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			{{Short description\|Concept in international relations among European countries}}
	'''Western betrayal''' is a popular term in many ]an nations (including ], ], the ], ], ] and the ]) which refers to the ] of several ] during the period from the ] in ] through ] and to the ], as rooted in ] and ].
			{{pp\|small=yes}}
			{{EngvarB\|date=October 2018}}
			]: ] (UK), ] (USA), and ] (USSR)]]
			'''Western betrayal''' is the view that the ], ] and the ] failed to meet their legal, diplomatic, military and moral obligations to the ]ns and ] before, during and after ]. It also sometimes refers to the treatment of other ] and ]an states by those three nations.

			The concept primarily derives from several events, including British and French ] towards ] during its 1938 ] and the perceived failure of Britain and France to adequately assist the Poles during the German ] in 1939. It also derives from concessions made by American and British political leaders to the ] during the ], ], and ] and their limited response during the 1944 ] along with post-war events, which allocated Poland to the ] as part of the ].
	The "betrayal" refers to the claim that the western Allies —in spite of having promoted ] and ], signing ]s and forming ]s during ] — nonetheless betrayed their Central European allies by abandoning these pacts (for example by not preventing ] invading and occupying ]). After World War II, Western powers did nothing to prevent these states from falling under the influence of communism and their wartime ally, the ] (]), which was shortly to become the nemesis of the capitalist bloc led by the United States during the ].

			Historically, such views were intertwined with some of the most significant geopolitical events of the 20th century, including the rise and fall of Nazi Germany, the emergency of the Soviet Union as a dominant ] exerting control over large parts of Europe after ], and various treaties, alliances, and positions during the ]. The view of the "Western betrayal" has been criticized as political scapegoating by Central and Eastern Europeans.
	The concept is disputed by those historians who argue that ] and ] had no option but to accept the demands of their ally ] in ] and later in ]. However, there is certainty that there were some misjudgements of the power of the Soviet Union by elements within the Western powers, much like the case with ] a decade before.

			==Perception of betrayal==
	Other historians suggest that Churchill urged Roosevelt to continue military action in Europe but against the Soviet Union to prevent the USSR extending its control beyond its own borders. Roosevelt apparently trusted Stalin's assurances and declined to support Churchill's intention of ensuring the liberty of all Europe outside the USSR. Without US backing, the exhausted, near bankrupt, and close to starving UK could not take action.

			According to professors Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, Western betrayal is a reference to a sense of historical and moral responsibility for the West's abandonment of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War.<ref name="google"/><ref name="research"/> In Central and Eastern Europe, the interpretation of the outcomes of the ] of 1938 and the ] of 1945 as a betrayal of Central and Eastern Europe by Western powers has been used by Central and Eastern European leaders to put pressure on Western countries to acquiesce to more recent political requests such as membership in ] and ].<ref name="google1"/>
	==Diplomacy and Central Europe between the wars==
	Starting in ], it was the policy of France to construct a '']'' (quarantine line) in ] that was designed to contain both the Germans and Soviets and their ideologies, which were metaphorically compared to diseases. The crushing of ]'s ] in 1919 by the combined forces of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and France was an early example of an enforcement of the ''cordon sanitaire''. In ], France signed a defensive alliance with Poland committing both states to come to each other's aid in the event of one of the powers being attacked by another European power. In ], the French signed a similar defensive alliance with Czechoslovakia, in ] with ] and in ] with ].

			In a few cases deliberate duplicity is alleged, whereby secret agreements or intentions are claimed to have existed in conflict with understandings given publicly. An example is British Prime Minister ]'s covert concordance with the ], in which he stated that the ] did not apply to the ]. Given the strategic requirements of winning the war, retired American diplomat Charles G. Stefan argued Churchill and U.S. President ] had no option but to accept the demands of their erstwhile ally, ] ], at the Tehran, Yalta, and ] conferences.<ref name="unc"/>
	In 1925, the French signed new treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which tightened the levels of military co-operation between the signatory states. In addition, the French tried to turn the ] of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia which had been set up as an ] alliance in 1921 into an anti-German alliance. In 1921, Poland and Romania signed a ]. This was as close as Poland came to joining the Little Entente. The French would have preferred to also see Poland a member, but antagonism between Czechoslovakia and Poland doomed the idea.

			There was also a lack of military or political support for the ] rebels during the ] in 1953, during the ],<ref name="ALLIANCES: How to Help Hungary"/> and during the ] in 1968 (the so-called "]"). According to Ilya Prizel, the "preoccupation with their historical sense of 'damaged self' fueled resentment" towards the West generally and reinforced the western betrayal concept in particular.<ref name="google7"/> ] argues that damage to central European national psyches left by the Western "betrayal" at Yalta and Munich remained a "psychological event" or "psychiatric issue" during debates over ] expansion.<ref name="google8"/>
	Beyond the Covenant of the ], Britain had no defence commitments in Eastern Europe in the 1920s and made clear that they wanted to keep it that way. In ], the British Foreign Secretary, Sir ] had stated in public that the ] was "not worth the bones of a single British grenadier".<ref name="Rothstein">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =Andrew Rothstein \| title =The Soldiers' Strikes of 1919 \| year =1980 \| editor = \| pages =35 \| publisher =Macmillan Publishing \| location =Basingstoke \| id =ISBN 0333276930 \| url= http://books.google.com/books?id=wDQaAAAAMAAJ&vid=ISBN0333276930&dq=The+Soldiers'+Strikes&q=&pgis=1#search }}</ref><ref name="Harris">] used the same phrase in 1945 and the historian Frederick Taylor on page 432 in ''Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945'' mentions that it was a deliberate echo of a famous sentence used by ] "The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier."</ref>

			===Criticism of the concept===
	In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). In ] and again in ], Poland signed a 10 year non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Also in 1932, the Soviets signed 10-year non-aggression pacts with ], ] and ]. In January 1934, Germany and Poland signed a 10-year non-aggression pact. In 1935, the Soviets signed treaties of alliance with France and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty committed the Soviets to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if attacked by a neighbor provided France did first.

			] stated that he did not think "betrayal is the appropriate word" regarding the Allies' role in the ].<ref name="Poles mark 1944 Warsaw uprising"/> While complaints of "betrayal" are common in politics generally,<ref name="harpers"/> the idea of a western betrayal can also be seen as a political scapegoat in both Central and Eastern Europe<ref name="contemporary"/>{{verify source\|date=June 2012}} and a partisan electioneering phrase among the former ].<ref name="google10"/> Historian ] maintains betrayal myths were used in part by those opposing US membership in the ].<ref name="google10"/>{{verify source\|date=June 2012}} The word "Yalta" came to stand for the appeasement of ] and abandonment of freedom.<ref name="google11"/>
	In November 1933, there were rumours in Paris that a "preventive war" option against Germany was being considered by the French, Belgian and Polish governments. The British historian ] claimed later that the Poles had proposed a preventive war to the French at this time, but the French declined the offer. However, there is no evidence in the French, Belgian or Polish archives that a "preventive war" was considered in 1933.

	==Croatia==
	During the final days of the war, large numbers of refugees from Nazi-abandoned ] and ] were fleeing from the Red Army and ]'s partisans.

	In ], British troops gathered these thousands of refugees in Austria including ], ], Croatian and ]n troops, and civilians. The Croatian citizens were turned over to Slovenia, where in many cases ]. In the ] at Linz, Cossacks including women and children were delivered to the Soviet Union, for a similar fate.

	==Czechoslovakia==		==Czechoslovakia==
	''See also: ~~] and later sections''~~		{{See also\|German occupation of Czechoslovakia}}
	] showing Western powers giving Hitler Czechoslovakia on a dish. Inscription in the flag in Russian: "To the East!"]]
	The term Western betrayal ({{lang-cz\|zrada Západu}}) was coined after the ] (1938) when ] was forced to cede part of its area (]) to ]. Czech politicians joined the newspapers in regularly using the term and it, along with the associated feelings, became a stereotype among ]. The Czech terms ''Mnichov'' (]), ''Mnichovská zrada'' (''Munich betrayal'') and ''zrada spojenců'' (''betrayal of the allies'') were coined at the same time and have the same meaning.

			===Munich Conference===
	During World War II, Czech propagandists from the ] (], for example) employed the term to justify collaboration with Nazi Germany.{{Fact\|date=February 2007}}
			The term ''Betrayal of the West'' ({{langx\|cs\|zrada Západu}}, {{langx\|sk\|zrada Západu}}) was coined after the 1938 ] when Czechoslovakia was forced to cede the mostly German-populated ] to Germany. The region contained the ] and means of viable defence against German invasion.<ref name="vscht"/><ref name="encyklopedia"/><ref name="World War II: A Political, Social, and Military History"/> Poland would take ] from Czechoslovakia, while the ] returned territories to Hungary. The next year, by the proclamation of the ], Czechoslovakia was dissolved, the next day the remainder of ] was occupied and annexed by Hungary, while the next day Germany occupied the remaining ] and proclaimed the ].

			Along with Italy and Nazi Germany, the Munich treaty was signed by Britain and France, both allied ot Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was allied by treaty with France so it would be obliged to help Czechoslovakia if it was attacked.<ref>Text in League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 23, pp. 164–169.</ref> Czech politicians joined the newspapers in regularly using the term ''Western betrayal'' and it, along with the associated feelings, became a stereotype among ]. The Czech terms ''Mnichov'' (Munich), ''Mnichovská zrada'' (''Munich betrayal''), ''Mnichovský diktát'' (''Munich Dictate''), and ''zrada spojenců'' (''betrayal of the allies'') were coined at the same time and have the same meaning. Poet ] published a poem with verse about "ringing bell of betrayal".<ref name="rozhoupaly"/>
	During the post-war 1946 parliamentary campaign, the ] argued (with much success) that the historical unreliability of Western allies must be countered by closer relations with the ].{{Fact\|date=February 2007}}

			Then ] for ], ] said: "Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonour. They chose dishonour. They will have war".<ref name="Scraps of paper: the disarmament treaties between the world wars"/>
	], the Jews, Masons, Soviet Russia, the entire world has betrayed us'']]
	After the Communist Party assumed all power in Czechoslovakia in ], the betrayal was frequently referenced in propaganda. This interpretation of history was official and the only one allowed.

