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Hedonism is a family of philosophical views that prioritize pleasure. Psychological hedonism is the theory that the underlying motivation of all human behavior is to maximize pleasure and avoid pain. As a form of egoism, it suggests that people only help others if they expect a personal benefit. Axiological hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of intrinsic value. It asserts that other things, like knowledge and money, only have value insofar as they produce pleasure and reduce pain. This view divides into quantitative hedonism, which only considers the intensity and duration of pleasures, and qualitative hedonism, which holds that the value of pleasures also depends on their quality. The closely related position of prudential hedonism states that pleasure and pain are the only factors of well-being. Ethical hedonism applies axiological hedonism to morality, arguing that people have a moral obligation to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Utilitarian versions assert that the goal is to increase overall happiness for everyone, whereas egoistic versions state that each person should only pursue their own pleasure. Outside the academic context, hedonism is a pejorative term for an egoistic lifestyle seeking short-term gratification.

Hedonists typically understand pleasure and pain broadly to include any positive or negative experience. While traditionally seen as bodily sensations, contemporary philosophers tend to view them as attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects. Hedonists often use the term happiness for the balance of pleasure over pain. The subjective nature of these phenomena makes it difficult to measure this balance and compare it between different people. The paradox of hedonism and the hedonic treadmill are proposed psychological barriers to the hedonist goal of long-term happiness.

As one of the oldest philosophical theories, hedonism was discussed by the Cyrenaics and Epicureans in ancient Greece, the Charvaka school in ancient India, and Yangism in ancient China. It attracted less attention in the medieval period but became a central topic in the modern era with the rise of utilitarianism. Various criticisms of hedonism emerged in the 20th century, while its proponents suggested new versions to meet these challenges. Hedonism remains relevant to many fields, ranging from psychology and economics to animal ethics.

Types

The term hedonism refers not to a single theory but to a family of theories about the role of pleasure. These theories are often categorized into psychological, axiological, and ethical hedonism depending on whether they study the relation between pleasure and motivation, value, or right action. While these distinctions are common in contemporary philosophy, earlier philosophers did not always clearly differentiate between them and sometimes combined several views in their theories. The word hedonism derives from the Ancient Greek word ἡδονή (hēdonē), meaning 'pleasure'. Its earliest known use in the English language is from the 1850s.

Psychological hedonism

Psychological or motivational hedonism is the view that all human actions aim at increasing pleasure and avoiding pain. It is an empirical view about what motivates people, both on the conscious and the unconscious levels. Psychological hedonism is usually understood as a form of egoism, meaning that people strive to increase their own happiness. This implies that a person is only motivated to help others if it is in their own interest because they expect a personal benefit from it. As a theory of human motivation, psychological hedonism does not imply that all behavior leads to pleasure. For example, if a person holds mistaken beliefs or lacks necessary skills, they may attempt to produce pleasure but fail to attain the intended outcome.

The standard form of psychological hedonism asserts that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the only sources of all motivation. Some psychological hedonists propose weaker formulations, suggesting that considerations of pleasure and pain influence most actions to some extent or limiting their role to certain conditions. For example, reflective or rationalizing hedonism says that human motivation is only driven by pleasure and pain when people actively reflect on the overall consequences. Another version is genetic hedonism, which accepts that people desire various things besides pleasure but asserts that each desire has its origin in a desire for pleasure.

Proponents of psychological hedonism often highlight its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, arguing that many desires directly focus on pleasure while the others have an indirect focus by aiming at the means to bring about pleasure. Critics of psychological hedonism often cite apparent counterexamples in which people act for reasons other than their personal pleasure. Proposed examples include acts of genuine altruism, such as a soldier sacrificing themselves on the battlefield to save their comrades or a parent wanting their children to be happy. Critics also mention non-altruistic cases, like a desire for posthumous fame. It is an open question to what extent these cases can be explained as types of pleasure-seeking behavior.

Axiological hedonism

Axiological or evaluative hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of intrinsic value. An entity has intrinsic value or is good in itself if its worth does not depend on external factors. Intrinsic value contrasts with instrumental value, which is the value of things that lead to other good things. According to axiological hedonism, pleasure is intrinsically valuable because it is good even when it produces no external benefit. Money, by contrast, is only instrumentally good because it can be used to obtain other good things but lacks value apart from these uses. Axiological hedonism asserts that only pleasure has intrinsic value whereas other things only have instrumental value to the extent that they lead to pleasure or the avoidance of pain. The overall value of a thing depends on both its intrinsic and instrumental value. In some cases, even unpleasant things, like a painful surgery, can be overall good, according to axiological hedonism, if their positive consequences make up for the unpleasantness.

