead====
]
Despite the success the Israelis were having on the west bank, Generals Bar-Lev and Elazar ordered Sharon to concentrate on securing the bridgehead on the east bank. He was ordered to clear the roads leading to the canal as well as a position known as the ], just north of Deversoir, the Israeli crossing point. Sharon objected and requested permission to expand and break out of the bridgehead on the west bank, arguing that such a maneuver would cause the collapse of Egyptian forces on the east bank. But the Israeli high command was insistent, believing that until the east bank was secure, forces on the west bank could be cut off. Sharon was overruled by his superiors and relented.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 393.</ref>
]]]


The ] passed (14–0) ] calling for a ceasefire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on 22 October. It called upon the belligerents to immediately cease all military activity. The cease-fire was to come into effect 12 hours later at {{nowrap|6:52 pm}} Israeli time.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=452}} Because this was after dark, it was impossible for ] ] to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=458}} U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger intimated to Prime Minister Meir that he would not object to offensive action during the night before the ceasefire was to come into effect.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-54.pdf |title=22 October Memorandum of Conversation between Meir and Kissinger |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref>
On October 16, he dispatched Amnon Reshef's Brigade to attack the Chinese Farm. Other IDF forces attacked entrenched Egyptian forces overlooking the roads to the canal. After three days of bitter and close-quarters fighting, the Israelis succeeded in dislodging the numerically superior Egyptian forces. The Israelis lost about 300 dead, 1,000 wounded, and 56 tanks. The Egyptians suffered heavier casualties, including 118 tanks destroyed and 15 captured.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 425.</ref><ref>Sharon, Gilad: ''Sharon: The Life of A Leader'' (2011)</ref><ref>Rabinovich, p. 427.</ref><ref>Pollack, pp. 118–19.</ref><ref>Hammad (2002), pp. 335–408.</ref><ref>Gawrych (1996), pp. 62–64.</ref>


Several minutes before the ceasefire came into effect, three Scud missiles ] at Israeli targets by either Egyptian forces or Soviet personnel in Egypt. This was the first combat use of Scud missiles. One Scud targeted the port of ] and two targeted the Israeli bridgehead on the Suez Canal. One hit an Israeli supply convoy and killed seven soldiers.<ref>Adan, p. 284.</ref> When the time for the ceasefire arrived, Sharon's division had failed to capture Ismailia and cut off the Second Army's supply lines, but Israeli forces were just a few hundred metres short of their southern goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|pp=73–74}}
====Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing====
]. One of them has a captured Egyptian ].]]


Adan's drive south had left Israeli and Egyptian units scattered throughout the battlefield, with no clear lines between them. As Egyptian and Israeli units tried to regroup, regular firefights broke out. During the night, Elazar reported that the Egyptians were attacking in an attempt to regain land at various locations, and that nine Israeli tanks had been destroyed. He asked permission from Dayan to respond to the attacks and Dayan agreed. Israel then resumed its drive south.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=463}}
The Egyptians, meanwhile, failed to grasp the extent and magnitude of the Israeli crossing, nor did they appreciate its intent and purpose. This was partly due to attempts by Egyptian field commanders to obfuscate reports concerning the Israeli crossing<ref>Pollack, p. 129</ref> and partly due to a false assumption that the canal crossing was merely a diversion for a major IDF offensive targeting the right flank of the Second Army.<ref>Pollack, p. 119.</ref> Consequently, on October 16 General Shazly ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward and the T-62-equipped 25th Independent Armored Brigade to attack northward in a pincer action to eliminate the perceived threat to the Second Army.<ref name="Pollack, pp. 119–20">Pollack, pp. 119–20.</ref>


It is unclear which side fired first<ref name="collapse">{{cite web |title=The October War and U.S. Policy |at=The Collapse of the Ceasefire |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/#VII |access-date=2023-03-10 |df=dmy-all |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu |editor=William Burr |date=7 October 2003}}</ref> but Israeli field commanders used the skirmishes as justification to resume the attacks. When Sadat protested alleged Israeli truce violations, Israel said that Egyptian troops had fired first. ] noted that regardless of who fired the first post-ceasefire shot, it was the Israeli Army that was advancing beyond the 22 October ceasefire lines.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=120}}
The Egyptians failed to scout the area and were unaware that by now, Adan's 162nd Armored Division was in the vicinity. Moreover, the 21st and 25th failed to coordinate their attacks, allowing General Adan's Division to meet each force separately. Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division, destroying 50–60 Egyptian tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. He then turned southward and ambushed the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs, while losing three tanks.<ref name="Pollack, pp. 119–20"/>


Adan resumed his attack on 23 October.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=73}} Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the last ancillary road south of the port of Suez, and encircled the Egyptian Third Army east of the Suez Canal.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=483, 487–490}} The Israelis then transported enormous amounts of military equipment across the canal, which Egypt claimed was in violation of the ceasefire.<ref name="collapse" /> Egyptian aircraft launched repeated attacks in support of the Third Army, sometimes in groups of up to 30 planes, but took severe losses.{{sfnp|Nicolle|Cooper|2004}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}
] tanks on the banks of the Suez Canal]]


=== Battle of Suez ===
Egyptian artillery shelled the Israeli bridge over the canal on the morning of October 17, scoring several hits. The Egyptian Air Force launched repeated raids, some with up to 20 aircraft, to take out the bridge and rafts, damaging the bridge. The Egyptians had to shut down their SAM sites during these raids, allowing Israeli fighters to intercept the Egyptians. The Egyptians lost 16 planes and seven helicopters, while the Israelis lost six planes.<ref>Boyne, p. 181</ref>
{{Main article|Battle of Suez}}


Israeli armor and paratroopers also entered Suez in an attempt to capture the city, but failed after being confronted by Egyptian soldiers and hastily raised local militia forces. They were surrounded and the armored column was ambushed and severely hit, while the paratroopers came under heavy fire and many of them became trapped inside a local building. The armored column and part of the infantry force were evacuated during the day, while the main contingent of the paratrooper force eventually managed to dash out of the city and make their way back to Israeli lines. The Israelis had lost 80 dead and 120 wounded, with minimal Egyptian casualties, for no tactical gain. Israel made two more probes into Suez, one on the 25th and one on the 28th, but both were repulsed.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|pp=73}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=466–475}}<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200126235235/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a324335.pdf|date=2020-01-26|df=dmy-all}}"The experience represents one of the most humiliating failures in israeli modern history .. Analysis reveals there were three main factors that led to this stunning defeat."</ref>
The bridge was damaged, and the Israeli Paratroop Headquarters, which was near the bridge, was also hit; its commander and his deputy were wounded. During the night, the bridge was repaired, but only a trickle of Israeli forces was able to cross. According to Chaim Herzog, the Egyptians continued attacking the bridgehead until the ceasefire, using artillery and mortars to fire tens of thousands of shells into the area of the crossing. Egyptian aircraft attempted to bomb the bridge every day, and helicopters launched suicide missions, making attempts to drop barrels of napalm on the bridge and bridgehead. The bridges were damaged multiple times, and had to be repaired at night. The attacks caused heavy casualties, and many tanks were sunk when their rafts were hit. Egyptian commandos and frogmen with armored support launched a ground attack against the bridgehead, which was repulsed with the loss of 10 tanks. Two subsequent Egyptian counterattacks were also beaten back.<ref name="O'Ballance"/>


===Egypt's trapped Third Army===
After the failure of the October 17 counterattacks, the Egyptian General Staff slowly began to realize the magnitude of the Israeli offensive. Early on October 18, the Soviets showed Sadat satellite imagery of Israeli forces operating on the west bank. Alarmed, Sadat dispatched Shazly to the front to assess the situation first-hand. He no longer trusted his field commanders to provide accurate reports.<ref name="Pollack, p. 120">Pollack, p. 120.</ref> Shazly confirmed that the Israelis had at least one division on the west bank and were widening their bridgehead. He advocated withdrawing most of Egypt's armor from the east bank to confront the growing Israeli threat on the west bank. Sadat rejected this recommendation outright and even threatened Shazly with a court martial.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 401.</ref> Ahmad Ismail Ali recommended that Sadat push for a ceasefire so as to prevent the Israelis from exploiting their successes.<ref name="Pollack, p. 120" />
Kissinger found out about the Third Army's encirclement shortly thereafter.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=465}} Kissinger considered that the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity and that Egypt was dependent on the United States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to ] in the dispute and wean Egypt from Soviet influence. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a UN resolution demanding that the Israelis withdraw to their 22 October positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador ], Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=487}}


The Israeli government also had its own motivations for not destroying the Third Army. These included the possibility of using the encircled Third Army as a bargaining chip for ending the Egyptian blockade of the Bab-el-Mandel Straits in the Red Sea and negotiating a repatriation of Israeli prisoners-of-war captured by Egypt. The exhausted state of the IDF, the possibility that humiliating Egypt by destroying the Third Army would make Sadat more bellicose and unwilling to cease hostilities, and Israel's intense fears that the Soviet Union would militarily intervene in the event the Third Army was destroyed were additional reasons for Israel ultimately deciding against destroying it.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Winokur |first1=Talia |date=27 February 2009 |title='The Soviets were just an excuse': why Israel did not destroy the Egyptian Third Army |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682740802573458 |journal=] |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=59–78 |doi=10.1080/14682740802573458 |s2cid=154527628 |access-date=19 February 2023}}</ref>
====Israeli forces across the Suez====
]
Israeli forces were by now pouring across the canal on two bridges, including one of Israeli design, and motorized rafts. Israeli engineers under Brigadier-General Dan Even had worked under heavy Egyptian fire to set up the bridges, and over 100 were killed and hundreds more wounded.<ref>Dunstan, p. 107.</ref> The crossing was difficult because of Egyptian artillery fire, though by 4:00&nbsp;am, two of Adan's brigades were on the west bank of the canal. On the morning of October 18, Sharon's forces on the west bank launched an ] toward Ismailia, slowly pushing back the Egyptian paratroop brigade occupying the sand rampart northward to enlarge the bridgehead.<ref name="O'Ballance"/><ref name="Gawrych p.223" /> Some of his units attempted to move west, but were stopped at the crossroads in Nefalia. Adan's division rolled south toward Suez City while Magen's division pushed west toward Cairo and south toward Adabiya.<ref>Herzog, ''The War of Atonement'', Little, Brown and Company (1975), pp. 236–37.</ref><ref>Pollack, p. 122.</ref> On October 19, one of Sharon's brigades continued to push the Egyptian paratroopers north towards Ismailia until the Israelis were within {{convert|8|or|10|km|mi|abbr=on|0}} of the city. Sharon hoped to seize the city and thereby sever the logistical and supply lines for most of the Egyptian Second Army. Sharon's second brigade began to cross the canal. The brigade's forward elements moved to the Abu Sultan Camp, from where they moved north to take Orcha, an Egyptian logistics base defended by a commando battalion. Israeli infantrymen cleared the trenches and bunkers, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat, as tanks moved alongside them and fired into the trench sections to their front. The position was secured before nightfall. More than 300 Egyptians were killed and 50 taken prisoner, while the Israelis lost 16 dead. The fall of Orcha caused the collapse of the Egyptian defensive line, allowing more Israeli troops to get onto the sand rampart. There, they were able to fire in support of Israeli troops facing Missouri Ridge, an Egyptian-occupied position on the ] that could pose a threat to the Israeli crossing. On the same day, Israeli paratroopers participating in Sharon's drive pushed the Egyptians back far enough for the Israeli bridges to be out of sight of Egyptian artillery observers, though the Egyptians continued shelling the area.<ref>Rabinovich, pp. 428–29.</ref>


Despite being surrounded, the Third Army managed to maintain its combat integrity east of the canal and keep up its defensive positions, to the surprise of many.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=74}} According to ], the Israelis, Soviets and Americans overestimated the vulnerability of the Third Army at the time. It was not on the verge of collapse, and he wrote that while a renewed Israeli offensive would probably overcome it, this was not a certainty.<ref>Dupuy, pp. 543–545, 589.</ref>
As the Israelis pushed towards Ismailia, the Egyptians fought a delaying battle, retreating into defensive positions further north as they came under increasing pressure from the Israeli ground offensive, coupled with airstrikes. On October 21, one of Sharon's brigades was occupying the city's outskirts, but facing fierce resistance from Egyptian paratroopers and commandos. The same day, Sharon's last remaining unit on the east bank attacked Missouri Ridge. Shmuel Gonen had demanded Sharon capture the position, and Sharon had reluctantly ordered the attack. The assault was preceded by an air attack that caused hundreds of Egyptian soldiers to flee and thousands of others to dig in. One battalion then attacked from the south, destroying 20 tanks and overrunning infantry positions before being halted by Sagger rockets and minefields. Another battalion attacked from the southwest and inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians, but its advance was halted after eight tanks were knocked out. The surviving Israeli soldiers managed to hold off an Egyptian infantry assault while losing two soldiers before surrendering. Two of the Israeli soldiers managed to hide and escape back to Israeli lines. The Israelis managed to occupy one-third of Missouri Ridge. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan countermanded orders from Sharon's superiors to continue the attack.<ref>O'Ballance, p. 120.</ref><ref>Rabinovich, p. 445.</ref> However, the Israelis continued to expand their holdings on the east bank. According to the Israelis, the IDF bridgehead was {{convert|40|km|abbr=on}} wide and {{convert|32|km|abbr=on}} deep by the end of October 21.<ref>O'Ballance, p. 121.</ref>


David T. Buckwalter agrees that despite the isolation of the Third Army, it was unclear if the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front.<ref name="The 1973 Arab-Israeli War">David T. Buckwalter, </ref> This assessment was challenged by ], who stated that the Third Army was "on the brink of collapse".<ref name="Seale">{{cite book |last1=Seale |first1=Patrick |last2=McConville |first2=Maureen |title=The Struggle for the Middle East |date=1988 |publisher=University of California Press |location=Berkeley |isbn=978-0-520-06976-3 |page=227 |edition=Revision 1995 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6D9EiJKRTHcC&pg=PA213}}</ref> Seale's position was supported by P.R. Kumaraswamy, who wrote that intense American pressure prevented the Israelis from annihilating the stranded Third Army.<ref name="Kumaraswamy">{{cite book|last1=Kumaraswamy|first1=P. R.|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|date=2000|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-313-31302-8|page=1|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z58nmWqS94MC}}</ref>
On October 22, Ismailia's Egyptian defenders were occupying their last line of defense, but managed to repel an Israeli attempt to get behind Ismailia and encircle the city, then push some of Sharon's forward troops back to the ]. The Israeli advance on Ismailia was stopped {{convert|10|km|mi|0|abbr=on}} south of the city. Both sides had suffered heavy losses.


Herzog noted that given the Third Army's desperate situation, in terms of being cut off from re-supply and reassertion of Israeli air superiority, the destruction of the Third Army was inevitable and could have been achieved within a very brief period.{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|p=283}} Shazly himself described the Third Army's plight as "desperate" and classified its encirclement as a "catastrophe that was too big to hide".{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=293}} He further noted that, "the fate of the Egyptian Third Army was in the hands of Israel. Once the Third Army was encircled by Israeli troops every bit of bread to be sent to our men was paid for by meeting Israeli demands."{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=323}}
On the northern front, the Israelis also attacked Port Said, facing Egyptian troops and a 900-strong ]n unit, who fought a defensive battle.<ref>O'Ballance, p. 122.</ref> The Egyptian government claimed that the city was repeatedly bombed by Israeli jets, and that hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded.<ref>'']'', October 25, 1973, issue.</ref>


Shortly before the ceasefire came into effect, an Israeli tank battalion advanced into Adabiya, and took it with support from the ]. Some 1,500 Egyptian prisoners were taken, and about a hundred Egyptian soldiers assembled just south of Adabiya, where they held out against the Israelis. The Israelis also conducted their third and final incursion into Suez. They made some gains, but failed to break into the city center. As a result, the city was partitioned down the main street, with the Egyptians holding the city center and the Israelis controlling the outskirts, port installations and oil refinery, effectively surrounding the Egyptian defenders.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}<ref name=almog>{{cite magazine |last=Almog |first=Zeev |date=May 2011 |magazine=Military and Strategic Affairs |volume=3 |number=1 |pages=29–43 |issn=2307-793X |publisher=] |url=https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/(FILE)1308129507.pdf |title=Israeli Naval Power: An Essential Factor in the Operational Battlefield |access-date=8 February 2012 }}</ref>
Adan and Magen moved south, decisively defeating the Egyptians in a series of engagements, though they often encountered determined Egyptian resistance, and both sides suffered heavy casualties.<ref name="Gawrych p.223">Gawrych, p. 223</ref> Adan advanced towards the Sweetwater Canal area, planning to break out into the surrounding desert and hit the Geneifa Hills, where many SAM sites were located. Adan's three armored brigades fanned out, with one advancing through the Geneifa Hills, another along a parallel road south of them, and the third advancing towards Mina. Adan's brigades met resistance from dug-in Egyptian forces in the Sweetwater Canal area's ]. Adan's other brigades were also held by a line of Egyptian military camps and installations. Adan was also harassed by the Egyptian Air Force. The Israelis slowly advanced, bypassing Egyptian positions whenever possible. After being denied air support due to the presence of two SAM batteries that had been brought forward, Adan sent two brigades to attack them. The brigades slipped past the dug-in Egyptian infantry, moving out from the greenbelt for more than {{convert|8|km|mi|0|abbr=on}}, and fought off multiple Egyptian counterattacks. From a distance of {{convert|4|km|mi|frac=2|abbr=on}}, they shelled and destroyed the SAMs, allowing the IAF to provide Adan with close air support.<ref>Boyne, p. 183.</ref> Adan's troops advanced through the greenbelt and fought their way to the Geneifa Hills, clashing with scattered Egyptian, Kuwaiti and Palestinian troops. The Israelis clashed with an Egyptian armored unit at Mitzeneft and destroyed multiple SAM sites. Adan also captured Fayid Airport, which was subsequently prepared by Israeli crews to serve as a supply base and to fly out wounded soldiers.<ref>Hoyne, p. 205.</ref>


===Post-war battles===
{{convert|10|mi|km|order=flip|spell=In}} west of the Bitter Lake, Colonel Natke Nir's brigade overran an Egyptian artillery brigade that had been participating in the shelling of the Israeli bridgehead. Scores of Egyptian artillerymen were killed and many more taken prisoner. Two Israeli soldiers were also killed, including the son of General ]. Meanwhile, Magen's division moved west and then south, covering Adan's flank and eventually moving south of Suez City to the Gulf of Suez.<ref>Boyne, p. 214</ref> The Israeli advance southward reached ], on the southern boundary of the Suez Canal.
On the morning of 26 October, the Egyptian Third Army violated the ceasefire by attempting to break through the surrounding Israeli forces. The attack was repulsed by Israeli air and ground forces.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-77.pdf |title=Department of State Operations Center, Situation Report in the Middle East as of 10/26/73 |access-date=22 October 2011}}</ref> The Egyptians also made minor gains in attacks against Sharon's forces in the Ismailia area.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}} The Israelis reacted by bombing and shelling priority targets in Egypt, including command posts and water reserves.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=486}} The front was quieter in the Second Army's sector in the northern canal area, where both sides generally respected the ceasefire.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}


Though most heavy fighting ended on 28 October, the fighting never stopped until 18 January 1974. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated that:
====The ceasefire and further battles====
{{blockquote|The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not the only characteristic of the situation between 24 October 1973 and 18 January 1974. This intermediate period also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack Israeli units west of the canal from the direction of Cairo. The other was to cut off the Israeli canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of Israeli forces, who were not well fortified and who would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldiers' lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support.<ref>{{cite book |last=Dayan |first=Moshe |title=Story of My Life |publisher=Da Capo |year=1992 |page=568}}</ref>}}
]
]]]


The IDF acknowledged the loss of 14 soldiers during this postwar period. Egyptian losses were higher, especially in the sector controlled by Ariel Sharon, who ordered his troops to respond with massive firepower to any Egyptian provocation.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=493}} Some aerial battles took place, and the Israelis also shot down several helicopters attempting to resupply the Third Army.{{sfnp|Aloni|2001}}{{pn|date=January 2025}}
The ] passed (14–0) ] calling for a ceasefire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22. It called upon the belligerents to immediately cease all military activity. The cease-fire was to come into effect 12 hours later at 6:52&nbsp;pm Israeli time.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 452.</ref> Because this was after dark, it was impossible for ] ] to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 458.</ref> U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger intimated to Prime Minister Meir that he would not object to offensive action during the night before the ceasefire was to come into effect.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-54.pdf |title=22 October Memorandum of Conversation between Meir and Kissinger |access-date=March 28, 2010}}</ref>


===Final situation on the Egyptian front===
Several minutes before the ceasefire came into effect, three Scud missiles ] at Israeli targets by either Egyptian forces or Soviet personnel in Egypt. This was the first combat use of Scud missiles. One Scud targeted the port of ] and two targeted the Israeli bridgehead on the Suez Canal. One hit an Israeli supply convoy and killed seven soldiers.<ref>Adan, p. 284.</ref> When the time for the ceasefire arrived, Sharon's division had failed to capture Ismailia and cut off the Second Army's supply lines, but Israeli forces were just a few hundred metres short of their southern goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez.<ref>Gawrych, pp. 73–74.</ref>
By the end of the war, the Israelis had advanced to positions some 101 kilometres from Egypt's capital, Cairo, and occupied 1,600 square kilometres west of the Suez Canal.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=477}} They had also cut the Cairo–Suez road and encircled the bulk of Egypt's Third Army. The Israelis had also taken many prisoners after Egyptian soldiers, including many officers, began surrendering in masses towards the end of the war.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=467}} The Egyptians held a narrow strip on the east bank of the canal, occupying some 1,200 square kilometres of the Sinai.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=467}} One source estimated that the Egyptians had 70,000 men, 720 tanks and 994 artillery pieces on the east bank of the canal.{{sfnp|Neff|1988|p=306}} However, 30,000 to 45,000 of them were now encircled by the Israelis.{{sfnp|Johnson|Tierney|2009|p=176}}{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=295}}


Despite Israel's tactical successes west of the canal, the Egyptian military was reformed and organized. Consequently, according to ], the Israeli military position became "weak" for different reasons:
Adan's drive south had left Israeli and Egyptian units scattered throughout the battlefield, with no clear lines between them. As Egyptian and Israeli units tried to regroup, regular firefights broke out. During the night, Elazar reported that the Egyptians were attacking in an attempt to regain land at various locations, and that nine Israeli tanks had been destroyed. He asked permission from Dayan to respond to the attacks and Dayan agreed. Israel then resumed its drive south.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 463.</ref>


{{blockquote|One, Israel now had a large force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed force—and consequently the country—mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this was in total conflict with its military theories.{{sfnp|el-Gamasy|1993|p=302}}}}
It is unclear which side fired first<ref name="collapse">, ''Collapse of the Ceasefire''.</ref> but Israeli field commanders used the skirmishes as justification to resume the attacks. When Sadat protested alleged Israeli truce violations, Israel said that Egyptian troops had fired first. ] noted that regardless of who fired the first post-ceasefire shot, it was the Israeli Army that was advancing beyond the October 22 ceasefire lines.<ref>William B. Quandt, ''Peace Process'', p. 120.</ref>


Egypt wished to end the war when it realized that the IDF canal crossing offensive could result in a catastrophe.{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=436}} The Egyptians' besieged Third Army could not hold on without supply.{{sfnmp|Morris|2011|1p=437|Shazly|2003|2p=323}} The Israeli Army advanced to 100&nbsp;km from Cairo, which worried Egypt.{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=437}} The Israeli army had open terrain and no opposition to advance further to Cairo; had they done so, Sadat's rule might have ended.<ref name="Stein1999p87" />
Adan resumed his attack on October 23.<ref name="USMC report">{{cite web |first=Major Steven J |last=Piccirilli |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1989/PSJ.htm |title=The 1973 Arab Israeli war |publisher=Globalsecurity.org |year=1989 |access-date=September 29, 2011}}</ref><ref name="Gawrych73">Gawrych, 1996, p. 73.</ref> Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the last ancillary road south of the port of Suez, and encircled the Egyptian Third Army east of the Suez Canal.<ref>Hammad, pp. 483, 487–90.</ref> The Israelis then transported enormous amounts of military equipment across the canal, which Egypt claimed was in violation of the ceasefire.<ref name="collapse" /> Egyptian aircraft launched repeated attacks in support of the Third Army, sometimes in groups of up to 30 planes, but took severe losses.<ref name=nicolle>Nicolle, David & Cooper, Tom: ''Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 units in combat''.</ref>


==Golan front==
Israeli armor and paratroopers also entered Suez in an attempt to capture the city, but they were confronted by Egyptian soldiers and hastily raised local militia forces. They were surrounded, but towards night the Israeli forces managed to extricate themselves. The Israelis had lost 80 dead and 120 wounded, with an unknown number of Egyptian casualties, for no tactical gain (see ]).<ref name="Gawrych73" /><ref>Rabinovich, pp. 466–75.</ref>


===Initial Syrian attacks===
The next morning, October 23, a flurry of diplomatic activity occurred. Soviet ] had confirmed that Israeli forces were moving south, and the Soviets accused the Israelis of treachery. Kissinger called Meir in an effort to persuade her to withdraw a few hundred metres and she indicated that Israel's tactical position on the ground had improved.
]


In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked two Israeli armored brigades, an infantry brigade, two paratrooper battalions and eleven artillery batteries with five ] (the ], ] and ], with the ] and ] in reserve) and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, the Israeli brigades of some 3,000 troops, 180 tanks and 60 artillery pieces faced off against three infantry divisions with large armor components comprising 28,000 Syrian troops, 800 tanks and 600 artillery pieces. In addition, the Syrians deployed two armored divisions from the second day onwards.<ref name=knapp>{{cite book|title=Combined Arms in battle since 1939 |chapter=4: Antiarmor Operations on the Golan Heights |chapter-url=http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/Spiller/Spiller.asp#4AO |author=Major George E. Knapp |publisher=U.S. Army Command and General Staff College |year=1992 |access-date=1 June 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100507120017/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/Spiller/Spiller.asp |archive-date=7 May 2010}}</ref><ref name="oup">Peter Caddick-Adams, "Golan Heights, battles of", ''The Oxford Companion to Military History'', ed. Richard Holmes. Oxford University Press, 2001.{{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref><ref name="O'Ballance Ch 7">O'Ballance (1978). Chapter 7: "The Syrians attack", pp. 119–146.</ref>
====Egypt's trapped Third Army====
Kissinger found out about the Third Army's encirclement shortly thereafter.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 465</ref> Kissinger considered that the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity and that Egypt was dependent on the United States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to ] in the dispute and wean Egypt from Soviet influence. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a UN resolution demanding that the Israelis withdraw to their October 22 positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador ], Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist."<ref>Rabinovich, p. 487.</ref>


To fight the opening phase of a possible battle, before reserves arrived, Israeli high command had, conforming to the original plan, allocated a single armored brigade, the 188th, accepting a disparity in tank numbers of eighteen to one.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=158}} When the warning by King Hussein of an imminent Syrian attack was conveyed, Elazar at first only assigned two additional tank companies from ]: "We'll have one hundred tanks against their eight hundred. That ought to be enough".{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=57}} Eventually, his deputy, ], ordered the entire 7th Armored Brigade to be brought up.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=64}}
Despite being surrounded, the Third Army managed to maintain its combat integrity east of the canal and keep up its defensive positions, to the surprise of many.<ref>Gawrych, p. 74</ref> According to ], the Israelis, Soviets and Americans overestimated the vulnerability of the Third Army at the time. It was not on the verge of collapse, and he wrote that while a renewed Israeli offensive would probably overcome it, this was not a certainty.<ref>Dupuy, pp. 543–45, 589.</ref> According to David Elazar, Chief of Israeli headquarters staff, on December 3, 1973: "As for the third army, in spite of our encircling them they resisted and advanced to occupy in fact a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can not say that we defeated or conquered them."


Efforts had been made to improve the Israeli defensive position. The "Purple Line" ran along a series of low dormant volcanic cones, "tels", in the north and deep ravines in the south. It was covered by a continuous tank ditch, bunker complexes and dense ]s. Directly west of this line a series of tank ramps were constructed: earthen platforms on which a Centurion tank could position itself with ], offering a substantial advantage when duelling the fully exposed enemy tanks.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=159}}
David T. Buckwalter agrees that despite the isolation of the Third Army, it was unclear if the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front.<ref name="The 1973 Arab-Israeli War">David T. Buckwalter, </ref> This assessment was challenged by ], who stated that the Third Army was "on the brink of collapse".<ref name="Seale">{{cite book |last1=Seale |first1=Patrick |last2=McConville |first2=Maureen |title=The Struggle for the Middle East |date=1988 |publisher=University of California Press |location=Berkeley |isbn=0520069765 |page=227 |edition=Revision 1995 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6D9EiJKRTHcC&pg=PA213}}</ref> Seale's position was supported by P.R. Kumaraswamy, who wrote that intense American pressure prevented the Israelis from annihilating the stranded Third Army.<ref name="Kumaraswamy">{{cite book|last1=Kumaraswamy|first1=P. R.|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|date=2000|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=0-313-31302-4|page=1|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z58nmWqS94MC}}</ref>


The Syrians began their attack at 14:00 with an airstrike by about a hundred aircraft and a fifty-minute artillery barrage. The two forward infantry brigades, with an organic tank battalion, of each of the three infantry divisions then crossed the cease-fire lines, bypassing United Nations observer posts. They were covered by mobile anti-aircraft batteries, and equipped with bulldozers to fill-in anti-tank ditches, bridge-layer tanks to overcome obstacles and mine-clearance vehicles. These engineering vehicles were priority targets for Israeli tank gunners and took heavy losses, but Syrian infantry at points demolished the tank ditch, allowing their armor to cross.<ref name="historynet golan">{{cite web |first=Gary |last=Rashba |title=Yom Kippur War: Sacrificial Stand in the Golan Heights |url=http://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-sacrificial-stand-in-the-golan-heights.htm |publisher=Military History magazine via History.net|date=October 1998}}</ref>
Herzog noted that given the Third Army's desperate situation, in terms of being cut off from re-supply and reassertion of Israeli air superiority, the destruction of the Third Army was inevitable and could have been achieved within a very brief period.<ref>Herzog, ''Arab–Israeli Wars'', p. 283.</ref> Shazly himself described the Third Army's plight as "desperate" and classified its encirclement as a "catastrophe that was too big to hide".<ref>Shazly, p. 293.</ref> He further noted that, "the fate of the Egyptian Third Army was in the hands of Israel. Once the Third Army was encircled by Israeli troops every bit of bread to be sent to our men was paid for by meeting Israeli demands."<ref name=Shazli-p123>Shazly, p. 323.</ref>


At 14:45, two hundred men from the Syrian 82nd Paratrooper Battalion descended on foot from ] and around 17:00 took the Israeli observation base on the southern slope, with its advanced surveillance equipment. A small force dropped by four ]s simultaneously placed itself on the access road south of the base.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=171}} Specialised intelligence personnel were captured. Made to believe that Israel had fallen, they disclosed much sensitive information.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=172–173}} A first Israeli attempt on 8 October to retake the base from the south was ambushed and beaten off with heavy losses.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=282}}
Shortly before the ceasefire came into effect, an Israeli tank battalion advanced into Adabiya, and took it with support from the ]. Some 1,500 Egyptian prisoners were taken, and about a hundred Egyptian soldiers assembled just south of Adabiya, where they held out against the Israelis. The Israelis also conducted their third and final incursion into Suez. They made some gains, but failed to break into the city center. As a result, the city was partitioned down the main street, with the Egyptians holding the city center and the Israelis controlling the outskirts, port installations and oil refinery, effectively surrounding the Egyptian defenders.<ref name="O'Ballance"/><ref name=almog>{{cite web |url=http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1308129507.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=February 8, 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403144817/http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1308129507.pdf |archive-date=April 3, 2015 }}</ref>


] (right) with soldiers, 1973]]
====Post-war battles====
On the morning of October 26, the Egyptian Third Army violated the ceasefire by attempting to break through the surrounding Israeli forces. The attack was repulsed by Israeli air and ground forces.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-77.pdf |title=Department of State Operations Center, Situation Report in the Middle East as of 10/26/73 |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> The Egyptians also made minor gains in attacks against Sharon's forces in the Ismailia area.<ref name="O'Ballance"/> The Israelis reacted by bombing and shelling priority targets in Egypt, including command posts and water reserves.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 486</ref> The front was quieter in the Second Army's sector in the northern canal area, where both sides generally respected the ceasefire.<ref name="O'Ballance"/>


During the afternoon 7th Armored Brigade was still kept in reserve and the 188th Armored Brigade held the frontline with only two tank battalions, the 74th in the north and the 53rd in the south.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=88–105}} The northern battalion waged an exemplary defensive battle against the forward brigades of the Syrian 7th Infantry Division, destroying fifty-nine Syrian tanks for minimal losses.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=100}} The southern battalion destroyed a similar number, but facing four Syrian tank battalions from two divisions had a dozen of its own tanks knocked out.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=105}} At bunker complex 111, opposite Kudne in Syria, the defending company beat off "determined" and "bravely" pressed attacks by the Syrian 9th Infantry Division; by nightfall it was reduced to three tanks, with only sixty-nine anti-tank rounds between them.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=103}} Further successful resistance by the southern battalion was contingent on reinforcements.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=105}}
Though most heavy fighting ended on October 28, the fighting never stopped until January 18, 1974. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated that:
{{quote|The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not the only characteristic of the situation between October 24, 1973 and January 18, 1974. This intermediate period also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack Israeli units west of the canal from the direction of Cairo. The other was to cut off the Israeli canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of Israeli forces, who were not well fortified and who would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldier's lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support.<ref>{{cite book |last=Dayan |first=Moshe |title=Story of My Life |publisher=Da Capo |year=1992 |page=568}}</ref>}}


Direct operational command of the Golan had at first been given to the 188 AB commander, Yitzhak Ben-Shoham, who ordered the 7th AB to concentrate at Wasset.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=161}} The 7th AB commander, Avigdor Ben-Gal, resented obeying an officer of equal rank and went to the ] headquarters at Nafah, announcing he would place his force in the northern sector at the "] Gap", a pass south of the Hermonit peak and the main access to the Golan Heights from the east. Northern Command was in the process of moving their headquarters to ] in Galilee and the senior staff officers were absent at this moment, having expected the Syrian attack to start at 18:00. Operations officer Lieutenant-Colonel Uri Simhoni therefore improvised an allocation of the tactical reserves, thereby largely deciding the course of the battle.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=162}}
The IDF acknowledged the loss of 14 soldiers during this postwar period. Egyptian losses were higher, especially in the sector controlled by Ariel Sharon, who ordered his troops to respond with massive firepower to any Egyptian provocation.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 493.</ref> Some aerial battles took place, and the Israelis also shot down several helicopters attempting to resupply the Third Army.<ref name="Aloni">Aloni, Shlomo: ''Arab–Israeli Air Wars, 1947–82''.</ref>


The Armored School Centurion Tank Battalion (71st TB) was kept in general reserve. The 77th Tank Battalion of 7th AB was sent to Quneitra. Two companies of the 75th Mechanised Infantry Battalion, arrived in the morning, of the same brigade were sent to the southern sector. Also 82nd TB had to reinforce the south. However, Ben-Gal had split off a company of this battalion to serve as a reserve for his own brigade.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=107}} Another company, soon after arriving in the south, was ambushed by an infiltrated Syrian commando force armed with Sagger missiles and almost entirely wiped out.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=118}} As a result, effective reinforcement of the southern Golan sector was limited to just a single tank company.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=170}}
====Final situation on the Egyptian front====
By the end of the war, the Israelis had advanced to positions some 101 kilometres from Egypt's capital, Cairo, and occupied 1,600 square kilometres west of the Suez Canal.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 477.</ref> They had also cut the Cairo-Suez road and encircled the bulk of Egypt's Third Army. The Israelis had also taken many prisoners after Egyptian soldiers, including many officers, began surrendering in masses towards the end of the war.<ref name="Rabinovich, p. 467">Rabinovich, p. 467.</ref> The Egyptians held a narrow strip on the east bank of the canal, occupying some 1,200 square kilometres of the Sinai.<ref name="Rabinovich, p. 467"/> One source estimated that the Egyptians had 70,000 men, 720 tanks and 994 artillery pieces on the east bank of the canal.<ref>Neff, p. 306.</ref> However, 30,000 to 45,000 of them were now encircled by the Israelis.<ref>Johnson and Tierney, p. 176.</ref><ref>Shazly, p. 295.</ref>


At 16:00, ], head Northern Command, shortly visited Nafah and split command of the Golan front: the north would be the responsibility of 7th AB, to which 53rd TB would be transferred. Command of 188th AB would be limited to the south, taking over 82nd TB.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=173–174}} The first wave of the Syrian offensive had failed to penetrate, but at nightfall a second, larger, wave was launched. For this purpose each of the three infantry divisions, also committing their organic mechanised brigade with forty tanks, had been reinforced by an armored brigade of about ninety tanks. Two of these brigades were to attack the northern sector, four the southern sector.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=174}}
Despite Israel's tactical successes west of the canal, the Egyptian military was reformed and organized. Consequently, according to ], the Israeli military position became "weak" for different reasons:
{{quote|One, Israel now had a large force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed force - and consequently the country - mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this in total conflict with its military theories.<ref>El-Gamasy, p. 302.</ref>}}
For those reasons and according to Dayan, "It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldier's lives." The Egyptian forces didn't pull to the west and held onto their positions east of the canal controlling both shores of the Suez Canal. None of the Canal's main cities were occupied by Israel; however, the city of Suez was surrounded.


===Defense of the Quneitra Gap===
Egypt wished to end the war when it realized that the IDF canal crossing offensive could result in a catastrophe.<ref>Morris, 2011, Righteous Victims, p. 436</ref> The Egyptians' besieged Third Army could not hold on without supply.<ref name="Morris2011p437"/><ref name=Shazli-p123/> The Israeli Army advanced to 100&nbsp;km from Cairo, which worried Egypt.<ref name=Morris2011p437/> The Israeli army had open terrain and no opposition to advance further to Cairo; had they done so, Sadat's rule might have ended.<ref name="Stein1999p87"/>
]. It was considered in many respects superior to the Soviet ]/55.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 291–293.</ref>]]


Over four days of fighting, the 7th Armored Brigade in the north under ] managed to hold the rocky hill line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah, inflicting heavy losses on the Syrians. During the night of 6/7 October it beat off an attack of the Syrian 78th Armoured Brigade, attached to the 7th Infantry Division.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=140–144}} On 7 October, 7th AB had to send part of its reserves to the collapsing southern sector. Replenishment from the Nafah matériel stock became impossible. Syrian High Command, understanding that forcing the Quneitra Gap would ensure a total victory on the Golan, decided to commit its strategic armored reserves.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=193–197}}
===Golan Heights front===


During the night of 7/8 October, the independent 81st Armored Brigade, equipped with modern T-62s and part of the presidential guard, attacked but was beaten off.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=193–197}} After this fight, the Israeli brigade would refer to the gap as the "Valley of Tears".{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=196}} Syrian Brigadier-General Omar Abrash, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, was killed on 8 October when his command tank was hit as he was preparing an attempt by 121st Mechanised Brigade to bypass the gap through a more southern route.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=202}}
====Initial Syrian attacks====
]


Having practiced on the Golan Heights numerous times, Israeli gunners made effective use of ].<ref name="historynet golan" /> During night attacks, however, the Syrian tanks had the advantage of ], which was not a standard Israeli equipment. Instead, some Israeli tanks were fitted with large xenon searchlights which were useful in illuminating and locating enemy positions, troops and vehicles. The close distances during night engagements negated the usual Israeli superiority in long-range duels. 77th Tank Battalion commander ] in the Quneitra Gap generally managed to hold a second tank ramp line.<ref name="historynet golan"/>
In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked two Israeli armored brigades, an infantry brigade, two paratrooper battalions and eleven artillery batteries with five ] (the ], ] and ], with the ] and ] in reserve) and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, the Israeli brigades of some 3,000 troops, 180 tanks and 60 artillery pieces faced off against three infantry divisions with large armor components comprising 28,000 Syrian troops, 800 tanks and 600 artillery pieces. In addition, the Syrians deployed two armored divisions from the second day onwards.<ref name=Jordan1973>{{cite web |title=The 1973 Arab–Israeli War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Jordan.htm |author=] Major Michael C. Jordan |publisher=GlobalSecurity.org |year=1997 |access-date=April 20, 2009}}</ref><ref name=knapp>{{cite book|title=Combined Arms in battle since 1939 |chapter=4: Antiarmor Operations on the Golan Heights |chapter-url=http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/Spiller/Spiller.asp#4AO |author=Major George E. Knapp |publisher=U.S. Army Command and General Staff College |year=1992 |access-date=June 1, 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100507120017/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/Spiller/Spiller.asp |archive-date=May 7, 2010 }}</ref><ref name="oup">Peter Caddick-Adams, "Golan Heights, battles of", ''The Oxford Companion to Military History'', ed. Richard Holmes. Oxford University Press, 2001.{{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref><ref name="O'Ballance Ch 7">O'Ballance (1978). Chapter 7: "The Syrians attack", pp. 119–46.</ref> To fight the opening phase of a possible battle, before reserves arrived, Israeli high command had, conforming to the original plan, allocated a single armored brigade, the 188th, accepting a disparity in tank numbers of eighteen to one.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 158</ref> When the warning by King Hussein of an imminent Syrian attack was conveyed, Elazar at first only assigned two additional tank companies from ]: "We'll have one hundred tanks against their eight hundred. That ought to be enough".<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 57</ref> Eventually, his deputy, ], ordered the entire 7th Armored Brigade to be brought up.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 64</ref> Efforts had been made to improve the Israeli defensive position. The "Purple Line" ran along a series of low dormant volcanic cones, "tels", in the north and deep ravines in the south. It was covered by a continuous tank ditch, bunker complexes and dense ]s. Directly west of this line a series of tank ramps were constructed: earthen platforms on which a Centurion tank could position itself with ], offering a substantial advantage when duelling the fully exposed enemy tanks.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 159</ref>


]]]
The Syrians began their attack at 14:00 with an airstrike by about a hundred aircraft and a fifty-minute artillery barrage. The two forward infantry brigades, with an organic tank battalion, of each of the three infantry divisions then crossed the cease-fire lines, bypassing United Nations observer posts. They were covered by mobile anti-aircraft batteries, and equipped with bulldozers to fill-in anti-tank ditches, bridge-layer tanks to overcome obstacles and mine-clearance vehicles. These engineering vehicles were priority targets for Israeli tank gunners and took heavy losses, but Syrian infantry at points demolished the tank ditch, allowing their armor to cross.<ref name="historynet golan">{{cite journal |first=Gary |last=Rashba |title=Yom Kippur War: Sacrificial Stand in the Golan Heights |url=http://www.historynet.com/yom-kippur-war-sacrificial-stand-in-the-golan-heights.htm |publisher=Military History magazine via HISTORYnet |date=October 1998}}</ref>
In the afternoon of 9 October, Syrian command committed the Republican Guard independent 70th Armored Brigade, equipped with T-62s and ]s.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=227}} To hold the gap, 7th AB could by now muster only some two dozen tanks, elements from the 77th, 74th, 82nd and 71st Tank Battalion. Israeli command had directed all reserves to the threatened southern sector, trusting that the northern sector was secure. Fighting in daylight proved to be advantageous to the Syrians: the better armored T-62s were hard to destroy at long range and their high-velocity 115&nbsp;mm ] smoothbore guns were quite accurate at medium ranges, despite the lack of a ].{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=240}}


Taking losses and hit by an intense artillery barrage, the Israeli Centurions withdrew from their tank ramps. The situation was restored by an ad hoc force of thirteen tanks formed by Lt. Col. Yossi Ben-Hanan from repaired vehicles and stray crews. The Syrians abandoned their last breakthrough attempt, having lost since 6 October some 260 tanks in the Quneitra Gap.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=240}}
At 14:45, two hundred men from the Syrian 82nd Paratrooper Battalion descended on foot from ] and around 17:00 took the Israeli observation base on the southern slope, with its advanced surveillance equipment. A small force dropped by four ]s simultaneously placed itself on the access road south of the base.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 171</ref> Specialised intelligence personnel were captured. Made to believe that Israel had fallen, they disclosed much sensitive information.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 172–73</ref> A first Israeli attempt on October 8 to retake the base from the south was ambushed and beaten off with heavy losses.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 282</ref>


===Syrian breakthrough in the Southern Golan===
] (right) with soldiers, 1973]]
In the southern sector, the Israeli ] had to defend a much flatter terrain.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=178–179}} It also faced two-thirds of the Syrian second wave, while fielding at this time less than a third of the operational Israeli tanks. Beside these objective draw-backs, it suffered from ineffective command. Ben-Shoham initially still had his headquarters in ], far from his sector. He did not realise a full war was in progress and tended to spread the 53rd TB platoons along the entire line, to stop any Syrian incursion. Also, he failed to coordinate the deployment of 82nd TB and 53rd TB.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=163, 179}}


The commander of 53rd TB, Lieutenant-Colonel Oded Eres, sent the two arriving companies of 82nd TB to his right flank and centre.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=108}} No further reinforcement materialising, he urgently ordered the southern company to the north again; it was ambushed on the way. His left flank at Kudne remained unreinforced, although the defending company had increased the number of operational tanks to eight. This was the main axis of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division and its commander, Colonel Hassan Tourkmani, ordered the remnants of an organic tank battalion to be sacrificed forcing the minefield belt.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=123–124}} Subsequently, the Syrian 51st Armored Brigade bypassed bunker complex 111 after dark. It then overran the Israeli supply compound at the Hushniya cross-roads.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=125}}
During the afternoon 7th Armored Brigade was still kept in reserve and the 188th Armored Brigade held the frontline with only two tank battalions, the 74th in the north and the 53rd in the south.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 88−105</ref> The northern battalion waged an exemplary defensive battle against the forward brigades of the Syrian 7th Infantry Division, destroying fifty-nine Syrian tanks for minimal losses.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 100</ref> The southern battalion destroyed a similar number, but facing four Syrian tank battalions from two divisions had a dozen of its own tanks knocked out.<ref name="Asher105">Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 105</ref> At bunker complex 111, opposite Kudne in Syria, the defending company beat off "determined" and "bravely" pressed attacks by the Syrian 9th Infantry Division; by nightfall it was reduced to three tanks, with only sixty-nine anti-tank rounds between them.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 103</ref> Further successful resistance by the southern battalion was contingent on reinforcements.<ref name="Asher105"/>


