Misplaced Pages

Conatus: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editContent deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 08:55, 14 April 2007 editLacatosias (talk | contribs)8,348 editsm minor rewording← Previous edit Latest revision as of 18:12, 16 October 2024 edit undoNavadda (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users504 editsm →Definition and origin: Fixed typoTags: Mobile edit Mobile app edit Android app edit App section source 
(698 intermediate revisions by more than 100 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{short description|Innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself}}
{|align=right
{{About|a term in philosophy|the Zola Jesus album|Conatus (album)|Conatus - Journal of Philosophy|Conatus (journal)}}
|__TOC__
|}
{{Two other uses|a term in philosophy|the book|Conatus (book)|the species of fish|Platycephalus}}
'''''Conatus''''', (''Latin: effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking''), is a term used in early philosophies of ] and ] to refer to an innate inclination of ] or ] to continue to exist and enhance itself {{Harv|Traupman|1966|p=52}}. Over the millennia, many different definitions and treatments have been formulated by philosophers such as the 17th century ], ], ], and ], and their ] contemporary ] {{Harv|LeBuffe|2006}}.<!--These last three contitute the "great early modern classic of ''conatus''" {{Harv|Tuusvuori|2000|p=147}}.--> The ''conatus'' may refer to the instinctual "will to live" of animals or to various metaphysical theories of ] and ] {{Harv|Wolfson|1934|p=202}}. Often the concept is associated with ]'s will in a ] view of ], as in the case of Spinoza {{Harv|LeBuffe|2006}}. The concept may be broken up into separate definitions for the mind and body, or even differentiated when discussing ] or inertia {{Harv|Kollerstrom|1999}}.


], where "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being."{{efn|'']'', part 3, prop. 6}}]]
The history of the term ''conatus'' is the story of a gradual evolution: after its formulation in ancient ], each successive philosopher to adopt the term put his own personal twist on the concept, tweaking the scope or meaning of the term such that it now has no concrete and universally accepted definition {{Harv|Wolfson|1934|p=202}}. These early authors wrote primarily in ], and thus used ''conatus'' not only as a technical term but as a common word and in a general sense. ''Conatus'' is, of course, more than simply a Latin participle. But, in archaic texts, the more technical usage is difficult to discern from the more vulgar one, and they are also difficult to differentiate in translation. In ] translations, the term is italicized when used in the technical sense or translated and followed by "conatus" in brackets {{Harv|Leibniz|1989|p=118}}. Today, ''conatus'' is rarely used in the technical sense, since modern physics and evolutionary biology eclipse it; it has, however, been a notable influence on nineteenth and twentieth-century thinkers such as ] and ].
In the philosophy of ], '''conatus''' ({{IPAc-en|k|oʊ|ˈ|n|eɪ|t|ə|s}}; ]; ] for "effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking; striving") is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. This ''thing'' may be mind, matter, or a combination of both, and is often associated with God's will in a ] view of nature. The ''conatus'' may refer to the instinctive ''will to live'' of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of ] and ]. Today, ''conatus'' is rarely used in the technical sense, since classical mechanics uses concepts such as ] and ] that have superseded it. It has, however, been a notable influence on later thinkers such as ] and ].


==Definition and origin==
== Classical origins ==
] used the term ''conatus'' in his mechanistic theory of motion.]]
]]]
The Latin '']'' comes from the verb '']'', which is usually translated into English as, ''to endeavor''; used as an abstract noun, ''conatus'' is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. Although the term is most central to Spinoza's philosophy, many other ] including ], ], and ] made significant contributions, each developing the term differently.<ref Name="LeB">{{Harvnb|LeBuffe|2006}}</ref>
The Latin ''conatus'' comes from the verb ''conatur'', which is usually translated into English as, "to endeavor"; but the concept of the conatus was first developed in the ] by the ] before the ]. These groups used the word {{polytonic|''ὁρμήν''}} to describe the bestial and human instinct towards self-preservation in a general sense. The ] thinkers, ] and ], expanded this principle to include a repulsion from destruction, but continued to limit these assertions only to the motivations of non-human animals. Diogenes Laertius specifically denied the application of the term to plants. Before the ], ], ] and ] expressed similar sentiments using the Latin words ''vult'', ''velle'' or ''appetit'' as synonyms of ''"conatus"''; indeed, all four terms may be used to translate the original Greek {{polytonic|''ὁρμήν''}}. Around 1700, ] and ] extended the primitive Greek notions and applied them to all objects, animate and inanimate {{Harv|Wolfson|1934|pp=196,199,202}}.


Whereas the medieval ] philosophers such as ] developed a notion of ''impetus'' as a mysterious intrinsic property of things,<ref>{{Harvnb|Grant|1964|pp=265–292}}</ref> René Descartes (1596–1650) developed a more modern, ] concept of motion which he called the ''conatus.''<ref>{{Harvnb|Garber|1992|pp=150,154}}</ref> For Descartes, in contrast to Buridan, motion and rest are properties of the ''interactions'' of matter according to eternally fixed mechanical laws, not dispositions and intentions, nor as inherent properties or ''forces'' of things, but rather as a unifying, external characteristic of the physical universe itself.<ref>{{Harvnb|Garber|1992|pp=180,184}}</ref> Descartes specifies two varieties of the ''conatus'': ''conatus a centro,''{{efn|"tendency towards the center"}} or a theory of ] and ''conatus recedendi{{efn|"tendency away from the center"}}'' which represents ].<ref name="Koll">{{Harvnb|Kollerstrom|1999|pp=331–356}}</ref> Descartes, in developing his First Law of Nature, also invokes the idea of a ''conatus se movendi'', or "''conatus'' of self-preservation", a generalization of the principle of ], which was formalized by ] and made into the first of his three ] fifty years after the death of Descartes.{{sfn|Wolfson|1934|pp=197-202}}
In ancient Greece, Cicero, Laertius and ] each alluded to a connection between the ''conatus'' and other emotions. In their view, the former induces the latter. They posited that humans do not wish to do something because they think it "good", but rather they think it "good" because they want to do it: in other words, the cause for human desire is our ''conatus'', and the natural inclination for a body to augment itself in accordance with its principles {{Harv|Wolfson|1934|p=204}}.


] criticized previous definitions of ''conatus'' for failing to explain the origin of motion, defining ''conatus'' to be the infinitesimal unit at the ''beginning'' of motion: an inclination in a specified direction.<ref>{{Harvnb|Hobbes|1998|loc=III, xiv, 2}}</ref> Furthermore, Hobbes uses conatus to describe cognition functions in the mind,{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}} describing ] as the beginning of motion and the ] as the sum of all emotions, which forms the ''conatus'' of a body and its physical manifestation is the perceived "will to survive".<ref name="LeB" /> In a notion similar that of Hobbes, ] differentiates between the ''conatus'' of the body and soul,{{sfn|Arthur|1998}} primarily focusing however on the concept of a ''conatus'' of body in developing the principles of ] to explain ] of motion.<ref>{{Harvnb|Leibniz|1988|p=135}}</ref> Leibniz later defines the term ''monadic conatus'', as the ''state of change'' through which his ] perpetually advance.<ref>{{Harvnb|Arthur|1994|loc=sec. 3}}</ref> This ''conatus'' is a sort of instantaneous or ''virtual'' motion that all things possess, even when they are static. Motion, meanwhile, is just the summation of all the ''conatuses'' that a thing has, along with the interactions of things. By summing an infinity of such ''conatuses'' (i.e., what is now called ]), Leibniz could measure the effect of a continuous force.<ref name="Gill">{{Harvnb|Gillispie|1971|pp=159–161}}</ref>
There is a traditional connection between ''conatus'' and motion itself. Aquinas and ] both related the concept directly to that which ] saw to be the "natural movements upward and downward or with their being balanced in an intermediate position" described in his '']'', XI, 27. They called this force that causes objects to rise or fall, "''amor naturalis''", or "natural love" {{Harv|Wolfson|1934|pp=197,200}}.