Prudential hedonism is a form of axiological hedonism that focuses specifically well-being or what is good for an individual. It states that pleasure and pain are the sole factors of well-being, meaning that how good a life is for a person only depends on its balance of pleasure over pain. Prudential hedonism allows for the possibility that other things than well-being have intrinsic value, such as beauty or freedom.

According to quantitative hedonism, the intrinsic value of pleasure depends solely on its intensity and duration. Qualitative hedonists hold that the quality of pleasure is an additional factor. They argue, for instance, that subtle pleasures of the mind, like the enjoyment of fine art and philosophy, can be more valuable than simple bodily pleasures, like enjoying food and drink, even if their intensity is lower.

Proponents of axiological hedonism often focus on intuitions about the relation between pleasure and value or on the observation that pleasure is desirable. The idea that most pleasures are valuable in some form is relatively uncontroversial. However, the stronger claim that all pleasures are valuable and that they are the only source of intrinsic value is subject to debate. Some critics assert that certain pleasures are worthless or even bad, like disgraceful and sadistic pleasures. A different criticism comes from value pluralists, who contend that other things besides pleasure have value. To support the idea that beauty is an additional source of value, G. E. Moore used a thought experiment involving two worlds: one exceedingly beautiful and the other a heap of filth. He argued that the beautiful world is better even if there is no one to enjoy it. Another influential thought experiment, proposed by Robert Nozick, involves an experience machine able to create artificial pleasures. Based on his observation that most people would not want to spend the rest of their lives in this type of pleasant illusion, he argued that hedonism cannot account for the values of authenticity and genuine experience.

Ethical hedonism

Ethical or normative hedonism is the thesis that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the highest moral principles of human behavior. It implies that other moral considerations, like duty, justice, or virtue, are relevant only to the extent that they influence pleasure and pain.

Theories of ethical hedonism can be divided into egoistic and utilitarian theories. Egoistic hedonism says that each person should only pursue their own pleasure. According to this controversial view, a person only has a moral reason to care about the happiness of others if this happiness impacts their own well-being. For example, if a person feels guilty about harming others, they have a reason not to do so. However, a person would be free to harm others, and would even be morally required to, if they overall benefit from it.

Utilitarian hedonism, also called classical utilitarianism, asserts that everyone's happiness matters. It says that a person should maximize the sum total of happiness of everybody affected by their actions. This sum total includes the person's own happiness, but it is only one factor among many without any special preference compared to the happiness of others. As a result, utilitarian hedonism sometimes requires of people to forego their own enjoyment to benefit others. For example, philosopher Peter Singer argues that good earners should donate a significant portion of their income to charities since this money can produce more happiness for people in need.

Ethical hedonism is often understood as a form of consequentialism, which asserts that an act is right if it has the best consequences. It is typically combined with axiological hedonism, which links the intrinsic value of consequences to pleasure and pain. As a result, the arguments for and against axiological hedonism also apply to ethical hedonism.

Others

Aesthetic hedonism is a theory about the nature of aesthetic value or beauty. It states that a thing, like a landscape, a painting, or a song, has aesthetic value if people are pleased by it or get aesthetic pleasure from it. It is a subjective theory because it focuses on how people respond to aesthetically engaging things. It contrasts with objective theories, which assert that aesthetic value only depends on objective or mind-independent features of things, like symmetry or harmonic composition. Some aesthetic hedonists believe that any type of pleasure is relevant to the aesthetic value of a thing. Others offer a more nuanced characterization, saying that aesthetic value is only based on how people with a well-developed taste respond to it.

Outside the academic contexts of philosophy and psychology, the word hedonism is often used in a more narrow sense as a pejorative term. Sometimes called folk hedonism, it describes a lifestyle dedicated to the egoistic pursuit of short-term gratification. For example, a person who indulges in sex and drugs without concern for the long-term consequences of their behavior is acting hedonistically in this sense. The negative connotation of the term is associated with a lack of interest or foresight regarding the potential harm or ethical implications of such actions. Negative consequences can impact both the individual and the people around them, affecting areas such as health, financial stability, relationships, and societal responsibilities. Most philosophical hedonists reject the idea that a lifestyle characterized by folk hedonism leads to long-term happiness.

