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{{short description|Paper by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson}} {{short description|1971 ethics essay by Judith Jarvis Thomson}}
{{use dmy dates|date=May 2024}}
"'''A Defense of Abortion'''" is a ] ] essay by ] first published in '']'' in 1971. Granting for the sake of argument that the ] has a ], Thomson uses ]s to argue that the fetus's right to life does not override the pregnant person's right to have jurisdiction over their body, and that ] is therefore morally permissible. Thomson's argument has many critics on both sides of the abortion debate,<ref>e.g., Schwarz 1990, Beckwith 1993 and Lee 1996 on the ] side; Tooley 1972, Warren 1973, Steinbock 1992 and McMahan 2002 on the ] side</ref> yet it continues to receive defense.<ref>Kamm 1992; Boonin 2003: ch 4</ref> Thomson's imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made "A Defense of Abortion" perhaps "the most widely reprinted essay in all of contemporary ]".<ref>Parent 1986: vii</ref>
'''''A Defense of Abortion''''' is a ] essay by ] first published in '']'' in 1971. Granting for the sake of argument that the ] has a ], Thomson uses ]s to argue that the right to life does not include, entail, or imply the right to use someone else's body to survive and that ] is therefore morally permissible. Thomson's argument has critics on both sides of the ],<!--Abortion-rights side-->{{sfnm|1a1=Tooley|1y=1972|pp=52–53|2a1=Warren|2y=1973|3a1=Steinbock|3y=1992|3p=78|4a1=McMahan|4y=2002}}<!--Anti-abortion side-->{{sfnm|1a1=Schwarz|1y=1990|1loc=chap.&nbsp;8|2a1=Beckwith|2y=1993|2loc=chap.&nbsp;7|3a1=Lee|3y=1996|3loc=chap.&nbsp;4}} but it continues to receive defense.{{sfnm|1a1=Kamm|1y=1992|2a1=Boonin|2y=2003|2loc=chap.&nbsp;4}} Despite criticism, "A Defense of Abortion" remains highly influential.{{sfn|Moran|2023}}


==Overview of the essay== == Overview ==
=== Violinist&nbsp;– the "use of someone else's body"{{anchor|The Violinist}} ===
In "A Defense of Abortion", Thomson grants for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life but defends the permissibility of ] by appealing to a thought experiment. She writes:
{{quote|You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious ]ist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right ] to help. They have therefore ]ped you, and last night the violinist's ] was plugged into yours, so that your ] can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.{{sfnm|1a1=Thomson|1y=1971|1pp=48–49|2a1=Silverstein|2y=1987}}}}


Thomson argues that one can permissibly unplug oneself from the violinist even though this will cause his death; this is due to limits on the right to life, which does not include the right to use another person's body, and so by unplugging the violinist one does not violate his right to life but merely deprives him of something&nbsp;– the use of someone else's body&nbsp;– to which he has no right. She argues: "f you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a ] on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due."{{sfn|Thomson|1971|p=55}} For the same reason, Thomson says that abortion does not violate the fetus's legitimate right to life but merely deprives the fetus of something&nbsp;– the non-consensual use of the ] woman's body and life-supporting functions&nbsp;– to which it has no right. Thus, by choosing to terminate her pregnancy, Thomson concludes that a pregnant woman does not normally violate the fetus's right to life but merely withdraws its use of her own body, which usually causes the fetus to die.{{sfnm|1a1=Thomson|1y=1971|1p=63|2a1=Boonin|2y=2003|2pp=133–134}}
===The violinist{{anchor|The_Violinist}}===


=== Third-party participation&nbsp;– the "expanding child" ===
In "A Defense of Abortion", Thomson grants for the sake of argument that the fetus has a ], but defends the permissibility of abortion by appealing to a ]:
Thomson criticizes the common method of deducing a woman's right to abort from the permissibility of a third party committing the abortion. In most instances, a ] to abortion may hinge on the doctor's willingness to perform it. If the doctor refuses, then the pregnant woman is denied her right. To base the pregnant woman's right on the accordance or refusal of a doctor, she argues that it is to ignore the pregnant woman's full personhood and subsequently her right to her own body. Thomson presents the hypothetical example of the expanding child. She writes:
:You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious ]ist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right ] to help. They have therefore ]ped you, and last night the violinist's ] was plugged into yours, so that your ] can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.<ref>Thomson 1971: 48–49.</ref>
{{quote|Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house and a rapidly growing child&nbsp;– you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you'll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end, he'll simply burst open the house and walk out a free man.{{sfnm|1a1=Thomson|1y=1971|1p=52|2a1=Abbott|2y=1978}}}}