== In Descartes == ==In Spinoza's philosophy==
{{main|Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza}}
{{seealso|René Descartes}}
Conatus is a central theme in the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677), which is derived from principles that Hobbes and Descartes developed.<ref>{{Harvnb|Morgan|2006|p=ix}}</ref> Contrary to most philosophers of his time, Spinoza rejects the dualistic assumption that mind, ], ethics, and freedom are to be treated as things separate from the natural world of physical objects and events.<ref>{{Harvnb|Jarrett|1991|pp=470–475}}</ref> One significant change he makes to Hobbes' theory is his belief that the ''conatus ad motum'' (''conatus'' to motion) is ''not'' mental, but material.{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}} Spinoza also uses ''conatus'' to refer to rudimentary concepts of ], as Descartes had earlier.<ref name="LeB" /> According to Spinoza, "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" ('']'', part 3, prop. 6). Since a thing cannot be destroyed without the action of external forces, motion and rest, too, exist indefinitely until disturbed.{{sfn|Allison|1975|p=124-125}} His goal is to provide a unified explanation of all these things within a ] framework, man and nature must be unified under a consistent set of laws; ] and ] are one, and there is no ]. For example, an action is ''free'', for Spinoza, only if it arises from the essence and ''conatus'' of an entity. However, an action can still be free in the sense that it is not constrained or otherwise subject to external forces.<ref>{{Harvnb|Lachterman|1978}}</ref> Human beings are thus an integral part of nature.{{sfn|Allison|1975|p=124-125}} Spinoza explains seemingly irregular human behaviour as really ''natural'' and rational and motivated by this principle of the ''conatus''.{{sfn|Allison|1975|p=124-125}} Some have argued that the ''conatus'' consists of happiness and the perpetual drive toward perfection.<ref>{{Harvnb|DeBrabander|2007|pp=20–1}}</ref> Conversely, a person is saddened by anything that opposes his ''conatus.'' Others have associated ''desire'', a primary affect, with the ''conatus'' principle of Spinoza. Desire is then controlled by the other affects, pleasure and pain, and thus the ''conatus'' strives towards that which causes joy and avoids that which produces pain.{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}}
]]]
In the first half of the seventeenth century, René Descartes began to develop a more modern, ] concept of the ''conatus'', describing it as "an active power or tendency of bodies to move, expressing the power of God" {{Harv|Pietarinen|2000}}. Whereas the ancients had used the term in a strictly ] sense similar to voluntary "endeavoring" or "struggling" to achieve certain ends, and medieval Scholastics has developed a notion of ''conatus'' as a mysterious intrinsic property of things, Descartes used the term in a somewhat more ] sense. Here one can see the beginnings of a move away from the attribution of desires and intentions to nature and its workings toward a more scientific and modern view {{Harv|Goukroger|1980}}.


==Later usages and related concepts==
Despite his dualism, Descartes strongly rejected the ], or purposive, view of the material world that was dominant in the West from the time of Aristotle. His mechanistic view of ''conatus'' and other such notions would have a revolutionary effect on the understanding of nature and physics. Descartes specified two varieties of the ''conatus'': ''conatus a centro'' and ''conatus recedendi''. ''Conatus a centro'', or "tendency towards the center", was used by Descartes as a theory of ]; ''conatus recendendi'', or "tendency away from the center", represented the ]s {{Harv|Kollerstrom|1999}}.These tendencies are not to be thought of in terms of animate dispositions and intentions, but rather as inherent properties or "forces" of the physical world.
After the development of ], the concept of a ''conatus,'' in the sense used by philosophers other than Spinoza,{{sfn|Bidney|1962|p=87-93}} an intrinsic property of all physical bodies, was largely superseded by the principles of ] and ]. Similarly, ''Conatus recendendi'' became ], and ''conatus a centro'' became ].<ref name="Koll" /> However, ], inspired by ], explicitly rejected the principle of inertia and the laws of motion of the new physics. For him, ''conatus'' was the essence of human ],<ref>{{Harvnb|Goulding|2005|p=22040}}</ref> and also, in a more traditional, ] sense, as the generating power of movement which pervades all of nature,<ref>{{Harvnb|Vico|1710|pp=180–186}}</ref> which was composed neither of atoms, as in the dominant view, nor of extension, as in Descartes, but of ''metaphysical points'' animated by a ''conatus'' principle provoked by God.<ref>{{Harvnb|Landucci|2004|pp=1174,1175}}</ref> ] (1788–1860) developed a principle notably similar to that of Spinoza's ''conatus''.<ref name="LeB" /><ref name="Shop">{{Harvnb|Schopenhauer|1958|p=357}}</ref> This principle, ''Wille zum Leben'', or of a "Will to Live", described the specific phenomenon of an organism's self-preservation instinct.<ref>{{Harvnb|Rabenort|1911|p=16}}</ref> Schopenhauer qualified this, however, by suggesting that the Will to Live is not limited in duration, but rather, "the will wills absolutely and for all time", across generations.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schopenhauer|1958|p=568}}</ref> Rejecting the primacy of Schopenhauer's Will to Live, ] (1844–1900) developed a separate principle the ], which comes out of a rejection of such notions of self-preservation.<ref>{{Harvnb|Durant|Durant|1963|loc=chp. IX}}</ref> In ], the Spinozistic conception of a ''conatus'' has been related to modern theories of ] in biological systems.<ref name=sandy144145>{{Harvnb|Sandywell|1996|pp=144–5}}</ref> However, the scope of the idea is definitely narrower today, being explained in terms of chemistry and neurology where, before, it was a matter of metaphysics and ].<ref name=mathews110>{{Harvnb|Mathews|1991|p=110}}</ref>


==See also==
Descartes, developing his First Law of Nature, also invoked the idea of a ''conatus se movendi'', or "''conatus'' of self-preservation"{{Harv|Wolfson|1934|p=201}}. This law is very closely related to ]'s much better-known ], which was developed fifty years later. Descartes' version states: "Each thing, insofar as in it lies, always perseveres in the same state, and when once moved, always continues to move" {{Harv|Blackwell|1966|p=220}}.
*]


==In Hobbes== ==Notes==
{{notelist}}
{{seealso|Thomas Hobbes}}
{{Reflist|30em}}
]]]
===Conatus and the psyche===
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), too, worked off of the previous notions of the ''conatus'' principle; but, he notably criticized previous definitions for failing to explain the origin of motion. Working towards this end becomes the primary focus of Hobbes' work in this field. Indeed, Hobbes "reduces all the cognitive functions of the mind to variations of its ''conative'' functions" {{Harv|Bidney|1962|p=91}}.