Basic concepts

Pleasure and pain

Pleasure and pain are fundamental experiences about what is attractive and aversive, influencing how people feel, think, and act. They play a central role in all forms of hedonism. Both pleasure and pain come in degrees corresponding to their intensity. They are typically understood as a continuum ranging from positive degrees through a neutral point to negative degrees. However, some hedonists reject the idea that pleasure and pain form a symmetric pair and suggest instead that avoiding pain is more important than producing pleasure.

The nature of pleasure and pain is disputed and affects the plausibility of various versions of hedonism. In everyday language, these concepts are often understood in a narrow sense associated with specific phenomena, like the pleasure of food and sex or the pain of an injury. However, hedonists usually take a wider perspective in which pleasure and pain cover any positive or negative experiences. In this broad sense, anything that feels good is a pleasure, including the joy of watching a sunset, whereas anything that feels bad is a pain, including the sorrow of losing a loved one. A traditionally influential position says that pleasure and pain are specific bodily sensations, similar to the sensations of hot and cold. A more common view in contemporary philosophy holds that pleasure and pain are attitudes of attraction or aversion toward objects. This view implies that they do not have a specific location in the body and do not arise in isolation since they are always directed at an object that people enjoy or suffer.

Measurement

Both philosophers and psychologists are interested in methods of measuring pleasure and pain to guide decision-making and gain a deeper understanding of their causes. A common approach is to use self-report questionnaires in which people are asked to quantify how pleasant or unpleasant an experience is. For example, some questionnaires use a nine-point scale from -4 for the most unpleasant experiences, to +4 for the most pleasant ones. Some methods rely on memory and ask individuals to retrospectively assess their experiences. A different approach is for individuals to evaluate their experiences while they are happening to avoid biases and inaccuracies introduced by memory.

In either form, the measurement of pleasure and pain poses various challenges. As a highly subjective phenomenon, it is difficult to establish a standardized metric. Moreover, asking people to rate their experiences using an artificially constructed scale may not accurately reflect their subjective experiences. A closely related problem concerns comparisons between individuals since different people may use the scales differently and thus arrive at different values even if they had similar experiences. Neuroscientists avoid some of these challenges by using neuroimaging techniques such as PET scans and fMRI. However, this approach comes with new difficulties of its own since the neurological basis of happiness is not yet fully understood.

Based on the idea that individual experiences of pleasure and pain can be quantified, Jeremy Bentham proposed the hedonistic calculus as a method to combine various episodes to arrive at their total contribution to happiness. This makes it possible to quantitatively compare different courses of action based on the experiences they produce to choose the course with the highest overall contribution to happiness. Bentham considered several factors for each pleasurable experience: its intensity and duration, the likelihood that it occurs, its temporal distance, the likelihood that it causes further experiences of pleasure and pain, and the number of people affected. Some simplified versions of the hedonic calculus focus primarily on what is intrinsically valuable to a person and only consider two factors: intensity and duration.

Happiness, well-being, and eudaimonia

Some theorists formulate hedonism in terms of happiness rather than pleasure and pain. According to a common interpretation, happiness is the balance of pleasure over pain. This means that a person is happy if they have more pleasure than pain and unhappy if the balance is overall negative. There are also other ways to understand happiness that do not fully align with the traditional account of hedonism. One view defines happiness as life satisfaction. This means that a person is happy if they have a favorable attitude toward their life, for example, by being satisfied with their life as a whole or by judging it to be good overall. This attitude may be affected by the balance of pleasure over pain but can also be shaped by other factors.

Well-being is what is ultimately good for a person. According to a common view, pleasure is one component of well-being. It is controversial whether it is the only factor and what other factors there are, such as health, knowledge, and friendship. Another approach focuses on desires, saying that well-being consists in the satisfaction of desires. The view that the balance of pleasure over pain is the only source of well-being is called prudential hedonism.

Eudaimonia is a form of well-being rooted in ancient Greek thought, serving as a foundation of many forms of moral philosophy during this period. Aristotle understood eudaimonia as a type of flourishing in which a person is happy by leading a fulfilling life and manifesting their inborn capacities. Ethical theories based on eudaimonia often share parallels with hedonism, like an interest in long-term happiness, but are distinguished from it by their emphasis of virtues, advocating an active lifestyle focused on self-realization.

Paradox of hedonism and hedonic treadmill

The paradox of hedonism is the thesis that the direct pursuit of pleasure is counterproductive. It says that conscious attempts to become happy usually backfire, acting as obstacles to one's personal happiness. According to one interpretation, the best way to produce pleasure is to follow other endeavors, with pleasure being a by-product rather than the goal itself. For example, this view suggests that a tennis player who tries to win a game may enjoy the activity more than a tennis player who tries to maximize their enjoyment. It is controversial to what extent the paradox of hedonism is true since, at least in some cases, the pursuit of pleasure is successful.