Parts of the 75th Mechanised Infantry Battalion had been concentrated at Hushniya, but they did not consist of its two organic tank companies; they were ] units. Lacking modern antitank weapons, Israeli infantry was ineffective at stopping Syrian armor.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=127}} The 51st AB passing through the Kudne/Rafid Gap turned northwest to move along the ] or "Tapline Road", which provided a diagonal route across the heights, running straight from Hushniya to Nafah, the Israeli Golan headquarters, in the rear of the Quneitra Gap.<ref name="jpost">{{cite news|first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |url=http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.23.html |title=Shattered Heights: Part 1 |newspaper=The Jerusalem Post |date=25 September 1998 |access-date=9 June 2005 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050311235445/http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.23.html |archive-date=11 March 2005}}</ref>
Direct operational command of the Golan had at first been given to the 188 AB commander, Yitzhak Ben-Shoham, who ordered the 7th AB to concentrate at Wasset.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 161</ref> The 7th AB commander, Avigdor Ben-Gal, resented obeying an officer of equal rank and went to the ] headquarters at Nafah, announcing he would place his force in the northern sector at the "] Gap", a pass south of the ] peak and the main access to the Golan Heights from the east. Northern Command was in the process of moving their headquarters to ] in Galilee and the senior staff officers were absent at this moment, having expected the Syrian attack to start at 18:00. Operations officer Lieutenant-Colonel Uri Simhoni therefore improvised an allocation of the tactical reserves, thereby largely deciding the course of the battle.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 162</ref> The Armored School Centurion Tank Battalion (71st TB) was kept in general reserve. The 77th Tank Battalion of 7th AB was sent to Quneitra. Two companies of the 75th Mechanised Infantry Battalion, arrived in the morning, of the same brigade were sent to the southern sector. Also 82nd TB had to reinforce the south. However, Ben-Gal had split off a company of this battalion to serve as a reserve for his own brigade.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 107</ref> Another company, soon after arriving in the south, was ambushed by an infiltrated Syrian commando force armed with Sagger missiles and almost entirely wiped out.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 118</ref> As a result, effective reinforcement of the southern Golan sector was limited to just a single tank company.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 170</ref>


] tanks on the Golan Heights]]
At 16:00, ], head Northern Command, shortly visited Nafah and split command of the Golan front: the north would be the responsibility of 7th AB, to which 53rd TB would be transferred. Command of 188th AB would be limited to the south, taking over 82nd TB.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 173–74</ref> The first wave of the Syrian offensive had failed to penetrate, but at nightfall a second, larger, wave was launched. For this purpose each of the three infantry divisions, also committing their organic mechanised brigade with forty tanks, had been reinforced by an armored brigade of about ninety tanks. Two of these brigades were to attack the northern sector, four the southern sector.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 174</ref>


Israeli command was initially slow to realise that a breakthrough had taken place. Their main concern was that the Syrians would occupy some forward bunker complex or settlement.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=177}} The fact that the defending tank platoons were still intact was seen as proof that the line had not been broken. Ben-Shoham around 18:30 moved his headquarters to the south. Reports of Syrian radio traffic at Hushniya, of Israeli reserve tanks passing columns of Syrian tanks in the dark and of enemy tanks moving at the rear of the observation post on ], were dismissed by him as misidentifications.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=178}} Only when two tanks parked in the dark near his staff vehicles and were recognised for T-55s when hastily driving away upon being hailed, he understood that a large Syrian tank unit had infiltrated his lines.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=179}}
====Successful Israeli defense of the Quneitra Gap by the 7th Armored Brigade====
]. It was considered in many respects superior to the Soviet ]/55.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 291–93.</ref>]]


As a result, no regular units were directed to block a Syrian advance to Nafah. Ben-Shoham had ordered Lieutenant ], who, about to be trained as a tank company commander, had arrived at Nafah unattached to any combat unit, to gather some crews and follow him to the south with a few tanks to take command of the bunker complex 111 and 112 tank forces which had lost all officers. {{convert|3|mi|km|0|order=flip|spell=On|abbr=off}} south of Nafah base, Greengold was warned by a truck convoy that there were Syrian tanks ahead.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=182–183}} These belonged to the 452st Tank Battalion, hurrying north to surprise Nafah.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=136}}
Over four days of fighting, the 7th Armored Brigade in the north under ] managed to hold the rocky hill line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah, inflicting heavy losses on the Syrians. During the night of October 6/7 it beat off an attack of the Syrian 78th Armoured Brigade, attached to the 7th Infantry Division.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 140–44</ref> On October 7, 7th AB had to send part of its reserves to the collapsing southern sector. Replenishment from the Nafah matériel stock became impossible. Syrian High Command, understanding that forcing the Quneitra Gap would ensure a total victory on the Golan, decided to commit its strategic armored reserves. During the night of October 7/8, the independent 81st Armored Brigade, equipped with modern T-62's and part of the presidential guard, attacked but was beaten off.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 193–97</ref> After this fight, the Israeli brigade would refer to the gap as the "Valley of Tears".<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 196</ref> Syrian Brigadier-General Omar Abrash, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, was killed on October 8 when his command tank was hit as he was preparing an attempt by 121st Mechanised Brigade to bypass the gap through a more southern route.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 202</ref>


Confronted at short range with a first group of three T-55's, Greengold's Centurion destroyed them in quick succession. He then moved parallel to the road to the south, hitting advancing Syrian tanks in the flank and destroying another ten until he approached Hushniya. From this the commander of 452st TB, Major Farouk Ismail, concluded that he had been ambushed by a strong Israeli tank unit and concentrated his remaining vehicles in a defensive position at Hushniya.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=136}} Greengold decided not to reveal how precarious the Israeli situation was, in radio contact with Ben-Shoham hiding the fact that his "Force Zvika" consisted of only a single tank.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=184–185}}
Having practiced on the Golan Heights numerous times, Israeli gunners made effective use of ].<ref name="historynet golan" /> During night attacks, however, the Syrian tanks had the advantage of ], which was not a standard Israeli equipment (instead, some Israeli tanks were fitted with large xenon searchlights which were useful in illuminating and locating enemy positions, troops and vehicles). The close distances during night engagements, negated the usual Israeli superiority in long-range duels. 77th Tank Battalion commander ] in the Quneitra Gap generally managed to hold a second tank ramp line.<ref name="historynet golan"/>
]]]
In the afternoon of October 9, Syrian command committed the Republican Guard independent 70th Armored Brigade, equipped with T-62's and ]s.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 227</ref> To hold the gap, 7th AB could by now muster only some two dozen tanks, elements from the 77th, 74th, 82nd and 71st Tank Battalion. Israeli command had directed all reserves to the threatened southern sector, trusting that the northern sector was secure. Fighting in daylight proved to be advantageous to the Syrians: the better armored T-62's were hard to destroy at long range and their high-velocity 115&nbsp;mm smoothbore guns were quite accurate at medium ranges, despite the lack of a ]. Taking losses and hit by an intense artillery barrage, the Israeli Centurions withdrew from their tank ramps. The situation was restored by an ad hoc force of thirteen tanks formed by Lt. Col. Yossi Ben-Hanan from repaired vehicles and stray crews. The Syrians abandoned their last breakthrough attempt, having lost since October 6 some 260 tanks in the Quneitra Gap.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 240</ref>


The next 9th Infantry Division unit to participate in the second wave, the 43rd Mechanised Infantry Brigade, entered the Golan at Kudne, but then sharply turned to the right advancing over the lateral "Reshet" road behind the Purple Line in the direction of Quneitra. Israeli 1st Infantry Brigade elements warned 7th Armored Brigade of the danger. Ben Gal then released the 82nd TB company he had held back, commanded by Captain Meir "Tiger" Zamir, and sent it to the south to cover his flank. Zamir ambushed the Syrian brigade; directing their fire with the xenon light projector on one of his tanks his company destroyed a dozen vehicles.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=138–139}} At dawn he surprised the enemy column from the rear and dispersed the remnants of 43 MIB, having knocked-out all of its forty tanks.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=158–159}}
====Syrian breakthrough in the Southern Golan====
In the southern sector, the Israeli ] had to defend a much flatter terrain.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 178–79</ref> It also faced two-thirds of the Syrian second wave, while fielding at this time less than a third of the operational Israeli tanks. Beside these objective draw-backs, it suffered from ineffective command. Ben-Shoham initially still had his headquarters in Nafah, far from his sector. He did not realise a full war was in progress and tended to spread the 53rd TB platoons along the entire line, to stop any Syrian incursion. Also, he failed to coordinate the deployment of 82nd TB and 53rd TB.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 163, 179</ref> The commander of 53rd TB, Lieutenant-Colonel Oded Eres, sent the two arriving companies of 82nd TB to his right flank and centre.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 108</ref> No further reinforcement materialising, he urgently ordered the southern company to the north again; it was ambushed on the way. His left flank at Kudne remained unreinforced, although the defending company had increased the number of operational tanks to eight. This was the main axis of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division and its commander, Colonel Hassan Tourkmani, ordered the remnants of an organic tank battalion to be sacrificed forcing the minefield belt.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 123–24</ref> Subsequently, the Syrian 51st Armored Brigade bypassed bunker complex 111 after dark. It then overran the Israeli supply compound at the Hushniya cross-roads.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 125</ref> Parts of the 75th Mechanised Infantry Battalion had been concentrated at Hushniya, but they did not consist of its two organic tank companies; they were ] units. Lacking modern antitank weapons, Israeli infantry was ineffective at stopping Syrian armor.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 127</ref> The 51st AB passing through the Kudne/Rafid Gap turned northwest to move along the ] or "Tapline Road", which provided a diagonal route across the heights, running straight from Hushniya to ], the Israeli Golan headquarters, in the rear of the Quneitra Gap.<ref name="jpost">{{cite news|first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |url=http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.23.html |title=Shattered Heights: Part 1 |newspaper=The Jerusalem Post |date=September 25, 1998 |access-date=June 9, 2005 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050311235445/http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.23.html |archive-date=March 11, 2005 }}</ref>


===Israeli strategic response===
] tanks on the Golan Heights]]
Around midnight, Hofi, at Safed, began to understand the magnitude of the Syrian breakthrough. He warned chief-of-staff Elazar that the entire Golan might be lost. Overhearing this message, an alarmed Dayan decided to personally visit the Northern Command headquarters.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=187}} In the late night, Hofi informed Dayan that an estimated three hundred Syrian tanks had entered the southern Golan. No reserves were available to stop a Syrian incursion into Galilee. Visibly shaken by this news, the Israeli minister of defence ordered the Jordan bridges to be prepared for detonation.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=194}}


Next, he contacted ], commander of the Israeli Air Force. He shocked Peled by announcing that the ] was about to fall. The IAF had just made a successful start with Operation Tagar, a very complex plan to neutralise the Egyptian AA-missile belt. Overruling objections by Peled, Dayan ordered to immediately carry out ] instead, the destruction of the Syrian SAM-belt, to allow the IAF to halt the Syrian advance.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=195}}
Israeli command was initially slow to realise that a breakthrough had taken place. Their main concern was that the Syrians would occupy some forward bunker complex or settlement.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 177</ref> The fact that the defending tank platoons were still intact was seen as proof that the line had not been broken. Ben-Shoham around 18:30 moved his headquarters to the south. Reports of Syrian radio traffic at Hushniya, of Israeli reserve tanks passing columns of Syrian tanks in the dark and of enemy tanks moving at the rear of the observation post on Tel Saki, were dismissed by him as misidentifications.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 178</ref> Only when two tanks parked in the dark near his staff vehicles and were recognised for T-55s when hastily driving away upon being hailed, he understood that a large Syrian tank unit had infiltrated his lines.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 179</ref>


As there was no time to obtain recent information on the location of the batteries,{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=198}} the attempt was a costly failure. The Israelis destroyed only one Syrian missile battery but lost six Phantom II aircraft.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=199}} As a result, the IAF was unable to make a significant contribution to the defensive battle on the Golan. Over both fronts together, on 7 October only 129 bombardment sorties were flown.{{sfnp|Bar-Joseph|2012|p=220}} It also proved impossible to restart Tagar, curtailing IAF operations on the Sinai front for the duration of the war.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=200}}
As a result, no regular units were directed to block a Syrian advance to Nafah. Ben-Shoham had ordered Lieutenant ], who, about to be trained as a tank company commander, had arrived at Nafah unattached to any combat unit, to gather some crews and follow him to the south with a few tanks to take command of the bunker complex 111 and 112 tank forces which had lost all officers. {{convert|3|mi|km|0|order=flip|spell=On|abbr=off}} south of Nafah base, Greengold was warned by a truck convoy that there were Syrian tanks ahead.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 182–83</ref> These belonged to the 452st Tank Battalion, hurrying north to surprise Nafah. Confronted at short range with a first group of three T-55's, Greengold's Centurion destroyed them in quick succession. He then moved parallel to the road to the south, hitting advancing Syrian tanks in the flank and destroying another ten until he approached Hushniya. From this the commander of 452st TB, Major Farouk Ismail, concluded that he had been ambushed by a strong Israeli tank unit and concentrated his remaining vehicles in a defensive position at Hushniya.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 136</ref> Greengold decided not to reveal how precarious the Israeli situation was, in radio contact with Ben-Shoham hiding the fact that his "Force Zvika" consisted of only a single tank.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 184–85</ref>


Less pessimistic than Dayan, Elazar was not ready yet to abandon the Golan Heights.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=157}} Israeli High Command had a strategic reserve, consisting of the 146th Ugda that was earmarked for Central Command, controlling the eastern border with Jordan. In the evening of 6 October, Elazar had considered sending this division to the collapsing Sinai front in view of the initial defensive success at the Golan. The unexpected crisis led to an about-face. Priority was given to the north because of its proximity to Israeli population centers at ], Safed, ] and ]. Elazar ordered that, after mobilisation, the 146th Ugda was to reconquer the southern Golan.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=189}}
The next 9th Infantry Division unit to participate in the second wave, the 43rd Mechanised Infantry Brigade, entered the Golan at Kudne, but then sharply turned to the right advancing over the lateral "Reshet" road behind the Purple Line in the direction of Quneitra. Israeli 1st Infantry Brigade elements warned 7th Armored Brigade of the danger. Ben Gal then released the 82nd TB company he had held back, commanded by Captain Meir "Tiger" Zamir, and sent it to the south to cover his flank. Zamir ambushed the Syrian brigade; directing their fire with the xenon light projector on one of his tanks his company destroyed a dozen vehicles.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 138–39</ref> At dawn he surprised the enemy column from the rear and dispersed the remnants of 43 MIB, having knocked-out all of its forty tanks.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 158–59</ref>


This division would take some time to deploy. Some smaller units could be quickly mobilised to bolster the defenses. The Syrians had expected it to take at least twenty-four hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, they began to join the fight only nine hours after the war began, twelve hours after the start of the mobilisation.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=185}} The Golan position had been at only 80% of its planned strength for the defensive phase of a full war with Syria.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=106}} Northern Command had a headquarters reserve consisting of a unnumbered rapid deployment Centurion tank battalion. Also, the 71st Mechanised Infantry Battalion, with two organic tank companies, of the 188th AB had not yet been activated. During the night of 6/7 October these two battalions were gradually brought up.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=134–135}}
====Israeli strategic response====
Around midnight, Hofi, at Safed, began to understand the magnitude of the Syrian breakthrough. He warned chief-of-staff Elazar that the entire Golan might be lost. Overhearing this message, an alarmed Dayan decided to personally visit the Northern Command headquarters.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 187</ref> In the late night, Hofi informed Dayan that an estimated three hundred Syrian tanks had entered the southern Golan. No reserves were available to stop a Syrian incursion into Galilee. Visibly shaken by this news, the Israeli minister of defence ordered the Jordan bridges to be prepared for detonation.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 194</ref> Next, he contacted ], commander of the Israeli Air Force. He shocked Peled by announcing that the ] was about to fall. The IAF had just made a successful start with Operation Tagar, a very complex plan to neutralise the Egyptian AA-missile belt. Overruling objections by Peled, Dayan ordered to immediately carry out ] instead, the destruction of the Syrian SAM-belt, to allow the IAF to halt the Syrian advance.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 195</ref> As there was no time to obtain recent information on the location of the batteries,<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 198</ref> the attempt was a costly failure. The Israelis destroyed only one Syrian missile battery but lost six Phantom II aircraft.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 199</ref> As a result, the IAF was unable to make a significant contribution to the defensive battle on the Golan. Over both fronts together, on October 7 only 129 bombardment sorties were flown.<ref>Bar-Joseph (2012), p. 220</ref> It also proved impossible to restart Tagar, curtailing IAF operations on the Sinai front for the duration of the war.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 200</ref>


Around 01:00 on 7 October, the ] was activated as a divisional headquarters under Brigadier ], to take direct command of the northern front.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=188}} The 7th Armored Brigade did not have this division as its original destination. It was an elite active General Headquarters reserve, moved from the Sinai to the Golan in reaction to the Syrian build-up. Under the original mobilisation Plan ''Gir'' ("Chalk"), the 36th Division was to be expanded by the 179th Armored Brigade. In the evening of 6 October, it was considered to send this brigade to the Sinai instead but this option was abandoned after the Syrian breakthrough. To speed up the relocation of 7th Armored Brigade to the north, this brigade had left its tanks at Tasa, the main mobilisation complex of the Sinai, and used the stocked vehicles of the 179th Armored Brigade to rebuild itself at Nafah.{{sfnp|Bar-Joseph|2012|p=227}}
Less pessimistic than Dayan, Elazar was not ready yet to abandon the Golan Heights.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 157</ref> Israeli High Command had a strategic reserve, consisting of the 146th Ugda that was earmarked for Central Command, controlling the eastern border with Jordan. In the evening of October 6, Elazar had considered sending this division to the collapsing Sinai front in view of the initial defensive success at the Golan. The unexpected crisis led to an about-face. Priority was given to the north because of its proximity to Israeli population centers at ], Safed, ] and ]. Elazar ordered that, after mobilisation, the 146th Ugda was to reconquer the southern Golan.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 189</ref> This division would take some time to deploy. Some smaller units could be quickly mobilised to bolster the defenses. The Syrians had expected it to take at least twenty-four hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, they began to join the fight only nine hours after the war began, twelve hours after the start of the mobilisation.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 185</ref> The Golan position had been at only 80% of its planned strength for the defensive phase of a full war with Syria.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 106</ref> Northern Command had a headquarters reserve consisting of a unnumbered rapid deployment Centurion tank battalion. Also, the 71st Mechanised Infantry Battalion, with two organic tank companies, of the 188th AB had not yet been activated. During the night of October 6/7 these two battalions were gradually brought up.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 134–35</ref>


Around 01:00 on October 7, the 36th Ugda was activated as a divisional headquarters under Brigadier ], to take direct command of the northern front.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 188</ref> The 7th AB did not have this division as its original destination. It was an elite active General Headquarters reserve, moved from the Sinai to the Golan in reaction to the Syrian build-up. Under the original mobilisation Plan ''Gir'' ("Chalk"), the 36th Ugda was to be expanded by the 179th Armored Brigade. In the evening of October 6, it was considered to send this brigade to the Sinai instead but this option was abandoned after the Syrian breakthrough. To speed up the relocation of 7th AB to the north, this brigade had left its tanks at Tasa, the main mobilisation complex of the Sinai, and used the stocked vehicles of the 179th AB to rebuild itself at Nafah. In turn, the 179th AB began to mobilise in eastern Galilee, from the mobilisation complex at the foot of the Golan Heights, using the stocked vehicles of the 164th Armoured Brigade. This latter brigade was earmarked for the 240th Ugda, a division to be held in reserve. Assuming that a sustained Syrian offensive would have led to crippling Arab tank losses, 36th Ugda and 240th Ugda were in the prewar planning intended to execute an advance in the direction of Damascus, Operation Ze'ev Aravot ("Desert Wolf"). All remaining stocked Centurions in the north were eventually used to rebuild 7th and 188th AB in the night of October 9/10. The 164th AB was ultimately sent to the Sinai, to activate itself using the old 7th AB matériel.<ref>Bar-Joseph (2012), p. 227</ref> Also the 679th Armored Brigade was intended to join the 240th Ugda and ordered to mobilise at noon October 6.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 170</ref> Reservists of both brigades arriving at the Galilee army depots were quickly assigned to tanks and sent to the front, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive,<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 190</ref> machine guns to be installed, or the tank guns to be calibrated, a time-consuming process known as ].<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 209</ref> Elements of such larger units were during October 7 fed into the battle piece-meal.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 171</ref> In turn, the 179th Armored Brigade began to mobilise in eastern Galilee, from the mobilisation complex at the foot of the Golan Heights, using the stocked vehicles of the 164th Armoured Brigade. This latter brigade was earmarked for the 240th Division, a division to be held in reserve. Assuming that a sustained Syrian offensive would have led to crippling Arab tank losses, 36th and 240th divisions were in the prewar planning intended to execute an advance in the direction of Damascus, Operation Ze'ev Aravot ("Desert Wolf"). All remaining stocked Centurions in the north were eventually used to rebuild 7th and 188th brigades on the night of 9/10 October. The 164th Armored Brigade was ultimately sent to the Sinai, to activate itself using the old 7th Armored Brigade matériel.{{sfnp|Bar-Joseph|2012|p=227}}


The 679th Armored Brigade was intended to join the 240th Division and ordered to mobilise at noon 6 October.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=170}} Reservists of both brigades arriving at the Galilee army depots were quickly assigned to tanks and sent to the front, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive,{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=190}} machine guns to be installed, or the tank guns to be calibrated, a time-consuming process known as ].{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=209}} Elements of such larger units were during 7 October fed into the battle piece-meal.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=171}}
====Collapse of the Israeli 188th Armored Brigade====
The Syrian first and second wave had in total numbered about six hundred tanks, half of which had been lost by the morning of October 7. By this time, the Israelis had committed about 250 tanks to battle.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 218</ref> Of the initially arriving reserves, the 71 MIB was used to block an advance by the westernmost elements of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division towards the Bnot Yaacov Bridge, the crucial connection between Galilee and Nafah. During the late evening of October 6, the NCTB advanced from Nafah towards Hushniya, attempting to seal the breakthrough point. The attack, running into prepared positions occupied by a superior force of T-55s, was a dismal failure, leaving all of its officers dead or wounded. Greengold incorporated the remnants of the unit into his "Force Zvika".<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 185–86</ref>


===Collapse of the Israeli 188th Armored Brigade===
By the early morning of October 7, all attempts to patch the breach in the main defensive line of the southern sector became futile because also the center and right flank of the 188th AB had started to collapse.<ref name="Asher & Hammel 1987, p. 155">Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 155</ref> During the night, it had largely managed to hold its ground against continuous attacks, inflicting severe losses on the Syrians with accurate cannon fire, hoping to buy time for reserve forces to reach the front lines. Some tank crews sacrificed themselves rather than voluntarily give ground.<ref name="O'Ballance Ch 7" /> Gradually, the fighting subsided.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 193</ref> Dawn revealed that the Syrian 5th Infantry Division under the cover of darkness had at numerous points bridged the tank ditch and cleared corridors through the minefield belt. The situation of 188th AB was rendered even more hazardous by the presence in its rear of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division. It was decided to abandon the southern Golan. In the night, many artillery and logistic units had already withdrawn, some slipping through the columns of 9th ID, others being destroyed by them. Civilian Jewish settlements had been evacuated. The same now happened with most fortifications,<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 206</ref> except bunker complex 116.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 233</ref> Ben-Shoham with his staff outflanked the Syrian penetration via a western route and reached the north.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) p. 207</ref> The 82nd TB company that had reinforced the center, commanded by Eli Geva, had the previous evening destroyed about thirty Syrian tanks. It now successfully crossed the axis of 9th ID to the north.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 218–19</ref> Of the originally thirty-six tanks of 53rd TB, twelve remained. Eres hid them in the crater of Tel Faris,<ref name="Asher & Hammel 1987, p. 155"/> where a surveillance base was located. During the late evening of October 7, he would successfully break out to the west.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 231–33</ref>
The Syrian first and second wave had in total numbered about six hundred tanks, half of which had been lost by the morning of 7 October. By this time, the Israelis had committed about 250 tanks to battle.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=218}} Of the initially arriving reserves, the 71 MIB was used to block an advance by the westernmost elements of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division towards the Bnot Yaacov Bridge, the crucial connection between Galilee and Nafah. During the late evening of 6 October, the NCTB advanced from Nafah towards Hushniya, attempting to seal the breakthrough point. The attack, running into prepared positions occupied by a superior force of T-55s, was a dismal failure, leaving all of its officers dead or wounded. Greengold incorporated the remnants of the unit into his "Force Zvika".{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=185–186}}


By the early morning of 7 October, all attempts to patch the breach in the main defensive line of the southern sector became futile because also the center and right flank of the 188th AB had started to collapse.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=155}} During the night, it had largely managed to hold its ground against continuous attacks, inflicting severe losses on the Syrians with accurate cannon fire, hoping to buy time for reserve forces to reach the front lines. Some tank crews sacrificed themselves rather than voluntarily give ground.<ref name="O'Ballance Ch 7" /> Gradually, the fighting subsided.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=193}}
] tank on the Golan Heights]]


Dawn revealed that the Syrian 5th Infantry Division under the cover of darkness had at numerous points bridged the tank ditch and cleared corridors through the minefield belt. The situation of 188th AB was rendered even more hazardous by the presence in its rear of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division. It was decided to abandon the southern Golan. In the night, many artillery and logistic units had already withdrawn, some slipping through the columns of 9th ID, others being destroyed by them. Civilian Jewish settlements had been evacuated. The same now happened with most fortifications,{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=206}} except bunker complex 116.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=233}}
The Syrian 5th ID subsequently occupied the plateau of the southern Golan. Ben-Shoham tried to maintain a foothold on the access roads by small groups of APCs manned by the 50th Paratrooper Battalion,<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), pp. 136–37</ref> but these were easily brushed aside. The Syrian 47th Armored Brigade advanced along the escarpment to the north, in the direction of the Bnot Yaacov Bridge. The 132nd Mechanised Infantry Brigade positioned itself east of El Al, on the road along the Jordan border, running to the south of ]. Israeli General Dan Lener in the late night activated the divisional headquarters of the 210th Ugda to take control over the sector between the lake and the Bnot Yaacov Bridge but he had no regular units to hold this line.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 178</ref> For the moment, he could do little more than personally halt retreating troops and vehicles on the more southern Arik Bridge and send them over the River Jordan again. Israeli command feared that the Syrians would quickly exploit this situation by advancing into Galilee. Dayan in the morning of October 7 called ], the director-general of the ], to a meeting with Golda Meir to discuss the possible arming of nuclear weapons. Meir rejected this option.<ref>Rabinovich (2017) pp. 246–47</ref> The Syrian mechanised brigades in this area did not continue the offensive but began to entrench themselves in strong defensive positions. They had been forbidden by Al-Assad to approach the River Jordan, for fear of triggering an Israeli nuclear response.<ref>Richard B. Parker (ed.), 2001, ''The October War&nbsp;– A Retrospective'' Gainesville: University of Florida Press, pp. 102–03, 119</ref>


Ben-Shoham with his staff outflanked the Syrian penetration via a western route and reached the north.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|p=207}} The 82nd TB company that had reinforced the center, commanded by Eli Geva, had the previous evening destroyed about thirty Syrian tanks. It now successfully crossed the axis of 9th ID to the north.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=218–19}} Of the originally thirty-six tanks of 53rd TB, twelve remained. Eres hid them in the crater of Tel Faris,{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=155}} where a surveillance base was located. During the late evening of 7 October, he would successfully break out to the west.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=231–233}}
The original Syrian offensive plan ''Al-Aouda'' ("The Return"), devised by Major-General Adul Habeisi, had emphasized the element of tactical surprise. It was known to the Syrians that the 188th AB normally rotated its two tank battalions on the Purple Line, so that on any given moment just thirty-three tanks were guarding the tank ditch. Infiltrations by commando teams armed with Saggers were planned to quickly isolate these ten tank platoons from reinforcement by tactical reserves.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 55</ref> Simultaneously, helicopter-borne commando attacks at the Jordan bridges, landing during conditions of dusk to avoid the IAF, would isolate the Golan Heights from strategic reinforcements. Night attacks by the three Syrian infantry divisions would then fragment the weakly-held forward Israeli defensive positions. To conclude the operation and deter any Israeli attempt to reconquer the Golan, the Syrian 1st and 3rd Armored Division would advance onto the plateau. This way, it was hoped to take the Golan within thirty hours.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 58</ref> Coordination with Egypt forced a change of plans. The Egyptians wanted hostilities to start at noon;<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 60</ref> in the end they agreed to a compromise time of 14:00.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 64</ref> The Syrian helicopter attacks were cancelled.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 65</ref> Now uncertain of a successful outcome, the Syrians became less committed to the attack. They decided to keep one armored division as a strategic reserve, together with the two presidential guard independent armored brigades, which fielded the most modern tank matériel.<ref>Asher & Hammel (1987), p. 63</ref>


] tank]]
Greengold fought running battles in this area with Syrian armor for twenty hours, sometimes with his single tank and at other times as part of a larger unit, changing tanks half a dozen times as they were knocked out. Greengold suffered burn injuries, but stayed in action and repeatedly showed up at critical moments from an unexpected direction to change the course of a skirmish.<ref name="jpost" /> For his actions, he received Israel's highest decoration, the ].
The Syrian 5th ID subsequently occupied the plateau of the southern Golan. Ben-Shoham tried to maintain a foothold on the access roads by small groups of APCs manned by the 50th Paratrooper Battalion,{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|pp=136–137}} but these were easily brushed aside. The Syrian 47th Armored Brigade advanced along the escarpment to the north, in the direction of the Bnot Yaacov Bridge. The 132nd Mechanised Infantry Brigade positioned itself east of El Al, on the road along the Jordan border, running to the south of ]. Israeli General Dan Lener in the late night activated the divisional headquarters of the 210th Ugda to take control over the sector between the lake and the Bnot Yaacov Bridge but he had no regular units to hold this line.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=178}}


For the moment, he could do little more than personally halt retreating troops and vehicles on the more southern Arik Bridge and send them over the River Jordan again. Israeli command feared that the Syrians would quickly exploit this situation by advancing into Galilee. Dayan in the morning of 7 October called ], the director-general of the ], to a meeting with Golda Meir to discuss the possible arming of nuclear weapons. Meir rejected this option.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2017|pp=246–247}} The Syrian mechanised brigades in this area did not continue the offensive but began to entrench themselves in strong defensive positions. They had been forbidden by Al-Assad to approach the River Jordan, for fear of triggering an Israeli nuclear response.<ref>Richard B. Parker (ed.), 2001, ''The October War&nbsp;– A Retrospective'' Gainesville: University of Florida Press, pp. 102–103, 119</ref>
Brigade Commander Colonel Shoham was killed on the second day, along with his second-in-command and operations officer, as the Syrians desperately tried to advance towards the ] and Nafah. At this point, the Barak Brigade was no longer a cohesive force, although surviving tanks and crewmen continued fighting independently. The Syrians were close to reaching the Israeli defenders at Nafah, yet stopped the advance on Nafah's fences at 1700; the pause lasted all night, allowing Israeli forces to form a defensive line.<ref name="O'Ballance Ch 7" /> It is surmised that the Syrians had calculated estimated advances, and the commanders in the field did not want to diverge from the plan.


The original Syrian offensive plan ''Al-Aouda'' ("The Return"), devised by Major-General Adul Habeisi, had emphasized the element of tactical surprise. It was known to the Syrians that the 188th AB normally rotated its two tank battalions on the Purple Line, so that on any given moment just thirty-three tanks were guarding the tank ditch. Infiltrations by commando teams armed with Saggers were planned to quickly isolate these ten tank platoons from reinforcement by tactical reserves.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=55}} Simultaneously, helicopter-borne commando attacks at the Jordan bridges, landing during conditions of dusk to avoid the IAF, would isolate the Golan Heights from strategic reinforcements.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=58}}
====Israel retakes the southern Golan====
The tide in the Golan began to turn as arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain the Syrian advance. Beginning on October 8, the Israelis began pushing the Syrians back towards the pre-war ceasefire lines, inflicting heavy tank losses. Another Syrian attack north of Quneitra was repulsed. The tiny Golan Heights were too small to act as an effective territorial buffer, unlike the Sinai Peninsula in the south, but it proved to be a strategic geographical stronghold and was a crucial key in preventing the Syrians from bombarding the cities below. The Israelis, who had suffered heavy casualties during the first three days of fighting, also began relying more heavily on artillery to dislodge the Syrians at long-range.


Night attacks by the three Syrian infantry divisions would then fragment the weakly-held forward Israeli defensive positions. To conclude the operation and deter any Israeli attempt to reconquer the Golan, the Syrian 1st and 3rd Armored Division would advance onto the plateau. This way, it was hoped to take the Golan within thirty hours.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=58}} Coordination with Egypt forced a change of plans. The Egyptians wanted hostilities to start at noon;{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=60}} in the end they agreed to a compromise time of 14:00.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=64}} The Syrian helicopter attacks were cancelled.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=65}} Now uncertain of a successful outcome, the Syrians became less committed to the attack. They decided to keep one armored division as a strategic reserve, together with the two presidential guard independent armored brigades, which fielded the most modern tank matériel.{{sfnp|Asher|Hammel|1987|p=63}}

===Israel retakes the southern Golan===
]]] ]]]
The tide in the Golan began to turn as arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain the Syrian advance. Beginning on 8 October, the Israelis began pushing the Syrians back towards the pre-war ceasefire lines, inflicting heavy tank losses.


On October 9, Syrian ] ]s struck the Israeli Air Force base of ], killing a pilot and injuring several soldiers. Additional missiles struck civilian settlements. In retaliation, seven Israeli F-4 Phantoms flew into Syria and ] in Damascus. The jets struck from Lebanese airspace to avoid the heavily defended regions around the Golan Heights, attacking a Lebanese radar station along the way. The upper floors of the Syrian GHQ and the Air Force Command were badly damaged. A ] cultural center, a television station, and other nearby structures were also mistakenly hit. One Israeli Phantom was shot down.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/syria_raid.html |title=The Air Raid on the Syrian General Command |publisher=Jewishvirtuallibrary.org |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> The strike prompted the Syrians to transfer air defense units from the Golan Heights to the home front, allowing the IAF greater freedom of action.<ref name="historynet golan" /> On 9 October, the Syrians launched a counterattack north of Quneitra. As part of the operation, they attempted to land heli-borne troops in the vicinity of El Rom. The counterattack was repulsed, and four Syrian helicopters were shot down with total loss of life.<ref>'']'', 9 October 1973 issue, p. 2</ref> Syrian ] ]s struck the Israeli Air Force base of ], killing a pilot and injuring several soldiers. Additional missiles struck civilian settlements. In retaliation, seven Israeli F-4 Phantoms flew into Syria and ] in Damascus. One Israeli Phantom was shot down.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=http://www.iaf.org.il/971-16606-he/IAF.aspx|last=Barkat|first=Liad|journal=Israeli Air Force Magazine|language=Hebrew|title=Yaakobi's Box|date=February 1, 1998|issue=119}}</ref> The attack prompted the Syrians to transfer air defense units from the Golan Heights to the home front, allowing the IAF greater freedom of action.<ref name="historynet golan" />


On October 9, as the last Syrian units were being driven from the Golan Heights, the Syrians launched a counterattack north of Quneitra. As part of the operation, they attempted to land heli-borne troops in the vicinity of El Rom. The counterattack was repulsed, and four Syrian helicopters were shot down with total loss of life.<ref>'']'', October 9, 1973 issue, p. 2</ref> By October 10, the last Syrian unit in the central sector was pushed back across the ], the pre-war ceasefire line. After four days of intense and incessant combat, the Israelis had succeeded in ejecting the Syrians from the entire Golan.<ref name="historynet golan" /> By 10 October, the last Syrian unit in the central sector was pushed back across the ], the pre-war ceasefire line. After four days of intense and incessant combat, the Israelis had succeeded in ejecting the Syrians from the entire Golan.<ref name="historynet golan" />


====Israeli advance towards Damascus==== ===Israeli advance towards Damascus===
A decision now had to be made—whether to stop at the post-1967 border or to continue advancing into Syrian territory. The Israeli High Command spent all of October 10 debating well into the night. Some favored disengagement, which would allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had taken place two days earlier). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and would give Israel a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended.<ref name="Rabinovich, p. 304">Rabinovich, p. 304.</ref> A decision now had to be made—whether to stop at the post-1967 border or to continue advancing into Syrian territory. The Israeli High Command spent all of 10 October debating well into the night. Some favored disengagement, which would allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had taken place two days earlier). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and would give Israel a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=304}}


Others countered that Syria had strong defenses—antitank ditches, ], and strongpoints—and that it would be better to fight from defensive positions in the Golan Heights (rather than the flat terrain deeper in Syria) in the event of another war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Golda Meir realized the most crucial point of the whole debate: Others countered that Syria had strong defenses—antitank ditches, ], and strongpoints—and that it would be better to fight from defensive positions in the Golan Heights (rather than the flat terrain deeper in Syria) in the event of another war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Golda Meir realized the most crucial point of the whole debate:
{{blockquote|It would take four days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a political matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line. ... The attack would be launched tomorrow, Thursday, 11 October.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=304}}}}

<blockquote>It would take four days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a political matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line. ... The attack would be launched tomorrow, Thursday, October 11.<ref name="Rabinovich, p. 304"/></blockquote>

] village after Israeli shelling, showing a church and an elevated car]] ] village after Israeli shelling, showing a church and an elevated car]]
On 11 October, Israeli forces pushed into Syria and advanced towards Damascus along the Quneitra-Damascus road until 14 October, encountering stiff resistance by Syrian reservists in prepared defenses. Three Israeli divisions broke the first and second defensive lines near Sasa, and conquered a further 50 square kilometres of territory in the Bashan ]. From there, they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40&nbsp;km away, using ] heavy artillery.{{citation needed|date=June 2022}} The Israeli Army advanced to within 30&nbsp;km of Damascus.{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=437}}


On 12 October, Israeli ]s from the elite ] ] reconnaissance unit launched ], infiltrating deep into Syria and destroying a bridge in the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and ]. The operation disrupted the flow of weapons and troops to Syria. During the operation, the paratroopers destroyed a number of tank transports and killed several Syrian soldiers. There were no Israeli casualties.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=he:המלחמה שלי רב-אלוף שאול מופז (מיל):300 קילומטר בעומק סוריה |url=http://www.nrg.co.il/online/archive/ART/550/213.html |language=he |access-date=17 November 2011 |archive-date=27 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120227032911/http://www.nrg.co.il/online/archive/ART/550/213.html |url-status=dead }} {{unreliable source?|date=November 2011}}</ref>
On October 11, Israeli forces pushed into Syria and advanced towards Damascus along the Quneitra-Damascus road until October 14, encountering stiff resistance by Syrian reservists in prepared defenses. Three Israeli divisions broke the first and second defensive lines near Sasa, and conquered a further 50 square kilometres of territory in the Bashan ]. From there, they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40&nbsp;km away, using ] heavy artillery.

On October 12, Israeli ]s from the elite ] ] reconnaissance unit launched ], infiltrating deep into Syria and destroying a bridge in the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and ]. The operation disrupted the flow of weapons and troops to Syria. During the operation, the paratroopers destroyed a number of tank transports and killed several Syrian soldiers. There were no Israeli casualties.<ref>{{cite web |script-title=he:המלחמה שלי רב-אלוף שאול מופז (מיל):300 קילומטר בעומק סוריה |url=http://www.nrg.co.il/online/archive/ART/550/213.html |language=he}} {{unreliable source?|date=November 2011}}</ref>

====Arab military intervention====
As the Syrian position deteriorated, Jordan sent an expeditionary force into Syria. King Hussein, who had come under intense pressure to enter the war, told Israel of his intentions through U.S. intermediaries, in the hope that Israel would accept that this was not a ] justifying an attack on Jordan. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declined to offer any such assurance, but said that Israel had no intention of opening another front.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 433.</ref> ] also sent an expeditionary force to Syria, consisting of the ] and ], some 30,000 men, 250–500 tanks, and 700 APCs.<ref name="tlas">{{cite web|first=Hamid |last=Hussain |url=http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/nov/4th-round.htm |title=Opinion: The Fourth round&nbsp;– A Critical Review of 1973 Arab–Israeli War |date=November 2002 |work=Defence Journal |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090116071541/http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/nov/4th-round.htm |archive-date=January 16, 2009 }}</ref><ref name="Rabinovich, 314">Rabinovich, p. 314.</ref><ref>Pollack, ''Arabs at War'', 2002, p. 167, gives total numbers for the Iraqi force by the end of the conflict as 60,000 men, more than 700 T-55 tanks, 500 APCs, more than 200 artillery pieces, two armored divisions, two infantry brigades, twelve artillery battalions, and a special forces brigade.</ref> Israeli jets attacked Iraqi forces as they arrived in Syria.<ref name="Dunstan">Dunstan, Simon: ''The Yom Kippur War: The Arab–Israeli War of 1973''{{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref>

The Iraqi divisions were a strategic surprise for the IDF, which had expected 24-hour-plus advance intelligence of such moves. This turned into an operational surprise, as the Iraqis attacked the exposed southern flank of the advancing Israeli armor, forcing its advance units to retreat a few kilometres in order to prevent encirclement. Combined Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counterattacks prevented any further Israeli gains. However, they were unable to push the Israelis back from the Bashan salient, and suffered heavy losses in their engagements with the Israelis. The most effective attack took place on October 20, though Arab forces lost 120 tanks in that engagement.<ref name="Dunstan" />

The ] attacked Israeli columns, but its operations were highly limited because of Israeli air superiority, and it suffered heavy losses in dogfights with Israeli jets. On October 23, a large air battle took place near Damascus during which the Israelis shot down 10 Syrian aircraft. The Syrians claimed a similar toll against Israel.<ref>, Department of State Operations Center</ref> The IDF also destroyed the Syrian missile defense system. The Israeli Air Force utilized its air superiority to attack strategic targets throughout Syria, including important power plants, petrol supplies, bridges and main roads. The strikes weakened the Syrian war effort, disrupted Soviet efforts to airlift military equipment into Syria, and disrupted normal life inside the country.<ref>{{cite journal|first=Noam |last=Ophir |script-title=he:צילו הארוך של הסקאד |trans-title=The Long Shadow of the Scud |publisher=Israeli Air Force Official Website |date=October 2006 |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/1779-26839-he/IAF.aspx |language=he |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101214854/http://www.iaf.org.il/1779-26839-he/IAF.aspx |archive-date=January 1, 2016 }}</ref>

On October 22, the ] and ] commandos recaptured the outpost on Mount Hermon, after a ] that involved hand-to-hand combat and Syrian sniper attacks. An unsuccessful attack two weeks prior had cost the Israelis 23 dead and 55 wounded and the Syrians 29 dead and 11 wounded, while this second attack cost Israel an additional 55 dead and 79 wounded.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 450</ref> An unknown number of Syrians were also killed and some were taken prisoner. An ] supported by infantry forced its way to the peak. An Israeli paratroop force landing by helicopter took the corresponding Syrian Hermon outposts on the mountain, killing more than a dozen Syrians while losing one dead and four wounded. Seven Syrian MiGs and two Syrian helicopters carrying reinforcements were shot down as they attempted to intercede.<ref>Rabinovich, pp. 450–51.</ref>


====Northern front de-escalation==== ===Arab military intervention===
As the Syrian position deteriorated, Jordan sent an expeditionary force into Syria. King Hussein, who had come under intense pressure to enter the war, told Israel of his intentions through U.S. intermediaries, in the hope that Israel would accept that this was not a ] justifying an attack on Jordan. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declined to offer any such assurance, but said that Israel had no intention of opening another front.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=433}} ] also sent an expeditionary force to Syria, consisting of the ] and ], some 30,000 men, 250–500 tanks, and 700 APCs.<ref name="tlas">{{cite web|first=Hamid |last=Hussain |url=http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/nov/4th-round.htm |title=Opinion: The Fourth round&nbsp;– A Critical Review of 1973 Arab–Israeli War |date=November 2002 |work=Defence Journal |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090116071541/http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/nov/4th-round.htm |archive-date=16 January 2009}}</ref>{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=314}}<ref>{{harvp|Pollack|2002|p=167}} gives total numbers for the Iraqi force by the end of the conflict as 60,000 men, more than 700 T-55 tanks, 500 APCs, more than 200 artillery pieces, two armored divisions, two infantry brigades, twelve artillery battalions, and a special forces brigade.</ref> Israeli jets attacked Iraqi forces as they arrived in Syria.<ref name="Dunstan">Dunstan, Simon: ''The Yom Kippur War: The Arab–Israeli War of 1973''{{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref>
The Syrians prepared for a massive counteroffensive to drive Israeli forces out of Syria, scheduled for October 23. A total of five Syrian divisions were to take part, alongside the Iraqi and Jordanian expeditionary forces. The Soviets had replaced most of the losses Syria's tank forces had suffered during the first weeks of the war.