Thomson concedes that a third party cannot make the choice to kill either the person being crushed or the child but argues that this does not mean the person being crushed cannot act in self-defense and attack the child to save his or her own life. To liken this to pregnancy, the mother can be thought to be the person inside the house and the fetus to be the growing child. In such a case, the mothers's life is being threatened, and the fetus is the one who threatens it. Because for no reason should the pregnant woman's life be threatened and also for no reason is the fetus threatening it, both are innocent and thus no third party can intervene. Thomson asserts that the person threatened can intervene, by which justification a mother can rightfully abort.{{sfn|Thomson|1971|pp=52–53}} Returning to the expanding child example, she argues:
Thomson argues that one can now permissibly unplug themself from the violinist even though this will cause his death: this is due to limits on the right to life, which does not include the right to use another person's body, and so by unplugging the violinist, one does not violate his right to life but merely deprives him of something&mdash;the use of someone else's body&mdash;to which he has no right. "f you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a ] on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due."<ref>Thomson 1971: 55</ref>
{{quote|For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house, which has, by unfortunate mistake, been rented to both: the mother ''owns'' the house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do nothing.{{sfnm|1a1=Thomson|1y=1971|1p=53|2a1=Johnson|2y=1997|2pp=111–112}}}}


If one says that no one may help the mother obtain an abortion, this is a failure to acknowledge her right over her own body or property. Thomson says that one is not personally obligated to help the pregnant woman, although this does not rule out the possibility that someone else may act. Thomson reminds that the house belongs to the pregnant woman; similarly, the body which holds a fetus also belongs to her.{{sfn|Thomson|1971|p=54}}
For the same reason, Thomson says, abortion does not violate the fetus's legitimate right to life, but merely deprives the fetus of something&mdash;the non-consensual use of the ] person's body and life-supporting functions&mdash;to which it has no right. Thus, by choosing to terminate their pregnancy, Thomson concludes that a pregnant person does not normally violate the fetus's right to life, but merely withdraws its use of their own body, which usually causes the fetus to die.<ref>Thomson 1971: 63; Boonin 2003: 133–134</ref>


=== Pregnancy resulting from voluntary intercourse&nbsp;– "people-seeds" ===
===Third-party participation – the "expanding child"===
To illustrate an example of pregnancy due to voluntary intercourse, Thomson presents the people-seeds situation. She writes:
{{quote|Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root.{{sfnm|1a1=Thomson|1y=1971|1p=59|2a1=Griffith|2y=1985|3a1=Cain|3a2=Love|3y=1988|4a1=Pavlischek|4y=1993}}}}


In this example, the people-seeds flying through the window represent conception, despite the precautionary mesh screen, which functions as ]. The woman in question does not want a people-seed to root itself in her house, and so she takes the necessary precautions and measures to protect herself with the best mesh screens and then voluntarily opens the windows. In the event that a single people-seed finds its way through the window screens, unwelcome as it may be, Thomson asks whether the simple fact that the woman knowingly risked such an occurrence when opening her window deny her the ability to rid her house of the intruder. She observes that some may argue the affirmative to this question, stating: "fter all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors."{{sfn|Thomson|1971|p=59}} Thomson responds that in following this logic any woman could avoid ] by simply having a ]&nbsp;– an extreme procedure simply to safeguard against such a possibility. Thomson concludes that although there may be times when the fetus has a right to the pregnant woman's body, it does not have a right to her body in most cases. This analogy raises the issue of whether all abortions are unjust killing.{{sfn|Thomson|1971|p=59}}
Thomson criticizes the common method of deducing a person's right to abort from the permissibility of a third party committing the abortion. In most instances, a person's right to abortion may hinge on the doctor's willingness to perform it. If the doctor refuses, then the pregnant person is denied their right. To base the pregnant person's right on the accordance or refusal of a doctor, she argues, is to ignore the pregnant person's full personhood, and subsequently, their right to their own body. Thomson presents the hypothetical example of the 'expanding child':
: Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house and a rapidly growing child&mdash; you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you'll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end, he'll simply burst open the house and walk out a free man.<ref>Thomson 1971: 52</ref>

