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] ]
The ] in ] are considerable. It has adverse effects on the livelihoods of the people as well as its environment.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":12" /> Syria is a ] and non-industrialized country that is located in an ] to ] region.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gleick |first=Peter H. |date=2014-07-01 |title=Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria |url=https://journals.ametsoc.org:443/view/journals/wcas/6/3/wcas-d-13-00059_1.xml |journal=Weather, Climate, and Society |language=EN |volume=6 |issue=3 |pages=331–340 |doi=10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 |issn=1948-8327}}</ref> Climate change-induced ], ], increasing temperatures and ] affect agriculture especially.<ref name=":11">{{Cite web |last=UNFCCC Syrian Arab Republic |date=2018 |title=Nationally Determined Contributions |url=https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/FirstNDC-Eng-Syrian%20Arab%20Republic.pdf}}</ref> ], which has historically been an issue in the region, is accelerating due to ].<ref name=":2" /> Syria has employed various efforts to address climate change, such as ratifying the ], and submitting its ] (NDCs) with a focus on both adaptation and ] measures for the period 2020-2030.<ref name=":11" /> While it has contributed to only 0.1% of global emissions, it is highly vulnerable to climate change.<ref>{{Cite web |last=The International Energy Agency |date=2022 |title=Syria |url=https://www.iea.org/countries/syria/emissions}}</ref> The ] in ] are considerable. It has adverse effects on the livelihoods of the people as well as its environment.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":12" /> Syria is a ] and non-industrialized country that is located in an ] to ] region.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gleick |first=Peter H. |date=2014-07-01 |title=Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria |url=https://journals.ametsoc.org:443/view/journals/wcas/6/3/wcas-d-13-00059_1.xml |journal=Weather, Climate, and Society |language=EN |volume=6 |issue=3 |pages=331–340 |doi=10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 |issn=1948-8327}}</ref> Climate change-induced ]s, ], increasing temperatures and ] affect agriculture especially.<ref name=":11">{{Cite web |last=UNFCCC Syrian Arab Republic |date=2018 |title=Nationally Determined Contributions |url=https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/FirstNDC-Eng-Syrian%20Arab%20Republic.pdf}}</ref> ], which has historically been an issue in the region, is accelerating due to ].<ref name=":2" /> Syria has employed various efforts to address climate change, such as ratifying the ], and submitting its ] (NDCs) with a focus on both adaptation and ] measures for the period 2020-2030.<ref name=":11" /> While it has contributed to only 0.1% of global emissions, it is highly vulnerable to climate change.<ref>{{Cite web |last=The International Energy Agency |date=2022 |title=Syria |url=https://www.iea.org/countries/syria/emissions}}</ref>


== Greenhouse Gas Emissions == == Greenhouse Gas Emissions ==
] estimate 2023 emissions at 60 million tonnes CO2eq, with the largest sectors being transport and power generation.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Country Inventory - Climate TRACE |url=https://climatetrace.org/inventory?country=SYR&year_from=2023&year_to=2023&gas=co2e100 |access-date=2024-12-08 |website=climatetrace.org |language=en}}</ref> Syria prepared it first national communication on ] in 2010. Its total ] reached 79 million tonnes CO2 eq in 2005. The emissions originated mainly in ] (73%), followed by agriculture sector (18%). These two sectors contributed to more than 90% of all emissions in Syria.<ref name=":11" /> ] has also contributed to emissions, responsible for approximately 5% amongst all sectors from 1994-2005.<ref name=":14">Meslmani, Y., Khorfan, S., Hainoun, A., Housami , N., Jabbour, E., & Al Kabikly , R. (2009). (rep.). ''General Report Of Green House Gases (GHG) Inventory in Syria'' . UNDP.</ref> Waste primarily emitted ] from ] in ] and untreated sewage, though ] accounts for the majority of emissions due to the use of ] in electricity and transport.<ref name=":14" /> However the UNFCCC does not insist on military emissions being reported. ] estimate 2023 emissions at 60 million tonnes CO2eq, with the largest sectors being transport and power generation.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Country Inventory - Climate TRACE |url=https://climatetrace.org/inventory?country=SYR&year_from=2023&year_to=2023&gas=co2e100 |access-date=2024-12-08 |website=climatetrace.org |language=en}}</ref> Syria prepared it first national communication on ] in 2010. Its total ] reached 79 million tonnes CO2 eq in 2005. The emissions originated mainly in ] (73%), followed by agriculture sector (18%). These two sectors contributed to more than 90% of all emissions in Syria.<ref name=":11" /> ] has also contributed to emissions, responsible for approximately 5% amongst all sectors from 1994-2005.<ref name=":14">Meslmani, Y., Khorfan, S., Hainoun, A., Housami , N., Jabbour, E., & Al Kabikly , R. (2009). (rep.). ''General Report Of Green House Gases (GHG) Inventory in Syria'' . UNDP.</ref> Waste primarily emitted ] from ] in ]s and untreated sewage, though ] accounts for the majority of emissions due to the use of ]s in electricity and transport.<ref name=":14" /> However the UNFCCC does not insist on military emissions being reported.


== Impact on the Natural Environment == == Impact on the Natural Environment ==
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=== Temperature and Weather Changes === === Temperature and Weather Changes ===
] ]
There is regional and seasonal variability of ] in ]. Autumn seasons have experienced slight increases in rainfall, where critical agricultural seasons such as winter and spring have steadily declined. Additionally, the southwestern portion of the country, near to the ], has experienced minor increases in rainfall, while the northwestern portion has steadily declined.<ref name=":0" /> Drought risks have been found to be greatest in areas such as ].<ref name=":3" /> The Syrian Drought, from 2006-2011, is widely considered one of the worst in the region’s history, and led to widespread agricultural failures, especially in the northeastern portion of the country. Farming and herding communities were deeply affected.<ref name=":5" /> The crisis compelled approximately 1.5 million rural Syrians to migrate to cities.<ref name=":5" /> While the period of time is consistent with decreasing rainfall data, some studies argue that the Syrian Drought was not a part of long term drying trends attributed to climate change.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last1=Selby |first1=Jan |last2=Dahi |first2=Omar |last3=Fröhlich |first3=Christiane |last4=Hulme |first4=Mike |date=September 2017 |title=Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629816301822 |journal=Political Geography |volume=60 |pages=232–244 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007 |via=Science Direct}}</ref> There is regional and seasonal variability of ]s in ]. Autumn seasons have experienced slight increases in rainfall, where critical agricultural seasons such as winter and spring have steadily declined. Additionally, the southwestern portion of the country, near to the ], has experienced minor increases in rainfall, while the northwestern portion has steadily declined.<ref name=":0" /> Drought risks have been found to be greatest in areas such as ].<ref name=":3" /> The Syrian Drought, from 2006-2011, is widely considered one of the worst in the region’s history, and led to widespread agricultural failures, especially in the northeastern portion of the country. Farming and herding communities were deeply affected.<ref name=":5" /> The crisis compelled approximately 1.5 million rural Syrians to migrate to cities.<ref name=":5" /> While the period of time is consistent with decreasing rainfall data, some studies argue that the Syrian Drought was not a part of long term drying trends attributed to climate change.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last1=Selby |first1=Jan |last2=Dahi |first2=Omar |last3=Fröhlich |first3=Christiane |last4=Hulme |first4=Mike |date=September 2017 |title=Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629816301822 |journal=Political Geography |volume=60 |pages=232–244 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007 |via=Science Direct}}</ref>