The Iraqi divisions were a strategic surprise for the IDF, which had expected 24-hour-plus advance intelligence of such moves. This turned into an operational surprise, as the Iraqis attacked the exposed southern flank of the advancing Israeli armor, forcing its advance units to retreat a few kilometres in order to prevent encirclement. Combined Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counterattacks prevented any further Israeli gains. However, they were unable to push the Israelis back from the Bashan salient, and suffered heavy losses in their engagements with the Israelis. The most effective attack took place on 20 October, though Arab forces lost 120 tanks in that engagement.<ref name="Dunstan" />
However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations imposed its ceasefire (following the acquiescence of both Israel and Egypt). Abraham Rabinovich claimed that:
{{quote|The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him, but its implications could not be ignored. Some on the Syrian General Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so Egypt would feel obliged to continue fighting as well ... Others, however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's efforts to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would not come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking Damascus.<ref name=Rabinovich464-465>Rabinovich, pp. 464–65.</ref>}}


The ] attacked Israeli columns, but its operations were highly limited because of Israeli air superiority, and it suffered heavy losses in dogfights with Israeli jets. On 23 October, a large air battle took place near Damascus during which the Israelis shot down 10 Syrian aircraft. The Syrians claimed a similar toll against Israel.<ref>, Department of State Operations Center</ref> The IDF also destroyed the Syrian missile defense system. The Israeli Air Force utilized its air superiority to attack strategic targets throughout Syria, including important power plants, petrol supplies, bridges and main roads. The strikes weakened the Syrian war effort, disrupted Soviet efforts to airlift military equipment into Syria, and disrupted normal life inside the country.<ref>{{cite web |first=Noam |last=Ophir |script-title=he:צילו הארוך של הסקאד |trans-title=The Long Shadow of the Scud |publisher=Israeli Air Force Official Website |date=October 2006 |url=http://www.iaf.org.il/1779-26839-he/IAF.aspx |language=he |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101214854/http://www.iaf.org.il/1779-26839-he/IAF.aspx |archive-date=1 January 2016}}</ref>
Ultimately, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad decided to cancel the offensive. On October 23, the day the offensive was to begin, Syria announced that it had accepted the ceasefire, and ordered its troops to cease fire, while the Iraqi government ordered its forces home.


On 22 October, the ] and ] commandos recaptured the outpost on Mount Hermon, after a ] that involved hand-to-hand combat and Syrian sniper attacks. An unsuccessful attack two weeks prior had cost the Israelis 23 dead and 55 wounded and the Syrians 29 dead and 11 wounded, while this second attack cost Israel an additional 55 dead and 79 wounded.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=450}} An unknown number of Syrians were also killed and some were taken prisoner. An ] supported by infantry forced its way to the peak. An Israeli paratroop force landing by helicopter took the corresponding Syrian Hermon outposts on the mountain, killing more than a dozen Syrians while losing one dead and four wounded. Seven Syrian MiGs and two Syrian helicopters carrying reinforcements were shot down as they attempted to intercede.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=450–451}}
Following the UN ceasefire, there were constant artillery exchanges and skirmishes, and Israeli forces continued to occupy positions deep within Syria. According to Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam, Syria's constant artillery attacks were "part of a deliberate war of attrition designed to paralyse the Israeli economy", and were intended to pressure Israel into yielding the occupied territory.<ref>Jonathan B. A. Bailey. ''Field Artillery and Firepower''. Naval Institute Press, 2004, p. 398. {{ISBN|1-59114-029-3}}.</ref> Some aerial engagements took place, and both sides lost several aircraft. In the spring of 1974, the Syrians attempted to retake the summit of Mount Hermon. The fighting lasted for more than a month and saw heavy losses on both sides, but the Israelis held their positions.<ref name="Aloni" /> The situation continued until a May 1974 disengagement agreement.


===Northern front de-escalation===
====Jordanian participation====
On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council adopted ] calling for a ceasefire.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=464–465}} Following the UN-backed ceasefire, there were ongoing artillery exchanges and skirmishes, and Israeli forces continued to occupy positions deep within Syria.<ref>Jonathan B. A. Bailey. ''Field Artillery and Firepower''. Naval Institute Press, 2004, p. 398. {{ISBN|978-1-59114-029-0}}.</ref> Some aerial engagements took place, and both sides lost several aircraft.{{sfnp|Aloni|2001}}{{pn|date=January 2025}} Amid mounting international pressure and further UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire, the war finally came to a close on 26 October.<ref name=Britannica>{{cite encyclopedia |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Yom-Kippur-War |title=Yom Kippur War |encyclopedia=Britannica|date=15 October 2023 }}</ref> Israel and Egypt signed a formal cease-fire agreement on 11 November, and this was followed the with a disengagement agreement on 18 January the next year.<ref name=Britannica />
The U.S. pressed King Hussein to keep Jordan out of the war.<ref name="Quandt2005p114b"/> Though King Hussein initially refrained from entering the conflict, on the night of October 12–13 Jordanian troops deployed to the Jordanian-Syrian frontier to buttress Syrian troops, and Jordanian forces joined Syrian and Iraqi assaults on Israeli positions on October 16 and 19. Hussein sent a second brigade to the Golan front on October 21.<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2012.11446491 |doi=10.1080/23739770.2012.11446491 |first=David |last=Rodman |title=Friendly Enemies: Israel and Jordan in the 1973 Yom Kuppur War |journal=] |volume=6 |issue=1 |date=January 2012 |pages=96|s2cid=151961941 }}</ref> According to historian Assaf David, declassified U.S. documents show that the Jordanian participation was only a token to preserve King Hussein's status in the Arab world.<ref name=Haaretz20130912>{{cite news|author=Ofer Aderet |title=Jordan and Israel cooperated during Yom Kippur War, documents reveal |newspaper=Haaretz |date=September 12, 2013 |url=http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.546843}}</ref> The documents reveal that Israel and Jordan had a tacit understanding that the Jordanian units would try to stay out of the fighting and Israel would try to not attack them.<ref name=Haaretz20130912/>


Hostilities between Israel and Syria continued, and on 4 February 1974, 500 Cubans joined a Syrian tank division at ] in an attack against Israeli forces, sparking a war of attrition in the Golan Heights.<ref name="Ra'anan"/>{{efn|Castro dispatched 500 Cuban tank commanders to Syria.<ref name="auto3"/>}} It ended only in 31 May with a ceasefire between Israel and Syria.<ref name=Britannica/>
====Final situation on the Syrian front====
The Israeli Army advanced to a 30&nbsp;km distance from Damascus.<ref name=Morris2011p437/>


===Naval war=== ===Jordanian participation===
The U.S. pressed King Hussein to keep Jordan out of the war.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=114}} Though King Hussein initially refrained from entering the conflict, on the night of 12–13 October Jordanian troops deployed to the Jordanian-Syrian frontier to buttress Syrian troops, and Jordanian forces joined Syrian and Iraqi assaults on Israeli positions on 16 and 19 October. Hussein sent a second brigade to the Golan front on 21 October.<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23739770.2012.11446491 |doi=10.1080/23739770.2012.11446491 |first=David |last=Rodman |title=Friendly Enemies: Israel and Jordan in the 1973 Yom Kuppur War |journal=] |volume=6 |issue=1 |date=January 2012 |page=96|s2cid=151961941}}</ref> According to historian Assaf David, declassified U.S. documents show that the Jordanian participation was only a token to preserve King Hussein's status in the Arab world.<ref name=Haaretz20130912>{{cite news|author=Ofer Aderet |title=Jordan and Israel cooperated during Yom Kippur War, documents reveal |newspaper=Haaretz |date=12 September 2013 |url=http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.546843}}</ref> The documents reveal that Israel and Jordan had a tacit understanding that the Jordanian units would try to stay out of the fighting and Israel would try to not attack them.<ref name=Haaretz20130912 />
]]]
]]]
On the first day of the war, Egyptian ]s bombarded the Sinai Mediterranean coast, targeting Rumana and Ras Beyron, Ras Masala and Ras Sudar on the Gulf of Suez and Sharm el-Sheikh. Egyptian naval frogmen also raided the oil installations at Bala'eem, disabling the massive driller.<ref name="Hammad, pp. 100-101">Hammad, pp. 100–01.</ref>


==Naval operations==
The ], between the Israeli and Syrian navies, took place on October 7, the second day of the war. Five Israeli missile boats heading towards the Syrian port of ], sank a Syrian torpedo boat and minesweeper before encountering five Syrian missile boats. The Israelis used electronic countermeasures and chaff to evade Syrian missiles, then sank all five Syrian missile boats. This revolutionary engagement, the first between missile boats using surface-to-surface missiles, proved the potency of small, fast missile boats equipped with advanced ]. The battle also established the Israeli Navy, long derided as the "]" of the Israeli military, as a formidable and effective force in its own right. The port of Latakia was the site of another engagement between October 10–11, when Israeli missile boats fired into the port, targeting two Syrian missile boats spotted maneuvering among merchant ships. Both Syrian vessels were sunk, and two merchant ships were mistakenly hit and sunk.
]]]
On the first day of the war, Egyptian ]s bombarded Israeli positions on the Sinai coast; targeting Rumana, Ras Beyron, Ras Masala and Ras Sudar on the Mediterranean and Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea coast of the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian ] raided the oil installations at Bala'eem, disabling the massive driller.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=100–101}} Several small naval engagements took place on 7 October, including the ] and ].<ref>Almog, "Israel's Navy beat the odds", United States Naval Institute&nbsp;– ''Proceedings'' (March 1997), Vol. 123, Iss. 3; p. 106.</ref>
] ]
The ], which took place on 8–9 October off the coast of ] and ], ended in a decisive Israeli victory. Six Israeli missile boats heading towards Port Said encountered four Egyptian missile boats coming from ]. In an engagement lasting about forty minutes, the Israelis evaded Egyptian ] using electronic countermeasures and sank three of the Egyptian missile boats with ] and gunfire.<ref name=dunstan114>Dunstan, ''The Yom Kippur War'', p. 114.</ref><ref name=bolia>Bolia, '''' {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140903050613/http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/september_2004/9_04_4.html |date=3 September 2014}}</ref>{{sfnmp|Rabinovich|1988|1pp=256–262|Dupuy|1978|2pp=562–563|Herzog|1982|3p=312}} The Battles of Latakia and Baltim "drastically changed the operational situation at sea to Israeli advantage".<ref>Vego, ''Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas'' (Routledge: 1999), at p. 151.</ref>
October 7 also witnessed the ]. Two Israeli ]s patrolling in the Gulf of Suez encountered two Egyptian ] boats loaded with Egyptian naval commandos as well as a patrol boat that was backed up by coastal guns. The Israeli patrol boats sank both Zodiacs and the patrol boat, although both suffered damage during the battle.<ref>Almog, "Israel's Navy beat the odds", United States Naval Institute&nbsp;– ''Proceedings'' (March 1997), Vol. 123, Iss. 3; p. 106.</ref>


Five nights after the Battle of Baltim, five Israeli patrol boats entered the Egyptian anchorage at ], where over fifty Egyptian small patrol craft and armed fishing boats mobilized for the war effort and loaded with troops, ammunition, and supplies bound for the Israeli side of the Gulf were based. In the battle that followed, 19 Egyptian boats were sunk, while others remained bottled up in port.<ref name=almog/>
The ], which took place on October 8–9 off the coast of ] and ], ended in a decisive Israeli victory. Six Israeli missile boats heading towards Port Said encountered four Egyptian missile boats coming from ]. In an engagement lasting about forty minutes, the Israelis evaded Egyptian ] using electronic countermeasures and sank three of the Egyptian missile boats with ] and gunfire.<ref name=dunstan114>Dunstan, ''The Yom Kippur War'', p. 114.</ref><ref name=bolia>Bolia, '''' {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140903050613/http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/september_2004/9_04_4.html |date=September 3, 2014 }}</ref><ref name=cherbourg>Rabonovich, ''The Boats of Cherbourg'', pp. 256–62.</ref><ref name=dupuy562-563>Dupuy, ''Elusive Victory'', pp. 562–63.</ref><ref name=herzog312>Herzog, ''The Arab–Israeli Wars'', p. 312.</ref> The Battles of Latakia and Baltim "drastically changed the operational situation at sea to Israeli advantage".<ref>Vego, ''Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas'' (Routledge: 1999), at p. 151.</ref>

Five nights after the Battle of Baltim, five Israeli patrol boats entered the Egyptian anchorage at Ras Ghareb, where over fifty Egyptian small patrol craft and armed fishing boats mobilized for the war effort and loaded with troops, ammunition, and supplies bound for the Israeli side of the Gulf were based. In the battle that followed, 19 Egyptian boats were sunk, while others remained bottled up in port.<ref name=almog/>


The Israeli Navy had control of the Gulf of Suez during the war, which made possible the continued deployment of an Israeli SAM battery near an Israeli naval base close to the southern end of the Suez Canal, depriving the Egyptian Third Army of air support and preventing it from moving southward and attempting to capture the southern Sinai.<ref>Almog, Ze'ev (March 1997). "Israel's Navy beat the odds"&nbsp;– ''United States Naval Institute&nbsp;– Proceedings'' (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute){{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref> The Israeli Navy had control of the Gulf of Suez during the war, which made possible the continued deployment of an Israeli SAM battery near an Israeli naval base close to the southern end of the Suez Canal, depriving the Egyptian Third Army of air support and preventing it from moving southward and attempting to capture the southern Sinai.<ref>Almog, Ze'ev (March 1997). "Israel's Navy beat the odds"&nbsp;– ''United States Naval Institute&nbsp;– Proceedings'' (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute){{page needed|date=January 2012}}</ref>


Israeli commandos from ], the Israeli Navy's elite special unit, infiltrated the Egyptian port of ] on the night of October 9–10 and sank a ] after four previous attempts had failed. After another infiltration attempt failed, the commandos successfully infiltrated Hurghada again on the night of October 21–22 and heavily damaged a missile boat with ] rockets. During one of the raids, the commandos also blew up the port's main docking pier. On October 16, Shayetet 13 commandos infiltrated Port Said in two Hazir mini-submarines to strike Egyptian naval targets. During the raid, the commandos sank a torpedo boat, a coast guard boat, a tank landing craft, and a missile boat. Two frogmen went missing during the operation.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/Shayetet_13.htm |title=Shayetet 13 |publisher=Zionism-israel.com |access-date=October 22, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111016231359/http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/Shayetet_13.htm |archive-date=October 16, 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>{{unreliable source?|date=February 2012}} On October 18, Israeli frogmen set off an explosion that severed two underwater communications cables off ], one of which led to Alexandria and the other to ]. As a result, ] and telecommunications between the West and Syria were severed, and were not restored until the cables were repaired on October 27. The cables had also been used by the Syrians and Egyptians to communicate with each other in preference to using radio, which was monitored by Israeli, U.S. and Soviet intelligence. Egypt and Syria resorted to communicating via a Jordanian radio station in ], bouncing the signals off a U.S. satellite.<ref name="O'Ballance, p. 157">O'Ballance, p. 157.</ref> On 18 October, Israeli frogmen set off an explosion that severed two underwater communications cables off ], one of which led to Alexandria and the other to ]. As a result, ] and telecommunications between the West and Syria were severed, and were not restored until the cables were repaired on 27 October. The cables had also been used by the Syrians and Egyptians to communicate with each other in preference to using radio, which was monitored by Israeli, U.S. and Soviet intelligence. Egypt and Syria resorted to communicating via a Jordanian radio station in ], bouncing the signals off a U.S. satellite.<ref name="O'Ballance, p. 157">O'Ballance, p. 157.</ref>
] after being shelled by Israeli ]s]]
Having decisively beaten the Egyptian and Syrian navies, the Israeli Navy had the run of the coastlines. Israeli missile boats utilized their 76&nbsp;mm cannons and other armaments to strike targets along the Egyptian and Syrian coastlines, including wharves, oil tank farms, coastal batteries, radar stations, airstrips, and other targets of military value. The Israeli Navy even attacked some of Egypt's northernmost SAM batteries.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 212–213.</ref><ref>Safran, Nadav: ''Israel{{snd}}The Embattled Ally'', p. 312</ref> The Israeli Navy's attacks were carried out with minimal support from the IAF (only one Arab naval target was destroyed from the air during the entire war).<ref name=almog/>


The Egyptian Navy managed to enforce a blockade at ]. Eighteen million tons of oil had been transported yearly from ] to Israel through the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The blockade was enforced by two Egyptian destroyers and two submarines, supported by ancillary craft. Shipping destined for Israel through the ] was halted by the Egyptians. The Israeli Navy had no means of lifting the blockade due to the long range involved, and the Israeli Air Force, apparently also incapable of lifting the blockade, did not challenge it. The blockade was lifted on 1 November, after Israel used the surrounded Egyptian Third Army as a bargaining chip. The Egyptians unsuccessfully attempted to blockade the Israeli Mediterranean coastline, and mined the Gulf of Suez to prevent the transportation of oil from the Bala'eem and Abu Rudeis oil fields in southwestern Sinai to ] in southern Israel. Two oil tankers, of 48,000 ton and 2,000 ton capacity, sank after hitting mines in the Gulf.<ref>El Gammasy, ''The October War, 1973'' pp. 215–216.</ref>{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=287}}
On October 11, Israeli missile boats sank two Syrian missile boats in an engagement off ]. During the battle, a Soviet merchant ship was hit by Israeli missiles and sank.<ref name="littlerock">{{cite journal |title=How did the U.S.S. ''Little Rock'' and her Crew Participate in the Arab–Israeli Yom Kippur War? |url=http://www.usslittlerock.org/Historic%20Events/LittleRockYomKippur.html |publisher=USS Little Rock Association |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304092609/http://www.usslittlerock.org/Historic%20Events/LittleRockYomKippur.html |archive-date=March 4, 2016 }}</ref>


According to Admiral ], the Israeli Navy escorted tankers from the Gulf to Eilat throughout the war, and Israeli tankers sailing from Iran were directed to bypass the Red Sea. As a result of these actions and the failure of Egypt's Mediterranean blockade, the transport of oil, grain and weapons to Israeli ports was made possible throughout nearly the entire war. A post-war survey found that during the entire war period, Israel suffered no oil shortages, and even sold oil to third parties affected by the Arab oil embargo.<ref name=almog/> This claim was disputed by ], who claimed that no oil went to Israel during the blockade, and the Eilat-] pipeline was empty by the end of the war.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979|p=160}}
] after being shelled by Israeli ]s]]


Israel responded with a counter-blockade of Egypt in the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade was enforced by naval vessels based at Sharm el-Sheikh and on the Sinai coast facing the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade substantially damaged the Egyptian economy. According to historian Gammal Hammad, Egypt's principal ports, Alexandria and ], remained open to shipping throughout the war.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|pp=100-101}} Throughout the war, the Israeli Navy enjoyed complete command of the seas both in the Mediterranean approaches and in the Gulf of Suez.{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|pp=268–269}}
Having decisively beaten the Egyptian and Syrian navies, the Israeli Navy had the run of the coastlines. Israeli missile boats utilized their 76&nbsp;mm cannons and other armaments to strike targets along the Egyptian and Syrian coastlines, including wharves, oil tank farms, coastal batteries, radar stations, airstrips, and other targets of military value. The Israeli Navy even attacked some of Egypt's northernmost SAM batteries.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 212–13.</ref><ref>Safran, Nadav: ''Israel—The Embattled Ally'', p. 312</ref> The Israeli Navy's attacks were carried out with minimal support from the IAF (only one Arab naval target was destroyed from the air during the entire war).<ref name=almog/>

The Egyptian Navy managed to enforce a blockade at ]. Eighteen million tons of oil had been transported yearly from ] to Israel through the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The blockade was enforced by two Egyptian destroyers and two submarines, supported by ancillary craft. Shipping destined for Israel through the ] was halted by the Egyptians. The Israeli Navy had no means of lifting the blockade due to the long range involved, and the Israeli Air Force, apparently also incapable of lifting the blockade, did not challenge it. The blockade was lifted on November 1, after Israel used the surrounded Egyptian Third Army as a bargaining chip. The Egyptians unsuccessfully attempted to blockade the Israeli Mediterranean coastline, and mined the Gulf of Suez to prevent the transportation of oil from the Bala'eem and Abu Rudeis oil fields in southwestern Sinai to ] in southern Israel. Two oil tankers, of 48,000 ton and 2,000 ton capacity, sank after hitting mines in the Gulf.<ref>El Gammasy, ''The October War, 1973'' pp. 215–16.</ref><ref>Shazly, p. 287.</ref> According to Admiral ], the Israeli Navy escorted tankers from the Gulf to Eilat throughout the war, and Israeli tankers sailing from Iran were directed to bypass the Red Sea. As a result of these actions and the failure of Egypt's Mediterranean blockade, the transport of oil, grain and weapons to Israeli ports was made possible throughout nearly the entire war. A post-war survey found that during the entire war period, Israel suffered no oil shortages, and even sold oil to third parties affected by the Arab oil embargo.<ref name=almog/> This claim was disputed by ], who claimed that no oil went to Israel during the blockade, and the Eilat-] pipeline was empty by the end of the war.<ref>O'Ballance, p. 160.</ref>

Israel responded with a counter-blockade of Egypt in the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade was enforced by naval vessels based at Sharm el-Sheikh and the Sinai coast facing the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade substantially damaged the Egyptian economy. According to historian Gammal Hammad, Egypt's principal ports, Alexandria and ], remained open to shipping throughout the war.<ref name="Hammad, pp. 100-101" /> Throughout the war, the Israeli Navy enjoyed complete command of the seas both in the Mediterranean approaches and in the Gulf of Suez.<ref>Herzog (1975), pp. 268–69.</ref>


During the last week of the war, Egyptian frogmen carried out three or four raids on Eilat. The attacks caused minor damage, but created some alarm.<ref name="O'Ballance, p. 157"/> During the last week of the war, Egyptian frogmen carried out three or four raids on Eilat. The attacks caused minor damage, but created some alarm.<ref name="O'Ballance, p. 157"/>


According to Israeli and Western sources, the Israelis lost no vessels in the war.<ref name=dunstan114/><ref name=bolia/><ref name=morris432>Morris, ''Righteous Victims'', p. 432.</ref><ref name=herzog314>Herzog, ''The Arab–Israeli Wars'', p. 314.</ref> Israeli vessels were "targeted by as many as 52 Soviet-made anti-ship missiles", but none hit their targets.<ref>Annati, Anti-ship missiles and countermeasures—part I (ASM), ''Naval Forces'' (2001), Vol. 22, Iss. 1; p. 20.</ref> According to historian ], the Egyptians lost seven missile boats and four torpedo boats and coastal defense craft, while the Syrians lost five missile boats, one minesweeper, and one coastal defense vessel.<ref name=morris432/> All together, the Israeli Navy suffered three dead or missing and seven wounded. According to Israeli and Western sources, the Israelis lost no vessels in the war.<ref name=dunstan114/><ref name=bolia/>{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=432}}{{sfnp|Herzog|1982|p=314}} Israeli vessels were "targeted by as many as 52 Soviet-made anti-ship missiles", but none hit their targets.<ref>Annati, "Anti-ship missiles and countermeasures"{{snd}}part I (ASM), ''Naval Forces'' (2001), Vol. 22, Iss. 1; p. 20.</ref> According to historian ], the Egyptians lost seven missile boats and four torpedo boats and coastal defense craft, while the Syrians lost five missile boats, one minesweeper, and one coastal defense vessel.{{sfnp|Morris|2011|p=432}}


=== U.S.–Soviet naval standoff ===
==Atrocities against Israeli prisoners==
The war saw the largest naval confrontation between the ] and ] of the entire Cold War. As the United States and Soviet Union supported their respective allies, their fleets in the Mediterranean became increasingly hostile toward each other. The Soviet ] had 52 ships in the Mediterranean when the war began, including 11 submarines, some of which carried cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The ] had 48, including two aircraft carriers, a ], and amphibious vessels carrying 2,000 marines.<ref name="The war that nearly was">{{Cite news|url=https://www.jpost.com/features/in-thespotlight/the-war-that-nearly-was|title = The war that nearly was| newspaper=The Jerusalem Post &#124; Jpost.com}}</ref><ref name="pri.org">{{Cite web|url=https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-26/little-known-us-soviet-confrontation-during-yom-kippur-war|title = The little-known US-Soviet confrontation during Yom Kippur War| date=31 July 2016 }}</ref>


As the war continued, both sides reinforced their fleets. The Soviet squadron grew to 97 vessels including 23 submarines, while the US Sixth Fleet grew to 60 vessels including 9 submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, and 3 aircraft carriers. Both fleets made preparations for war, and US aircraft conducted reconnaissance over the Soviet fleet. The two fleets began to disengage following the ceasefire.<ref name="The war that nearly was"/><ref name="pri.org"/>
===Syrian atrocities===
Syria ignored the ] and many Israeli prisoners of war were tortured or killed.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 279, 429.</ref> Advancing Israeli forces, re-capturing land taken by the Syrians early in the war, came across the bodies of 28 Israeli soldiers who had been blindfolded with their hands bound and summarily executed.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 429, 449.</ref> In a December 1973 address to the National Assembly, Syrian Defense Minister ] stated that he had awarded one soldier the Medal of the Republic for killing 28 Israeli prisoners with an axe, decapitating three of them and eating the flesh of one of his victims.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/23/opinion/l-on-arab-treatment-of-israeli-prisoners-019506.html|title=On Arab Treatment of Israeli Prisoners|work=The New York Times|date=June 23, 1984|access-date=July 27, 2021}}</ref><ref>Official Gazette of Syria (July 11, 1974).</ref> The Syrians employed brutal interrogation techniques utilizing electric shocks to the genitals. A number of Israeli soldiers taken prisoner on Mount Hermon were executed. Near the village of Hushniye, the Syrians captured 11 administrative personnel from the Golan Heights Force, all of whom were later found dead, blindfolded, and with their hands tied behind their backs. Within Hushniye, seven Israeli prisoners were found dead, and another three were executed at Tel Zohar. Syrian prisoners who fell into Israeli captivity confirmed that their comrades killed IDF prisoners.<ref>Schiff, p. 90.</ref> A soldier from the Moroccan contingent fighting with Syrian forces was found to be carrying a sack filled with the body parts of Israeli soldiers which he intended to take home as souvenirs. The bodies of Israeli prisoners who were killed were stripped of their uniforms and found clad only in their underpants, and Syrian soldiers removed their ]s to make identification of the bodies more difficult.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_eAjAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA18 |title = Treatment of Israeli POW's in Syria and Their Status Under the Geneva Conventions: Hearing, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session. February 26, 1974|year = 1974}}</ref>

Some Israeli POWs reported having their fingernails ripped out while others were described as being turned into human ashtrays as their Syrian guards burned them with lit cigarettes.<ref name=arnold> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120523201613/http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.34.html |date=May 23, 2012 }}, Michael S. Arnold, ''The Jerusalem Post'', September 17, 1999.</ref> A report submitted by the chief medical officer of the Israeli army notes that, "the vast majority of (Israeli) prisoners were exposed during their imprisonment to severe physical and mental torture. The usual methods of torture were beatings aimed at various parts of the body, electric shocks, wounds deliberately inflicted on the ears, burns on the legs, suspension in painful positions and other methods."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1974-1977/5+Statement+in+the+Knesset+on+the+treatment+of+Isr.htm?DisplayMode=print |title=Statement in the Knesset on the treatment of Israeli prisoners of war in Syria by Defence Minister Peres and Knesset Resolution – 12 June 1974 |publisher=Mfa.gov.il |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> Following the conclusion of hostilities, Syria would not release the names of prisoners it was holding to the ] and in fact, did not even acknowledge holding any prisoners despite the fact they were publicly exhibited by the Syrians for television crews.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', p. 429.</ref> The Syrians, having been thoroughly defeated by Israel, were attempting to use their captives as their sole bargaining chip in the post-war negotiations.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 449–50.</ref> One of the most famous Israeli POWs was ], an Israeli pilot who bailed out over Syria and was taken prisoner.<ref>Sarna, Igal (2000), ''The Man Who Fell into a Puddle: Israeli Lives'', Vintage Books/Random House, pp. 144–48.</ref> Lanir died under Syrian interrogation.<ref name="Rabinovich, p. 115" /><ref name="Sarna p. 148">Sarna, p. 148.</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Yemini |first=Galya |url=http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/noam-lanir-plans-to-float-empire-online-at-1b-value-1.159508 |title=Noam Lanir plans to float Empire Online at $1b value |work=Haaretz |location=Israel |date=April 2, 2008 |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> When his body was returned in 1974, it exhibited signs of torture.<ref name="Sarna p. 148" />

===Egyptian atrocities===
Israeli historian Aryeh Yitzhaki estimated that the Egyptians killed about 200 Israeli soldiers who had surrendered. Yitzhaki based his claim on army documents. In addition, dozens of Israeli prisoners were beaten and otherwise mistreated in Egyptian captivity.<ref name="chron">{{cite news|url=http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1995_1293259/israeli-veterans-offer-accounts-of-egyptian-atroci.html |title=Israeli veterans offer accounts of Egyptian atrocities in '73 war |work=Houston Chronicle |date=August 26, 1995 |access-date=May 31, 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120709103156/http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1995_1293259/israeli-veterans-offer-accounts-of-egyptian-atroci.html |archive-date=July 9, 2012 }}</ref>

Individual Israeli soldiers gave testimony of witnessing comrades killed after surrendering to the Egyptians, or seeing the bodies of Israeli soldiers found blindfolded with their hands tied behind their backs. Avi Yaffe, a radioman serving on the Bar-Lev Line, reported hearing calls from other soldiers that the Egyptians were killing anyone who tried to surrender, and also obtained recordings of soldiers who were saved from Egyptian firing squads. Issachar Ben-Gavriel, an Israeli soldier who was captured at the Suez Canal, claimed that out of his group of 19 soldiers who surrendered, 11 were shot dead. Another soldier claimed that a soldier in his unit was captured alive but beaten to death during interrogation.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3378194,00.html|title = Israeli documentary: Egyptians killed Israeli POWs in 1973 war|newspaper = Ynetnews|date = 19 March 2007}}</ref> Photographic evidence of such executions exists, though some of it has never been made public. Photos were also found of Israeli prisoners who were photographed alive in Egyptian captivity, but were returned to Israel dead.<ref name="chron" /><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.isracast.com/article.aspx?id=451 |title=Pow Expose |publisher=IsraCast |date=March 9, 2007 |access-date=May 31, 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120624064651/http://www.isracast.com/article.aspx?id=451 |archive-date=June 24, 2012 }}</ref>

The order to kill Israeli prisoners came from General Shazly, who, in a pamphlet distributed to Egyptian soldiers immediately before the war, advised his troops to kill Israeli soldiers even if they surrendered.<ref name="chron" />


==Participation by other states== ==Participation by other states==


===Failure of the U.S. intelligence community=== ===U.S. intelligence efforts===
The U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, failed to predict in advance the Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel. A U.S. intelligence report as late as October 4 still stated that "We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab–Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/nixon-arab-isaeli-war.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141009021459/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/nixon-arab-isaeli-war.pdf|url-status=dead|title=Matthew T. Penney, "Intelligence and the 1973 Arab–Israeli War" in President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, symposium held by CIA, January 30, 2013.|archive-date=October 9, 2014}}</ref> However, one U.S. government source that was able to predict the approaching war was Roger Merrick, an analyst working for the INR (] in the State Department), but his conclusions were ignored at the time, and the report he had written to that effect was only rediscovered by U.S. government archive officials in 2013.<ref>.</ref> The U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, failed to predict in advance the Egyptian–Syrian attack on Israel. A U.S. intelligence report as late as 4 October still stated that "We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab–Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/nixon-arab-isaeli-war.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141009021459/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/arab-israeli-war/nixon-arab-isaeli-war.pdf|url-status=dead|title=Matthew T. Penney, "Intelligence and the 1973 Arab–Israeli War" in President Nixon and the Role of Intelligence in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, symposium held by CIA, 30 January 2013.|archive-date=9 October 2014}}</ref> However, one U.S. government source that was able to predict the approaching war was Roger Merrick, an analyst working for the INR (] in the State Department), but his conclusions were ignored at the time, and the report he had written to that effect was only rediscovered by U.S. government archive officials in 2013.<ref>{{cite web
| date = 5 March 2013
| editor= William Burr
| publisher=The National Security Archive (U.S.)
|title=State Department Intelligence and Research Predicted 1973 Arab–Israeli War |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB415/ |access-date=2023-03-10 |df=dmy-all |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu}}</ref>


===U.S. aid to Israel=== ===U.S. aid to Israel===
{{Main|Operation Nickel Grass}} {{Main|Operation Nickel Grass}}
Based on intelligence estimates at the commencement of hostilities, American leaders expected the tide of the war to quickly shift in Israel's favor, and that Arab armies would be completely defeated within 72 to 96 hours.<ref> October 6 conversation between Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and Chinese Ambassador to the United States Huan Chen. . George Washington University National Security Archive.</ref> On October 6, Secretary of State Kissinger convened the ]'s official crisis management group, the Washington Special Actions Group, which debated whether the U.S. should supply additional arms to Israel. High-ranking representatives of the ] and ] opposed such a move. Kissinger was the sole dissenter; he said that if the U.S. refused aid, Israel would have little incentive to conform to American views in postwar diplomacy. Kissinger argued the sending of U.S. aid might cause Israel to moderate its territorial claims, but this thesis raised a protracted debate whether U.S. aid was likely to make it more accommodating or more intransigent toward the Arab world.<ref>], ''American Presidents and the Middle East'' (1990), p. 129.</ref> Based on intelligence estimates at the commencement of hostilities, American leaders expected the tide of the war to quickly shift in Israel's favor, and that Arab armies would be completely defeated within 72 to 96 hours.<ref>6 October conversation between Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and Chinese Ambassador to the United States Huan Chen. . George Washington University National Security Archive.</ref> On 6 October, Secretary of State Kissinger convened the ]'s official crisis management group, the Washington Special Actions Group, which debated whether the U.S. should supply additional arms to Israel. High-ranking representatives of the ] and ] opposed such a move. Kissinger was the sole dissenter; he said that if the U.S. refused aid, Israel would have little incentive to conform to American views in postwar diplomacy. Kissinger argued the sending of U.S. aid might cause Israel to moderate its territorial claims, but this thesis raised a protracted debate whether U.S. aid was likely to make it more accommodating or more intransigent toward the Arab world.<ref>], ''American Presidents and the Middle East'' (1990), p. 129.</ref>
] captured by Egyptian forces]] ] captured by Egyptian forces]]


By October 8, Israel had encountered military difficulties on both fronts. In the Sinai, Israeli efforts to break through Egyptian lines with armor had been thwarted, and while Israel had contained and begun to turn back the Syrian advance, Syrian forces were still overlooking the ] and their air defense systems were inflicting a high toll on Israeli planes.<ref>William B. Quandt, ''Peace Process'', p. 109.</ref>{{r|time19760412}}{{r|farr}} It became clear by October 9 that no quick reversal in Israel's favor would occur and that IDF losses were unexpectedly high.<ref name="Oct8AMconvo">October 9, 1973, conversation (8:20–8:40&nbsp;am) between Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, military attaché General Mordechai Gur, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and Peter Rodman. George Washington University National Security Archive.</ref> By 8 October, Israel had encountered military difficulties on both fronts. In the Sinai, Israeli efforts to break through Egyptian lines with armor had been thwarted, and while Israel had contained and begun to turn back the Syrian advance, Syrian forces were still overlooking the ] and their air defense systems were inflicting a high toll on Israeli planes.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=109}}{{r|time19760412}}{{r|farr}} It became clear by 9 October that no quick reversal in Israel's favor would occur and that IDF losses were unexpectedly high.<ref name="Oct8AMconvo">9 October 1973, conversation (8:20–8:40&nbsp;am) between Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz, military attaché General ], Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and ]. George Washington University National Security Archive.</ref>


During the night of October 8–9, an alarmed Dayan told Meir that "this is the end of the third temple."<ref name="time19760412">{{cite news |url=http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,914023,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130501030016/http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,914023,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=1 May 2013 |title=Violent Week: The Politics of Death |access-date=March 4, 2011 |date=April 12, 1976 |work=Time}}</ref> He was warning of Israel's impending total defeat, but "Temple" was also the code word for ].<ref name="farr" /> Dayan raised the nuclear topic in a cabinet meeting, warning that the country was approaching a point of "last resort".<ref name="cohennyt">Cohen, Avner. "" ''The New York Times'', October 6, 2003.</ref> That night, Meir authorized the assembly of thirteen {{convert|20|ktonTNT|adj=on}} ]s for ] at ] and F-4 Phantom II aircraft at ].<ref name="farr" /> They would be used if absolutely necessary to prevent total defeat, but the preparation was done in an easily detectable way, likely as a signal to the United States.<ref name="cohennyt" /> Kissinger learned of the nuclear alert on the morning of October 9. That day, President Nixon ordered the commencement of ], an American ] to replace all of Israel's material losses.<ref>Arnon Gutfeld and Boaz Vanetik, "‘A Situation That Had to Be Manipulated’: The American Airlift to Israel During the Yom Kippur War." ''Middle Eastern Studies'' 52.3 (2016): 419–47.</ref> Anecdotal evidence suggests that Kissinger told Sadat that the reason for the U.S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to "going nuclear".<ref name="farr">Farr, Warner D. "". Counterproliferation Paper No. 2, USAF Counterproliferation Center, ], September 1999.</ref> However, subsequent interviews with Kissinger, Schlesinger, and ] suggested that the nuclear aspect was not a major factor in the decision to re-supply. These officials cited the ongoing Soviet re-supply effort and Sadat's early rejection of a ceasefire as the primary motivators.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Colby |first1=Elbridge |last2=Cohen |first2=Avner |last3=McCants |first3=William |last4=Morris |first4=Bradley |last5=Rosenau |first5=William |title=The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis |date=April 2013 |url=http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdf |publisher=CNA |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141023173129/http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdf |archive-date=October 23, 2014 }}</ref> European countries refused to allow U.S. airplanes carrying supplies for Israel to refuel at their bases, fearing an Arab oil embargo, with the exception of ] and the ]. Portugal permitted the United States to use a leased base in the ],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thefreelibrary.com/A+tale+of+two+fleets%3A+a+Russian+perspective+on+the+1973+Naval...-a0118039860|title=A tale of two fleets: a Russian perspective on the 1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean |publisher=Thefreelibrary.com |access-date=May 31, 2012}}</ref> and the defence minister of the Netherlands, apparently acting without consulting his cabinet colleagues, secretly authorised the use of Dutch airfields.<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403142318/http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=5&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=625&PID=0&IID=8194 |date=April 3, 2015 }}</ref> During the night of 8–9 October, an alarmed Dayan told Meir that "this is the end of the third temple."<ref name="time19760412">{{cite magazine |url=http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,914023,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130501030016/http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,914023,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=1 May 2013 |title=Violent Week: The Politics of Death |access-date=4 March 2011 |date=12 April 1976 |magazine=Time}}</ref> He was warning of Israel's impending total defeat, but "Temple" was also the code word for ].<ref name="farr" /> Dayan raised the nuclear topic in a cabinet meeting, warning that the country was approaching a point of "last resort".<ref name="cohennyt">{{cite news|last=Cohen|first=Avner|date=2003-10-06 |title=Opinion &#124; The Last Nuclear Moment|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/06/opinion/the-last-nuclear-moment.html|access-date=2023-03-10 |df=dmy-all|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> That night, Meir authorized the assembly of thirteen {{convert|20|ktonTNT|adj=on}} ]s for ] at ] and F-4 Phantom II aircraft at ].<ref name="farr" /> They would be used if absolutely necessary to prevent total defeat, but the preparation was done in an easily detectable way, likely as a signal to the United States.<ref name="cohennyt" /> Kissinger learned of the nuclear alert on the morning of 9 October. That day, President Nixon ordered the commencement of ], an American ] to replace all of Israel's material losses.<ref name="GutfeldVanetik2016">{{cite journal |last1=Gutfeld |first1=Arnon |last2=Vanetik |first2=Boaz |date=30 March 2016 |title='A Situation That Had to Be Manipulated': The American Airlift to Israel During the Yom Kippur War |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263206.2016.1144393 |journal=] |volume=52 |issue=3 |pages=419–447 |doi=10.1080/00263206.2016.1144393 |s2cid=146890821 |access-date=20 February 2023}}</ref>

Anecdotal evidence suggests that Kissinger told Sadat that the reason for the U.S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to "going nuclear".<ref name="farr">{{citation|title=The Third Temple's Holy of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons
| last = Farr | first = Warner D.
| date = September 1999
| series= Future Warfare Series | number= 2
|url=https://nuke.fas.org/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm|access-date=2023-03-10 |df=dmy-all|website=The Counterproliferation Papers}}</ref> However, subsequent interviews with Kissinger, Schlesinger, and ] suggested that the nuclear aspect was not a major factor in the decision to re-supply. These officials cited the ongoing Soviet re-supply effort and Sadat's early rejection of a ceasefire as the primary motivators.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Colby |first1=Elbridge |last2=Cohen |first2=Avner |last3=McCants |first3=William |last4=Morris |first4=Bradley |last5=Rosenau |first5=William |title=The Israeli 'Nuclear Alert' of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling in Crisis |date=April 2013 |url=http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdf |publisher=CNA |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141023173129/http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdf |archive-date=23 October 2014}}</ref> European countries refused to allow U.S. airplanes carrying supplies for Israel to refuel at their bases, fearing an Arab oil embargo, with the exception of ] and the ]. Portugal permitted the United States to use the leased base of ] in the ],<ref name="WhichChileAllende">{{cite journal |last1=Del Pero |first1=Mario |date=23 August 2011 |title='Which Chile, Allende?' Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese revolution |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2010.494301 |journal=] |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=625–657 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2010.494301 |s2cid=218576108 |access-date=20 February 2023}}</ref><ref name="ATaleOfTwoFleets">{{cite web|url=http://www.thefreelibrary.com/A+tale+of+two+fleets%3A+a+Russian+perspective+on+the+1973+Naval...-a0118039860|title=A tale of two fleets: a Russian perspective on the 1973 Naval standoff in the Mediterranean |publisher=Thefreelibrary.com |access-date=31 May 2012}}</ref><ref name="LeadershipLessonsFromHistoryLajesAirBase">{{cite web |last=Easly |first=David |title=Leadership lessons from history |url=http://www.lajes.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123229376 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160611054403/http://www.lajes.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123229376 |date=4 November 2010 |archive-date=11 June 2016 |website=Lajes Field}}</ref> and the defence minister of the Netherlands, apparently acting without consulting his cabinet colleagues, secretly authorised the use of Dutch airfields.<ref name="NetherlandsHelp"> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403142318/http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=5&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=625&PID=0&IID=8194|date=3 April 2015}}</ref> Greece, then under the dictatorial rule of the ], declared itself neutral in the conflict. However, the Greek junta permitted the United States to use communications facilities within Greece and the airports at Athens and at ] to facilitate its assistance to Israel, though it refused to allow the Americans to use its strategically important bases in Cyprus.<ref name="JohnSakkas2007">{{cite journal |last1=Sakkas |first1=John |date=23 January 2007 |title=The Greek dictatorship, the USA and the Arabs, 1967–1974 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1461319042000296804 |journal=Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans |volume=6 |issue=3 |pages=245–257 |doi=10.1080/1461319042000296804 |s2cid=154266308 |access-date=20 February 2023}}</ref>


]]] ]]]


Israel began receiving supplies via U.S. Air Force cargo airplanes on October 14,<ref>Krisinger, Chris J. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090105033858/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/spr89/krisinger.html |date=January 5, 2009 }}, ''Aerospace Power Journal'', Spring 1989.</ref> although some equipment had arrived on planes from Israel's national airline ] before this date. By that time, the IDF had advanced deep into Syria and was mounting a largely successful invasion of the Egyptian mainland from the Sinai, but had taken severe material losses. According to Abraham Rabinovich, "while the American airlift of supplies did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, it did allow Israel to expend what it did have more freely".<ref>Rabinovich, p. 491.</ref> By the end of Nickel Grass, the United States had shipped 22,395 tons of matériel to Israel. 8,755 tons of it arrived before the end of the war.<ref name="Haber & Schiff, p. 382">Haber & Schiff, p. 382.</ref> American ] and ] aircraft flew 567 missions throughout the airlift.<ref>{{cite web|author=John Lacomia |url=http://www.travis.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123122053 |title=Remember When ... Operation Nickel Grass |location=Travis |publisher=Air Force |access-date=March 28, 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722182454/http://www.travis.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123122053 |archive-date=July 22, 2011 }}</ref> El Al planes flew in an additional 5,500 tons of matériel in 170 flights.<ref name="Shazli p.275–276">Shazli pp. 275–76</ref><ref name="Haber & Schiff, p. 282">Haber & Schiff, p. 282.</ref> The airlift continued after the war until November 14. The United States delivered approximately 90,000 tons of materiel to Israel by sealift by the beginning of December, using 16 ships.<ref name="Haber & Schiff, p. 382" /> 33,210 tons of it arrived by November.<ref>Shazly. p. 276. "... the USA mounted a seaborne resupply operation of 33,210 tons by October 30."</ref> Israel began receiving supplies via U.S. Air Force cargo airplanes on 14 October,<ref>Krisinger, Chris J. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090105033858/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/spr89/krisinger.html |date=5 January 2009}}, ''Aerospace Power Journal'', Spring 1989.</ref> although some equipment had arrived on planes from Israel's national airline ] before this date. By that time, the IDF had advanced deep into Syria and was mounting a largely successful invasion of the Egyptian mainland from the Sinai, but had taken severe material losses. According to Abraham Rabinovich, "while the American airlift of supplies did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, it did allow Israel to expend what it did have more freely".{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=491}}


By the end of Nickel Grass, the United States had shipped 22,395 tons of matériel to Israel. 8,755 tons of it arrived before the end of the war.{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=382}} American ] and ] aircraft flew 567 missions throughout the airlift.<ref>{{cite web|author=John Lacomia |url=http://www.travis.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123122053 |title=Remember When ... Operation Nickel Grass |location=Travis |publisher=Air Force |access-date=28 March 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722182454/http://www.travis.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123122053 |archive-date=22 July 2011}}</ref> El Al planes flew in an additional 5,500 tons of matériel in 170 flights.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=275–276}}{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=282}} The airlift continued after the war until 14 November. The United States delivered approximately 90,000 tons of materiel to Israel by sealift by the beginning of December, using 16 ships.{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=382}} 33,210 tons of it arrived by November.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=276|ps=. "... the USA mounted a seaborne resupply operation of 33,210 tons by 30 October."}}
By the beginning of December, Israel had received between 34 and 40 F-4 fighter-bombers, 46 A-4 attack airplanes, 12 ] cargo airplanes, 8 ] helicopters, 40 ]s, 200 ]/] tanks, 250 APCs, 226 utility vehicles, 12 ] surface-to-air missile systems, three MIM-23 Hawk SAM systems, 36 155&nbsp;mm artillery pieces, seven 175&nbsp;mm artillery pieces, and large quantities of 105&nbsp;mm, 155&nbsp;mm and 175&nbsp;mm ammunition. ] equipment, such as the ] missile and the ], weapons that had only entered production one or more years prior, as well as highly advanced electronic jamming equipment, was also sent. Most of the combat airplanes arrived during the war, and many were taken directly from USAF units. Most of the large equipment arrived after the ceasefire. The total cost of the equipment was approximately US$800&nbsp;million (US${{formatprice|{{Inflation|US|800000000|1973|r=2}}}} today).<ref name="Shazli p.275–276" /><ref name="Haber & Schiff, p. 282" /><ref>Gawrych 1996, p. 56.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historynet.com/mcdonnell-f-4-phantom-essential-aircraft-in-the-air-warfare-in-the-middle-east.htm/4 |title=McDonnell F-4 Phantom: Essential Aircraft in the Air Warfare in the Middle East |publisher=Historynet.com |access-date=March 28, 2010|date=June 12, 2006 }}</ref>