			===Prague uprising===
	After the Communist Party lost its power in the ] ], official use of the term stopped and historians began to discuss the events. Occasionally, the media pick up such discussions.
			{{see also\|Prague uprising}}

			On 5 May 1945, the citizens of ] learned of the American invasion of Czechoslovakia by the US Third Army and revolted against German occupation. In four days of street fighting, thousands of Czechs were killed. Tactical conditions were favourable for an American advance, and General ], in command of the army, requested permission to continue eastward to the ] river in order to aid the Czech partisans fighting in Prague. This was denied by General ], who was disinclined to accept American casualties or risk antagonising the Soviet Union. As a result, Prague was liberated on 9 May by the Red Army, significantly increasing the standing of the ]. According to a British diplomat, this was the moment that "Czechoslovakia was now definitely lost to the West."<ref>{{cite book \|last1=Olson \|first1=Lynne \|title=Last Hope Island: Britain, Occupied Europe, and the Brotherhood That Helped Turn the Tide of War \|date=2018 \|publisher=Random House Publishing Group \|isbn=9780812987164 \|page=429 \|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-xVHDwAAQBAJ \|language=en}}</ref>
	Attempts to add yet another meaning to the term, namely the inability or unwillingness of Western powers to keep Czechoslovakia out of the ], failed to gain widespread acceptance among Czechs. Truth is, that Czechoslovakia has been betrayed by France (and England), and its citizens remember it. Winston Churchil himself said: "Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonor. They chose dishonor. They will have war."

	==Poland==		==Poland==
	=== First World War aftermath ===
	After the ], Poland regained independence after ]. While the victorious Western allies proclaimed their support for an independent Poland, they primarily wanted to weaken ] and the Soviet Union.{{Fact\|date=February 2007}} As a result, their actual support was limited. One instance was the affair of ]. Many French and British politicians desired the industrial region of Silesia to remain part of Germany, so that Germany would have an easier time paying the Great War reparations to France and its allies. Britain provided no aid to Poland during the 1921 ]. Under the terms of the ], a ] was to be held to determine which areas of ethnically mixed Silesia were to be ceded to Poland and which were to remain with Germany. In some districts of Upper Silesia, the majority of the people were Polish and opted for Poland; the majority in the rest of Upper Silesia opted for Germany. After the plebiscite, the Germans balked at handing over any part of Upper Silesia, claiming that the Versailles treaty did not call for partitioning Silesia by districts. The German interpretation was that the majority of people in Silesia had chosen Germany and so all of Silesia should remain with Germany. The German view was supported by Britain. In fact, Versailles did clearly state that Upper Silesia was to be partitioned by districts after the plebiscite.<ref name="Butler">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =various authors \| coauthors = \| title =Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939 \| year =1961 (1974) \| editor =], J.P.T. Bury, M.E. Lambert \| pages = \| chapter =Upper Silesia, Poland, and the Baltic States, January 1920–March 1921 <333\| chapterurl = \| series=1st \| volume=XI \| publisher =] \| location =London \| id =ISBN 0-11-591511-7 \| url = \| format = \| accessdate = }}</ref><ref name="Jędruszczak">{{pl icon}} {{cite book \| author =] \| title =Plebiscyt i trzecie powstanie śląskie \| series = Historia Polski \| volume = IV \| year =1984 \| editor = \| pages = \| publisher =] \| location =Warsaw \| id =ISBN 83-01-003865-9 }}</ref>

			===World War I aftermath===
	However, France and the French military in Silesia generally took a pro-Polish stance during the 1921 Polish uprising. In the years immediately after World War One, it was French policy to weaken Germany as much as possible, and though the French did not champion the border that the Poles wanted in Silesia, the French attitude to the Polish cause in regard to the Silesian dispute was markedly pro-Polish and anti-German. Indeed, it was a ultimatum from ] that compelled the Germans to withdraw their forces from Silesia in June 1921.

			In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complex set of alliances was established among the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or the Soviet Union). With the rise of Nazism in Germany, this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between France, Britain, and Poland (]). This agreement with France stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilise and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked.<ref name="Ajnenkiel"/><ref name="Ciałowicz"/><ref name="Raczyński"/> The ] stated that in the event of hostilities with a European power, the other contracting party would give "all the support and assistance in its power."<ref>{{cite web \|title=ANGLO-POLISH AGREEMENT. \|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-078.html \|website=www.ibiblio.org}}</ref>
	Ostensibly, the British view that all of Silesia ought to remain with Germany was based on the belief that it would allow Germany to more easily pay reparations to France; by 1921, London had largely abandoned any claims against Germany and was strongly pressuring both France and Belgium to lower their reparations claims against the Germans as much as possible. The British argument about reparations was mostly a bid to influence French public opinion; the real reason for London's pro-German stance was the belief that if Germany were to lose too much territory, this could undermine the fragile ] and lead to extremists taking power in Germany. Thus, British policy towards Silesia in 1921 was largely motivated by the desire to consolidate German democracy. Though the British were prepared to support an interpretation of Versailles that violated both its letter and its spirit, and though the Poles were understandably angry with London’s pro-German view in this matter, it is very hard to refer to British refusal to support the Polish rebels in Silesia as a “betrayal” as Britain had never made any commitments to do so.

			According to Krzysztof Źwikliński, additionally representatives of the Western powers made several military promises to Poland, including designs as those made by British General ] in his July 1939 talks with Marshall Rydz-Śmigły who promised an attack from the direction of ], or placing a British ] in the Baltic.<ref name="krzysztof"/> However, the Anglo-Polish alliance did not make that commitment, and the British commitment to France was for four divisions in Europe within 30 days of the outbreak of war, which was met.<ref>{{cite book \|last1=Bond \|first1=Brian \|title=The Battle for France & Flanders Sixty Years On \|date=2001 \|publisher=Pen and Sword \|isbn=978-0-85052-811-4}}</ref>
	During the ] (]-]), there was a debate among western politicians which side they should support: the ] (representing the former ] loyalists), the new ] revolutionaries, or newly independent countries trying to expand their territory at the expense of the powers that lost the First World War. Eventually, France and Britain decided to support the White Russians and Poland; however, their support to Poland was limited to the few hundred soldiers of the ]. Further, when it seemed likely in early 1920 that Poland would lose the war (which did not happen), Western diplomats encouraged Poland to surrender and settle for large territorial losses (the ]).

			===Beginning of World War II, 1939===
	In July 1920, Britain announced it would send huge quantities of World War One surplus military supplies to Poland, but a threatened general strike by the ] who objected to British support of "White Poland" ensured that none of the weapons that were supposed to go to Poland went any further than British ports. The British ] ] had never been enthusiastic about supporting the Poles, and had been pressured by his more right-wing Cabinet members such as ] and Winston Churchill into offering the supplies. The threatened general strike was for Lloyd George a convenient excuse for backing out of his commitments. The French were hampered in their efforts to supply Poland by the refusal of ] (modern ], Poland) dockworkers to unload supplies for Poland. Likewise, French efforts to supply Poland via land were hindered by the refusal of Czechoslovakia and Germany (both which had border disputes with Poland) to allow arms for Poland to cross their frontiers.

			On the eve of the Second World War, the Polish government tried to buy as much armaments as it could and was asking for arms loans from Britain and France. As a result of that in the summer of 1939 Poland placed orders for 160 French ] fighters, and for 111 British airplanes (100 light bombers ], 10 ], and 1 ]).<ref name="Wojciech Mazur">{{cite journal \|last1=Mazur \|first1=Wojciech \|title=Pomocnik Historyczny \|journal=Polityka \|date=March 2009 \|volume=3/2009 \|pages=103}}</ref> Although some of these planes had been shipped to Poland before 1 September 1939, none took part in combat. Shipments were interrupted due to the outbreak of war. The total amount of the loan from British government was also much smaller than asked for. Britain agreed to lend 8 million pounds, but Poland was asking for 60 million.<ref>{{cite journal \|last1=Wojciech \|first1=Mazur \|title=Dozbrojenie last minute \|journal=Polityka \|date=n.d. \|volume=3/2009 \|issue=3/2009 \|page=103}}</ref>
	In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). With the rise of ] in Germany, this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between ], ], and ] (] and ]). This agreement stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked<ref name="Ajnenkiel">{{pl icon}} {{cite book \| author =] \| title =Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy \| year =2000 \| editor = \| pages = \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =] \| location =Warsaw \| id = \| url = \| format = \| accessdate = }}</ref><ref name="Ciałowicz">{{pl icon}} {{cite book \| author =Jan Ciałowicz \| coauthors = \| title =Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy, 1921–1939 \| year =1971 \| editor = \| pages = \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =] \| location =Warsaw \| id = }}</ref><ref name="Raczyński">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =Count ] \| title =The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning \| year =1948 \| editor = \| pages = \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =The Mellville Press \| location =London \| id = }}</ref>

			Upon the ] by Nazi Germany in September 1939, after giving Germany an ultimatum on 1 September, Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September, and a British ] was initiated. ] was appointed commander of the ], and placed under the command of French ] of the North-eastern Theatre of Operations, as agreed before the war. On 4 September, an ] raid against ] was conducted, and the BEF began its shipment to France.
	===Up to 1939===
	====Diplomacy====
	In the years following the end of ] and the ], Poland had signed alliances with many ]an powers. The most important were the military alliance with ] signed on ], ] and the defensive alliance with ] of ], ]. The alliance with France was a major factor in Polish inter-war foreign relations, and was seen as the main warrant of peace in ]; Poland's military doctrine was heavily influenced by this alliance as well.

			The German forces reached Warsaw on 8 September, and on 14 September, Marshal ] ordered Polish forces to withdraw to the ]. On 17 September, the Soviet Union invaded Poland, and Polish Army in the field was effectively defeated before the divisions of the BEF could arrive in France. The first two BEF divisions, which took their place in the French line and change of command, on 3 October, and two further BEF divisions took their place in the French line on 12 October.
	As ] was nearing, both governments started to look for a renewal of the bilateral promises. This was accomplished in May ], when general ] signed a secret protocol (later ratified by both governments) to the ] with general ]. It was agreed that France would grant her eastern ally a military credit ''as soon as possible''. In case of war with Germany, France promised to start minor land and air military operations at once, and to start a major offensive ''(with the majority of its forces)'' not later than 15 days after the ].

			France had committed to undertaking a ground offensive within two weeks of the outbreak of war. The French initiated full mobilisation and began the limited ] on 7 September, sending 40 divisions into the region. The French assault was slowed down by out-dated doctrines, minefields, and the French lacked mine detectors. When the French reached artillery range of the ], they found that their shells could not penetrate the German defences. The French decided to regroup an attack on 20 September, but when Poland was invaded by the Soviet Union on 17 September, any further assault was called off.<ref>{{cite web \|last1=Andrew \|first1=Knighton \|title=Did You Know? The French Army Invaded Germany in 1939 To Support The Polish \|url=https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/did-you-know-the-french-army-invaded-germany-in-1939.html?edg-c=1 \|website=War History Online \|date=27 February 2016 \|access-date=2 March 2022}}</ref> Around 13 September, the Polish military envoy to France, general ], upon receiving the text of the message sent by Gamelin, alerted Marshal Śmigły: "I received the message by General Gamelin. Please don't believe a single word in the dispatch".<ref name="krzysztof" />
	On ], ], the government of the ] pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and ] in case of ''other threats.'' The reason for the British-issued “guarantee” of Romania and ] was a panic-stricken ''ad hoc'' reaction to rumours (later proven to be false) of an imminent German descent on Romania in late March 1939. A German seizure of ]-rich Romania would ensure that in any future Anglo-German war, a British naval ] would not starve Germany of oil. From ]’s point of view, it was imperative to keep the oil wells of Romania out of German hands. The British “guarantee” was primarily intended to block a German move against Romania; Poland was added to the “guarantee” almost as an after-thought. Only in April 1939 did it become evident that the next German target was Poland.