There are persistent ] in Syria, particularly since the 2010s. Compound events, which are hot and dry conditions simultaneously, have grown in frequency. These heatwaves have an annual frequency increase of 6.3%. Such extremes are particularly pronounced in northeastern and southwestern Syria.<ref>Mathbout , S., & Martin Vide, J. (n.d.). (working paper). ''Climate extremes: Characteristics of dry and compound hot - dry events in Syria  over the last 120 years''. Barcelona.</ref> Both frequency and severity of extreme heat events are expected to rise significantly, which is especially true for densely populated areas. The number of people exposed to ] is also projected to increase, as urban populations in Syria are expected to become more vulnerable.<ref>Hamed, M. M., Al-Hasani, A. A. J., Nashwan, M. S., Sa’adi, Z., & Shahid, S. (2024). Assessing the growing threat of heat stress in the North Africa and Arabian Peninsula region connected to climate change. ''Journal of Cleaner Production'', ''447'', 141639. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141639</nowiki></ref> There are persistent ] in Syria, particularly since the 2010s. Compound events, which are hot and dry conditions simultaneously, have grown in frequency. These heatwaves have an annual frequency increase of 6.3%. Such extremes are particularly pronounced in northeastern and southwestern Syria.<ref>Mathbout , S., & Martin Vide, J. (n.d.). (working paper). ''Climate extremes: Characteristics of dry and compound hot - dry events in Syria  over the last 120 years''. Barcelona.</ref> Both frequency and severity of extreme heat events are expected to rise significantly, which is especially true for densely populated areas. The number of people exposed to ] is also projected to increase, as urban populations in Syria are expected to become more vulnerable.<ref>Hamed, M. M., Al-Hasani, A. A. J., Nashwan, M. S., Sa’adi, Z., & Shahid, S. (2024). Assessing the growing threat of heat stress in the North Africa and Arabian Peninsula region connected to climate change. ''Journal of Cleaner Production'', ''447'', 141639. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141639</nowiki></ref>


=== Water Resources === === Water Resources ===
The effect of climate change on ] is reflected in its water scarcity issues. The ] is an arid climate, and climate change exacerbates its existing low precipitation levels and susceptibility to ]. Syria’s overall ] has decreased over time between 1991 to 2009, particularly in the northwestern portion of the country in the winter and spring.<ref name=":0">Zeleňáková, M., Abd-Elhamid, H. F., Krajníková, K., Smetanková, J., Purcz, P., & Alkhalaf, I. (2022). Spatial and temporal variability of rainfall trends in response to climate change—a case study: Syria. ''Water'', ''14''(10), 1670. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.3390/w14101670</nowiki> </ref> Reports until 2011 show similar trends, along with increases in average temperatures, which have resulted in extreme ].<ref name=":1">''Climate change risk profile - syria''. USAID: From the American People. (n.d.). <nowiki>https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2017_USAID_GEMS_Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Profile_Syria.pdf</nowiki> </ref> These periods of drought have also grown in frequency and severity from the late 1990s onwards, with some lasting up to 200 days.<ref name=":2">Skaf M., Mathbout S. Drought changes over the last five decades in Syria. In: López-Francos A. (comp.), López-Francos A. (collab.). ''Economics of drought and drought preparedness in a climate change context'' . Zaragoza: CIHEAM / FAO / ICARDA / GDAR / CEIGRAM / MARM, 2010. p. 107-112. (Options Méditerranéennes: Series A. Séminaires Méditerranéens; n. 95). 2. International Conference on Drought Management, 2010/03/04-06, Istanbul (Turkey). <nowiki>http://om.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a95/00801334.pdf</nowiki></ref> Notable periods of drought include: 1998-1999, 2007-2008, 1972-1973, 2014, and 2016.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3">Abd‐Elhamid, H. F., Zeleňáková, M., Soľáková, T., Saleh, O. K., & El‐Dakak, A. M. (2023). Monitoring flood and drought risks in arid and semi‐arid regions using remote sensing data and standardized precipitation index: A case study of syria. ''Journal of Flood Risk Management'', ''17''(1). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12961</nowiki> </ref> The effect of climate change on ] is reflected in its water scarcity issues. The ] is an arid climate, and climate change exacerbates its existing low precipitation levels and susceptibility to ]. Syria’s overall ]fall has decreased over time between 1991 to 2009, particularly in the northwestern portion of the country in the winter and spring.<ref name=":0">Zeleňáková, M., Abd-Elhamid, H. F., Krajníková, K., Smetanková, J., Purcz, P., & Alkhalaf, I. (2022). Spatial and temporal variability of rainfall trends in response to climate change—a case study: Syria. ''Water'', ''14''(10), 1670. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.3390/w14101670</nowiki></ref> Reports until 2011 show similar trends, along with increases in average temperatures, which have resulted in extreme ]s.<ref name=":1">''Climate change risk profile - syria''. USAID: From the American People. (n.d.). <nowiki>https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2017_USAID_GEMS_Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Profile_Syria.pdf</nowiki></ref> These periods of drought have also grown in frequency and severity from the late 1990s onwards, with some lasting up to 200 days.<ref name=":2">Skaf M., Mathbout S. Drought changes over the last five decades in Syria. In: López-Francos A. (comp.), López-Francos A. (collab.). ''Economics of drought and drought preparedness in a climate change context'' . Zaragoza: CIHEAM / FAO / ICARDA / GDAR / CEIGRAM / MARM, 2010. p. 107-112. (Options Méditerranéennes: Series A. Séminaires Méditerranéens; n. 95). 2. International Conference on Drought Management, 2010/03/04-06, Istanbul (Turkey). <nowiki>http://om.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a95/00801334.pdf</nowiki></ref> Notable periods of drought include: 1998-1999, 2007-2008, 1972-1973, 2014, and 2016.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3">Abd‐Elhamid, H. F., Zeleňáková, M., Soľáková, T., Saleh, O. K., & El‐Dakak, A. M. (2023). Monitoring flood and drought risks in arid and semi‐arid regions using remote sensing data and standardized precipitation index: A case study of syria. ''Journal of Flood Risk Management'', ''17''(1). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12961</nowiki></ref>