By the beginning of December, Israel had received between 34 and 40 F-4 fighter-bombers, 46 A-4 attack airplanes, 12 ] cargo airplanes, 8 ] helicopters, 40 ]s, 200 ]/] tanks, 250 APCs, 226 utility vehicles, 12 ] surface-to-air missile systems, three MIM-23 Hawk SAM systems, 36 155&nbsp;mm artillery pieces, seven 175&nbsp;mm artillery pieces, and large quantities of 105&nbsp;mm, 155&nbsp;mm and 175&nbsp;mm ammunition. ] equipment, such as the ] missile and the ], weapons that had only entered production one or more years prior, as well as highly advanced electronic jamming equipment, was also sent. Most of the combat airplanes arrived during the war, and many were taken directly from USAF units. Most of the large equipment arrived after the ceasefire. The total cost of the equipment was approximately US$800&nbsp;million (US${{formatprice|{{Inflation|US|800000000|1973|r=2}}}} today).{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=275–276}}{{sfnp|Haber|Schiff|2003|p=282}}{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|p=56}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.historynet.com/mcdonnell-f-4-phantom-essential-aircraft-in-the-air-warfare-in-the-middle-east.htm/4 |title=McDonnell F-4 Phantom: Essential Aircraft in the Air Warfare in the Middle East |publisher=Historynet.com |access-date=28 March 2010 |date=12 June 2006 |archive-date=28 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428193045/http://www.historynet.com/mcdonnell-f-4-phantom-essential-aircraft-in-the-air-warfare-in-the-middle-east.htm/4 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
On October 13 and 15, Egyptian air defense radars detected an aircraft at an altitude of {{convert|25000|m}} and a speed of {{convert|3|Mach}}, making it impossible to intercept either by fighter or SAM missiles. The aircraft proceeded to cross the whole of the canal zone, the naval ports of the Red Sea (Hurghada and Safaga), flew over the airbases and air defenses in the ], and finally disappeared from radar screens over the Mediterranean Sea. The speed and altitude were those of the ]. According to Egyptian commanders, the intelligence provided by the reconnaissance flights helped the Israelis prepare for the Egyptian attack on October 14 and assisted it in conducting Operation Stouthearted Men.<ref>El Gamasy, ''The October War, 1973'', p. 276.</ref><ref>Shazly, pp. 251–52.</ref><ref>O'Ballance, p. 182.</ref>

On 13 and 15 October, Egyptian air defense radar detected an aircraft at an altitude of {{convert|25000|m}} and a speed of {{convert|3|Mach}}, making it impossible to intercept either by fighter or SAM missiles. The aircraft proceeded to cross the whole of the canal zone, the naval ports of the Red Sea (Hurghada and Safaga), flew over the airbases and air defenses in the ], and finally disappeared from radar screens over the Mediterranean Sea. The speed and altitude were those of the ]. According to Egyptian commanders, the intelligence provided by the reconnaissance flights helped the Israelis prepare for the Egyptian attack on 14 October and assisted it in conducting Operation Stouthearted Men.<ref>El Gamasy, ''The October War, 1973'', p. 276.</ref>{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=251–252}}<ref>O'Ballance, p. 182.</ref>


===Aid to Egypt and Syria=== ===Aid to Egypt and Syria===


====Soviet supplies==== ====Soviet supplies====
] captured by Israeli forces]] ] captured by Israeli forces]]
Starting on October 9, the Soviet Union began supplying Egypt and Syria by air and by sea. The Soviets airlifted 12,500–15,000 tons of supplies, of which 6,000 tons went to Egypt, 3,750 tons went to Syria and 575 tons went to Iraq. ], the former Egyptian chief of staff, claimed that more than half of the airlifted Soviet hardware actually went to Syria. According to ], Arab losses were so high and the attrition rate so great that equipment was taken directly from Soviet and Warsaw Pact stores to supply the airlift.<ref name=Schiff303>Schiff, 303</ref> ] and ] aircraft flew over 900 missions during the airlift.<ref>Shazly, p. 275.</ref> Starting on 9 October, the Soviet Union began supplying Egypt and Syria by air and by sea. The Soviets airlifted 12,500–15,000 tons of supplies, of which 6,000 tons went to Egypt, 3,750 tons went to Syria and 575 tons went to Iraq. ], the former Egyptian chief of staff, claimed that more than half of the airlifted Soviet hardware actually went to Syria. According to ], Arab losses were so high and the attrition rate so great that equipment was taken directly from Soviet and Warsaw Pact stores to supply the airlift.{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|p=303}} ] and ] aircraft flew over 900 missions during the airlift.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=275}}

The Soviets supplied another 63,000 tons, mainly to Syria, by means of a sealift by 30 October.<ref>{{harvp|Shazly|2003|pp=274–275}}. Shazly states that " ... &nbsp;the Soviet Union mounted a sea-borne resupply operation: no less than 63,000 tons, mainly to Syria, by 30 October"</ref><ref>Quandt, 25–26 (pdf pp. 37–38), gives the airlift total as approximately 12,500 tons; Quandt 23 (pdf p. 35) gives the sealift total as approximately 63,000 tons.</ref> Historian Gamal Hammad asserts that 400 T-55 and T-62 tanks supplied by the sealift were directed towards replacing Syrian losses, transported from ] on the ] to the Syrian port of Latakia. Hammad claimed that Egypt did not receive any tanks from the Soviets.{{sfnp|Hammad|2002|p=382}} The sealift may have included ], which were not unloaded but kept in Alexandria harbor until November to counter the Israeli nuclear preparations, which Soviet satellites had detected. Soviet intelligence informed Egypt that Israel had armed three nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://nuke.fas.org/guide/israel/doctrine/index.html|title=Strategic Doctrine – Israel|website=nuke.fas.org}}</ref>


The Soviets supplied another 63,000 tons, mainly to Syria, by means of a sealift by October 30.<ref>Shazly, pp. 274–75. Shazly states that " ... &nbsp;the Soviet Union mounted a sea-borne resupply operation: no less than 63,000 tons, mainly to Syria, by October 30"</ref><ref>Quandt, 25–26 (pdf pp. 37–38), gives the airlift total as approximately 12,500 tons; Quandt 23 (pdf p. 35) gives the sealift total as approximately 63,000 tons.</ref> Historian Gamal Hammad asserts that 400 T-55 and T-62 tanks supplied by the sealift were directed towards replacing Syrian losses, transported from ] on the ] to the Syrian port of Latakia. Hammad claimed that Egypt did not receive any tanks from the Soviets,<ref>Hammad, p. 382.</ref> a claim disputed by Schiff, who stated that Soviet freighters loaded with tanks and other weapons reached Egyptian, ]n and Syrian ports throughout the war.{{citation needed|date=June 2017}} The sealift may have included ], which were not unloaded but kept in Alexandria harbor until November to counter the Israeli nuclear preparations, which Soviet satellites had detected (Soviet intelligence informed Egypt that Israel had armed three nuclear weapons).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/doctrine/index.html|title=Strategic Doctrine – Israel}}</ref> American concern over possible evidence of nuclear warheads for the Soviet Scud missiles in Egypt contributed to Washington's decision to go to ] 3.{{r|farr}} According to documents declassified in 2016, the move to DEFCON 3 was motivated by CIA reports indicating that the Soviet Union had sent a ship to Egypt carrying nuclear weapons along with two other amphibious vessels.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Naftali|first1=Tim|title=CIA reveals its secret briefings to Presidents Nixon and Ford|date=26 August 2016|url=http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/26/opinions/secret-briefings-to-presidents-from-cia-naftali/|publisher=CNN|access-date=August 26, 2016}}</ref> Soviet troops never landed, though the ship supposedly transporting nuclear weapons did arrive in Egypt. Further details are unavailable and may remain classified. American concern over possible evidence of nuclear warheads for the Soviet Scud missiles in Egypt contributed to Washington's decision to go to ] 3.{{r|farr}} According to documents declassified in 2016, the move to DEFCON 3 was motivated by CIA reports indicating that the Soviet Union had sent a ship to Egypt carrying nuclear weapons along with two other amphibious vessels.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Naftali |first1=Tim |title=CIA reveals its secret briefings to Presidents Nixon and Ford|date=26 August 2016 |url=http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/26/opinions/secret-briefings-to-presidents-from-cia-naftali/ |publisher=CNN |access-date=26 August 2016}}</ref>


====Soviet active aid==== ====Soviet active aid====
On the Golan front, Syrian forces received direct support from Soviet technicians and military personnel. At the start of the war, there were an estimated 2,000 Soviet personnel in Syria, of whom 1,000 were serving in Syrian air defense units. Soviet technicians repaired damaged tanks, SAMs and radar equipment, assembled fighter jets that arrived via the sealift, and drove tanks supplied by the sealift from ports to Damascus. On both the Golan and Sinai fronts, Soviet military personnel retrieved abandoned Israeli military equipment for shipment to Moscow.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 325.</ref> On the Golan front, Syrian forces received direct support from Soviet technicians and military personnel. At the start of the war, there were an estimated 2,000 Soviet personnel in Syria, of whom 1,000 were serving in Syrian air defense units. Soviet technicians repaired damaged tanks, SAMs and radar equipment, assembled fighter jets that arrived via the sealift, and drove tanks supplied by the sealift from ports to Damascus. On both the Golan and Sinai fronts, Soviet military personnel retrieved abandoned Israeli military equipment for shipment to Moscow.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=325}}


Soviet advisors were reportedly present in Syrian command posts "at every echelon, from battalion up, including supreme headquarters". Some Soviet military personnel went into battle with the Syrians, and it was estimated that 20 were killed in action and more were wounded. In July 1974, Israeli Defense Minister ] informed the Knesset that high-ranking Soviet officers had been killed on the Syrian front during the war. There were strong rumors that a handful were taken prisoner, but this was denied. However, it was noted that certain Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate just after the war, leading to suspicions of a covert exchange. '']'' wrote that seven Soviets in uniform were taken prisoner after surrendering when the Israelis overran their bunker. The Israelis reportedly took the prisoners to Ramat David Airbase for interrogation, and treated the incident with great secrecy.<ref>O'Ballance, pp. 165–66.</ref><ref>Porter, Bruce D.&nbsp; ''The USSR in Third World Conflicts, Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars'', p. 135.</ref> Soviet advisors were reportedly present in Syrian command posts "at every echelon, from battalion up, including supreme headquarters". Some Soviet military personnel went into battle with the Syrians, and it was estimated that 20 were killed in action and more were wounded. In July 1974, Israeli Defense Minister ] informed the Knesset that high-ranking Soviet officers had been killed on the Syrian front during the war. There were strong rumors that a handful were taken prisoner, but this was denied. However, it was noted that certain Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate just after the war, leading to suspicions of a covert exchange. '']'' wrote that seven Soviets in uniform were taken prisoner after surrendering when the Israelis overran their bunker. The Israelis reportedly took the prisoners to Ramat David Airbase for interrogation, and treated the incident with great secrecy.<ref>O'Ballance, pp. 165–166.</ref><ref>Porter, Bruce D.&nbsp; ''The USSR in Third World Conflicts, Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars'', p. 135.</ref>


Soviet fighter pilots stationed in Egypt as advisors and instructors may have participated in combat operations. There are several references to Soviet personnel being captured which were never officially confirmed, including a ] mention of a report from an Israeli Air Force pilot which claimed that two Soviet MiG pilots had been captured, and the account of an Israeli paratrooper reservist who claimed that while mopping up bunkers near Suez City, his force captured four or five Soviet officers. Israeli officers who reported great difficulty in command and control due to jamming of their radio frequencies attributed the improved jamming capabilities they were facing to the Soviets. According to ] and ], Soviet ] commandos twice conducted raids behind Israeli lines on the Egyptian front in the early days of the war and captured two Israeli Centurion tanks after killing their crews so that their upgraded guns could be studied.<ref>Remez, Gideon and Ginor, Isabella: ''The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973: The USSR's Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict''</ref> Soviet fighter pilots stationed in Egypt as advisors and instructors may have participated in combat operations. There are several references to Soviet personnel being captured which were never officially confirmed, including a ] mention of a report from an Israeli Air Force pilot which claimed that two Soviet MiG pilots had been captured, and the account of an Israeli paratrooper reservist who claimed that while mopping up bunkers near Suez City, his force captured four or five Soviet officers. Israeli officers who reported great difficulty in command and control due to jamming of their radio frequencies attributed the improved jamming capabilities they were facing to the Soviets. According to ] and ], Soviet ] commandos twice conducted raids behind Israeli lines on the Egyptian front in the early days of the war and captured two Israeli Centurion tanks after killing their crews so that their upgraded guns could be studied.<ref>Remez, Gideon and Ginor, Isabella: ''The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973: The USSR's Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict''</ref>


Israeli military intelligence reported that Soviet-piloted ] interceptor/reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Canal Zone.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-56.pdf |title=White House Military Briefing, October 22 |access-date=March 28, 2010}}</ref> Israeli military intelligence reported that Soviet-piloted ] interceptor/reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Canal Zone.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-56.pdf |title=White House Military Briefing, 22 October |access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref>


====Soviet threat of intervention==== ====Soviet intervention threat====
] and Egyptian Brigadier General Bashir Sharif in Sinai.<ref name="BarLev-Sharif">{{cite book|last1=Boyne|first1=Walter J.|title=The Yom Kippur War: And the Airlift Strike That Saved Israel|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=978-0312320423|page=Insert 6|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YFhoddeS5fEC&pg=PA142-IA6|language=en|date=2002|access-date=June 3, 2016}}</ref>]] ] and Egyptian Brigadier General Bashir Sharif in Sinai.<ref name="BarLev-Sharif">{{cite book|last1=Boyne|first1=Walter J.|title=The Yom Kippur War: And the Airlift Strike That Saved Israel|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=978-0-312-32042-3|page=Insert 6|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YFhoddeS5fEC&pg=PA142-IA6|language=en|date=2002|access-date=3 June 2016}}</ref>]]
On October 9, the Soviet cultural center in Damascus was damaged during an IAF airstrike, and two days later, the Soviet merchant ship ''Ilya Mechnikov'' was sunk by the Israeli Navy during a battle off Syria. The Soviets condemned Israeli actions, and there were calls within the government for military retaliation. The Soviets ultimately reacted by deploying two destroyers off the Syrian coast. Soviet warships in the Mediterranean were authorized to open fire on Israeli combatants approaching Soviet convoys and transports. There were several recorded instances of Soviet ships exchanging fire with Israeli forces. In particular, the Soviet minesweeper ''Rulevoi'' and the medium landing ship ''SDK-137'', guarding Soviet transport ships at the Syrian port of Latakia, fired on approaching Israeli jets.<ref name="littlerock" /> On 9 October, the Soviet cultural center in Damascus was damaged during an IAF airstrike, and two days later, the Soviet merchant ship ''Ilya Mechnikov'' was sunk by the Israeli Navy during a battle off Syria. The Soviets condemned Israeli actions, and there were calls within the government for military retaliation. The Soviets ultimately reacted by deploying two destroyers off the Syrian coast. Soviet warships in the Mediterranean were authorized to open fire on Israeli combatants approaching Soviet convoys and transports. There were several recorded instances of Soviet ships exchanging fire with Israeli forces. In particular, the Soviet minesweeper ''Rulevoi'' and the medium landing ship ''SDK-137'', guarding Soviet transport ships at the Syrian port of Latakia, fired on approaching Israeli jets.<ref name="littlerock">{{cite web |title=How did the U.S.S. ''Little Rock'' and her Crew Participate in the Arab–Israeli Yom Kippur War? |url=http://www.usslittlerock.org/Historic%20Events/LittleRockYomKippur.html |publisher=USS Little Rock Association |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304092609/http://www.usslittlerock.org/Historic%20Events/LittleRockYomKippur.html |archive-date=4 March 2016}}</ref>


During the cease-fire, Henry Kissinger mediated a series of exchanges with the Egyptians, Israelis and the Soviets. On October 24, Sadat publicly appealed for American and Soviet contingents to oversee the ceasefire; it was quickly rejected in a White House statement. Kissinger also met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss convening a peace conference with Geneva as the venue. Later in the evening (9:35&nbsp;pm) of October 24–25, Brezhnev sent Nixon a "very urgent" letter. In that letter, Brezhnev began by noting that Israel was continuing to violate the ceasefire and it posed a challenge to both the U.S. and USSR. He stressed the need to "implement" the ceasefire resolution and "invited" the U.S. to join the Soviets "to compel observance of the cease-fire without delay". He then threatened "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps ]. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel."<ref name="William B Quandt p 121">William B Quandt, ''Peace Process'', p. 121.</ref><ref>Rabinovich, p. 479.</ref> The Soviets were threatening to militarily intervene in the war on Egypt's side if they could not work together to enforce the ceasefire. During the cease-fire, Henry Kissinger mediated a series of exchanges with the Egyptians, Israelis and the Soviets. On 24 October, Sadat publicly appealed for American and Soviet contingents to oversee the ceasefire; it was quickly rejected in a White House statement. Kissinger also met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss convening a peace conference with Geneva as the venue. Later in the evening (9:35&nbsp;pm) of 24–25 October, Brezhnev sent Nixon a "very urgent" letter.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=121}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=479}}


In that letter, Brezhnev began by noting that Israel was continuing to violate the ceasefire and it posed a challenge to both the U.S. and USSR. He stressed the need to "implement" the ceasefire resolution and "invited" the U.S. to join the Soviets "to compel observance of the cease-fire without delay". He then threatened "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps ]. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel."{{sfnmp|Quandt|2005|1p=121|Rabinovich|2004|2p=497}}
Kissinger immediately passed the message to ] ], who met with Nixon for 20 minutes around 10:30&nbsp;pm, and reportedly empowered Kissinger to take any necessary action.<ref name="William B Quandt p 121" /> Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Haig, Defense Secretary ] and CIA Director ]. The ] had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him:


Kissinger immediately passed the message to ] ], who met with Nixon for 20 minutes around 10:30&nbsp;pm, and reportedly empowered Kissinger to take any necessary action.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=121}} Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Haig, Defense Secretary ] and CIA Director ]. The ] had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him:
<blockquote>When Kissinger asked Haig whether should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions.<ref name="Rabinovich_3">Rabinovich, p. 480.</ref> </blockquote>


<blockquote>When Kissinger asked Haig whether should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=480}}</blockquote>
The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the DEFCON from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.<ref name="Rabinovich_3" />


The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the DEFCON from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=480}}
The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshaled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union, and several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in ]".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004_CCRTS/CD/papers/190.pdf |title=Effects-Based Operations: the Yom Kippur War Case Study|access-date=March 28, 2010}}</ref> The Soviets also deployed seven amphibious warfare craft with some 40,000 naval infantry in the Mediterranean.


The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshaled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union, and several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in ]".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004_CCRTS/CD/papers/190.pdf |title=Effects-Based Operations: the Yom Kippur War Case Study|access-date=28 March 2010}}</ref>
The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said ]. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier ], while KGB chief ] added that "We shall not unleash the ]."<ref>Rabinovich, p. 484.</ref> The letter from the U.S. cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 485.</ref> The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.

The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said ]. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier ], while KGB chief ] added that "We shall not unleash the ]."{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=484}} The letter from the U.S. cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=485}} The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.


====Other countries==== ====Other countries====
] MiG-21s to Syria during the war, on display at the Flugplatzmuseum ]]] ] MiG-21s to Syria during the war, on display at the Flugplatzmuseum ]]]
In total, Arab countries added up to 100,000 troops to Egypt and Syria's frontline ranks, and about 20,000 troops stationed in Jordanian territory.<ref name="Rabinovich, p54">{{cite book | last=Rabinovich | title=The Yom Kippur War | page=54}}</ref> Besides Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, several other Arab states were also involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing. In addition to its forces in Syria, Iraq sent a single ] squadron to Egypt. The squadron quickly gained a reputation amongst Egyptian field commanders for its skill in air support, particularly in anti-armor strikes.<ref name="Shazly, pp. 277–278" /> In total, Arab countries added up to 100,000 troops to Egypt and Syria's frontline ranks, and about 20,000 troops stationed in Jordanian territory.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=54}} Besides Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, several other Arab states were also involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing. In addition to its forces in Syria, Iraq sent a single ] squadron to Egypt. The squadron quickly gained a reputation amongst Egyptian field commanders for its skill in air support, particularly in anti-armor strikes.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=277–278}}


However, nearly all Arab reinforcements came with no logistical plan or support, expecting their hosts to supply them, and in several cases causing logistical problems. On the Syrian front, a lack of coordination between Arab forces led to several instances of friendly fire.<ref name="tlas" /><ref name="Shazly p.278">Shazly, p. 278.</ref> However, nearly all Arab reinforcements came with no logistical plan or support, expecting their hosts to supply them, and in several cases causing logistical problems. On the Syrian front, a lack of coordination between Arab forces led to several instances of friendly fire.<ref name="tlas" />{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=278}}
* ] sent a squadron each of MiG-21s and ]s to Egypt, which arrived at the front between October 9 and 11. It also sent an armored brigade of 150 tanks, the advance elements of which began to arrive on October 17, but reached the front only on October 24, too late to participate in the fighting. After the war, during the first days of November, Algeria deposited around US$200&nbsp;million with the Soviet Union to finance arms purchases for Egypt and Syria.<ref name="Shazly p.278" /> Algerian fighter jets, however, did participate in attacks together with Egyptians and Iraqis.<ref name=kuwaraswamy60>Kuwaraswamy. p. 60. "On the Egyptian front, the Libyan (manned by Egyptians), Algerian and Iraqi squadrons took part in bombing Israeli targets and providing air assistance to ground operations. Additional Arab forces operating on the Egyptian front were a Libyan armored brigade and a Kuwaiti infantry battalion which had been deployed in Egypt before the war, and an Algerian armored brigade which arrived on 17 October. Neither of these units took an active part in the war. After the cease-fire went into effect, a Sudanese infantry brigade also arrived in the front."</ref> * ] sent a squadron each of MiG-21s and ]s to Egypt, which arrived at the front between 9 and 11 October. It also sent an armored brigade of 150 tanks, the advance elements of which began to arrive on 17 October, but reached the front only on 24 October, too late to participate in the fighting. After the war, during the first days of November, Algeria deposited around US$200&nbsp;million with the Soviet Union to finance arms purchases for Egypt and Syria.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=278}} Algerian fighter jets, however, did participate in attacks together with Egyptians and Iraqis.<ref name=kuwaraswamy60>Kuwaraswamy. p. 60. "On the Egyptian front, the Libyan (manned by Egyptians), Algerian and Iraqi squadrons took part in bombing Israeli targets and providing air assistance to ground operations. Additional Arab forces operating on the Egyptian front were a Libyan armored brigade and a Kuwaiti infantry battalion which had been deployed in Egypt before the war, and an Algerian armored brigade which arrived on 17 October. Neither of these units took an active part in the war. After the cease-fire went into effect, a Sudanese infantry brigade also arrived in the front."</ref>
* ] Communist Party leader ] directed the shipment of 75,000 grenades, 30,000 mines, 62 tanks and 12 fighter jets to Syria.<ref name="fisher1993">{{cite news|last1=Fisher|first1=Marc|title=E. Germany Ran Antisemitic Campaign in West in '60s|newspaper=]|date=28 February 1993}}</ref>
* ] sent approximately 4,000 troops, including tank and helicopter crews to Syria, and they reportedly engaged in combat operations against the IDF.<ref name="Perez, Cuba p. 377-379"/><ref name="Cuba">Perez, ''Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution'', pp. 377–79.</ref><ref>] (1986), ''Fidel: A Biography of Fidel Castro''. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company.</ref>
* 20 ]n pilots and 19 non-combat personnel were sent to Egypt.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=83–84}} According to Shlomo Aloni, the last aerial engagement on the Egyptian front, which took place on 6 December, saw Israeli F-4s engage North Korean-piloted MiG-21s.<ref name="david2013" /> The Israelis shot down one MiG, and another was mistakenly shot down by Egyptian air defenses. Egyptian sources said that the North Koreans suffered no losses but claimed no aerial victories in their engagements.{{sfnp|Nicolle|Cooper|2004}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}{{sfnp|Aloni|2001}}{{pn|date=January 2025}}{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=83–84}}
* ] Communist Party leader ] directed the shipment of 75,000 grenades, 30,000 mines, 62 tanks and 12 fighter jets to Syria.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Fisher|first1=Marc|title=E. Germany Ran Antisemitic Campaign in West in '60s|work=]|date=February 28, 1993}}</ref>
* According to Chengappa, several ] pilots flew combat missions in Syrian aircraft, and shot down one Israeli fighter.<ref name="Chengappa2004">{{cite book|author=Bidanda M. Chengappa|title=Pakistan: Islamisation Army And Foreign Policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iDoMlBd4dYsC&pg=PA42 |date=2004|publisher=APH Publishing|isbn=978-81-7648-548-7|page=42}}</ref><ref name="Dunstan2003">{{cite book|author=Simon Dunstan|title=The Yom Kippur War 1973 (2): The Sinai|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1BYk_sXT6tsC&pg=PA39|access-date=22 February 2013 |date=2003|publisher=Osprey Publishing|isbn=978-1-84176-221-0|page=39}}</ref><ref name="Kumaraswamy2013">{{cite book|author=P. R. Kumaraswamy|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g1TkFQgzp5cC&pg=PT75|date=2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-32895-4|page=75}}</ref>
* 20 ]n pilots and 19 non-combat personnel were sent to Egypt.<ref name="Shazly, pp.83–84">Shazly, pp. 83–84.</ref> According to Shlomo Aloni, the last aerial engagement on the Egyptian front, which took place on December 6, saw Israeli F-4s engage North Korean-piloted MiG-21s.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-north-korea-dogfight-yom-kippur-war-2013-6|title=Israeli F-4s Actually Fought North Korean MiGs During the Yom Kippur War|first=David Cenciotti, The|last=Aviationist|website=Business Insider}}</ref> The Israelis shot down one MiG, and another was mistakenly shot down by Egyptian air defenses. Egyptian sources said that the North Koreans suffered no losses but claimed no aerial victories in their engagements.<ref name=nicolle/><ref name="Aloni" /><ref name="Shazly, pp.83–84"/>
* ], which had forces stationed in Egypt before the outbreak of the war, provided one armored brigade and two squadrons of ] fighters, of which one squadron was to be piloted by the Egyptian Air Force and the other by Libyan pilots. Only Egyptian-manned squadrons participated in the war.<ref name=kuwaraswamy60/> The Libyan armored brigade stationed in Egypt never took an active part in the war.<ref name=kuwaraswamy60/> Libya also sent financial aid.<ref>{{cite book |author=Lindsey Hilsum |title=Sandstorm |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RRc2AAAAQBAJ&pg=PT65|date=2015 |publisher=Faber & Faber |isbn=978-0-571-28806-9}} {{page needed|date=October 2022}}</ref>
* According to Chengappa, several ] pilots flew combat missions in Syrian aircraft, and shot down one Israeli fighter.<ref name="Chengappa2004">{{cite book|author=Bidanda M. Chengappa|title=Pakistan: Islamisation Army And Foreign Policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iDoMlBd4dYsC&pg=PA42|date= 2004|publisher=APH Publishing|isbn=978-81-7648-548-7|page=42}}</ref><ref name="Dunstan2003">{{cite book|author=Simon Dunstan|title=The Yom Kippur War 1973 (2): The Sinai|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1BYk_sXT6tsC&pg=PA39|access-date=February 22, 2013|date=2003|publisher=Osprey Publishing|isbn=978-1-84176-221-0|page=39}}</ref><ref name="Kumaraswamy2013">{{cite book|author=P. R. Kumaraswamy|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=g1TkFQgzp5cC&pg=PT75|date=2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-32895-4|page=75}}</ref>
* ] had a force of 20,000 Saudi soldiers that remained in Jordanian territory since 1967 to provide support and assistance as needed for a total of 10 years.<ref name="okaz2019" /><ref name=sauditw/><ref name="cmu1978">{{cite web|title=Saudi Arabian Military Activity Against Israel|url=http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=475577|work=CMU|date=May 1978|access-date=19 November 2021|archive-date=20 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211120001418/http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=475577|url-status=dead}}</ref> Additionally, the Saudis sent 3,000 soldiers to Syria, bolstered by a light armored battalion of ] vehicles.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=464–465}} One of the AMLs was later captured by the Israelis near Golan Heights and displayed to the media as proof of Saudi involvement.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}} The Saudi armor was deployed primarily in rearguard actions{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}} but also performed active reconnaissance for the Iraqi and Jordanian expeditionary forces between 16 and 19 October.<ref name=Syrianfront>{{cite book|last=Asher|first=Dani|title=Inside Israel's Northern Command: The Yom Kippur War on the Syrian Border|date=2014|pages=415–418|publisher=University Press of Kentucky|location=Lexington|isbn=978-0-8131-6737-4}}</ref> During that time, it participated in two major engagements and the IDF claimed that most of the armoured car battalion was destroyed.<ref name=Syrianfront/> The Saudis acknowledged only minor losses, including the loss of 4 AMLs.{{sfnp|O'Ballance|1979}}{{pn|date=December 2024}}
* ], which had forces stationed in Egypt before the outbreak of the war, provided one armored brigade and two squadrons of ] fighters, of which one squadron was to be piloted by the Egyptian Air Force and the other by Libyan pilots. Only Egyptian-manned squadrons participated in the war.<ref name=kuwaraswamy60/> The Libyan armored brigade stationed in Egypt never took an active part in the war.<ref name=kuwaraswamy60/> Libya also sent financial aid.<ref>{{cite book |author=Lindsey Hilsum |title=Sandstorm |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RRc2AAAAQBAJ&pg=PT65|date=2015 |publisher=Faber & Faber |isbn=978-0-571-28806-9 }}</ref>
* ] dispatched 3,000 soldiers to Syria.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=464–465}} These arrived with additional Jordanian and Iraqi reinforcements in time for a new Syrian offensive scheduled for 23 October, which was later cancelled.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=464–465}} ] were also sent to Egypt.<ref name="almasryalyoum">; Kuwait Defense Minister, His Highness Sheikh ] visiting Egyptian front in 1972 and issues war operation order 3967 to enact Al-Jahra Force</ref>{{better source needed|date=July 2018}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121024002838/http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp |url-status=dead |title=Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense|archive-date=24 October 2012}}</ref> Kuwait also provided financial aid.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=464}}
* ] had a force of 20,000 Saudi soldiers that remained in Jordanian territory since 1967 to provide support and assistance as needed for a total of 10 years.<ref>{{cite web|title=بطولات السعوديين حاضرة.. في الحروب العربية|url=https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1756574|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216061810/https://www.okaz.com.sa/local/na/1756574|archive-date=16 February 2021|work=Okaz|date=17 November 2019|access-date=13 August 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Saudi Arabian Military Activity Against Israel|url=http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=475577|work=CMU|date=May 1978|access-date=19 November 2021|archive-date=20 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211120001418/http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=475577|url-status=dead}}</ref> Additionally, the Saudis sent 3,000 soldiers to Syria, bolstered by a light armored battalion of ] vehicles.<ref name=Rabinovich464-465/> One of the AMLs was later captured by the Israelis near Golan Heights and displayed to the media as proof of Saudi involvement.<ref name="O'Ballance"/> The Saudi armor was deployed primarily in rearguard actions<ref name="O'Ballance"/> but also performed active reconnaissance for the Iraqi and Jordanian expeditionary forces between October 16 and 19.<ref name=Syrianfront>{{cite book|last=Asher|first=Dani|title=Inside Israel's Northern Command: The Yom Kippur War on the Syrian Border|date=2014|pages=415–18|publisher=University Press of Kentucky|location=Lexington|isbn=978-0-8131-6737-4}}</ref> During that time, it participated in two major engagements and the IDF claimed that most of the armoured car battalion was destroyed.<ref name=Syrianfront/> The Saudis acknowledged only minor losses, including the loss of 4 AMLs.<ref name="O'Ballance"/>
* ] sent one infantry brigade to Egypt and one armored regiment to Syria.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|pp=277–278}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=464}} Six Moroccan troops were killed in action on the Syrian front.<ref name="tobji"/>
* ] dispatched 3,000 soldiers to Syria.<ref name=Rabinovich464-465/> These arrived with additional Jordanian and Iraqi reinforcements in time for a new Syrian offensive scheduled for October 23, which was later cancelled.<ref name=Rabinovich464-465/> ] were also sent to Egypt.<ref name="almasryalyoum">; Kuwait Defense Minister, His Highness Sheikh ] visiting Egyptian front in 1972 and issues war operation order 3967 to enact Al-Jahra Force</ref>{{better source needed|date=July 2018}}<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121024002838/http://www.mod.gov.kw/MOD/Arabic_P/index.jsp |date=October 24, 2012 }}</ref> Kuwait also provided financial aid.<ref name=Rabinovich464/>
* ] sent one infantry brigade to Egypt and one armored regiment to Syria.<ref name="Shazly, pp. 277–278">Shazly, pp. 277–78.</ref><ref name="Rabinovich464" /> 6 Moroccan troops were taken prisoner in the war.
* ] sent 1,000–2,000 soldiers to Egypt, where they were stationed in the Nile Delta and some of them were stationed to defend Port Said.<ref name="tlas" /> * ] sent 1,000–2,000 soldiers to Egypt, where they were stationed in the Nile Delta and some of them were stationed to defend Port Said.<ref name="tlas" />
* Lebanon sent radar units to Syria for air defense.<ref name="The Yom Kippur War">{{cite web|url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/73_War.html |title=The Yom Kippur War |publisher=Jewishvirtuallibrary.org |date=October 6, 1973 |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> Lebanon however did not take part in the war.<ref>Rabinovich, I. ''The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985''. p. 105. "Lebanon was perceived as Israel's one harmless neighbour, a state that since 1949 had not taken part in the Arab–Israeli wars …"</ref> * Lebanon enabled Palestinian artillery units to operate from its territory and Lebanese radar operators guided Syrian air force aircraft.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Yom Kippur War|first=Walter|last=Boyne|year=2007|publisher=]|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YFhoddeS5fEC&q=Lebanon%20radar%20yom%20kippur%20war|page=11|isbn=978-1-4299-0181-9}}</ref> Lebanon however did not directly take part in the war.<ref>Rabinovich, I. ''The War for Lebanon, 1970–1985''. p. 105. "Lebanon was perceived as Israel's one harmless neighbour, a state that since 1949 had not taken part in the Arab–Israeli wars ..."</ref>
* ] deployed a 3,500-strong infantry brigade to Egypt. It arrived on October 28, too late to participate in the war. * ] deployed a 3,500-strong infantry brigade to Egypt. It arrived on 28 October, too late to participate in the war.
''Non-state participants'': ''Non-state participants'':
* An infantry brigade composed of ] was in Egypt before the outbreak of the war.<ref name="tlas" /><ref name=Rabinovich464>Rabinovich, p. 464.</ref> * An infantry brigade composed of ] was in Egypt before the outbreak of the war.<ref name="tlas" />{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=464}}


===Palestinian attacks from Lebanese territory===
=== U.S.–Soviet naval standoff ===
During the course of the war, Palestinian militias from southern Lebanon launched several attacks on Israeli border communities. All of the attempts to infiltrate Israel failed, and 23 militants were killed and four were captured during the clashes. Most of the activity was focused on ] and anti-tank missile fire on Israeli border communities. In the attacks some civilians were injured, mostly lightly and damage was made to property. On 10 October, after Palestinian militants fired some 40 rockets on Israeli communities, Chief of Staff David Elazar and chief of the ] Yitzhak Hofi requested permission to send a force into Lebanon to root out Palestinian militants, but the request was declined by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who did not want to divert forces from the Syrian front.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wallach |first1=Jehuda |title=Carta's Atlas of Israel: The Third Decade 1971–1981 |date=1983 |publisher=Jerusalem: Carta|isbn=978-965-220-060-0 |page=68 |language=he}}</ref>{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=411}}
The war saw the largest naval confrontation between the ] and ] of the entire Cold War. As the United States and Soviet Union supported their respective allies, their fleets in the Mediterranean became increasingly hostile toward each other. The Soviet ] had 52 ships in the Mediterranean when the war began, including 11 submarines, some of which carried cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, while the ] had 48, including two aircraft carriers, a helicopter carrier, and amphibious vessels carrying 2,000 marines. As the war continued, both sides reinforced their fleets. The Soviet squadron grew to 97 vessels including 23 submarines, while the US Sixth Fleet grew to 60 vessels including 9 submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, and 3 aircraft carriers. Both fleets made preparations for war, and US aircraft conducted reconnaissance over the Soviet fleet. The two fleets began to disengage following the ceasefire.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.jpost.com/features/in-thespotlight/the-war-that-nearly-was|title = The war that nearly was}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-10-26/little-known-us-soviet-confrontation-during-yom-kippur-war|title = The little-known US-Soviet confrontation during Yom Kippur War}}</ref>

===Palestinian attacks from the Lebanese border===
During the course of the war, Palestinian militias from southern Lebanon launched several attacks on Israeli border communities. All of the attempts to infiltrate Israel failed, and 23 militants were killed and four were captured during the clashes. Most of the activity was focused on ] and anti-tank missile fire on Israeli border communities. In the attacks some civilians were injured, mostly lightly and damage was made to property. On October 10, after Palestinian militants fired some 40 rockets on Israeli communities, Chief of Staff David Elazar and chief of the ] Yitzhak Hofi requested to deploy a force which would expel Palestinian militants from Lebanese villages, but the request was declined by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wallach |first1=Jehuda |title=Carta's Atlas of Israel: The Third Decade 1971–1981 |date=1983 |publisher=Carta, Jerusalem, Israel |isbn=965-220-060-3 |page=68 |language=he}}</ref>

==Weapons==
The Arab armies (with the exception of the Jordanians), were equipped with predominantly Soviet-made weapons while Israel's armaments were mostly Western-made. The Arabs' T-54/55s and T-62s were equipped with night vision equipment, which the Israeli tanks lacked, giving them an advantage in fighting at night, while Israel tanks had better armor and/or better armament.{{citation needed|date=September 2013}} Israeli tanks also had a distinct advantage while on the ramps, in the "]" position where steeper angles of depression resulted in less exposure. The main guns of Soviet tanks could only depress 4 degrees. By contrast, the 105&nbsp;mm guns on Centurion and Patton tanks could depress 10 degrees.<ref>{{cite book |first=Simon |last=Dunstan |title=Centurion Vs T-55: Yom Kippur War 1973 |url=https://archive.org/details/centurionvstyomk00duns |url-access=limited |year=2009 |publisher=Osprey |isbn=978-1-84603-369-8 |pages=, 69}}</ref>

{|class="wikitable"
|-
!width=10% | Type
!width=40% | Arab armies
!width=40% | IDF
|-
! ]
| Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan used ], ], T-55, T-62, ] and M48 Patton, as well as ]/] World War II vintage self-propelled guns.
| ] and ] with upgraded engines, M48 Patton, ], ], ], ], ] and ]. All tanks were upgraded with the British ], prior to the war.
|-
! ]/]
| ], ], ], ] APC's & ] IFV's
| ] ], M113
|-
! Artillery
| ], ], ], ], ]
| ], ], ], ] and ], ], ] and ]
|-
! Aircraft
| MiG-21, ], ], ], ]B, ], ], ], ], ], ], ]
| ], ], ], ], ]
|-
! Helicopters
| ], ]
| ], ], ]
|-
! ]
| ], ], ], ], ]
| ], ], ]
|-
! Infantry weapons
| ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ] HMG, ], ] and ]
| ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ] (only received during the war), ] (received during the war), ] and ]
|-
! Sea-to-Sea Missiles
| ]
| ]
|-
! Air-to-Air Missiles
| ]
| ] 2, ], ]
|-
! Air-to-Ground Missiles
|
| ] anti radiation missile
|}

==Home front during the war==
The war created a state of emergency in the countries involved in fighting. Upon the outbreak of war, ] sounded throughout Israel. During the war, blackouts were enforced in major cities. The Egyptian government began to evacuate foreign tourists, and on October 11, 1973, the Egyptian ship ''Syria'' left Alexandria to ] with a load of tourists wishing to exit Egypt. The U.S. Interest Section in Cairo also requested U.S. government assistance in removing U.S. tourists to Greece.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=84225&dt=2472&dl=1345 |title=Smith (US Interest Section in Cairo) to Department of State, October 11, 1973 |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> On October 12, Kissinger ordered the U.S. Interest Section in Cairo to speed up preparations for the departure of U.S. tourists staying in Egypt, while notifying such actions to the IDF in order to avoid accidental military operations against them.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=84739&dt=2472&dl=1345 |title=Kissinger to the US Interest Section in Cairo, October 12, 1973 |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref>

==Casualties==
{{See also|Israeli casualties of war}}
]
]

Israel suffered between 2,521<ref name="autogenerated450"/><ref name="autogenerated6">Schiff, ''A History of the Israeli Army'', p. 328.</ref><ref name="autogenerated87">Herzog, ''Encyclopaedia Judaica'', Keter Publishing House, 1974, p. 87.</ref> and 2,800 killed in action.<ref name="Garwych, p. 243">Garwych, p. 243.</ref> An additional 7,250<ref name="autogenerated3">Rabinovich, 497.</ref> to 8,800<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" /> soldiers were wounded. Some 293 Israelis were captured.<ref name="autogenerated2004">{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/1/Background%20on%20Israeli%20POWs%20and%20MIAs |title=Ministry of Foreign Affairs |publisher=Mfa.gov.il |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> Approximately 400 Israeli tanks were destroyed. Another 600 were disabled but returned to service after repairs.<ref name="Rabinovich, 496">Rabinovich, p. 496</ref> A major Israeli advantage, noted by many observers, was their ability to quickly return damaged tanks to combat.<ref name="globalsecurity1984" /><ref name="Gal">{{cite book|last1=Gal|first1=Reuven|title=A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier|date=1986|publisher=Greenwood Press|location=New York|isbn=0313243158|page=161|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y_s6_k8ngccC&pg=PA161}}</ref> The Israeli Air Force lost 102 airplanes: 32 F-4s, 53 A-4s, 11 Mirages and 6 Super Mysteres. Two helicopters, a Bell 205 and a CH-53, were also lost.<ref name="White House Military Briefing">{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-56.pdf |title=White House Military Briefing |access-date=October 22, 2011}}</ref> According to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, nearly half of these were shot down during the first three days of the war.<ref name="Herzog, 260">Herzog, p. 260.</ref> IAF losses per combat sortie were less than in the Six-Day War of 1967.<ref>John Pimlott, Michael Orr, ''The Middle East Conflicts: From 1945 to the Present'', London: Orbis Publishing (1983), p. 99.</ref>

Arab casualties were known to be much higher than Israel's, though precise figures are difficult to ascertain as Egypt and Syria never disclosed official figures. The lowest casualty estimate is 8,000 (5,000 Egyptian and 3,000 Syrian) killed and 18,000 wounded.<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" /> The highest estimate is 18,500 (15,000 Egyptian and 3,500 Syrian) killed.<ref name="autogenerated87" /> Most estimates lie somewhere in between the two, with the Insight Team of London's '']'' putting combined Egyptian and Syrian losses at 16,000 killed<ref name="autogenerated450"/> and yet another source citing a figure of some 15,000 dead and 35,000 wounded.<ref name="Rabinovich, 496-7">Rabinovich, pp. 496–97.</ref> U.S. estimates placed Egyptian casualties at 13,000.<ref>O'Ballance, p. 129</ref> Iraq lost 278 killed and 898 wounded, while Jordan suffered 23 killed and 77 wounded.<ref name="Dunstan, p. 200"/> Some 8,372 Egyptians, 392 Syrians, 13 Iraqis and 6 Moroccans were taken prisoner.<ref name="autogenerated2004" /><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071031052757/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=31 October 2007 |title=Middle East: Sandstorm at Kilometer 101 |work=Time |date=December 3, 1973 |access-date=May 21, 2010}}</ref>

Arab tank losses amounted to 2,250<ref name="Rabinovich, 496-7" /><ref>, Martin van Creveld, p. 47 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140513183257/http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |date=May 13, 2014 }}</ref> though Garwych cites a figure of 2,300.<ref name="Garwych p 244">Garwych p. 244</ref> 400 of these fell into Israeli hands in good working order and were incorporated into Israeli service.<ref name="Rabinovich, 496-7" /> Between 341<ref name="Garwych, p. 243" /> and 514<ref name="Herzog, 260" /> Arab aircraft were shot down. According to Herzog, 334 of these aircraft were shot down by the IAF in air-to-air combat for the loss of only five Israeli planes.<ref name="Herzog, 260" /> The ''Sunday Times'' Insight Team notes Arab aircraft losses of 450.<ref name="autogenerated450"/> 19 Arab naval vessels, including 10 missile boats, were sunk for no Israeli losses.<ref name="Herzog, War of Atonement, p 269">Herzog, ''War of Atonement'', p. 269.</ref>

==Post-ceasefire==


==UN-backed ceasefire==
===Kissinger pushes for peace===
] ]
On October 24, the UNSC passed ], serving as a renewed call for all parties to adhere to the ceasefire terms established in Resolution 338. Most heavy fighting on the Egyptian front ended by October 26, but clashes along the ceasefire lines and a few airstrikes on the Third Army took place. With some Israeli advances taking place, Kissinger threatened to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before Israel could respond, Egyptian national security advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with Israel, provided that it agree to allow non-military supplies to reach the Third Army and to a complete ceasefire. On 24 October, the UNSC passed ], serving as a renewed call for all parties to adhere to the ceasefire terms established in Resolution 338. Most heavy fighting on the Egyptian front ended by 26 October, but clashes along the ceasefire lines and a few airstrikes on the Third Army took place. With some Israeli advances taking place, Kissinger threatened to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before Israel could respond, Egyptian national security advisor ] sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with Israel, provided that it agree to allow non-military supplies to reach the Third Army and to a complete ceasefire.


