Misplaced Pages

Latest revision as of 12:07, 10 January 2025

Ahmed al-Sharaa
أحمد الشرع
Al-Sharaa in 2024
Leader of Syria
De facto
Assumed office 8 December 2024
Prime Minister	Mohammed al-Bashir
Preceded by	Bashar al-Assad (as president)
2nd Emir of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
Incumbent
Assumed office 1 October 2017
Preceded by	Abu Jaber Shaykh
Emir of the al-Nusra Front
In office 23 January 2012 – 28 January 2017
Preceded by	Position established
Succeeded by	Position abolished
Personal details
Born	Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (1982-10-29) 29 October 1982 (age 42) Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Political party	Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
Parent	Hussein al-Sharaa (father)
Relatives	Maher al-Sharaa (brother)
Nickname	Abu Mohammad al-Julani
Military career
Allegiance	Syrian transitional government (2024–present) Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (2017–present) Formerly Al-Qaeda (2003–2016) Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2004–2006) Mujahideen Shura Council (January 2006 – October 2006) Islamic State of Iraq (October 2006 – 23 January 2012) Al-Nusra Front (2012–2016) Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (2016–2017) Syrian Salvation Government (2017–2024)
Years of service	2003–present
Rank	Commander-in-chief (HTS)
Battles / wars	See list Iraq War Iraqi insurgency 2003–2006 phase Syrian civil war Inter-rebel conflict 2016 Idlib clashes 2017 Idlib clashes 2020 Idlib clashes 2021 Idlib clashes 2022 Aleppo clashes 2014 Idlib offensive 2015 Idlib offensive 2017 Hama offensive Northwestern Syria campaign (October 2017–February 2018) Idlib demilitarization (2018–2019) 2018 Aleppo clashes Dawn of Idlib Dawn of Idlib 2 2024 Syrian opposition offensives Battle of Aleppo Hama offensive Homs offensive

Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (born 29 October 1982), also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, is a Syrian revolutionary, military commander and politician who has been widely regarded as the de facto leader of Syria since 2024. As the emir of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) since 2017, he played a key role in the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives, which led to the downfall of the Assad regime and establishment of the Syrian transitional government.

Al-Sharaa was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a Syrian family from the Golan Heights. Shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he joined al-Qaeda in Iraq and fought for three years in the Iraqi insurgency. American forces captured and imprisoned him from 2006 to 2011. His release coincided with the Syrian revolution, and he created the al-Nusra Front in 2012 with the support of al-Qaeda to take part in the Syrian civil war against the Ba'athist government of Bashar al-Assad. As emir of the al-Nusra Front, al-Sharaa built a stronghold in the northwestern Idlib Governorate and opposed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's attempts to integrate al-Nusra into the Islamic State. This dispute led to open conflict between al-Nusra and the Islamic State.

The U.S. State Department listed al-Sharaa as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" in May 2013, and four years later announced a $10 million reward for information leading to his capture. The reward offer was rescinded in December 2024 after al-Sharaa met with an American delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara A. Leaf.

In 2016, al-Sharaa cut al-Nusra's ties with al-Qaeda, merging it with other organizations to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham the following year. Since breaking with al-Qaeda, he has sought international legitimacy by focusing on governance in Syria rather than global jihadist goals. HTS established an administration in the territory it controls, collecting taxes, providing public services, and issuing identity cards to residents, though it has faced criticism for authoritarian tactics and suppressing dissent. In recent years, he has presented a more moderate view of himself, suggesting he has no urge to wage war against Western nations, and has vowed to protect Syria's minorities.

Life before the Syrian civil war

Family background

Al-Sharaa's family came from the Golan Heights in Syria, and were displaced in 1967 after the Israeli occupation during the Six-Day War. The nisba "al-Julani" in his nom de guerre is a reference to the Golan Heights.

Al-Sharaa's father, Hussein Ali al-Sharaa, was an Arab nationalist student activist for the Nasserists in Syria who studied economics at the University of Baghdad before becoming an oil engineer. He has published numerous books on regional economic development. Al-Sharaa's father, Hussein, is the cousin of Farouk al-Sharaa, vice president of Syria from 2006 to 2016. Also, his uncle is married to Farouk's aunt.

His paternal grandfather, Ali Mohammed al-Sharaa, was a large landowner and tradesman in the city of Fiq. His great-grandfather, Mohammed Khalid al-Sharaa (1899–1932), played a significant role in the Great Syrian Revolt against the French occupation of Syria. He was sentenced to death in absentia for his involvement in the revolt, though the sentence was never carried out.

Youth in Syria

Al-Sharaa was born Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa on 29 October 1982 in Riyadh to a middle-class family. His father worked there as an oil engineer, and his mother was a geography teacher. The family returned to Syria in 1989, settling in the affluent Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus. According to Hussam Jazmati, who produced his most definitive biography, classmates remember al-Sharaa as a studious but unremarkable boy who wore thick glasses and avoided attention. During his youth, he was described as "quiet" and "shy", "manipulatively intelligent" but "socially introverted," and was noted for his "good looks" and a romance with an Alawite girl which both families opposed. He remained in Damascus, studying media studies and starting a degree in medicine until moving to Iraq in 2003.

Iraq war

According to an interview with Frontline in 2021, al-Sharaa stated he was radicalized by the Palestinian Second Intifada in 2000 when he was 17 or 18 years old. He said: "I started thinking about how I could fulfil my duties, defending a people who are oppressed by occupiers and invaders."