			It had been decided that no major air operations against Germany would take place. This was due to French concerns over reprisals on RAF launches from French airfields, against targets in Germany, so most British bomber activity over Germany was the dropping of propaganda leaflets and reconnaissance.<ref>{{cite book \|last1=Ellis \|first1=L. F. \|title=The war in France and Flanders \|date=2004 \|publisher=Naval & Military Press \|location=London \|isbn=978-1-84574-056-6}}</ref> This theme would continue in subsequent ]. Afterwards, French military leader ] issued orders prohibiting Polish military envoys Lieutenant Wojciech Fyda and General Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki from contacting him.<ref name="krzysztof" /> In his post-war diaries, General Edmund Ironside, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, commented on French promises: "The French had lied to the Poles in saying they are going to attack. There is no idea of it".<ref>{{cite book \|title=Why air forces fail: the anatomy of defeat\|first1=Robin D. S. \|last1=Higham\|first2=Stephen \|last2=John\|publisher =Harris University Press of Kentucky\|date=2006}}</ref>
	The British “guarantee” of Poland was only of Polish independence, and pointly excluded Polish territorial integrity. “The reasons for the guarantee policy are nowhere more clearly stated than in a memorandum by the Foreign Office, composed in the summer of 1939, which submitted that it was essential to prevent Hitler from “expanding easterwards, and obtaining control of the resources of Central and Eastern Europe,” which would enable him “to turn upon the Western countries with overwhelming force. ””.<ref name="Borsody">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =] \| title =The New Central Europe \| year =1994 \| pages = \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =] \| location =New York \| id =ISBN 1-882785-03-7 \| url =http://www.hungarian-history.hu/lib/newce/ }}</ref> The basic goal of British foreign policy between 1919-1939 was to prevent another world war by a mixture of “carrot and stick”. The “stick” in this case was the “guarantee” of March 1939, which was intended to prevent Germany from attacking either Poland or Romania. At the same time, the Prime Minister ] and his Foreign Secretary ] hoped to offer a “carrot” to ] in the form of another ] type deal that would see the ] (modern Gdańsk, Poland) and the Polish Corridor returned to Germany in exchange for a promise by Hitler to leave the rest of Poland alone. {{Fact\|date=February 2007}}

			On 17 September 1939 the Soviet Union ], as agreed in advance with Germany following the signing of the ]. Britain and France did not take any ] in response to the Soviet invasion.<ref>{{cite book \|ref=Reference-Prazmowska \|author-link=Anita Prazmowska \|last=Prazmowska \|first=Anita J. \|year=1995 \|title=Britain and Poland 1939–1943: The Betrayed Ally \|location=Cambridge \| publisher=Cambridge University Press \|isbn=0-521-48385-9\|pages=44–45}}</ref><ref>{{cite book\|ref=Reference-Hiden-Lane \|title=The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War\| publisher=] \|year=2003 \|first1=John \|last1=Hiden \|first2=Thomas \|last2 = Lane \|isbn=978-0-521-53120-7}}
	This declaration was further amended in April, when Poland's minister of foreign affairs Colonel ] met with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. In the aftermath of the talks, a mutual assistance treaty was signed. On ] the ] was signed as an annex to Polish-French alliance. Like the “guarantee” of March 30, the Anglo-Polish alliance committed Britain only to the defence of Polish independence. It was clearly aimed against German aggression. In case of war, United Kingdom was to start hostilities as soon as possible; initially helping Poland with air raids against the German war industry, and joining the struggle on land as soon as the ] arrived in France. In addition, a military credit was granted and armament was to reach Polish or Romanian ports in ''early autumn.''
			* {{Citation \| last = Hill \| first = Alexander \| title = The Red Army and the Second World War \| publisher = Cambridge University Press \| year = 2017 \| isbn = 978-1-107-02079-5\|page=148}}</ref> However, the terms of the Anglo-Polish alliance specifically applied to invasion from Germany only.

			France and Britain were unable to launch a successful land attack on Germany in September 1939, and Poland was overcome by both the Germans and Soviets on 6 October, with the last Polish units capitulating that day following the ].<ref>{{cite book\|title=Panzers at War 1939-1942\|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zzBForupwBoC&pg=PT67\|publisher=Coda Books Ltd\|isbn=978-1-908538-24-6\|page=67}}</ref> However, even by the end of October, the still-forming British Expeditionary Force totaled only 4 divisions compared to the 25 German divisions in Western Germany, making a British invasion of Germany unlikely to succeed.<ref>{{Cite web\|url=https://www.ww2-weapons.com/german-orders-of-battle-for-september-1-1939/\|title = German Orders of Battle for September 1, 1939\|date = 24 August 2020}}</ref>
	However, both British and French governments had other plans than fulfilling the treaties with Poland. On ], ], a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that ''the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning.'' Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on ], but ] postponed the signing until ], ].

			===Tehran, 1943===
	At the same time secret German-Soviet talks were held in ] which resulted in signing of the ] on ]. The full text of the treaty, including the secret protocol assuming a partition of Poland and Soviet military help to Germany in case of war, was known to the British government thanks to ], an American informer in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, Poland's government was not informed of this fact either.<ref name="Bohlen">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =] \| title =Witness to history, 1929-1969 \| year =1973 \| editor = \| pages =562 \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =Norton \| location = \| id =ISBN 978-0393074765 }}</ref>

			In November 1943, the ] (the USSR, US, and UK) met at the ]. President Roosevelt and PM Churchill officially agreed that the eastern borders of Poland would roughly follow the ].<ref name="The origins of the 'Teheran formula' on Polish frontiers"/> The Polish government-in-exile was not a party to this decision made in secret.<ref name="www"/><ref name="wajszczuk"/> The resulting loss of the ], or "eastern territories", approximately 48% of Poland's pre-war territory, to the Soviet Union was seen by the London Poles in exile as another "betrayal" by their Western "Allies".<ref name="google2"/> However, it was no secret to the Allies that before his death in July 1943 General ], Prime Minister of Poland's London-based government in exile had been the originator, and not Stalin, of the concept of a westward shift of Poland's boundaries along an ] as compensation for relinquishing Poland's eastern territories as part of a Polish rapprochement with the USSR.<ref name="Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943"/> ], who was Sikorski's special political advisor at the time, was also in agreement with Sikorski's concept of Poland's realigned post-war borders, later in his memoirs Retinger wrote: "At the Tehran Conference, in November 1943, the Big Three agreed that Poland should receive territorial compensation in the West, at Germany's expense, for the land it was to lose to Russia in Central and Eastern Europe. This seemed like a fair bargain."<ref name="Joseph Retinger: Memoirs of an Eminence Grise"/>
	====The Phony War====
	{{main\|Phony War\|Invasion of Poland (1939)}}

			Churchill told Stalin he could settle the issue with the Poles once a decision was made in Tehran,<ref name="google3"/> however he never consulted the Polish leadership.<ref name="google4"/> When the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile ] attended the ], he was convinced he was coming to discuss borders that were still disputed, while Stalin believed everything had already been settled. This was the principal reason for the failure of the Polish Prime Minister's mission to Moscow.{{Citation needed\|reason=Stalin and Molotv wanted the Lublin Poles, and never intended to negotiate anything with Mikołajczyk\|date=January 2015}} The Polish premier allegedly begged for inclusion of ] and ] in the new Polish borders, but got the following reply from ]: "There is no use discussing that; it was all settled in Tehran."<ref name="time"/>
	Germany invaded Poland on ], ], Britain and France declared war on Germany after ultimatums to withdraw expired on ]. However, some other items of the March 30 guarantee pledge were violated; most notably the failure to respond with an overland invasion from the West. The pledge would not have obliged France and Great Britain to declare war on the Soviet Union due to the actual wording of the pact that specifically named Germany as the potential aggressor. This was kept secret for diplomatic reasons. Great Britain and France enforced a naval ] on Germany and seized German ships starting with the declaration of war.

			===Warsaw Uprising, 1944===
	], head of the ]]]
			{{main article\|Lack of outside support during the Warsaw Uprising}}
	According to the ], the French Army was to start preparations for the major offensive three days after the mobilisation started. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the ] and to probe the German defences. On the 15th day of the mobilisation (that is on ]), the French Army was to start a full scale assault on Germany. The pre-emptive mobilisation was started in France on ], and on ], the full mobilisation was declared. A French offensive in the ] valley area (]) started on ]. Eleven French divisions (out of 102 being mobilized) advanced along a 32 km line near ] with negligible German opposition. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-] German territory. At the same time Great Britain, who promised to start air-raids on German industry as soon as possible, conducted a number of air raids against the German ] on ] ], losing 2 ] and 5 ] bombers in the action.<ref> WWII timeline for 1939</ref><ref> German ''Chronik des Seekriegs''</ref> During those first days of the war ] ] night bombers also ] on German cities, taking great care to ensure that the leaflets were not dropped tied together so that they would cause no casualties on the ground. On ], the leaflet raids were halted.
			].]]
			Since the establishment of the Polish government-in-exile in Paris and then in London, the military commanders of the Polish army were focusing most of their efforts on preparation of a future all-national uprising against Germany. Finally the plans for ] were prepared and on 1 August 1944, the ] started. The Uprising was an armed struggle by the Polish ] to liberate Warsaw from German occupation and Nazi rule.

			Despite the fact that Polish and later ] (RAF) planes flew missions over Warsaw dropping supplies from 4 August on, the ] (USAAF) planes did not join the operation. The Allies specifically requested the use of Red Army airfields near Warsaw on 20 August but were refused by Stalin on 22 August (he referred to the insurrectionists as "a handful of criminals"). After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt on 25 August and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to "see what happens". Roosevelt replied on 26 August that "I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe."<ref name="CNN.com"/> The commander of the British air drop, Air Marshal Sir ], later stated, "How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible statesman could trust the Russian Communist further than he could kick him, passes the comprehension of ordinary men."
	Both the pre-war reports of the Polish intelligence and the post-war testimonies of German generals (most notably of ] and ]) reported that there was an equivalent of less than 20 divisions facing France in 1939, as compared to roughly 90 French divisions. Eleven of them were under-manned infantry divisions, mostly stripped of all heavy equipment, while the rest was composed mainly of second-line troops, ] and border guards. Similarly, most of the ] and all armoured units were then in Poland while the ] was severely under-manned and far from completed. Knowing all of the above, the Allied commanders expected that the French offensive would quickly break the German lines and force the ] to withdraw a large part of its forces fighting on Polish soil back to German western frontier. This would force Germany to fight a costly two-front war.

