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{{Short description|1912 battle of the First Balkan War}}
{{Infobox Military Conflict

|conflict=Battle of Kumanovo
{{Infobox military conflict
|partof=]
| conflict = Battle of Kumanovo
|image=
| partof = the ]
|caption=
| image = Kumanovo1912 marcossouza.jpg
|date=] - ] ]
| image_size = 300px
|place=], Ottoman ]
| caption = First Balkan War. The Serbian Front (Serbia) The march of the armies before the battle of Kumanovo.
|casus=
| date = 23–24 October 1912
|territory=
| place = ], ], ], ]<br>{{small|(now Kumanovo, ])}}
|result=Serbian victory
| casus =
|combatant1=] ]
| territory =
|combatant2=] ]
| result = Serbian victory
|commander1=] ]<br>] ]
| combatant1 = {{flag|Kingdom of Serbia}}
|commander2=] ]
| combatant2 = {{flag|Ottoman Empire}}
|strength1=132,000 men<br>148 artillery pieces<br>100 machine guns<ref name=one>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 70.</ref>
| commander1 = {{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]
|strength2=65,000 men<br>164 artillery pieces<br>104 machine guns<ref name=one>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 70.</ref>
| commander2 = {{flagicon|Ottoman Empire}} ]<br />(])<br>{{flagicon|Ottoman Empire}} ]<br />(])
|casualties1=4,564<br>(687 killed,<br>3,280 wounded,<br>597 missing)<ref name=two>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 83. The Ottoman casualties don't include the significant number of soldiers who deserted during and after the battle.</ref>
| units1 = {{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Kingdom of Serbia}} ]
|casualties2=4,500<br>(1,200 killed,<br>3,000 wounded,<br>327 captured)<ref name=two>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 83. The Ottoman casualties don't include the significant number of soldiers who deserted during and after the battle.</ref>
| units2 = {{flagicon|Ottoman Empire}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Ottoman Empire}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Ottoman Empire}} ]
|notes=
| strength1 = 132,000 men<br>148 artillery pieces<br>100 machine guns<br>{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=70}}
| strength2 = 65,000 men<br>164 artillery pieces<br>104 machine guns<br>{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=70}}
| casualties1 = 687 killed<br>3,280 wounded<br>597 missing<br>{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=83}}<br><br>'''Total''': 4,564{{efn|Erickson argues that Serbian casualties may have been as high as 7,000 as the Serbs used their infantry in a manner similar to Japanese ] {{sfn|Erickson|2003|p=181}}}}
| casualties2 = 1,200 killed<br>3,000 wounded<br>327 captured<br>98 artillery pieces lost<br> {{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=83}}{{efn|The Ottoman casualties don't include the significant number of soldiers who deserted during and after the battle.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=83}}}}<br>'''Total''': 4,500{{efn|Erickson estimates that Turkish casualties were 7,000 and argues against Serbian estimates that Turkish casualties were as high as 12,000.{{sfn|Erickson|2003|p=181}}}}
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox First Balkan War}}
| notes = {{center| {{flagicon image|Flag of the prizren league government.png|size=22px}} {{circa|3,000}} ] were ] between Kumanovo and ]}}
}} }}
{{Campaignbox First Balkan War}}
The '''Battle of Kumanovo''' (] and ]: '''''Кумановска битка''''') on ] - ] ] was a major battle of the ]. It was an important ] victory over the ] army in ], shortly after the outbreak of war.


The '''Battle of Kumanovo''' (Serbian: Кумановска битка / Kumanovska bitka, Turkish: Kumanova Muharebesi), on 23–24 October 1912, was a major battle of the ]. It was an important ] victory over the ] army in the ], shortly after the outbreak of the war. After this defeat, the Ottoman army abandoned the major part of the region, suffering heavy losses in manpower (mostly due to ]s) and in war ].{{sfn|Encyclopedic Lexicon Mosaic of Knowledge - History|1970|p=363}}
==Planning==


==Background==
The objective of the Serbian war plan was to destroy the Ottoman army in a decisive battle before the Ottomans can complete the ] and concentration of forces. The Serbian planners assumed that the main Ottoman force will be ] defensively in the ] of ] and on the ] important ] of ]. The aim was to ] the Ottoman army by using three armies:
The objective of the ] plan was to destroy the ] in a decisive battle before the Ottomans could complete the ] and concentration of forces. The Serbian planners assumed that the main Ottoman force would be ] defensively in the ] of ] and on the ] important ] of ]. The Serbian ] was ] ]. The aim was to ] the Ottoman army by using three armies:{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=39–45}}


*], under ] ], comprising of five ] and one ] ] (132,000 men), was deployed in the area around ], with the task to attack the enemy frontally. *], under ] ], composed of five ] and one ] ] (132,000 men), was deployed in the area around ], with the task to attack the enemy frontally.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=39–45}}
*], under ], composed of one Serbian and one ] division (74,000 men), deployed in the area around ], was assigned to the easternmost attack, with the objective of attacking the right flank of the enemy.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=39–45}}
*], under ], composed of four infantry divisions and one infantry ] (76,000 men), deployed in two groups, the first one at ] and the second one at ], was assigned to the westernmost attack, with the task to take ] and then move south to attack the left flank of the enemy.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=39–45}}
*Smaller units were sent to take ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=39–45}}


According to the initial Ottoman plan, created by ], the Ottoman forces in Macedonia would stay in defense and, if necessary, ] to ]. The decisive battle would take place in ], versus the ] army. However, ], the newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army, decided to surprise the Serbs by taking an offensive in Macedonia. The plan also included the offensive in Thrace. His goal was to win the initial battles against the surprised ], hoping that the ] would then intervene and stop the war.{{citation needed|date=October 2019}}
*], under ], comprising of one Serbian and one ] division (74,000 men), deployed in the area around ], was assigned to the easternmost attack, with the objective of attacking the right flank of the enemy.