Syria’s water scarcity due to drought is likely to continue intensifying, aligning with IPCC predictions of reduced rainfall in the Mediterranean.<ref name=":0" /> Between 2021 to 2050, temperatures could increase by approximately 1.6-2°C, with precipitation dropping by approximately 11% in the winter and 8% in the spring.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal |last1=Smiatek |first1=Gerhard |last2=Kaspar |first2=Severin |last3=Kunstmann |first3=Harald |date=1 April 2013 |title=Hydrological Climate Change Impact Analysis for the Figeh Spring near Damascus, Syria |url=https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/hydr/14/2/jhm-d-12-065_1.xml?tab_body=pdf |journal=Journal of Hydrometeorology |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=577–593 |doi=10.1175/JHM-D-12-065.1 |via=American Meteorological Society}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> By 2070-2099, temperatures could rise by 4°C, with an overall decrease of 22% in annual ] across the region.<ref name=":6" /> These reports also predict a 25-27% reduction in runoff, resulting in prolonged dry spells, coastal flooding, and intensified dust storms.<ref name=":1" /> The Figeh Spring, a critical water source near ], is predicted to decrease its peak spring discharge by 20% by 2050, and up to 50% by the end of the century.<ref name=":6" /> Reduced recharge due to less snow and higher evapotranspiration could lead to a 9-30% decrease in annual discharge by the century’s end. The decline of Figeh Spring’s water output poses risks for ]’ water supply.<ref name=":6" /> Syria’s water scarcity due to drought is likely to continue intensifying, aligning with IPCC predictions of reduced rainfall in the Mediterranean.<ref name=":0" /> Between 2021 to 2050, temperatures could increase by approximately 1.6-2&nbsp;°C, with precipitation dropping by approximately 11% in the winter and 8% in the spring.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal |last1=Smiatek |first1=Gerhard |last2=Kaspar |first2=Severin |last3=Kunstmann |first3=Harald |date=1 April 2013 |title=Hydrological Climate Change Impact Analysis for the Figeh Spring near Damascus, Syria |url=https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/hydr/14/2/jhm-d-12-065_1.xml?tab_body=pdf |journal=Journal of Hydrometeorology |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=577–593 |doi=10.1175/JHM-D-12-065.1 |bibcode=2013JHyMe..14..577S |via=American Meteorological Society|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name=":1" /> By 2070-2099, temperatures could rise by 4&nbsp;°C, with an overall decrease of 22% in annual ] across the region.<ref name=":6" /> These reports also predict a 25-27% reduction in runoff, resulting in prolonged dry spells, coastal flooding, and intensified dust storms.<ref name=":1" /> The Figeh Spring, a critical water source near ], is predicted to decrease its peak spring discharge by 20% by 2050, and up to 50% by the end of the century.<ref name=":6" /> Reduced recharge due to less snow and higher evapotranspiration could lead to a 9-30% decrease in annual discharge by the century’s end. The decline of Figeh Spring’s water output poses risks for ]’ water supply.<ref name=":6" />


== Impacts on People == == Impacts on People ==
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=== Agriculture === === Agriculture ===
] ]
Climate change’s influence on drought periods have had effects on Syria’s agricultural systems.<ref name=":1" /> Only 10% of Syria’s farmland is ], with its remaining portion relying on ].<ref name=":4" /> Declining rainfall, poor irrigation practices, and government neglect of rural areas weakened food security and employment. Wheat production, for example, fell significantly, forcing Syria to import it for the first time.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Akhmedkhodjaeva |first=Nodira |date=2 November 2024 |title=Drought in Syria |url=https://www.thealeppoproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Drought-in-Syria-HD.pdf |website=The Aleppo Project}}</ref> This severe strain on Syria’s agriculture sector is due to climate change-driven drought, resulting in intensified ]. Projected climate changes could further reduce agricultural productivity and increase soil salinity.<ref name=":1" /> This is especially true for areas such as the ], an area crucial for agriculture, where decreased precipitation has resulted in major crop losses.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Kelley |first=Colin |date=2 March 2015 |title=Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought |journal=PNAS |volume=112 |issue=11 |pages=3241–3246 |doi=10.1073/pnas.1421533112 |doi-access=free |pmid=25733898 |pmc=4371967 }}</ref> Syria’s unsustainable use of water resources and depleted river levels have long presented risks, with future climate trends likely to worsen ] and drive greater reliance on rainfall.<ref name=":1" /> Climate change’s influence on drought periods have had effects on Syria’s agricultural systems.<ref name=":1" /> Only 10% of Syria’s farmland is ], with its remaining portion relying on ]fall.<ref name=":4" /> Declining rainfall, poor irrigation practices, and government neglect of rural areas weakened food security and employment. Wheat production, for example, fell significantly, forcing Syria to import it for the first time.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Akhmedkhodjaeva |first=Nodira |date=2 November 2024 |title=Drought in Syria |url=https://www.thealeppoproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Drought-in-Syria-HD.pdf |website=The Aleppo Project}}</ref> This severe strain on Syria’s agriculture sector is due to climate change-driven drought, resulting in intensified ]. Projected climate changes could further reduce agricultural productivity and increase soil salinity.<ref name=":1" /> This is especially true for areas such as the ], an area crucial for agriculture, where decreased precipitation has resulted in major crop losses.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Kelley |first=Colin |date=2 March 2015 |title=Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought |journal=PNAS |volume=112 |issue=11 |pages=3241–3246 |doi=10.1073/pnas.1421533112 |doi-access=free |pmid=25733898 |pmc=4371967 |bibcode=2015PNAS..112.3241K }}</ref> Syria’s unsustainable use of water resources and depleted river levels have long presented risks, with future climate trends likely to worsen ] and drive greater reliance on rainfall.<ref name=":1" />