A related phenomenon, the hedonic treadmill is the theory that people return to a stable level of happiness after significant positive or negative changes to their life circumstances. This suggests that good or bad events affect a person's happiness temporarily but not in the long term—their overall level of happiness tends to revert to a baseline as they get used to the changed situation. For instance, studies on lottery winners indicate that their happiness initially increases as the newly acquired wealth augments their living standards but returns to its original level after about one year. If true, this effect would undermine efforts to increase happiness in the long term, including personal efforts to lead a healthy lifestyle and social efforts to create a free, just, and prosperous society. While there is some empirical support for this effect, it is controversial how strong this tendency is and whether it applies to all fields or only to certain aspects of life.

Non-hedonism and asceticism

Non-hedonist theories reject certain aspects of hedonism. One form of non-hedonism says that pleasure is one thing in life that matters but not the only thing. Another form argues that some pleasures are good while others are bad. The strongest rejection of hedonism, sometimes termed anti-hedonism, claims that all pleasures are bad. Motivations to adopt this view include the idea that pleasure is an irrational emotion and that the pursuit of pleasure is an obstacle that prevents people from leading a good life.

Asceticism is a lifestyle dedicated to a program of self-discipline that renounces worldly pleasures. It can take various forms, including abstinence from sex and drugs, fasting, withdrawal from society, and practices like prayer and meditation. This lifestyle is often motivated by religious aspirations to become close to the divine, reach a heightened spiritual state, or purify oneself. Most forms of asceticism are opposed to hedonism and its pursuit of pleasure. However, there are forms of ascetic hedonism that combine the two views, for example, by asserting that the right form of ascetic practice leads to higher overall happiness by replacing simple sensory pleasures with deeper and more meaningful spiritual pleasures.

History

Ancient

Hedonism is one of the oldest philosophical theories and some interpreters trace it back to the Epic of Gilgamesh, written around 2100–2000 BCE. A central topic in ancient Greek thought, Aristippus of Cyrene (435-356 BCE) is usually identified as its earliest philosophical proponent. As a student of Socrates (c. 469–399 BCE), he formulated a hedonistic egoism, arguing that personal pleasure is the highest good. He and the school of Cyrenaics he inspired focused on the gratification of immediate sensory pleasures with little concern for long-term consequences. Plato (c. 428–347 BCE) critiqued this view and proposed a more balanced pursuit of pleasure that aligns with virtue and rationality. Following a similar approach, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) associated pleasure with eudaimonia or the realization of natural human capacities, like reason.

Epicurus (341–271 BCE) developed a nuanced form of hedonism that contrasts with the indulgence in immediate gratification proposed by the Cyrenaics. He argued that excessive desires and anxiety result in suffering, suggesting instead that people practice moderation, cultivate a tranquil state of mind, and avoid pain. Following Antisthenes (c. 446—366 BCE), the Cynics warned against the pursuit of pleasure, viewing it as an obstacle to freedom. The Stoics also dismissed a hedonistic lifestyle, focusing on virtue and integrity instead of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Lucretius (c. 99–55 BCE) further expanded on Epicureanism, highlighting the importance of overcoming obstacles to personal happiness, such as the fear of death.

In ancient India, the Charvaka school developed a hedonistic egoism, starting between the 6th and 5th centuries BCE. Their belief in the non-existence of God or an afterlife led them to advocate for enjoying life in the present to the fullest. Many other Indian traditions rejected this view and recommended a more ascetic lifestyle, a tendency common among Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain schools of thought. In ancient China, Yang Zhu (c. 440–360 BCE) argued that it is human nature to follow self-interest and satisfy personal desires. His hedonistic egoism inspired the subsequent school of Yangism.

Medieval

Hedonist philosophy received less attention in medieval philosophy. The early Christian philosopher Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), was critical of the hedonism found in ancient Greek philosophy, warning of the dangers of earthly pleasures as obstacles to a spiritual life dedicated to God. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) developed a nuanced perspective on hedonism, characterized by some interpreters as spiritual hedonism. He held that humans are naturally inclined to seek happiness, arguing that the only way to truly satisfy this inclination is through a beatific vision of God. In Islamic philosophy, the problem of pleasure played a central role in the philosophy of al-Razi (c. 864—925 or 932 CE). Similar to Epicureanism, he recommended a life of moderation avoiding the extremes of excess and asceticism. Both al-Farabi (c. 878–950 CE) and Avicenna (980–1037 CE) asserted that a form of intellectual happiness, reachable only in the afterlife, is the highest human good.