			===Yalta, 1945===
	The French assault was to be carried out by roughly 40 divisions, including one armoured division, three mechanized divisions, 78 artillery regiments and 40 tank battalions. All the necessary forces were mobilised in the first week of September. On ], the ] gathered for the first time at ] in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. By then, the French divisions have advanced approximately eight kilometres into Germany on a 24 kilometres long strip of the frontier in the ] area. ] ordered his troops to stop ''not closer than 1 kilometre'' from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed marshal ] that half of his divisions are in contact with the enemy, and that French advances have forced the ] to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The following day, the commander of the ], General ], informed the Polish Chief of Staff, General ], that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from ] to ]. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the ]. The ] started.
			{{See also\|Yalta Conference}}
			The Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945) acknowledged the era of Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe, subsequent to the Soviet occupation of these lands as they advanced against Nazi Germany. This domination lasted until the ] and the ] and left bitter memories of Western betrayal and Soviet dominance in the collective memory of the region.<ref name="dash.harvard.edu"/> To many ], the Yalta conference "constituted a betrayal" of Poland and the ].<ref name="The Republican Party and Yalta: partisan exploitation of the Polish American concern over the conference, 1945–1960"/> "After World War II," remarked ], "many countries in the (center and) east suffered half a century under the shadow of Yalta."<ref name="dash.harvard.edu"/> Territories which the Soviet Union had occupied during World War II in 1939 (with the exception of the ] area) were permanently annexed, and most of their Polish inhabitants expelled: today these territories are part of ], ], and ]. The factual basis of this decision was the result of a forged referendum from November 1939 in which the "huge majority" of voters accepted the incorporation of these lands into western Belarus and western Ukraine. In compensation, Poland was given former German territory (the so-called ]): the southern half of ] and all of ] and ], up to the ]. The German population of these territories ] and these territories were subsequently repopulated with Poles including ] from the ] regions. This, along with other similar migrations in Central and Eastern Europe, combined to form ]. Stalin ordered Polish resistance fighters to be either incarcerated or deported to ]s in Siberia.

			At the time of Yalta over 200,000 troops of the ] were serving under the high command of the British Army. Many of these men and women were originally from the ] region of eastern Poland including cities such as ] and ]. They had been deported from Kresy to the Soviet gulags when Hitler and Stalin occupied Poland in 1939 in accordance with the ]. Two years later, when Churchill and Stalin formed an alliance against Hitler, the Kresy Poles were released from the Gulags in Siberia, formed the ], and marched to ] to create the ] under British high command. These Polish troops contributed to the Allied defeat of the Germans in North Africa and Italy, and hoped to return to Kresy in an independent and democratic Poland at the end of the War. But at Yalta, the borders agreed in Tehran in 1943 were finalized meaning that Stalin would keep the Soviet gains Hitler agreed to in the Nazi–Soviet Pact, including Kresy, and carry out ]. These transfers included the land Poland gained at Tehran in the West, at the expense of Germany. Consequently, at Yalta, it was agreed that tens of thousands of veteran Polish troops under British command should lose their Kresy homes to the Soviet Union.<ref name="pbs"/> In reaction, thirty officers and men from the II Corps committed suicide.<ref name="pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003"/>
	The Allied attitude towards Poland in 1939 has been a subject of an ongoing dispute among ] ever since. Some historians argue that if only France had pursued the offensive agreed on in the treaties, it would have definitely been able to break through the unfinished Siegfried Line and force Germany to fight a costly two-front war that it was in no position to win. At the same time, others argue that France and Britain had promised more than they would deliver — especially when confronted with the option to declare war on the ] for violating Poland's territory on ], ] the way they had on Germany on ], ] — and that the French army was superior to the ] in numbers only. It lacked the ]s, ]s, and offensive spirit necessary to attack Germany. Also, while the bulk of Luftwaffe was engaged in Poland, neither the French airforce nor the British ] engaged in any operations against Germany beyond the leaflet droppings.

			Churchill defended his actions in a three-day Parliamentary debate starting 27 February 1945, which ended in a ]. During the debate, many MPs openly criticised Churchill and passionately voiced loyalty to Britain's Polish allies and expressed deep reservations about Yalta.<ref name="pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003"/> Moreover, 25 of these MPs risked their careers to draft an amendment protesting against Britain's tacit acceptance of Poland's domination by the Soviet Union. These members included ], ], Commander ], the ], and ].<ref name="pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003"/> After the failure of the amendment, ], the ] for ], resigned his seat in protest at the British treatment of Poland.<ref name="pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003"/>
	It is unlikely, given Soviet ] of opportunistic war that they would have carried on with invasion of Poland fulfilling their promises given to Germans. {{Fact\|date=February 2007}} Through Germans asked Russians to invade Poland on ] no such action took place till ], ]. This is partly due to ] waiting for a proof of Poland's collapse as well as lack of military involvement on the part of the Allies {{Fact\|date=March 2007}}.

			Before the Second World War ended, the Soviets installed a pro-Soviet regime. Although President Roosevelt "insisted on free and unfettered" elections in Poland, ] instead managed to deliver an election fair by "Soviet standards."<ref name="daastol"/> As many as half a million Polish soldiers refused to return to Poland,<ref name="acu"/> because of the ], the ], and other executions of pro-democracy Poles, particularly the so-called ], former members of the ]. The result was the ],<ref name="legislation"/> Britain's first mass immigration law.
	The problem with Polish expectations was that the French and British commitments greatly exaggerated their capabilities. Although France promptly declared war, the French mobilization was not complete until early October, by which time Poland had fallen. In Britain where mobilization was more rapid, only 1 in 40 men were mobilized (compared to 1 in 10 in France, and 1 in 20 in Poland), thus providing only a token force against Germany's forces of several million. The presumption that "something could have been done but wasn't" overlooks the basic fact that the West, just like Poland, was ill-equipped to fight Germany even with the majority of German forces engaged in the east. After the war, General Alfred Jodl commented that the Germans survived 1939 "only because approximately 110 French and English divisions in the West, which during the campaign on Poland were facing 25 German divisions, remained completely inactive."

			Yalta was used by ruling communists to underline ] in Poland.<ref name="Sharp"/><ref name="Davies"/> It was easy to argue that Poland was not very important to the West, since Allied leaders sacrificed Polish borders, legal government, and free elections for future peace between the Allies and the Soviet Union.<ref name="Jones"/><ref name="PAC"/><ref name="Sharp_2"/>
	In the end, many Poles believe that although Poland held out for five weeks, three weeks longer than was planned, it received no military aid from its allies, the United Kingdom and France. Additionally Poland never surrendered to either the Germans or Russians. The agreed upon "two week ground response" never materialized, and it is contended that Poland fell to the Nazis and the Soviets as a result. It is uncertain whether the British or French had any real capacity to launch a successful offensive on the German-French border before mid-October 1939. Nevertheless, an offensive within a two week timeframe was what they had promised the Polish government.

			On the other hand, some authors have pointed out that Yalta allowed the Polish communists to win over Polish nationalists by allowing them to realize their goal to annex and resettle formerly German land.<ref>{{cite book\|title=Recovered Territory: A German-Polish Conflict over Land and Culture, 1919-1989\|author=Peter Polak-Springer\|publisher=Berghahn Books}}</ref>
	====Aftermath====
	]

			The ] (]), formed in 1949, was portrayed by Communist propaganda as the breeder of Hitler's posthumous offspring who desired retaliation and wanted to take back from Poland the "]" <ref name="wielkopolska"/> that had been home of more than 8 million Germans. Giving this picture a grain of credibility was that West Germany until 1970 refused to ], and that some West German officials had a tainted Nazi past. For a segment of Polish public opinion, Communist rule was seen as the lesser of the two evils.
	After the hostilities ended, German propaganda tried to win Poles and ensure collaboration by underlining that Poland was abandoned by her allies, and that the only world order that could ensure peaceful and prosperous life for the Poles was the German Reich.{{Fact\|date=February 2007}} These claims were even strengthened by the ] ] signed in ] which was a clear violation of the alliance (both parties agreed not to sign any ] agreements with Germany).

			Defenders of the actions taken by the Western allies maintain that '']'' made it impossible to do anything else, and that they were in no shape to start an utterly un-winnable war with the Soviet Union over the subjugation of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries immediately after the end of World War II. It could be contended that the presence of a double standard with respect to Nazi and Soviet aggression existed in 1939 and 1940, when the Soviets attacked the eastern part of Poland, then the Baltic States, and then Finland, and yet the Western Allies chose not to intervene in those theatres of the war.
	Similar slogans were expressed by the Soviet Union propaganda until ]. The official propaganda in all ] countries stated that Poland was betrayed and the only ally Poland could rely on was ].{{Fact\|date=February 2007}}

			The chief American negotiator at Yalta was ], later accused of being a Soviet spy and convicted of ] himself in his testimony to the ]. This accusation was later corroborated by the ] tapes. In 2001, ], a staff reporter for '']'', identified what he called a "growing consensus that Hiss, indeed, had most likely been a Soviet agent."<ref>{{Cite news\| last = Barron\| first = James\| title =Online, the Hiss Defense Doesn't Rest\| work =The New York Times\| date =August 16, 2001\| url = https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/16/technology/online-the-hiss-defense-doesn-t-rest.html?scp=1&sq=The%20Hiss%20defense%20doesn't%20rest&st=cse\| access-date =August 29, 2009 }}</ref>
	===1940s===
	====Atlantic Charter====
	Soon after the ] had invaded the Soviet Union in ], the Polish ] signed a pact with ]. Although the Poles wanted a declaration that all pacts the USSR had signed with the Nazis were null and void, Stalin refused to consider any suggestion that he surrender the terrority he seized consequent to the ]. It was for Poland that Britain entered the war in the first place and Britain was sympathetic to Polish interests. Britain nonetheless pressured the Poles to withdraw this demand, since, in Churchill's words, "We could not force our new and sorely threatened ally to abandon, even on paper, regions on her frontier which she regarded for generations as vital to her security." The ],(based in London,)conceded but only after Britain agreed to state in writing that all agreements that adjusted Poland's pre-war borders were null and void. The Soviet-Polish agreement was signed on July 30, 1941, and ] formally notified the ] of the arrangements that same day. In response to a parliamentary question about Britain's commitment, however, Eden stated that "The exchange of notes which I have just read to the House does not involve any guarantee of frontiers by His Majesty's Government."

			At the war's end many of these feelings of resentment were capitalised on by the occupying Soviets, who used them to reinforce anti-Western sentiments within Poland. Propaganda was produced by Communists to show the Soviet Union as the Great Liberator, and the West as the Great Traitor. For instance, Moscow's '']'' reported in February 1944 that all Poles who valued Poland's honour and independence were marching with the "Union of Polish Patriots" in the USSR.<ref name="angelfire"/>
	The Poles were more successful in obtaining Soviet agreement to the creation of the ], and obtaining the release of Polish citizens from the ]. Despite the difficulties the Soviet government made, many were freed from confinement and permitted to join the Polish Army formed formally on ], ]. However, after the troops were withdrawn to the ] in March ], Stalin revoked the amnesty and in June and July arrested all Polish diplomats in the USSR.