==References==
Furthermore, Hobbes describes ] as the beginning of motion and the ] as the sum of all emotions. This "will" forms the ''conatus'' of a body {{Harv|Pietarinen|2000}} and its physical manifestation is the perceived "will to survive" {{Harv|LeBuffe|2006}}. In order that living beings may thrive, Hobbes says, "they seek peace and fight anything that threatens this peace" {{Harv|Pietarinen|2000}}. Hobbes also equates this ''conatus'' with "imagination", and states that a change in the conatus, or will, is the result of "deliberation" {{Harv|Schmitter|2006}}.
{{refbegin|30em}}

===Conatus and physics ===
{{cquote|I define to be motion made in less space and time then can be given; that is, less then can be determined or assigned by exposition or number; that is, motion made through the length of a point, and in an instant or point of time {{Harv|Jesseph|2006|p=21}}.}}

As it was in his psychological theory, Hobbes's physical ''conatus'' was an infinitessimal unit of motion; it was the ''beginning'' of motion: an inclination in a specified direction. '']'' and other concepts of Hobbes's were defined in terms of this ''conatus''. The ''impetus'', for instance, was, “a measure of the conatus exercised by a moving body over the course of time” {{Harv|Jesseph|2006|p=22}}. ] was a caused by a contrary ''conatus''; ] was this and “the magnitude of the body” {{Harv|Jesseph|2006|p=35}}. Hobbes also used the word ''conatus'' to refer to the "restorative forces" which may cause ]s , for example, to contract or expand. Hobbes perceived some force inherent in these objects that inclined them to return to their previous state. Today, science attributes this phenomenon to material ] {{Harv|Osler|2001}}.

==In Spinoza==
{{seealso|Baruch Spinoza}}
]]]
Of all of the different uses of the word "conatus" in philosophy, Baruch Spinoza's were perhaps the most significant {{Specify|date=March 2007}}<!--why really?-->. Spinoza applied it to the human body, psyche and both simultaneously, using a different term for each {{Harv|Wolfson|1934|p=199}}. When referring to psychological manifestation of the concept, he uses the term '''''voluntas''''' (will). When referring to the overarching concept, he uses the word '''''appetitus''''' or (appetite). When referring to the bodily impulse, he uses the plain term "''conatus''" {{Harv|Allison|1975|p=126}}. Sometimes he expands the term and used the whole phrase, "conatus sese conservandi" (the striving for self-preservation) {{Harv|Duff|1903|loc=chp. VII}}

Spinoza asserts the existence of this general principle of a "conatus" in attempting to explain the "self-evident" truth that "nothing can be destroyed except by an external cause" (IIIP4); it is self-evident that "the definition of anything affirms, and does not negate, the thing's essence" {{Harv|Spinoza|1677|p=66}}. This resistance to self-destruction is formulated by Spinoza to equal an ] endeavoring to continue to exist: and ''conatus'' is the word he most often uses to describe this force {{Harv|Allison|1975|p=124}}.

In Spinoza's world-view, this principle is applicable to all things, and furthermore it constitutes the very essence of objects, including Man, for these are but finite ]s of God {{Harv|Lin|2004|p=4}}. Thus, as is stated in IIIP8, this ''conatus'' is of "indefinite time"; it lasts as long as the object does {{Harv|Spinoza|1677|pp=66-7}}. Spinoza uses ''conatus'' to describe an inclination for things to increase in character; more than just cause to continue statically, to strive towards perfection {{Harv|Allison|1975|p=126}}. Even further, all existing things act ] the action maintains or augments its existence {{Harv|Lin|2004|p=4}}. Spinoza, extending the concepts of his precedessors, used the term ''conatus'' to refer to rudimentary concepts of ], as Descartes had even earlier {{Harv|LeBuffe|2006}}. It follows that as a thing cannot self-destruct without the action of external forces, motion and rest, too, exist indefinitely until disturbed {{Harv|Allison|1975|p=125}}.

===Psychological manifestation===
]
The concept of the ''conatus'' when used in ]'s ] on ] was derived from sources both ancient and medieval. Spinoza reformulates the principles that the Stoics, Cicero, Laertius and especially Hobbes and Descartes developed {{Harv|Morgan|2006|p=ix}}. One significant change he makes to Hobbes' theory is his belief that the '''''conatus ad motum''''', (Latin: ''conatus'' to motion), is ''not'' mental, but material {{Harv|Bidney|1962|p=93}}.

Spinoza, with his ], believed that man and nature may be unified under a consistent set of laws; ] and ] are one, and there is no ]: ] is thus an integral part of nature {{Harv|Allison|1975|p=125}}. Spinoza explained seemingly irregular human behaviour as really "natural" and rational and motivated by this principle of the ''conatus'' {{Harv|Dutton|2006|loc= chp. 5}}; he replaced the notion of free will with the ''conatus'', a principle that could be applied to all of nature and not just man {{Harv|Allison|1975|p=125}}.

====Emotions and affects====
The relationship between the ''conatus'' and the human ]s is not clear. ], assistant professor of philosophy at the ], and ], professor of ] at the ], both argue that the human ] arise from the ''conatus'' and the perpetual drive toward perfection {{Harv|DeBrabander|2007|p=20-1}}. Indeed, Spinoza states in IVP18 of his ''Ethics'' that ] specifically, "consists in the human capacity to preserve itself." This endeavor is also named by Spinoza to be the "foundation of ]". {{Harv|Damasio|2003|p=170}}. Inversely, a person is saddened by anything that opposes his ''conatus'' {{Harv|Damasio|2003|pp=138-9}}

The late ], who was a professor at ], disagrees. Bidney closely associates "desire", a primary ], with the ''conatus'' principle of Spinoza. This assertion is backed up by the Scholium of IIIP9 of the ''Ethics'' which states, "...Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of the appetite. So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite" <!-- ? -->{{Harv|LeBuffe|2006}}. According to Bidney, this desire is is controlled by the other affects, pleasure and pain, and thus the ''conatus'' strives towards that which causes joy and avoids that which produce pain {{Harv|Bidney|1962|p=87}}.

===Counter-arguments===
It has been noted that, despite Spinoza's extensive argument for the existence of a universal conatus principle, many arguments against it can be enumerated. Martin Lin, professor at the ], points to lit ], ]s and ]s as counterexamples to Spinozean conatus. Counter-counter arguments may be, “lit candles do not light themselves”, or “Tongley's sculpture or a time bomb involve parts that never succeed in constituting genuinely integrated wholes” {{Harv|Lin|2004|p=30}}.
]]]

==In Leibniz==
{{Quote_box|
width=20%
|align=left
|quote=" is to motion as a point is to space, or as one to infinity, for it is the beginning and end of motion"
|source= {{Harv|Arthur|1998}}}}
{{seealso|Gottfried Leibniz}}
Gottfried Leibniz (1646 – 1716) was a student of ] and learned of the ''conatus'' princple from him and from Hobbes, though Weigel used the word '''''tendentia''''' (Latin: tendency) {{Harv|Arthur|1998|}}. Specifically, Leibniz used the word "''conatus''" in his ''Exposition and Defence of the New System'' in 1695 to describe similar notions to previous ones, but here, he differentiated between the ''conatus'' of the body and soul, the first of which may only travel in a straight like by its own power, and the latter of which may "remember" more complicated motion {{Harv|Leibniz|1988|p=135}}. Leibniz also defined the term '''monadic conatus''', as the "state of change" through which his ]s perpetually advance {{Harv|Arthur|1994|loc=sec. 3}}.