The Ottoman mobilisation in Macedonia was slow, and the Ottoman ], led by ], had little more than a half of its manpower mobilised when the war started. The army was composed of:
*], under ], comprising of four infantry divisions and one infantry ] (76,000 men), deployed in two groups, the first one at ] and the second one at ], was assigned to the westernmost attack, with the task to take ] and then move south to attack the left flank of the enemy.


*], under Said Pasha, composed of 4 divisions (32,000 men), deployed in the area around ].
*smaller units were sent to take ]. The Serbian ] was ] ].<ref name=three>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 39-45. Serbian war plan and order of battle.</ref>
*], under Cavit Pasha, composed of two divisions (6,000 men), deployed in the area around ].
* ], under Fethi Pasha, composed of three divisions (19,000 men), deployed in the area around ].
* Smaller units in Kosovo.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=45–48}}


==Prelude==
According to the initial Ottoman plan, created by ], the Ottoman forces in Macedonia would stay in defense and, if necessary, ] to ]. The decisive battle would take place in ], versus the ] army. However, ], the newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army, decided to surprise the Serbs by taking an offense in Macedonia. The plan also included the offense in Thrace. His goal was to win the initial battles against the surprised ], hoping that the ] would then intervene and stop the war. However, the Ottoman mobilisation in Macedonia was slow, and the Ottoman ], led by ], had little more than a half of manpower mobilised when the war started. It comprised of:
Even before the war was declared, border skirmishes occurred. On the 15 October, the front of the Toplica group of the Third Army, Serbian ], acting on their own, attacked the Ottoman forces; although the Serbian deployment had not been completed yet. The Ottomans ]ed, but they were stopped by the Morava Division II. The fighting on the border lasted until 19 October when the Ottomans were forced to retreat. On 21 October the entire Third Army began its advance and on 22 October, without serious resistance, entered ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=50–62}}


On 18 October, Bulgarian 7th Rila Infantry Division of the Second Army started its advance towards ], while the rest of the army advanced towards the village of ] and captured it on 21 October.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=66–67}}
*''5. ]'', under ?, comprising of 4 divisions (32,000 men), deployed in the area around ].


The First Army crossed the border on 20 October and in the evening of 22 October reached the outskirts of ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=65–66}}
*''6. Topluluk'', under ], comprising of 2 divisions (6,000 men), deployed in the area around ].


At the other side, as soon as his forces were deployed, ] decided to take the offensive towards Kumanovo. In the evening of 22 October, Vardar Army gathered in the valley of ]. While Zeki Pasha had the precise information about the strength and disposal of the Serbian forces, the Serbian command did not realise that the battle with the main Ottoman force would start the very next morning.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=68–70}} Not expecting the attack, Serbs did not ] their positions, which were ] strong. Still, only two out of five infantry divisions were deployed in the front echelon – Danube Division I on the left wing, with the Cavalry Division behind it, and Morava Division I on the right wing. The left flank was particularly vulnerable, because Srtevica, the important topographic object, was defended by local ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=70}}
*''7. Topluluk'', under Feti Pasha, comprising of 3 divisions (19,000 men), deployed in the area around ].


During the night of 22–23 October, VI Corps 17th Infantry Division and Monastir Infantry Division crossed ] and took the position in the Ottoman centre, on the hill of Zebrnjak. The main forces of V Corps 13th Infantry Division and Štip Infantry Division remained on the left bank of Pčinja, forming the right of the Ottoman's which was acting as a reserve and protecting the route from ], while the main forces of VII Corps ] and Üsküb Infantry Division were on the left side.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=70}}
*smaller units in Kosovo.<ref name=four>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 45-48. Ottoman war plan and order of battle.</ref>
==Prelude==


==Battle==
Even before the war was declared, the border skirmishes occurred. On the ], on the front of the Toplica group of ''3. Armija'', Serbian ], acting on their own, attacked the Ottoman forces, although the Serbian deployment hasn't been completed yet. The Ottomans ]ed, but they were stopped by ''Moravska divizija II poziva''. The fighting on the border lasted until ] when the Ottomans were forced to retreat. On ] the entire ''3. Armija'' began it's advance and on ], without serious resistance, entered ].


===23 October===
On the ], Bulgarian ''7. Rilska pehotna diviziya'' of ''2.Armija'' started it's advance towards ], while the rest of the army advanced towards the village of ] and captured it on ].
]


The morning of 23 October was ]gy, and ] could not be performed properly. On the Serbian left flank, the observers noticed the troops of 17th Infantry Division in movement, but mistook them for the Ottoman battery withdrawing from ]. Troops of the 18th ] of Danube Division I, which moved forward to capture it, were pushed back, as well as the reconnaissance forces of Cavalry Division.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=70–71}}
''1. Armija'' crossed the border on ] and in the evening of ] reached the outskirts of ].