Climate change has caused considerable damage to the livelihood of Syrian farmers. Droughts and desertification have caused a massive exodus of around 1.5 million people from rural agricultural communities to urban environments.<ref name=":1" /> These droughts, combined with government mismanagement, caused roughly 800,000 farmers to lose their livelihoods.<ref name=":1" /> The economic impacts of climate change on ] are also projected to be devastating, with predictions stating that any given Syrian household, rural or urban, stands to lose 1.6 to 2.8 percent of their welfare annually due to climate change.<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |date=June 2011 |title=Global and Local Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Syria and Options for Adaptation |url=https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b5863299-8e47-4c0a-8e43-53d7fc6a651f/content |journal=International Food Policy Research Institute |pages=1–64 |via=Cgiar}}</ref> The poorest groups of farmers have the least amount of resources to recover from droughts. Therefore, they are disproportionately affected by water shortages.<ref name=":10" /> Moreover, they take longer to recover financially.<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |date=2012 |editor-last=Al-Riffai |editor-first=Perrihan |editor2-last=Breisinger |editor2-first=Clemens |editor3-last=Verner |editor3-first=Dorte |editor4-last=Zhu |editor4-first=Tingju |title=Droughts in Syria: An Assessment of Impacts and Options for Improving the Resilience of the Poor |url=https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/155471/?v=pdf |journal=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture |series=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 51 (2012) |doi=10.22004/ag.econ.155471 |last1=Al-Riffai |first1=Perrihan |last2=Breisinger |first2=Clemens |last3=Verner |first3=Dorte |last4=Zhu |first4=Tingju |last5=Al-Riffai |first5=Perrihan |last6=Breisinger |first6=Clemens |last7=Verner |first7=Dorte |last8=Zhu |first8=Tingju }}</ref> Climate change has caused considerable damage to the livelihood of Syrian farmers. Droughts and desertification have caused a massive exodus of around 1.5 million people from rural agricultural communities to urban environments.<ref name=":1" /> These droughts, combined with government mismanagement, caused roughly 800,000 farmers to lose their livelihoods.<ref name=":1" /> The economic impacts of climate change on ] are also projected to be devastating, with predictions stating that any given Syrian household, rural or urban, stands to lose 1.6 to 2.8 percent of their welfare annually due to climate change.<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |date=June 2011 |title=Global and Local Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Syria and Options for Adaptation |url=https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b5863299-8e47-4c0a-8e43-53d7fc6a651f/content |journal=International Food Policy Research Institute |pages=1–64 |via=Cgiar}}</ref> The poorest groups of farmers have the least amount of resources to recover from droughts. Therefore, they are disproportionately affected by water shortages.<ref name=":10" /> Moreover, they take longer to recover financially.<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |date=2012 |editor-last=Al-Riffai |editor-first=Perrihan |editor2-last=Breisinger |editor2-first=Clemens |editor3-last=Verner |editor3-first=Dorte |editor4-last=Zhu |editor4-first=Tingju |title=Droughts in Syria: An Assessment of Impacts and Options for Improving the Resilience of the Poor |url=https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/155471/?v=pdf |journal=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture |series=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 51 (2012) |doi=10.22004/ag.econ.155471 |last1=Al-Riffai |first1=Perrihan |last2=Breisinger |first2=Clemens |last3=Verner |first3=Dorte |last4=Zhu |first4=Tingju |last5=Al-Riffai |first5=Perrihan |last6=Breisinger |first6=Clemens |last7=Verner |first7=Dorte |last8=Zhu |first8=Tingju }}</ref>


=== '''Human Health''' === === Human Health ===
The ] from 2006-2010 decreased agricultural productivity and food access, as well as water scarcity. Scarcity of clean water, especially after ]'s major drought, has increased the risk of waterborne disease. Limited sanitation infrastructure has exacerbated health vulnerabilities, along with ] and ] which has increased disease transmission.<ref name=":15">Bellizzi, S., Lane, C., Elhakim, M., & Nabeth, P. (2020). Health consequences of drought in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean region: Hotspot areas and needed actions. ''Environmental Health'', ''19''(1). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-020-00665-z</nowiki></ref> ]’s climate-related impacts may worsen nutrition due to food insecurity related to agricultural productivity losses. The presence of ] may also increase, with risks of ] and ] caused by shifting climates and increases in drought-resilient rodent populations.<ref name=":1" /> ] has called for increased support in disease surveillance, mental health services, and emergency preparedness. ] advocates for targeted aid to address these health impacts.<ref name=":15" /> The ] from 2006-2010 decreased agricultural productivity and food access, as well as water scarcity. Scarcity of clean water, especially after ]'s major drought, has increased the risk of waterborne disease. Limited sanitation infrastructure has exacerbated health vulnerabilities, along with ] and ] which has increased disease transmission.<ref name=":15">Bellizzi, S., Lane, C., Elhakim, M., & Nabeth, P. (2020). Health consequences of drought in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean region: Hotspot areas and needed actions. ''Environmental Health'', ''19''(1). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-020-00665-z</nowiki></ref> ]’s climate-related impacts may worsen nutrition due to food insecurity related to agricultural productivity losses. The presence of ]s may also increase, with risks of ] and ] caused by shifting climates and increases in drought-resilient rodent populations.<ref name=":1" /> ] has called for increased support in disease surveillance, mental health services, and emergency preparedness. ] advocates for targeted aid to address these health impacts.<ref name=":15" />


There are also health damages associated with Syria's electricity generation system. Heavy fuel oil power plants, due to high sulfur content, generate significant health-related costs through pollutants that lead to respiratory and cardiovascular issues. The costs of these health issues vary significantly depending on the population density around the power plants. Facilities near densely populated areas, like ], result in higher health costs due to more people being exposed to pollutants.<ref>Hainoun, A., Almoustafa, A., & Seif Aldin, M. (2010). Estimating the health damage costs of Syrian electricity generation system using impact pathway approach. ''Energy'', ''35''(2), 628–638. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.10.034</nowiki></ref> There are also health damages associated with Syria's electricity generation system. Heavy fuel oil power plants, due to high sulfur content, generate significant health-related costs through pollutants that lead to respiratory and cardiovascular issues. The costs of these health issues vary significantly depending on the population density around the power plants. Facilities near densely populated areas, like ], result in higher health costs due to more people being exposed to pollutants.<ref>Hainoun, A., Almoustafa, A., & Seif Aldin, M. (2010). Estimating the health damage costs of Syrian electricity generation system using impact pathway approach. ''Energy'', ''35''(2), 628–638. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.10.034</nowiki></ref>