			===Aborted Yalta agreement enforcement plans===
	Meanwhile, on ], ], Poland's government-in-exile and the Soviet Union signed the ]. It underlined that no territorial changes should be made that would ''not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.'' It was viewed by the Polish government as a warrant of Poland's borders, although it became apparent that some concessions would have to be made.
			{{Further\|Operation Unthinkable}}
			At some point in the spring of 1945, Churchill commissioned a contingency military enforcement operation plan (war on the Soviet Union) to obtain a "square deal for Poland" (]), which resulted in a May 22 report stating unfavorable success odds.<ref name=OpUnthinkable-1/> The report's arguments included geostrategic issues (possible Soviet-Japanese alliance resulting in moving of Japanese troops from continent to Home Islands, threat to Iran and Iraq) and uncertainties concerning land battles in Europe.<ref name=OpUnthinkable-4/>

			==Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia==
	In December 1941, a Conference was held in ] between the USSR and Great Britain. Stalin proposed to base post-war Polish western borders on the ] and demanded that the United Kingdom accept the pre-war western borders of the Soviet Union. ] accepted the demand as he assumed that the border in question was the ] line.{{Fact\|date=February 2007}} However, Stalin apparently meant the 1941 border with Germany. It was soon discovered, but British government decided not to change the document. On ], ], ] notified the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile, ], that the borders of the ] and ] were guaranteed, and that no decision was made regarding the borders of Poland.
			{{Main article\|Percentages agreement}}
			During the ] in 1944, Soviet premier ] and British prime minister ] discussed how to divide various European countries into ].<ref>The American Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, Apr., 1978, p. 368, {{JSTOR\|1862322}}</ref><ref name="Ryan2004">{{cite book\|author=Henry Butterfield Ryan\|title=The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943-1946\|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uRGu4C1FgKsC&q=Percentages+agreement&pg=PA137\|year=2004\|publisher=Cambridge University Press\|isbn=978-0-521-89284-1\|page=137}}</ref><ref name="Roberts2006">{{cite book\|author=Geoffrey Roberts\|title=Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953\|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5GCFUqBRZ-QC&q=Percentages+agreement&pg=PA406\|year=2006\|publisher=Yale University Press\|isbn=0-300-11204-1\|pages=217–218}}</ref> Churchill's account of the incident is that Churchill suggested that the ] should have 90 percent influence in ] and 75 percent in ]; the United Kingdom should have 90 percent in Greece; with a 50–50 share in Hungary and ]. The two foreign ministers, ] and ], negotiated about the percentage shares on October 10 and 11. The result of these discussions was that the percentages of Soviet influence in Bulgaria and, more significantly, Hungary were amended to 80 percent.

			==See also==
	====Katyn and the Soviet pressure====
			*]
	From the very beginning of Polish-Soviet talks in ], the government of Poland was searching for approximately 20,000 Polish officers missing in Russia. Stalin always replied that they either ''must have fled to Mongolia'' or ''are somewhere in Russia, which is a big country and it's easy to get lost here''{{Fact\|date=March 2007}}. In April ] German news agencies reported finding mass graves of Polish soldiers in ]. The Polish government requested the Soviet Union examine the case and at the same time asked the ] for help in verifying the German reports.
			*]
			*'']''
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*]
			*'']'', the slogan "The Americans are coming" expressed the Romanian expectation for an American intervention against the Soviet occupation
			*]
			*'']''

			== Citations ==
	On ], ], Sikorski met with Eden and demanded Allied help in releasing Polish prisoners in the ]s and Soviet prisons. Sikorski also declined the Soviet demand that Poland withdraw their plea to have the Red Cross investigate Katyn. ] refused to help and the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Poland on the following day, arguing that the Polish government was collaborating with ]. Despite Polish pleas for help, the ] and the United Kingdom decided not to put pressure on the USSR.
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			<ref name="krzysztof">Polityka - nr 37 (2469) z dnia 2004-09-11; s. 66-67 Historia / Wrzesień ’39 Krzysztof Źwikliński Tajemnica zamku Vincennes</ref>
			<ref name="legislation"></ref>

			<ref name="OpUnthinkable-1">Operation Unthinkable, report May 22, 1945, page 1 (goals) {{cite web \|url=http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm \|title=1 \|access-date=2015-09-25 \|url-status=dead \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101116160624/http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm \|archive-date=November 16, 2010 }}</ref>
	====Tehran====
			<ref name="OpUnthinkable-4">Operation Unthinkable, report May 22, 1945, page 4 (geostrategic implications) {{cite web \|url=http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm \|title=1 \|access-date=2015-09-25 \|url-status=dead \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101116160624/http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/pages/002.htm \|archive-date=November 16, 2010 }}</ref>
	In November ], the ] (USSR, USA, and UK) met at the ]. Both Roosevelt and Churchill officially agreed that the eastern borders of Poland would roughly follow the Curzon Line. The Polish government was not notified of this decision and the only information given was the press release claiming that ''We await the day, when all nations of the world will live peacefully, free of tyranny, according to their national needs and conscience''. The resulting loss of the "eastern territories," approximately 48% of Poland's pre-war territory, to the Soviet Union is seen by Poles as another "betrayal" by their Western "Allies".
			<ref name="PAC">{{cite book \|author=Polish American Congress\|title=Selected Documents: A Compilation of Selected Resolutions, Declarations, Memorials, Memorandums, Letters, Telegrams, Press Statements, Etc., in Chronological Order, Showing Various Phases of Polish American Congress Activities, 1944-1948\|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x5brwE5vmlwC\|access-date=27 July 2013\|year=1948}}</ref>
			<ref name="pbs">{{Cite web \|url=https://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/about/index.html \|title=''WWII Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and the West''. About {{!}}PBS<!-- Bot generated title --> \|website=] \|access-date=2017-09-18 \|archive-date=2011-10-02 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111002023928/http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/about/index.html \|url-status=dead }}</ref>
			<ref name="Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943">{{cite book \|last=Meiklejohn Terry\|first=Sarah\|title=Poland's Place in Europe: General Sikorski and the Origin of the Oder-Neisse Line, 1939-1943\|year=1992\|publisher=Princeton University Press\|isbn=978-0-691-07643-0\|page=416}}</ref>
			<ref name="Poles mark 1944 Warsaw uprising">{{cite news \|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3943265.stm \|work=BBC News \|title=Poles mark 1944 Warsaw uprising \|date=1 August 2004}}</ref>

			<ref name="pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003">pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003</ref>
	According to many historians, Churchill and Roosevelt promised Stalin to settle the issue with the Poles, however they never sincerely informed the Polish side. When the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile attended the ], he was convinced he was coming to discuss borders that were still disputed, while Stalin believed everything had already been settled. This was the principal reason for the failure of the Polish Prime Minister's mission to Moscow.
			<ref name="Raczyński">{{cite book \|author =Count ] \|title =The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning \|year =1948 \|publisher =The Mellville Press \|location =London}}</ref>
			<ref name="research">{{cite web \|url=http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/projects/cidel/old/sjursen%20why%20expand.pdf \|title=6.Sjursen491-513 \|access-date=2012-11-09 \|archive-date=2012-07-15 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120715103116/http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/projects/cidel/old/sjursen%20why%20expand.pdf \|url-status=dead }}</ref>
			<ref name="rozhoupaly">], ''Torzo naděje'' (1938), poem ''Zpěv úzkosti'', "Zvoní zvoní zrady zvon zrady zvon, Čí ruce ho rozhoupaly, Francie sladká hrdý Albion, a my jsme je milovali"</ref>
			<ref name="Scraps of paper: the disarmament treaties between the world wars">{{cite book \|last=Hyde\|first=Harlow A.\|title=Scraps of paper: the disarmament treaties between the world wars\|year=1988\|publisher=Media Publishing & Marketing \|page=307\|isbn=978-0-939644-46-9}}</ref>
			<ref name="Sharp_2">Sharp, op.cit., p.12</ref>
			<ref name="Sharp">{{cite book \|author=Samuel L. Sharp\|title=Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field\|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xtceAAAAMAAJ\|access-date=27 July 2013\|year=1953\|publisher=Harvard University Press\|page=163\|isbn=9780674422636}}</ref>
			<ref name="The origins of the 'Teheran formula' on Polish frontiers">{{cite journal \|author=Tony Sharp \|year=1977 \|title=The origins of the 'Teheran formula' on Polish frontiers \|journal=] \|volume=12 \|issue=2 \|pages=381–393 \|jstor=260222 \|doi=10.1177/002200947701200209\|s2cid=153577101 }}</ref>
			<ref name="The Republican Party and Yalta: partisan exploitation of the Polish American concern over the conference, 1945–1960">{{cite journal \|author=Athan Theoharis \|year=1971 \|title=The Republican Party and Yalta: partisan exploitation of the Polish American concern over the conference, 1945–1960 \|journal=] \|volume=28 \|issue=1 \|pages=5–19 \|jstor=20147828}}</ref>
			<ref name="time">, '']'', December 25, 1944</ref>
			<ref name="unc"></ref>
			<ref name="vscht">{{Cite web \|url=http://www.vscht.cz/homepage/english/main/services/czechrepublic \|title=ICT - Czech Republic<!-- Bot generated title --> \|access-date=2011-03-30 \|archive-date=2012-09-08 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120908092318/http://www.vscht.cz/homepage/english/main/services/czechrepublic \|url-status=dead }}</ref>
			<ref name="wajszczuk"></ref>
			<ref name="wielkopolska">"Poland under Stalinism", _Poznan in June 1956: A Rebellious City_, The Wielkopolska Museum of the Fight for Independence in Poznan, 2006, p. 5</ref>
			<ref name="World War II: A Political, Social, and Military History">{{cite book \|title=World War II: A Political, Social, and Military History\|author=Spencer Tucker, Priscilla Mary Roberts\|year=2005\|publisher=ABC-CLIO\|isbn=1-57607-999-6}}</ref>
			<ref name="www">{{cite web \|url=http://www.geo.lt/geo/uploads/media/29-44.pdf \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924021740/http://www.geo.lt/geo/uploads/media/29-44.pdf \|archive-date=24 September 2015 \|title=Annales Geographicae.indd \|access-date=2012-11-09 \|url-status=dead }}</ref>
			}}