Observing the retreat of these Serbian units, ] concluded that the Serbian left wing was weak. Since there were no actions of the Second Army from Stracin, he decided to attack.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=71}} Around 11:00, with ] support, V and VI Corps attacked the positions of Danube Division I. Soon, 13th and 17th Infantry Division forced the 18th regiment to retreat in disorder, but, instead of continuing the attack, Zeki Pasha waited for the arrival of Štip Infantry Division from the rear to use this division to attack the Serbian flank and rear.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=72–73}} That enabled the Serbian 7th regiment to aid the wavering 18th regiment and to consolidate a defense. Soon after that, the Serbian 8th regiment arrived, and 7th regiment was able to move to the left flank and reinforce the defense of Srtevica, which was endangered by an attack by the Štip Infantry Division.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=73}} On the right flank of Danube Division I, its 9th regiment halted the advance of the weakened Monastir Infantry Division.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=73–74}}
On the other side, as soon as his forces were deployed, ] decided to take the offense towards Kumanovo. In the evening of ] Vardar Army gathered in the valley of ]. While Zekki Pasha had the precise informations about the strength and disposal of the Serbian forces, the Serbian command didn't realise that the battle with the main Ottoman force will start the very next morning.<ref name=five>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 68-70.</ref> Not expecting the attack, Serbs didn't ] their positions, which were, on the other hand, ] strong. Still, only two out of five infantry divisions were deployed in the front echelon - ''Dunavska divizija I poziva'' on the left wing, with ''Konjička divizija'' (Cavalry division) behind it, and ''Moravska divizija I poziva'' on the right wing. The left wing was particularly vulnerable, because Srtevica, the important topographic object, was defended by ] ].<ref name=six>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 70.</ref>


Around 12:00, VII Corps started its attack on the positions held by Morava Division I. However, Serbian infantry and artillery were already deployed for combat, as the artillery fire from the east suggested that the battle had started.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=74}} After the initial Ottoman progress, Serbs counterattacked and pushed them back to their starting positions. After the Serbian counterattack, Ottoman units were kept at bay by the well organised Serbian artillery fire until the end of day.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=74}}
During the night of ]/], ''6. Topluluk'' (''17. piyade tümeni'' and ''Monastir piyade tümeni'') took the position in the Ottoman centre, on the hill of Zebrnjak. The main forces of ''5. Topluluk'' (''13. piyade tümeni'' and ''Štip piyade tümeni'') were on the right Ottoman wing, while the main forces of ''7. Topluluk'' (''19. piyade tümeni'' and ''Üsküb piyade tümeni'') were on the left wing.


The Serbian rear echelon divisions (Danube Division II on the left, Drina Division I in the centre and Timok Division II on the right) and the army artillery were not informed about the combat operations. They remained in the rear, without participating in the first day of the battle. The First Army command did not receive precise information about the battle and did not have any influence on the actual combat. Despite these facts, the Ottoman attack of the 23 October was not successful, mostly thanks to "''the high devotion of (Serbian) troops and lower officers''".{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=76}}
==23 October==


===24 October===
The morning of ] was ]gy, and ] couldn't be performed properly. On the Serbian left wing, the observers noticed the troops of ''17. piyade tümeni'' in movement, but mistaken them for the Ottoman battery withdrawing from ]. Troops of the 18th ] of ''Dunavska divizija I poziva'' which moved forward to capture it were pushed back, as well as the reconnaissance forces of ''Konjička divizija''.<ref name=seven>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 70-71.</ref>
]


], the army chief of staff, ] ], is sitting next to him.]]
Observing the retreat of these Serbian units, ] concluded that the Serbian left wing is weak. Since there were no actions of ''2. Armija'' from ], he decided to attack. Around 11:00, with the ] support, ''5.'' and ''6. Topluluk'' attacked the positions of ''Dunavska divizija I poziva''. Soon, ''13.'' and ''17. piyade tümeni'' forced the 18th regiment to retreat in disorder, but, instead of continuing the attack, Zekki Pasha decided to wait for the arrival of ''Štip piyade tümeni'' from the rear and to use this division to attack the Serbian flank and rear.<ref name=eight>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, pages 72-73.</ref> That enabled the Serbian 7th regiment to aid the wavering 18th regiment and to consolidate the defense. Soon after that, the Serbian 8th regiment arrived, and 7th regiment was able to move to the left flank and reinforce the defense of Srtevica, which was endangered by an attack of ''Štip piyade tümeni''. On the right flank of ''Dunavska divizija I poziva'', it's 9th regiment halted the advance of the weakened ''Monastir piyade tümeni''.