Appreciative of the 9/11 attacks, al-Sharaa traveled from Damascus to Baghdad by bus just weeks before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, where he quickly rose through the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The Times of Israel newspaper claimed in 2013 that al-Sharaa was a close associate of AQI leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In his 2021 interview with Frontline, al-Sharaa denied ever meeting al-Zarqawi and asserted that he served only as a regular foot-soldier under al-Qaeda against American occupation. Before the eruption of the Iraqi civil war in 2006, al-Sharaa was arrested by American forces and imprisoned for over five years in various detention centres, including Abu Ghraib, Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper and Camp Taji prisons.

Syrian civil war

Syrian uprising and foundation of al-Nusra

Upon his release from prison coinciding with the Syrian revolution, Ahmed al-Sharaa was tasked in August 2011 by Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda's central command to establish al-Qaeda's mission in Syria. Al-Shara'a crossed into Syria with significant funding and a mandate to establish al-Qaeda's presence. Alongside senior operatives from al-Qaeda's central command, he formed "Jabhat al-Nusra", also known as the Al-Nusra Front, which was envisioned by al-Zawahiri as a broad coalition of Islamist militant groups led by al-Shara'a in Syria, with direct allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command.

Despite tensions with then al-Qaeda-allied leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), who were content with his departure, al-Sharaa proceeded to orchestrate an agreement with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to expand al-Qaeda's Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. The group maintained this alliance with ISI the until 2013, with an arrangement between al-Sharaa and al-Baghdadi to resolve disputes through mediation by al-Qaeda Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. Over time, al-Sharaa began distancing himself from transnational jihadist ideology, increasingly framing his faction within the context of a nationalist Syrian struggle.

ISI initially provided al-Sharaa with fighters, weapons, and funding to establish the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Al-Sharaa implemented these plans alongside ISI leaders after his release from prison.

Al-Sharaa became the "general emir" of al-Nusra when it was officially announced in January 2012. By December of that year, the US Department of State designated Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist organization, identifying it as an alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq). Under al-Sharaa's leadership, al-Nusra emerged as one of Syria's most powerful groups. Its stronghold was centered on the Idlib Governorate in northwestern Syria.

Conflict with ISIS

As al-Sharaa carved out a fiefdom in Syria between 2012 and 2013, the Iraqi leadership of ISI grew suspicious of him. Al-Nusra became increasingly popular for providing social services and cooperating with other Syrian rebel groups against the Assad regime, and al-Sharaa ignored al-Baghdadi's orders to begin fighting these groups and assassinate opposition activists. Al-Baghdadi's top aide, Abu Ali al-Anbari, travelled to Syria to investigate al-Sharaa, concluding that he was a "cunning person; two-faced; glows when he hears his name mentioned on satellite channels".

Concerned about al-Nusra's popularity and al-Sharaa's perceived insubordination, al-Baghdadi unilaterally announced that al-Nusra would merge into ISI to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2013. The proposed merger would have eliminated al-Nusra's autonomy and allegiance to al-Qaeda's central command by placing all its leaders, decisions, and operations under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's direct control. To preserve al-Nusra's independence, al-Sharaa publicly pledged allegiance (bay'ah) directly to al-Qaeda's leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who issued a declaration that confirmed al-Nusra's independence from ISI, proclaiming that Syria was the "spatial state" of al-Nusra Front and that ISIL's rule was restricted to Iraq. Al-Zawahiri repudiated al-Baghdadi's merger move which was announced without consulting or informing al-Qaeda's central command, and appointed Abu Khalid al-Suri as his emissary to mediate between the two groups and supervise the implementation of the accords.

In late 2013, al-Zawahiri ordered al-Baghdadi to accept the annulment of the merger, who refused and attempted to proceed with it. By February 2014, efforts to end the dispute between ISIS and al-Nusra had failed, leading to al-Qaeda formally severing its ties with ISIS on February 2014 and leaving al-Nusra as the sole representative of al-Qaeda in Syria. After the assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri on 23 February, al-Sharaa denounced ISIS and likened them to the Iraqi "sahawat" who fought against al-Qaeda alongside the U.S., accusing them of undermining the fight against Assad by fighting rebels. Open warfare between ISIS and al-Nusra ensued; al-Sharaa warned that the fighting risked giving a reprieve to Assad. Over the following months, ISIS captured much of the territory controlled by al-Nusra and the Syrian opposition, leaving an estimated four thousand fighters on both sides dead by February 2015. In June 2015, al-Sharaa told Al Jazeera that no resolution to the conflict was forthcoming, and that unless ISIS "repent to God and return to their senses", there would be "nothing but fighting between us”.

Threats against the United States

After the start of Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led coalition's airstrike campaign against the Islamic State in Syria, al-Sharaa, in a rare public declaration, described the airstrikes as an assault on Islam, and warned the Western public: "This is what will take the battle to the heart of your land, for the Muslims will not stand as spectators watching their sons bombed and killed in their lands, while you stay safe in your lands." In his audio message, released five days after the U.S. strikes, al-Sharaa said: "Do not let the West and America take advantage of the injustice of the Islamic State upon you … Those who are unable to repulse the Islamic State or others, then let them do so without being a partner with the crusader alliance." Al-Sharaa also warned that al-Nusra will fight any group which takes American cash and weapons, condemning "the traitorous factions that were bought by the West with some money and ammunition so as to be a pawn in its hands." In an audio statement released on 28 September 2014, al-Sharaa stated that he would fight the "United States and its allies" and urged his fighters not to accept help from the West in their battle against the Islamic State.