About noon on October 25, Kissinger appeared before the press at the State Department. He described the various stages of the crisis and the evolution of U.S. policy. He reviewed the first two weeks of the crisis and the nuclear alert, reiterated opposition to U.S. and Soviet troops in the area and more strongly opposed unilateral Soviet moves. He then reviewed the prospects for a peace agreement, which he termed "quite promising", and had conciliatory words for Israel, Egypt and even the USSR. Kissinger concluded his remarks by spelling out the principles of a new U.S. policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict saying:<ref>Quandt 2005, pp. 123–24.</ref> About noon on 25 October, Kissinger appeared before the press at the State Department. He described the various stages of the crisis and the evolution of U.S. policy. He reviewed the first two weeks of the crisis and the nuclear alert, reiterated opposition to U.S. and Soviet troops in the area and more strongly opposed unilateral Soviet moves. He then reviewed the prospects for a peace agreement, which he termed "quite promising", and had conciliatory words for Israel, Egypt and even the USSR. Kissinger concluded his remarks by spelling out the principles of a new U.S. policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict saying:<ref>Quandt 2005, pp. 123–124.</ref>
<blockquote>Our position is that ... the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that in the process of negotiations it will be necessary to make substantial concessions. The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for the sovereignty over the territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries. We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this.</blockquote> <blockquote>Our position is that ... the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that in the process of negotiations it will be necessary to make substantial concessions. The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for the sovereignty over the territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries. We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this.</blockquote>


Quandt considers, "It was a brilliant performance, one of his most impressive." One hour later the United Nations Security Council adopted ]. This time the ceasefire held, and the fourth Arab–Israeli war was over. Quandt considers, "It was a brilliant performance, one of his most impressive." One hour later the United Nations Security Council adopted ]. This time the ceasefire held, and the fourth Arab–Israeli war was over.


===Disengagement agreement=== ==Disengagement==
{{main|Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria}} {{main|Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria}}
] ]
Disengagement talks took place on October 28, 1973, at "Kilometre 101" between Israeli Major General ] and Egyptian Major General ]. Ultimately, Kissinger took the proposal to Sadat, who agreed. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli ones, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and ] were to be exchanged. Disengagement talks took place on 28 October 1973, at "Kilometre 101" between Israeli Major General ] and Egyptian Major General ]. Ultimately, Kissinger took the proposal to Sadat, who agreed. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli ones, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and ] were to be exchanged.


A ] followed in December 1973. All parties to the war—Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt—were invited to a joint effort by the Soviet Union and the United States to finally usher peace between the Arabs and Israelis. This conference was recognized by UN Security Council Resolution 344 and was based on the Resolution 338, calling for a "just and durable peace". Nevertheless, the conference was forced to adjourn on January 9, 1974, as Syria refused attendance.<ref>Drysdale, A. & Hinnebusch, R.: ''Syria and the Middle East Peace Process''. Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1991.</ref> A ] followed in December 1973. All parties to the war—Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt—were invited to a joint effort by the Soviet Union and the United States to finally usher peace between the Arabs and Israelis. This conference was recognized by UN Security Council Resolution 344 and was based on the Resolution 338, calling for a "just and durable peace". Nevertheless, the conference was forced to adjourn on 9 January 1974, as Syria refused attendance.<ref>Drysdale, A. & Hinnebusch, R.: ''Syria and the Middle East Peace Process''. Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1991.</ref>


After the failed conference Henry Kissinger started conducting shuttle diplomacy, meeting with Israel and the Arab states directly. The first concrete result of this was the initial military disengagement agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt on January 18, 1974. The agreement commonly known as Sinai I had the official name of ''Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement''. Under its terms, Israel agreed to pull back its forces from the areas West of Suez Canal, which it had occupied since the end of hostilities. Moreover, Israeli forces were also pulled back on the length of the whole front to create security zones for Egypt, UN and Israel, each roughly ten kilometres wide. Thus Israel gave up its advances reaching beyond the Suez canal, but it still held nearly all of Sinai. It became the first of many such ''Land for Peace'' agreements where Israel gave up territory in exchange for treaties.<ref name="Tristam">Tristam, P.: '' {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130509115512/http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/a/me080421.htm |date=May 9, 2013 }}''. About.com, accessed 2012.</ref> After the failed conference, Henry Kissinger started conducting ], meeting with Israel and the Arab states directly. The first concrete result of this was the initial military disengagement agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt on 18 January 1974. The agreement commonly known as Sinai I had the official name of ''Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement''. Under its terms, Israel agreed to pull back its forces from the areas West of Suez Canal, which it had occupied since the end of hostilities. Moreover, Israeli forces were also pulled back on the length of the whole front to create security zones for Egypt, UN and Israel, each roughly ten kilometres wide. Thus Israel gave up its advances reaching beyond the Suez canal, but it still held nearly all of Sinai. It became the first of many such ''Land for Peace'' agreements where Israel gave up territory in exchange for treaties.<ref name="Tristam">Tristam, P.: '' {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130509115512/http://middleeast.about.com/od/arabisraeliconflict/a/me080421.htm |date=9 May 2013}}''. About.com, accessed 2012.</ref>


On the Syrian front, skirmishes and artillery exchanges continued taking place. ] by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a ] on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the ] and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The agreement ended the skirmishes and exchanges of artillery fire that had occurred frequently along the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire line. The ] (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan. On the Syrian front, skirmishes and artillery exchanges continued taking place. Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a ] on 31 May 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the ] and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The agreement ended the skirmishes and exchanges of artillery fire that had occurred frequently along the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire line. The ] (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.


The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the ]. The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the ].


==Reactions==
===Response in Israel=== ===Response in Israel===
Though the war reinforced Israel's military deterrence, it had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden reversals that occurred at the beginning of the war inflicted a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had hitherto experienced no serious military challenges.<ref name=rab497-498>Rabinovich, pp. 497–98.</ref> Though the war reinforced Israel's military deterrence, it had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden reversals that occurred at the beginning of the war inflicted a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had hitherto experienced no serious military challenges.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=497–498}}


A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by ], commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 499.</ref> Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. ], President of the ], was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 501.</ref> A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by ], commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=499}} Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. ], President of the ], was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=501}}


], commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=502}} He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on 30 January 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."<ref>{{citation
The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2, 1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's failings:
|title = Findings of the Agranat Commission
* Though his performance and conduct during the war was lauded,<ref>Rabinovich, p. 503</ref> IDF ] David Elazar was recommended for dismissal after the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF".
|publisher = The Jewish Agency for Israel
* Aman Chief, ] ], and his deputy, head of Research, ] ], were recommended for dismissal.
|at = 30 January
* Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
|url = http://www.jafi.org.il/education/jafi75/timeline6f.html
* ], commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty.<ref name="Rabinovich_4">Rabinovich, p. 502.</ref> He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on January 30, 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."<ref name="Agranat">, The Jewish Agency for Israel, see "January 30" on linked page. Retrieved June 9, 2005. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081203153941/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/jafi75/timeline6f.html |date=December 3, 2008 }}</ref>
|editor = Chani Hinker
|access-date = 14 November 2016
|archive-date = 3 December 2008
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20081203153941/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/jafi75/timeline6f.html
|url-status = dead
}}</ref>{{better source needed |date=June 2023 |reason=archive restored, but the quote does not appear on the page, and the page it links has not been archived. most web sources appear to postdate this article and several of them cite wikipedia as their source. the primary source is in hebrew and I've been unable to locate it.}}


Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had absolved Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignations (especially Dayan's) intensified.<ref name="Rabinovich_4" /> In the ], Meir's ] party lost five Knesset seats. Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had absolved Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignations (especially Dayan's) intensified.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=502}}


On April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. A new government was seated in June and Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity, became Prime Minister.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 237.</ref> On 11 April 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. A new government was seated in June and Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity, became prime minister.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=237}}

In 1999, the issue was revisited by the Israeli political leadership to prevent similar shortcomings from being repeated. The ] was created to improve coordination between the different ] and ] bodies, and the political branch of government.


===Response in Egypt=== ===Response in Egypt===
General Shazly had angered Sadat for advocating the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Sinai to meet the Israeli incursion on the West Bank of the Canal. Six weeks after the war, he was relieved of command and forced out of the army, ultimately going into political exile for years. Upon his return to Egypt, he was placed under house arrest.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=507}}
For the Arab states (and Egypt in particular), Arab successes during the war healed the psychological trauma of their defeat in the Six-Day War, allowing them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. Because of the later setbacks in the war (which saw Israel gain a large salient on African soil and even more territory on the Syrian front),{{failed verification|date=August 2012}} some believe that the war helped convince many in the Arab world that Israel could not be defeated militarily, thereby strengthening peace movements and delaying the Arab ambition of destroying Israel by force.<ref>. ''Guardian'' Unlimited, May 15, 2001.</ref>


General Shazly had angered Sadat for advocating the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Sinai to meet the Israeli incursion on the West Bank of the Canal. Six weeks after the war, he was relieved of command and forced out of the army, ultimately going into political exile for years. Upon his return to Egypt, he was placed under house arrest.<ref name="autogenerated7" /> Following his release, he advocated the formation of a "Supreme High Committee" modeled after Israel's Agranat Commission in order to "probe, examine and analyze" the performance of Egyptian forces and the command decisions made during the war, but his requests were completely ignored.<ref>Shazly, p. 331</ref> He published a book, banned in Egypt, that described Egypt's military failings and the sharp disagreements he had with Ismail and Sadat in connection with the prosecution of the war.<ref>Shazly, p. 334.</ref> Following his release, he advocated the formation of a "Supreme High Committee" modeled after Israel's Agranat Commission in order to "probe, examine and analyze" the performance of Egyptian forces and the command decisions made during the war, but his requests were completely ignored.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=331}} He published a book, banned in Egypt, that described Egypt's military failings and the sharp disagreements he had with Ismail and Sadat in connection with the prosecution of the war.{{sfnp|Shazly|2003|p=334}}


The commanders of the Second and Third Armies, Generals Khalil and Wasel, were also dismissed from the army.<ref name="autogenerated7">Rabinovich, p. 507.</ref> The commander of the Egyptian Second Army at the start of the war, General Mamoun, suffered a heart attack,<ref name="globalsecurity1984" /> or, alternatively, a breakdown, after the Egyptian defeat during the October 14 Sinai tank battle, and was replaced by General Khalil.<ref>Rabinovich, p. 356.</ref><ref>Blum, Howard (2007), ''The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War'', HarperCollins, p. 298.</ref> The commanders of the Second and Third Armies, Generals Khalil and Wasel, were also dismissed from the army.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=507}} The commander of the Egyptian Second Army at the start of the war, General Mamoun, suffered a heart attack,{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} or, alternatively, a breakdown, after the Egyptian defeat during the 14 October Sinai tank battle, and was replaced by General Khalil.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=356}}<ref>Blum, Howard (2007), ''The Untold Story of the Yom Kippur War'', HarperCollins, p. 298.</ref>


===Response in Syria=== ===Response in Syria===
In Syria, Colonel Rafik Halawi, the ] commander of an infantry brigade that had collapsed during the Israeli breakthrough, was executed before the war even ended.<ref name="autogenerated7" /> He was given a quick hearing and sentenced to death; his execution was immediate.<ref name="Eartkquake">Schiff, Zeev (1973), ''October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973'', University Publishing Projects, pp. 194–95.</ref> Military historian ] referred to him as Syria's "sacrificial lamb".<ref name=Eartkquake/> The Syrians however offered vehement denials that Halawi was executed and expended great efforts trying to debunk the allegation.<ref name="Halawi">{{cite book |last=Macdonald |first=Scot |year=2006 |title=Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century |publisher=Routledge |isbn=1135983518 |page=68 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JjxCIc247pYC&pg=PA68}}</ref> They claimed he was killed in battle with Israel and threatened severe punishment to anyone repeating the allegation of execution.<ref name=Halawi/> Their concern stemmed from a desire to maintain Syrian Druze loyalty to Assad's regime and prevent Syrian Druze from siding with their co-religionists in Israel.<ref name=Halawi/> On July 7, 1974, Halawi's remains were removed from a Syrian military hospital and he was interred in Damascus at the "Cemetery of the Martyrs of the October War" in the presence of many Syrian dignitaries.<ref name=Halawi/> One analyst noted that the presence of so many high-level officials was unusual and attributed it to Syrian efforts to quell any suggestion of execution.<ref name=Halawi/> In Syria, Colonel Rafik Halawi, the ] commander of an infantry brigade that had collapsed during the Israeli breakthrough, was executed before the war even ended.{{dubious|date=June 2022}}{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=507}} He was given a quick hearing and sentenced to death;{{dubious|date=June 2022}} his execution was immediate.{{dubious|date=June 2022}}<ref name="Eartkquake">Schiff, Zeev (1973), ''October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973'', University Publishing Projects, pp. 194–195.</ref> Military historian ] referred to him as Syria's "sacrificial lamb".<ref name=Eartkquake/> The Syrians however offered vehement denials that Halawi was executed and expended great efforts trying to debunk the allegation.<ref name="Halawi">{{cite book |last=Macdonald |first=Scot |year=2006 |title=Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-98351-2 |page=68 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JjxCIc247pYC&pg=PA68}}</ref> They claimed he was killed in battle with Israel and threatened severe punishment to anyone repeating the allegation of execution.<ref name=Halawi/>
Their concern stemmed from a desire to maintain Syrian Druze loyalty to Assad's regime and prevent Syrian Druze from siding with their co-religionists in Israel.<ref name=Halawi/> On 7 July 1974, Halawi's remains were removed from a Syrian military hospital and he was interred in Damascus at the "Cemetery of the Martyrs of the October War" in the presence of many Syrian dignitaries.<ref name=Halawi/> One analyst noted that the presence of so many high-level officials was unusual and attributed it to Syrian efforts to quell any suggestion of execution.<ref name=Halawi/>


===Response in the Soviet Union=== ===Response in the Soviet Union===
According to Chernyaev, on November 4, 1973, Soviet leader ] said: According to Chernyaev, on 4 November 1973, Soviet leader ] said:
{{quote|We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn't have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed{{sic}}. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them.<ref name=Chernyaev1973p69/>}} {{blockquote|We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn't have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed{{sic}}. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them.<ref name=Chernyaev1973p69/>}}


===Arab oil embargo=== ===Arab oil embargo===
In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on October 17. On October 19, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2&nbsp;billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other states, causing the ].<ref>Smith, Charles D. (2006), ''Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict'', New York: Bedford, p. 329.</ref> In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by ] of ], decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on 17 October. On 19 October, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2&nbsp;billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other countries, causing the ].<ref>Smith, Charles D. (2006), ''Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict'', New York: Bedford, p. 329.</ref>

==Aftermath==


Analyses differ on the militarily outcome of the war; as an Israeli victory by military historians,{{refn|See{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|loc=Foreword}}<ref name="autogenerated450">Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', p. 450.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Luttwak |last2=Horowitz |title=The Israeli Army |url=https://archive.org/details/israeliarmy0000lutt |url-access=registration |place=Cambridge, MA |publisher=Abt Books |year=1983|isbn=978-0-89011-585-5}}</ref>{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=498}}<ref>{{cite book |title=Revisiting The Yom Kippur War |first=PR |last=Kumaraswamy |pages=–2 |isbn=978-0-7146-5007-4 |date=2000 |publisher=Psychology Press |url=https://archive.org/details/revisitingyomkip00pkum |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{sfnp|Johnson|Tierney|2009|pp=177, 180}}<ref>{{cite journal|first=Charles |last=Liebman |url=http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/10011.pdf |title=The Myth of Defeat: The Memory of the Yom Kippur war in Israeli Society |journal=] |volume=29 |date=July 1993 |publisher=Frank Cass |place=London |page=411 |issue=3 |doi=10.1080/00263209308700958 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130507055718/http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/10011.pdf |archive-date=7 May 2013 | issn = 0026-3206}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Milestones: 1969–1976 - Office of the Historian|url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/arab-israeli-war-1973|access-date=2023-03-10 |df=dmy-all|website=history.state.gov}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Simon Dunstan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-glXraIMt8gC|title=The Yom Kippur War: The Arab-Israeli War of 1973|page=205|isbn=978-1-84603-288-2|date=18 September 2007| publisher=Bloomsbury USA }}{{Dead link|date=October 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref name="Siniver2013p6">{{cite book|author=Asaf Siniver|title=The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GS4DBQAAQBAJ|year=2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-933481-0|page=6|quote=(p. 6) "For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory—militarily as well as politically ... The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt." (p. 11) "Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as 'the earthquake' or 'the blunder'"}}</ref><ref name="Bickerton2012p128">{{cite book|author=Ian Bickerton|title=The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Perplexed|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jf5GAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA128|date=2012|publisher=A&C Black|isbn=978-1-4411-2872-0|page=128|quote=the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1973}}</ref><ref name="Kumaraswamy2013p184">{{cite book|author=P.R. Kumaraswamy|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=R_YrBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA184|date=2013 |publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-32888-6|page=184|quote=(p. 184) "Yom Kippur War ... its final outcome was, without doubt, a military victory&nbsp; ... " (p. 185) " ... &nbsp;in October 1973, that despite Israel's military victory"}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.nationalreview.com/article/360505/how-we-used-do-it-mario-loyola|title=How We Used to Do It – American diplomacy in the Yom Kippur War|last=Loyola|first=Mario|date=7 October 2013|work=]|page=1|access-date=2 December 2013}}</ref>}} and by others, as a military stalemate.{{refn|See<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Tolchin |first1=Martin |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wp_KAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 |title=A World Ignited: How Apostles of Ethnic, Religious, and Racial Hatred Torch the Globe |last2=Tolchin |first2=Susan J. |date=2007-10-30 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |isbn=978-1-4617-1165-0 |pages=8 |language=en |quote=The themes of defeat and victory played important roles in Sadat's famous pursuit of peace with Israel. In Cairo, a bridge and statues are among the symbols that celebrate the "October 6 victory." What was that victory? It turned out to be what the rest of the world called the "Yom Kippur War," the war between Egypt and Israel in 1973. The reason that no one else referred to the war as a "victory" was that most historians regarded it as a stalemate rather than a clear triumph for either side.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Kacowicz |first=Arie Marcelo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y7NRn5s73sQC&pg=PA131 |title=Peaceful Territorial Change |date=1994 |publisher=Univ of South Carolina Press |isbn=978-0-87249-989-8 |pages=131 |language=en |quote=The Camp David Agreements should be understood against the background of the Yom Kippur War and its political, military, and economic implications. The Israeli military achievements on the battlefield, balanced by the Egyptian psychological victory in political terms, created a complex situation of military stalemate and political ripeness for striking a diplomatic bargain between the parties.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Porter |first=Bruce D. |url=https://www.google.com/books/?id=S9NKCCXbzbQC&pg=PA28 |title=The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 |date=1986-07-25 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-31064-2 |pages=28 |language=en |quote=Although Moscow managed against considerable odds to salvage from the Yom Kippur war a military stalemate and a moral victory for the Arabs, it suffered almost total collapse of its influence in Egypt shortly thereafter.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Lansford |first=Tom |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8HfDEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 |title=9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide |date=2011-11-04 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing USA |isbn=978-1-59884-420-7 |pages=2 |language=en |quote=In 1973, Israel was attacked by a coalition of Arab states in the Yom Kippur War (Ramadan War). The conflict ended in a military stalemate.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Bailey |first=Clinton |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8CiNDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT41 |title=Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History |date=2019-03-04 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-70916-6 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/01/the-next-days-were-hell-how-the-yom-kippur-war-realigned-the-middle-east |date=23 August 2024 |title='The next days were hell': How the Yom Kippur war realigned the Middle East |newspaper=] via ].com |last=McKernan |first=Bethan }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/features/2018/10/8/the-october-arab-israeli-war-of-1973-what-happened |date=23 August 2024 |title=The October Arab-Israeli War of 1973: What happened? }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= https://www.beyondintractability.org/artsum/pruitt-tactical |date=23 August 2024 |title=Summary of "Tactical Stalemates" }}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|url= https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1974/03/who-lost-the-yom-kippur-war-a-military-inventory-of-the-middle-east/670833/ |date=23 August 2024 |title=Who Lost the Yom Kippur War? A Military Inventory of the Middle East |magazine=The Atlantic |last1=Middleton |first1=Drew }}</ref>}}
==Long-term effects==


===Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement=== ===Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement===
{{Main|Sinai Interim Agreement}} {{Main|Sinai Interim Agreement}}
Another Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement, the ''Sinai Interim Agreement'', was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975, and was commonly known as Sinai II. This agreement led Israel to withdraw from another 20–40&nbsp;km with UN forces buffering the vacated area. After the agreement, Israel still held more than two-thirds of Sinai, which would prove to be a valuable bargaining chip in the coming negotiations.<ref>Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ''''. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008.</ref> Another Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement, the ''Sinai Interim Agreement'', was signed in Geneva on 4 September 1975, and was commonly known as Sinai II. This agreement led Israel to withdraw from another 20–40&nbsp;km with UN forces buffering the vacated area. After the agreement, Israel still held more than two-thirds of Sinai, which would prove to be a valuable bargaining chip in the coming negotiations.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Sinai+Interim+Agreement-+1975.htm |access-date=2023-03-25 |df=dmy-all |website=www.mfa.gov.il |archive-date=12 June 2004 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040612023146/http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/Sinai+Interim+Agreement-+1975.htm |title=Sinai Interim Agreement: 1975}}</ref>


===Egyptian–Israeli Camp David Accords=== ===Egyptian–Israeli Camp David Accords===
] acknowledge applause during a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., during which President ] announced the results of the ], 18 September 1978.]]
{{Main|Camp David Accords}} {{Main|Camp David Accords}}
The Yom Kippur War upset the status quo in the Middle East, and the war served as a direct antecedent of the 1978 Camp David Accords.<ref name="The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" /> The impetus for the talks came when United States President ] invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at ] to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from 5–17 September 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel subsequently withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace, with the last Israeli troops exiting on 26 April 1982.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Shipler|first1=David K.|last2=Times|first2=Special To the New York|date=1982-04-26|title=ISRAELI COMPLETES PULLOUT, LEAVING SINAI TO EGYPT|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/26/world/israeli-completes-pullout-leaving-sinai-to-egypt.html|access-date=2023-03-10 |df=dmy-all|issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
The Yom Kippur War upset the status quo in the Middle East, and the war served as a direct antecedent of the 1978 Camp David
Accords.<ref name="The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" /> The Accords resulted in the ], the first ever between Israel and an Arab state. According to ], the war gave the Israelis increased respect for the Egyptian military and decreased their confidence in their own, and caused the Israelis to be uncertain whether they could defeat Egypt in the event of another war. At the same time, the Egyptians recognized that despite their improvements, they were defeated in the end, and became doubtful that they could ever defeat Israel militarily. Therefore, a negotiated settlement made sense to both sides.<ref>Friedman, George: ], August 23, 2010.</ref>


The Accords resulted in the ], the first ever between Israel and an Arab state. According to ], the war gave the Israelis increased respect for the Egyptian military and decreased their confidence in their own, and caused the Israelis to be uncertain whether they could defeat Egypt in the event of another war. At the same time, the Egyptians recognized that despite their improvements, they were defeated in the end, and became doubtful that they could ever defeat Israel militarily. Therefore, a negotiated settlement made sense to both sides.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Israeli–Palestinian Peace Talks, Again|date=23 August 2010|author=George Friedman|url=https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/israeli-palestinian-peace-talks-again|website=stratfor|access-date=12 June 2023|archive-date=11 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211175647/https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/israeli-palestinian-peace-talks-again|url-status=live}}</ref> Many in the ] were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel. Sadat, in particular, became deeply unpopular both in the Arab world and in his own country. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League until 1989. Until then, Egypt had been "at the helm of the Arab world".<ref>Karsh, p. 86.</ref>
Rabin's government was hamstrung by a pair of scandals, and he was forced to step down in 1977. In the elections that followed, the ] ] party won a majority in the Knesset and ], the party's founder and leader, was appointed Prime Minister. This marked a historic change in the Israeli political landscape: for the first time since Israel's founding, a coalition not led by the ] was in control of the government.


===U.S. military doctrine===
] acknowledge applause during a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., during which President ] announced the results of the ], September 18, 1978.]]
{{See also|AirLand Battle}}


U.S. military studies of the Yom Kippur War played a major role in shaping U.S. ] in subsequent decades,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Doyle |first1=Joseph S. |title=The Yom Kippur War and the Shaping of the United States Air Force |url=https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/28/2002094404/-1/-1/0/DP_31_DOYLE_THE_YOM_KIPPUR_WAR_AND_THE_SHAPING_OF_THE_USAF.PDF |publisher=Air University Press, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education |date=February 2019 |access-date=26 June 2022}}</ref><ref name="Bronfeld">{{cite journal |last1=Bronfeld |first1=Saul |title=Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army |journal=The Journal of Military History |date=2007 |volume=71 |issue=2 |pages=465–498 |doi=10.1353/jmh.2007.0096 |s2cid=159609515 |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/213470 |access-date=26 June 2022 |issn=1543-7795}}</ref> particularly because the U.S. Army's ] was established only three months before the onset of the war. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. ], TRADOC Commander Gen. ], and other Army leaders saw Israel's strategic and doctrinal conditions between 1967 and 1973 as similar to NATO's position in Europe, and thus they undertook a deep study of Israel's warfighting in 1973 to derive insights for war against the Soviet Union.<ref name="Bronfeld" />
Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the Sinai from Israel, grew frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In a 1977 interview with '']'' anchorman ], Sadat admitted under pointed questioning that he was open to a more constructive dialog for peace, including a state visit. This seemed to open the floodgates, as in a later interview with the same reporter, the normally hard-line Begin—perhaps not wishing to be compared unfavorably to Sadat—said he too would be amenable to better relations. On November 9, 1977, Sadat stunned the world when he told parliament that he would be willing to visit Israel and address the Knesset. Shortly afterward, the Israeli government cordially invited him to address the Knesset. Thus, in November of that year, Sadat took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the first Arab leader to do so, and so implicitly ] Israel.


Soon after the war, U.S. Army civilian analysts and senior officers such as Gen. ] visited the IDF and compiled "lessons" for the Army to learn after the war.<ref name="Bronfeld" /> These lessons covered the improved lethality and accuracy of anti-tank and anti-air missiles, the importance of superior training for tank crews, the necessity of cover and concealment during movement, and the importance of ] warfare.<ref name="Bronfeld" /> In 1976, TRADOC revised the Army's FM 100–5 ''Operations'' field manual and promoted an operational concept of "Active Defense", with a strong emphasis on tactical proficiency tied to the performance of advanced weapons systems like those observed in the Yom Kippur War fighting.<ref name="Romjue">{{cite web |last1=Romjue |first1=John L. |title=From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982 |url=https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1662/ |publisher=United States Army Training and Doctrine Command |access-date=26 June 2022 |location=Fort Monroe, VA |language=en |date=1984}}</ref> Gen. DePuy visited Israel in 1976, where he toured Yom Kippur War battlefields and observed Israeli field training. He used these insights to encourage reforms of U.S. Army training to ease the Army's transition to a more professional force after the end of the military draft in 1973.<ref name="Bronfeld" />
The act jump-started the peace process. United States President ] invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at ] to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17, 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel subsequently withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace, with last Israeli troops exiting on April 26, 1982.<ref>Shipler, David: "". ''The New York Times'', April 25, 1982: A1.</ref> There is still no formal peace agreement between Israel and Syria to this day.


In May 1977, Gen. Starry (soon to succeed DePuy as TRADOC commander) returned to Israel and toured Yom Kippur War sites on the Golan Heights, guided by ] and ].<ref name="Bronfeld" /> Starry used his observations to address problems left unaddressed by the Active Defense doctrine, such as how best to fight follow-on echelons after the first battle. TRADOC's 1982 revision of FM 100–5 replaced Active Defense with an offense-oriented operational doctrine known as ], which formed the basis of the American plan for ] in 1991.<ref name="Bronfeld" /><ref name="Romjue" />
Many in the ] were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel. Sadat, in particular, became deeply unpopular both in the Arab world and in his own country. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League until 1989. Until then, Egypt had been "at the helm of the Arab world".<ref>Karsh, p. 86.</ref> Egypt's tensions with its Arab neighbors culminated in 1977 in the short-lived ].


==Casualties==
Sadat ] two years later on October 6, 1981, while attending a military parade marking the eighth anniversary of the start of the war, by Islamist army members who were outraged at his negotiations with Israel.
{{See also|Israeli casualties of war}}
]


Israel suffered between 2,521<ref name="autogenerated450">Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', p. 450.</ref>{{sfnp|Schiff|1974|p=328}}<ref name="autogenerated87">Herzog, ''Encyclopaedia Judaica'', Keter Publishing House, 1974, p. 87.</ref> and 2,800 killed in action.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}} An additional 7,250{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=497}} to 8,800{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}} soldiers were wounded. Some 293 Israelis were captured.<ref name="autogenerated2004">{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2004/1/Background%20on%20Israeli%20POWs%20and%20MIAs |title=Ministry of Foreign Affairs |publisher=Mfa.gov.il |access-date=22 October 2011}}</ref> Approximately 400 Israeli tanks were destroyed. Another 600 were disabled but returned to service after repairs.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=496}} A major Israeli advantage, noted by many observers, was their ability to quickly return damaged tanks to combat.<ref name="Gal">{{cite book |last1=Gal |first1=Reuven |title=A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier |date=1986 |publisher=Greenwood Press |location=New York |isbn=978-0-313-24315-8 |page=161 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=y_s6_k8ngccC&pg=PA161}}</ref>
===Commemorations===
]
October 6 is a ] in Egypt called ]. It is a national holiday in Syria as well, where it is called "Tishreen Liberation Day".<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151016053924/http://www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x_121370.pdf |date=October 16, 2015}}, U.S. Commercial Service, United States of America Department of Commerce, retrieved May 21, 2010.</ref> Marking the 35th anniversary in 2008, ] said that the conflict "breathed new life" into Egypt. He said Egypt and Syria's initial victories in the conflict eased Arab bitterness over Israel's victory in the 1967 Six-Day War and ultimately put the two nations on a path of peaceful coexistence.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/10/06/Mubarak-reflects-on-1973-Yom-Kippur-War/UPI-59221223312625/|title=Mubarak reflects on 1973 Yom Kippur War|date=October 6, 2008 |agency=UPI|access-date=April 20, 2010}}</ref>


The Israeli Air Force lost 102 airplanes: 32 F-4s, 53 A-4s, 11 Mirages and 6 Super Mysteres. Two helicopters, a Bell 205 and a CH-53, were lost.<ref name="White House Military Briefing">{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-56.pdf |title=White House Military Briefing |access-date=22 October 2011}}</ref> According to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, nearly half of these were shot down during the first three days of the war.<ref name="Herzog, 260">Herzog, p. 260.</ref>{{fcn|date=December 2024}} IAF losses per combat sortie were less than in the Six-Day War of 1967.<ref>John Pimlott, Michael Orr, ''The Middle East Conflicts: From 1945 to the Present'', London: Orbis Publishing (1983), p. 99.</ref>
In Egypt, many places were named after the date of October 6 and ] 10th, which is the equivalent day in the ]. Examples of these commemorations are ] in Cairo and the cities of ] and ].


Arab casualties were known to be much higher than Israel's. Precise figures are difficult to ascertain as Egypt and Syria never disclosed official figures. The lowest casualty estimate is 8,000 (5,000 Egyptian and 3,000 Syrian) killed and 18,000 wounded.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}} The highest estimate is 18,500 (15,000 Egyptian and 3,500 Syrian) killed.<ref name="autogenerated87" /> Most estimates lie somewhere in between the two, with the Insight Team of London's '']'' putting combined Egyptian and Syrian losses at 16,000 killed.<ref name="autogenerated450"/> Another source cites a figure of some 15,000 dead and 35,000 wounded.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=496–497}} U.S. estimates placed Egyptian casualties at 13,000.<ref>O'Ballance, p. 129</ref> Iraq lost 278 killed and 898 wounded, while Jordan suffered 23 killed and 77 wounded.<ref name="Dunstan, p. 200"/> Morocco lost 170 killed.<ref name="Yabiladi">{{cite web |last1=Babas |first1=Latifa |title=6th of October 1973: When Morocco Participated in the Yom Kippur War |url=https://en.yabiladi.com/articles/details/58148/october-1973-when-morocco-participated.html |website=Yabiladi |access-date=12 January 2024}}</ref> Some 8,372 Egyptians, 392 Syrians, 13 Iraqis and 6 Moroccans were taken prisoner.<ref name="autogenerated2004" /><ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071031052757/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908222,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=31 October 2007 |title=Middle East: Sandstorm at Kilometer 101 |magazine=Time |date=3 December 1973 |access-date=21 May 2010}}</ref>
In addition, the ] was built in 1989 in the Heliopolis district of Cairo. The center of the museum is occupied by a rotunda housing a ] of the struggle between Egyptian and Israeli armed forces. The panorama, the creation of which was outsourced to a group of North Korean artists and architects, is equipped with engines to rotate it 360° during a 30-minutes presentation accompanied by commentary in various languages.<ref>{{cite web|title=Egypt State Information Service |url=http://www.sis.gov.eg/VR/october/english/5.htm |access-date=June 19, 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090522012146/http://www.sis.gov.eg/VR/october/english/5.htm |archive-date=May 22, 2009}}</ref> A similar museum, which was also built with North Korean assistance—the October War Panorama—operates in Damascus.<ref>{{cite web|title=Lonely Planet|url=http://www.lonelyplanet.com/syria/damascus/sights/museum/tishreen-october-war|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110821093251/http://www.lonelyplanet.com/syria/damascus/sights/museum/tishreen-october-war|archive-date=August 21, 2011}}</ref>


Arab tank losses amounted to 2,250{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=496–497}}<ref>, Martin van Creveld, p. 47 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140513183257/http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/courses/ise817/papers/creveld_military_lessons.pdf |date=13 May 2014}}</ref> though Gawrych cites a figure of 2,300.{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=244}} 400 of these fell into Israeli hands in good working order and were incorporated into Israeli service.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|pp=496–497}} Between 341{{sfnp|Gawrych|2000|p=243}} and 514<ref name="Herzog, 260" /> Arab aircraft were shot down. According to Herzog, 334 of these aircraft were shot down by the IAF in air-to-air combat for the loss of only five Israeli planes.<ref name="Herzog, 260" /> The ''Sunday Times'' Insight Team notes Arab aircraft losses of 450.<ref name="autogenerated450"/> Nineteen Arab naval vessels, including 10 missile boats, were sunk for no Israeli losses.{{sfnp|Herzog|1975|p=269}}
Another Yom Kippur War exhibit can be found at ] at ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.yadlashiryon.com/show_item.asp?levelId=64950&itemId=2030 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110618204213/http://www.yadlashiryon.com/show_item.asp?levelId=64950&itemId=2030 |url-status=dead |archive-date=June 18, 2011 |title=Yad Lashiryon, Armored Corps Museum |publisher=Yadlashiryon.com |access-date=May 31, 2012}}</ref>

==Atrocities==

===Syrian atrocities===
Syria ignored the ] and many Israeli prisoners of war were tortured or killed.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 279, 429.</ref> Advancing Israeli forces, re-capturing land taken by the Syrians early in the war, came across the bodies of 28 Israeli soldiers who had been blindfolded with their hands bound and summarily executed.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 429, 449.</ref> In a December 1973 address to the National Assembly, Syrian Defense Minister ] stated that he had awarded one soldier the Medal of the Republic for killing 28 Israeli prisoners with an axe, decapitating three of them and eating the flesh of one of his victims.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/23/opinion/l-on-arab-treatment-of-israeli-prisoners-019506.html|title=On Arab Treatment of Israeli Prisoners|work=The New York Times|date=23 June 1984|access-date=27 July 2021}}</ref><ref>Official Gazette of Syria (11 July 1974).</ref>

The Syrians employed brutal interrogation techniques utilizing electric shocks to the genitals. A number of Israeli soldiers taken prisoner on Mount Hermon were executed. Near the village of Hushniye, the Syrians captured 11 administrative personnel from the Golan Heights Force, all of whom were later found dead, blindfolded, and with their hands tied behind their backs. Within Hushniye, seven Israeli prisoners were found dead, and another three were executed at Tel Zohar. Syrian prisoners who fell into Israeli captivity confirmed that their comrades killed IDF prisoners.{{sfnp|Schiff|2013|p=90}}

A soldier from the Moroccan contingent fighting with Syrian forces was found to be carrying a sack filled with the body parts of Israeli soldiers which he intended to take home as souvenirs. The bodies of Israeli prisoners who were killed were stripped of their uniforms and found clad only in their underpants, and Syrian soldiers removed their ]s to make identification of the bodies more difficult.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_eAjAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA18 |title=Treatment of Israeli POW's in Syria and Their Status Under the Geneva Conventions: Hearing, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session. 26 February 1974 |year=1974}}</ref>

Some Israeli POWs reported having their fingernails ripped out while others were described as being turned into human ashtrays as their Syrian guards burned them with lit cigarettes.<ref name=arnold> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120523201613/http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.34.html |date=23 May 2012}}, Michael S. Arnold, ''The Jerusalem Post'', 17 September 1999.</ref> A report submitted by the chief medical officer of the Israeli army notes that, "the vast majority of (Israeli) prisoners were exposed during their imprisonment to severe physical and mental torture. The usual methods of torture were beatings aimed at various parts of the body, electric shocks, wounds deliberately inflicted on the ears, burns on the legs, suspension in painful positions and other methods."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1974-1977/5+Statement+in+the+Knesset+on+the+treatment+of+Isr.htm?DisplayMode=print |title=Statement in the Knesset on the treatment of Israeli prisoners of war in Syria by Defence Minister Peres and Knesset Resolution – 12 June 1974 |publisher=Mfa.gov.il |access-date=22 October 2011}}</ref>

Following the conclusion of hostilities, Syria would not release the names of prisoners it was holding to the ] and in fact, did not even acknowledge holding any prisoners despite the fact they were publicly exhibited by the Syrians for television crews.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', p. 429.</ref> The Syrians, having been thoroughly defeated by Israel, were attempting to use their captives as their sole bargaining chip in the post-war negotiations.<ref>Insight Team of the London ''Sunday Times'', pp. 449–450.</ref> One of the most famous Israeli POWs was ], an Israeli pilot who bailed out over Syria and was taken prisoner.<ref>Sarna, Igal (2000), ''The Man Who Fell into a Puddle: Israeli Lives'', Vintage Books/Random House, pp. 144–148.</ref> Lanir died under Syrian interrogation.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=115}}<ref name="Sarna p. 148">Sarna, p. 148.</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Yemini |first=Galya |url=http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/noam-lanir-plans-to-float-empire-online-at-1b-value-1.159508 |title=Noam Lanir plans to float Empire Online at $1b value |work=Haaretz |location=Israel |date=2 April 2008 |access-date=22 October 2011}}</ref> When his body was returned in 1974, it exhibited signs of torture.<ref name="Sarna p. 148" />

===Egyptian atrocities===
Israeli historian Aryeh Yitzhaki estimated that the Egyptians killed about 200 Israeli soldiers who had surrendered. Yitzhaki based his claim on army documents. In addition, dozens of Israeli prisoners were beaten and otherwise mistreated in Egyptian captivity.<ref name="chron">{{cite news|url=http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1995_1293259/israeli-veterans-offer-accounts-of-egyptian-atroci.html |title=Israeli veterans offer accounts of Egyptian atrocities in '73 war |work=Houston Chronicle |date=26 August 1995 |access-date=31 May 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120709103156/http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1995_1293259/israeli-veterans-offer-accounts-of-egyptian-atroci.html |archive-date=9 July 2012}}</ref>

Individual Israeli soldiers gave testimony of witnessing comrades killed after surrendering to the Egyptians, or seeing the bodies of Israeli soldiers found blindfolded with their hands tied behind their backs. Avi Yaffe, a radioman serving on the Bar-Lev Line, reported hearing calls from other soldiers that the Egyptians were killing anyone who tried to surrender, and also obtained recordings of soldiers who were saved from Egyptian firing squads.<ref name="auto5">{{cite news |url=https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3378194,00.html |title=Israeli documentary: Egyptians killed Israeli POWs in 1973 war |newspaper=Ynetnews |date=19 March 2007}}</ref>

Issachar Ben-Gavriel, an Israeli soldier who was captured at the Suez Canal, claimed that out of his group of 19 soldiers who surrendered, 11 were shot dead. Another soldier claimed that a soldier in his unit was captured alive but beaten to death during interrogation.<ref name="auto5"/> Photographic evidence of such executions exists, though some of it has never been made public. Photos were also found of Israeli prisoners who were photographed alive in Egyptian captivity, but were returned to Israel dead.<ref name="chron" /><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.isracast.com/article.aspx?id=451 |title=Pow Expose |publisher=IsraCast |date=9 March 2007 |access-date=31 May 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120624064651/http://www.isracast.com/article.aspx?id=451 |archive-date=24 June 2012}}</ref>

In 2013, the Israeli government declassified documents detailing Egyptian atrocities against prisoners of war, recording the deaths of at least 86 Israeli POWs at the hands of Egyptian forces. In an interview Israeli major general ] recalled instances of these accounts, including that of an injured prisoner who was murdered when an Egyptian doctor "disconnected him from the oxygen and kept him from getting an ]." He noted that statistics on the number of people killed was still unclear.<ref>{{cite news|title=At Least 86 Israeli POWs Were Killed in 1973 War, New Documents Reveal|language=en|work=Haaretz|url=https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-86-israeli-pows-killed-in-1973-war-1.5339130|access-date=2022-01-22 |df=dmy-all}}</ref>


==See also== ==See also==
* ]
* ]
* ] * ]
* ] – Seven Soviet Union ''Leninsky Komsomol''–class of cargo ships carried military cargo to Syria and Egypt in October and November 1973:<ref>Author: Розин Александр. Title: Советский флот в войнах и конфликтах "холодной войны". Это – персональная страница Александра Розина >> Война «Судного дня» 1973 г. Противостояние флотов СССР и США на море. >> Chapter 9: Корабли эскадры конвоируют транспорты.</ref>
** {{SS|Fizik Kurchatov}} visited Alexandria twice and Latakia once
** {{SS|Bratstvo|1963}} arrived in Latakia on 20 October 1973
* ] * ]
* ]
* ] – Seven Soviet Union Leninsky Komsomol class of cargo ships carried out military cargo in Syria and Egypt in October and November 1973:<ref>Author: Розин Александр. Title: Советский флот в войнах и конфликтах "холодной войны". Это – персональная страница Александра Розина >> Война «Судного дня» 1973 г. Противостояние флотов СССР и США на море. >> Chapter 9: Корабли эскадры конвоируют транспорты.</ref>
* ]
** ] visited Alexandria twice and Latakia once
** ] arrived in Latakia on October 20, 1973
* ] – One Soviet Union ] (built in Gdansk) that participated in open hostilities against Israelites and downed at least one Israeli ]
* ] * ]
* ] – One Soviet ] (built in Gdansk) that participated in open hostilities against Israel and downed at least one Israeli ]


==References== ==References==

===Notes=== ===Notes===
{{notelist}}

===Citations===
{{reflist|30em|refs= {{reflist|30em|refs=


Line 819: Line 803:
<ref name=Chernyaev1973p69>{{cite web|author1=Anatoly Chernyaev|title=Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1973|url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB430/Chernyaev%201973%20final%20PDF%20version.pdf|website=National Security Archive|publisher=National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 430|page=69}}</ref> <ref name=Chernyaev1973p69>{{cite web|author1=Anatoly Chernyaev|title=Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1973|url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB430/Chernyaev%201973%20final%20PDF%20version.pdf|website=National Security Archive|publisher=National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 430|page=69}}</ref>


<ref name="Kissinger2011p254">{{cite book|author=Henry Kissinger|title=Years of Upheaval: The Second Volume of His Classic Memoirs|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tsGNRCLfaBQC&pg=PT254|date=2011|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-0-85720-718-0|page=254|quote="It was in France on May 20, 1973. ... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this 'diluted sovereignty,' but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall. ... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him."}}</ref> <ref name="Kissinger2011p254">{{cite book|author=Henry Kissinger|title=Years of Upheaval: The Second Volume of His Classic Memoirs|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tsGNRCLfaBQC&pg=PT254|date=2011|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-0-85720-718-0|page=254|quote="It was in France on 20 May 1973. ... We had a formal meeting on the upper floor and, after lunch, I walked with Ismail in the garden in the spring sunshine. In these beautiful ... Ismail remained cool to my scheme of separating sovereignty and security. He called this 'diluted sovereignty,' but said he would check with Sadat and let me know. I never heard from him. The American official who had found the meeting place reported to me that after I left, Ismail, visibly dispirited and glum, had sat alone in the garden for a long time contemplating the waterfall. ... For Ismail knew that Sadat was determined on war. Only an American guarantee that we would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded him."}}</ref>

<ref name="SullivanJones2008p9">{{cite book|author1=Denis Joseph Sullivan|author2=Kimberly Jones|title=Global Security Watch – Egypt: A Reference Handbook|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fGWiXfGrBWAC&pg=PA9|year=2008|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-0-275-99482-2|pages=9–|quote=" Sadat's goals were the` return of Sinai and the reopening of the Suez Canal ... to reengage the U.S in middle east diplomacy"}}</ref>

<ref name="Morris2011p396">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1998|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jGtVsBne7PgC|date=2011|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group| isbn=978-0-307-78805-4| page=396|quote="Sadat and Assad 'sought to regain the territories lost in 1967. Neither aimed to destroy Israel, though during the opening hours of the conflict, its leaders could not be sure of it.'"}}</ref>