Uninformed about the situation in the field, the First Army command did not realise that the attack of the main Ottoman forces had occurred, as those forces were expected on Ovče Pole. Assuming that the Ottoman units north of Kumanovo were merely forward ], it ordered the troops to continue their advance towards south, as previously planned. After midnight, it received a report from Danube Division I which stated that the division was attacked by the strong enemy forces and suffered heavy casualties, but at that moment it was too late for any change of orders.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=76}}
Around 12.00, ''7. Topluluk'' started it's attack on the positions held by ''Moravska divizija I poziva''. However, Serbian infantry and artillery were already deployed for combat, as the artillery fire from the east suggested that the battle has started.<ref name=nine>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 74.</ref> After the initial Ottoman progress, Serbs have counterattacked and pushed them back to the starting positions. After that, the Ottoman units have been kept at bay by the well organised Serbian artillery fire until the end of day.
The Serbian rear echelon divisions (''Dunavska divizija II poziva'' on the left, ''Drinska divizija I poziva'' in the centre and ''Timočka divizija II poziva'' on the right) and the army artillery weren't informed about the combat operations. They remained in the rear, without participating in the first day of the battle. ''1. Armija'' command didn't receive precise informations about the battle and didn't have any influence on the actual combat. Despite these facts, the Ottoman attack of the 23 October was not successful, mostly thanks to "''the high devotion of (Serbian) troops and lower officers''".<ref name=ten>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 76. Quote in ]: "''Iako vođena bez plana i bez uticaja komande armije, koja nije imalaa vezu sa divizijama, odbrana je uspela da odbije napad nadmoćnijih snaga neprijatelja zahvaljujući krajnjem požrtvovanju trupa i nižih starešina, posebno Dunavske divizije I poziva, koja je podnela najveći teret bitke i pretrpela teške gubitke.''"</ref>


On the other side, ] decided to continue the attack with the hope that his forces would be able to achieve victory on the following day.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=76}}
==24 October==


The Ottoman attack on their right wing started around 5:30. VI Corps was assigned to tie up as many enemy forces as possible by attacking from the front, while Štip Infantry Division was again assigned to ]. Danube Division I again had to withstand heavy pressure, but around 10:00 parts of Danube Division II arrived from the rear and strengthened the defense. At the same time, Cavalry Division moved to the left bank of Pčinja and slowed the advance of Ottoman forces towards Srtevica. Around 12:00, parts of Danube Division II reinforced the defense of Srtevica, definitely stopping the advance of the Ottoman right wing.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=78–79}}
Uninformed about the situation in the field, the command of ''1. Armija'' didn't realise that the attack of the main Ottoman forces has occurred, as those forces were expected on Ovče Pole. Assuming that the Ottoman units north of Kumanovo are merely forward ], it ordered the troops to continue their advance towards south, as previously planned. After midnight, it received a report from ''Dunavska divizija I poziva'' which stated that the division was attacked by the strong enemy forces and suffered heavy casualties, but at that moment it was too late for any change of orders.<ref name=eleven>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 76.</ref>
On the other side, ] decided to continue the attack, hoping that his forces will be able to achieve victory on the following day.


On the left Ottoman wing, a lot of reservists from Üsküb Infantry Division had ] during the night, upon hearing that the Third Army had captured ] and that it was marching towards ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=79}} Still, at 5:30, VII Corps started the attack. However, Morava Division I counterattacked at 6:00 and with the arrival of Timok Division II from the rear they forced the entire Ottoman left wing to retreat.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|pp=81–83}}
The Ottoman attack on their right wing started around 5:30. ''6. Topluluk'' was assigned to tie up as many enemy forces as possible by attacking from the front, while ''Štip piyade tümeni'' was again assigned to ]. ''Dunavska divizija I poziva'' again had to withstand heavy pressure, but around 10:00 parts of ''Dunavska divizija II poziva'' arrived from the rear and strengthened it's defense. At the same time, ''Konjička divizija'' moved to the left bank of ] and slowed the advance of Ottoman forces towards Srtevica. Around 12:00, parts of ''Dunavska divizija II poziva'' reinforced the defense of Srtevica, definitely stopping the advance of the Ottoman right wing.


Around 9:30, Drina Division II from the rear echelon of the First Army arrived to the front and attacked the Ottoman centre. Around 11:00, Monastir Infantry Division started to retreat. The commander of VI Corps managed to temporarily halt the Serbian advance by using his last reserves, but in the repeated attack around 13:00, Drina Division I captured Zebrnjak, the main object in Ottoman defense, and forced 17th Infantry Division to retreat. With Üsküb Infantry Division and Monastir Infantry Division already retreating, the battle was resolved. At 15:00, Morava Division I entered ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=80}}
On the left Ottoman wing, a lot of reservists from ''Üsküb piyade tümeni'' had ] during the night, upon hearing that ''3. Armija'' has captured ] and that it is marching towards ].<ref name=twelve>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 79.</ref> Still, at 5:30, ''7. Topluluk'' started the attack. However, ''Moravska divizija I poziva'' has counterattacked at 6:00, and with the arrival of ''Timočka divizija II poziva'' from the rear, forced the entire Ottoman left wing to retreat.


Ottoman forces retreated in disorder: VII and parts of VI Corps towards ] and V and parts of VI Corps towards ] and ]. Serbian troops missed the chance to pursue them.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=83}}
Around 9:30, ''Drinska divizija I poziva'' from the rear echelon of ''1. Armija'' arrived to the front and attacked the Ottoman centre. Around 11:00, ''Monastir piyade tümeni'' started to retreat. The commander of ''6. Topluluk'' managed to temporarily halt the Serbian advance by using his last reserves, but in the repeated attack around 13:00, ''Drinska divizija I poziva'' managed to capture Zebrnjak, the main object in Ottoman defense, and to force ''17. piyade tümeni'' to retreat. With ''Üsküb piyade tümeni'' and ''Monastir piyade tümeni'' already retreating, the battle was solved.<ref name=thirteen>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 80.</ref> At 15:00, ''Moravska divizija I poziva'' entered ].