Resurgence of al-Nusra

In late May 2015, al-Sharaa was interviewed by Ahmed Mansour on Qatari news broadcaster Al Jazeera, hiding his face. He described the Geneva peace conference as a farce and claimed that the Western-backed Syrian National Coalition did not represent the Syrian people and had no ground presence in Syria. Al-Sharaa mentioned that al-Nusra have no plans for attacking Western targets, and that their priority is focused on fighting the al-Assad Syrian government, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Al-Sharaa told al-Jazeera in 2015, "Nusra Front doesn't have any plans or directives to target the West. We received clear orders from Ayman al-Zawahiri not to use Syria as a launching pad to attack the U.S. or Europe in order to not sabotage the true mission against the regime. Maybe Al-Qaeda does that but not here in Syria. Assad forces are fighting us on one end, Hezbollah on another and ISIL on a third front. It is all about their mutual interests". "Our war is not a matter of revenge against the Alawites despite the fact that in Islam, they are considered to be heretics", he added. A commentary on this interview however states that al-Sharaa also added that Alawites would be left alone as long as they abandon elements of their faith which contradict Islam.

In October 2015, the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war prompted al-Sharaa to call for increased attacks on Assad's Alawite strongholds in retaliation for Russian airstrikes on Sunni areas. Al-Sharaa also called for Russian civilians to be attacked by Muslims from the former Soviet Union.

Split from al-Qaeda

The Russian entrance into the war led to a reversal of fortunes for the Syrian opposition and increased the influence of their foreign backers over them. In January 2016, al-Nusra held unity negotiations with other rebel groups in a bid to pre-empt any foreign attempt to co-opt these groups against it. When the talks collapsed due to concerns over al-Nusra's affiliation with al-Qaeda, the reformist wing of al-Nusra — which may have comprised a third of its overall membership — presented al-Sharaa with an ultimatum: to sever ties with al-Qaeda and merge with other rebel groups, or face a mass defection.

In July 2016, al-Sharaa convened al-Nusra's Shura Council twice to discuss the matter. The first council was inconclusive, while the second council settled on a "middle way" after several meetings: to break ties with al-Qaeda outside of Syria while retaining them inside Syria. As al-Zawahiri could not be contacted, several senior al-Qaeda leaders, including al-Zawahiri's deputy Abu Khayr al-Masri, approved the split contingent on al-Zawahiri later approving it himself. If he did not, the split would have to be reversed. Al-Sharaa agreed to these terms, which were narrowly approved by al-Nusra's Shura Council.

On 28 July 2016, al-Sharaa announced that al-Nusra had severed ties with al-Qaeda and rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). He added that the new organisation would have "no affiliation to any external entity". Ayman al-Zawahiri was publicly supportive of the split, even though he had rejected the plan when it was presented to him. In protest, several leading al-Qaeda loyalists in al-Nusra, including Abu Julaybib, Abu Khadija al-Urduni and Abu Humam al-Shami, left JFS. In September 2016, al-Zawahiri authored a letter that harshly reprimanded al-Sharaa for his "act of disobedience", and admonished al-Masri for giving it his approval. Due to al-Zawahiri's rejection, al-Masri withdrew his support for the split. Al-Qaeda leaders Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah and Saif al-Adel also opposed the split, and al-Sharaa was expected to reverse his decision. However, he refused to do so.

Formation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

After forming JFS, al-Sharaa attempted to arrange a merger with Ahrar al-Sham. However, negotiations collapsed due to al-Sharaa supporting Jund al-Aqsa — a group that he had secretly established to discourage al-Nusra's foreign fighters from defecting to ISIS — in their conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. Ahrar al-Sham's leadership were also concerned that JFS continued to maintain ties with al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa came under attack from al-Qaeda. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi wrote a critique of the manhaj of JFS, and rumours circulated that al-Qaeda was preparing to launch a new affiliate in Syria named "Taliban al-Sham".

In a last-ditch bid to secure a merger, al-Sharaa led efforts to undermine Ahrar al-Sham's nationalist and anti-merger wing. When Ahrar al-Sham's leadership again refused to merge in December 2017, the pro-merge wing formed a breakaway "sub-faction" named Jaysh al-Ahrar. Shortly afterwards, JFS attacked Free Syrian Army (FSA) positions across Idlib and Aleppo, precipitating a conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. The conflict allowed JFS to defeat CIA-backed FSA groups, which it viewed as a "foreign conspiracy".

On 28 January 2017, al-Sharaa announced that JFS would dissolve and merge with Liwa al-Haqq, Jaysh al-Sunna, Ansar al-Din Front and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), gaining approximately 3,000 to 5,000 more fighters. In an effort to demonstrate the maturity of the new group, al-Sharaa arranged for Jaysh al-Ahrar's leader Abu Jaber Shaykh to serve as the nominal leader of HTS, although leadership was formally transferred back to al-Sharaa by December 2017.

The remaining al-Qaeda loyalists in JFS viewed the formation of HTS as a definitive break from the organisation and refused to join. A number of al-Qaeda veterans publicly criticised al-Sharaa for his moves; Sami al-Oraydi condemned it as insubordination against Ayman al-Zawahiri. As a result, several were arrested by HTS towards the end of 2017, including al-Oraydi. After their release, some were involved in forming Hurras al-Din, the new Syrian affiliate of al-Qaeda.

The U.S. government quickly rejected this rebranding, with the U.S. Embassy in Syria stating that "The core of HTS is Nusra, a designated terrorist organisation. This designation applies regardless of what name it uses or what groups merge into it." The Embassy characterized HTS's formation as an attempt to "hijack the Syrian revolution" rather than a move toward moderation.

Despite this stance, under HTS, the group prioritized combating al-Qaeda and ISIS in an effort to improve its standing with Western nations. HTS successfully defeated ISIS, al-Qaeda, and most opposing forces in its territory, establishing control over most of Idlib Governorate, which it administered through the HTS-aligned Syrian Salvation Government.