Modern and contemporary

At the transition to the early modern period, Lorenzo Valla (c. 1406–1457) synthesized Epicurean hedonism with Christian ethics, suggesting that earthly pleasures associated with the senses are stepping stones to heavenly pleasures associated with Christian virtues. Hedonism gained prominence during the Age of Enlightenment. According to Thomas Hobbes's (1588–1679) psychological hedonism, self-interest in what is pleasant is the root of all human motivation. John Locke (1632–1704) stated that pleasure and pain are the only sources of good and evil. Joseph Butler (1692–1752) formulated an objection to psychological hedonism, arguing that most desires, like wanting food or ambition, are not directed at pleasure itself but at external objects. According to David Hume (1711–1776), pleasure and pain are both the measure of ethical value and the main motivators fueling the passions. The libertine novels of Marquis de Sade (1740–1814) depicted an extreme form of hedonism, emphasizing full indulgence in pleasurable activities without moral or sexual restraint.

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) developed an influential form of hedonism known as classical utilitarianism. One of his key innovations was the rejection of egoistic hedonism, advocating instead that individuals should promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. He introduced the idea of the hedonic calculus to assess the value of an action based on the pleasurable and painful experiences it causes, relying on factors such as intensity and duration. His student John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) feared that Bentham's quantitative focus on intensity and duration would lead to an overemphasis on simple sensory pleasures. In response, he included the quality of pleasures as an additional factor, arguing that higher pleasures of the mind are more valuable than lower pleasures of the body. Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) further refined utilitarianism and clarified many of its core distinctions, such as the contrast between ethical and psychological hedonism and between egoistic and impartial hedonism.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) rejected ethical hedonism and emphasized the importance of excellence and self-overcoming instead, stating that suffering is necessary to achieve greatness rather than something to be avoided. An influential view about the nature of pleasure was developed by Franz Brentano (1838–1917). He dismissed the idea that pleasure is a sensation located in a specific area of the body, proposing instead that pleasure is a positive attitude that people can have towards various objects—a position also later defended by Roderick Chisholm (1916–1999). Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) developed a form of psychological hedonism in his early psychoanalytic theory. He stated that the pleasure principle describes how individuals seek immediate pleasure while avoiding pain whereas the reality principle represents the ability to postpone immediate gratification to avoid unpleasant long-term consequences.

The 20th century saw various criticisms of hedonism. G. E. Moore (1873–1958) rejected the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the only source of intrinsic value. According to his axiological pluralism, there are other sources, such as beauty and knowledge, a criticism also shared by W. D. Ross (1877–1971). Both C. D. Broad (1887–1971) and Richard Brandt (1910–1997) held that malicious pleasures, like enjoying the suffering of others, do not have inherent value. Robert Nozick (1938–2002) used his experience machine thought experiment about simulated pleasure to argue against traditional hedonism, which ignores whether there is an authentic connection between pleasure and reality.

In response to these and similar criticisms, Fred Feldman (1941–present) has developed a modified form of hedonism. Drawing on Brentano's attitudinal theory of pleasure, he has defended the idea that even though pleasure is the only source of intrinsic goodness, its value must be adjusted based on whether it is appropriate or deserved. Peter Singer (1946–present) has expanded classical hedonism to include concerns about animal welfare. He has advocated effective altruism, relying on empirical evidence and reason to prioritize actions that have the most significant positive impact. Inspired by the philosophy of Albert Camus (1913–1960), Michel Onfray (1959–present) has aimed to rehabilitate Epicurean hedonism in a modern form. David Pearce (1959–present) has developed a transhumanist version of hedonism, arguing for the use of modern technology, ranging from genetic engineering to nanotechnology, to reduce suffering and possibly eliminate it in the future. The emergence of positive psychology at the turn of the 21st century has led to an increased interest in the empirical exploration of various topics of hedonism.

In various fields

Positive psychology studies how to cultivate happiness and promote optimal human functioning. Unlike traditional psychology, which often focuses on psychopathology, positive psychology emphasizes that optimal functioning goes beyond merely the absence of mental illness. On the individual level, it investigates experiences of pleasure and pain and the role of character traits. On the societal level, it examines how social institutions impact human well-being.