==Aftermath==
Ottoman forces retreated in disorder: ''7.'' and parts of ''6. Topluluk'' towards ] and ''5.'' and parts of ''6.Topluluk'' towards ] and ]. Serbian troops missed the chance to pursue them.
The Ottoman Vardar Army fought the battle according to plan, but despite this, suffered a heavy defeat. Although ] ] surprised the Serbian command by his sudden attack, the decision to act offensively against the superior enemy was a grave error which determined the outcome of Battle of Kumanovo.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=83}} On the other side, the Serbian command started the battle without plans and preparations, and missed the chance to pursue the defeated enemy and effectively end the operations in the region, although it had the fresh troops of the rear echelon available for such action. Even after the end of battle, the Serbs still believed that it was fought against weaker Ottoman units and that main enemy forces were on ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=83}} {{efn|] states that General ] believed that the Vardar army still had the ability to fight a battle at ] even after its defeat at Kumanovo. {{sfn|Mišić|1985|p=236}}}}


Nevertheless, the Battle of Kumanovo was a decisive factor in the outcome of the war in the region. The Ottoman plan for an offensive war had failed, and the Vardar Army was forced to abandon much territory and lost a significant number of artillery pieces without the possibility to reinforce, because the supply routes from ] were cut.{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=83}}
==Results==


The Vardar Army was not able to organise the defense on ] and was forced to abandon ], retreating all the way to ]. The First Army advanced slowly and entered Skopje on 26 October. Two days later, it was strengthened by Morava Division II, while the rest of the Third Army was sent to Western Kosovo and then through northern ] to the ]. The Second Army was sent to aid the Bulgarians in the ], while the First Army was preparing for an ].{{sfn|Ratković|Đurišić|Skoko|1972|p=87}}
The Ottoman Vardar Army fought the battle according to plan, but despite this, suffered heavy defeat. Although ] ] surprised the Serbian command by attacking suddenly, the decision to act offensively against the superior enemy was, in fact, a grave error which determined the outcome of this battle.<ref name=fourteen>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 83. Result an significance of the battle.</ref> On the other side, Serbian command started the battle without plans and preparations, and missed the chance to pursue the defeated enemy and effectively end the operations in ], although it has the fresh troops of the rear echelon capable for such action. Even after the end of battle, Serbs still believed that it was fought against weaker Ottoman units and that main enemy forces are on ].<ref name=fourteen>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 83. Result and significance of the battle.</ref><ref name=fifteen>], ''Moje uspomene'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1985, page 236. Mišić states that general ] believed that Vardar army still has the ability to fight a battle on ] even after it's defeat at Kumanovo.</ref>


=== Massacres of Albanian civilians ===
Still, the Battle of Kumanovo was decisive for the outcome of the war in Macedonia. The Ottoman plan for an offensive war has failed, Vardar Army has abandoned large territory and lost a large number of artillery pieces without the possibility to reinforce, as the supply routes from ] were cut out.<ref name=fourteen>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 83. Result and significance of the battle.</ref>
{{Main article|Massacres of Albanians in the Balkan Wars}}
According to Arben Qirezi, Peter I of Serbia had ordered the execution of Albanian civilians living in Kumanovo.<ref name="Qirezi462">{{cite book |last=Qirezi |first=Arben |title=Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences |publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-8229-8157-2 |editor1-last=Mehmeti |editor1-first=Leandrit I. |pages=46 |chapter=Settling the self-determination dispute in Kosovo |quote="However, as pointed out by Noel Malcolm, this was an intentional policy of extermination, when King Peter of Serbia himself ordered the execution of Albanian civilians in Kumanovo." |editor2-last=Radeljić |editor2-first=Branislav |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IWMqDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT74}}</ref> Subsequently, after the battle, the Serbian forces had massacred an estimated 3,000 Albanians between Kumanovo and Uskub based on contemporary accounts.<ref name=":25">{{cite book |last1=Elsie |first1=Robert |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Kosovo_A_Documentary_History/adWLDwAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0 |title=Kosovo, A Documentary History: From the Balkan Wars to World War II |last2=Destani |first2=Bejtullah D. |date=30 January 2018 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-78672-354-3 |page=153 |language=en |quote="they slaughtered 3,000 people in the region between Kumanovo and skopje alone." |access-date=10 August 2023}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Hoare |first=Marko Attila |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Serbia/s8_2EAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=%22Serbian%20military%20activities%20in%20Macedonia%20have%20taken%20on%20the%20character%20of%20an%20extermination%20of%20the%20Arnaut%20population.%20The%20army%20is%20conducting%20an%20unspeakable%20war%20of%20atrocities.%20According%20to%20officers%20and%20soldiers,%203,000%20Arnauts%20were%20slaughtered%20in%20the%20region%20between%20Kumanova/Kumanovo%20and%20Skoplje%20and%205,000%20near%20Prishtina%22 |title=Serbia: A Modern History |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2024 |isbn=9780197790441 |quote="The Danish journalist Fritz Magnussen reported: 'Serbian military activities in Macedonia have taken on the character of an extermination of the Arnaut population. The army is conducting an unspeakable war of atrocities. According to officers and soldiers, 3,000 Arnauts were slaughtered in the region between Kumanova/Kumanovo and Skoplje and 5,000 near Prishtina...'"}}</ref>