			== General sources ==
	====Warsaw Uprising====
			{{refbegin}}
	: ''See: ] for more info on the Allied policy towards Poland during the Uprising.''
			*], ''The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939'', New York, 1972.
			*] ''The History of Poland''. Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 2000.
			*Russell D. Buhite ''Decisions at Yalta: an appraisal of summit diplomacy'', Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1986.
			*] "Poland in British and French policy in 1939: determination to fight — or avoid war?" pages 413–433 from ''The Origins of The Second World War'' edited by Patrick Finney, Arnold, London, 1997.
			*Anna M. Cienciala and {{Interlanguage link\|Titus Komarnicki\|pl}} ''From Versailles to Locarno: keys to Polish foreign policy, 1919–25'', Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984.
			*Richard Crampton ''Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century — and After''. London; New York: Routledge, 1997.
			*], ''Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw''. Viking Books, 2004. {{ISBN\|0-670-03284-0}}.
			*Norman Davies, '']'' {{ISBN\|0-231-05353-3}} and {{ISBN\|0-231-05351-7}} (two volumes).
			*David Dutton ''Neville Chamberlain'', London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
			*Sean Greenwood "The Phantom Crisis: Danzig, 1939" pages 247–272 from ''The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: A. J. P. Taylor and the Historians'' edited by Gordon Martel Routledge Inc, London, United Kingdom, 1999.
			*], ''Munich: The Eleventh Hour'', London: Hamilton, 1988.
			*], '']: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People''. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1948. {{ISBN\|1-125-47550-1}}.
			*Igor Lukes & Erik Goldstein (ed.) ''The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II'', London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass Inc, 1999.
			*Margaret Olwen Macmillan ''Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World''. New York: Random House, 2003, 2002, 2001.
			*David Martin, ''Ally Betrayed''. Prentice-Hall, New York, 1946.
			*David Martin, ''Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich''. ], Stanford, California, 1978. {{ISBN\|0-8179-6911-X}}.
			*David Martin, ''The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder''. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, ] & New York, 1990. {{ISBN\|0-15-180704-3}}
			*], ], ''''. Knopf, 2003. {{ISBN\|0-375-41197-6}}.
			*], ''Poland: The Betrayed Ally''. ], ], 1995. {{ISBN\|0-521-48385-9}}.
			*], ''Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland'', New York, 1958, reprint Boulder, CO, 1989.
			*Henry L. Roberts "The Diplomacy of Colonel Beck" pages 579–614 from ''The Diplomats 1919–1939'' edited by ] & ], Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 1953.
			*{{cite book \|author =Wacław Stachiewicz \|author-link =Wacław Stachiewicz \|title =Wierności dochować żołnierskiej \|publisher=Rytm, Warsaw \|year =1998 \|isbn=83-86678-71-2}}
			*Robert Young ''France and the origins of the Second World War'', New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
			*] ''The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926–1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarisation of the Rhineland'', Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
			*Piotr Wandycz ''France and her eastern allies, 1919–1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno'', Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.
			*Gerhard Weinberg ''A world at arms: a global history of World War II'', Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
			*] ''Munich: Prologue to Tragedy'', New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948.
			*Paul E. Zinner "Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Benes". In ] & Felix Gilbert (ed.). ''The Diplomats 1919–1939''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953. pp. 100–122.
			*Republic of Poland, ''The Polish White Book: Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933–1939''; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, New York, 1940.
			*], "Betrayed by the Big Three". '']'', London, November 8, 2003
			*], "How the Allies Betrayed Warsaw". '']'', Toronto, February 7, 2004
			*], "The Great Betrayal". '']'', Tel Aviv, February 23, 2004
			*Piotr Zychowicz, ''Pakt Ribbentrop - Beck''. Dom Wydawniczy Rebis, Poznań 2012. {{ISBN\|978-83-7510-921-4}}
			{{refend}}

			==External links==
	Since the establishment of the ] in Paris and then in London, the military commanders of the Polish army were focusing most of their efforts on preparation of a future all-national uprising against Germany. Finally, the plans for ] were prepared and on ], ] the ] started. The Uprising was an armed struggle by the Polish ] to liberate ] from German occupation and Nazi rule.

	Despite the fact that Polish and later ] (RAF) planes flew missions over Warsaw dropping supplies from ] on, the ] (USAF) planes did not join the operation. The Allies specifically requested the use of Red Army airfields near Warsaw on ] but were refused by Stalin on ] (he referred to the insurgents as 'a handful of criminals'). After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegrammed Roosevelt on ] and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to 'see what happens'. Roosevelt replied on 26 August that ''I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe'' (). The commander of the British air drop, Air Marshal Sir ], later stated, "How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible statesman could trust the Russian Communist further than he could kick him, passes the comprehension of ordinary men."

	Various scholars (including ] in his recently published ''Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw'') argue that during the Warsaw Uprising both the governments of United Kingdom and the United States did little to help the Poland insurgents in their struggle. Also, it is often argued that the Allies put little pressure on Stalin to help the Polish struggle.

	====Yalta====
	: ''See also: ]''.

	In ], Poland's borders were redrawn following the decision made at the ] of ] at the insistence of the Soviet Union. The Polish government was not invited to the talks and was to be notified of their outcome. Polish representatives did present arguments concerning borders at the Potsdam conference, however, and Polish demands for German territory were agreed to. The eastern territories which the Soviet Union had occupied in ] (with the exception of the ] area) were permanently annexed, and most of their Polish inhabitants expelled: today these territories are part of ], ] and ]. The factual basis of this decision was the result of a forged referendum from November ] in which the "huge majority" of voters accepted the incorporation of these lands into Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. In compensation, Poland was given former German territory (the so-called ]): the southern half of ] and all of ] and ], up to the ]. The German population of these territories ] and these territories were subsequently repopulated with ]. This combined with other similar migrations in Central and Eastern Europe to form ]. Stalin ordered Polish resistance fighters to be either incarcerated or deported to ]s in Siberia.

	Many Poles believe that Western leaders tried to force Polish leaders to accept the conditions of Stalin. Some view it as a 'betrayal' of Poland by its Western allies (which can be seen as part of a larger 'betrayal' to 'allow' it to fall entirely into the Soviet sphere of influence). Moreover, it was used by ruling communists to underline anti-Western sentiments.<ref name="Sharp">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =] \| title =Poland, white eagle on a red field \| year =1953 \| editor = \| pages =163 \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =] \| location =Harvard \| id = \| url =http://books.google.com/books?id=xtceAAAAMAAJ&vid=OCLC01457011&dq=Yalta+free+elections+Poland&q=betrayal&pgis=1#search }}</ref><ref name="Davies">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =] \| title =] \| volume = 2 \| year =2005 \| editor = \| pages = \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =] \| location = \| id =ISBN 0-231-12819-3\| url = \| format = \| accessdate = }}</ref> It was easy to argue that Poland was not very important to the West, since Allied leaders sacrificed Polish borders, legal government and free elections.<ref name="Jones">{{en icon}} {{cite book \| author =] \| coauthors = \| title =Crucible of Power: a history of U.S. foreign relations since 1897 \| year =2001 \| editor = \| pages =205-207 \| chapter = \| chapterurl = \| publisher =Rowman & Littlefield \| location = \| id =ISBN 0842029184 \| url =http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0842029184&id=n6Al88smOAUC&pg=PA207&lpg=PA207&ots=ifNDYJ7z_Y&dq=Yalta+free+elections+Poland&sig=6fllW8jCLI-QEifsfDX0XFTZ2Vk#PPA207,M1 \| format = \| accessdate = }}</ref><ref name="PAC">{{en icon}} {{cite journal \| author =various authors \| year =1948 \| month = \| title =A compilation of selected resolutions, declarations, memorials, memorandums,... \| journal =Selected Documents \| volume = \| issue =1244-1248 \| pages =112 \| publisher = ] \| location = Chicago, IL \| id = \| url =http://books.google.com/books?id=x5brwE5vmlwC&vid=OCLC05523398&dq=Yalta+free+elections+Poland&q=AS+A+PARTY+TO+THE+YALTA+AGREEMENT+THAT+CRUSHED&pgis=1#search }}</ref><ref name="Sharp_2">Sharp, op.cit., p.12</ref>

	With this background, even Stalin looked like a better friend of Poland, since he did have strong interests in Poland. The Federal Republic of Germany, formed in 1949, was portrayed by Communist propaganda as the breeder of Hitler's posthumous offspring who desired retaliation and wanted to take back from Poland the "]".<ref>"Poland under Stalinism", _Poznan in June 1956: A Rebellious City_, The Wielkopolska Museum of the Fight for Independence in Poznan, 2006, p. 5</ref> Giving this picture a grain of creditability was the fact that Federal Republic of Germany until 1970 refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line and the fact that many West German officials were alleged to have a tainted Nazi past. Thus, for a segment of Polish public opinion, Communist rule was seen as the lesser of the two evils.

	Defenders of the actions taken by the Western allies maintain that ] made it impossible to do anything else, and that they were in no shape to start an utterly un-winnable war with the Soviet Union over the subjugation of Poland and other ] and ] countries immediately after the end of World War II. Some argue that the actions of the Secretary of State were a result of ignorance rather than Realpolitik.{{Fact\|date=February 2007}} It could be contended that the presence of a double standard with respect to Nazi and Soviet aggression existed in 1939 and 1940, when the Soviets invaded eastern Poland and the Baltic States, respectively, and the Western Allies failed to declare war.

	What the Western allies sacrificed is also disputed. Some argue that Poland's borders had been re-drawn many times in history, the country had not had free elections since ] and throughout the 1930s it had endured increasing political repression under an ] ] government. On the other hand, the Polish government in exile was composed entirely of the pre-war democratic opposition and all political parties of the ] underlined the need to follow the democratic traditions of March ] constitution, rather than the ] ] of ].

	In May ] US President ] admitted that the Soviet domination of central and eastern Europe after World War II was "one of the greatest wrongs of history" and acknowledged that the United States played a significant role in the division of the continent and that the Yalta conference "followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. (...) Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable."

	The chief American negotiator at Yalta was ], later convicted of spying for the Soviets.

	====Aftermath====
	], ] of Polish Government in Exile, was killed in an air crash over ] in July ]. As he was the most prestigious leader of the Polish exiles, his death was a severe setback to the Polish cause, and was certainly highly convenient for Stalin. It was in some ways also convenient for the western Allies, who were finding the Polish issue a stumbling-block in their efforts to preserve good relations with Stalin.

	This has given rise to persistent suggestions that Sikorski's death was not accidental. Many historians speculate that his death might have been effect of Soviet, British or even Polish conspiracy. This has never been proved, and the fact that the principal exponents of this theory in the west have been the ] historians ] and ] has not encouraged many western historians to take it seriously.

	On the other hand by ] only a small part of the British Intelligence documents related to Sikorski's death had been unclassified and made available to Polish historians. The majority of the files will be classified for another "50 to 100 years." It should be noted however that this is a common procedure in the release of most types of official secret documents in the UK.