<ref name="Quandt2005p109">{{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC |series=109–12 |year=2005 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-520-24631-7 |page=109 |quote=between October 9 and October 12 ... the American response ... call for cease-fire ... in place ... arms for Israel began to flow in modest quantities}}</ref>
<ref name="Quandt2005p112">{{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC |series=109–12 |year=2005 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|page=112|quote=Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full scale ... resupply effort ... short of supplies, the Israeli government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on October 12 ... but ... Sadat refused}}</ref>
<ref name="Quandt2005p114">{{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC |series=114 |year=2005 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|page=112|quote=Soviet arms must not be allowed to dictate the outcome of the fighting. ... Israeli success on the battlefield had become an important factor in persuading the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end. ... With an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until ... realities on the battlefield led to a change of Egyptian and Soviet calculations}}</ref>
<ref name="Quandt2005p114b">{{cite book|author=William B. Quandt|title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC|series=114|year=2005|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-24631-7|page=112|quote=The U.S. influence with king Hussein had helped keep Jordan out of the war.}}</ref>
<ref name="Quandt2005p116">{{cite book |author=William B. Quandt |title=Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6Jm0YNKvQsAC |series=116 |year=2005 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-24631-7 |page=112 |quote=it was of prime importance that the fighting should be ended ... when all parties could still emerge from the conflict with their vital interests and self esteem intact ... the airlift ... the Soviets must see that the united states could deliver more than they could; p. 123 the U.S. would not permit the destruction of the 3rd army corps.}}</ref>
}} }}


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* {{cite book|publisher=Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College|last=Gawrych|first=Dr. George W.|title=The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory|url=https://archive.org/details/1973arabisraeliw00geor|year=1996}}
{{Unbulleted list|style=text-indent: 0em; margin-left: 2em;|{{cite web|url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_intro.pdf|title=Intro|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070610033855/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_intro.pdf|archive-date=10 June 2007|url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web|url=http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt1.pdf|title=Part I|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110507130100/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt1.pdf|archive-date=7 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web|url=http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt2.pdf|title=Part II|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110507130122/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt2.pdf|archive-date=7 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web|url=http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt3.pdf|title=Part III|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110507130200/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt3.pdf|archive-date=7 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web |url=http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt4.pdf|title=Part IV|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110507130226/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt4.pdf|archive-date=7 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web |url=http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt5.pdf|title=Part V|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110507130253/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt5.pdf|archive-date=7 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web |url=http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt6.pdf|title=Part VI |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110507130315/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt6.pdf|archive-date=7 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web |url=http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt7.pdf|title=Part VII|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110507130346/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_pt7.pdf|archive-date=7 May 2011 |url-status=dead}}
|{{cite web |url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_notes.pdf |title=Notes|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090319143113/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/gawrych/gawrych_notes.pdf|archive-date=19 March 2009|url-status=dead |access-date=28 May 2015}}}}
* {{cite book |last1=Haber |first1=Eitan |last2=Schiff |first2=Ze'ev |title=Yom Kippur War Lexicon |location=Or-Yehuda, Israel |publisher=Zmora-Bitan-Dvir |year=2003 |language=he |isbn=978-965-517-124-2}} * {{cite book |last1=Haber |first1=Eitan |last2=Schiff |first2=Ze'ev |title=Yom Kippur War Lexicon |location=Or-Yehuda, Israel |publisher=Zmora-Bitan-Dvir |year=2003 |language=he |isbn=978-965-517-124-2}}
* {{cite book |edition=first |publisher=Dār al-Shurūq<!--|isbn=977-09-0866-5--> |last=Hammad |first=Gamal |title=al-Maʻārik al-ḥarbīyah ʻalá al-jabhah al-Miṣrīyah: (Ḥarb Uktūbar 1973, al-ʻĀshir min Ramaḍān) |trans-title=Military Battles on the Egyptian Front |year=2002 |language=ar}} * {{cite book |last=Hammad |first=Gamal |edition=first |publisher=Dār al-Shurūq |isbn=977-09-0866-5 |title=al-Maʻārik al-ḥarbīyah ʻalá al-jabhah al-Miṣrīyah: (Ḥarb Uktūbar 1973, al-ʻĀshir min Ramaḍān) |trans-title=Military Battles on the Egyptian Front |year=2002 |language=ar}}
* {{cite book |title=The Road to Ramadan |first=Mohamed |last=Heikal |location=London |publisher=Collins |year=1975 |isbn=0-8129-0567-9 |url=https://archive.org/details/roadtoramadan001056}} * {{cite book |title=The Road to Ramadan |first=Mohamed |last=Heikal |location=London |publisher=Collins |year=1975 |isbn=978-0-8129-0567-0 |url=https://archive.org/details/roadtoramadan001056}}
* {{cite book |title=The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War |first=Chaim |last=Herzog |location=London |publisher=Greenhill Books |orig-year=1975 |year=2003 |isbn=978-1-85367-569-0}} * {{cite book |last=Herzog |first=Chaim |title=The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War |url=https://archive.org/details/warofatonementoc00herz |url-access=registration |publisher=Little, Brown and Company |year=1975|isbn=978-0-316-35900-9}} Also 2003 edition, {{ISBN|978-1-85367-569-0}}
* {{cite book |publisher=Random House |isbn=978-0-394-50379-0 |last=Herzog |first=Chaim |title=the Arab-Israeli Wars |year=1982}} * {{cite book |publisher=Random House |isbn=978-0-394-50379-0 |last=Herzog |first=Chaim |title=the Arab-Israeli Wars |year=1982}}
* {{cite book |publisher=Little, Brown |location=Boston |isbn=0-316-35901-7 |last=Herzog |first=Chaim |title=Heroes of Israel |year=1989 |url=https://archive.org/details/heroesofisraelpr00herz }} * {{cite book |publisher=Little, Brown |location=Boston |isbn=978-0-316-35901-6 |last=Herzog |first=Chaim |title=Heroes of Israel |year=1989 |url=https://archive.org/details/heroesofisraelpr00herz}}
* {{cite book |author=Insight Team of the London Sunday Times |title=The Yom Kippur War |publisher=Doubleday |location=Garden City, NJ|year=1974 |isbn=978-0-385-06738-6 |url=https://archive.org/details/yomkippurwar00gard}} * {{cite book |author=Insight Team of the London Sunday Times |title=The Yom Kippur War |publisher=Doubleday |location=Garden City, NJ|year=1974 |isbn=978-0-385-06738-6 |url=https://archive.org/details/yomkippurwar00gard}}
* {{cite book |title=Man of Defiance: A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat |first=Raphael |last=Israeli |location=London |publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicolson |year=1985 |isbn=0-389-20579-6}} * {{cite book |title=Boats of Cherbourg |first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |publisher=Random House Value Publishing |date=1990 |isbn=978-0-517-03176-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uTNOAAAACAAJ}}
* {{cite book |title=Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War |first=Victor |last=Israelyan |location=University Park, PA |publisher=] |orig-year=1995 |year=2003 |isbn=0-271-01737-6}} * {{cite book |title=Man of Defiance: A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat |first=Raphael |last=Israeli |location=London |publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicolson |year=1985 |isbn=978-0-389-20579-1}}
* {{cite book |title=The Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988 |first=Efraim |last=Karsh |location=Oxford |publisher=Osprey Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=1-84176-371-3}} * {{cite book |title=Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War |first=Victor |last=Israelyan |location=University Park, PA |publisher=] |orig-year=1995 |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-271-01737-2}}
* {{cite book |title=The Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988 |first=Efraim |last=Karsh |location=Oxford |publisher=Osprey Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=978-1-84176-371-2}}
* {{cite book | last1=Johnson | first1=Dominic D. P | last2=Tierney | first2=Dominic | title=Failing to Win | publisher=Harvard University Press | date=2009-06-30 | isbn=978-0-674-03917-9}}
* {{cite book |last1=Kaufman |first1=Uri |title=Eighteen Days in October. The Yom Kippur War and How It Created the Modern Middle East |date=August 2023 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |isbn=9781250281883}}
* {{cite book |title=ha-Hafta'ah ha-basisit: modi'in ba-mashber |trans-title=Fundamental Surprise: Intelligence in Crisis |first=Zvi |last=Lanir |location=Tel-Aviv |publisher=Hakibbutz Hameuchad |orig-year=1983 |year=2002 |oclc=65842089 |language=he}} * {{cite book |title=ha-Hafta'ah ha-basisit: modi'in ba-mashber |trans-title=Fundamental Surprise: Intelligence in Crisis |first=Zvi |last=Lanir |location=Tel-Aviv |publisher=Hakibbutz Hameuchad |orig-year=1983 |year=2002 |oclc=65842089 |language=he}}
* Menshawy, Mustafa. "Turning 'defeat' into 'victory': the power of discourse on the 1973 war in Egypt." ''Middle Eastern Studies'' 52.6 (2016): 897–916. Historiography. * {{Cite journal |last=Menshawy |first=Mustafa |date=November 2016 |title=Turning 'defeat' into 'victory': the power of discourse on the 1973 war in Egypt |journal=Middle Eastern Studies |language=en |volume=52 |issue=6 |pages=897–916 |doi=10.1080/00263206.2016.1197831 |issn=0026-3206}}
* {{cite book |publisher=Vintage Books |location=New York |isbn=978-0-679-74475-7 |last=Morris |first=Benny |title=Righteous Victims |year=2001 |url=https://archive.org/details/righteousvictims00morr_0 }} * {{cite book |publisher=Vintage Books |location=New York |isbn=978-0-679-74475-7 |last=Morris |first=Benny |title=Righteous Victims |year=2001 |url=https://archive.org/details/righteousvictims00morr_0}}
** {{cite book |last1=Morris |first1=Benny |title=Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 |date=25 May 2011 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group |isbn=978-0-307-78805-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xC_uIe9G2FYC |language=en}}
* {{cite book |title=Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking |first=Moshe |last=Ma'Oz |location=Oxford |publisher=Clarendon Press |year=1995|isbn=0-19-828018-1}}
* {{cite book |title=Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking |first=Moshe |last=Ma'Oz |location=Oxford |publisher=Clarendon Press |year=1995|isbn=978-0-19-828018-7}}
* {{cite book |last=Neff |first=Donald |title=Warriors against Israel |publisher=Amana Books |location=Brattleboro, Vermont |year=1988 |isbn=978-0-915597-59-8}} * {{cite book |last=Neff |first=Donald |title=Warriors against Israel |publisher=Amana Books |location=Brattleboro, Vermont |year=1988 |isbn=978-0-915597-59-8}}
* {{cite book |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=1-84176-655-0 |last1=Nicolle |first1=David |last2=Cooper |first2=Tom |title=Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 units in combat |year= 2004}} * {{cite book |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=978-1-84176-655-3 |last1=Nicolle |first1=David |last2=Cooper |first2=Tom |title=Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 units in combat |year= 2004}}
* {{cite book |last=Edgar O'Ballance |title=No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War |edition=1979 |pages=28–370 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0214206702 |year=1979}} * {{cite book |last=O'Ballance |first=Edgar |title=No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yom Kippur War |edition=1979 |pages=28–370 |publisher=] |isbn=978-0-214-20670-2 |year=1979}}
* {{cite journal |last=Pape |first=Robert A |title=Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work |journal=International Security |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=90–136 |date=Fall 1997 |oclc=482431341 |doi=10.2307/2539368 |jstor=2539368}} * {{cite journal |last=Pape |first=Robert A |title=Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work |journal=International Security |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=90–136 |date=Fall 1997 |oclc=482431341 |doi=10.2307/2539368 |jstor=2539368}}
* {{cite book |last1=Pollack |first1=Kenneth Michael |title=Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 |date=2002 |publisher=University of Nebraska Press |isbn=978-0-8032-3733-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YUfy2BXY7S8C |language=en}}
* {{cite book |title=Peace Process: American diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli conflict since 1967 |first=William |last=Quandt |author-link=William B. Quandt |location=Washington, DC |publisher=] / ] |year=2005 |isbn=0-520-22374-8}}
* {{cite book |title=Peace Process: American diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli conflict since 1967 |first=William |last=Quandt |author-link=William B. Quandt |location=Washington, DC |publisher=] / ] |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-520-22374-5}}
* {{cite journal |last=Quandt |first=William B |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R1864.pdf |title=Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War |publisher=Rand Corp. R-1864-ISA |date=May 1976 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121002131554/http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R1864.pdf |archive-date=October 2, 2012}}
* {{cite web |last=Quandt |first=William B |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R1864.pdf |title=Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War |publisher=Rand Corp. R-1864-ISA |date=May 1976 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121002131554/http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006/R1864.pdf |archive-date=2 October 2012}}
* {{cite book |title=The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East |first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |location=New York |publisher=Schocken Books |orig-year=2004 |year=2005 |isbn=0-8052-4176-0}}
* {{cite book |last1=Rabinovich |first1=Abraham |title=The Boats of Cherbourg: The Navy That Stole Its Own Boats and Revolutionized Naval Warfare |date=1988 |publisher=Primary Publishing |isbn=978-1-78301-069-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rn2rnQAACAAJ |language=en}}
* {{cite book |title=The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East. Revised and Updated Edition|first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |location=New York |publisher=Schocken Books |year=2017 |isbn=978-0805211245}}
* {{cite book |title=In Search of Identity: An Autobiography |first=Muhammad Anwar |last=al Sadat |location=London |publisher=Collins |year=1978 |isbn=0-00-216344-6}} * {{cite book |title=The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East |first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |location=New York |publisher=Schocken Books |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-8052-4176-1}}
* {{cite book |title=The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East. Revised and Updated Edition|first=Abraham |last=Rabinovich |location=New York |publisher=Schocken Books |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-8052-1124-5}}
* {{cite book |edition=revised |publisher=American Mideast Research |isbn=0-9604562-2-8 |last=Shazly |first=Lieutenant General Saad el |title=The Crossing of the Suez, Revised Edition |year=2003}}
* {{cite book |author=Shlaim, Avi |title=The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World |publisher=W.W. Norton & Company |year=2001 |isbn=0-393-32112-6}} * {{cite book |title=In Search of Identity: An Autobiography |first=Muhammad Anwar |last=al Sadat |location=London |publisher=Collins |year=1978 |isbn=978-0-00-216344-6}}
* {{cite book |last1=Schiff |first1=Zeev |title=A history of the Israeli Army (1870-1974) |date=1974 |publisher=San Francisco : Straight Arrow Books ; New York : distributed by Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-0-87932-077-5 |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofisraeli0000schi/}}
* {{cite journal |last=Rodman |first=David |url=http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/7-3/7-3-6-DavidRodman.pdf |title=The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War |publisher=Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, VII:3. |date=2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150526160709/http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/7-3/7-3-6-DavidRodman.pdf |archive-date=May 26, 2015 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Schiff |first1=Zeev |title=October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973 |date=23 January 2013 |publisher=Transaction Publishers |isbn=978-1-4128-4984-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8N212UugtnEC |language=en}}
* Rodman, David. ''Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War: Diplomacy, Battle and Lessons'' (Sussex Academic Press, 2016).
* {{cite book |last1=Sharon |first1=Gilad |title=Sharon: The Life of a Leader |date=25 October 2011 |publisher=HarperCollins |isbn=978-0-06-212308-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RkgdEAAAQBAJ |language=en}}
* {{cite book |edition=revised |publisher=American Mideast Research |isbn=978-0-9604562-2-2 |last=Shazly |first=Lieutenant General Saad el |title=The Crossing of the Suez, Revised Edition |year=2003}}
* {{cite book |author=Shlaim, Avi |title=The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World |publisher=W.W. Norton & Company |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-393-32112-8}}
* {{cite web |last=Rodman |first=David |url=http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/7-3/7-3-6-DavidRodman.pdf |title=The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War |publisher=Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, VII:3. |date=2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150526160709/http://www.israelcfr.com/documents/7-3/7-3-6-DavidRodman.pdf |archive-date=26 May 2015}}
* {{Cite book |last=Rodman |first=David |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JV-VEAAAQBAJ |title=Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War: diplomacy, battle, and lessons |date=2017 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-84519-832-9 |location=Brighton ; Chicago}}


{{refend}} {{refend}}
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* WikiLeaks * WikiLeaks
* and . Israeli TV documentaries broadcast in October 2013, featuring original video footage filmed during the war, interviews with combatants during the war and decades later, etc. Posted on the official YouTube channel of the '']'' * and . Israeli TV documentaries broadcast in October 2013, featuring original video footage filmed during the war, interviews with combatants during the war and decades later, etc. Posted on the official YouTube channel of the '']''
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Latest revision as of 02:55, 3 January 2025

1973 war between Israel and a coalition of Arab states
This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. When this tag was added, its readable prose size was 22,000 words. Consider splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding subheadings. Please discuss this issue on the article's talk page. (September 2021)

Yom Kippur War
Part of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Cold War

Clockwise from top-left:
Date6–25 October 1973
(2 weeks and 5 days)
LocationGolan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, Suez Canal (both banks) and surrounding regions
Result See § Aftermath
Territorial
changes
  • Egyptian forces occupy the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, with the exception of the Israeli crossing point near the Deversoir Air Base
  • Israeli forces occupy 1,600 km (620 sq mi) of territory on the southwestern coast of the Suez Canal within 100 km (60 mi) of the Egyptian capital of Cairo, and encircle an Egyptian enclave on its eastern bank
  • Israeli forces occupy 500 km (193 sq mi) of the Syrian Bashan region on top of the Golan Heights, bringing them within 32 km (20 mi) of the Syrian capital of Damascus
Belligerents
 Israel
Expeditionary forces
 Saudi Arabia
 Algeria
 Jordan
Iraq
 Kuwait
 Tunisia
 Morocco
 Cuba
 North Korea
Commanders and leaders
Strength
  • 375,000–415,000 troops
  • 1,700 tanks
  • 3,000 armored carriers
  • 945 artillery units
  • 440 combat aircraft
Egypt
650,000–800,000 troops (200,000 crossed)
1,700 tanks (1,020 crossed)
2,400 armored carriers
1,120 artillery units
400 combat aircraft
140 helicopters
104 naval vessels
150 surface-to-air missile batteries (62 in the front line)
Syria
150,000 troops
1,200 tanks
800–900 armored carriers
600 artillery units
Expeditionary forces
120,000 troops
500–670 tanks
700 armored carriers
Saudi Arabia
23,000 troops (3,000 crossed)
Morocco
5,500 troops
30 tanks provided by Syria
Cuba
500–1,000 troops
Total
914,000–1,067,500 troops
3,430–3,600 tanks
3,900–4,000 armored carriers
1,720 artillery units
452 combat aircraft
140 helicopters
104 naval vessels
150 surface-to-air missile batteries
Casualties and losses
  • 2,521–2,800 dead
  • 7,250–8,800 wounded
  • 293 captured
  • 400 tanks destroyed, 663 damaged or captured
  • 407 armored vehicles destroyed or captured
  • 102–387 aircraft destroyed
Egypt
5,000–15,000 dead
8,372 captured
Syria
3,000–3,500 dead
392 captured
Morocco
6 dead
6 captured
Iraq
278 dead
898 wounded
13 captured
Cuba
180 dead
250 wounded
Jordan
23 dead
77 wounded
Total
8,000–18,500 dead
18,000–35,000 wounded
8,783 captured
2,250–2,300 tanks destroyed
341–514 aircraft destroyed
19 naval vessels sunk
Yom Kippur War
Syrian front

Egyptian front

International front

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War, the October War, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, or the Fourth Arab–Israeli War, was fought from 6 to 25 October 1973 between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. Most of the fighting occurred in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Some combat also took place in Egypt and northern Israel. Egypt aimed to secure a foothold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and use it to negotiate the return of the Sinai Peninsula.

The war started on 6 October 1973, when the Arab coalition launched a surprise attack on Israel during the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, which coincided with the 10th day of Ramadan. The United States and Soviet Union engaged in massive resupply efforts for their allies (Israel and the Arab states, respectively), which heightened tensions between the two superpowers.

Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed their respective ceasefire lines with Israel, advancing into the Sinai and Golan Heights. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal in Operation Badr and advanced into the Sinai, while Syrian forces gained territory in the Golan Heights. After three days, Israel halted the Egyptian advance and pushed most of the Syrians back to the Purple line. Israel then launched a counteroffensive into Syria, shelling the outskirts of Damascus.

Egyptian forces attempted to push further into Sinai but were repulsed, and Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal, advancing toward Ismailia City on 18 October. Israeli forces were then defeated in the Battle of Ismailia and accepted a UN-brokered ceasefire. On 22 October, the ceasefire broke down. Initially both sides accused each other of violations, however declassified documents revealed the United States had given Israel permission to breach the ceasefire and encircle the Egyptian Third Army and Suez City. Israeli forces then advanced on Suez City, but were successfully repulsed in the ensuing battle amid stiff Egyptian resistance. A second ceasefire was imposed on 25 October, officially ending the war.

The Yom Kippur War had significant consequences. The Arab world, humiliated by the 1967 defeat, felt psychologically vindicated by its early and late successes in 1973. Meanwhile, Israel, despite battlefield achievements, recognized that future military dominance was uncertain. These shifts contributed to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, leading to the 1978 Camp David Accords, when Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, and the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, the first time an Arab country recognized Israel. Egypt drifted away from the Soviet Union, eventually leaving the Eastern Bloc.

Background

See also: Closure of the Suez Canal (1967–1975) and Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula

Arab–Israeli conflict

The war was part of the Arab–Israeli conflict, an ongoing dispute that has included many battles and wars since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948. During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel had captured Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, roughly half of Syria's Golan Heights, and the territories of the West Bank which had been held by Jordan since 1948.

On 19 June 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories. This decision was not made public at the time, nor was it conveyed to any Arab state. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has said that it had been conveyed, but there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim; no formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel. The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply. Eban rejected the prospect of a mediated peace, insisting of the need for direct negotiations with the Arab governments.

The Arab position, as it emerged in September 1967 at the Khartoum Arab Summit, was to reject any peaceful settlement with the State of Israel. The eight participating states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan—passed a resolution that would later become known as the "three nos": there would be no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. Prior to that, King Hussein of Jordan had stated that he could not rule out a possibility of a "real, permanent peace" between Israel and the Arab states.

Armed hostilities continued on a limited scale after the Six-Day War and escalated into the War of Attrition, an attempt to wear down the Israeli position through long-term pressure. In December 1970, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had signaled in an interview with The New York Times that, in return for a total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was ready "to recognize the rights of Israel as an independent state as defined by the Security Council of the United Nations." On 4 February 1971, Sadat gave a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly outlining a proposal under which Israel would withdraw from the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula along with other occupied Arab territories.

Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring coincidentally proposed a similar initiative four days later, on 8 February 1971. Egypt responded by accepting much of Jarring's proposals, though differing on several issues, regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, and expressed its willingness to reach an accord if it also implemented the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This was the first time an Arab government had gone public declaring its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir reacted to the overture by forming a committee to examine the proposal and vet possible concessions. When the committee unanimously concluded that Israel's interests would be served by full withdrawal to the internationally recognized lines dividing Israel from Egypt and Syria, returning the Gaza Strip and, in a majority view, returning most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Meir was angered and shelved the document.

The United States was infuriated by the cool Israeli response to Egypt's proposal, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph Sisco informed Israeli ambassador Yitzhak Rabin that "Israel would be regarded responsible for rejecting the best opportunity to reach peace since the establishment of the state." Israel responded to Jarring's plan on 26 February by outlining its readiness to make some form of withdrawal, while declaring it had no intention of returning to the pre-5 June 1967 lines. Explicating the response, Eban told the Knesset that the pre-5 June 1967 lines "cannot assure Israel against aggression". Jarring was disappointed and blamed Israel for refusing to accept a complete pullout from the Sinai Peninsula.

The U.S. considered Israel an ally in the Cold War and had been supplying the Israeli military since the 1960s. U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed that the regional balance of power hinged on maintaining Israel's military dominance over Arab countries and that an Arab victory in the region would strengthen Soviet influence. Britain's position, on the other hand, was that war between the Arabs and Israelis could only be prevented by the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and a return to the pre-1967 boundaries.

Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office ... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history. ... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option." Almost a full year before the war, in a meeting on 24 October 1972, with his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support.

In February 1973, Sadat made a final peace overture that would have included Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula that he relayed to Kissinger via his adviser Mohammad Hafez Ismail, which Kissinger made known to Meir. Meir rejected the peace proposal despite knowing that the only plausible alternative was going to war with Egypt.

Lead up to the war

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat

Four months before the war broke out, Kissinger made an offer to Ismail, Sadat's emissary. Kissinger proposed returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control and an Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai, except for some strategic points. Ismail said he would return with Sadat's reply, but he never did. Sadat was already determined to go to war. Only an American guarantee that the United States would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded Sadat.

Sadat declared that Egypt was prepared to "sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover its lost territory. From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-21 jet fighters, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-7 antiaircraft missiles, T-55 and T-62 tanks, RPG-7 antitank weapons, and the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics, based on Soviet battlefield doctrines. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.

The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez Canal would incur massive losses. Both the Soviets and Americans were at that time pursuing détente and had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting with American President Richard Nixon, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans.

Between May and August 1973, the Egyptian Army conducted military exercises near the border, and Ashraf Marwan inaccurately warned that Egypt and Syria would launch a surprise attack in the middle of May. The Israeli Army mobilized with their Blue-White Alert, in response to both the warnings and exercises, at considerable cost. These exercises led some Israelis to dismiss the actual war preparations—and Marwan's warning right before the attack was launched—as another exercise.

In the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptian Army staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as mere training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops towards the border were also detected, as were the cancellation of leaves and a call-up of reserves in the Syrian army. These activities were considered puzzling but not a threat because Israeli intelligence suggested they would not attack without Egypt, and Egypt would not attack until the weaponry they wanted arrived. Despite this belief, Israel sent reinforcements to the Golan Heights. These forces were to prove critical during the early days of the war.

On 27 to 30 September, two batches of reservists were called up by the Egyptian Army to participate in these exercises. Two days before the outbreak of the war, on 4 October, the Egyptian command publicly announced the demobilization of part of the reservists called up during 27 September to lull Israeli suspicions. Around 20,000 troops were demobilized, and subsequently some of these men were given leave to perform the Umrah (pilgrimage) to Mecca.

According to Egyptian General El-Gamasy, "On the initiative of the operations staff, we reviewed the situation on the ground and developed a framework for the planned offensive operation. We studied the technical characteristics of the Suez Canal, the ebb and the flow of the tides, the speed of the currents and their direction, hours of darkness and of moonlight, weather conditions, and related conditions in the Mediterranean and Red sea." He explained further by saying: "Saturday 6 October 1973 (10 Ramadan 1393) was the day chosen for the September–October option. Conditions for a crossing were good, it was a fast day in Israel, and the moon on that day, 10 Ramadan, shone from sunset until midnight." The war coincided that year with the Muslim month of Ramadan, when many Muslim soldiers fast. On the other hand, the fact that the attack was launched on Yom Kippur may have helped Israel to more easily marshal reserves from their homes and synagogues because roads and communication lines were largely open, easing the mobilization and transportation of the military.

Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."

On the night of 25 September, Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they would cooperate.'" This warning was ignored, and Israeli intelligence indicated that Hussein had not said anything that was not already known. Throughout September, Israel received eleven warnings of war from well-placed sources. However, Mossad Director-General Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option, even after Hussein's warning. Zamir would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable ."

Several days before the war began, Lieutenant Colonel Aviezer Ya'ari, head of the Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq desk of Israeli military intelligence, suggested that the Egyptian and Syrian military exercises which were underway might be preparations for a combined attack. He was reprimanded and later told the Agranat Commission that he subsequently became more cautious in his estimates.

On the day before the war, General Ariel Sharon was shown aerial photographs and other intelligence by Yehoshua Saguy, his divisional intelligence officer. Sharon noticed that the concentration of Egyptian forces along the canal was far beyond anything observed during the training exercises, and that the Egyptians had amassed all of their crossing equipment along the canal. He then called General Shmuel Gonen, who had replaced him as head of Southern Command, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent.

Zamir's concern grew on 4–5 October, as additional signs of an impending attack were detected. Soviet advisers and their families left Egypt and Syria, transport aircraft thought to be laden with military equipment landed in Cairo and Damascus, and aerial photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were at an unprecedented high. According to declassified documents from the Agranat Commission, Brigadier General Yisrael Lior (Meir's military secretary/attaché) claimed that Mossad knew from Marwan that an attack was going to occur under the guise of a military drill a week before it occurred, but the process of passing along the information to the prime minister's office failed.

On the night of 5–6 October, Marwan incorrectly informed Zamir that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack would take place at sunset. It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli High Command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli reserves.

Israeli preparation

Upon learning of the impending attack, Prime Minister of Israel Golda Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike.

Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and Chief of General Staff David Elazar met at 8:05 am on the morning of Yom Kippur, six hours before the war began. Elazar proposed a mobilization of the entire air force and four armored divisions, or 100,000 to 120,000 troops, while Dayan favored a mobilization of the air force and two armored divisions, or around 70,000 troops. Meir chose Elazar's proposal. Elazar argued in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00 pm, and Syrian ground forces at 5:00 pm:

When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it would not be blamed for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody,' she said.

Prior to the war, Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Meir that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war, and on 6 October 1973, Kissinger sent a further dispatch discouraging a preemptive strike. Israel was totally dependent on the United States for military resupply and sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. At 10:15 am, Meir met with American ambassador Kenneth Keating to inform him that Israel did not intend to preemptively start a war and asked that American efforts be directed at preventing war.

Kissinger urged the Soviets to use their influence to prevent war, contacted Egypt with Israel's message of non-preemption, and sent messages to other Arab governments to enlist their help on the side of moderation. These late efforts were futile. According to Kissinger, had Israel struck first it would not have received "so much as a nail".

Sinai front

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Wreckage from an Egyptian Sukhoi Su-7 shot down over the Sinai on 6 October, Israeli Air Force Museum

The Egyptians had prepared for an assault across the canal and deployed five divisions totaling 100,000 soldiers, 1,350 tanks and 2,000 guns and heavy mortars for the onslaught. Facing them were 450 soldiers of the Jerusalem Brigade, spread out in 16 forts along the length of the canal. There were 290 Israeli tanks in all of Sinai, divided into three armored brigades, only one of which was deployed near the canal when hostilities commenced.

Large bridgeheads were established on the east bank on 6 October. Israeli armoured forces launched counterattacks from 6 to 8 October, but they were often piecemeal and inadequately supported and were beaten back principally by Egyptians using portable anti-tank missiles. Between 9 and 12 October, the American response was a call for a cease-fire in place. The Egyptian units generally would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing the protection of their SAM batteries, which were situated on the west bank of the canal. In the Six-Day War, the Israeli Air Force had pummeled the defenseless Arab armies; this time, Egypt had heavily fortified their side of the ceasefire lines with SAM batteries provided by the Soviet Union.

On 9 October, the IDF chose to concentrate its reserves and build up its supplies while the Egyptians remained on the strategic defensive. Nixon and Kissinger held back on a full-scale resupply of arms to Israel. Short of supplies, the Israeli government reluctantly accepted a cease-fire in place on 12 October, but Sadat refused to do so. The Soviets started an airlift of arms to Syria and Egypt. The American global interest was to prove that Soviet arms could not dictate the outcome of the fighting, by supplying Israel. With an airlift in full swing, Washington was prepared to wait until Israeli success on the battlefield might persuade the Arabs and the Soviets to bring the fighting to an end.

Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal

The Israelis decided to counterattack once Egyptian armor attempted to expand the bridgehead beyond the protective SAM umbrella. The riposte, codenamed Operation Gazelle, was launched on 15 October. IDF forces spearheaded by Ariel Sharon's division broke through the Tasa corridor and crossed the Suez Canal to the north of the Great Bitter Lake. After intense fighting, the IDF progressed towards Cairo and advanced southwards on the east bank of the Great Bitter Lake and in the southern extent of the canal right up to Port Suez. Israeli progress towards Cairo was brought to a halt by a fresh ceasefire on 24 October.

Egyptian attack

Main article: Operation Badr (1973)
The 1973 War in the Sinai, 6–15 October

Anticipating a swift Israeli armored counterattack by three armored divisions, the Egyptians had armed their assault force with large numbers of man-portable anti-tank weapons—rocket-propelled grenades and the less numerous but more advanced Sagger guided missiles, which proved devastating to the first Israeli armored counterattacks. Each of the five infantry divisions that were to cross the canal had been equipped with RPG-7 rockets and RPG-43 grenades and reinforced with an anti-tank guided missile battalion, as they would not have any armor support for nearly 12 hours. In addition, the Egyptians had built separate ramps at the crossing points, reaching as high as 21 metres (69 ft) to counter the Israeli sand wall, provide covering fire for the assaulting infantry and to counter the first Israeli armored counterattacks.

The Egyptian Army put great effort into finding a quick and effective way of breaching the Israeli defenses. The Israelis had built large 18-metre (59 foot) high sand walls with a 60-degree slope and reinforced with concrete at the water line. Egyptian engineers initially experimented with explosive charges and bulldozers to clear the obstacles, before a junior officer proposed using high pressure water cannons. The idea was tested and found to be a sound one, and several high pressure water cannons were imported from Britain and East Germany. The water cannons effectively breached the sand walls using water from the canal.

Wreckage of an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk on display in Egypt's war museum.
Egyptian Sukhoi Su-7 fighter jets conducting air strikes over the Bar Lev Line on 6 October

At 2:00 pm on 6 October, Operation Badr began with a large airstrike. More than 200 Egyptian aircraft conducted simultaneous strikes against three airbases, Hawk missile batteries, three command centers, artillery positions, and several radar installations. Airfields at Refidim and Bir Tamada were temporarily put out of service, and damage was inflicted on a Hawk battery at Ophir. The aerial assault was coupled with a barrage from more than 2,000 artillery pieces for a period of 53 minutes against the Bar Lev Line and rear area command posts and concentration bases.

Author Andrew McGregor claimed that the success of the first strike negated the need for a second planned strike. Egypt acknowledged the loss of five aircraft during the attack. Kenneth Pollack wrote that 18 Egyptian aircraft were shot down, and that these losses prompted the cancellation of the second planned wave. In one notable engagement during this period, a pair of Israeli F-4E Phantoms challenged 28 Egyptian MiGs over Sharm el-Sheikh and within half an hour, shot down seven or eight MiGs with no losses. One of the Egyptian pilots killed was Captain Atef Sadat, President Sadat's half-brother.

Simultaneously, 14 Egyptian Tupolev Tu-16 bombers attacked Israeli targets in the Sinai with Kelt missiles, while another two Egyptian Tupolevs fired two Kelt missiles at a radar station in central Israel. One missile was shot down by a patrolling Israeli Mirage fighter, and the second fell into the sea. The attack was an attempt to warn Israel that Egypt could retaliate if it bombed targets deep within Egyptian territory.

An Israeli Mirage III shot down by an Egyptian MiG-21

Under cover of the initial artillery barrage, the Egyptian assault force of 32,000 infantry began crossing the canal in twelve waves at five separate crossing areas, from 14:05 to 17:30, in what became known as The Crossing. The Egyptians prevented Israeli forces from reinforcing the Bar Lev Line and proceeded to attack the Israeli fortifications. Meanwhile, engineers crossed over to breach the sand wall. The Israeli Air Force conducted air interdiction operations to try to prevent the bridges from being erected, but took losses from Egyptian SAM batteries. The air attacks were ineffective overall, as the sectional design of the bridges enabled quick repairs when hit.

Despite fierce resistance, the Israeli reserve brigade garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts was overwhelmed. According to Shazly, within six hours, fifteen strongpoints had been captured as Egyptian forces advanced several kilometres into the Sinai. Shazly's account was disputed by Kenneth Pollack, who noted that for the most part, the forts only fell to repeated assaults by superior forces or prolonged sieges over many days. The northernmost fortification of the Bar Lev Line, code-named 'Fort Budapest', withstood repeated assaults and remained in Israeli hands throughout the war. Once the bridges were laid, additional infantry with the remaining portable and recoilless anti-tank weapons began to cross the canal, while the first Egyptian tanks started to cross at 20:30.

The Egyptians also attempted to land several heli-borne commando units in various areas in the Sinai to hamper the arrival of Israeli reserves. This attempt met with disaster as the Israelis shot down up to 20 helicopters, inflicting heavy casualties. Israeli Major General (res.) Chaim Herzog placed Egyptian helicopter losses at 14. Other sources claim that "several" helicopters were downed with "total loss of life" and that the few commandos that did filter through were ineffectual and presented nothing more than a "nuisance". Kenneth Pollack asserted that despite their heavy losses, the Egyptian commandos fought exceptionally hard and created considerable panic, prompting the Israelis to take precautions that hindered their ability to concentrate on stopping the assault across the canal.

Egyptian forces advanced approximately 4 to 5 km (2+1⁄2 to 3 mi) into the Sinai Desert with two armies (both corps-sized by western standards, included the 2nd Infantry Division in the northern Second Army). By the following morning, some 850 tanks had crossed the canal. In his account of the war, Saad El Shazly noted that by the morning of 7 October, the Egyptians had lost 280 soldiers and 20 tanks, though this account is disputed.

An Egyptian MiG-17 shot down during the dogfight over Sharm el-Sheikh

Most Israeli soldiers defending the Bar Lev Line became casualties, and some 200 were taken prisoner. In the subsequent days, some defenders of the Bar Lev Line managed to break through the Egyptian encirclement and return to their lines or were extracted during later Israeli counterattacks. For the next several days, the IAF played a minimal role in the fighting, largely because it was needed to deal with the simultaneous, and ultimately more threatening, Syrian attack in the Golan Heights.

Egyptian forces then consolidated their initial positions. On 7 October, the bridgeheads were enlarged an additional 4 km (2+1⁄2 mi), at the same time repulsing Israeli counterattacks. In the north, the Egyptian 18th Division attacked the town of El-Qantarah el-Sharqiyya, engaging Israeli forces in and around the town. The fighting there was conducted at close quarters, and was sometimes hand-to-hand. The Egyptians were forced to clear the town building by building. By evening, most of the town was in Egyptian hands. El-Qantarah was completely cleared by the next morning.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian commandos airdropped on 6 October began encountering Israeli reserves the following morning. Both sides suffered heavy losses, but the commandos were at times successful in delaying the movement of Israeli reserves to the front. These special operations often led to confusion and anxiety among Israeli commanders, who commended the Egyptian commandos. This view was contradicted by another source that stated that few commandos made it to their objectives, and were usually nothing more than a nuisance. According to Abraham Rabinovich, only the commandos near Baluza and those blocking the road to Fort Budapest had measurable success. Of the 1,700 Egyptian commandos inserted behind Israeli lines during the war, 740 were killed—many in downed helicopters—and 330 taken prisoner.

Failed Israeli counter-attack

An Israeli M60 Patton tank destroyed in the Sinai

On 7 October, David Elazar visited Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern Command—who had only taken the position three months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—and met with Israeli commanders. The Israelis planned a cautious counterattack for the following day by Avraham Adan's 162nd Armored Division. The same day, the IAF carried out Operation Tagar, aiming to neutralize Egyptian Air Force bases and its missile defense shield.

Seven Egyptian airbases were damaged, with the loss of two A-4 Skyhawks and their pilots. Two more planned attacks were called off because of the increasing need for air power on the Syrian front. The IAF carried out additional air attacks against Egyptian forces on the east bank of the canal, reportedly inflicting heavy losses. Israeli jets had carried out hundreds of sorties against Egyptian targets by the following day, but the Egyptian SAM shield inflicted heavy losses. IAF aircraft losses amounted to three aircraft for every 200 sorties, an unsustainable rate. The Israelis responded by rapidly devising new tactics to thwart the Egyptian air defenses.

Wrecks of Israeli and Egyptian armour stand directly opposed one another in a testament to the ferocity of the combat near the Suez Canal.

On 8 October, after Elazar had left, Gonen changed the plans on the basis of unduly optimistic field reports. Adan's division was composed of three brigades totaling 183 tanks. One of the brigades was still en route to the area, and would participate in the attack by noon, along with a supporting mechanized infantry brigade with an additional 44 tanks. The Israeli counterattack was in the direction of the Bar Lev strongpoints opposite the city of Ismailia, against entrenched Egyptian infantry. In a series of ill-coordinated attacks which were met by stiff resistance from Egyptian tanks, artillery, and infantry armed with anti-tank rockets, the Israelis were repulsed with heavy losses.

An initial Israeli attack by some 25 tanks broke through the first Egyptian troops and managed to come within 800 metres (2,600 ft) of the canal before coming under withering fire. The Israelis lost 18 tanks within minutes and most of the commanders were killed or wounded. This was followed by a second attack by elements of two Israeli brigades, which had communication and coordination problems. The Egyptians allowed the Israelis to advance and then encircled them in a prepared kill zone before opening fire, wiping out most of the Israeli force within 13 minutes. The Egyptians destroyed over 50 Israeli tanks and captured eight intact.

That afternoon, Egyptian forces advanced once more to deepen their bridgeheads, and as a result the Israelis lost several strategic positions. Further Israeli attacks to regain the lost ground proved futile. Towards nightfall, an Egyptian counterattack was repulsed with the loss of 50 Egyptian tanks by the Israeli 143rd Armored Division, which was led by Ariel Sharon, who had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. Gawrych, citing Egyptian sources, documented Egyptian tank losses up to 13 October at 240.

Temporary stabilization

An Israeli Centurion tank operating in the Sinai

According to Herzog, by 9 October the front lines had stabilized. The Egyptians were unable to advance further, and Egyptian armored attacks on 9 and 10 October were repulsed with heavy losses. However, this claim was disputed by Shazly, who claimed that the Egyptians continued to advance and improve their positions well into 10 October. He pointed to one engagement, which involved elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade, attached to the 19th Division, which captured Ayoun Mousa, south of Suez.

The Egyptian 1st Mechanized Brigade launched a failed attack southward along the Gulf of Suez in the direction of Ras Sudar. Leaving the safety of the SAM umbrella, the force was attacked by Israeli aircraft and suffered heavy losses.

Abandoned or destroyed Egyptian armour being collected by IDF personnel, 12 October 1973

Between 10 and 13 October, both sides refrained from any large-scale actions, and the situation was relatively stable. Both sides launched small-scale attacks, and the Egyptians used helicopters to land commandos behind Israeli lines. Some Egyptian helicopters were shot down, and those commando forces that managed to land were quickly destroyed by Israeli troops. In one key engagement on 13 October, a particularly large Egyptian incursion was stopped and close to a hundred Egyptian commandos were killed.

Battle of the Sinai

On 14 October, an engagement now known as the Battle of the Sinai took place. In preparation for the attack, Egyptian helicopters set down 100 commandos near the Lateral Road to disrupt the Israeli rear. An Israeli reconnaissance unit quickly subdued them, killing 60 and taking numerous prisoners. Still bruised by the extensive losses their commandos had suffered on the opening day of the war, the Egyptians were unable or unwilling to implement further commando operations that had been planned in conjunction with the armored attack.

General Shazly strongly opposed any eastward advance that would leave his armor without adequate air cover. He was overruled by General Ismail and Sadat, whose aims were to seize the strategic Mitla and Gidi Passes and the Israeli nerve centre at Refidim, which they hoped would relieve pressure on the Syrians (who were by now on the defensive) by forcing Israel to shift divisions from the Golan to the Sinai.

The 1973 War in the Sinai, 15–24 October

The 2nd and 3rd Armies were ordered to attack eastward in six simultaneous thrusts over a broad front, leaving behind five infantry divisions to hold the bridgeheads. The attacking forces, consisting of 800–1,000 tanks would not have SAM cover, so the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) was tasked with their defense against Israeli aerial attacks. Armored and mechanized units initiated the attack on 14 October with artillery support. They were up against 700–750 Israeli tanks.

In the event, the Egyptian armored thrust suffered heavy losses. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the wadi thrust, Egyptian units launched head-on-attacks against the waiting Israeli defenses. At least 250 Egyptian tanks and some 200 armored vehicles were destroyed. Egyptian casualties exceeded 1,000. Fewer than 40 Israeli tanks were hit, and all but six of them were repaired by Israeli maintenance crews and returned to service, while Israeli casualties numbered 665.

Kenneth Pollack credited a successful Israeli commando raid early on 14 October against an Egyptian signals-intercept site at Jebel Ataqah with seriously disrupting Egyptian command and control and contributing to its breakdown during the engagement. Israeli intelligence had also detected signs that the Egyptians were gearing up for a major armored thrust as early as 12 October.

Israeli breakthrough and crossing of the Suez Canal

Israeli tanks crossing the Suez Canal

At this point, General Sharon advocated an immediate crossing at Deversoir at the northern edge of Great Bitter Lake. Earlier, on 9 October, a reconnaissance force attached to Colonel Amnon Reshef's Brigade had detected a gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies in this sector. According to General Gamasy, the gap had been spotted by an American SR-71 spy plane.

The Israelis followed the Egyptian failed attack of 14 October with a multidivisional counterattack through the gap between the Egyptian Second and Third Armies. Sharon's 143rd Division, now reinforced with a paratroop brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Matt, was tasked with establishing bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the canal. The 162nd and 252nd Armored Divisions, commanded by Generals Avraham Adan and Kalman Magen, respectively, would then cross through the breach to the west bank of the canal and swing southward, encircling the 3rd Army.

On the night of 15 October, 750 of Colonel Matt's paratroopers crossed the canal in rubber dinghies. They were soon joined by tanks, ferried on motorized rafts, and additional infantry. The force encountered no resistance initially and fanned out in raiding parties, attacking supply convoys, SAM sites, logistic centers and anything else of military value, with priority given to the SAMs. Attacks on SAM sites punched a hole in the Egyptian anti-aircraft screen and enabled the IAF to strike Egyptian ground targets more aggressively.