==Notes==
The Vardar Army wasn't able to organise the defense on ] and was forced to abandon ], retreating all the way to ]. ''1. Armija'' advanced slowly and entered Skopje on ]. Two days later, it was strengthened by ''Moravska divizija II poziva'', while the rest of ''3. Armija'' was sent to ] and then through northern ] to the ]. ''2. Armija'' was sent to aid the Bulgarians in the ], while ''1. Armija'' was preparing for an ].<ref name=sixteen>Borislav Ratković, Mitar Đurišić, Savo Skoko, ''Srbija i Crna Gora u Balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913'', Belgrade: BIGZ, 1972, page 87.</ref>
{{Notelist}}


==Citations==
==References and notes==
{{Reflist|2}}
<div class="references-small">
<references/>
</div>


==References==
{{DEFAULTSORT:Kumanovo}}
{{Refbegin|indent=yes}}
* {{cite book |title=Encyclopedic Lexicon Mosaic of knowledge - History |publisher=Interpres |location=Belgrade |date=1970 |ref={{sfnref|Encyclopedic Lexicon Mosaic of Knowledge - History|1970}}}}
* {{cite book |last1=Erickson |first1=Edward J. |title=Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913 |year=2003 |publisher=Praeger |isbn=978-0275978884}}
* {{cite book |last1=Mišić |first1=Vojvoda Živojin |title=My Memories |language=Serbian |publisher=BIGZ |location=Belgrade |date=1985}}
* {{cite book |last1=Ratković|first1=Borislav|last2=Đurišić|first2=Mitar|last3=Skoko|first3=Savo|title=Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 |language=Serbian |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jBAvAAAAMAAJ|year=1972|publisher=Belgrade Publishing and Graphic Institute}}
{{refend}}


==External links==
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{{Balkan Wars}}
{{Kumanovo |state=collapsed}}
{{Ottoman battles in the 20th century}}
{{Wars and battles involving Serbs}}
{{Authority control}}

{{Coord missing|North Macedonia}}

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Latest revision as of 18:31, 8 January 2025

1912 battle of the First Balkan War
Battle of Kumanovo
Part of the First Balkan War

First Balkan War. The Serbian Front (Serbia) The march of the armies before the battle of Kumanovo.
Date23–24 October 1912
LocationKumanovo district, Sanjak of Üsküp, Kosovo Vilayet, Ottoman Empire
(now Kumanovo, North Macedonia)
Result Serbian victory
Belligerents
 Kingdom of Serbia  Ottoman Empire
Commanders and leaders
Kingdom of Serbia Radomir Putnik
Kingdom of Serbia Prince Alexander
Kingdom of Serbia Stepa Stepanović
Kingdom of Serbia Božidar Janković
Kingdom of Serbia Ahmed Ademović
Ottoman Empire Halepli Zeki Pasha
(Vardar Army)
Ottoman Empire Fethi Pasha
(VII Corps)
Units involved
Kingdom of Serbia First Army
Kingdom of Serbia Second Army
Kingdom of Serbia Third Army
Ottoman Empire V Corps
Ottoman Empire VI Corps
Ottoman Empire VII Corps
Strength
132,000 men
148 artillery pieces
100 machine guns
65,000 men
164 artillery pieces
104 machine guns
Casualties and losses
687 killed
3,280 wounded
597 missing


Total: 4,564
1,200 killed
3,000 wounded
327 captured
98 artillery pieces lost

Total: 4,500
c. 3,000 Albanians were massacred by the Serbian army between Kumanovo and Uskub
First Balkan War
Bulgarian Front

Serbian and Montenegrin front

Greek front

The Battle of Kumanovo (Serbian: Кумановска битка / Kumanovska bitka, Turkish: Kumanova Muharebesi), on 23–24 October 1912, was a major battle of the First Balkan War. It was an important Serbian victory over the Ottoman army in the Kosovo Vilayet, shortly after the outbreak of the war. After this defeat, the Ottoman army abandoned the major part of the region, suffering heavy losses in manpower (mostly due to desertions) and in war materiel.

Background

The objective of the Royal Serbian Army plan was to destroy the Ottoman army in a decisive battle before the Ottomans could complete the mobilisation and concentration of forces. The Serbian planners assumed that the main Ottoman force would be deployed defensively in the valley of Vardar and on the strategically important plateau of Ovče Pole. The Serbian Commander-in-Chief was General Radomir Putnik. The aim was to double envelop the Ottoman army by using three armies:

According to the initial Ottoman plan, created by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, the Ottoman forces in Macedonia would stay in defense and, if necessary, retreat to Albania. The decisive battle would take place in Thrace, versus the Bulgarian army. However, Nazim Pasha, the newly appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army, decided to surprise the Serbs by taking an offensive in Macedonia. The plan also included the offensive in Thrace. His goal was to win the initial battles against the surprised allies, hoping that the Great powers would then intervene and stop the war.

The Ottoman mobilisation in Macedonia was slow, and the Ottoman Vardar Army, led by Zeki Pasha, had little more than a half of its manpower mobilised when the war started. The army was composed of:

  • V Corps, under Said Pasha, composed of 4 divisions (32,000 men), deployed in the area around Štip.
  • VI Corps, under Cavit Pasha, composed of two divisions (6,000 men), deployed in the area around Veles.
  • VII Corps, under Fethi Pasha, composed of three divisions (19,000 men), deployed in the area around Kumanovo.
  • Smaller units in Kosovo.