Thomson concedes that a third party indeed cannot make the choice to kill either the person being crushed or the child. However, this does not mean that the person being crushed cannot act in self-defense and attack the child to save his or her own life. To liken this to pregnancy, the pregnant person can be thought to be the person inside the house, the fetus the growing child. In such a case, the pregnant person's life is being threatened, and the fetus is the one who threatens it. Because for no reason should the pregnant person's life be threatened, and also for no reason is the fetus threatening it, both are innocent, and thus no third party can intervene. But, Thomson asserts, the person threatened can intervene, by which justification a pregnant person can rightfully abort.<ref>Thomson 1971: 52–53</ref>

Continuing, Thomson returns to the 'expanding child' example and points out:
:For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house, which has, by unfortunate mistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do nothing.<ref>Thomson 1971: 53</ref>

If we say that no one may help the pregnant person obtain an abortion, we fail to acknowledge the their right over their own body (or property). Thomson says that we are not personally obligated to help the pregnant person, though this does not rule out the possibility that someone else may act. As Thomson reminds, the house belongs to the pregnant person; similarly, the body which holds a fetus also belongs to them.<ref>Thomson 1971: 54</ref>

===Pregnancy resulting from voluntary intercourse – “people-seeds”===

To illustrate an example of pregnancy due to voluntary intercourse, Thomson presents the 'people-seeds' situation:
:Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root.<ref name="Thomson 1971: 59">Thomson 1971: 59</ref>

In this example, the people-seeds flying through the window represent conception, despite the precautionary mesh screen, which functions as ]. The woman does not want a people-seed to root itself in her house, and so she takes the necessary precautions and measures to protect herself with the best mesh screens, and then voluntarily opens the windows. However, in the event that a single people-seed finds its way through her window screens, unwelcome as it may be, does the simple fact that the woman knowingly risked such an occurrence when opening her window deny her the ability to rid her house of the intruder? Thomson notes that some may argue the affirmative to this question, claiming that "...after all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors".<ref name="Thomson 1971: 59"/> But by this logic, she says, any woman could avoid ] by simply having a hysterectomy – an extreme procedure simply to safeguard against such a possibility. Thomson concludes that although there may be times when the fetus ''does'' have a right to the mother's body, certainly in most cases the fetus does not have a right to the mother's body. This analogy raises the issue of whether all abortions are ''unjust'' killing.<ref name="Thomson 1971: 59"/>


=== Caveats === === Caveats ===
Thomson does not support unlimited abortion rights. She gives as an example a hypothetical woman who seeks a ]; "just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad" and declares this to be "positively indecent". Thomson does not support abortion in all circumstances, and she gives as an example a hypothetical woman who seeks a ] "just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad", and declares this to be "positively indecent".{{sfn|Thomson|1971|pp=65-66}} Thomson also explicitly rejects the claim that pregnant women have a right to kill their offspring. She argues for the right of the pregnant woman to stop being pregnant even if this results in the death of the offspring but not for the right to ensure that the offspring is dead. For example, if a ] accidentally results in the birth of a living baby, then Thomson would conclude that the mother has no right to kill the baby.{{sfn|Manninen|2013}}


== Responses ==
Thomson also explicitly rejects the claim that pregnant women have a right to kill their offspring. She argues for the right of the mother to stop being pregnant, even if this results in the death of the offspring, but not for the right to ensure that the offspring is dead. If, for example, a late-term abortion accidentally results in the birth of a living baby, then Thomson would conclude that the mother has no right to kill the baby.
By positing a moral justification for abortion even if one grants a ], Thomson's article opened up a new avenue in the ] debate about the ethics of abortion. Critics of her view have formulated many objections to her argument, and defenders have responded in kind in a back and forth that continues in philosophy journals. Thomson's imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made "A Defense of Abortion" perhaps "the most widely reprinted essay in all of contemporary philosophy".{{sfn|Parent|1986|p=vii}} Critics of Thomson's argument generally grant the permissibility of unplugging the violinist but seek to block the ] that abortion is permissible by arguing that there are morally relevant differences between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. One notable exception to this general agreement is ], who argues that, despite human intuitions, a ] calculus implies that one is morally obliged to stay connected to the violinist.{{sfn|Singer|2011|p=134}} Thomson observes that the woman's right to abortion does not include the right to directly insist upon the death of the child should the fetus happen to be viable, that is, capable of surviving outside the womb. She writes: "All the same, I agree that the desire for the child's death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child alive."{{sfn|Manninen|2013}}