On the night of 15 October, 20 Israeli tanks and seven APCs under the command of Colonel Haim Erez crossed the canal and penetrated 12 kilometres (7.5 mi) into Egypt, taking the Egyptians by surprise. For the first 24 hours, Erez's force attacked SAM sites and military columns with impunity, including a major raid on Egyptian missile bases on 16 October, in which three Egyptian missile bases were destroyed, along with several tanks, for no Israeli losses. On the morning of 17 October, the force was attacked by the 23rd Egyptian Armored Brigade, but managed to repulse the attack. By this time, the Syrians no longer posed a credible threat and the Israelis were able to shift their air power to the south in support of the offensive. The combination of a weakened Egyptian SAM umbrella and a greater concentration of Israeli fighter-bombers meant that the IAF was capable of greatly increasing sorties against Egyptian military targets, including convoys, armor and airfields. The Egyptian bridges across the canal were damaged in Israeli air and artillery attacks.

Israeli jets began attacking Egyptian SAM sites and radars, prompting General Ismail to withdraw much of the Egyptians' air defense equipment. This in turn gave the IAF still greater freedom to operate in Egyptian airspace. Israeli jets also attacked and destroyed underground communication cables at Banha in the Nile Delta, forcing the Egyptians to transmit selective messages by radio, which could be intercepted. Aside from the cables at Banha, Israel refrained from attacking economic and strategic infrastructure following an Egyptian threat to retaliate against Israeli cities with Scud missiles. Israeli aircraft bombed Egyptian Scud batteries at Port Said several times.

The Egyptian Air Force attempted to interdict IAF sorties and attack Israeli ground forces, but suffered heavy losses in dogfights and from Israeli air defenses, while inflicting light aircraft losses. The heaviest air battles took place over the northern Nile Delta, where the Israelis repeatedly attempted to destroy Egyptian airbases. Although the Israelis tended to come out on top in aerial battles, one notable exception was the Air battle of Mansoura, when an Israeli raid against the Egyptian airbases of Tanta and Mansoura was repulsed by Egyptian fighter aircraft.

Securing the bridgehead

An Israeli position with captured RPD machine gun overlooks the Suez Canal on 16 October 1973

Despite the success the Israelis were having on the west bank, Generals Bar-Lev and Elazar ordered Sharon to concentrate on securing the bridgehead on the east bank. He was ordered to clear the roads leading to the canal as well as a position known as the Chinese Farm, just north of Deversoir, the Israeli crossing point. Sharon objected and requested permission to expand and break out of the bridgehead on the west bank, arguing that such a maneuver would cause the collapse of Egyptian forces on the east bank. But the Israeli high command was insistent, believing that until the east bank was secure, forces on the west bank could be cut off. Sharon was overruled by his superiors and relented.

On 16 October, he dispatched Amnon Reshef's Brigade to attack the Chinese Farm. Other IDF forces attacked entrenched Egyptian forces overlooking the roads to the canal. After three days of bitter and close-quarters fighting, the Israelis succeeded in dislodging the numerically superior Egyptian forces. The Israelis lost about 300 dead, 1,000 wounded, and 56 tanks. The Egyptians suffered heavier casualties, including 118 tanks destroyed and 15 captured.

Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing

Israeli soldiers during the Battle of Ismailia. One of them has a captured Egyptian RPG-7.

The Egyptians, meanwhile, failed to grasp the extent and magnitude of the Israeli crossing, nor did they appreciate its intent and purpose. This was partly due to attempts by Egyptian field commanders to obfuscate reports concerning the Israeli crossing and partly due to a false assumption that the canal crossing was merely a diversion for a major IDF offensive targeting the right flank of the Second Army. Consequently, on 16 October General Shazly ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward and the T-62-equipped 25th Independent Armored Brigade to attack northward in a pincer action to eliminate the perceived threat to the Second Army.

The Egyptians failed to scout the area and were unaware that by now, Adan's 162nd Armored Division was in the vicinity. Moreover, the 21st and 25th failed to coordinate their attacks, allowing General Adan's Division to meet each force separately. Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division, destroying 50–60 Egyptian tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. He then turned southward and ambushed the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs, while losing three tanks.

Destroyed Israeli M48 Patton tanks on the banks of the Suez Canal

Egyptian artillery shelled the Israeli bridge over the canal on the morning of 17 October, scoring several hits. The Egyptian Air Force launched repeated raids, some with up to 20 aircraft, to take out the bridge and rafts, damaging the bridge. The Egyptians had to shut down their SAM sites during these raids, allowing Israeli fighters to intercept the Egyptians. The Egyptians lost 16 planes and seven helicopters, while the Israelis lost six planes.

The bridge was damaged, and the Israeli Paratroop Headquarters, which was near the bridge, was also hit; its commander and his deputy were wounded. During the night, the bridge was repaired, but only a trickle of Israeli forces was able to cross. According to Chaim Herzog, the Egyptians continued attacking the bridgehead until the ceasefire, using artillery and mortars to fire tens of thousands of shells into the area of the crossing. Egyptian aircraft attempted to bomb the bridge every day, and helicopters launched suicide missions, making attempts to drop barrels of napalm on the bridge and bridgehead.

The bridges were damaged multiple times, and had to be repaired at night. The attacks caused heavy casualties, and many tanks were sunk when their rafts were hit. Egyptian commandos and frogmen with armored support launched a ground attack against the bridgehead, which was repulsed with the loss of 10 tanks. Two subsequent Egyptian counterattacks were also beaten back.

After the failure of the 17 October counterattacks, the Egyptian General Staff slowly began to realize the magnitude of the Israeli offensive. Early on 18 October, the Soviets showed Sadat satellite imagery of Israeli forces operating on the west bank. Alarmed, Sadat dispatched Shazly to the front to assess the situation first-hand. He no longer trusted his field commanders to provide accurate reports. Shazly confirmed that the Israelis had at least one division on the west bank and were widening their bridgehead. He advocated withdrawing most of Egypt's armor from the east bank to confront the growing Israeli threat on the west bank. Sadat rejected this recommendation outright and even threatened Shazly with a court martial. Ahmad Ismail Ali recommended that Sadat push for a ceasefire so as to prevent the Israelis from exploiting their successes.

Israeli forces across the Suez

A knocked-out Egyptian tank

Israeli forces were by now pouring across the canal on two bridges, including one of Israeli design, and motorized rafts. Israeli engineers under Brigadier-General Dan Even [he] had worked under heavy Egyptian fire to set up the bridges, and over 100 were killed and hundreds more wounded. The crossing was difficult because of Egyptian artillery fire, though by 4:00 am, two of Adan's brigades were on the west bank of the canal. On the morning of 18 October, Sharon's forces on the west bank launched an offensive toward Ismailia, slowly pushing back the Egyptian paratroop brigade occupying the sand rampart northward to enlarge the bridgehead. Some of his units attempted to move west, but were stopped at the crossroads in Nefalia. Adan's division rolled south toward Suez City while Magen's division pushed west toward Cairo and south toward Adabiya.

On 19 October, one of Sharon's brigades continued to push the Egyptian paratroopers north towards Ismailia until the Israelis were within 8 or 10 km (5 or 6 mi) of the city. Sharon hoped to seize the city and thereby sever the logistical and supply lines for most of the Egyptian Second Army. Sharon's second brigade began to cross the canal. The brigade's forward elements moved to the Abu Sultan Camp, from where they moved north to take Orcha, an Egyptian logistics base defended by a commando battalion. Israeli infantrymen cleared the trenches and bunkers, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat, as tanks moved alongside them and fired into the trench sections to their front. The position was secured before nightfall. More than 300 Egyptians were killed and 50 taken prisoner, while the Israelis lost 16 dead.

The fall of Orcha caused the collapse of the Egyptian defensive line, allowing more Israeli troops to get onto the sand rampart. There, they were able to fire in support of Israeli troops facing Missouri Ridge, an Egyptian-occupied position on the Bar-Lev Line that could pose a threat to the Israeli crossing. On the same day, Israeli paratroopers participating in Sharon's drive pushed the Egyptians back far enough for the Israeli bridges to be out of sight of Egyptian artillery observers, though the Egyptians continued shelling the area.

As the Israelis pushed towards Ismailia, the Egyptians fought a delaying battle, retreating into defensive positions further north as they came under increasing pressure from the Israeli ground offensive, coupled with airstrikes. On 21 October, one of Sharon's brigades was occupying the city's outskirts, but facing fierce resistance from Egyptian paratroopers and commandos. The same day, Sharon's last remaining unit on the east bank attacked Missouri Ridge. Shmuel Gonen had demanded Sharon capture the position, and Sharon had reluctantly ordered the attack. The assault was preceded by an air attack that caused hundreds of Egyptian soldiers to flee and thousands of others to dig in.

One Israeli battalion then attacked from the south, destroying 20 tanks and overrunning infantry positions before being halted by Sagger missiles and minefields. Another battalion attacked from the southwest and inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians, but its advance was halted after eight tanks were knocked out. The surviving Israeli soldiers managed to hold off an Egyptian infantry assault while losing two soldiers before surrendering. Two of the Israeli soldiers managed to hide and escape back to Israeli lines. The Israelis managed to occupy one-third of Missouri Ridge. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan countermanded orders from Sharon's superiors to continue the attack. However, the Israelis continued to expand their holdings on the east bank. According to the Israelis, the IDF bridgehead was 40 km (25 mi) wide and 32 km (20 mi) deep by the end of 21 October.

Egyptian soldiers gather the bodies of Israeli soldiers killed during the Battle of Ismailia.

On 22 October, Ismailia's Egyptian defenders were occupying their last line of defense. At around 10:00 am, the Israelis renewed the attack, moving toward Jebel Mariam, Abu 'Atwa and Nefisha. The paratroopers at Jebel Mariam became engaged in intense fighting but, with their advantageous position, were able to repel the attack by late afternoon. Meanwhile, the Israelis concentrated artillery and mortar fire against the Sa'iqa positions at Abu 'Atwa and Nefisha. At noon, advance Israeli elements engaged with a Sa'iqa reconnaissance unit, and the Israelis lost two tanks and a half-track. At 1:00 pm, an Israeli paratrooper company attacked Abu 'Atwa without first scouting ahead, and was ambushed and annihilated. The attack ended after paratroopers suffered over fifty casualties and lost four tanks.

At the same time, two tank companies and mechanized infantry attacked Nefisha, supported with close air support. The Egyptian Sa'iqa commando battalion in charge of Nefisha managed to repel the attack after prolonged, heavy fighting that closed to very short distances. The Israelis lost three tanks, two half-tracks, and a large number of men. For their part the Sa'iqa commandos at Nefisha lost 24 killed, including four officers, and 42 wounded, including three officers. Edgar O'Ballance mentions a counterattack by the Sa'iqa which took place during the afternoon and pushed some of Sharon's troops back along the Sweetwater Canal. The Israeli attack had been thoroughly routed.

Israeli forces failed to get behind Ismailia and encircle the city. The Israeli advance on Ismailia was stopped 10 km (6 mi) south of the city. The IDF failed to cut supplies for the Egyptian Second Army or to occupy Ismailia. The Egyptians registered a tactical and strategic victory in the defense of Ismailia, stopping an encirclement of their large forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal and ensuring their supply lines remained open.

On the northern front, the Israelis also attacked Port Said, facing Egyptian troops and a 900-strong Tunisian unit, who fought a defensive battle. The Egyptian government claimed that the city was repeatedly bombed by Israeli jets, and that hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded.

Adan and Magen moved south, decisively defeating the Egyptians in a series of engagements, though they often encountered determined Egyptian resistance, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. Adan advanced towards the Sweetwater Canal area, planning to break out into the surrounding desert and hit the Geneifa Hills, where many SAM sites were located. Adan's three armored brigades fanned out, with one advancing through the Geneifa Hills, another along a parallel road south of them, and the third advancing towards Mina. Adan's brigades met resistance from dug-in Egyptian forces in the Sweetwater Canal area's greenbelt. Adan's other brigades were also held by a line of Egyptian military camps and installations. Adan was also harassed by the Egyptian Air Force.

The Israelis slowly advanced, bypassing Egyptian positions whenever possible. After being denied air support due to the presence of two SAM batteries that had been brought forward, Adan sent two brigades to attack them. The brigades slipped past the dug-in Egyptian infantry, moving out from the greenbelt for more than 8 km (5 mi), and fought off multiple Egyptian counterattacks. From a distance of 4 km (2+1⁄2 mi), they shelled and destroyed the SAMs, allowing the IAF to provide Adan with close air support. Adan's troops advanced through the greenbelt and fought their way to the Geneifa Hills, clashing with scattered Egyptian, Kuwaiti and Palestinian troops. The Israelis clashed with an Egyptian armored unit at Mitzeneft and destroyed multiple SAM sites. Adan also captured Fayid Airport, which was subsequently prepared by Israeli crews to serve as a supply base and to fly out wounded soldiers.

Sixteen kilometres (10 mi) west of the Bitter Lake, Colonel Natke Nir's brigade overran an Egyptian artillery brigade that had been participating in the shelling of the Israeli bridgehead. Scores of Egyptian artillerymen were killed and many more taken prisoner. Two Israeli soldiers were also killed, including the son of General Moshe Gidron. Meanwhile, Magen's division moved west and then south, covering Adan's flank and eventually moving south of Suez City to the Gulf of Suez.

The ceasefire and further battles

When the ceasefire came into effect, Israel had lost territory on the east side of the Suez Canal to Egypt –  , but gained territory west of the canal and beyond the Golan Heights –  .
A soldier with an Uzi next to a road sign reading "ISMAILIA 36"
An Israeli soldier on the road to Ismailia

The United Nations Security Council passed (14–0) Resolution 338 calling for a ceasefire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on 22 October. It called upon the belligerents to immediately cease all military activity. The cease-fire was to come into effect 12 hours later at 6:52 pm Israeli time. Because this was after dark, it was impossible for satellite surveillance to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger intimated to Prime Minister Meir that he would not object to offensive action during the night before the ceasefire was to come into effect.

Several minutes before the ceasefire came into effect, three Scud missiles were fired at Israeli targets by either Egyptian forces or Soviet personnel in Egypt. This was the first combat use of Scud missiles. One Scud targeted the port of Arish and two targeted the Israeli bridgehead on the Suez Canal. One hit an Israeli supply convoy and killed seven soldiers. When the time for the ceasefire arrived, Sharon's division had failed to capture Ismailia and cut off the Second Army's supply lines, but Israeli forces were just a few hundred metres short of their southern goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez.

Adan's drive south had left Israeli and Egyptian units scattered throughout the battlefield, with no clear lines between them. As Egyptian and Israeli units tried to regroup, regular firefights broke out. During the night, Elazar reported that the Egyptians were attacking in an attempt to regain land at various locations, and that nine Israeli tanks had been destroyed. He asked permission from Dayan to respond to the attacks and Dayan agreed. Israel then resumed its drive south.

It is unclear which side fired first but Israeli field commanders used the skirmishes as justification to resume the attacks. When Sadat protested alleged Israeli truce violations, Israel said that Egyptian troops had fired first. William B. Quandt noted that regardless of who fired the first post-ceasefire shot, it was the Israeli Army that was advancing beyond the 22 October ceasefire lines.

Adan resumed his attack on 23 October. Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the last ancillary road south of the port of Suez, and encircled the Egyptian Third Army east of the Suez Canal. The Israelis then transported enormous amounts of military equipment across the canal, which Egypt claimed was in violation of the ceasefire. Egyptian aircraft launched repeated attacks in support of the Third Army, sometimes in groups of up to 30 planes, but took severe losses.

Battle of Suez

Main article: Battle of Suez

Israeli armor and paratroopers also entered Suez in an attempt to capture the city, but failed after being confronted by Egyptian soldiers and hastily raised local militia forces. They were surrounded and the armored column was ambushed and severely hit, while the paratroopers came under heavy fire and many of them became trapped inside a local building. The armored column and part of the infantry force were evacuated during the day, while the main contingent of the paratrooper force eventually managed to dash out of the city and make their way back to Israeli lines. The Israelis had lost 80 dead and 120 wounded, with minimal Egyptian casualties, for no tactical gain. Israel made two more probes into Suez, one on the 25th and one on the 28th, but both were repulsed.

Egypt's trapped Third Army

Kissinger found out about the Third Army's encirclement shortly thereafter. Kissinger considered that the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity and that Egypt was dependent on the United States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to mediate in the dispute and wean Egypt from Soviet influence. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a UN resolution demanding that the Israelis withdraw to their 22 October positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist."

The Israeli government also had its own motivations for not destroying the Third Army. These included the possibility of using the encircled Third Army as a bargaining chip for ending the Egyptian blockade of the Bab-el-Mandel Straits in the Red Sea and negotiating a repatriation of Israeli prisoners-of-war captured by Egypt. The exhausted state of the IDF, the possibility that humiliating Egypt by destroying the Third Army would make Sadat more bellicose and unwilling to cease hostilities, and Israel's intense fears that the Soviet Union would militarily intervene in the event the Third Army was destroyed were additional reasons for Israel ultimately deciding against destroying it.

Despite being surrounded, the Third Army managed to maintain its combat integrity east of the canal and keep up its defensive positions, to the surprise of many. According to Trevor N. Dupuy, the Israelis, Soviets and Americans overestimated the vulnerability of the Third Army at the time. It was not on the verge of collapse, and he wrote that while a renewed Israeli offensive would probably overcome it, this was not a certainty.

David T. Buckwalter agrees that despite the isolation of the Third Army, it was unclear if the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front. This assessment was challenged by Patrick Seale, who stated that the Third Army was "on the brink of collapse". Seale's position was supported by P.R. Kumaraswamy, who wrote that intense American pressure prevented the Israelis from annihilating the stranded Third Army.

Herzog noted that given the Third Army's desperate situation, in terms of being cut off from re-supply and reassertion of Israeli air superiority, the destruction of the Third Army was inevitable and could have been achieved within a very brief period. Shazly himself described the Third Army's plight as "desperate" and classified its encirclement as a "catastrophe that was too big to hide". He further noted that, "the fate of the Egyptian Third Army was in the hands of Israel. Once the Third Army was encircled by Israeli troops every bit of bread to be sent to our men was paid for by meeting Israeli demands."

Shortly before the ceasefire came into effect, an Israeli tank battalion advanced into Adabiya, and took it with support from the Israeli Navy. Some 1,500 Egyptian prisoners were taken, and about a hundred Egyptian soldiers assembled just south of Adabiya, where they held out against the Israelis. The Israelis also conducted their third and final incursion into Suez. They made some gains, but failed to break into the city center. As a result, the city was partitioned down the main street, with the Egyptians holding the city center and the Israelis controlling the outskirts, port installations and oil refinery, effectively surrounding the Egyptian defenders.

Post-war battles

On the morning of 26 October, the Egyptian Third Army violated the ceasefire by attempting to break through the surrounding Israeli forces. The attack was repulsed by Israeli air and ground forces. The Egyptians also made minor gains in attacks against Sharon's forces in the Ismailia area. The Israelis reacted by bombing and shelling priority targets in Egypt, including command posts and water reserves. The front was quieter in the Second Army's sector in the northern canal area, where both sides generally respected the ceasefire.

Though most heavy fighting ended on 28 October, the fighting never stopped until 18 January 1974. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated that:

The cease-fire existed on paper, but the continued firing along the front was not the only characteristic of the situation between 24 October 1973 and 18 January 1974. This intermediate period also held the ever-present possibility of a renewal of full-scale war. There were three variations on how it might break out, two Egyptian and one Israeli. One Egyptian plan was to attack Israeli units west of the canal from the direction of Cairo. The other was to cut off the Israeli canal bridgehead by a link-up of the Second and Third Armies on the east bank. Both plans were based on massive artillery pounding of Israeli forces, who were not well fortified and who would suffer heavy casualties. It was therefore thought that Israel would withdraw from the west bank, since she was most sensitive on the subject of soldiers' lives. Egypt, at the time had a total of 1,700 first-line tanks on both sides of the canal front, 700 on the east bank and 1,000 on the west bank. Also on the west bank, in the second line, were an additional 600 tanks for the defense of Cairo. She had some 2,000 artillery pieces, about 500 operational aircraft, and at least 130 SAM missile batteries positioned around our forces so as to deny us air support.

The IDF acknowledged the loss of 14 soldiers during this postwar period. Egyptian losses were higher, especially in the sector controlled by Ariel Sharon, who ordered his troops to respond with massive firepower to any Egyptian provocation. Some aerial battles took place, and the Israelis also shot down several helicopters attempting to resupply the Third Army.

Final situation on the Egyptian front

By the end of the war, the Israelis had advanced to positions some 101 kilometres from Egypt's capital, Cairo, and occupied 1,600 square kilometres west of the Suez Canal. They had also cut the Cairo–Suez road and encircled the bulk of Egypt's Third Army. The Israelis had also taken many prisoners after Egyptian soldiers, including many officers, began surrendering in masses towards the end of the war. The Egyptians held a narrow strip on the east bank of the canal, occupying some 1,200 square kilometres of the Sinai. One source estimated that the Egyptians had 70,000 men, 720 tanks and 994 artillery pieces on the east bank of the canal. However, 30,000 to 45,000 of them were now encircled by the Israelis.

Despite Israel's tactical successes west of the canal, the Egyptian military was reformed and organized. Consequently, according to Gamasy, the Israeli military position became "weak" for different reasons:

One, Israel now had a large force (about six or seven brigades) in a very limited area of land, surrounded from all sides either by natural or man-made barriers, or by the Egyptian forces. This put it in a weak position. Moreover, there were the difficulties in supplying this force, in evacuating it, in the lengthy communication lines, and in the daily attrition in men and equipment. Two, to protect these troops, the Israeli command had to allocate other forces (four or five brigades) to defend the entrances to the breach at the Deversoir. Three, to immobilize the Egyptian bridgeheads in Sinai the Israeli command had to allocate ten brigades to face the Second and Third army bridgeheads. In addition, it became necessary to keep the strategic reserves at their maximum state of alert. Thus, Israel was obliged to keep its armed force—and consequently the country—mobilized for a long period, at least until the war came to an end, because the ceasefire did not signal the end of the war. There is no doubt that this was in total conflict with its military theories.

Egypt wished to end the war when it realized that the IDF canal crossing offensive could result in a catastrophe. The Egyptians' besieged Third Army could not hold on without supply. The Israeli Army advanced to 100 km from Cairo, which worried Egypt. The Israeli army had open terrain and no opposition to advance further to Cairo; had they done so, Sadat's rule might have ended.

Golan front

Initial Syrian attacks

A map of the fighting on the Golan Heights

In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked two Israeli armored brigades, an infantry brigade, two paratrooper battalions and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions (the 7th, 9th and 5th, with the 1st and 3rd in reserve) and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, the Israeli brigades of some 3,000 troops, 180 tanks and 60 artillery pieces faced off against three infantry divisions with large armor components comprising 28,000 Syrian troops, 800 tanks and 600 artillery pieces. In addition, the Syrians deployed two armored divisions from the second day onwards.

To fight the opening phase of a possible battle, before reserves arrived, Israeli high command had, conforming to the original plan, allocated a single armored brigade, the 188th, accepting a disparity in tank numbers of eighteen to one. When the warning by King Hussein of an imminent Syrian attack was conveyed, Elazar at first only assigned two additional tank companies from 7th Armored Brigade: "We'll have one hundred tanks against their eight hundred. That ought to be enough". Eventually, his deputy, Israel Tal, ordered the entire 7th Armored Brigade to be brought up.

Efforts had been made to improve the Israeli defensive position. The "Purple Line" ran along a series of low dormant volcanic cones, "tels", in the north and deep ravines in the south. It was covered by a continuous tank ditch, bunker complexes and dense minefields. Directly west of this line a series of tank ramps were constructed: earthen platforms on which a Centurion tank could position itself with only its upper turret and gun visible, offering a substantial advantage when duelling the fully exposed enemy tanks.

The Syrians began their attack at 14:00 with an airstrike by about a hundred aircraft and a fifty-minute artillery barrage. The two forward infantry brigades, with an organic tank battalion, of each of the three infantry divisions then crossed the cease-fire lines, bypassing United Nations observer posts. They were covered by mobile anti-aircraft batteries, and equipped with bulldozers to fill-in anti-tank ditches, bridge-layer tanks to overcome obstacles and mine-clearance vehicles. These engineering vehicles were priority targets for Israeli tank gunners and took heavy losses, but Syrian infantry at points demolished the tank ditch, allowing their armor to cross.

At 14:45, two hundred men from the Syrian 82nd Paratrooper Battalion descended on foot from Mount Hermon and around 17:00 took the Israeli observation base on the southern slope, with its advanced surveillance equipment. A small force dropped by four helicopters simultaneously placed itself on the access road south of the base. Specialised intelligence personnel were captured. Made to believe that Israel had fallen, they disclosed much sensitive information. A first Israeli attempt on 8 October to retake the base from the south was ambushed and beaten off with heavy losses.

President Hafez al-Assad (right) with soldiers, 1973

During the afternoon 7th Armored Brigade was still kept in reserve and the 188th Armored Brigade held the frontline with only two tank battalions, the 74th in the north and the 53rd in the south. The northern battalion waged an exemplary defensive battle against the forward brigades of the Syrian 7th Infantry Division, destroying fifty-nine Syrian tanks for minimal losses. The southern battalion destroyed a similar number, but facing four Syrian tank battalions from two divisions had a dozen of its own tanks knocked out. At bunker complex 111, opposite Kudne in Syria, the defending company beat off "determined" and "bravely" pressed attacks by the Syrian 9th Infantry Division; by nightfall it was reduced to three tanks, with only sixty-nine anti-tank rounds between them. Further successful resistance by the southern battalion was contingent on reinforcements.

Direct operational command of the Golan had at first been given to the 188 AB commander, Yitzhak Ben-Shoham, who ordered the 7th AB to concentrate at Wasset. The 7th AB commander, Avigdor Ben-Gal, resented obeying an officer of equal rank and went to the Northern Command headquarters at Nafah, announcing he would place his force in the northern sector at the "Quneitra Gap", a pass south of the Hermonit peak and the main access to the Golan Heights from the east. Northern Command was in the process of moving their headquarters to Safed in Galilee and the senior staff officers were absent at this moment, having expected the Syrian attack to start at 18:00. Operations officer Lieutenant-Colonel Uri Simhoni therefore improvised an allocation of the tactical reserves, thereby largely deciding the course of the battle.

The Armored School Centurion Tank Battalion (71st TB) was kept in general reserve. The 77th Tank Battalion of 7th AB was sent to Quneitra. Two companies of the 75th Mechanised Infantry Battalion, arrived in the morning, of the same brigade were sent to the southern sector. Also 82nd TB had to reinforce the south. However, Ben-Gal had split off a company of this battalion to serve as a reserve for his own brigade. Another company, soon after arriving in the south, was ambushed by an infiltrated Syrian commando force armed with Sagger missiles and almost entirely wiped out. As a result, effective reinforcement of the southern Golan sector was limited to just a single tank company.

At 16:00, Yitzhak Hofi, head Northern Command, shortly visited Nafah and split command of the Golan front: the north would be the responsibility of 7th AB, to which 53rd TB would be transferred. Command of 188th AB would be limited to the south, taking over 82nd TB. The first wave of the Syrian offensive had failed to penetrate, but at nightfall a second, larger, wave was launched. For this purpose each of the three infantry divisions, also committing their organic mechanised brigade with forty tanks, had been reinforced by an armored brigade of about ninety tanks. Two of these brigades were to attack the northern sector, four the southern sector.

Defense of the Quneitra Gap

An Israeli Centurion tank. It was considered in many respects superior to the Soviet T-54/55.

Over four days of fighting, the 7th Armored Brigade in the north under Avigdor Ben-Gal managed to hold the rocky hill line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah, inflicting heavy losses on the Syrians. During the night of 6/7 October it beat off an attack of the Syrian 78th Armoured Brigade, attached to the 7th Infantry Division. On 7 October, 7th AB had to send part of its reserves to the collapsing southern sector. Replenishment from the Nafah matériel stock became impossible. Syrian High Command, understanding that forcing the Quneitra Gap would ensure a total victory on the Golan, decided to commit its strategic armored reserves.

During the night of 7/8 October, the independent 81st Armored Brigade, equipped with modern T-62s and part of the presidential guard, attacked but was beaten off. After this fight, the Israeli brigade would refer to the gap as the "Valley of Tears". Syrian Brigadier-General Omar Abrash, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, was killed on 8 October when his command tank was hit as he was preparing an attempt by 121st Mechanised Brigade to bypass the gap through a more southern route.

Having practiced on the Golan Heights numerous times, Israeli gunners made effective use of mobile artillery. During night attacks, however, the Syrian tanks had the advantage of active-illumination infrared night-vision equipment, which was not a standard Israeli equipment. Instead, some Israeli tanks were fitted with large xenon searchlights which were useful in illuminating and locating enemy positions, troops and vehicles. The close distances during night engagements negated the usual Israeli superiority in long-range duels. 77th Tank Battalion commander Avigdor Kahalani in the Quneitra Gap generally managed to hold a second tank ramp line.

Israeli artillery pounds Syrian forces near the Valley of Tears

In the afternoon of 9 October, Syrian command committed the Republican Guard independent 70th Armored Brigade, equipped with T-62s and BMP-1s. To hold the gap, 7th AB could by now muster only some two dozen tanks, elements from the 77th, 74th, 82nd and 71st Tank Battalion. Israeli command had directed all reserves to the threatened southern sector, trusting that the northern sector was secure. Fighting in daylight proved to be advantageous to the Syrians: the better armored T-62s were hard to destroy at long range and their high-velocity 115 mm U-5TS smoothbore guns were quite accurate at medium ranges, despite the lack of a rangefinder.

Taking losses and hit by an intense artillery barrage, the Israeli Centurions withdrew from their tank ramps. The situation was restored by an ad hoc force of thirteen tanks formed by Lt. Col. Yossi Ben-Hanan from repaired vehicles and stray crews. The Syrians abandoned their last breakthrough attempt, having lost since 6 October some 260 tanks in the Quneitra Gap.

Syrian breakthrough in the Southern Golan

In the southern sector, the Israeli Barak Armored Brigade had to defend a much flatter terrain. It also faced two-thirds of the Syrian second wave, while fielding at this time less than a third of the operational Israeli tanks. Beside these objective draw-backs, it suffered from ineffective command. Ben-Shoham initially still had his headquarters in Nafah, far from his sector. He did not realise a full war was in progress and tended to spread the 53rd TB platoons along the entire line, to stop any Syrian incursion. Also, he failed to coordinate the deployment of 82nd TB and 53rd TB.

The commander of 53rd TB, Lieutenant-Colonel Oded Eres, sent the two arriving companies of 82nd TB to his right flank and centre. No further reinforcement materialising, he urgently ordered the southern company to the north again; it was ambushed on the way. His left flank at Kudne remained unreinforced, although the defending company had increased the number of operational tanks to eight. This was the main axis of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division and its commander, Colonel Hassan Tourkmani, ordered the remnants of an organic tank battalion to be sacrificed forcing the minefield belt. Subsequently, the Syrian 51st Armored Brigade bypassed bunker complex 111 after dark. It then overran the Israeli supply compound at the Hushniya cross-roads.

Parts of the 75th Mechanised Infantry Battalion had been concentrated at Hushniya, but they did not consist of its two organic tank companies; they were M-113 units. Lacking modern antitank weapons, Israeli infantry was ineffective at stopping Syrian armor. The 51st AB passing through the Kudne/Rafid Gap turned northwest to move along the Petroleum Road or "Tapline Road", which provided a diagonal route across the heights, running straight from Hushniya to Nafah, the Israeli Golan headquarters, in the rear of the Quneitra Gap.

Abandoned Syrian T-62 tanks on the Golan Heights

Israeli command was initially slow to realise that a breakthrough had taken place. Their main concern was that the Syrians would occupy some forward bunker complex or settlement. The fact that the defending tank platoons were still intact was seen as proof that the line had not been broken. Ben-Shoham around 18:30 moved his headquarters to the south. Reports of Syrian radio traffic at Hushniya, of Israeli reserve tanks passing columns of Syrian tanks in the dark and of enemy tanks moving at the rear of the observation post on Tel Saki, were dismissed by him as misidentifications. Only when two tanks parked in the dark near his staff vehicles and were recognised for T-55s when hastily driving away upon being hailed, he understood that a large Syrian tank unit had infiltrated his lines.

As a result, no regular units were directed to block a Syrian advance to Nafah. Ben-Shoham had ordered Lieutenant Zvika Greengold, who, about to be trained as a tank company commander, had arrived at Nafah unattached to any combat unit, to gather some crews and follow him to the south with a few tanks to take command of the bunker complex 111 and 112 tank forces which had lost all officers. Five kilometres (three miles) south of Nafah base, Greengold was warned by a truck convoy that there were Syrian tanks ahead. These belonged to the 452st Tank Battalion, hurrying north to surprise Nafah.

Confronted at short range with a first group of three T-55's, Greengold's Centurion destroyed them in quick succession. He then moved parallel to the road to the south, hitting advancing Syrian tanks in the flank and destroying another ten until he approached Hushniya. From this the commander of 452st TB, Major Farouk Ismail, concluded that he had been ambushed by a strong Israeli tank unit and concentrated his remaining vehicles in a defensive position at Hushniya. Greengold decided not to reveal how precarious the Israeli situation was, in radio contact with Ben-Shoham hiding the fact that his "Force Zvika" consisted of only a single tank.

The next 9th Infantry Division unit to participate in the second wave, the 43rd Mechanised Infantry Brigade, entered the Golan at Kudne, but then sharply turned to the right advancing over the lateral "Reshet" road behind the Purple Line in the direction of Quneitra. Israeli 1st Infantry Brigade elements warned 7th Armored Brigade of the danger. Ben Gal then released the 82nd TB company he had held back, commanded by Captain Meir "Tiger" Zamir, and sent it to the south to cover his flank. Zamir ambushed the Syrian brigade; directing their fire with the xenon light projector on one of his tanks his company destroyed a dozen vehicles. At dawn he surprised the enemy column from the rear and dispersed the remnants of 43 MIB, having knocked-out all of its forty tanks.

Israeli strategic response

Around midnight, Hofi, at Safed, began to understand the magnitude of the Syrian breakthrough. He warned chief-of-staff Elazar that the entire Golan might be lost. Overhearing this message, an alarmed Dayan decided to personally visit the Northern Command headquarters. In the late night, Hofi informed Dayan that an estimated three hundred Syrian tanks had entered the southern Golan. No reserves were available to stop a Syrian incursion into Galilee. Visibly shaken by this news, the Israeli minister of defence ordered the Jordan bridges to be prepared for detonation.

Next, he contacted Benjamin Peled, commander of the Israeli Air Force. He shocked Peled by announcing that the Third Temple was about to fall. The IAF had just made a successful start with Operation Tagar, a very complex plan to neutralise the Egyptian AA-missile belt. Overruling objections by Peled, Dayan ordered to immediately carry out Operation Doogman 5 instead, the destruction of the Syrian SAM-belt, to allow the IAF to halt the Syrian advance.

As there was no time to obtain recent information on the location of the batteries, the attempt was a costly failure. The Israelis destroyed only one Syrian missile battery but lost six Phantom II aircraft. As a result, the IAF was unable to make a significant contribution to the defensive battle on the Golan. Over both fronts together, on 7 October only 129 bombardment sorties were flown. It also proved impossible to restart Tagar, curtailing IAF operations on the Sinai front for the duration of the war.

Less pessimistic than Dayan, Elazar was not ready yet to abandon the Golan Heights. Israeli High Command had a strategic reserve, consisting of the 146th Ugda that was earmarked for Central Command, controlling the eastern border with Jordan. In the evening of 6 October, Elazar had considered sending this division to the collapsing Sinai front in view of the initial defensive success at the Golan. The unexpected crisis led to an about-face. Priority was given to the north because of its proximity to Israeli population centers at Tiberias, Safed, Haifa and Netanya. Elazar ordered that, after mobilisation, the 146th Ugda was to reconquer the southern Golan.

This division would take some time to deploy. Some smaller units could be quickly mobilised to bolster the defenses. The Syrians had expected it to take at least twenty-four hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, they began to join the fight only nine hours after the war began, twelve hours after the start of the mobilisation. The Golan position had been at only 80% of its planned strength for the defensive phase of a full war with Syria. Northern Command had a headquarters reserve consisting of a unnumbered rapid deployment Centurion tank battalion. Also, the 71st Mechanised Infantry Battalion, with two organic tank companies, of the 188th AB had not yet been activated. During the night of 6/7 October these two battalions were gradually brought up.

Around 01:00 on 7 October, the 36th Division was activated as a divisional headquarters under Brigadier Rafael Eitan, to take direct command of the northern front. The 7th Armored Brigade did not have this division as its original destination. It was an elite active General Headquarters reserve, moved from the Sinai to the Golan in reaction to the Syrian build-up. Under the original mobilisation Plan Gir ("Chalk"), the 36th Division was to be expanded by the 179th Armored Brigade. In the evening of 6 October, it was considered to send this brigade to the Sinai instead but this option was abandoned after the Syrian breakthrough. To speed up the relocation of 7th Armored Brigade to the north, this brigade had left its tanks at Tasa, the main mobilisation complex of the Sinai, and used the stocked vehicles of the 179th Armored Brigade to rebuild itself at Nafah.

In turn, the 179th Armored Brigade began to mobilise in eastern Galilee, from the mobilisation complex at the foot of the Golan Heights, using the stocked vehicles of the 164th Armoured Brigade. This latter brigade was earmarked for the 240th Division, a division to be held in reserve. Assuming that a sustained Syrian offensive would have led to crippling Arab tank losses, 36th and 240th divisions were in the prewar planning intended to execute an advance in the direction of Damascus, Operation Ze'ev Aravot ("Desert Wolf"). All remaining stocked Centurions in the north were eventually used to rebuild 7th and 188th brigades on the night of 9/10 October. The 164th Armored Brigade was ultimately sent to the Sinai, to activate itself using the old 7th Armored Brigade matériel.

The 679th Armored Brigade was intended to join the 240th Division and ordered to mobilise at noon 6 October. Reservists of both brigades arriving at the Galilee army depots were quickly assigned to tanks and sent to the front, without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive, machine guns to be installed, or the tank guns to be calibrated, a time-consuming process known as bore-sighting. Elements of such larger units were during 7 October fed into the battle piece-meal.

Collapse of the Israeli 188th Armored Brigade

The Syrian first and second wave had in total numbered about six hundred tanks, half of which had been lost by the morning of 7 October. By this time, the Israelis had committed about 250 tanks to battle. Of the initially arriving reserves, the 71 MIB was used to block an advance by the westernmost elements of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division towards the Bnot Yaacov Bridge, the crucial connection between Galilee and Nafah. During the late evening of 6 October, the NCTB advanced from Nafah towards Hushniya, attempting to seal the breakthrough point. The attack, running into prepared positions occupied by a superior force of T-55s, was a dismal failure, leaving all of its officers dead or wounded. Greengold incorporated the remnants of the unit into his "Force Zvika".

By the early morning of 7 October, all attempts to patch the breach in the main defensive line of the southern sector became futile because also the center and right flank of the 188th AB had started to collapse. During the night, it had largely managed to hold its ground against continuous attacks, inflicting severe losses on the Syrians with accurate cannon fire, hoping to buy time for reserve forces to reach the front lines. Some tank crews sacrificed themselves rather than voluntarily give ground. Gradually, the fighting subsided.

Dawn revealed that the Syrian 5th Infantry Division under the cover of darkness had at numerous points bridged the tank ditch and cleared corridors through the minefield belt. The situation of 188th AB was rendered even more hazardous by the presence in its rear of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division. It was decided to abandon the southern Golan. In the night, many artillery and logistic units had already withdrawn, some slipping through the columns of 9th ID, others being destroyed by them. Civilian Jewish settlements had been evacuated. The same now happened with most fortifications, except bunker complex 116.

Ben-Shoham with his staff outflanked the Syrian penetration via a western route and reached the north. The 82nd TB company that had reinforced the center, commanded by Eli Geva, had the previous evening destroyed about thirty Syrian tanks. It now successfully crossed the axis of 9th ID to the north. Of the originally thirty-six tanks of 53rd TB, twelve remained. Eres hid them in the crater of Tel Faris, where a surveillance base was located. During the late evening of 7 October, he would successfully break out to the west.

An abandoned Syrian T-55 tank

The Syrian 5th ID subsequently occupied the plateau of the southern Golan. Ben-Shoham tried to maintain a foothold on the access roads by small groups of APCs manned by the 50th Paratrooper Battalion, but these were easily brushed aside. The Syrian 47th Armored Brigade advanced along the escarpment to the north, in the direction of the Bnot Yaacov Bridge. The 132nd Mechanised Infantry Brigade positioned itself east of El Al, on the road along the Jordan border, running to the south of Lake Tiberias. Israeli General Dan Lener in the late night activated the divisional headquarters of the 210th Ugda to take control over the sector between the lake and the Bnot Yaacov Bridge but he had no regular units to hold this line.

For the moment, he could do little more than personally halt retreating troops and vehicles on the more southern Arik Bridge and send them over the River Jordan again. Israeli command feared that the Syrians would quickly exploit this situation by advancing into Galilee. Dayan in the morning of 7 October called Shalhevet Freier, the director-general of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, to a meeting with Golda Meir to discuss the possible arming of nuclear weapons. Meir rejected this option. The Syrian mechanised brigades in this area did not continue the offensive but began to entrench themselves in strong defensive positions. They had been forbidden by Al-Assad to approach the River Jordan, for fear of triggering an Israeli nuclear response.

The original Syrian offensive plan Al-Aouda ("The Return"), devised by Major-General Adul Habeisi, had emphasized the element of tactical surprise. It was known to the Syrians that the 188th AB normally rotated its two tank battalions on the Purple Line, so that on any given moment just thirty-three tanks were guarding the tank ditch. Infiltrations by commando teams armed with Saggers were planned to quickly isolate these ten tank platoons from reinforcement by tactical reserves. Simultaneously, helicopter-borne commando attacks at the Jordan bridges, landing during conditions of dusk to avoid the IAF, would isolate the Golan Heights from strategic reinforcements.

Night attacks by the three Syrian infantry divisions would then fragment the weakly-held forward Israeli defensive positions. To conclude the operation and deter any Israeli attempt to reconquer the Golan, the Syrian 1st and 3rd Armored Division would advance onto the plateau. This way, it was hoped to take the Golan within thirty hours. Coordination with Egypt forced a change of plans. The Egyptians wanted hostilities to start at noon; in the end they agreed to a compromise time of 14:00. The Syrian helicopter attacks were cancelled. Now uncertain of a successful outcome, the Syrians became less committed to the attack. They decided to keep one armored division as a strategic reserve, together with the two presidential guard independent armored brigades, which fielded the most modern tank matériel.

Israel retakes the southern Golan

The aftermath of an Israeli airstrike on the Syrian General Staff headquarters in Damascus

The tide in the Golan began to turn as arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain the Syrian advance. Beginning on 8 October, the Israelis began pushing the Syrians back towards the pre-war ceasefire lines, inflicting heavy tank losses.

On 9 October, the Syrians launched a counterattack north of Quneitra. As part of the operation, they attempted to land heli-borne troops in the vicinity of El Rom. The counterattack was repulsed, and four Syrian helicopters were shot down with total loss of life. Syrian FROG-7 artillery rockets struck the Israeli Air Force base of Ramat David, killing a pilot and injuring several soldiers. Additional missiles struck civilian settlements. In retaliation, seven Israeli F-4 Phantoms flew into Syria and struck the Syrian General Staff Headquarters in Damascus. One Israeli Phantom was shot down. The attack prompted the Syrians to transfer air defense units from the Golan Heights to the home front, allowing the IAF greater freedom of action.

By 10 October, the last Syrian unit in the central sector was pushed back across the Purple Line, the pre-war ceasefire line. After four days of intense and incessant combat, the Israelis had succeeded in ejecting the Syrians from the entire Golan.

Israeli advance towards Damascus

A decision now had to be made—whether to stop at the post-1967 border or to continue advancing into Syrian territory. The Israeli High Command spent all of 10 October debating well into the night. Some favored disengagement, which would allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had taken place two days earlier). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and would give Israel a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended.

Others countered that Syria had strong defenses—antitank ditches, minefields, and strongpoints—and that it would be better to fight from defensive positions in the Golan Heights (rather than the flat terrain deeper in Syria) in the event of another war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Golda Meir realized the most crucial point of the whole debate:

It would take four days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a political matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line. ... The attack would be launched tomorrow, Thursday, 11 October.

Quneitra village after Israeli shelling, showing a church and an elevated car

On 11 October, Israeli forces pushed into Syria and advanced towards Damascus along the Quneitra-Damascus road until 14 October, encountering stiff resistance by Syrian reservists in prepared defenses. Three Israeli divisions broke the first and second defensive lines near Sasa, and conquered a further 50 square kilometres of territory in the Bashan salient. From there, they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40 km away, using M107 heavy artillery. The Israeli Army advanced to within 30 km of Damascus.

On 12 October, Israeli paratroopers from the elite Sayeret Tzanhanim reconnaissance unit launched Operation Gown, infiltrating deep into Syria and destroying a bridge in the tri-border area of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. The operation disrupted the flow of weapons and troops to Syria. During the operation, the paratroopers destroyed a number of tank transports and killed several Syrian soldiers. There were no Israeli casualties.

Arab military intervention

As the Syrian position deteriorated, Jordan sent an expeditionary force into Syria. King Hussein, who had come under intense pressure to enter the war, told Israel of his intentions through U.S. intermediaries, in the hope that Israel would accept that this was not a casus belli justifying an attack on Jordan. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declined to offer any such assurance, but said that Israel had no intention of opening another front. Iraq also sent an expeditionary force to Syria, consisting of the 3rd and 6th Armoured Divisions, some 30,000 men, 250–500 tanks, and 700 APCs. Israeli jets attacked Iraqi forces as they arrived in Syria.

The Iraqi divisions were a strategic surprise for the IDF, which had expected 24-hour-plus advance intelligence of such moves. This turned into an operational surprise, as the Iraqis attacked the exposed southern flank of the advancing Israeli armor, forcing its advance units to retreat a few kilometres in order to prevent encirclement. Combined Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counterattacks prevented any further Israeli gains. However, they were unable to push the Israelis back from the Bashan salient, and suffered heavy losses in their engagements with the Israelis. The most effective attack took place on 20 October, though Arab forces lost 120 tanks in that engagement.