	In November ], despite his mistrust of the Soviets, Sikorski's successor, Prime Minister ] resigned to return to Poland and take office in the ] established under the auspices of the Soviet occupation authorities. Many of the Polish exiles opposed this action, believing that this government was a facade for the establishment of Communist rule in Poland, a view that was later proved correct; after losing an election which was later shown to have been fraudulent, Mikołajczyk left Poland again in ].

	Meanwhile the government in exile had maintained its existence, but the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew their recognition on ], ]. The Polish armed forces in exile were disbanded in ] and most of their members, unable to return to Communist Poland, settled in other countries. The London Poles had to leave the embassy on Portland Place and were left only with the president's private residence at 43 Eaton Place. The government in exile then became largely symbolic, serving mainly to symbolise the continued resistance to foreign occupation of Poland, and retaining control of some important archives from pre-war Poland. ] and ] were the last countries to recognize the government in exile.

	No representatives of Polish military, veterans of ] and ], were invited to the ] of 1946 - Poles were supposed to attend the ] instead. This was due to the fact that the Victory Parade was solely for the nations of the British Empire and Commonwealth and no other foreign troops were invited.

	At the war's end many of these feelings of resentment were capitalized on by the occupying Soviets, who used them to reinforce anti-Western sentiments within Poland. Propaganda was produced by Communists to show Russia as the Great Liberator, and the West as the Great Traitor.{{Fact\|date=February 2007}} Capitalism was shown as being inherently bad, because capitalists only cared for "their own skin," while communism was portrayed as the great "uniter and protector."

	==Russia==
	In the final days of the war, masses of refugees from Nazi-abandoned Russia and ] were fleeing from the Red Army and ]'s partisans.
	In ], British troops gathered these thousands of refugees in Austria including ], ], ] and ]n troops, and civilians.
	The Soviet and Russian citizens were turned to ], where in many cases they were summarily shot.

	==Spain==
	A similar feeling occurred among the supporters of the ].
	During the ], the democratic countries had taken to neutrality instead of supporting the democratically-elected republic against the rebels supported by ] and ].
	At most, the people of France, Belgium and Britain took refugee children, and some foreign volunteers, mostly leftists, joined the ].
	Only the ] and ] offered limited military help to the Republic.

	To this perception, they added the treatment of republican soldiers that fled to France who were secluded in harsh concentration camps.

	During the Second World War, many of the former republican soldiers joined the French Resistance and the ], expecting that the next step after allied victory would be the defeat of ].
	However, the Allies did not invade Spain, it was just left alone in ].

	The entry of Spain in the United Nations and the visit of ] to Spain dispelled any hope of Western action against Franco.

	==Baltic States==

	{{sect-stub}}

	Although many Poles feel betrayed by a lack of aggressiveness with which the western allies pursued the war against their invaders, the western allies did maintain their commitments to declare war on Germany. For the Baltic States, however, who also had their fate sealed by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, the western allies failed to take up the defence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania when the Soviet Union invaded in 1940 as they had for Poland in 1939.

	===Memel Territory===

	The ] was separated from German ] in 1920, and put under French administration. The area had been conquered by the ] in the Middle Ages, and had belonged to Prussia for at least 500 years. It was inhabited by Germans as the largest part of the population, while a quarter declared itself Lithuanian, and another quarter, as local Memelländer and/or Klaipedians depending on language.

	In 1923, Lithuanian forces occupied the area during what is called the ]. The French forces put up a token resistance and left, and later the annexation of the area now called the ] by ] was confirmed by the ]. This was considered a Western betrayal by many, especially by France who did not protect autonomy either with their troops, or by diplomacy {{Fact\|date=February 2007}}. Also, when the government of the ] agreed to the annexation in 1928, it was also considered a betrayal by many Germans, by their own government.

	==Yugoslavia==
	At the ] in November 1943, a decision was made by the Allies to cease their support of the Royalist ], and switch allegiances to ]'s communist ].

	The West (primarily the UK) had supported the Yugoslav monarchy, allowing the exiled King to settle in London and providing assistance to the Chetniks via RAF and ] (SOE) prior to 1943. The people of Yugoslavia, however, had by and large already abandoned it, given how the kingdom deteriorated after the death of ] and especially how it crumbled in March and April of ] when the ] invaded it. Therefore it would be difficult to speak of a ''Western betrayal of Yugoslavia'' in the context of 1940s and later decades.

	Supporters of the Chetniks contend that if the Allies maintained their assistance support for their cause, the Karageorgeovich family would have restored to the Yugoslav throne. This argument has been the subject of considerable controversy. Opponents of this viewpoint have argued that the Allies had no other choice then to sever their support for the Chetniks as the Chetniks were collaborating with the Axis while the Partisans were resisting the Axis.

	==Notes and references==
	{{wikiquote}}		{{wikiquote}}
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			{{Cold War}}
	<!--This article uses the Cite.php citation mechanism. If you would like more information on how to add references to this article, please see http://meta.wikimedia.org/Cite/Cite.php -->
			{{Munich Agreement}}
	<div class="references-small">
	::'''In-line:'''
	<references/>
	::'''General:'''
	* ], ''The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939'', New York, 1972.
	* Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski ''The history of Poland'' Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press, 2000.
	* Russell D. Buhite ''Decisions at Yalta: an appraisal of summit diplomacy'', Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1986.
	* Anna M. Cienciala "Poland in British and French policy in 1939: determination to fight — or avoid war?" pages 413–433 from ''The Origins of The Second World War'' edited by Patrick Finney, Arnold, London, 1997.
	* Anna M. Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki ''From Versailles to Locarno: keys to Polish foreign policy, 1919–25'', Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984.
	* Richard Crampton ''Eastern Europe in the twentieth century — and after'' London; New York: Routledge, 1997.
	* ], ''Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw''. Viking Books, ]. ISBN 0-670-03284-0.
	* Norman Davies, '']'' ISBN 0-231-05353-3 and ISBN 0-231-05351-7 (two volumes).
	* David Dutton ''Neville Chamberlain'', London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
	* Sean Greenwood "The Phantom Crisis: Danzig, 1939" pages 247–272 from ''The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: A.J.P. Taylor and the Historians'' edited by Gordon Martel Routledge Inc, London, United Kingdom, 1999.
	* Robert Kee ''Munich: the eleventh hour'', London: Hamilton, 1988.
	* ], '']: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People''. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, ], ]. ISBN 1-125-47550-1.
	* Igor Lukes & Erik Goldstein (editors) ''The Munich crisis, 1938: prelude to World War II'', London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass Inc, 1999.
	* Margaret Olwen Macmillan ''Paris 1919: six months that changed the world'' New York: Random House, 2003, 2002, 2001.
	* ], ''Ally Betrayed''. Prentice-Hall, ], ].
	* David Martin, ''Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich''. ], ], ]. ISBN 0-8179-6911-X.
	* David Martin, ''The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder''. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, ] & ], ]. ISBN 0-15-180704-3
	* ], ], ''''. Knopf, 2003. ISBN 0-375-41197-6.
	* ], ''Poland: the Betrayed Ally''. ], ], ]. ISBN 0-521-48385-9.
	* ], ''Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland'', New York, 1958, reprint Boulder, CO, 1989.
	* Henry L. Roberts "The Diplomacy of Colonel Beck" pages 579–614 from ''The Diplomats 1919–1939'' edited by ] & Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 1953.
	* {{cite book \| author= ] \| title = Wierności dochować żołnierskiej \| publisher=Rytm, ] \| year= 1998 \| id=ISBN 83-86678-71-2}}
	* Robert Young ''France and the origins of the Second World War'', New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
	* Piotr Stefan Wandycz ''The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926–1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from Locarno to the remilitarization of the Rhineland'', Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
	* Piotr Wandycz ''France and her eastern allies, 1919–1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno'', Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.
	* Gerhard Weinberg ''A world at arms: a global history of World War II'', Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
	* ] ''Munich: Prologue to Tragedy'', New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948.
	* Paul E. Zinner "Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Eduard Benes" pages 100–122 from ''The Diplomats 1919–1939'' edited by ] & Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 1953.
	* Republic of Poland, ''The Polish White Book: Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933–1939''; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, ], ].
	::'''Essays and articles:'''
	*], ''Betrayed by the Big Three''. ], ], ], ]
	*], ''How the Allies Betrayed Warsaw''. ], ], ], ]
	*], ''The Great Betrayal''. ], ], ], ]
	</div>

	==See also==
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	==External links==
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	* ], Volume 57 Issue 4 Page 614 - October 1998]
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	* by ], includes section on post-World War II Western betrayal
	* Listen to Lynn Olsen & Stanley Cloud, authors of "A Question of Honor, speak about the Polish contribution to World War II and "Western betrayal"

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Latest revision as of 07:58, 16 December 2024

Concept in international relations among European countries

Western betrayal is the view that the United Kingdom, France and the United States failed to meet their legal, diplomatic, military and moral obligations to the Czechoslovakians and Poles before, during and after World War II. It also sometimes refers to the treatment of other Central and Eastern European states by those three nations.

The concept primarily derives from several events, including British and French appeasement towards Nazi Germany during its 1938 occupation of Czechoslovakia and the perceived failure of Britain and France to adequately assist the Poles during the German invasion of Poland in 1939. It also derives from concessions made by American and British political leaders to the Soviet Union during the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences and their limited response during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising along with post-war events, which allocated Poland to the Soviet sphere of influence as part of the Eastern Bloc.

Historically, such views were intertwined with some of the most significant geopolitical events of the 20th century, including the rise and fall of Nazi Germany, the emergency of the Soviet Union as a dominant superpower exerting control over large parts of Europe after World War II, and various treaties, alliances, and positions during the Cold War. The view of the "Western betrayal" has been criticized as political scapegoating by Central and Eastern Europeans.

Perception of betrayal

According to professors Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, Western betrayal is a reference to a sense of historical and moral responsibility for the West's abandonment of Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. In Central and Eastern Europe, the interpretation of the outcomes of the Munich Crisis of 1938 and the Yalta Conference of 1945 as a betrayal of Central and Eastern Europe by Western powers has been used by Central and Eastern European leaders to put pressure on Western countries to acquiesce to more recent political requests such as membership in NATO and EU.

In a few cases deliberate duplicity is alleged, whereby secret agreements or intentions are claimed to have existed in conflict with understandings given publicly. An example is British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's covert concordance with the Soviet Union, in which he stated that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the Baltic states. Given the strategic requirements of winning the war, retired American diplomat Charles G. Stefan argued Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had no option but to accept the demands of their erstwhile ally, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences.

There was also a lack of military or political support for the anticommunist rebels during the uprising in German Democratic Republic in 1953, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and during the democracy-oriented reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (the so-called "Prague Spring"). According to Ilya Prizel, the "preoccupation with their historical sense of 'damaged self' fueled resentment" towards the West generally and reinforced the western betrayal concept in particular. Grigory Yavlinsky argues that damage to central European national psyches left by the Western "betrayal" at Yalta and Munich remained a "psychological event" or "psychiatric issue" during debates over NATO expansion.