The most common objection is that Thomson's violinist argument can justify abortion only in cases of ], although Thomson uses separate analogies to argue in cases other than rape. In the violinist scenario, the pregnant woman was kidnapped; she did not consent to having the violinist plugged into her and she did nothing to cause the violinist to be plugged in, just as a woman who is pregnant due to rape did nothing to cause the pregnancy. In some cases of abortion, the pregnant woman had voluntary intercourse, and thus has either tacitly consented to allow the fetus to use her body (the tacit consent objection),{{sfnm|1a1=Warren|1y=1973|2a1=Steinbock|2y=1992|2p=78}} or else has a duty to sustain the fetus because the pregnant woman herself caused the fetus to stand in need of her body (the responsibility objection).{{sfnm|1a1=Beckwith|1y=1993|1loc=chap.&nbsp;7|2a1=McMahan|2y=2002}} Other common objections turn on the claim that the fetus is the pregnant woman's ], whereas the violinist is a stranger (the stranger versus offspring objection),{{sfnm|1a1=Schwarz|1y=1990|1loc=chap.&nbsp;8|2a1=Beckwith|2y=1993|2loc=chap.&nbsp;7|3a1=McMahan|3y=2002}} or that abortion directly and intentionally kills the fetus, whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die of natural causes (the killing versus ] objection).{{sfnm|1a1=Schwarz|1y=1990|1loc=chap.&nbsp;8|2a1=Beckwith|2y=1993|2loc=chap.&nbsp;7|3a1=McMahan|3y=2002}} Defenders of Thomson's argument reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not matter, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed. Thomson's defenders also point to her people-seeds argument as a strong analogy to typical cases of abortion.{{sfn|Boonin|2003|loc=chap.&nbsp;4}}
==Criticism==


== See also ==
Critics of Thomson's argument generally grant the permissibility of unplugging the violinist, but seek to block the ] that abortion is permissible by arguing that there are morally relevant differences between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. One notable exception to this general agreement is ], who argues that, despite our intuitions, a ] calculus implies that one is morally obliged to stay connected to the violinist.<ref>Singer 2011:134</ref>
* ]&nbsp;– for more detail about how this debate has progressed beyond Thomson's article


== References ==
The most common objection is that Thomson's violinist argument can justify abortion only in cases of ], though Thomson uses separate analogies to argue in cases other than rape. In the violinist scenario, the woman was kidnapped: she did not consent to having the violinist plugged into her and she did nothing to cause the violinist to be plugged in, just as a woman who is pregnant due to rape did nothing to cause her pregnancy. But in typical cases of abortion, the pregnant woman had voluntary intercourse, and thus has either tacitly consented to allow the fetus to use her body (the ''tacit consent'' objection),<ref name="Reftacit">e.g. Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992</ref> or else has a duty to sustain the fetus because the woman herself caused the fetus to stand in need of her body (the ''responsibility'' objection).<ref name="Refresponsibility">e.g. Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002</ref> Other common objections turn on the claim that the fetus is the pregnant woman's ], whereas the violinist is a stranger (the ''stranger versus offspring'' objection),<ref name="ReferenceA">e.g. Schwarz 1990; Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002</ref> or that abortion directly and intentionally kills the fetus, whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die of natural causes (the ''killing versus ]'' objection).<ref name="ReferenceA"/>
{{reflist}}