In mid-2020, al-Sharaa increased his public presence in Idlib to build popular support. HTS-affiliated media significantly expanded its output during this period, releasing multiple daily videos showcasing governance activities, tax distribution in rural areas, frontline operations, and al-Sharaa's meetings with local militia groups.

Idlib governance

Under al-Sharaa's administration, Idlib had experienced significant development, becoming Syria's fastest-growing region despite being historically its poorest province. The area featured new luxury shopping malls, housing estates, and round-the-clock electricity supply surpassing that of Damascus. Educational facilities included a university with 18,000 segregated students. However, his administration faced criticism for its taxation policies, including customs taxes on goods from Turkey and checkpoint fees on smuggled goods, as well as the economic impact of the Turkish lira's depreciation, which was the main currency in the region.

In March 2024, widespread protests erupted in Idlib Governorate against al-Sharaa's rule, with demonstrators adopting the slogan "Isqat al-Julani" ("Down with Julani"), reminiscent of earlier protests against the Assad regime. For over a month, hundreds and sometimes thousands of protesters marched through Idlib's cities and towns. The protests were triggered by multiple factors, including allegations of brutality, with reports of thousands of critics held in prisons, and economic grievances related to high taxes.

In response to the unrest, al-Sharaa made several concessions. He released hundreds of detainees from a previous summer's security operation, including his former deputy Abu Maria al-Qahtani, who had been arrested along with 300 others in a purge of his movement. He also promised local elections and increased employment opportunities for displaced persons, while warning protesters against what he termed treachery.

Turkey, which had previously helped stabilize the province by connecting it to its electricity grid and allowing building materials to enter freely, had grown concerned about al-Sharaa's expanding influence. In response, it reduced trade through its border crossings with Idlib, affecting HTS's revenue. Reports indicated that al-Sharaa had twice attempted to take over other Turkish-administered areas in northern Syria.

2024 rebel takeover

In late November 2024, al-Sharaa led HTS in its Deterrence of Aggression offensive against the pro-Assad Syrian Arab Army.

During the capture of Aleppo, al-Sharaa instructed his forces not to "scare children" and HTS channels broadcast footage of Christians in the city continuing their normal activities. Archbishop Afram Ma'lui stated that services would not be affected by the change in control. After regime forces were expelled from the city, al-Sharaa declared "diversity is a strength". HTS quickly established administrative bodies to restore basic services, including garbage collection, electricity, and water. The group's General Zakat Commission began distributing emergency bread supplies, while its General Organization for Grain Trade and Processing provided fuel to local bakeries. The Ministry of Development and Humanitarian Affairs reported delivering 65,000 loaves of bread under a campaign called "Together We Return".

On 6 December, in a face-to-face interview with CNN, al-Sharaa declared that the offensive's goal was to remove Assad from power. Using his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, he explicitly pledged to protect minority groups, and outlined plans for establishing a government grounded in institutions and a "council chosen by the people". According to Dareen Khalifa of the International Crisis Group, al-Sharaa has considered dissolving HTS to strengthen civilian and military governance structures. He also expressed his intention to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees to their homes. In his victory speech following the fall of Damascus, he condemned Iran as a source of sectarianism and corruption, and framed the triumph as a turning point for the region.

On 20 December 2024, following meetings between HTS officials and U.S. diplomats in Damascus, the United States rescinded a $10 million reward it had previously offered for the arrest of al-Sharaa.

Governance following fall of Assad government

On 8 December, Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali announced that the Syrian government would hand over power to a new elected government following the departure of al-Assad from Damascus, and al-Sharaa announced further that al-Jalali will "supervise state institutions until they are handed over". Al-Jalali later noted to Al Arabiya that al-Sharaa had been in contact with himself prior to the announcement to discuss the handover. On the same day, he delivered a speech at Damascus's Umayyad Mosque, calling the fall of Assad's regime "a new chapter in the history of the region" and condemning Syria's role as "a playground for Iranian ambitions", characterized by sectarianism and corruption. On 9 December, HTS released a video of al-Sharaa, al-Jalali and Mohammed al-Bashir, the head of the de facto government in Idlib. On 12 December, al-Sharaa met with Turkish officials, which marked the first diplomatic delegation since Assad's overthrow.

On 24 December, al-Sharaa announced the dissolution and merger of multiple rebel factions, including the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army, into the interim government's Ministry of Defense. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces were excluded from this consolidation due to ongoing conflicts with Turkish-backed rebels in northeastern Syria. The reorganization coincided with al-Sharaa's efforts to establish new state institutions, including law enforcement and security forces, amid reports of revenge killings and highway banditry. The administration established processing centers for former regime soldiers and initiated police force recruitment.

In an interview with al-Arabiya on 29 December, al-Sharaa said that he expected the process of writing a new constitution of Syria to take two or three years, with elections expected after four years.

On 3 January 2025, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot became the first top diplomats from European Union member states to travel to Damascus since the fall of Assad, meeting with al-Sharaa to discuss a new political beginning between Europe and Syria.

Views on Israel

In an interview with the Syria TV news channel regarding the ongoing Israeli airstrikes on Syria, al-Sharaa said that after the fall of the Assad regime, Israel no longer has "any excuses" for attacking Syrian territory. He also spoke of "diplomatic solutions" as the only way to ensure security instead of "ill-considered military adventures". Al-Sharaa reportedly told a group of journalists that HTS would continue to uphold the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement that ended the Yom Kippur War.