Hedonic psychology or hedonics is one of the main pillars of positive psychology by studying pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences. It investigates and compares different states of consciousness associated with pleasure and pain, ranging from joy and satisfaction to boredom and sorrow. It also examines the role or biological function of these states, such as signaling to individuals what to approach and avoid, and their purpose as reward and punishment to reinforce or discourage future behavioral patterns. Additionally, hedonic psychology explores the circumstances that evoke these experiences, on both the biological and social levels. It includes questions about psychological obstacles to pleasure, such as anhedonia, which is a reduced ability to experience pleasure, and hedonophobia, which is a fear or aversion to pleasure. Positive psychology in general and hedonic psychology in particular are relevant to hedonism by providing a scientific understanding of the experiences of pleasure and pain and the processes impacting them.

In the field of economics, welfare economics examines how economic activities affect social welfare. It is often understood as a form of normative economics that uses considerations of welfare to evaluate economic processes and policies. Hedonist approaches to welfare economics state that pleasure is the main criterion of this evaluation, meaning that economic activities should aim to promote societal happiness. The economics of happiness is a closely related field studying the relation between economic phenomena, such as wealth, and individual happiness. Economists also employ hedonic regression, a method used to estimate the value of commodities based on their utility or effect on the owner's pleasure.

Animal ethics is the branch of ethics studying human behavior towards other animals. Hedonism is an influential position in this field as a theory about animal welfare. It emphasizes that humans have the responsibility to consider the impact of their actions on how animals feel to minimize harm done to them. Some quantitative hedonists suggest that there is no significant difference between the pleasure and pain experienced by humans and other animals. As a result of this view, moral considerations about promoting the happiness of other people apply equally to all sentient animals. This position is modified by some qualitative hedonists, who argue that human experiences carry more weight because they include higher forms of pleasure and pain.

While many religious traditions are critical of hedonism, some have embraced it or certain aspects of it, such as Christian hedonism. Elements of hedonism are also found in various forms of popular culture, such as consumerism, the entertainment industry, and the enduring influences of the sexual revolution.

References

Notes

1. A more controversial objection asserts that all pleasures are bad.
2. Another historically influential argument, first formulated by Socrates, suggests that a pleasurable life void of any higher cognitive processes, like the life of a happy oyster, is not the best form of life.
3. Some definitions do not distinguish between ethical and axiological hedonism, and define ethical hedonism in terms of intrinsic values rather than right action.
4. In this context the term "pro-attitude" is also used.
5. Some interpreters question whether Yang Zhu is a historical or a mythical figure.
6. It is controversial whether al-Razi's position is a form of hedonism.
7. According to this view, for instance, the pleasure of reading a novel is a positive attitude towards the novel.
8. Singer was initially a proponent of preference utilitarianism but has shifted his position in favor of hedonistic utilitarianism.
9. In a different sense, the term hedonics is also used in ethics for the study of the relation between pleasure and duty.