== Bibliography ==
Defenders of Thomson's argument reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not matter, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed. Thomson's defenders also point to her 'people-seeds' argument as a strong analogy to typical cases of abortion.<ref>Boonin 2003: 133–281</ref>
{{refbegin|indent=yes}}
* {{cite journal
|last=Abbott
|first=Philip
|date=1978
|title=Philosophers and the Abortion Question
|journal=Political Theory
|volume=6
|issue=3
|pages=313–335
|doi=10.1177/009059177800600304
|issn=0090-5917
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}}
* {{cite book
|last=Beckwith
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|year=1993
|title=Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights
|location=Grand Rapids, Michigan
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}}
* {{cite book
|last=Boonin
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|title=A Defense of Abortion
|location=Cambridge
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}}
* {{cite journal
|last1=Cain
|first1=Patricia
|last2=Love
|first2=Jean
|date=1 May 1988
|title=Stories of Rights: Developing Moral Theory and Teaching Law
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|journal=Michigan Law Review
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* {{cite journal
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|first=Steven
|date=1985
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|journal=Philosophy Research Archives
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* {{cite journal
|last=Johnson
|first=Nicholas
|date=1 January 1997
|title=Principles and Passions: The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights
|url=https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1436&context=faculty_scholarship
|journal=Rutgers L. Rev.
|volume=50
|pages=97–197
}}
* {{cite book
|last=Kamm
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|author-link=Frances Kamm
|year=1992
|title=Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy
|location=New York
|publisher=Oxford University Press
}}
* {{cite book
|last=Lee
|first=Patrick
|year=1996
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* {{cite journal
|last=Manninen
|first=Bertha Alvarez
|date=2013
|title=Yes, the Baby Should Live: A Pro-Choice Response to Giubilini and Minerva
|journal=Journal of Medical Ethics
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* {{cite book
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*
{{cite magazine
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|first=Rosalind
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|title=Artificial Wombs Will Change Abortion Rights Forever
|url=https://www.wired.com/story/ectogenesis-reproductive-health-abortion/
|url-status=live
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240416152606/https://www.wired.com/story/ectogenesis-reproductive-health-abortion/
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* {{cite book
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|year=1986
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|editor-first=William
|title=Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory
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* {{cite journal
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* {{cite book
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* {{cite journal
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* {{cite book
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* {{cite book
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* {{cite journal
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|author-link=Judith Jarvis Thomson
|year=1971
|title=A Defense of Abortion
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|issue=1
|pages=47–66
|issn=1088-4963
|jstor=2265091
}}
* {{cite journal
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|doi=10.5840/monist197357133
|issn=2153-3601
|jstor=27902294
|pmid=11661013
}}
{{refend}}


== Further reading ==
Thomson's article, by positing a moral justification for abortion even if one grants a fetal right to life, opened up a new avenue in the philosophical debate about the ethics of abortion. Critics of her view have formulated many objections to her argument, and defenders have responded in kind in a back and forth that continues in philosophy journals.
{{refbegin|indent=yes}}
* {{cite journal
|last=Bourbaki
|first=Nicola
|year=2001
|title=Living High and Letting Die
|journal=Philosophy
|volume=76
|issue=3
|pages=435–442
|doi=10.1017/S0031819101000377
|issn=1469-817X
|jstor=3751780
|s2cid=145357729
|url=https://philarchive.org/rec/BOULHA-2
}}
* {{cite journal
|last=Finnis
|first=John
|author-link=John Finnis
|year=1973
|title=The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson
|journal=Philosophy and Public Affairs
|volume=2
|issue=2
|pages=117–145
|issn=1088-4963
|jstor=2265137
|pmid=11663360
}}
* {{cite journal
|last=Hershenov
|first=David B.
|year=2001
|title=Abortions and Distortions: An Analysis of Morally Irrelevant Factors in Thomson's Violinist Thought Experiment
|journal=Social Theory and Practice
|volume=27
|issue=1
|pages=129–148
|doi=10.5840/soctheorpract200127124
|issn=2154-123X
|jstor=23559045
|pmid=12564447
}}
* {{cite book
|last1=Lee
|first1=Patrick
|last2=George
|first2=Robert P.
|author2-link=Robert P. George
|year=2005
|chapter=The Wrong of Abortion
|editor1-last=Cohen
|editor1-first=Andrew I.
|editor2-last=Wellman
|editor2-first=Christopher Heath
|editor2-link=Christopher Heath Wellman
|title=Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics
|url=https://archive.org/details/contemporarydeba0000unse_n8m9
|url-access=limited
|location=Malden, Massachusetts
|publisher=Blackwell Publishing
|pages=13–26, esp. pp.&nbsp;20–21
|isbn=978-1-4051-1548-3
}}
* {{cite book
|editor-last=Munson
|editor-first=Ronald
|title=Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics
|date=1996
|publisher=Wadsworth
|isbn=978-0-534-52039-7
|edition=5th
|location=Belmont
|pages=69–80
}}
* {{cite journal
|last=Parks
|first=Brian D.
|year=2006
|title=The Natural–Artificial Distinction and Conjoined Twins: A Response to Judith Thomson's Argument for Abortion Rights
|journal=The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly
|volume=6
|issue=4
|pages=671–680
|doi=10.5840/ncbq2006646
|issn=1938-1646
}}
* {{cite journal
|last1=Pruski
|first1=Michal
|last2=Playford
|first2=Richard C.
|date=21 October 2022
|title=Artificial Wombs, Thomson and Abortion – What Might Change?
|journal=Diametros
|volume=19
|issue=73
|pages=35–53
|doi=10.33392/diam.1794
|issn=1733-5566
|doi-access=free
}}
* {{cite journal
|last=Thomson
|first=Judith Jarvis
|author-link=Judith Jarvis Thomson
|year=1973
|title=Rights and Deaths
|journal=Philosophy and Public Affairs
|volume=2
|issue=2
|pages=146–159
|issn=1088-4963
|jstor=2265138
|pmid=11663361
}}
* {{cite journal
|last=Wiland
|first=Eric
|year=2000
|title=Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument
|journal=Journal of Medical Ethics
|volume=26
|issue=6
|pages=466–468
|doi=10.1136/jme.26.6.466
|pmid=11129849
|pmc=1733303
|doi-access=free
|issn=1473-4257
}}
{{refend}}