Documentary

On 1 June 2021 PBS Frontline released a documentary, The Jihadist, investigating al-Sharaa's past in the context of the ongoing Syrian civil war. In the interview, reflecting on his past affiliation with al-Qaeda, on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Palestinian cause, al-Sharaa commented in the interview:

The history of the region and what it went through over the past 20 or 30 years needs to be taken into consideration... We are talking about a region ruled by tyrants, by people who rule with iron fists and their security apparatuses. At the same time, this region is surrounded by numerous conflicts and wars... We can't take a segment of this history and say so-and-so joined Al Qaeda. There are thousands of people who joined Al Qaeda, but let us ask what was the reason behind these people joining Al Qaeda? That's the question. Are the U.S. policies after World War II toward the region partially responsibility for driving people towards Al Qaeda organization? And are the European policies in the region responsible for the reactions of people who sympathize with the Palestinian cause or with the way the Zionist regime deals with the Palestinians?.. are the broken and oppressed peoples who had to endure what happened in Iraq, for example, or in Afghanistan, are they responsible..?.. our involvement with Al Qaeda in the past was an era, and it ended, and even at that time when we were with Al Qaeda, we were against external attacks, and it's completely against our policies to carry out external operations from Syria to target European or American people. This was not part of our calculations at all, and we did not do it at all.

Writings

On Jihadist online forums, there are essays and articles attributed to al-Sharaa under the name "Abdullah Bin Muhammad", including The Strategy of the Regional War.

See also

• Abu Jaber Shaykh
• Ali Keda
• Riad al-Asaad
• Saif al-Adel
• Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi

Notes

1. Renamed "Jabhat Fateh al-Sham" from 28 July 2016.
2. Arabic: أحمَد حُسين الشرع, romanized: ʾAḥmad Ḥusayn al-Sharaʿ
3. Arabic: أبو محمد الجولاني, romanized: ʾAbū Muḥammad al-Jawlānī; also transliterated as Joulani, Jolani, and Golani