Leibniz did do much to develop the concept of a ''conatus'', incorporating it with the principles of ]. Leibniz made some significant contributions to the early science of physical ], using the adopted term "''conatus''" as a mathematical analog of Newton's "]" {{Harv|Gillespie|1971|p=161}}. The '']'' was the result of a continuous summation of the ''conatus'' of a body, as the '']'' was the sum of the inactive '']'' {{Harv|Duchesneau|1998}}. Based on the work of Kepler and possibly Descartes, Leibniz developed a model of planetary motion based on the ''conatus'' principle he developed with the idea of a ]. This theory is expounded in the work ''Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis'' {{Harv|Gillespie|1971|p=161}}.

]]]

==Related terms==
]]]

*] (1668 – 1744) defined ''conatus'' as the essence of human ] {{Harv|Goulding|2005|p=22040}}.

*]'s, (1788 - 1860), philosophy, not necessarily derived from Spinoza, nevertheless contains a principle notably similar to that of Spinoza's ''conatus''. This principle, ''Wille zum Leben'', or ], described the specific phenomenon of an organism's self-preservation instinct {{Harv|Rabenort|1911|p=16}}.

*], (1844 - 1900), developed a separate principle which is related to Spinoza's original: this was Nietzsche's ], or ''Wille zur Macht'' {{Harv|Durant|Durant|1963|loc=chp. IX}}.

*], (1859 – 1941) developed the principle of the '']'', or "vital impulse", which was thought to aid in the ] of ]s. This concept which implies a fundamental driving force behind all life, is reminiscient of the ''conatus'' principle of Spinoza and others {{Harv|Schrift|2006|p=13}}.
<!--
*], (1856 – 1939), among others, greatly depended on Spinoza's formulation of the ''conatus'' principle as a system of self preservation, though he never cited him in any of his published works {{Harv|Damasio|2003|p=260}}.-->

*], (1911 - 1998), defined a '''cultural conatus''' built directly upon Spinoza's seminal definition in IIIP3<!--reread this book--> of his ''Ethics''. The principle behind this derivative concept states that any given culture, "tends to persevere in its being, whether by dominating other cultures or by struggling against their domination" {{Harv|Polt|1996}}.

==Modern significance==
<!-- ]-->
===Physical===
After the advent of Newtonian physics, the concept of a ''conatus'' of all physical bodies was largely superseded by the principle of ] and ]. As Bidney states, "It is true that logically desire or the conatus is merely a principle of inertia ... the fact remains, however, that this is not Spinoza's usage" {{Harv|Bidney|p=88}}. Likewise, ''conatus'' was used by many philosophers to describe other concepts which have slowly been made obsolete. ''Conatus recendendi'', for instance, became the centrifugal force, and ] is used where ''conatus a centro'' was before {{Harv|Kollerstrom|1999}}.

===Biological===
The archaic concept of ''conatus'' is today reconciled with modern biology<!--psychology and philosophy-->; but the perceived ''conatus'' of today is explained in terms of chemistry and neurology where, before, it was a matter of metaphysics and ] {{Harv|Damasio|2003|p=37}}. This concept similar to ''conatus'' may be "constructed so as to maintain the coherence of a living ]'s structures and functions against numerous life-threatening odds", as put by Damasio (36). This ''conatus'' is similar to modern notions of the ] in the ] sense, and the animal directive of ].

== Bibliography ==
{{Sisterlinks}}
<div class="references-small">
* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Allison | last = Allison
Line 107: Line 36:
| publisher = Twayne Publishers | publisher = Twayne Publishers
| place = San Diego | place = San Diego
| isbn = 0-8057-2853-8 | isbn =978-0-8057-2853-8}}
}}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Arthur | last = Arthur
Line 116: Line 43:
| journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | journal = The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
| volume = 45 | volume = 45
| number = 1
| year = 1994 | year = 1994
| pages = 219-240 | pages = 219–240
| id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A16109468 | id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A16109468
| doi = 10.1093/bjps/45.1.219
| issue = 1
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Arthur | last = Arthur
| first = Richard | first = Richard
| title = Cohesion, Division and Harmony: Physical Aspects of Leibniz's Continuum Problem (1671-1686) | title = Cohesion, Division and Harmony: Physical Aspects of Leibniz's Continuum Problem (1671–1686)
| journal = Perspectives on Science | journal = Perspectives on Science
| volume = 110 | volume = 6
| number = 1
| year = 1998 | year = 1998
| pages = 110–135
| id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A54601187 | id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A54601187
| issue = 1
}}
| doi = 10.1162/posc_a_00546

| s2cid = 141579187
}}
* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Bidney | last = Bidney
| first = David | first = David
| title = The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas | title = The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas
| year = 1962 | year = 1962
| date = 1962
| place = New York | place = New York
| publisher = Russell & Russell Inc. | publisher = Russell & Russell
}} }}

* {{Citation
| last = Blackwell
| first = Richard J.
| title = Descartes' Laws of Motion
| journal = Isis
| volume = 57
| number = 2
| year = 1966
| pages = 220-234
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Damasio
| first = Antonio R.
| year = 2003
| publisher = Harcourt, Inc.
| isbn = 0-15-100557-5
| title = Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling
}}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = DeBrabander | last = DeBrabander
Line 170: Line 77:
| publisher = Continuum International Publishing Group | publisher = Continuum International Publishing Group
|date=March 15, 2007 |date=March 15, 2007
| year = 2007 | isbn = 978-0-8264-9393-4
| ISBN = 0826493939
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Ducheseau | last = Duchesneau
| first = Francois | first = Francois
| title = Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and Dynamica de Potentia | title = Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and Dynamica de Potentia
| journal = Perspectives on Science | journal = Perspectives on Science
| date = Spring-Summer | date = Spring–Summer 1998
| year = 1998 | volume = 6
| id = Thomson Gale Document Number: A54601186 | id = Thomson Gale Document Number: A54601186
| pages = 77(1) | pages = 77–109
| issue = 2
}}
| doi = 10.1162/posc_a_00545

| s2cid = 141935224
}}
* {{Citation * {{Citation
|last1 = Durant
| title = Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy
|first1 = Will
| last = Duff
|last2 = Durant
| first = Robert Alexander
|first2 = Ariel
| year = 1903
|title = The Story of Civilization
| publisher = J. Maclehose and Sons
|volume = 8
| url = http://books.google.com/books?vid=0ldBhP9K5Ah0OUtJT6&id=MTUAAAAAMAAJ&as_brr=1
|publisher = Simon & Schuster
| access-date = 2007-3-19
|place = New York
|year = 1963
|chapter = XXII: Spinoza: 1632–77
|chapter-url = http://caute.net.ru/spinoza/aln/durants.htm
|access-date = 2007-03-29
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070423151411/http://caute.net.ru/spinoza/aln/durants.htm
|archive-date = 2007-04-23
|url-status = dead
}} }}