Citations

1. • Weijers, Lead section
   • Bruton 2024
   • Tilley 2012, Lead section
2. Gosling 1998, § 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism
3. • Hoad 1993, p. 213
   • Cresswell 2021, § Epicure
4. Oxford University Press 2024
5. ^
   • Blakemore & Jennett 2001, § Pleasure and the Enlightenment
   • Schmitter 2021, § 3. The Classification of the Passions
   • Abizadeh 2018, p. 146
6. • Weijers, § 1c. Motivational Hedonism
   • Buscicchi, § 2. Paradoxes of Hedonism
   • Bruton 2024
   • Tilley 2012, § IV. Psychological Hedonism
7. • Bruton 2024
   • Gosling 2001, p. 1326
   • Tilley 2012, § IV. Psychological Hedonism
8. Bruton 2024
9. Weijers, § 1c. Motivational Hedonism
10. • Gosling 1998, § 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism
    • Gosling 2001, p. 1326
    • Gosling 2005, pp. 363–364
11. Tilley 2012, § IV. Psychological Hedonism
12. • Heathwood 2013, § Why Think Hedonism Is True?
    • Moore 2019, § 1.1 Arguments For Psychological Hedonism
13. • Gosling 2001, p. 1326
    • Gosling 1998, § 2. Psychological, Evaluative and Reflective Hedonism
    • Bruton 2024
    • Heathwood 2013, § Why Think Hedonism Is True?
14. • Weijers, § 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism
    • Tilley 2012, § III. Axiological Hedonism
15. ^ Tilley 2012, § III. Axiological Hedonism
16. • Weijers, § 1b. Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism
    • de Bres 2014, Hedonism
17. • Tilley 2012, § III. Axiological Hedonism
    • Heathwood 2013, § What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?
18. ^
    • Heathwood 2015, pp. 146–147
    • Tiberius 2015, pp. 163–164
19. Weijers, Lead section
20. Feldman 2004, pp. 38–39
21. • Vogt 2018, p. 94
    • Aufderheide 2020, p. 57
22. Feldman 2004, pp. 51–52
23. • Weijers, § 2d. The Oyster Example
    • Feldman 2004, pp. 43–44
24. ^
    • Feldman 2001, pp. 665–666
    • Weijers, § 2c. Epicurus
25. Moore 2019, Lead section, § 2. Ethical Hedonism
26. • Weijers, Lead section
    • Tilley 2012, § II. Ethical Hedonism
27. • Weijers, § 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1e. Hedonistic Egoism
    • Tilley 2012, § II. Ethical Hedonism
28. • Weijers, § 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1f. Hedonistic Utilitarianism
    • Tilley 2012, § II. Ethical Hedonism
29. Singer 2016, pp. 163, 165
30. • Frykhol & Rutherford 2013, p. 416
    • Robertson & Walter 2013, p. 3
    • Weijers, § 1d. Normative Hedonism, § 1e. Hedonistic Egoism, § 1f. Hedonistic Utilitarianism
31. • Matthen & Weinstein 2020, § Introduction
    • Van der Berg 2020, pp. 1–4
    • Gorodeisky 2021, pp. 1–2
32. • Weijers, § 1a. Folk Hedonism
    • Buscicchi, § 1. Condensed Conceptual History, § 2. Paradoxes of Hedonism
33. • Pallies 2021, pp. 887–888
    • Katz 2016, Lead section
    • Johnson 2009, pp. 704–705
34. • Weijers, Lead section
    • Feldman 2001, p. 662
35. Alston 2006, § Demarcation of the Topic
36. • Shriver 2014, pp. 135–137
    • Luper 2009, p. 102
37. • Weijers, § 4b. Pleasure as Sensation, § 4d. Pleasure as Pro-Attitude
    • Katz 2016, Lead section
    • Katz 2016a, § Note 1
38. • Pallies 2021, pp. 887–888
    • Feldman 2001, pp. 663–668
    • Katz 2016, Lead section
    • Alston 2006, § Demarcation of the Topic
39. Weijers, § 4b. Pleasure as Sensation
40. • Feldman 2001, pp. 663–668
    • Pallies 2021, pp. 887–888
    • Weijers, § 4b. Pleasure as Sensation, § 4d. Pleasure as Pro-Attitude
41. ^
    • Alston 2006, § The Measurement of Pleasure
    • Johnson 2009, pp. 706–707
    • Bartoshuk 2014, pp. 91–93
    • Lazari-Radek 2024, pp. 51–58
42. Suardi et al. 2016, pp. 383–385
43. • Feldman 2001, p. 666
    • Bowie & Simon 1998, p. 25
    • Weijers, § 3a. Bentham
    • Heathwood 2013, § What Determines the Intrinsic Value of a Pleasure or a Pain?
    • Woodward 2017, Lead section, § Dimensions of the Hedonistic Calculus
44. • Norman 2005, pp. 358–359
    • Haybron 2020, § 2.1 The Chief Candidates
    • Lazari-Radek 2024, pp. 45–46
45. • Haybron 2020, § 2.1 The Chief Candidates
    • Besser 2020, § Conclusion
    • Lazari-Radek 2024, pp. 45–46
46. • Crisp 2021, Lead section
    • Tiberius 2015, p. 158
47. • Crisp 2021, § 1. The Concept, § 4. Theories of Well-being
    • Tiberius 2015, pp. 160, 162–164
48. • Crisp 2021, § 4.1 Hedonism
    • Hughes 2014, p. 239
49. • Lelkes 2021, pp. 85–86
    • Feldman 2004, pp. 15–16
    • Taylor 2005, pp. 364–365
50. • Buscicchi, Lead section, § 4. Defining the Paradox
    • Dietz 2019, pp. 497–498
    • Crisp 2006, pp. 636–637
51. • Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2009, pp. 103–104
    • Larsen & Prizmic 2008, p. 269
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52. • Aufderheide 2020, p. 57
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53. • Quinn 1998