Criticism of the concept

Colin Powell stated that he did not think "betrayal is the appropriate word" regarding the Allies' role in the Warsaw Uprising. While complaints of "betrayal" are common in politics generally, the idea of a western betrayal can also be seen as a political scapegoat in both Central and Eastern Europe and a partisan electioneering phrase among the former Western Allies. Historian Athan Theoharis maintains betrayal myths were used in part by those opposing US membership in the United Nations. The word "Yalta" came to stand for the appeasement of world communism and abandonment of freedom.

Czechoslovakia

Munich Conference

The term Betrayal of the West (Czech: zrada Západu, Slovak: zrada Západu) was coined after the 1938 Munich Conference when Czechoslovakia was forced to cede the mostly German-populated Sudetenland to Germany. The region contained the Czechoslovak border fortifications and means of viable defence against German invasion. Poland would take Trans-Olza from Czechoslovakia, while the First Vienna Award returned territories to Hungary. The next year, by the proclamation of the Slovak State, Czechoslovakia was dissolved, the next day the remainder of Carpathian Ruthenia was occupied and annexed by Hungary, while the next day Germany occupied the remaining Czech lands and proclaimed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

Along with Italy and Nazi Germany, the Munich treaty was signed by Britain and France, both allied ot Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was allied by treaty with France so it would be obliged to help Czechoslovakia if it was attacked. Czech politicians joined the newspapers in regularly using the term Western betrayal and it, along with the associated feelings, became a stereotype among Czechs. The Czech terms Mnichov (Munich), Mnichovská zrada (Munich betrayal), Mnichovský diktát (Munich Dictate), and zrada spojenců (betrayal of the allies) were coined at the same time and have the same meaning. Poet František Halas published a poem with verse about "ringing bell of betrayal".

Then Member of Parliament for Epping, Winston Churchill said: "Britain and France had to choose between war and dishonour. They chose dishonour. They will have war".

Prague uprising

Poland

World War I aftermath

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a complex set of alliances was established among the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or the Soviet Union). With the rise of Nazism in Germany, this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between France, Britain, and Poland (Franco-Polish alliance). This agreement with France stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilise and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked. The Anglo-Polish alliance stated that in the event of hostilities with a European power, the other contracting party would give "all the support and assistance in its power."

According to Krzysztof Źwikliński, additionally representatives of the Western powers made several military promises to Poland, including designs as those made by British General William Edmund Ironside in his July 1939 talks with Marshall Rydz-Śmigły who promised an attack from the direction of Black Sea, or placing a British aircraft carrier in the Baltic. However, the Anglo-Polish alliance did not make that commitment, and the British commitment to France was for four divisions in Europe within 30 days of the outbreak of war, which was met.

Beginning of World War II, 1939

On the eve of the Second World War, the Polish government tried to buy as much armaments as it could and was asking for arms loans from Britain and France. As a result of that in the summer of 1939 Poland placed orders for 160 French Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 fighters, and for 111 British airplanes (100 light bombers Fairey Battle, 10 Hurricanes, and 1 Spitfire). Although some of these planes had been shipped to Poland before 1 September 1939, none took part in combat. Shipments were interrupted due to the outbreak of war. The total amount of the loan from British government was also much smaller than asked for. Britain agreed to lend 8 million pounds, but Poland was asking for 60 million.

Upon the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany in September 1939, after giving Germany an ultimatum on 1 September, Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September, and a British naval blockade of Germany was initiated. General Gort was appointed commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and placed under the command of French General Gamelin of the North-eastern Theatre of Operations, as agreed before the war. On 4 September, an RAF raid against German warships in harbour was conducted, and the BEF began its shipment to France.

The German forces reached Warsaw on 8 September, and on 14 September, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły ordered Polish forces to withdraw to the Romanian Bridgehead. On 17 September, the Soviet Union invaded Poland, and Polish Army in the field was effectively defeated before the divisions of the BEF could arrive in France. The first two BEF divisions, which took their place in the French line and change of command, on 3 October, and two further BEF divisions took their place in the French line on 12 October.

France had committed to undertaking a ground offensive within two weeks of the outbreak of war. The French initiated full mobilisation and began the limited Saar Offensive on 7 September, sending 40 divisions into the region. The French assault was slowed down by out-dated doctrines, minefields, and the French lacked mine detectors. When the French reached artillery range of the Siegfried Line, they found that their shells could not penetrate the German defences. The French decided to regroup an attack on 20 September, but when Poland was invaded by the Soviet Union on 17 September, any further assault was called off. Around 13 September, the Polish military envoy to France, general Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki, upon receiving the text of the message sent by Gamelin, alerted Marshal Śmigły: "I received the message by General Gamelin. Please don't believe a single word in the dispatch".

It had been decided that no major air operations against Germany would take place. This was due to French concerns over reprisals on RAF launches from French airfields, against targets in Germany, so most British bomber activity over Germany was the dropping of propaganda leaflets and reconnaissance. This theme would continue in subsequent Anglo-French Supreme War Council meetings. Afterwards, French military leader Maurice Gamelin issued orders prohibiting Polish military envoys Lieutenant Wojciech Fyda and General Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki from contacting him. In his post-war diaries, General Edmund Ironside, the chief of the Imperial General Staff, commented on French promises: "The French had lied to the Poles in saying they are going to attack. There is no idea of it".

On 17 September 1939 the Soviet Union invaded Poland, as agreed in advance with Germany following the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Britain and France did not take any significant action in response to the Soviet invasion. However, the terms of the Anglo-Polish alliance specifically applied to invasion from Germany only.

France and Britain were unable to launch a successful land attack on Germany in September 1939, and Poland was overcome by both the Germans and Soviets on 6 October, with the last Polish units capitulating that day following the battle of Kock. However, even by the end of October, the still-forming British Expeditionary Force totaled only 4 divisions compared to the 25 German divisions in Western Germany, making a British invasion of Germany unlikely to succeed.

Tehran, 1943

In November 1943, the Big Three (the USSR, US, and UK) met at the Tehran Conference. President Roosevelt and PM Churchill officially agreed that the eastern borders of Poland would roughly follow the Curzon Line. The Polish government-in-exile was not a party to this decision made in secret. The resulting loss of the Kresy, or "eastern territories", approximately 48% of Poland's pre-war territory, to the Soviet Union was seen by the London Poles in exile as another "betrayal" by their Western "Allies". However, it was no secret to the Allies that before his death in July 1943 General Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland's London-based government in exile had been the originator, and not Stalin, of the concept of a westward shift of Poland's boundaries along an Oder–Neisse line as compensation for relinquishing Poland's eastern territories as part of a Polish rapprochement with the USSR. Józef Retinger, who was Sikorski's special political advisor at the time, was also in agreement with Sikorski's concept of Poland's realigned post-war borders, later in his memoirs Retinger wrote: "At the Tehran Conference, in November 1943, the Big Three agreed that Poland should receive territorial compensation in the West, at Germany's expense, for the land it was to lose to Russia in Central and Eastern Europe. This seemed like a fair bargain."

Churchill told Stalin he could settle the issue with the Poles once a decision was made in Tehran, however he never consulted the Polish leadership. When the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile Stanisław Mikołajczyk attended the Moscow Conference (1944), he was convinced he was coming to discuss borders that were still disputed, while Stalin believed everything had already been settled. This was the principal reason for the failure of the Polish Prime Minister's mission to Moscow. The Polish premier allegedly begged for inclusion of Lwów and Wilno in the new Polish borders, but got the following reply from Vyacheslav Molotov: "There is no use discussing that; it was all settled in Tehran."

Warsaw Uprising, 1944

Main article: Lack of outside support during the Warsaw Uprising

Since the establishment of the Polish government-in-exile in Paris and then in London, the military commanders of the Polish army were focusing most of their efforts on preparation of a future all-national uprising against Germany. Finally the plans for Operation Tempest were prepared and on 1 August 1944, the Warsaw Uprising started. The Uprising was an armed struggle by the Polish Home Army to liberate Warsaw from German occupation and Nazi rule.

Despite the fact that Polish and later Royal Air Force (RAF) planes flew missions over Warsaw dropping supplies from 4 August on, the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) planes did not join the operation. The Allies specifically requested the use of Red Army airfields near Warsaw on 20 August but were refused by Stalin on 22 August (he referred to the insurrectionists as "a handful of criminals"). After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt on 25 August and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to "see what happens". Roosevelt replied on 26 August that "I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe." The commander of the British air drop, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, later stated, "How, after the fall of Warsaw, any responsible statesman could trust the Russian Communist further than he could kick him, passes the comprehension of ordinary men."

Yalta, 1945

Aborted Yalta agreement enforcement plans

Further information: Operation Unthinkable

At some point in the spring of 1945, Churchill commissioned a contingency military enforcement operation plan (war on the Soviet Union) to obtain a "square deal for Poland" (Operation Unthinkable), which resulted in a May 22 report stating unfavorable success odds. The report's arguments included geostrategic issues (possible Soviet-Japanese alliance resulting in moving of Japanese troops from continent to Home Islands, threat to Iran and Iraq) and uncertainties concerning land battles in Europe.

Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia

Main article: Percentages agreement

During the Fourth Moscow Conference in 1944, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin and British prime minister Winston Churchill discussed how to divide various European countries into spheres of influence. Churchill's account of the incident is that Churchill suggested that the Soviet Union should have 90 percent influence in Romania and 75 percent in Bulgaria; the United Kingdom should have 90 percent in Greece; with a 50–50 share in Hungary and Yugoslavia. The two foreign ministers, Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov, negotiated about the percentage shares on October 10 and 11. The result of these discussions was that the percentages of Soviet influence in Bulgaria and, more significantly, Hungary were amended to 80 percent.

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Prelude (Oct 1925 – Sep 1938)	Locarno Treaties Sudeten German Party Parliamentary election, 1935 Border fortifications Fall Grün Hossbach Memorandum Heim ins Reich Anschluss May Crisis Runciman Mission Bled Agreement Runciman Report Godesberg Memorandum Oster Conspiracy Sudeten German uprising
Consequences (Nov 1938 – Sep 1939)	First Vienna Award Second Czechoslovak Republic German invasion of Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak government-in-exile Slovak Republic Bohemia and Moravia Hungarian invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine Slovak–Hungarian War Slovak invasion of Poland Generalplan Ost
Nullification (Mar 1945 – Dec 1973)	Third Czechoslovak Republic German evacuation from Central and Eastern Europe German expulsion from Czechoslovakia Potsdam Agreement Beneš decrees Paris Peace Treaties (1947) Treaty of Prague (1973)
Related topics	Events preceding the war in Europe European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry: Appeasement "Peace for our time" Lesson of Munich History of Czechoslovakia (1918–1938): Germans in Czechoslovakia Western betrayal: Arms and the Covenant (1938) Why England Slept (1940)