==See also== == External links ==
* &nbsp;– full text
* ]
* ]
* ] – for more detail about how this debate has progressed beyond Thomson's article

==Notes==
<references />

==References==
* Beckwith, F. 1993. ''Politically Correct Death''. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, ch 7.
* Boonin, D. 2003. ''A Defense of Abortion''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch 4.
* ] "The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion". ''Philosophy and Public Affairs'' 2:2 (Winter 1973): 117–145. {{JSTOR|2265137}}
* Hershenov, D. "Abortions and Distortions". ''Social Theory and Practice'' 27:1 (January 2001): 129–148.
* Kamm, F. 1992. ''Creation and Abortion''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Lee, P. 1996. ''Abortion and Unborn Human Life''. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, ch 4.
* Lee, P and R George. "The Wrong of Abortion". In A Cohen and C Wellman, eds. 2005. ''Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics''. Oxford: Blackwell: 13–26, at 20–21.
* McMahan, J. 2002. ''The Ethics of Killing''. New York: Oxford University Press.
* Parent, W. 1986. "Editor's introduction". In J Thomson. ''Rights, Restitution, and Risk''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: vii–x.
* Parks, B. D. "The Natural-Artificial Distinction and Conjoined Twins: A Response To Judith Thomson's Argument for Abortion Rights". ''National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly'' 6:4 (Winter 2006): 671–680
* Schwarz, S. 1990. ''The Moral Question of Abortion''. Chicago: Loyola University Press, ch 8.
* Singer, P. 2011. ''Practical Ethics''. New York, Cambridge University Press, ch 6.
* Smith, B. and Brogaard, B. 2001. "Living High and Letting Die". ''Philosophy'' 76 (3):435-442 (2001) {{doi|10.1017/S0031819101000377}}, {{JSTOR|3751780}}
* Steinbock, B. 1992. ''Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, at 78.
* Thomson, J. "A Defense of Abortion". ''Philosophy and Public Affairs'' 1:1 (Autumn 1971): 47–66. {{JSTOR|2265091}}
* Thomson, J. "Rights and Deaths". ''Philosophy and Public Affairs'' 2:2 (Winter 1973): 146–159. {{JSTOR|2265138}}
* Tooley, M. "Abortion and Infanticide". ''Philosophy and Public Affairs'' 2:1 (Autumn 1972): 37–65, at 52–53. {{JSTOR|2264919}}
* Warren, M. "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". ''Monist'' 57:1 (1973): 43–61. {{JSTOR|27902294}}
* Wiland, E. "Unconscious violinists and the use of analogies in moral argument". ''Journal of Medical Ethics'' 26 (2000): 466–468. {{doi|10.1136/jme.26.6.466}}