=== Conflict === === Conflict ===
] ]
The major drought in early 2000s affected agricultural production. Economic factors have driven force of unrest, along with their failure to address a rising humanitarian crisis.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=de Châtel |first=Francesca |title=Green Planet Blues |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |edition=6 |pages=1–19}}</ref> The discontent in rural areas went back several years before the major drought. Syrian media outlets were also a factor, as they excluded coverage of the drought and its economic and political consequences.<ref name=":9" /> More comprehensively, climate change, poor water management, and lack of governmental support were all major elements that eventually led to the ].<ref name=":9" /> The major drought in early 2000s affected agricultural production. Economic factors have driven force of unrest, along with their failure to address a rising humanitarian crisis.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=de Châtel |first=Francesca |title=Green Planet Blues |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |edition=6 |pages=1–19}}</ref> The discontent in rural areas went back several years before the major drought. Syrian media outlets were also a factor, as they excluded coverage of the drought and its economic and political consequences.<ref name=":9" /> More comprehensively, climate change, poor water management, and lack of governmental support were all major elements that eventually led to the ].<ref name=":9" />


== Mitigation == == Mitigation ==
Syria has moderate fossil fuel reserves, including oil and natural gas, though both contribute to ] and therefore ]. There have been significant efforts to expand natural gas for electricity production. Fossil fuels in the past and in modern day dominate energy sources, though hydropower is also a dominant source in Syria’s energy profile. Renewable energy has been increasingly considered for long-term sustainability.<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal |last=Hamzeh |first=Ali |date=30 April 2004 |title=Overview of the Syrian Energy Profile |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237638104 |journal=Beirut Regional Collaboration Workshop on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology |via=RersearchGate}}</ref> The ] has also caused considerable damage to the country's infrastructure in areas such as healthcare and residential, which has lowered the ability of the country to respond to the negative effects of ].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Muzzall |first1=Evan |last2=Perlman |first2=Brian |last3=Rubenstein |first3=Leonard S. |last4=Haar |first4=Rohini J. |date=2021-10-01 |title=Overview of attacks against civilian infrastructure during the Syrian civil war, 2012–2018 |url=https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/10/e006384.abstract |journal=BMJ Global Health |language=en |volume=6 |issue=10 |pages=e006384 |doi=10.1136/bmjgh-2021-006384 |issn=2059-7908 |pmid=34598977|pmc=8488748 }}</ref> Syria has moderate fossil fuel reserves, including oil and natural gas, though both contribute to ] and therefore ]. There have been significant efforts to expand natural gas for electricity production. Fossil fuels in the past and in modern day dominate energy sources, though hydropower is also a dominant source in Syria’s energy profile. Renewable energy has been increasingly considered for long-term sustainability.<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal |last=Hamzeh |first=Ali |date=30 April 2004 |title=Overview of the Syrian Energy Profile |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237638104 |journal=Beirut Regional Collaboration Workshop on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology |via=RersearchGate}}</ref> The ] has also caused considerable damage to the country's infrastructure in areas such as healthcare and residential, which has lowered the ability of the country to respond to the negative effects of ].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Muzzall |first1=Evan |last2=Perlman |first2=Brian |last3=Rubenstein |first3=Leonard S. |last4=Haar |first4=Rohini J. |date=2021-10-01 |title=Overview of attacks against civilian infrastructure during the Syrian civil war, 2012–2018 |url=https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/10/e006384.abstract |journal=BMJ Global Health |language=en |volume=6 |issue=10 |pages=e006384 |doi=10.1136/bmjgh-2021-006384 |issn=2059-7908 |pmid=34598977|pmc=8488748 }}</ref>


Syria's poor ] lacks capacity to endure extreme weather events such as heat waves, which are projected to worsen. Syria’s demand for cooling systems has also increased with ], population growth, and rising temperatures.<ref>IPCC 6th Assessment Report https://skidmoreess.slack.com/files/UCPBSB5FF/F07MP9V7M46/ipcc_ar6_wgii_fullreport.pdf</ref> Syria's poor ] lacks capacity to endure extreme weather events such as heat waves, which are projected to worsen. Syria’s demand for cooling systems has also increased with ], population growth, and rising temperatures.<ref>IPCC 6th Assessment Report https://skidmoreess.slack.com/files/UCPBSB5FF/F07MP9V7M46/ipcc_ar6_wgii_fullreport.pdf</ref>


== Adaptation == == Adaptation ==
Syria has high potential for utilization of ], with average irradiance levels about 5 kWh/m²/day. ] have been in use, and there have also been plans to expand ] systems for both residential and rural applications. The Wind Atlas for Syria shows promising wing speeds in central, southern, and coastal areas. With these speeds, Syria has the potential to produce 85,000 MW of wind energy. Biomass resources, including animal and agricultural waste, are sufficient to produce approximately 357 million m³ of biogas annually. While hydropower energy sources are significant, it is ongoingly limited by low precipitation and reliance on international rivers.<ref name=":8" /> Syria has high potential for utilization of ], with average irradiance levels about 5 kWh/m²/day. ] have been in use, and there have also been plans to expand ] systems for both residential and rural applications. The Wind Atlas for Syria shows promising wing speeds in central, southern, and coastal areas. With these speeds, Syria has the potential to produce 85,000 MW of wind energy. Biomass resources, including animal and agricultural waste, are sufficient to produce approximately 357 million m³ of biogas annually. While hydropower energy sources are significant, it is ongoingly limited by low precipitation and reliance on international rivers.<ref name=":8" />