* {{Citation
| last1 = Durant
| first1 = Will
| last2 = Durant
| first2 = Ariel
| title = The Story of Civilization
| volume = 8
| publisher = Simon & Schuster
| place = New York
| year = 1963
| chapter = XXII: Spinoza: 1632-77
| url = http://caute.net.ru/spinoza/aln/durants.htm
| access-date = 2007-03-29
}}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| url = http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/spinoza.htm | url = http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/spinoza.htm
| contribution = Benedict De Spinoza | contribution = Benedict De Spinoza
| access-date = 2007-01-15 | access-date = 2007-01-15
| last = Dutton | last = Dutton
| first = Blake D. | first = Blake D.
| year = 2006 | year = 2006
| title = The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | title = The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Gillespie | last= Garber
| first = Charles S. | first= Daniel
| year = 1992
| title = Descartes' Metaphysical Physics
| place = Chicago
| publisher = University of Chicago Press
| isbn = 978-0-226-28217-6
}}
* {{Citation
| editor-last = Gillispie
| editor-first = Charles Coulston
| title = Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm | title = Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm
| place = New York | place = New York
| year = 1971 | year = 1971
| journal = Dictionary of Scientific Biography | journal = Dictionary of Scientific Biography
| url = http://www.chlt.org/sandbox/lhl/dsb/page.149.php | url = https://www.chlt.org/sandbox/lhl/dsb/page.149.php
| access-date = 2007-03-27 | access-date = 2007-03-27
}} }}

* {{Citation
| last = Goukroger
| first = S.
| title = Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics.
| year = 1980
| place = Sussex
| publisher = Harvester Press.
}}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Goulding | last = Goulding
Line 253: Line 150:
| id = Thomson Gale Document Number:CX3424300736 | id = Thomson Gale Document Number:CX3424300736
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Jesseph | last = Grant
| first = Doug | first = Edward
| title= Motion in the Void and the Principle of Inertia in the Middle Ages
| year = 2006
| journal = Isis
| title = Hobbesian Mechanics
| volume = 55
| journal = Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy
| volume = 3 | year= 1964
| pages = 265–292
| url = http://www4.ncsu.edu/~dmjphi/Main/Papers/Hobbesian%20Mechanics.pdf
| access-date = 2007-03-10 | doi = 10.1086/349862
| isbn = 9780199203949 | issue = 3
| s2cid = 120402625
}} }}
* {{Citation

| last = Hobbes
| first = Thomas
| title = De Corpore
| year = 1998
| place = New York
| publisher = Oxford Publishing Company
| isbn = 978-0-19-283682-3
}}
* {{Citation
| doi = 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00604.x
| last = Jarrett
| first = Charles
| year= 1991
| title = Spinoza's Denial of Mind-Body Interaction and the Explanation of Human Action
| journal= The Southern Journal of Philosophy
| volume = 29
| pages = 465–486
| issue = 4
}}
* {{Citation
|last=Jesseph
|first=Doug
|year=2006
|title=Hobbesian Mechanics
|journal=Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy
|volume=3
|pages=119–152
|doi=10.1093/oso/9780199203949.003.0005
|url=http://www4.ncsu.edu/~dmjphi/Main/Papers/Hobbesian%20Mechanics.pdf
|access-date=2007-03-10
|isbn=978-0-19-920394-9
|url-status=dead
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061107113953/http://www4.ncsu.edu/~dmjphi/Main/Papers/Hobbesian%20Mechanics.pdf
|archive-date=2006-11-07
}}
* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Kollerstrom | last = Kollerstrom
| first = Nicholas | first = Nicholas
| author-link = Nicholas Kollerstrom
| year = 1999 | year = 1999
| title = How Newton Failed to Discover the Law of Gravity | title = The Path of Halley's Comet, and Newton's Late Apprehension of the Law of Gravity
| journal = Annals of Science | journal = Annals of Science
| volume = 59 | volume = 59
| pages = 331-356 | issue = 4
| pages = 331–356
| url = http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/nk/newton-gravity.htm
| doi = 10.1080/000337999296328}}
| access-date = 2007-01-15
* {{Citation
}}
| last = Lachterman

| first = D.
| year = 1978
| title = The Physics of Spinoza's Ethics in Spinoza: New Perspectives
| editor1= Robert Shahan
| editor2= J.I. Biro.
| place = Norman
| publisher = University of Oklahoma Press
}}
* {{Citation
| last = Landucci
| first = Sergio
| contribution= Vico, Giambattista
| title = Enciclopedia Garzantine della Filosofia
| editor = ]
| place = Milan
| year = 2004
| publisher = Garzanti Editore
| isbn = 978-88-11-50515-0
}}
* {{Citation * {{Citation
| url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-psychological/ | url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-psychological/
Line 285: Line 237:
| first = Michael | first = Michael
| date = 2006-03-20 | date = 2006-03-20
| publisher = Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
| year = 2006
| title = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
| publisher = The Paideia Archive On-Line
| title = Modern Philosophy
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Leibniz | last = Leibniz
| first = Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von | first = Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von
| year = 1695/1988 | orig-year = 1695
| date = 1988 | date = December 31, 1988
| contribution = Exposition and Defence of the New System | contribution = Exposition and Defence of the New System
| editor-first = Mary, M.A. | editor-first = Mary, M.A.
| editor-last = Morris | editor-last = Morris
| page = 136 | page = 136
| title = Leibniz: Philosophical Writings | title = Leibniz: Philosophical Writings
| publisher = J.M. Dent & Sons
| isbn = 978-0-460-87045-0
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Leibniz | last = Mathews
| first = Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von | first = Freya
| title Philosophical essays | title = The Ecological Self
| editor1-last = Ariew | year = 1991
| isbn = 978-0-415-10797-6
| editor1-first = Roger
| editor2-last = Garber | publisher = Routledge
}} <!-- this source is GREAT for this subject if expansion becomes necessary; but see also some book called Mind, Self and Society... by Mead!-->
| editor2-first = Daniel
| place = Indianapolis
| publisher = Hackett Pub. Co.
| year = c1989
| date = 1695/1989
| ISBN = 0872200639
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Lin
| first = Martin
| year = 2004
| title = Spinoza's Metaphysics of Desire: IIIP6D
| journal = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
| volume = 86
| number = 1
| url = http://individual.utoronto.ca/mtlin/std.1.mp1e.prstyle.pdf
| access-date = 2007-03-10
}}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Morgan | last = Morgan
| first = Michael L. | first = Michael L.
| year = 2006 | year = 2006
| publisher = Hacket Publishing Company, Inc. | publisher = Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
| location = Indianapolis/Cambridge | location = Indianapolis/Cambridge
| isbn = 0-87220-803-6 | isbn = 978-0-87220-803-2
| title = The Essential Spinoza | title = The Essential Spinoza
| page = ix | page = ix
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| doi = 10.1086/649343
| last = Osler | last = Osler
| first = Margaret J. | first = Margaret J.
| title = Whose ends? Teleology in early modern natural philosophy | title = Whose ends? Teleology in early modern natural philosophy
| journal = Osiris | journal = Osiris
| volume = 16
| issue = 1
| pages =151–168
| year = 2001 | year = 2001
| s2cid = 143776874
| id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A80401149 | id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A80401149
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| url = http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mode/ModePiet.htm
| contribution = Hobbes, Conatus and the Prisoner's Dilemma
| access-date = 2007-01-15
| last = Pietarinen
| first = Juhani
| date = 2000-08-08
| year = 2000
| title = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
}}