==External links==
*, full text

{{Abortion}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Defense Of Abortion}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Defense Of Abortion}}
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Latest revision as of 10:01, 13 October 2024

1971 ethics essay by Judith Jarvis Thomson

A Defense of Abortion is a moral philosophy essay by Judith Jarvis Thomson first published in Philosophy & Public Affairs in 1971. Granting for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, Thomson uses thought experiments to argue that the right to life does not include, entail, or imply the right to use someone else's body to survive and that induced abortion is therefore morally permissible. Thomson's argument has critics on both sides of the abortion debate, but it continues to receive defense. Despite criticism, "A Defense of Abortion" remains highly influential.

Overview

Violinist – the "use of someone else's body"

In "A Defense of Abortion", Thomson grants for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life but defends the permissibility of abortion by appealing to a thought experiment. She writes:

You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.

Thomson argues that one can permissibly unplug oneself from the violinist even though this will cause his death; this is due to limits on the right to life, which does not include the right to use another person's body, and so by unplugging the violinist one does not violate his right to life but merely deprives him of something – the use of someone else's body – to which he has no right. She argues: "f you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due." For the same reason, Thomson says that abortion does not violate the fetus's legitimate right to life but merely deprives the fetus of something – the non-consensual use of the pregnant woman's body and life-supporting functions – to which it has no right. Thus, by choosing to terminate her pregnancy, Thomson concludes that a pregnant woman does not normally violate the fetus's right to life but merely withdraws its use of her own body, which usually causes the fetus to die.

Third-party participation – the "expanding child"

Thomson criticizes the common method of deducing a woman's right to abort from the permissibility of a third party committing the abortion. In most instances, a woman's right to abortion may hinge on the doctor's willingness to perform it. If the doctor refuses, then the pregnant woman is denied her right. To base the pregnant woman's right on the accordance or refusal of a doctor, she argues that it is to ignore the pregnant woman's full personhood and subsequently her right to her own body. Thomson presents the hypothetical example of the expanding child. She writes:

Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house and a rapidly growing child – you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you'll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand won't be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing he'll be hurt, but in the end, he'll simply burst open the house and walk out a free man.

Thomson concedes that a third party cannot make the choice to kill either the person being crushed or the child but argues that this does not mean the person being crushed cannot act in self-defense and attack the child to save his or her own life. To liken this to pregnancy, the mother can be thought to be the person inside the house and the fetus to be the growing child. In such a case, the mothers's life is being threatened, and the fetus is the one who threatens it. Because for no reason should the pregnant woman's life be threatened and also for no reason is the fetus threatening it, both are innocent and thus no third party can intervene. Thomson asserts that the person threatened can intervene, by which justification a mother can rightfully abort. Returning to the expanding child example, she argues:

For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house, which has, by unfortunate mistake, been rented to both: the mother owns the house. The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do nothing.

If one says that no one may help the mother obtain an abortion, this is a failure to acknowledge her right over her own body or property. Thomson says that one is not personally obligated to help the pregnant woman, although this does not rule out the possibility that someone else may act. Thomson reminds that the house belongs to the pregnant woman; similarly, the body which holds a fetus also belongs to her.

Pregnancy resulting from voluntary intercourse – "people-seeds"

To illustrate an example of pregnancy due to voluntary intercourse, Thomson presents the people-seeds situation. She writes:

Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root.

In this example, the people-seeds flying through the window represent conception, despite the precautionary mesh screen, which functions as contraception. The woman in question does not want a people-seed to root itself in her house, and so she takes the necessary precautions and measures to protect herself with the best mesh screens and then voluntarily opens the windows. In the event that a single people-seed finds its way through the window screens, unwelcome as it may be, Thomson asks whether the simple fact that the woman knowingly risked such an occurrence when opening her window deny her the ability to rid her house of the intruder. She observes that some may argue the affirmative to this question, stating: "fter all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors." Thomson responds that in following this logic any woman could avoid pregnancy from rape by simply having a hysterectomy – an extreme procedure simply to safeguard against such a possibility. Thomson concludes that although there may be times when the fetus has a right to the pregnant woman's body, it does not have a right to her body in most cases. This analogy raises the issue of whether all abortions are unjust killing.