== Policy == == Policy ==
Syria has a number of international climate policies which it is involved in, with some being through the ]. This includes the 2010 ].<ref name=":1" /> Syria has a number of international climate policies which it is involved in, with some being through the ]. This includes the 2010 ].<ref name=":1" />
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The country's internal ] has been known to be difficult to enforce, especially due to the unrest caused by the Syrian Civil war.<ref name=":16">{{Cite journal |last=Prus |first=Alexandra |date=2020-09-30 |title=Protection of the Environment through the Lens of Syria: Scrutinizing the Loopholes in the Prevailing Legislative Framework |url=https://ugp.rug.nl/GROJIL/article/view/37075/34591 |journal=Groningen Journal of International Law |language=en |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=48–68 |doi=10.21827/GroJIL.8.1.48-68 |issn=2352-2674|doi-access=free }}</ref> Deliberate environmental attacks have proved hard to stop or are hard to enforce given the well discussed vague and high thresholds of both Syrian environmental law as well as international humanitarian and environmental laws.<ref name=":16" /> The country's internal ] has been known to be difficult to enforce, especially due to the unrest caused by the Syrian Civil war.<ref name=":16">{{Cite journal |last=Prus |first=Alexandra |date=2020-09-30 |title=Protection of the Environment through the Lens of Syria: Scrutinizing the Loopholes in the Prevailing Legislative Framework |url=https://ugp.rug.nl/GROJIL/article/view/37075/34591 |journal=Groningen Journal of International Law |language=en |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=48–68 |doi=10.21827/GroJIL.8.1.48-68 |issn=2352-2674|doi-access=free }}</ref> Deliberate environmental attacks have proved hard to stop or are hard to enforce given the well discussed vague and high thresholds of both Syrian environmental law as well as international humanitarian and environmental laws.<ref name=":16" />
] ]
In an attempt to improve the country's food production and irrigating parts of the Middle Eastern Steppe, the Syrian government has instituted several policies centered around expanding ], damming and the construction of reservoirs. The findings on the sustainability of these projects was inconclusive, however, it was found that irrigation of certain areas led to increased ].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hole |first1=F. |last2=Zaitchik |first2=B. F. |date=15 March 2007 |title=Policies, plans, practice, and prospects: irrigation in northeastern Syria |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ldr.772 |journal=Land Degradation & Development |language=en |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=133–152 |doi=10.1002/ldr.772 |issn=1085-3278}}</ref> In an attempt to improve the country's food production and irrigating parts of the Middle Eastern Steppe, the Syrian government has instituted several policies centered around expanding ], damming and the construction of reservoirs. The findings on the sustainability of these projects was inconclusive, however, it was found that irrigation of certain areas led to increased ].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hole |first1=F. |last2=Zaitchik |first2=B. F. |date=15 March 2007 |title=Policies, plans, practice, and prospects: irrigation in northeastern Syria |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ldr.772 |journal=Land Degradation & Development |language=en |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=133–152 |doi=10.1002/ldr.772 |bibcode=2007LDeDe..18..133H |issn=1085-3278}}</ref>


Fighting ] and ] has also been a focus of the Syrian government as well as ] ] operating in the region.<ref name=":17">{{Cite journal |last=Al Berni |first=Rim Rateb |date=2010-01-01 |title=An Investigation into Sustainable Forest Policies and Practices in Syria |url=https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/gees-theses/277/ |journal=School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Theses}}</ref> Only 3% of Syria's land area is forest, and many communities living in those areas use the forest as a resource, but come into conflict with farmers illegally grazing their livestock in and around the forests.<ref name=":17" /> Fighting ] and ] has also been a focus of the Syrian government as well as ] ] operating in the region.<ref name=":17">{{Cite journal |last=Al Berni |first=Rim Rateb |date=2010-01-01 |title=An Investigation into Sustainable Forest Policies and Practices in Syria |url=https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/gees-theses/277/ |journal=School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Theses}}</ref> Only 3% of Syria's land area is forest, and many communities living in those areas use the forest as a resource, but come into conflict with farmers illegally grazing their livestock in and around the forests.<ref name=":17" />
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{{Climate change regions|state=expanded}} {{Climate change regions|state=expanded}}

] ]
] ]

Latest revision as of 03:03, 16 December 2024

Syria highlighted on a map of the Middle East

The effects of climate change in Syria are considerable. It has adverse effects on the livelihoods of the people as well as its environment. Syria is a developing and non-industrialized country that is located in an arid to semi-arid region. Climate change-induced droughts, water shortages, increasing temperatures and soil degradation affect agriculture especially. Desertification, which has historically been an issue in the region, is accelerating due to climate change. Syria has employed various efforts to address climate change, such as ratifying the Paris Treaty, and submitting its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) with a focus on both adaptation and mitigation measures for the period 2020-2030. While it has contributed to only 0.1% of global emissions, it is highly vulnerable to climate change.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Climate Trace estimate 2023 emissions at 60 million tonnes CO2eq, with the largest sectors being transport and power generation. Syria prepared it first national communication on climate change in 2010. Its total GHG emissions reached 79 million tonnes CO2 eq in 2005. The emissions originated mainly in its energy sector (73%), followed by agriculture sector (18%). These two sectors contributed to more than 90% of all emissions in Syria. Waste has also contributed to emissions, responsible for approximately 5% amongst all sectors from 1994-2005. Waste primarily emitted methane from organic waste in landfills and untreated sewage, though carbon dioxide accounts for the majority of emissions due to the use of fossil fuels in electricity and transport. However the UNFCCC does not insist on military emissions being reported.

Impact on the Natural Environment

Temperature and Weather Changes

Temperature changes in Syria (1901-2020)

There is regional and seasonal variability of droughts in Syria. Autumn seasons have experienced slight increases in rainfall, where critical agricultural seasons such as winter and spring have steadily declined. Additionally, the southwestern portion of the country, near to the Mediterranean, has experienced minor increases in rainfall, while the northwestern portion has steadily declined. Drought risks have been found to be greatest in areas such as Al Qadmus. The Syrian Drought, from 2006-2011, is widely considered one of the worst in the region’s history, and led to widespread agricultural failures, especially in the northeastern portion of the country. Farming and herding communities were deeply affected. The crisis compelled approximately 1.5 million rural Syrians to migrate to cities. While the period of time is consistent with decreasing rainfall data, some studies argue that the Syrian Drought was not a part of long term drying trends attributed to climate change.

There are persistent heatwaves in Syria, particularly since the 2010s. Compound events, which are hot and dry conditions simultaneously, have grown in frequency. These heatwaves have an annual frequency increase of 6.3%. Such extremes are particularly pronounced in northeastern and southwestern Syria. Both frequency and severity of extreme heat events are expected to rise significantly, which is especially true for densely populated areas. The number of people exposed to extreme heat is also projected to increase, as urban populations in Syria are expected to become more vulnerable.