The Syrian Air Force attacked Israeli columns, but its operations were highly limited because of Israeli air superiority, and it suffered heavy losses in dogfights with Israeli jets. On 23 October, a large air battle took place near Damascus during which the Israelis shot down 10 Syrian aircraft. The Syrians claimed a similar toll against Israel. The IDF also destroyed the Syrian missile defense system. The Israeli Air Force utilized its air superiority to attack strategic targets throughout Syria, including important power plants, petrol supplies, bridges and main roads. The strikes weakened the Syrian war effort, disrupted Soviet efforts to airlift military equipment into Syria, and disrupted normal life inside the country.

On 22 October, the Golani Brigade and Sayeret Matkal commandos recaptured the outpost on Mount Hermon, after a hard-fought battle that involved hand-to-hand combat and Syrian sniper attacks. An unsuccessful attack two weeks prior had cost the Israelis 23 dead and 55 wounded and the Syrians 29 dead and 11 wounded, while this second attack cost Israel an additional 55 dead and 79 wounded. An unknown number of Syrians were also killed and some were taken prisoner. An IDF D9 bulldozer supported by infantry forced its way to the peak. An Israeli paratroop force landing by helicopter took the corresponding Syrian Hermon outposts on the mountain, killing more than a dozen Syrians while losing one dead and four wounded. Seven Syrian MiGs and two Syrian helicopters carrying reinforcements were shot down as they attempted to intercede.

Northern front de-escalation

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for a ceasefire. Following the UN-backed ceasefire, there were ongoing artillery exchanges and skirmishes, and Israeli forces continued to occupy positions deep within Syria. Some aerial engagements took place, and both sides lost several aircraft. Amid mounting international pressure and further UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire, the war finally came to a close on 26 October. Israel and Egypt signed a formal cease-fire agreement on 11 November, and this was followed the with a disengagement agreement on 18 January the next year.

Hostilities between Israel and Syria continued, and on 4 February 1974, 500 Cubans joined a Syrian tank division at Mount Hermon in an attack against Israeli forces, sparking a war of attrition in the Golan Heights. It ended only in 31 May with a ceasefire between Israel and Syria.

Jordanian participation

The U.S. pressed King Hussein to keep Jordan out of the war. Though King Hussein initially refrained from entering the conflict, on the night of 12–13 October Jordanian troops deployed to the Jordanian-Syrian frontier to buttress Syrian troops, and Jordanian forces joined Syrian and Iraqi assaults on Israeli positions on 16 and 19 October. Hussein sent a second brigade to the Golan front on 21 October. According to historian Assaf David, declassified U.S. documents show that the Jordanian participation was only a token to preserve King Hussein's status in the Arab world. The documents reveal that Israel and Jordan had a tacit understanding that the Jordanian units would try to stay out of the fighting and Israel would try to not attack them.

Naval operations

A diagram of the Battle of Baltim

On the first day of the war, Egyptian missile boats bombarded Israeli positions on the Sinai coast; targeting Rumana, Ras Beyron, Ras Masala and Ras Sudar on the Mediterranean and Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea coast of the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian frogmen raided the oil installations at Bala'eem, disabling the massive driller. Several small naval engagements took place on 7 October, including the Battle of Latakia and Battle of Marsa Talamat.

A Syrian Styx missile fired at an Israeli missile boat

The Battle of Baltim, which took place on 8–9 October off the coast of Baltim and Damietta, ended in a decisive Israeli victory. Six Israeli missile boats heading towards Port Said encountered four Egyptian missile boats coming from Alexandria. In an engagement lasting about forty minutes, the Israelis evaded Egyptian Styx missiles using electronic countermeasures and sank three of the Egyptian missile boats with Gabriel missiles and gunfire. The Battles of Latakia and Baltim "drastically changed the operational situation at sea to Israeli advantage".

Five nights after the Battle of Baltim, five Israeli patrol boats entered the Egyptian anchorage at Ras Ghareb, where over fifty Egyptian small patrol craft and armed fishing boats mobilized for the war effort and loaded with troops, ammunition, and supplies bound for the Israeli side of the Gulf were based. In the battle that followed, 19 Egyptian boats were sunk, while others remained bottled up in port.

The Israeli Navy had control of the Gulf of Suez during the war, which made possible the continued deployment of an Israeli SAM battery near an Israeli naval base close to the southern end of the Suez Canal, depriving the Egyptian Third Army of air support and preventing it from moving southward and attempting to capture the southern Sinai.

On 18 October, Israeli frogmen set off an explosion that severed two underwater communications cables off Beirut, one of which led to Alexandria and the other to Marseilles. As a result, telex and telecommunications between the West and Syria were severed, and were not restored until the cables were repaired on 27 October. The cables had also been used by the Syrians and Egyptians to communicate with each other in preference to using radio, which was monitored by Israeli, U.S. and Soviet intelligence. Egypt and Syria resorted to communicating via a Jordanian radio station in Ajloun, bouncing the signals off a U.S. satellite.

A Syrian oil terminal in Baniyas after being shelled by Israeli Sa'ar 3-class missile boats

Having decisively beaten the Egyptian and Syrian navies, the Israeli Navy had the run of the coastlines. Israeli missile boats utilized their 76 mm cannons and other armaments to strike targets along the Egyptian and Syrian coastlines, including wharves, oil tank farms, coastal batteries, radar stations, airstrips, and other targets of military value. The Israeli Navy even attacked some of Egypt's northernmost SAM batteries. The Israeli Navy's attacks were carried out with minimal support from the IAF (only one Arab naval target was destroyed from the air during the entire war).

The Egyptian Navy managed to enforce a blockade at Bab-el-Mandeb. Eighteen million tons of oil had been transported yearly from Iran to Israel through the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. The blockade was enforced by two Egyptian destroyers and two submarines, supported by ancillary craft. Shipping destined for Israel through the Gulf of Eilat was halted by the Egyptians. The Israeli Navy had no means of lifting the blockade due to the long range involved, and the Israeli Air Force, apparently also incapable of lifting the blockade, did not challenge it. The blockade was lifted on 1 November, after Israel used the surrounded Egyptian Third Army as a bargaining chip. The Egyptians unsuccessfully attempted to blockade the Israeli Mediterranean coastline, and mined the Gulf of Suez to prevent the transportation of oil from the Bala'eem and Abu Rudeis oil fields in southwestern Sinai to Eilat in southern Israel. Two oil tankers, of 48,000 ton and 2,000 ton capacity, sank after hitting mines in the Gulf.

According to Admiral Ze'ev Almog, the Israeli Navy escorted tankers from the Gulf to Eilat throughout the war, and Israeli tankers sailing from Iran were directed to bypass the Red Sea. As a result of these actions and the failure of Egypt's Mediterranean blockade, the transport of oil, grain and weapons to Israeli ports was made possible throughout nearly the entire war. A post-war survey found that during the entire war period, Israel suffered no oil shortages, and even sold oil to third parties affected by the Arab oil embargo. This claim was disputed by Edgar O'Ballance, who claimed that no oil went to Israel during the blockade, and the Eilat-Ashdod pipeline was empty by the end of the war.

Israel responded with a counter-blockade of Egypt in the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade was enforced by naval vessels based at Sharm el-Sheikh and on the Sinai coast facing the Gulf of Suez. The Israeli blockade substantially damaged the Egyptian economy. According to historian Gammal Hammad, Egypt's principal ports, Alexandria and Port Safaga, remained open to shipping throughout the war. Throughout the war, the Israeli Navy enjoyed complete command of the seas both in the Mediterranean approaches and in the Gulf of Suez.

During the last week of the war, Egyptian frogmen carried out three or four raids on Eilat. The attacks caused minor damage, but created some alarm.

According to Israeli and Western sources, the Israelis lost no vessels in the war. Israeli vessels were "targeted by as many as 52 Soviet-made anti-ship missiles", but none hit their targets. According to historian Benny Morris, the Egyptians lost seven missile boats and four torpedo boats and coastal defense craft, while the Syrians lost five missile boats, one minesweeper, and one coastal defense vessel.

U.S.–Soviet naval standoff

The war saw the largest naval confrontation between the United States Navy and Soviet Navy of the entire Cold War. As the United States and Soviet Union supported their respective allies, their fleets in the Mediterranean became increasingly hostile toward each other. The Soviet 5th Operational Squadron had 52 ships in the Mediterranean when the war began, including 11 submarines, some of which carried cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The United States Sixth Fleet had 48, including two aircraft carriers, a helicopter carrier, and amphibious vessels carrying 2,000 marines.

As the war continued, both sides reinforced their fleets. The Soviet squadron grew to 97 vessels including 23 submarines, while the US Sixth Fleet grew to 60 vessels including 9 submarines, 2 helicopter carriers, and 3 aircraft carriers. Both fleets made preparations for war, and US aircraft conducted reconnaissance over the Soviet fleet. The two fleets began to disengage following the ceasefire.

Participation by other states

U.S. intelligence efforts

The U.S. intelligence community, including the CIA, failed to predict in advance the Egyptian–Syrian attack on Israel. A U.S. intelligence report as late as 4 October still stated that "We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab–Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future". However, one U.S. government source that was able to predict the approaching war was Roger Merrick, an analyst working for the INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department), but his conclusions were ignored at the time, and the report he had written to that effect was only rediscovered by U.S. government archive officials in 2013.

U.S. aid to Israel

Main article: Operation Nickel Grass

Based on intelligence estimates at the commencement of hostilities, American leaders expected the tide of the war to quickly shift in Israel's favor, and that Arab armies would be completely defeated within 72 to 96 hours. On 6 October, Secretary of State Kissinger convened the National Security Council's official crisis management group, the Washington Special Actions Group, which debated whether the U.S. should supply additional arms to Israel. High-ranking representatives of the Defense and State Departments opposed such a move. Kissinger was the sole dissenter; he said that if the U.S. refused aid, Israel would have little incentive to conform to American views in postwar diplomacy. Kissinger argued the sending of U.S. aid might cause Israel to moderate its territorial claims, but this thesis raised a protracted debate whether U.S. aid was likely to make it more accommodating or more intransigent toward the Arab world.

An Israeli M48 Patton captured by Egyptian forces

By 8 October, Israel had encountered military difficulties on both fronts. In the Sinai, Israeli efforts to break through Egyptian lines with armor had been thwarted, and while Israel had contained and begun to turn back the Syrian advance, Syrian forces were still overlooking the Jordan River and their air defense systems were inflicting a high toll on Israeli planes. It became clear by 9 October that no quick reversal in Israel's favor would occur and that IDF losses were unexpectedly high.

During the night of 8–9 October, an alarmed Dayan told Meir that "this is the end of the third temple." He was warning of Israel's impending total defeat, but "Temple" was also the code word for Israel's nuclear weapons. Dayan raised the nuclear topic in a cabinet meeting, warning that the country was approaching a point of "last resort". That night, Meir authorized the assembly of thirteen 20-kiloton-of-TNT (84 TJ) tactical nuclear weapons for Jericho missiles at Sdot Micha Airbase and F-4 Phantom II aircraft at Tel Nof Airbase. They would be used if absolutely necessary to prevent total defeat, but the preparation was done in an easily detectable way, likely as a signal to the United States. Kissinger learned of the nuclear alert on the morning of 9 October. That day, President Nixon ordered the commencement of Operation Nickel Grass, an American airlift to replace all of Israel's material losses.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that Kissinger told Sadat that the reason for the U.S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to "going nuclear". However, subsequent interviews with Kissinger, Schlesinger, and William Quandt suggested that the nuclear aspect was not a major factor in the decision to re-supply. These officials cited the ongoing Soviet re-supply effort and Sadat's early rejection of a ceasefire as the primary motivators. European countries refused to allow U.S. airplanes carrying supplies for Israel to refuel at their bases, fearing an Arab oil embargo, with the exception of Portugal and the Netherlands. Portugal permitted the United States to use the leased base of Lajes Field in the Azores, and the defence minister of the Netherlands, apparently acting without consulting his cabinet colleagues, secretly authorised the use of Dutch airfields. Greece, then under the dictatorial rule of the Regime of the Colonels, declared itself neutral in the conflict. However, the Greek junta permitted the United States to use communications facilities within Greece and the airports at Athens and at Souda Naval Base to facilitate its assistance to Israel, though it refused to allow the Americans to use its strategically important bases in Cyprus.

A cargo plane with its access door open, men, and a tank
An M60 delivered during Operation Nickel Grass

Israel began receiving supplies via U.S. Air Force cargo airplanes on 14 October, although some equipment had arrived on planes from Israel's national airline El Al before this date. By that time, the IDF had advanced deep into Syria and was mounting a largely successful invasion of the Egyptian mainland from the Sinai, but had taken severe material losses. According to Abraham Rabinovich, "while the American airlift of supplies did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, it did allow Israel to expend what it did have more freely".

By the end of Nickel Grass, the United States had shipped 22,395 tons of matériel to Israel. 8,755 tons of it arrived before the end of the war. American C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy aircraft flew 567 missions throughout the airlift. El Al planes flew in an additional 5,500 tons of matériel in 170 flights. The airlift continued after the war until 14 November. The United States delivered approximately 90,000 tons of materiel to Israel by sealift by the beginning of December, using 16 ships. 33,210 tons of it arrived by November.

By the beginning of December, Israel had received between 34 and 40 F-4 fighter-bombers, 46 A-4 attack airplanes, 12 C-130 cargo airplanes, 8 CH-53 helicopters, 40 unmanned aerial vehicles, 200 M-60/M-48A3 tanks, 250 APCs, 226 utility vehicles, 12 MIM-72 Chaparral surface-to-air missile systems, three MIM-23 Hawk SAM systems, 36 155 mm artillery pieces, seven 175 mm artillery pieces, and large quantities of 105 mm, 155 mm and 175 mm ammunition. State of the art equipment, such as the AGM-65 Maverick missile and the BGM-71 TOW, weapons that had only entered production one or more years prior, as well as highly advanced electronic jamming equipment, was also sent. Most of the combat airplanes arrived during the war, and many were taken directly from USAF units. Most of the large equipment arrived after the ceasefire. The total cost of the equipment was approximately US$800 million (US$5.49 billion today).

On 13 and 15 October, Egyptian air defense radar detected an aircraft at an altitude of 25,000 metres (82,000 ft) and a speed of Mach 3 (3,700 km/h; 2,300 mph), making it impossible to intercept either by fighter or SAM missiles. The aircraft proceeded to cross the whole of the canal zone, the naval ports of the Red Sea (Hurghada and Safaga), flew over the airbases and air defenses in the Nile delta, and finally disappeared from radar screens over the Mediterranean Sea. The speed and altitude were those of the U.S. SR-71 Blackbird. According to Egyptian commanders, the intelligence provided by the reconnaissance flights helped the Israelis prepare for the Egyptian attack on 14 October and assisted it in conducting Operation Stouthearted Men.

Aid to Egypt and Syria

Soviet supplies

Two damaged armored personnel carriers. An Israeli flag is next to them.
A Syrian BMP-1 captured by Israeli forces

Starting on 9 October, the Soviet Union began supplying Egypt and Syria by air and by sea. The Soviets airlifted 12,500–15,000 tons of supplies, of which 6,000 tons went to Egypt, 3,750 tons went to Syria and 575 tons went to Iraq. General Shazly, the former Egyptian chief of staff, claimed that more than half of the airlifted Soviet hardware actually went to Syria. According to Ze'ev Schiff, Arab losses were so high and the attrition rate so great that equipment was taken directly from Soviet and Warsaw Pact stores to supply the airlift. Antonov An-12 and An-22 aircraft flew over 900 missions during the airlift.

The Soviets supplied another 63,000 tons, mainly to Syria, by means of a sealift by 30 October. Historian Gamal Hammad asserts that 400 T-55 and T-62 tanks supplied by the sealift were directed towards replacing Syrian losses, transported from Odessa on the Black Sea to the Syrian port of Latakia. Hammad claimed that Egypt did not receive any tanks from the Soviets. The sealift may have included Soviet nuclear weapons, which were not unloaded but kept in Alexandria harbor until November to counter the Israeli nuclear preparations, which Soviet satellites had detected. Soviet intelligence informed Egypt that Israel had armed three nuclear weapons.

American concern over possible evidence of nuclear warheads for the Soviet Scud missiles in Egypt contributed to Washington's decision to go to DEFCON 3. According to documents declassified in 2016, the move to DEFCON 3 was motivated by CIA reports indicating that the Soviet Union had sent a ship to Egypt carrying nuclear weapons along with two other amphibious vessels.

Soviet active aid

On the Golan front, Syrian forces received direct support from Soviet technicians and military personnel. At the start of the war, there were an estimated 2,000 Soviet personnel in Syria, of whom 1,000 were serving in Syrian air defense units. Soviet technicians repaired damaged tanks, SAMs and radar equipment, assembled fighter jets that arrived via the sealift, and drove tanks supplied by the sealift from ports to Damascus. On both the Golan and Sinai fronts, Soviet military personnel retrieved abandoned Israeli military equipment for shipment to Moscow.

Soviet advisors were reportedly present in Syrian command posts "at every echelon, from battalion up, including supreme headquarters". Some Soviet military personnel went into battle with the Syrians, and it was estimated that 20 were killed in action and more were wounded. In July 1974, Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres informed the Knesset that high-ranking Soviet officers had been killed on the Syrian front during the war. There were strong rumors that a handful were taken prisoner, but this was denied. However, it was noted that certain Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate just after the war, leading to suspicions of a covert exchange. The Observer wrote that seven Soviets in uniform were taken prisoner after surrendering when the Israelis overran their bunker. The Israelis reportedly took the prisoners to Ramat David Airbase for interrogation, and treated the incident with great secrecy.

Soviet fighter pilots stationed in Egypt as advisors and instructors may have participated in combat operations. There are several references to Soviet personnel being captured which were never officially confirmed, including a US State Department mention of a report from an Israeli Air Force pilot which claimed that two Soviet MiG pilots had been captured, and the account of an Israeli paratrooper reservist who claimed that while mopping up bunkers near Suez City, his force captured four or five Soviet officers. Israeli officers who reported great difficulty in command and control due to jamming of their radio frequencies attributed the improved jamming capabilities they were facing to the Soviets. According to Gideon Remez and Isabella Ginor, Soviet Spetsnaz commandos twice conducted raids behind Israeli lines on the Egyptian front in the early days of the war and captured two Israeli Centurion tanks after killing their crews so that their upgraded guns could be studied.

Israeli military intelligence reported that Soviet-piloted MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor/reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Canal Zone.

Soviet intervention threat

24 October. A UN-arranged meeting between IDF Lt. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev and Egyptian Brigadier General Bashir Sharif in Sinai.

On 9 October, the Soviet cultural center in Damascus was damaged during an IAF airstrike, and two days later, the Soviet merchant ship Ilya Mechnikov was sunk by the Israeli Navy during a battle off Syria. The Soviets condemned Israeli actions, and there were calls within the government for military retaliation. The Soviets ultimately reacted by deploying two destroyers off the Syrian coast. Soviet warships in the Mediterranean were authorized to open fire on Israeli combatants approaching Soviet convoys and transports. There were several recorded instances of Soviet ships exchanging fire with Israeli forces. In particular, the Soviet minesweeper Rulevoi and the medium landing ship SDK-137, guarding Soviet transport ships at the Syrian port of Latakia, fired on approaching Israeli jets.

During the cease-fire, Henry Kissinger mediated a series of exchanges with the Egyptians, Israelis and the Soviets. On 24 October, Sadat publicly appealed for American and Soviet contingents to oversee the ceasefire; it was quickly rejected in a White House statement. Kissinger also met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss convening a peace conference with Geneva as the venue. Later in the evening (9:35 pm) of 24–25 October, Brezhnev sent Nixon a "very urgent" letter.

In that letter, Brezhnev began by noting that Israel was continuing to violate the ceasefire and it posed a challenge to both the U.S. and USSR. He stressed the need to "implement" the ceasefire resolution and "invited" the U.S. to join the Soviets "to compel observance of the cease-fire without delay". He then threatened "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel."

Kissinger immediately passed the message to White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, who met with Nixon for 20 minutes around 10:30 pm, and reportedly empowered Kissinger to take any necessary action. Kissinger immediately called a meeting of senior officials, including Haig, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby. The Watergate scandal had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him:

When Kissinger asked Haig whether should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions.

The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the DEFCON from four to three. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.

The Soviets placed seven airborne divisions on alert and airlift was marshaled to transport them to the Middle East. An airborne command post was set up in the southern Soviet Union, and several air force units were also alerted. "Reports also indicated that at least one of the divisions and a squadron of transport planes had been moved from the Soviet Union to an airbase in Yugoslavia".

The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said Premier Alexei Kosygin, while KGB chief Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the Third World War." The letter from the U.S. cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply. The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.

Other countries

A plaque commemorating the supply of eight East German Air Force MiG-21s to Syria during the war, on display at the Flugplatzmuseum Cottbus

In total, Arab countries added up to 100,000 troops to Egypt and Syria's frontline ranks, and about 20,000 troops stationed in Jordanian territory. Besides Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, several other Arab states were also involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing. In addition to its forces in Syria, Iraq sent a single Hawker Hunter squadron to Egypt. The squadron quickly gained a reputation amongst Egyptian field commanders for its skill in air support, particularly in anti-armor strikes.

However, nearly all Arab reinforcements came with no logistical plan or support, expecting their hosts to supply them, and in several cases causing logistical problems. On the Syrian front, a lack of coordination between Arab forces led to several instances of friendly fire.

  • Algeria sent a squadron each of MiG-21s and Su-7s to Egypt, which arrived at the front between 9 and 11 October. It also sent an armored brigade of 150 tanks, the advance elements of which began to arrive on 17 October, but reached the front only on 24 October, too late to participate in the fighting. After the war, during the first days of November, Algeria deposited around US$200 million with the Soviet Union to finance arms purchases for Egypt and Syria. Algerian fighter jets, however, did participate in attacks together with Egyptians and Iraqis.
  • East German Communist Party leader Erich Honecker directed the shipment of 75,000 grenades, 30,000 mines, 62 tanks and 12 fighter jets to Syria.
  • 20 North Korean pilots and 19 non-combat personnel were sent to Egypt. According to Shlomo Aloni, the last aerial engagement on the Egyptian front, which took place on 6 December, saw Israeli F-4s engage North Korean-piloted MiG-21s. The Israelis shot down one MiG, and another was mistakenly shot down by Egyptian air defenses. Egyptian sources said that the North Koreans suffered no losses but claimed no aerial victories in their engagements.
  • According to Chengappa, several Pakistan Air Force pilots flew combat missions in Syrian aircraft, and shot down one Israeli fighter.
  • Libya, which had forces stationed in Egypt before the outbreak of the war, provided one armored brigade and two squadrons of Mirage V fighters, of which one squadron was to be piloted by the Egyptian Air Force and the other by Libyan pilots. Only Egyptian-manned squadrons participated in the war. The Libyan armored brigade stationed in Egypt never took an active part in the war. Libya also sent financial aid.
  • Saudi Arabia had a force of 20,000 Saudi soldiers that remained in Jordanian territory since 1967 to provide support and assistance as needed for a total of 10 years. Additionally, the Saudis sent 3,000 soldiers to Syria, bolstered by a light armored battalion of Panhard AML-90 vehicles. One of the AMLs was later captured by the Israelis near Golan Heights and displayed to the media as proof of Saudi involvement. The Saudi armor was deployed primarily in rearguard actions but also performed active reconnaissance for the Iraqi and Jordanian expeditionary forces between 16 and 19 October. During that time, it participated in two major engagements and the IDF claimed that most of the armoured car battalion was destroyed. The Saudis acknowledged only minor losses, including the loss of 4 AMLs.
  • Kuwait dispatched 3,000 soldiers to Syria. These arrived with additional Jordanian and Iraqi reinforcements in time for a new Syrian offensive scheduled for 23 October, which was later cancelled. Kuwaiti troops were also sent to Egypt. Kuwait also provided financial aid.
  • Morocco sent one infantry brigade to Egypt and one armored regiment to Syria. Six Moroccan troops were killed in action on the Syrian front.
  • Tunisia sent 1,000–2,000 soldiers to Egypt, where they were stationed in the Nile Delta and some of them were stationed to defend Port Said.
  • Lebanon enabled Palestinian artillery units to operate from its territory and Lebanese radar operators guided Syrian air force aircraft. Lebanon however did not directly take part in the war.
  • Sudan deployed a 3,500-strong infantry brigade to Egypt. It arrived on 28 October, too late to participate in the war.

Non-state participants:

  • An infantry brigade composed of Palestinians was in Egypt before the outbreak of the war.

Palestinian attacks from Lebanese territory

During the course of the war, Palestinian militias from southern Lebanon launched several attacks on Israeli border communities. All of the attempts to infiltrate Israel failed, and 23 militants were killed and four were captured during the clashes. Most of the activity was focused on Katyusha rocket and anti-tank missile fire on Israeli border communities. In the attacks some civilians were injured, mostly lightly and damage was made to property. On 10 October, after Palestinian militants fired some 40 rockets on Israeli communities, Chief of Staff David Elazar and chief of the Northern Command Yitzhak Hofi requested permission to send a force into Lebanon to root out Palestinian militants, but the request was declined by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, who did not want to divert forces from the Syrian front.

UN-backed ceasefire

A 1974 news report about warfare on the Golan prior to the May disengagement accords

On 24 October, the UNSC passed Resolution 339, serving as a renewed call for all parties to adhere to the ceasefire terms established in Resolution 338. Most heavy fighting on the Egyptian front ended by 26 October, but clashes along the ceasefire lines and a few airstrikes on the Third Army took place. With some Israeli advances taking place, Kissinger threatened to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before Israel could respond, Egyptian national security advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with Israel, provided that it agree to allow non-military supplies to reach the Third Army and to a complete ceasefire.

About noon on 25 October, Kissinger appeared before the press at the State Department. He described the various stages of the crisis and the evolution of U.S. policy. He reviewed the first two weeks of the crisis and the nuclear alert, reiterated opposition to U.S. and Soviet troops in the area and more strongly opposed unilateral Soviet moves. He then reviewed the prospects for a peace agreement, which he termed "quite promising", and had conciliatory words for Israel, Egypt and even the USSR. Kissinger concluded his remarks by spelling out the principles of a new U.S. policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict saying:

Our position is that ... the conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations and that in the process of negotiations it will be necessary to make substantial concessions. The problem will be to relate the Arab concern for the sovereignty over the territories to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries. We believe that the process of negotiations between the parties is an essential component of this.

Quandt considers, "It was a brilliant performance, one of his most impressive." One hour later the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 340. This time the ceasefire held, and the fourth Arab–Israeli war was over.

Disengagement

Main article: Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria
UN Emergency Forces at Kilometre 101, November 1973

Disengagement talks took place on 28 October 1973, at "Kilometre 101" between Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy. Ultimately, Kissinger took the proposal to Sadat, who agreed. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli ones, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and prisoners-of-war were to be exchanged.

A summit conference in Geneva followed in December 1973. All parties to the war—Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt—were invited to a joint effort by the Soviet Union and the United States to finally usher peace between the Arabs and Israelis. This conference was recognized by UN Security Council Resolution 344 and was based on the Resolution 338, calling for a "just and durable peace". Nevertheless, the conference was forced to adjourn on 9 January 1974, as Syria refused attendance.

After the failed conference, Henry Kissinger started conducting shuttle diplomacy, meeting with Israel and the Arab states directly. The first concrete result of this was the initial military disengagement agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt on 18 January 1974. The agreement commonly known as Sinai I had the official name of Sinai Separation of Forces Agreement. Under its terms, Israel agreed to pull back its forces from the areas West of Suez Canal, which it had occupied since the end of hostilities. Moreover, Israeli forces were also pulled back on the length of the whole front to create security zones for Egypt, UN and Israel, each roughly ten kilometres wide. Thus Israel gave up its advances reaching beyond the Suez canal, but it still held nearly all of Sinai. It became the first of many such Land for Peace agreements where Israel gave up territory in exchange for treaties.

On the Syrian front, skirmishes and artillery exchanges continued taking place. Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement agreement on 31 May 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The agreement ended the skirmishes and exchanges of artillery fire that had occurred frequently along the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire line. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.

The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the aftermath of the 1948 war.

Reactions

Response in Israel

Though the war reinforced Israel's military deterrence, it had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden reversals that occurred at the beginning of the war inflicted a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had hitherto experienced no serious military challenges.

A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by Motti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians. Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days.

Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty. He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on 30 January 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."

Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had absolved Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignations (especially Dayan's) intensified.

On 11 April 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. A new government was seated in June and Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity, became prime minister.

Response in Egypt

General Shazly had angered Sadat for advocating the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Sinai to meet the Israeli incursion on the West Bank of the Canal. Six weeks after the war, he was relieved of command and forced out of the army, ultimately going into political exile for years. Upon his return to Egypt, he was placed under house arrest.

Following his release, he advocated the formation of a "Supreme High Committee" modeled after Israel's Agranat Commission in order to "probe, examine and analyze" the performance of Egyptian forces and the command decisions made during the war, but his requests were completely ignored. He published a book, banned in Egypt, that described Egypt's military failings and the sharp disagreements he had with Ismail and Sadat in connection with the prosecution of the war.

The commanders of the Second and Third Armies, Generals Khalil and Wasel, were also dismissed from the army. The commander of the Egyptian Second Army at the start of the war, General Mamoun, suffered a heart attack, or, alternatively, a breakdown, after the Egyptian defeat during the 14 October Sinai tank battle, and was replaced by General Khalil.

Response in Syria

In Syria, Colonel Rafik Halawi, the Druze commander of an infantry brigade that had collapsed during the Israeli breakthrough, was executed before the war even ended. He was given a quick hearing and sentenced to death; his execution was immediate. Military historian Zeev Schiff referred to him as Syria's "sacrificial lamb". The Syrians however offered vehement denials that Halawi was executed and expended great efforts trying to debunk the allegation. They claimed he was killed in battle with Israel and threatened severe punishment to anyone repeating the allegation of execution.

Their concern stemmed from a desire to maintain Syrian Druze loyalty to Assad's regime and prevent Syrian Druze from siding with their co-religionists in Israel. On 7 July 1974, Halawi's remains were removed from a Syrian military hospital and he was interred in Damascus at the "Cemetery of the Martyrs of the October War" in the presence of many Syrian dignitaries. One analyst noted that the presence of so many high-level officials was unusual and attributed it to Syrian efforts to quell any suggestion of execution.

Response in the Soviet Union

According to Chernyaev, on 4 November 1973, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev said:

We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn't have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed [sic]. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them.

Arab oil embargo

In response to U.S. support of Israel, the Arab members of OPEC, led by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per month on 17 October. On 19 October, President Nixon authorized a major allocation of arms supplies and $2.2 billion in appropriations for Israel. In response, Saudi Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other countries, causing the 1973 energy crisis.

Aftermath

Analyses differ on the militarily outcome of the war; as an Israeli victory by military historians, and by others, as a military stalemate.

Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement

Main article: Sinai Interim Agreement

Another Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement, the Sinai Interim Agreement, was signed in Geneva on 4 September 1975, and was commonly known as Sinai II. This agreement led Israel to withdraw from another 20–40 km with UN forces buffering the vacated area. After the agreement, Israel still held more than two-thirds of Sinai, which would prove to be a valuable bargaining chip in the coming negotiations.

Egyptian–Israeli Camp David Accords

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledge applause during a joint session of Congress in Washington, D.C., during which President Jimmy Carter announced the results of the Camp David Accords, 18 September 1978.
Main article: Camp David Accords

The Yom Kippur War upset the status quo in the Middle East, and the war served as a direct antecedent of the 1978 Camp David Accords. The impetus for the talks came when United States President Jimmy Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from 5–17 September 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel subsequently withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace, with the last Israeli troops exiting on 26 April 1982.

The Accords resulted in the Egypt–Israel peace treaty, the first ever between Israel and an Arab state. According to George Friedman, the war gave the Israelis increased respect for the Egyptian military and decreased their confidence in their own, and caused the Israelis to be uncertain whether they could defeat Egypt in the event of another war. At the same time, the Egyptians recognized that despite their improvements, they were defeated in the end, and became doubtful that they could ever defeat Israel militarily. Therefore, a negotiated settlement made sense to both sides. Many in the Arab world were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel. Sadat, in particular, became deeply unpopular both in the Arab world and in his own country. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League until 1989. Until then, Egypt had been "at the helm of the Arab world".

U.S. military doctrine

See also: AirLand Battle

U.S. military studies of the Yom Kippur War played a major role in shaping U.S. military doctrine in subsequent decades, particularly because the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was established only three months before the onset of the war. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Creighton Abrams, TRADOC Commander Gen. William E. DePuy, and other Army leaders saw Israel's strategic and doctrinal conditions between 1967 and 1973 as similar to NATO's position in Europe, and thus they undertook a deep study of Israel's warfighting in 1973 to derive insights for war against the Soviet Union.

Soon after the war, U.S. Army civilian analysts and senior officers such as Gen. Donn A. Starry visited the IDF and compiled "lessons" for the Army to learn after the war. These lessons covered the improved lethality and accuracy of anti-tank and anti-air missiles, the importance of superior training for tank crews, the necessity of cover and concealment during movement, and the importance of combined arms warfare. In 1976, TRADOC revised the Army's FM 100–5 Operations field manual and promoted an operational concept of "Active Defense", with a strong emphasis on tactical proficiency tied to the performance of advanced weapons systems like those observed in the Yom Kippur War fighting. Gen. DePuy visited Israel in 1976, where he toured Yom Kippur War battlefields and observed Israeli field training. He used these insights to encourage reforms of U.S. Army training to ease the Army's transition to a more professional force after the end of the military draft in 1973.

In May 1977, Gen. Starry (soon to succeed DePuy as TRADOC commander) returned to Israel and toured Yom Kippur War sites on the Golan Heights, guided by Raful Eitan and Moshe Peled. Starry used his observations to address problems left unaddressed by the Active Defense doctrine, such as how best to fight follow-on echelons after the first battle. TRADOC's 1982 revision of FM 100–5 replaced Active Defense with an offense-oriented operational doctrine known as AirLand Battle, which formed the basis of the American plan for Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

Casualties

See also: Israeli casualties of war
A downed Israeli Mirage

Israel suffered between 2,521 and 2,800 killed in action. An additional 7,250 to 8,800 soldiers were wounded. Some 293 Israelis were captured. Approximately 400 Israeli tanks were destroyed. Another 600 were disabled but returned to service after repairs. A major Israeli advantage, noted by many observers, was their ability to quickly return damaged tanks to combat.

The Israeli Air Force lost 102 airplanes: 32 F-4s, 53 A-4s, 11 Mirages and 6 Super Mysteres. Two helicopters, a Bell 205 and a CH-53, were lost. According to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, nearly half of these were shot down during the first three days of the war. IAF losses per combat sortie were less than in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Arab casualties were known to be much higher than Israel's. Precise figures are difficult to ascertain as Egypt and Syria never disclosed official figures. The lowest casualty estimate is 8,000 (5,000 Egyptian and 3,000 Syrian) killed and 18,000 wounded. The highest estimate is 18,500 (15,000 Egyptian and 3,500 Syrian) killed. Most estimates lie somewhere in between the two, with the Insight Team of London's The Sunday Times putting combined Egyptian and Syrian losses at 16,000 killed. Another source cites a figure of some 15,000 dead and 35,000 wounded. U.S. estimates placed Egyptian casualties at 13,000. Iraq lost 278 killed and 898 wounded, while Jordan suffered 23 killed and 77 wounded. Morocco lost 170 killed. Some 8,372 Egyptians, 392 Syrians, 13 Iraqis and 6 Moroccans were taken prisoner.

Arab tank losses amounted to 2,250 though Gawrych cites a figure of 2,300. 400 of these fell into Israeli hands in good working order and were incorporated into Israeli service. Between 341 and 514 Arab aircraft were shot down. According to Herzog, 334 of these aircraft were shot down by the IAF in air-to-air combat for the loss of only five Israeli planes. The Sunday Times Insight Team notes Arab aircraft losses of 450. Nineteen Arab naval vessels, including 10 missile boats, were sunk for no Israeli losses.

Atrocities

Syrian atrocities

Syria ignored the Geneva Conventions and many Israeli prisoners of war were tortured or killed. Advancing Israeli forces, re-capturing land taken by the Syrians early in the war, came across the bodies of 28 Israeli soldiers who had been blindfolded with their hands bound and summarily executed. In a December 1973 address to the National Assembly, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass stated that he had awarded one soldier the Medal of the Republic for killing 28 Israeli prisoners with an axe, decapitating three of them and eating the flesh of one of his victims.

The Syrians employed brutal interrogation techniques utilizing electric shocks to the genitals. A number of Israeli soldiers taken prisoner on Mount Hermon were executed. Near the village of Hushniye, the Syrians captured 11 administrative personnel from the Golan Heights Force, all of whom were later found dead, blindfolded, and with their hands tied behind their backs. Within Hushniye, seven Israeli prisoners were found dead, and another three were executed at Tel Zohar. Syrian prisoners who fell into Israeli captivity confirmed that their comrades killed IDF prisoners.

A soldier from the Moroccan contingent fighting with Syrian forces was found to be carrying a sack filled with the body parts of Israeli soldiers which he intended to take home as souvenirs. The bodies of Israeli prisoners who were killed were stripped of their uniforms and found clad only in their underpants, and Syrian soldiers removed their dog tags to make identification of the bodies more difficult.

Some Israeli POWs reported having their fingernails ripped out while others were described as being turned into human ashtrays as their Syrian guards burned them with lit cigarettes. A report submitted by the chief medical officer of the Israeli army notes that, "the vast majority of (Israeli) prisoners were exposed during their imprisonment to severe physical and mental torture. The usual methods of torture were beatings aimed at various parts of the body, electric shocks, wounds deliberately inflicted on the ears, burns on the legs, suspension in painful positions and other methods."

Following the conclusion of hostilities, Syria would not release the names of prisoners it was holding to the International Committee of the Red Cross and in fact, did not even acknowledge holding any prisoners despite the fact they were publicly exhibited by the Syrians for television crews. The Syrians, having been thoroughly defeated by Israel, were attempting to use their captives as their sole bargaining chip in the post-war negotiations. One of the most famous Israeli POWs was Avraham Lanir, an Israeli pilot who bailed out over Syria and was taken prisoner. Lanir died under Syrian interrogation. When his body was returned in 1974, it exhibited signs of torture.

Egyptian atrocities

Israeli historian Aryeh Yitzhaki estimated that the Egyptians killed about 200 Israeli soldiers who had surrendered. Yitzhaki based his claim on army documents. In addition, dozens of Israeli prisoners were beaten and otherwise mistreated in Egyptian captivity.

Individual Israeli soldiers gave testimony of witnessing comrades killed after surrendering to the Egyptians, or seeing the bodies of Israeli soldiers found blindfolded with their hands tied behind their backs. Avi Yaffe, a radioman serving on the Bar-Lev Line, reported hearing calls from other soldiers that the Egyptians were killing anyone who tried to surrender, and also obtained recordings of soldiers who were saved from Egyptian firing squads.

Issachar Ben-Gavriel, an Israeli soldier who was captured at the Suez Canal, claimed that out of his group of 19 soldiers who surrendered, 11 were shot dead. Another soldier claimed that a soldier in his unit was captured alive but beaten to death during interrogation. Photographic evidence of such executions exists, though some of it has never been made public. Photos were also found of Israeli prisoners who were photographed alive in Egyptian captivity, but were returned to Israel dead.

In 2013, the Israeli government declassified documents detailing Egyptian atrocities against prisoners of war, recording the deaths of at least 86 Israeli POWs at the hands of Egyptian forces. In an interview Israeli major general Herzl Shafir recalled instances of these accounts, including that of an injured prisoner who was murdered when an Egyptian doctor "disconnected him from the oxygen and kept him from getting an intravenous drip." He noted that statistics on the number of people killed was still unclear.

See also

References

Notes

  1. ^ The number reflects artillery units of caliber 100 mm and up
  2. Castro dispatched 500 Cuban tank commanders to Syria.

Citations

  1. ^ O'Ballance (1979).
  2. ^ Shazly (2003), p. 278.
  3. ^ Rabinovich (2004), pp. 464–465.
  4. ^ Hussain, Hamid (November 2002). "Opinion: The Fourth round – A Critical Review of 1973 Arab–Israeli War". Defence Journal. Archived from the original on 16 January 2009.
  5. ^ Mahjoub Tobji (2006). Les officiers de Sa Majesté: Les dérives des généraux marocains 1956–2006 (in French). Fayard. p. 107. ISBN 978-2-213-63015-1.
  6. ^ Ra’anan, G. D. (1981). The Evolution of the Soviet Use of Surrogates in Military Relations with the Third World, with Particular Emphasis on Cuban Participation in Africa. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. p. 37
  7. ^ Shazly (2003), pp. 83–84.
  8. ^ Cenciotti, David. "Israeli F-4s Actually Fought North Korean MiGs During the Yom Kippur War". Business Insider.
  9. ^ Nicolle & Cooper (2004).
  10. ^ Aloni (2001).
  11. ^ Morris (2011), p. 437.
  12. Morris (2011), p. 433: "Bashan ... 500 square kilometers ... which brought it within 20 miles of Damascus"
  13. ^ Rabinovich (2004), p. 54.
  14. Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, pp. 372–373.
  15. Herzog (1975), p. 239.
  16. Shazly (2003), p. 244.
  17. Shazly (2003), p. 272.
  18. Haber & Schiff (2003), pp. 30–31.
  19. ^ Major George E. Knapp (1992). "4: Antiarmor Operations on the Golan Heights". Combined Arms in battle since 1939. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Archived from the original on 7 May 2010. Retrieved 1 June 2009.
  20. ^ Rabinovich (2004), p. 314.
  21. Bar-On (2004), p. 170.
  22. ^ Neil Partrick (2016). Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation. Bloomsbury. p. 183. ISBN 978-0-85772-793-0.
  23. ^ "بطولات السعوديين حاضرة.. في الحروب العربية". Okaz. 17 November 2019. Archived from the original on 16 February 2021. Retrieved 13 August 2021.
  24. ^ "Saudi Arabian Military Activity Against Israel". CMU. May 1978. Archived from the original on 20 November 2021. Retrieved 19 November 2021.
  25. ^ Touchard, Laurent (7 November 2013). "Guerre du Kippour: quand le Maroc et l'Algérie se battaient côte à côte" (in French). Jeune Afrique. Retrieved 4 December 2022.
  26. ^ "Le jour où Hassan II a bombardé Israël". Le Temps (in French). Archived from the original on 14 October 2013. Retrieved 25 December 2013.
  27. ^ Williams, John Hoyt (1 August 1988). "Cuba: Havana's Military Machine". The Atlantic. Retrieved 19 September 2022.
  28. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991. Routledge. 2004. p. 47. ISBN 978-1-134-26933-4.
  29. ^ Schiff (1974), p. 328.
  30. ^ Gawrych (2000), p. 243.
  31. Journal "الأهرام","Al Ahram". 14 October 1974
  32. ^ Rabinovich (2004), p. 497.
  33. ^ Rabinovich (2004), p. 496.
  34. ^ "White House Military Briefing" (PDF). Retrieved 22 October 2011.
  35. "القوة الثالثة، تاريخ القوات الجوية المصرية." Third Power: History of Egyptian Air Force Ali Mohammed Labib. pp. 187
  36. ^ Herzog, Encyclopaedia Judaica, Keter Publishing House, 1974, p. 87.
  37. ^ "Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Mfa.gov.il. Retrieved 22 October 2011.
  38. ^ Dunstan, p. 200.
  39. ^ Rabinovich (2004), pp. 496–497.
  40. ^ Gawrych (2000), p. 244.
  41. ^ Herzog, p. 260.
  42. ^ Herzog (1975), p. 269.
  43. (Hebrew: מלחמת יום הכיפורים, Milẖemet Yom HaKipurim, or מלחמת יום כיפור, Milẖemet Yom Kipur; Arabic: حرب أكتوبر, Ḥarb ʾUktōbar, or حرب تشرين, Ḥarb Tišrīn),
  44. Rabinovich (2004), p. 260.
  45. Herzog (1975).
  46. James Bean and Craig Girard (2001). "Anwar al-Sadat's grand strategy in the Yom Kippur War" (PDF). National War College. pp. 1, 8. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 February 2017. Retrieved 11 June 2018.
  47. ^ el-Gamasy (1993), p. 181.
  48. ^ Gutfeld, Arnon; Vanetik, Boaz (30 March 2016). "'A Situation That Had to Be Manipulated': The American Airlift to Israel During the Yom Kippur War". Middle Eastern Studies. 52 (3): 419–447. doi:10.1080/00263206.2016.1144393. S2CID 146890821. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
  49. Rodman, David (29 July 2015). "The Impact of American Arms Transfers to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War". Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs. 7 (3): 107–114. doi:10.1080/23739770.2013.11446570. S2CID 141596916. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
  50. Levey, Zach (7 October 2008). "Anatomy of an airlift: United States military assistance to Israel during the 1973 war". Cold War History. 8 (4): 481–501. doi:10.1080/14682740802373552. S2CID 154204359. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
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  433. Ian Bickerton (2012). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Perplexed. A&C Black. p. 128. ISBN 978-1-4411-2872-0. the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1973
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  438. Kacowicz, Arie Marcelo (1994). Peaceful Territorial Change. Univ of South Carolina Press. p. 131. ISBN 978-0-87249-989-8. The Camp David Agreements should be understood against the background of the Yom Kippur War and its political, military, and economic implications. The Israeli military achievements on the battlefield, balanced by the Egyptian psychological victory in political terms, created a complex situation of military stalemate and political ripeness for striking a diplomatic bargain between the parties.
  439. Porter, Bruce D. (25 July 1986). The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980. Cambridge University Press. p. 28. ISBN 978-0-521-31064-2. Although Moscow managed against considerable odds to salvage from the Yom Kippur war a military stalemate and a moral victory for the Arabs, it suffered almost total collapse of its influence in Egypt shortly thereafter.
  440. Lansford, Tom (4 November 2011). 9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. p. 2. ISBN 978-1-59884-420-7. In 1973, Israel was attacked by a coalition of Arab states in the Yom Kippur War (Ramadan War). The conflict ended in a military stalemate.
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