Caveats

Thomson does not support abortion in all circumstances, and she gives as an example a hypothetical woman who seeks a late termination of pregnancy "just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad", and declares this to be "positively indecent". Thomson also explicitly rejects the claim that pregnant women have a right to kill their offspring. She argues for the right of the pregnant woman to stop being pregnant even if this results in the death of the offspring but not for the right to ensure that the offspring is dead. For example, if a late-term abortion accidentally results in the birth of a living baby, then Thomson would conclude that the mother has no right to kill the baby.

Responses

By positing a moral justification for abortion even if one grants a fetal right to life, Thomson's article opened up a new avenue in the philosophical debate about the ethics of abortion. Critics of her view have formulated many objections to her argument, and defenders have responded in kind in a back and forth that continues in philosophy journals. Thomson's imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made "A Defense of Abortion" perhaps "the most widely reprinted essay in all of contemporary philosophy". Critics of Thomson's argument generally grant the permissibility of unplugging the violinist but seek to block the inference that abortion is permissible by arguing that there are morally relevant differences between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. One notable exception to this general agreement is Peter Singer, who argues that, despite human intuitions, a utilitarian calculus implies that one is morally obliged to stay connected to the violinist. Thomson observes that the woman's right to abortion does not include the right to directly insist upon the death of the child should the fetus happen to be viable, that is, capable of surviving outside the womb. She writes: "All the same, I agree that the desire for the child's death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child alive."

The most common objection is that Thomson's violinist argument can justify abortion only in cases of rape, although Thomson uses separate analogies to argue in cases other than rape. In the violinist scenario, the pregnant woman was kidnapped; she did not consent to having the violinist plugged into her and she did nothing to cause the violinist to be plugged in, just as a woman who is pregnant due to rape did nothing to cause the pregnancy. In some cases of abortion, the pregnant woman had voluntary intercourse, and thus has either tacitly consented to allow the fetus to use her body (the tacit consent objection), or else has a duty to sustain the fetus because the pregnant woman herself caused the fetus to stand in need of her body (the responsibility objection). Other common objections turn on the claim that the fetus is the pregnant woman's child, whereas the violinist is a stranger (the stranger versus offspring objection), or that abortion directly and intentionally kills the fetus, whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die of natural causes (the killing versus letting die objection). Defenders of Thomson's argument reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not matter, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed. Thomson's defenders also point to her people-seeds argument as a strong analogy to typical cases of abortion.

See also

References

  1. Tooley 1972; Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992, p. 78; McMahan 2002.
  2. Schwarz 1990, chap. 8; Beckwith 1993, chap. 7; Lee 1996, chap. 4.
  3. Kamm 1992; Boonin 2003, chap. 4.
  4. Moran 2023.
  5. Thomson 1971, pp. 48–49; Silverstein 1987.
  6. Thomson 1971, p. 55.
  7. Thomson 1971, p. 63; Boonin 2003, pp. 133–134.
  8. Thomson 1971, p. 52; Abbott 1978.
  9. Thomson 1971, pp. 52–53.
  10. Thomson 1971, p. 53; Johnson 1997, pp. 111–112.
  11. Thomson 1971, p. 54.
  12. Thomson 1971, p. 59; Griffith 1985; Cain & Love 1988; Pavlischek 1993.
  13. ^ Thomson 1971, p. 59.
  14. Thomson 1971, pp. 65–66.
  15. ^ Manninen 2013.
  16. Parent 1986, p. vii.
  17. Singer 2011, p. 134.
  18. Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992, p. 78.
  19. Beckwith 1993, chap. 7; McMahan 2002.
  20. ^ Schwarz 1990, chap. 8; Beckwith 1993, chap. 7; McMahan 2002.
  21. Boonin 2003, chap. 4.

Bibliography

Moran, Rosalind (3 April 2023). "Artificial Wombs Will Change Abortion Rights Forever". Wired. ISSN 1059-1028. Archived from the original on 16 April 2024. Retrieved 6 May 2024.

Further reading

External links

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