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54. • Goodman 1999, pp. 60–61
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55. • Porter 2001, p. 94
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56. Dehsen 2013, p. 178
57. • Weijers, § 2b. Aristippus and the Cyrenaics
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58. Dehsen 2013, p. 156
59. • Taylor 2005, p. 364
    • Gosling 1998, § 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism
60. Dehsen 2013, p. 13
61. • Taylor 2005, p. 365
    • Gosling 1998, § 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism
62. • Gosling 1998, § 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism
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63. • Gosling 1998, § 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism
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64. • Simpson, § 2b.iii. Ethics
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65. • Weijers, § 2a. Cārvāka
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66. Norden & Ivanhoe 2023, p. 111
67. • Roetz 1993, pp. 243–244
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68. Gosling 1998, § 1. History and Varieties of Hedonism
69. Dehsen 2013, p. 16
70. • Rist 1994, p. 158
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71. • Dewan 2008, pp. 101–103
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72. ^
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73. Dehsen 2013, p. 63
74. Dehsen 2013, p. 19
75. • Germann 2021, § 2.1 Happiness and the afterlife
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76. Nauta 2021, § 4. Moral Philosophy
77. Blakemore & Jennett 2001, § Pleasure and the Enlightenment
78. Dehsen 2013, p. 88
79. • Sheridan 2024, § 1.1 The puzzle of Locke’s moral philosophy
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80. • Stewart 1992, pp. 211–214
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81. Dehsen 2013, p. 91
82. • Blakemore & Jennett 2001, § Pleasure and the Enlightenment
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83. Airaksinen 1995, pp. 11, 78–80
84. Dehsen 2013, p. 25
85. • Weijers, § 3a. Bentham
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86. Dehsen 2013, p. 132
87. • Weijers, § 3b. Mill
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88. • Crisp 2011, pp. 26–27
    • Schultz 2024, Lead section, § 2.2 Reconstruction and Reconciliation
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89. Dehsen 2013, p. 144
90. • Hassan 2023, p. 227
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91. Kriegel 2018, p. 2
92. Massin 2013, pp. 307–308
93. • Feldman 2001, p. 668
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    • Moore 2019, § 2.1 Ethical Hedonism and the Nature of Pleasure
94. • Wallwork 1991, p. 115
    • Vittersø 2012, p. 475
95. Crisp 2011, pp. 43–44
96. Bunnin & Yu 2009, p. 443
97. • Hurka 2021, § 4. The Ideal
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98. • Skelton 2022, § 4.2 The Good
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99. • Crisp 2011, pp. 43–44
    • Hurka 2011a, p. 73
    • Feldman 2002, p. 616
    • Feldman 2004, p. 38
100. • Feldman 2004, pp. 120–123
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101. • Rice 2015, p. 379
     • Schultz 2017, p. 514
102. • Schultz 2017, p. 514
     • Fesmire 2020, § Ends, the Good, and Wisdom
     • Miligan 2015, p. 26
103. • McClellan 2015, pp. xviii–xx
     • Bishop 2020, pp. 110–112
104. • Adams IV 2004, p. 167
     • Ross 2020, p. 134
105. • Crisp 2011, p. 44
     • Peterson 2006, pp. 4–5, 78
106. • Vittersø 2012, pp. 473–474
     • Kaczmarek 2023, pp. 1050–1055
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107. • Merriam-Webster 2024
     • HarperCollins 2024
108. • Kahneman, Diener & Schwarz 1999, p. ix
     • Vittersø 2012, pp. 431, 473–474
     • Kaczmarek 2023, pp. 1054–1055
109. • American Psychological Association 2018
     • Doctor & Kahn 2010, p. 270
     • Campbell 2009, p. 449
110. • Vittersø 2012, pp. 431, 473–474
     • Kahneman, Diener & Schwarz 1999, p. ix
111. • Hausman 2010, pp. 321–322, 324–325, 327
     • Mishan 2008, § Lead section
112. Graham 2012, pp. 6–8
113. • Goodstein & Polasky 2017, p. 78
     • Hackett & Dissanayake 2014, p. 162
114. Miligan 2015, p. 26
115. • Wilson, Lead section
     • Gordon, "Bioethics", Lead section, § 3c. Animal Ethics
     • Robbins, Franks & von Keyserlingk 2018, § Abstract, § Introduction
116. • Lazari-Radek 2024, pp. 24–25
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117. • Piper 2011, p. 31
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118. • Danesi 2016, p. 142
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External links

• Hedonism
• Axiological theories
• Motivational theories
• Utilitarianism