References

1. "State Department amends terror designation for al Nusrah Front | FDD's Long War Journal". June 2018. Archived from the original on 26 February 2021. Retrieved 14 March 2021.
2. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/11/syria-rebel-leader-jolani-hts-al-qaeda-islamic-state-isis/
3. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-know-about-man-who-toppled-assad
4. https://www.degruyter.com/search/parent/9780520964037?query=nineveh+jolani&documentVisibility=all
5. "Ahmad al-Sharaa reveals his true date of birth" (in Arabic). An-Nahar. 30 December 2024. Retrieved 30 December 2024.
6. ^ "Elusive Al-Qaeda leader in Syria stays in shadows". Times of Israel. 4 November 2013. Archived from the original on 24 December 2018.
7. "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of Syria's shock insurgency?". AP News. 4 December 2024. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
8. • Salame, Richard (29 December 2024). "Syrian elections may not be held for 4 years, says de facto leader". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 29 December 2024.
   • Sarkar, Alisha Rahaman (19 December 2024). "Syria's de facto new leader says it is not a threat to the West". The Independent. Archived from the original on 20 December 2024.
   • Jewers, Chris (19 December 2024). "Syrian rebel leader says women's education will continue – but refuses to be drawn on alcohol". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 20 December 2024. Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria's de facto leader, said he believed in education for women as he denied the new government would be another version of the Taliban.
   • Bowen, Jeremy (18 December 2024). "Syria not a threat to world, rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa tells BBC". BBC News. Archived from the original on 18 December 2024. The de facto leader of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has said the country is exhausted by war and is not a threat to its neighbours or to the West.
   • Griswold, Eliza (17 December 2024). "Reasons to Leave Syria—and to Return". The New Yorker. Archived from the original on 17 December 2024. He wanted to see how Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the head of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham—an Islamist group formerly linked to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda—and now the de-facto leader of Syria, behaved.
   • Maher, Hatem (14 December 2024). "Syria's de facto leader not interested in new conflicts despite Israeli attacks". Reuters. Archived from the original on 14 December 2024.
9. "Terrorist Designations of Al-Nusrah Front Leader Muhammad Al-Jawlani". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 22 August 2019. Retrieved 24 June 2017.
10. Cone, Allen (10 May 2017). "U.S. offers $10M reward for information on al-Nusra leader". United Press International. Archived from the original on 11 May 2017. Retrieved 12 December 2024.
11. Rasgon, Adam; Abdulrahim, Raja (8 December 2024). "Who Is the Leader of Syria's Rebel Offensive?". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 8 December 2024. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
12. ^ Karadsheh, Jomana; Tuysuz, Gul; Laine, Brice; Kent, Lauren; Kourdi, Eyad (6 December 2024). "Syrian rebel leader says goal is to 'overthrow' Assad regime". CNN. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
13. Taylor, Adam (6 December 2024). "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the Islamist rebel leading the Syrian advance?". The Washington Post.
14. Abdulrahim, Raja (6 December 2024). "Leader of Syria's Resurgent Rebels Lays Out Strategy to Oust Assad". The New York Times.
15. ^ "The Jihadist". PBS. Archived from the original on 7 June 2021. Retrieved 7 June 2021.
16. Abouzeid, Rania (26 July 2012). "Meet the Islamist militants fighting alongside Syria's rebels". Time. Archived from the original on 1 September 2019.
17. ^ Almustafa, Hamzah Almustafa; Jazmati, Hossam (22 June 2021). "Syria war: Inside the world of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". Middle East Eye. Archived from the original on 6 December 2024.
18. "مصادر: الجولاني قريب فاروق الشرع.. درس الفقه على يد عالم دمشقي في المزة" [Sources: Al-Julani is a relative of Farouk al-Sharaa. He studied jurisprudence at the hands of a Damascene scholar in Mezzeh.]. Enab Baladi (in Arabic). 28 July 2016. Retrieved 16 December 2024.
19. "صديق طفولة الجولاني يروي ما يعرفه عنه" [Al-Joulani's childhood friend tells what he knows about him.] (in Arabic). Wattan. 30 July 2016. Retrieved 16 December 2024.
20. "أسرار «الجولاني» كشفت بعد انكشاف وجهه: ما علاقته بفاروق الشرع؟" [Jolani's secrets revealed after his face was exposed: What is his relationship with Farouk al-Sharaa?] (in Arabic). Janoubia. 30 July 2016. Retrieved 16 December 2024.
21. al-Akhirah, Jumada (22 December 2024). "قائد الإدارة الجديدة في سوريا التقى فاروق الشرع ودعاه لحوار وطني" [The leader of the new administration in Syria met with Farouk Al-Sharaa and invited him to a national dialogue]. aawsat.com (in Arabic). Retrieved 25 December 2024.
22. ^ جزماتي, حسام (10 September 2024). "سيرة والد الجولاني بقلمه". الجمهورية.نت (in Arabic). Retrieved 13 December 2024.
23. ^ Al-Atrush, Samer; Spencer, Richard (11 December 2024). "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani? 'Polite' Syrian leader heads home". The Times. Archived from the original on 18 December 2024. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
24. • "Transcript: The Jihadist". Frontline. Archived from the original on 19 August 2022. His birth name was Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa.
    • Chulov, Martin (28 July 2016). "Al-Nusra Front cuts ties with al-Qaida and renames itself". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 29 July 2016. Jolani, whose birth name is Ahmed Hussein al-Shara'a, had remained hidden throughout the war.
25. ^ Hassan, Hassan (8 December 2024). "Profile: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". The Sunday Telegraph.
26. ^ "بعد شهور.. الجولاني يكشف عن أسرار حياته لمارتن سميث". Al Alam TV. 5 June 2021. Archived from the original on 7 June 2021. Retrieved 7 June 2021.
27. ^ Raya Jalabi (7 December 2024). "Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the Syrian rebel leader hoping to overthrow Assad". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 6 December 2024.
28. Salem, Mostafa (6 December 2024). "How Syria's rebel leader went from radical jihadist to a blazer-wearing 'revolutionary'". CNN News.
29. "Interview-Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". PBS Frontline. 2 April 2021. Most of the information available on the internet is false... No, I didn't meet Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was mostly present in Fallujah and Ramadi and around this region, and I was in Mosul during that time. I was a regular soldier. I wasn't involved in any major operations that I would meet al-Zarqawi.
30. ^ Klausen, Jytte (2021). "11: The ISIS Effect". Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN 978-0-19-887079-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: url-status (link)
31. "Interview-Abu Mohammad al-Jolani". PBS Frontline. 2 April 2021.
32. ^ "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of HTS in Syria?". Al Jazeera. 4 December 2024. Archived from the original on 14 December 2024.
33. ^ Jalabi, Raya (8 December 2024). "Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the Syrian rebel leader". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 12 December 2024.
34. Klausen, Jytte (2021). "11: The ISIS Effect". Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN 978-0-19-887079-1. In August 2011, the new emir of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden's old second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al Qaeda's central command sent Abu Mohammad al-Julani to set up a mission in Syria.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: url-status (link)
35. Klausen, Jytte (2021). "11: The ISIS Effect". Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN 978-0-19-887079-1. Al-Julani and a cadre of experienced operatives from the Al Qaeda high command set up Jabhat al-Nusra, also known in English as the Nusra Front , which was supposed to function as a united front organization for the various jihadist fighter groups. ... The Nusra Front was, following al-Zawahiri's vision, supposed to work as a broad front organization and high command for aligned fighter groups in the area... In other words, al-Julani was the boss directly answering to al-Zawahiri's HQ{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: url-status (link)
36. "Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 30 January 2017. Retrieved 13 January 2017.
37. "An internal struggle: Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate is grappling with its identity". Brookings Institution. 31 May 2015. Retrieved 1 June 2015.
38. ^ Hassan, Hassan; Weiss, Michael (2 December 2024). "The Backstory Behind the Fall of Aleppo". New Lines Magazine. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
39. ^ Zelin 2022, p. 16
40. ^ Byman, Daniel L.; Williams, Jennifer R. "ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism's global civil war". Brookings. Retrieved 18 December 2024.
41. Klausen, Jytte (2021). Western Jihadism: A Thirty-Year History. Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 399. ISBN 978-0-19-887079-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: url-status (link)
42. ^ Zelin 2022, p. 17
43. ^ "Al-Nusra Commits to al-Qaeda, Deny Iraq Branch 'Merger'". Agence France Presse. 10 April 2013. Archived from the original on 1 April 2019. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
44. "Hundreds killed as ISIL insurgents gain ground in east Syria". Reuters. 10 June 2014. Retrieved 12 July 2014.
45. "Qaeda chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi jihad merger". Al Jazeera English. 9 June 2013. Archived from the original on 25 May 2019. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
46. Liz Sly (3 February 2014). "Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq". The Washington Post. Retrieved 27 August 2015.
47. ^ Zelin 2022, pp. 53-54
48. "ISIS vows to crush rival rebel groups". The Daily Star. 8 January 2014. Archived from the original on 7 January 2014. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
49. "Nusra leader: No end to conflict with ISIL in Syria". Al Jazeera. 4 June 2015. Retrieved 19 December 2024.
50. "Islamist rivals in Syria find a common enemy in 'crusaders' coalition". 6 October 2014.
51. "U.S. and its allies strike ISIS tank, refineries and checkpoints". CNN. 28 September 2014. Archived from the original on 12 December 2018. Retrieved 2 October 2014.
52. ^ "Syria Al-Qaeda leader: Our mission is to defeat regime, not attack West". al-Jazeera. 28 May 2015. Archived from the original on 1 June 2015. Retrieved 30 May 2015.
53. Lund, Aron (29 May 2015). ""Abu Mohammed al-Golani's Aljazeera Interview"". Syria Comment. Archived from the original on 26 June 2015. Retrieved 17 June 2015.
54. "Syria's Nusra Front leader urges wider attacks on Assad's Alawite areas to avenge Russian bombing". The Daily Telegraph. 13 October 2015. Archived from the original on 26 January 2019. Retrieved 4 April 2018.
55. Aji, Albert; Mroue, Bassem (14 October 2015). "Russian Embassy shelled in Syria as insurgents hit back". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 19 October 2015. Retrieved 7 October 2024.
56. "Head of al Qaeda's Syrian branch threatens Russia in audio message". The Long War Journal. 13 October 2015. Archived from the original on 13 April 2019. Retrieved 16 October 2015.
57. ^ Lister, Charles (15 February 2018). "How al-Qa`ida Lost Control of its Syrian Affiliate: The Inside Story". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Retrieved 19 December 2024.
58. ^ Zelin 2022, pp. 17-18
59. ^ "Syrian Nusra Front announces split from al-Qaeda". BBC News. 28 July 2016. Archived from the original on 30 July 2016. Retrieved 28 July 2016.
60. "Al-Nusra leader Jolani announces split from al-Qaeda". Al Jazeera. 29 July 2016. Archived from the original on 3 December 2022.
61. "Analysis: Al Nusrah Front rebrands itself as Jabhat Fath Al Sham | FDD's Long War Journal". FDD's Long War Journal. 28 July 2016. Archived from the original on 24 March 2019. Retrieved 17 January 2017.
62. ^ Zelin 2022, pp. 18-19
63. Joscelyn, Thomas (28 January 2017). "Al Qaeda and allies announce 'new entity' in Syria". FDD's Long War Journal. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 29 May 2017.
64. "US Stands Firm: HTS and Jolani Still Part of al-Qaeda Network". Times of India. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
65. "Julani is a temporary leader of the "Liberation of the Sham" .. This is the fate of its former leader". HuffPost. 2 October 2017. Archived from the original on 2 October 2017. Retrieved 2 October 2017.
66. ^ "Protests have erupted against another Syrian dictator". The Economist. 4 April 2024. Archived from the original on 4 April 2024. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
67. Sakr, Taha (8 December 2024). "From Riyadh to Rebellion: Rise of Syria's Abu Mohammad Al-Golani". Daily News Egypt. Retrieved 8 December 2024.
68. Abouzeid, Rania (8 December 2024). "The Fall of Assad's Syria". The New Yorker.
69. Salem, Mostafa (6 December 2024). "How Syria's rebel leader went from radical jihadist to a blazer-wearing 'revolutionary'". CNN. Retrieved 12 December 2024.
70. "Is the overthrow of Assad good for the Palestinians?". Middle East Monitor. 9 December 2024. Retrieved 12 December 2024.
71. Zelin, Aaron Y. (3 December 2024). "How Syria's 'Diversity-Friendly' Jihadists Plan on Building a State". The Washington Institute. Retrieved 7 December 2024.
72. ^ Robertson, Nic (8 December 2024). "Syrian rebel leader's victory speech holds a message for Iran – and for Trump and Israel too". CNN. Retrieved 10 December 2024.
73. Taylor, Adam (6 December 2024). "Who is Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the Islamist rebel leading the Syrian advance?". The Washington Post.
74. "Thousands flee as Syrian rebels advance on crossroads city of Homs". The Times of Israel. Reuters. Retrieved 6 December 2024.
75. Bateman, Tom (20 December 2024). "US scraps $10m bounty for arrest of Syria's new leader Sharaa". BBC. Retrieved 21 December 2024.
76. "Ex-Syrian PM to supervise state bodies until transition". Al Jazeera. 8 December 2024. Retrieved 8 December 2024.
77. Saleh, Heba; Jalabi, Raya (9 December 2024). "Syrian rebels seek to consolidate control". Financial Times. Retrieved 9 December 2024.
78. Ula, enab10 (12 December 2024). "Turkish delegation meets with Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus". Enab Baladi. Retrieved 13 December 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
79. Dadouch, Sarah (24 December 2024). "Syria dissolves rebel factions as al-Sharaa consolidates power". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 24 December 2024.
80. "Syria's leader says elections could take 4 years: Al Arabiya interview". France 24. 29 December 2024.
81. Camut, Nicolas (4 January 2025). "Handshakegate in Syria". Politico.
82. Boxerman, Aaron (3 January 2025). "European Ministers Visit Syria to Strengthen Ties With New Government". The New York Times.
83. "Syrian rebel leader: Israel has 'no more excuses' to strike, we don't seek conflict". The Times of Israel. 14 December 2024.
84. Cornish, Chloe; Shotter, James; Yackley, Ayla Jean; Dadouch, Sarah (15 December 2024). "Syria is not interested in conflict with Israel, rebel leader suggests". Financial Times. Retrieved 22 December 2024.
85. "Syria's al-Julani vows adherence to 1974 agreement with Israel". Jewish News Syndicate. 17 December 2024. Retrieved 20 December 2024.
86. The Designated Terrorist and the Fight Over the Future of Syria | The Jihadist | FRONTLINE, June 2021, archived from the original on 4 June 2021, retrieved 4 June 2021
87. al-Mustapha, Hamza (2014). The Al-Nusra Front: From Formation to Dissension. Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. p. 7. JSTOR resrep12643. the Jihadist online forums treat the writings of Abdullah Bin Muhammad as the writings of Abu Muhammad al-Julani himself.

Bibliography

• Zelin, Aaron Y. (2022). The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (PDF). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. ISBN 9798985447446.

External links

• Abu Muhammad al-Golani Counter Extremism Project profile

v t e Al-Qaeda
Leadership	Saif al-Adel Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi Sa'ad bin Atef al-Awlaki Ahmad Umar Iyad Ag Ghaly Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil Abu Ubaidah Youssef al-Annabi Ali Sayyid Muhamed Mustafa al-Bakri Ibrahim al-Banna Ibrahim al Qosi Abu Walid al-Masri Mohammed Showqi Al-Islambouli Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir Fuad Qalaf Jehad Mostafa Abu Humam al-Shami Sami al-Oraydi
Former leadership	Killed Osama bin Laden (killing) Ayman al-Zawahiri (killing) Mohammed Atef Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil Haitham al-Yemeni Abu Hamza Rabia Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Omar al-Faruq Haitham al-Badri Abu Yaqub al-Masri Abu Talha al-Sudani Abu Laith al-Libi Abu Sulayman Al-Jazairi Midhat Mursi Mohamed Moumou Khalid Habib Abu Ghadiya Abu Zubair al-Masri Rashid Rauf Mohammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan Saad bin Laden Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan Abdullah Said al Libi Saleh al-Somali Saeed al-Masri Hamza al-Jawfi Ahmed Mohammed Hamed Ali Mohamed Abul-Khair Sheikh Fateh Huthaifa al-Batawi Ilyas Kashmiri Fazul Abdullah Mohammed Atiyah Abd al-Rahman Anwar al-Awlaki Samir Khan Tariq al-Dahab Muhammad Sa'id Ali Hasan Fahd al-Quso Abu Yahya al-Libi Hassan Ghul Abu-Zaid al Kuwaiti Said Ali al-Shihri Farman Ali Shinwari Abdelhamid Abou Zeid Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee'aad Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki Said Bahaji Abu Khalid al-Suri Omar Ould Hamaha Ahmed Abdi Godane Abu Yusuf Al-Turki Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah Adam Yahiye Gadahn Harith bin Ghazi al-Nadhari Othman Ahmad Othman al-Ghamdi Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad al-Rubaysh Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi Nasir al-Wuhayshi Muhsin al-Fadhli Abu Khalil al-Madani Matiur Rehman Abu Firas al-Suri Ahmed Refai Taha Mokhtar Belmokhtar Abu Khayr al-Masri Ibrahim al-Asiri Hamza bin Laden Sari Shihab Asim Umar Qasim al-Raymi Abdelmalek Droukdel Khalid al-Aruri Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah Abu Muhsin al-Masri Captured Mamdouh Mahmud Salim Wadih el-Hage Khalid al-Fawwaz Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Walid bin Attash Riduan Isamuddin Ali al-Bahlul Ahmed Ghailani Abu Faraj al-Libbi Mustafa Setmariam Nasar Abdul Hadi al Iraqi Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani Mohamed Atiq Awayd Al Harbi Younis al-Mauritani Sulaiman Abu Ghaith Abu Anas al-Libi Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh Mukhtar Robow Amin al-Haq Other Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri (died) Abu Ubaidah al-Masri (died) Mahfouz Ould al-Walid (left) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (expelled) Abu Mohammad al-Julani (left) Abu Maria al-Qahtani (left) Ahmad Salama Mabruk (left) Abu Omar al-Turkistani (left) Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir (left) Khalid Batarfi (died)
Timeline of attacks	1998 United States embassy bombings 2000 USS Cole bombing 2001 September 11 attacks 2002 Bali bombings 2004 Madrid train bombings 2005 London bombings 2007 Algiers bombings 2008 Islamabad Danish embassy bombing 2008 Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting 2015 Garissa University College attack 2015 Bamako hotel attack 2016 Ouagadougou attacks 2016 Grand-Bassam shootings 2016 Bamako attack 2019 Naval Air Station Pensacola shooting
Wars	Soviet–Afghan War Afghan Civil War (1989–1992) Afghan Civil War (1992–1996) First Chechen War Afghan Civil War (1996–2001) Second Chechen War War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) Iraq War Somali Civil War War in North-West Pakistan (drone strikes) Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present) Syrian civil war Yemeni civil war (2014–present) Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen Houthi insurgency
Affiliates	Al-Shabaab (Somalia) Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (North Africa) Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Egypt) Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (Indian subcontinent) Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Mali) Hurras al-Din (Syria)
Charity organizations	Benevolence International Foundation Al-Haramain Foundation
Media	Al Qaeda Handbook Al Neda As-Sahab Al-Andalus Media Al-Kataib Media Foundation Radio al-Andalus Shahada News Agency Al-Malahem Media Inspire Az-Zallaqa Foundation Fatawā of Osama bin Laden Al-Khansaa Kuala Lumpur al-Qaeda Summit Management of Savagery Voice of Jihad Qaedat al-Jihad Global Islamic Media Front
Video and audio	Videos and audio recordings of Osama bin Laden Videos and audio recordings of Ayman al-Zawahiri USS Cole bombing
Related	Safe houses Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory Timeline
Category:Al-Qaeda

• 1982 births
• Al-Nusra Front members
• Al-Qaeda leaders
• Fugitives wanted by the United States
• Fugitives wanted on terrorism charges
• Individuals designated as terrorists by the United States government
• Leaders of Islamic terror groups
• Living people
• Members of al-Qaeda in Iraq
• People from Riyadh
• Prisoners and detainees of Syria
• Prisoners and detainees of the United States military
• Sunni Islamists
• Tahrir al-Sham
• Syrian al-Qaeda members
• Syrian people imprisoned abroad