Water Resources

The effect of climate change on Syria is reflected in its water scarcity issues. The Middle East is an arid climate, and climate change exacerbates its existing low precipitation levels and susceptibility to drought. Syria’s overall rainfall has decreased over time between 1991 to 2009, particularly in the northwestern portion of the country in the winter and spring. Reports until 2011 show similar trends, along with increases in average temperatures, which have resulted in extreme droughts. These periods of drought have also grown in frequency and severity from the late 1990s onwards, with some lasting up to 200 days. Notable periods of drought include: 1998-1999, 2007-2008, 1972-1973, 2014, and 2016.

Syria’s water scarcity due to drought is likely to continue intensifying, aligning with IPCC predictions of reduced rainfall in the Mediterranean. Between 2021 to 2050, temperatures could increase by approximately 1.6-2 °C, with precipitation dropping by approximately 11% in the winter and 8% in the spring. By 2070-2099, temperatures could rise by 4 °C, with an overall decrease of 22% in annual precipitation across the region. These reports also predict a 25-27% reduction in runoff, resulting in prolonged dry spells, coastal flooding, and intensified dust storms. The Figeh Spring, a critical water source near Damascus, Syria, is predicted to decrease its peak spring discharge by 20% by 2050, and up to 50% by the end of the century. Reduced recharge due to less snow and higher evapotranspiration could lead to a 9-30% decrease in annual discharge by the century’s end. The decline of Figeh Spring’s water output poses risks for Damascus’ water supply.

Impacts on People

Agriculture

A farm in Kalota, Syria

Climate change’s influence on drought periods have had effects on Syria’s agricultural systems. Only 10% of Syria’s farmland is irrigated, with its remaining portion relying on rainfall. Declining rainfall, poor irrigation practices, and government neglect of rural areas weakened food security and employment. Wheat production, for example, fell significantly, forcing Syria to import it for the first time. This severe strain on Syria’s agriculture sector is due to climate change-driven drought, resulting in intensified water scarcity. Projected climate changes could further reduce agricultural productivity and increase soil salinity. This is especially true for areas such as the Fertile Crescent, an area crucial for agriculture, where decreased precipitation has resulted in major crop losses. Syria’s unsustainable use of water resources and depleted river levels have long presented risks, with future climate trends likely to worsen groundwater depletion and drive greater reliance on rainfall.

Climate change has caused considerable damage to the livelihood of Syrian farmers. Droughts and desertification have caused a massive exodus of around 1.5 million people from rural agricultural communities to urban environments. These droughts, combined with government mismanagement, caused roughly 800,000 farmers to lose their livelihoods. The economic impacts of climate change on Syria are also projected to be devastating, with predictions stating that any given Syrian household, rural or urban, stands to lose 1.6 to 2.8 percent of their welfare annually due to climate change. The poorest groups of farmers have the least amount of resources to recover from droughts. Therefore, they are disproportionately affected by water shortages. Moreover, they take longer to recover financially.

Human Health

The drought in Syria from 2006-2010 decreased agricultural productivity and food access, as well as water scarcity. Scarcity of clean water, especially after Syria's major drought, has increased the risk of waterborne disease. Limited sanitation infrastructure has exacerbated health vulnerabilities, along with displacement and overcrowding which has increased disease transmission. Syria’s climate-related impacts may worsen nutrition due to food insecurity related to agricultural productivity losses. The presence of waterborne diseases may also increase, with risks of malaria and vector-borne diseases caused by shifting climates and increases in drought-resilient rodent populations. The World Health Organization has called for increased support in disease surveillance, mental health services, and emergency preparedness. WHO advocates for targeted aid to address these health impacts.

There are also health damages associated with Syria's electricity generation system. Heavy fuel oil power plants, due to high sulfur content, generate significant health-related costs through pollutants that lead to respiratory and cardiovascular issues. The costs of these health issues vary significantly depending on the population density around the power plants. Facilities near densely populated areas, like Damascus, result in higher health costs due to more people being exposed to pollutants.

Conflict

Total deaths over time as a result of the Syrian civil war

The major drought in early 2000s affected agricultural production. Economic factors have driven force of unrest, along with their failure to address a rising humanitarian crisis. The discontent in rural areas went back several years before the major drought. Syrian media outlets were also a factor, as they excluded coverage of the drought and its economic and political consequences. More comprehensively, climate change, poor water management, and lack of governmental support were all major elements that eventually led to the Syrian civil war.

Mitigation

Syria has moderate fossil fuel reserves, including oil and natural gas, though both contribute to emissions and therefore climate change. There have been significant efforts to expand natural gas for electricity production. Fossil fuels in the past and in modern day dominate energy sources, though hydropower is also a dominant source in Syria’s energy profile. Renewable energy has been increasingly considered for long-term sustainability. The Syrian Civil War has also caused considerable damage to the country's infrastructure in areas such as healthcare and residential, which has lowered the ability of the country to respond to the negative effects of climate change.

Syria's poor electricity infrastructure lacks capacity to endure extreme weather events such as heat waves, which are projected to worsen. Syria’s demand for cooling systems has also increased with urbanization, population growth, and rising temperatures.

Adaptation

Syria has high potential for utilization of solar energy, with average irradiance levels about 5 kWh/m²/day. Solar water heating systems have been in use, and there have also been plans to expand photovoltaic systems for both residential and rural applications. The Wind Atlas for Syria shows promising wing speeds in central, southern, and coastal areas. With these speeds, Syria has the potential to produce 85,000 MW of wind energy. Biomass resources, including animal and agricultural waste, are sufficient to produce approximately 357 million m³ of biogas annually. While hydropower energy sources are significant, it is ongoingly limited by low precipitation and reliance on international rivers.

Policy

Syria has a number of international climate policies which it is involved in, with some being through the UNFCCC. This includes the 2010 Greenhouse Gas Inventory.

The country's internal environmental legislation has been known to be difficult to enforce, especially due to the unrest caused by the Syrian Civil war. Deliberate environmental attacks have proved hard to stop or are hard to enforce given the well discussed vague and high thresholds of both Syrian environmental law as well as international humanitarian and environmental laws.

The Tabqa Dam in Raqqa, Syria

In an attempt to improve the country's food production and irrigating parts of the Middle Eastern Steppe, the Syrian government has instituted several policies centered around expanding irrigation, damming and the construction of reservoirs. The findings on the sustainability of these projects was inconclusive, however, it was found that irrigation of certain areas led to increased soil salinization.