*{{Citation
| last = Polt | last = Polt
| first = Richard | first = Richard
| title = German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back. | title = German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back
| journal = The Review of Metaphysics | journal = The Review of Metaphysics
| year = 1996 | year = 1996
| volume = 49 | volume = 49
| number = 3
| id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A18262679 | id = Thomson Gale Document Number:A18262679
| issue = 3
}} }}
* {{Citation

*{{Citation
| last = Rabenort | last = Rabenort
| first = William Louis | first = William Louis
Line 378: Line 301:
| place = New York City | place = New York City
| publisher = Teachers College, Columbia University | publisher = Teachers College, Columbia University
| url = http://books.google.com/books/pdf/Spinoza_as_Educator.pdf?id=N5YVAAAAIAAJ&output=pdf&sig=eHVk1ZldTGS_x-R6OembZ89qR0g
| access-date = 2007-03-24
}} }}
* {{Citation

| last = Sandywell
| first = Barry
| year = 1996
| isbn = 978-0-415-08756-8
| title = Reflexivity and the Crisis of Western Reason
| volume = 1: Logological Investigations
| place = London and New York
| publisher = Routledge
| pages = 144–5
}}
* {{Citation * {{Citation
| url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD3Hobbes.html | url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD3Hobbes.html
Line 387: Line 318:
| access-date = 2006-03-04 | access-date = 2006-03-04
| last = Schmitter | last = Schmitter
| first = Amy M. | first = Amy M.
| date = 2006 | year = 2006
| title = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | title = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Schrift | last = Schopenhauer
| first = Alan D. | first = Arthur
| title = Twentieth-Century French Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers | title = The World as Will and Representation
| year = 2006 | editor-last = Payne
| editor-first = E.F.J.
| publisher = Blackwell Publishing
| isbn = 9781405132183 | year = 1958
| publisher = The Colonial Press Inc.
| place = Clinton, Massachusetts
| volume = 1
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Spinoza | last = Vico
| first = Baruch | first = Giambattista
| title = De antiquissima Italiorum sapientia ex linguae originibus eruenda librir tres
| last2 = Shirley
| first2 = Samuel | editor = L.M. Palmer
| editor-last = Morgan | year = 1710
| editor-first = Michael L. | place = Ithaca
| publisher = Cornell University Press
| year = 1677
| title = Ethics
| page = 66-67
}} }}
*{{cite book |last1=Wolfson |first1=Harry Austryn |title=The philosophy of Spinoza : unfolding the latent processes of his reasoning |date=1934 |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, Mass. |isbn=978-0-674-66595-8}}

* {{Citation
| last = Traupman
| first = John C.
| title = The New Collegiate Latin & English Dictionary
| publisher = Bantam Books
| year = 1966
| place = New York
| isbn = 0-553-25329-8
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Wolfson
| first = Harry Austryn
| year = 1934
| publisher = Harvard University Press
| location = Cambridge, Massachusetts
| isbn = 0-674-66595-3
| title = The Philosophy of Spinoza
}}
</div>

== Further reading ==
<div class="references-small">
* {{Citation
| last = Ariew
| first = Roger
| title = Historical dictionary of Descartes and Cartesian philosophy
| place = Lanham, Md. ; Oxford
| publisher = Scarecrow Press
| date = 2003
| year = 2003
}}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Bernstein |last = Ziemke
| first = Howard R. |first = Tom
|editor1-last = Chella
| title = Conatus, Hobbes, and the Young Leibniz
|editor1-first = A.
| journal = Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
|editor2-last = Manzotti
| volume = 11
| date = 1980 |editor2-first = R.
| year = 1980 |year = 2007
|title = Artificial Consciousness
| pages = 167-81
|place = Exeter, UK
|publisher = Imprint Academic
|chapter = What's life got to do with it?
|isbn = 9781845406783
}} }}
{{refend}}


==Further reading==
{{wiktionary}}
{{refbegin}}
* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Bove | last = Bove
| first = Laurent | first = Laurent
| title = L'affirmation absolue d'une existence essai sur la stratégie du conatus Spinoziste | title = L'affirmation absolue d'une existence : essai sur la stratégie du conatus Spinoziste
| date = 1992 | year = 1992
| year = 1992
| publisher = Lille | publisher = Lille
| place = Université de Lille III | place = Université de Lille III
| OCLC = 57584015 | oclc = 57584015
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| title = Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy
| last = Caird
| first = Edward | last = Duff
| first = Robert Alexander
| title = Essays on Literature and Philosophy: Glasgow
| year = 1903
| publisher = J. Maclehose and sons
| publisher = J. Maclehose and Sons
| year = 1892
| isbn = 9780678006153
| url = http://books.google.com/books?vid=OCLC00855919&id=7a8K-nSGe7QC
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=MTUAAAAAMAAJ
| access-date = 2007-3-20
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Carlin
| first = Laurence
| title = Leibniz on Conatus, causation and freedom
| journal = Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
| ISSN = 0279-0750
| volume = 85
| number = 4
| date = December 2004
| year = 2004
| pages = 365-79
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Chamberland
| first = Jacques
| title = Les conatus chez Thomas Hobbes
| editor-last = Duchesneau
| editor-first = Francois
| journal = The Review of Metaphysics
| volume = 54
| number = 1
|date=September 2000
| year = 2000
| publisher = Université de Montreal
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Garber
| first = Daniel
| title = Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus
| journal = Studia Spinozana
| volume = 10
| year = 1994
| date = 1994
| publisher = Walther & Walther
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Garret
| first = D.
| year = 2002
| title = Spinoza's Conatus Argument
| journal = Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes
| editor1-last = Koistinen
| editor1-first = Olli
| editor2-last = Biro
| editor2-first = John
| place = Oxford
| publisher = Oxford University Press
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Groopman
| first = Leonard Charles
| title = The concept of conatus in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes
| OCLC = 76986316
}}

* {{Citation
| title = New Essays Concerning Human Understanding
| last1 = Leibniz
| first1 = Gottfried Wilhelm
| last2 = Gerhardt
| first2 = K.
| last3 = Langley
| first3 = Alfred Gideon
| editor-last = Langley
| editor-first = Alfred Gideon
| year = 1896
| publisher = Macmillan & Co., ltd.
| url = http://books.google.com/books?vid=OCLC01343217&id=UDmKMY08pcEC&printsec=toc&as_brr=1
| access-date = 2007-03-19 | access-date = 2007-03-19
}} }}

* {{Citation
| last = Lyon
| first = Georges
| title = La philosophie de Hobbes
| publisher = F. Alean
| year = 1893
| url = http://books.google.com/books?vid=0C7GtxQ97ZS0guMU9k&id=6r0YAAAAMAAJ&as_brr=1
| access-date = 2007-03-19
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Montag
| first = Warren
| title = Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries
| location = New York
| publisher = Verso
| year = 1999
| isbn = 1-85984-701-3
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Rabouin
| first = David
| title = Entre Deleuze et Foucault : Le jeu du désir et du pouvoir
| year = 2000
| journal = Critique
| date = June/July 2000
| pages = 637-638
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Schrijvers
| first = M.
| year = 1999
| title = The Conatus and the Mutual Relationship Between Active and Passive Affects in Spinoza
| journal = Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist
| editor-last = Yovel
| editor-first = Yirmiyaho
| place = New York
| publisher = Little Room Press
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Schulz
| first = O.
| title = Schopenhauer's Ethik - die Konzequenz aus Spinoza's Metaphysik?
| journal = Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch
| ISSN = 0080-6935
| date = 1995
| year = 1995
| volume = 76
| pages = 133-149
}}