Prelude

Even before the war was declared, border skirmishes occurred. On the 15 October, the front of the Toplica group of the Third Army, Serbian chetniks, acting on their own, attacked the Ottoman forces; although the Serbian deployment had not been completed yet. The Ottomans counterattacked, but they were stopped by the Morava Division II. The fighting on the border lasted until 19 October when the Ottomans were forced to retreat. On 21 October the entire Third Army began its advance and on 22 October, without serious resistance, entered Pristina.

On 18 October, Bulgarian 7th Rila Infantry Division of the Second Army started its advance towards Gorna Dzhumaya, while the rest of the army advanced towards the village of Stracin and captured it on 21 October.

The First Army crossed the border on 20 October and in the evening of 22 October reached the outskirts of Kumanovo.

At the other side, as soon as his forces were deployed, Zeki Pasha decided to take the offensive towards Kumanovo. In the evening of 22 October, Vardar Army gathered in the valley of Pčinja River. While Zeki Pasha had the precise information about the strength and disposal of the Serbian forces, the Serbian command did not realise that the battle with the main Ottoman force would start the very next morning. Not expecting the attack, Serbs did not fortify their positions, which were topographically strong. Still, only two out of five infantry divisions were deployed in the front echelon – Danube Division I on the left wing, with the Cavalry Division behind it, and Morava Division I on the right wing. The left flank was particularly vulnerable, because Srtevica, the important topographic object, was defended by local irregulars.

During the night of 22–23 October, VI Corps 17th Infantry Division and Monastir Infantry Division crossed Pčinja and took the position in the Ottoman centre, on the hill of Zebrnjak. The main forces of V Corps 13th Infantry Division and Štip Infantry Division remained on the left bank of Pčinja, forming the right of the Ottoman's which was acting as a reserve and protecting the route from Stracin, while the main forces of VII Corps 19th Infantry Division and Üsküb Infantry Division were on the left side.

Battle

23 October

Map of the battle on 23 October

The morning of 23 October was foggy, and reconnaissance could not be performed properly. On the Serbian left flank, the observers noticed the troops of 17th Infantry Division in movement, but mistook them for the Ottoman battery withdrawing from Stracin. Troops of the 18th regiment of Danube Division I, which moved forward to capture it, were pushed back, as well as the reconnaissance forces of Cavalry Division.

Observing the retreat of these Serbian units, Zeki Pasha concluded that the Serbian left wing was weak. Since there were no actions of the Second Army from Stracin, he decided to attack. Around 11:00, with artillery support, V and VI Corps attacked the positions of Danube Division I. Soon, 13th and 17th Infantry Division forced the 18th regiment to retreat in disorder, but, instead of continuing the attack, Zeki Pasha waited for the arrival of Štip Infantry Division from the rear to use this division to attack the Serbian flank and rear. That enabled the Serbian 7th regiment to aid the wavering 18th regiment and to consolidate a defense. Soon after that, the Serbian 8th regiment arrived, and 7th regiment was able to move to the left flank and reinforce the defense of Srtevica, which was endangered by an attack by the Štip Infantry Division. On the right flank of Danube Division I, its 9th regiment halted the advance of the weakened Monastir Infantry Division.

Around 12:00, VII Corps started its attack on the positions held by Morava Division I. However, Serbian infantry and artillery were already deployed for combat, as the artillery fire from the east suggested that the battle had started. After the initial Ottoman progress, Serbs counterattacked and pushed them back to their starting positions. After the Serbian counterattack, Ottoman units were kept at bay by the well organised Serbian artillery fire until the end of day.

The Serbian rear echelon divisions (Danube Division II on the left, Drina Division I in the centre and Timok Division II on the right) and the army artillery were not informed about the combat operations. They remained in the rear, without participating in the first day of the battle. The First Army command did not receive precise information about the battle and did not have any influence on the actual combat. Despite these facts, the Ottoman attack of the 23 October was not successful, mostly thanks to "the high devotion of (Serbian) troops and lower officers".

24 October

Map of the battle on 24 October
The staff of 1. Armija. On the left side is the army commander, Crown Prince Alexander, the army chief of staff, Colonel Petar Bojović, is sitting next to him.

Uninformed about the situation in the field, the First Army command did not realise that the attack of the main Ottoman forces had occurred, as those forces were expected on Ovče Pole. Assuming that the Ottoman units north of Kumanovo were merely forward detachments, it ordered the troops to continue their advance towards south, as previously planned. After midnight, it received a report from Danube Division I which stated that the division was attacked by the strong enemy forces and suffered heavy casualties, but at that moment it was too late for any change of orders.

On the other side, Zeki Pasha decided to continue the attack with the hope that his forces would be able to achieve victory on the following day.

The Ottoman attack on their right wing started around 5:30. VI Corps was assigned to tie up as many enemy forces as possible by attacking from the front, while Štip Infantry Division was again assigned to flank attack. Danube Division I again had to withstand heavy pressure, but around 10:00 parts of Danube Division II arrived from the rear and strengthened the defense. At the same time, Cavalry Division moved to the left bank of Pčinja and slowed the advance of Ottoman forces towards Srtevica. Around 12:00, parts of Danube Division II reinforced the defense of Srtevica, definitely stopping the advance of the Ottoman right wing.

On the left Ottoman wing, a lot of reservists from Üsküb Infantry Division had deserted during the night, upon hearing that the Third Army had captured Pristina and that it was marching towards Skopje. Still, at 5:30, VII Corps started the attack. However, Morava Division I counterattacked at 6:00 and with the arrival of Timok Division II from the rear they forced the entire Ottoman left wing to retreat.