Fighting desertification and deforestation has also been a focus of the Syrian government as well as forestry NGOs operating in the region. Only 3% of Syria's land area is forest, and many communities living in those areas use the forest as a resource, but come into conflict with farmers illegally grazing their livestock in and around the forests.

References

  1. ^ Kelley, Colin (2 March 2015). "Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought". PNAS. 112 (11): 3241–3246. Bibcode:2015PNAS..112.3241K. doi:10.1073/pnas.1421533112. PMC 4371967. PMID 25733898.
  2. ^ Selby, Jan; Dahi, Omar; Fröhlich, Christiane; Hulme, Mike (September 2017). "Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited". Political Geography. 60: 232–244. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007 – via Science Direct.
  3. ^ Al-Riffai, Perrihan; Breisinger, Clemens; Verner, Dorte; Zhu, Tingju; Al-Riffai, Perrihan; Breisinger, Clemens; Verner, Dorte; Zhu, Tingju (2012). Al-Riffai, Perrihan; Breisinger, Clemens; Verner, Dorte; Zhu, Tingju (eds.). "Droughts in Syria: An Assessment of Impacts and Options for Improving the Resilience of the Poor". Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture. Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 51 (2012). doi:10.22004/ag.econ.155471.
  4. Gleick, Peter H. (2014-07-01). "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria". Weather, Climate, and Society. 6 (3): 331–340. doi:10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1. ISSN 1948-8327.
  5. ^ UNFCCC Syrian Arab Republic (2018). "Nationally Determined Contributions" (PDF).
  6. ^ Skaf M., Mathbout S. Drought changes over the last five decades in Syria. In: López-Francos A. (comp.), López-Francos A. (collab.). Economics of drought and drought preparedness in a climate change context . Zaragoza: CIHEAM / FAO / ICARDA / GDAR / CEIGRAM / MARM, 2010. p. 107-112. (Options Méditerranéennes: Series A. Séminaires Méditerranéens; n. 95). 2. International Conference on Drought Management, 2010/03/04-06, Istanbul (Turkey). http://om.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a95/00801334.pdf
  7. The International Energy Agency (2022). "Syria".
  8. "Country Inventory - Climate TRACE". climatetrace.org. Retrieved 2024-12-08.
  9. ^ Meslmani, Y., Khorfan, S., Hainoun, A., Housami , N., Jabbour, E., & Al Kabikly , R. (2009). (rep.). General Report Of Green House Gases (GHG) Inventory in Syria . UNDP.
  10. ^ Zeleňáková, M., Abd-Elhamid, H. F., Krajníková, K., Smetanková, J., Purcz, P., & Alkhalaf, I. (2022). Spatial and temporal variability of rainfall trends in response to climate change—a case study: Syria. Water, 14(10), 1670. https://doi.org/10.3390/w14101670
  11. ^ Abd‐Elhamid, H. F., Zeleňáková, M., Soľáková, T., Saleh, O. K., & El‐Dakak, A. M. (2023). Monitoring flood and drought risks in arid and semi‐arid regions using remote sensing data and standardized precipitation index: A case study of syria. Journal of Flood Risk Management, 17(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12961
  12. Mathbout , S., & Martin Vide, J. (n.d.). (working paper). Climate extremes: Characteristics of dry and compound hot - dry events in Syria  over the last 120 years. Barcelona.
  13. Hamed, M. M., Al-Hasani, A. A. J., Nashwan, M. S., Sa’adi, Z., & Shahid, S. (2024). Assessing the growing threat of heat stress in the North Africa and Arabian Peninsula region connected to climate change. Journal of Cleaner Production, 447, 141639. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141639
  14. ^ Climate change risk profile - syria. USAID: From the American People. (n.d.). https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2017_USAID_GEMS_Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Profile_Syria.pdf
  15. ^ Smiatek, Gerhard; Kaspar, Severin; Kunstmann, Harald (1 April 2013). "Hydrological Climate Change Impact Analysis for the Figeh Spring near Damascus, Syria". Journal of Hydrometeorology. 14 (2): 577–593. Bibcode:2013JHyMe..14..577S. doi:10.1175/JHM-D-12-065.1 – via American Meteorological Society.
  16. ^ Akhmedkhodjaeva, Nodira (2 November 2024). "Drought in Syria" (PDF). The Aleppo Project.
  17. ^ "Global and Local Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Syria and Options for Adaptation". International Food Policy Research Institute: 1–64. June 2011 – via Cgiar.
  18. ^ Bellizzi, S., Lane, C., Elhakim, M., & Nabeth, P. (2020). Health consequences of drought in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean region: Hotspot areas and needed actions. Environmental Health, 19(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-020-00665-z
  19. Hainoun, A., Almoustafa, A., & Seif Aldin, M. (2010). Estimating the health damage costs of Syrian electricity generation system using impact pathway approach. Energy, 35(2), 628–638. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.10.034
  20. ^ de Châtel, Francesca (2019). Green Planet Blues (6 ed.). Routledge. pp. 1–19.
  21. ^ Hamzeh, Ali (30 April 2004). "Overview of the Syrian Energy Profile". Beirut Regional Collaboration Workshop on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology – via RersearchGate.
  22. Muzzall, Evan; Perlman, Brian; Rubenstein, Leonard S.; Haar, Rohini J. (2021-10-01). "Overview of attacks against civilian infrastructure during the Syrian civil war, 2012–2018". BMJ Global Health. 6 (10): e006384. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2021-006384. ISSN 2059-7908. PMC 8488748. PMID 34598977.
  23. IPCC 6th Assessment Report https://skidmoreess.slack.com/files/UCPBSB5FF/F07MP9V7M46/ipcc_ar6_wgii_fullreport.pdf
  24. ^ Prus, Alexandra (2020-09-30). "Protection of the Environment through the Lens of Syria: Scrutinizing the Loopholes in the Prevailing Legislative Framework". Groningen Journal of International Law. 8 (1): 48–68. doi:10.21827/GroJIL.8.1.48-68. ISSN 2352-2674.
  25. Hole, F.; Zaitchik, B. F. (15 March 2007). "Policies, plans, practice, and prospects: irrigation in northeastern Syria". Land Degradation & Development. 18 (2): 133–152. Bibcode:2007LDeDe..18..133H. doi:10.1002/ldr.772. ISSN 1085-3278.
  26. ^ Al Berni, Rim Rateb (2010-01-01). "An Investigation into Sustainable Forest Policies and Practices in Syria". School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Theses.
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