* {{Citation
| last = Steinberg
| first = Diane
| title = Belief, Affirmation, and the Doctrine of Conatus in Spinoza
| journal = Southern Journal of Philosophy
| volume = 43
| number = 1
| date = Spring 2005
| pages = 147-158
| ISSN = 0038-4283
}}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Tuusvuori | last = Tuusvuori
| first = Jarkko S. | first = Jarkko S.
| title = Nietzsche & Nihilism: Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality | title = Nietzsche & Nihilism: Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality
| year = 2000
|date=March 2000 |date=March 2000
| isbn = 951-45-9135-6 | isbn = 978-951-45-9135-8
| publisher = University of Helsinki | publisher = University of Helsinki
}} }}

* {{Citation * {{Citation
| last = Wendell | last = Wendell
Line 634: Line 394:
| title = Spinoza's Conatus doctrine: existence, being, and suicide | title = Spinoza's Conatus doctrine: existence, being, and suicide
| place = Waltham, Mass. | place = Waltham, Mass.
| date = 1997 | year = 1997
| year = 1997 | oclc = 37542442
| OCLC = 37542442
}} }}
{{refend}}
{{Authority control}}


* {{Citation
| last = Youpa
| first = A.
| year = 2003
| title = Spinozistic Self-Preservation
| journal = The Southern Journal of Philosophy
| volume = 41
| number = 1
}}

</div>
{{Foreign philosophy terms}}

]


]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Latest revision as of 18:12, 16 October 2024

Innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself This article is about a term in philosophy. For the Zola Jesus album, see Conatus (album). For Conatus - Journal of Philosophy, see Conatus (journal).
Conatus is, for Baruch Spinoza, where "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being."

In the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, conatus (/koʊˈneɪtəs/; wikt:conatus; Latin for "effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking; striving") is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. This thing may be mind, matter, or a combination of both, and is often associated with God's will in a pantheist view of nature. The conatus may refer to the instinctive will to live of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of motion and inertia. Today, conatus is rarely used in the technical sense, since classical mechanics uses concepts such as inertia and conservation of momentum that have superseded it. It has, however, been a notable influence on later thinkers such as Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.

Definition and origin

René Descartes used the term conatus in his mechanistic theory of motion.

The Latin cōnātus comes from the verb cōnor, which is usually translated into English as, to endeavor; used as an abstract noun, conatus is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. Although the term is most central to Spinoza's philosophy, many other early modern philosophers including René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes made significant contributions, each developing the term differently.

Whereas the medieval Scholastic philosophers such as Jean Buridan developed a notion of impetus as a mysterious intrinsic property of things, René Descartes (1596–1650) developed a more modern, mechanistic concept of motion which he called the conatus. For Descartes, in contrast to Buridan, motion and rest are properties of the interactions of matter according to eternally fixed mechanical laws, not dispositions and intentions, nor as inherent properties or forces of things, but rather as a unifying, external characteristic of the physical universe itself. Descartes specifies two varieties of the conatus: conatus a centro, or a theory of gravity and conatus recedendi which represents centrifugal forces. Descartes, in developing his First Law of Nature, also invokes the idea of a conatus se movendi, or "conatus of self-preservation", a generalization of the principle of inertia, which was formalized by Isaac Newton and made into the first of his three Laws of Motion fifty years after the death of Descartes.

Thomas Hobbes criticized previous definitions of conatus for failing to explain the origin of motion, defining conatus to be the infinitesimal unit at the beginning of motion: an inclination in a specified direction. Furthermore, Hobbes uses conatus to describe cognition functions in the mind, describing emotion as the beginning of motion and the will as the sum of all emotions, which forms the conatus of a body and its physical manifestation is the perceived "will to survive". In a notion similar that of Hobbes, Gottfried Leibniz differentiates between the conatus of the body and soul, primarily focusing however on the concept of a conatus of body in developing the principles of integral calculus to explain Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Leibniz later defines the term monadic conatus, as the state of change through which his monads perpetually advance. This conatus is a sort of instantaneous or virtual motion that all things possess, even when they are static. Motion, meanwhile, is just the summation of all the conatuses that a thing has, along with the interactions of things. By summing an infinity of such conatuses (i.e., what is now called integration), Leibniz could measure the effect of a continuous force.

In Spinoza's philosophy

Main article: Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza

Conatus is a central theme in the philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677), which is derived from principles that Hobbes and Descartes developed. Contrary to most philosophers of his time, Spinoza rejects the dualistic assumption that mind, intentionality, ethics, and freedom are to be treated as things separate from the natural world of physical objects and events. One significant change he makes to Hobbes' theory is his belief that the conatus ad motum (conatus to motion) is not mental, but material. Spinoza also uses conatus to refer to rudimentary concepts of inertia, as Descartes had earlier. According to Spinoza, "each thing, as far as it lies in itself, strives to persevere in its being" (Ethics, part 3, prop. 6). Since a thing cannot be destroyed without the action of external forces, motion and rest, too, exist indefinitely until disturbed. His goal is to provide a unified explanation of all these things within a naturalistic framework, man and nature must be unified under a consistent set of laws; God and nature are one, and there is no free will. For example, an action is free, for Spinoza, only if it arises from the essence and conatus of an entity. However, an action can still be free in the sense that it is not constrained or otherwise subject to external forces. Human beings are thus an integral part of nature. Spinoza explains seemingly irregular human behaviour as really natural and rational and motivated by this principle of the conatus. Some have argued that the conatus consists of happiness and the perpetual drive toward perfection. Conversely, a person is saddened by anything that opposes his conatus. Others have associated desire, a primary affect, with the conatus principle of Spinoza. Desire is then controlled by the other affects, pleasure and pain, and thus the conatus strives towards that which causes joy and avoids that which produces pain.

Later usages and related concepts

After the development of classical mechanics, the concept of a conatus, in the sense used by philosophers other than Spinoza, an intrinsic property of all physical bodies, was largely superseded by the principles of inertia and conservation of momentum. Similarly, Conatus recendendi became centrifugal force, and conatus a centro became gravity. However, Giambattista Vico, inspired by Neoplatonism, explicitly rejected the principle of inertia and the laws of motion of the new physics. For him, conatus was the essence of human society, and also, in a more traditional, hylozoistic sense, as the generating power of movement which pervades all of nature, which was composed neither of atoms, as in the dominant view, nor of extension, as in Descartes, but of metaphysical points animated by a conatus principle provoked by God. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) developed a principle notably similar to that of Spinoza's conatus. This principle, Wille zum Leben, or of a "Will to Live", described the specific phenomenon of an organism's self-preservation instinct. Schopenhauer qualified this, however, by suggesting that the Will to Live is not limited in duration, but rather, "the will wills absolutely and for all time", across generations. Rejecting the primacy of Schopenhauer's Will to Live, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) developed a separate principle the Will to Power, which comes out of a rejection of such notions of self-preservation. In systems theory, the Spinozistic conception of a conatus has been related to modern theories of autopoiesis in biological systems. However, the scope of the idea is definitely narrower today, being explained in terms of chemistry and neurology where, before, it was a matter of metaphysics and theurgy.