Around 9:30, Drina Division II from the rear echelon of the First Army arrived to the front and attacked the Ottoman centre. Around 11:00, Monastir Infantry Division started to retreat. The commander of VI Corps managed to temporarily halt the Serbian advance by using his last reserves, but in the repeated attack around 13:00, Drina Division I captured Zebrnjak, the main object in Ottoman defense, and forced 17th Infantry Division to retreat. With Üsküb Infantry Division and Monastir Infantry Division already retreating, the battle was resolved. At 15:00, Morava Division I entered Kumanovo.

Ottoman forces retreated in disorder: VII and parts of VI Corps towards Skopje and V and parts of VI Corps towards Štip and Veles. Serbian troops missed the chance to pursue them.

Aftermath

The Ottoman Vardar Army fought the battle according to plan, but despite this, suffered a heavy defeat. Although Zeki Pasha operationally surprised the Serbian command by his sudden attack, the decision to act offensively against the superior enemy was a grave error which determined the outcome of Battle of Kumanovo. On the other side, the Serbian command started the battle without plans and preparations, and missed the chance to pursue the defeated enemy and effectively end the operations in the region, although it had the fresh troops of the rear echelon available for such action. Even after the end of battle, the Serbs still believed that it was fought against weaker Ottoman units and that main enemy forces were on Ovče Pole.

Nevertheless, the Battle of Kumanovo was a decisive factor in the outcome of the war in the region. The Ottoman plan for an offensive war had failed, and the Vardar Army was forced to abandon much territory and lost a significant number of artillery pieces without the possibility to reinforce, because the supply routes from Anatolia were cut.

The Vardar Army was not able to organise the defense on Vardar River and was forced to abandon Skopje, retreating all the way to Prilep. The First Army advanced slowly and entered Skopje on 26 October. Two days later, it was strengthened by Morava Division II, while the rest of the Third Army was sent to Western Kosovo and then through northern Albania to the Adriatic coast. The Second Army was sent to aid the Bulgarians in the Siege of Adrianople, while the First Army was preparing for an offense towards Prilep and Bitola.

Massacres of Albanian civilians

Main article: Massacres of Albanians in the Balkan Wars

According to Arben Qirezi, Peter I of Serbia had ordered the execution of Albanian civilians living in Kumanovo. Subsequently, after the battle, the Serbian forces had massacred an estimated 3,000 Albanians between Kumanovo and Uskub based on contemporary accounts.

Notes

  1. Erickson argues that Serbian casualties may have been as high as 7,000 as the Serbs used their infantry in a manner similar to Japanese Banzai attacks.
  2. The Ottoman casualties don't include the significant number of soldiers who deserted during and after the battle.
  3. Erickson estimates that Turkish casualties were 7,000 and argues against Serbian estimates that Turkish casualties were as high as 12,000.
  4. Živojin Mišić states that General Putnik believed that the Vardar army still had the ability to fight a battle at Ovče Pole even after its defeat at Kumanovo.

Citations

  1. ^ Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 70.
  2. ^ Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 83.
  3. ^ Erickson 2003, p. 181.
  4. Encyclopedic Lexicon Mosaic of Knowledge - History 1970, p. 363.
  5. ^ Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 39–45.
  6. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 45–48.
  7. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 50–62.
  8. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 66–67.
  9. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 65–66.
  10. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 68–70.
  11. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 70–71.
  12. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 71.
  13. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 72–73.
  14. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 73.
  15. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 73–74.
  16. ^ Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 74.
  17. ^ Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 76.
  18. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 78–79.
  19. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 79.
  20. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, pp. 81–83.
  21. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 80.
  22. Mišić 1985, p. 236.
  23. Ratković, Đurišić & Skoko 1972, p. 87.
  24. Qirezi, Arben (2017). "Settling the self-determination dispute in Kosovo". In Mehmeti, Leandrit I.; Radeljić, Branislav (eds.). Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences. University of Pittsburgh Press. p. 46. ISBN 978-0-8229-8157-2. However, as pointed out by Noel Malcolm, this was an intentional policy of extermination, when King Peter of Serbia himself ordered the execution of Albanian civilians in Kumanovo.
  25. Elsie, Robert; Destani, Bejtullah D. (30 January 2018). Kosovo, A Documentary History: From the Balkan Wars to World War II. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 153. ISBN 978-1-78672-354-3. Retrieved 10 August 2023. they slaughtered 3,000 people in the region between Kumanovo and skopje alone.
  26. Hoare, Marko Attila (2024). Serbia: A Modern History. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780197790441. The Danish journalist Fritz Magnussen reported: 'Serbian military activities in Macedonia have taken on the character of an extermination of the Arnaut population. The army is conducting an unspeakable war of atrocities. According to officers and soldiers, 3,000 Arnauts were slaughtered in the region between Kumanova/Kumanovo and Skoplje and 5,000 near Prishtina...'

References

  • Encyclopedic Lexicon Mosaic of knowledge - History. Belgrade: Interpres. 1970.
  • Erickson, Edward J. (2003). Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913. Praeger. ISBN 978-0275978884.
  • Mišić, Vojvoda Živojin (1985). My Memories (in Serbian). Belgrade: BIGZ.
  • Ratković, Borislav; Đurišić, Mitar; Skoko, Savo (1972). Serbia and Montenegro in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 (in Serbian). Belgrade Publishing and Graphic Institute.

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