See also

Notes

  1. Ethics, part 3, prop. 6
  2. "tendency towards the center"
  3. "tendency away from the center"
  1. ^ LeBuffe 2006
  2. Grant 1964, pp. 265–292
  3. Garber 1992, pp. 150, 154
  4. Garber 1992, pp. 180, 184
  5. ^ Kollerstrom 1999, pp. 331–356
  6. Wolfson 1934, pp. 197–202.
  7. Hobbes 1998, III, xiv, 2
  8. ^ Bidney 1962, p. 87-93.
  9. Arthur 1998.
  10. Leibniz 1988, p. 135
  11. Arthur 1994, sec. 3
  12. Gillispie 1971, pp. 159–161
  13. Morgan 2006, p. ix
  14. Jarrett 1991, pp. 470–475
  15. ^ Allison 1975, p. 124-125.
  16. Lachterman 1978
  17. DeBrabander 2007, pp. 20–1
  18. Goulding 2005, p. 22040
  19. Vico 1710, pp. 180–186
  20. Landucci 2004, pp. 1174, 1175
  21. Schopenhauer 1958, p. 357
  22. Rabenort 1911, p. 16
  23. Schopenhauer 1958, p. 568
  24. Durant & Durant 1963, chp. IX
  25. Sandywell 1996, pp. 144–5
  26. Mathews 1991, p. 110

References

  • Allison, Henry E. (1975), Benedict de Spinoza, San Diego: Twayne Publishers, ISBN 978-0-8057-2853-8
  • Arthur, Richard (1994), "Space and relativity in Newton and Leibniz", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45 (1): 219–240, doi:10.1093/bjps/45.1.219, Thomson Gale Document Number:A16109468
  • Arthur, Richard (1998), "Cohesion, Division and Harmony: Physical Aspects of Leibniz's Continuum Problem (1671–1686)", Perspectives on Science, 6 (1): 110–135, doi:10.1162/posc_a_00546, S2CID 141579187, Thomson Gale Document Number:A54601187
  • Bidney, David (1962), The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza: A Study in the History and Logic of Ideas, New York: Russell & Russell
  • DeBrabander, Firmin (March 15, 2007), Spinoza and the Stoics: Power, Politics and the Passions, London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, ISBN 978-0-8264-9393-4
  • Duchesneau, Francois (Spring–Summer 1998), "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and Dynamica de Potentia", Perspectives on Science, 6 (2): 77–109, doi:10.1162/posc_a_00545, S2CID 141935224, Thomson Gale Document Number: A54601186
  • Durant, Will; Durant, Ariel (1963), "XXII: Spinoza: 1632–77", The Story of Civilization, vol. 8, New York: Simon & Schuster, archived from the original on 2007-04-23, retrieved 2007-03-29
  • Dutton, Blake D. (2006), "Benedict De Spinoza", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved 2007-01-15
  • Garber, Daniel (1992), Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-226-28217-6
  • Gillispie, Charles Coulston, ed. (1971), "Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm", Dictionary of Scientific Biography, New York, retrieved 2007-03-27
  • Goulding, Jay (2005), Horowitz, Maryanne (ed.), "Society", New Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 5, Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, Thomson Gale Document Number:CX3424300736
  • Grant, Edward (1964), "Motion in the Void and the Principle of Inertia in the Middle Ages", Isis, 55 (3): 265–292, doi:10.1086/349862, S2CID 120402625
  • Hobbes, Thomas (1998), De Corpore, New York: Oxford Publishing Company, ISBN 978-0-19-283682-3
  • Jarrett, Charles (1991), "Spinoza's Denial of Mind-Body Interaction and the Explanation of Human Action", The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29 (4): 465–486, doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00604.x
  • Jesseph, Doug (2006), "Hobbesian Mechanics" (PDF), Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 3: 119–152, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199203949.003.0005, ISBN 978-0-19-920394-9, archived from the original (PDF) on 2006-11-07, retrieved 2007-03-10
  • Kollerstrom, Nicholas (1999), "The Path of Halley's Comet, and Newton's Late Apprehension of the Law of Gravity", Annals of Science, 59 (4): 331–356, doi:10.1080/000337999296328
  • Lachterman, D. (1978), Robert Shahan; J.I. Biro. (eds.), The Physics of Spinoza's Ethics in Spinoza: New Perspectives, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press
  • Landucci, Sergio (2004), "Vico, Giambattista", in Gianni Vattimo (ed.), Enciclopedia Garzantine della Filosofia, Milan: Garzanti Editore, ISBN 978-88-11-50515-0
  • LeBuffe, Michael (2006-03-20), "Spinoza's Psychological Theory", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), retrieved 2007-01-15
  • Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von (December 31, 1988) , "Exposition and Defence of the New System", in Morris, Mary, M.A. (ed.), Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, J.M. Dent & Sons, p. 136, ISBN 978-0-460-87045-0{{citation}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  • Mathews, Freya (1991), The Ecological Self, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-10797-6
  • Morgan, Michael L. (2006), The Essential Spinoza, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., p. ix, ISBN 978-0-87220-803-2
  • Osler, Margaret J. (2001), "Whose ends? Teleology in early modern natural philosophy", Osiris, 16 (1): 151–168, doi:10.1086/649343, S2CID 143776874, Thomson Gale Document Number:A80401149
  • Polt, Richard (1996), "German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back", The Review of Metaphysics, 49 (3), Thomson Gale Document Number:A18262679
  • Rabenort, William Louis (1911), Spinoza as Educator, New York City: Teachers College, Columbia University
  • Sandywell, Barry (1996), Reflexivity and the Crisis of Western Reason, vol. 1: Logological Investigations, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 144–5, ISBN 978-0-415-08756-8
  • Schmitter, Amy M. (2006), "Hobbes on the Emotions", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved 2006-03-04
  • Schopenhauer, Arthur (1958), Payne, E.F.J. (ed.), The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, Clinton, Massachusetts: The Colonial Press Inc.
  • Vico, Giambattista (1710), L.M. Palmer (ed.), De antiquissima Italiorum sapientia ex linguae originibus eruenda librir tres, Ithaca: Cornell University Press
  • Wolfson, Harry Austryn (1934). The philosophy of Spinoza : unfolding the latent processes of his reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-66595-8.
  • Ziemke, Tom (2007), "What's life got to do with it?", in Chella, A.; Manzotti, R. (eds.), Artificial Consciousness, Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, ISBN 9781845406783

Further reading

  • Bove, Laurent (1992), L'affirmation absolue d'une existence : essai sur la stratégie du conatus Spinoziste, Université de Lille III: Lille, OCLC 57584015
  • Duff, Robert Alexander (1903), Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy, J. Maclehose and Sons, ISBN 9780678006153, retrieved 2007-03-19
  • Tuusvuori, Jarkko S. (March 2000), Nietzsche & Nihilism: Exploring a Revolutionary Conception of Philosophical Conceptuality, University of Helsinki, ISBN 978-951-45-9135-8
  • Wendell, Rich (1997), Spinoza's Conatus doctrine: existence, being, and suicide, Waltham, Mass., OCLC 37542442{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
Categories: