Misplaced Pages

Oslo I Accord: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editContent deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 12:30, 12 July 2008 view sourceLapsed Pacifist (talk | contribs)18,229 edits Undid revision 225042918 by Hadashot Livkarim (talk) Terminology as used in reference← Previous edit Latest revision as of 17:53, 4 December 2024 view source GünniX (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users311,836 editsm External link with a line breakTag: AWB 
(661 intermediate revisions by more than 100 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{short description|1993 Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization agreement}}
{{pp-extended|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=July 2024}}
], U.S. President ], and ] at the Oslo Accords signing ceremony on 13 September 1993]]
{{Israel-Palestinian Peace Process}} {{Israel-Palestinian Peace Process}}
], ], and ] during the Oslo Accords on 13 ].]]
{{see also|Israeli-Palestinian conflict}}


The '''Oslo Accords''', officially called the '''Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements''' or '''Declaration of Principles''' ('''DOP''') was a milestone in the ]. It was the first direct, face-to-face agreement between ] and political represtantives of ]. It was the first time that some Palestinian factions publicly acknowledged Israel's ]. It was intended to be a framework for the future relations between Israel and the anticipated ], when all outstanding final status issues between the two states would be addressed and resolved in one . The '''Oslo I Accord''' or '''Oslo I''', officially called the '''Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements'''<ref name=OsloAccords1993>{{cite news|title=Text: 1993 Declaration of Principles|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682727.stm|work=Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements|publisher=BBC|date=29 November 2001}}</ref> or short '''Declaration of Principles''' ('''DOP'''), was an attempt in 1993 to set up a framework that would lead to the resolution of the ongoing ]. It was the first face-to-face agreement between the ] and the ] (PLO).


The Accords were finalized in ], ] on 20 ], and subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in ] on 13 ], with ] signing for the ] and ] ] signing for the State of ]. It was witnessed by ] for the ] and ] for ], in the presence of ] ]. Negotiations concerning the agreement, an outgrowth of the ], were conducted secretly in ], ], hosted by the ] institute, and completed on 20 August 1993; the ] were subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993,<ref name="google1993">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GkbzYoZtaJMC&pg=PA66 |title=Encyclopedia of the Palestinians – Google Books |isbn=978-0-8160-6986-6 |access-date=2013-10-30|last1=Mattar |first1=Philip |year=2005 |publisher=Infobase }}</ref> in the presence of PLO chairman ], ] ] and U.S. President ]. The documents themselves were signed by ] for the PLO, ] ] for ], U.S.&nbsp;Secretary of State ] for the ] and ] ] for ].<!-- First and only mention of Russia; indicates missing content. -->


The Oslo Accords were a framework for the future relations between the two parties. The Accords provided for the creation of a ]. The Palestinian Authority would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. It also called {{who}} for the withdrawal of ] from parts of the ] and ]. The Accord provided for the creation of a Palestinian interim ], the ]&nbsp;(PNA). The Palestinian Authority would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. The Accords also called for the withdrawal of the ]&nbsp;(IDF) from parts of the ] and ].


It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Permanent issues such as ], ], ], ] and ] were deliberately left to be decided at a later stage. Interim self-government was to be granted by Israel in phases. It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Remaining issues such as the ], ], ], ] and ] would be part of the "permanent status negotiations" during this period.


In August 1993, the delegations had reached an agreement, which was signed in secrecy by Peres while visiting Oslo. In the ], the PLO acknowledged the State of Israel and pledged to reject violence, and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and as partner in negotiations. Yasser Arafat was allowed to return to the ]. In 1995, the Oslo I Accord was followed by ].
Support for the Accords, of the concessions made and the process were not free from criticism. The repeated public posturing of all sides has discredited the process, not to mention putting into question the possibility of achieving peace, at least in the short-term. The momentum towards peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians as demonstrated by the signing of the Oslo Accords has been seriously jolted with the continued settling of Israelis in the ], and the outbreak of the ] in 2000.


]
Further strain was put on the process after ] won ]. Although offering Israel a number of longterm ceasefires and accepting the 2002 ], Hamas has repeatedly refused to officially recognise Israel,<ref name="CaseforIsrael">]. ''The Case for Israel''. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003. p. 3.</ref> to renounce violence, or accept some agreements previously made by the Palestinian Authority, claiming it is being held to an unfair standard and points out the fact that Israel has not recognized a Palestinian state, renounced violence or lived up to all pledges it has made during previous negotiations. Hamas has always renounced the Oslo Accords.


==Principles of the Accords==
== Background ==
{{Main|Oslo Accords}}


In essence, the accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the ] and ], and affirmed a Palestinian right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. Palestinian rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which "permanent status negotiations" would commence in order to reach a final agreement.
From the ] in 1949<ref></ref> to the ]<ref></ref> there were many failed attempts for a settlement to bring about a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, what made the Oslo negotiations different was the decision {{who}} to hold direct, face-to-face talks, between Israel and the ].


The negotiations would cover major issues such as ], ]s, ], and security and borders were to be decided at these permanent status negotiations (Article&nbsp;V). Israel was to grant interim self-government to the Palestinians in phases.
A renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian quest for peace began at the end of the ] as the United States took the lead in international affairs.


Along with the principles, the two groups signed ]—the ] recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced ] as well as other violence, and its desire for the destruction of the Israeli state.
Following the collapse of the ], optimism was high, as ] wrote in an article, titled ''"]"''. The hope was that the end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a new international order. President ], in a speech on 11 ], spoke of a "rare opportunity" to move toward a "]" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the new world is struggling to be born."<ref></ref><ref></ref>


The aim of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations was to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, an elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on UN&nbsp;Security Council ] and ], an integral part of the whole peace process.
Despite that, the hope of a New World Order was short-lived; for Israelis the optimism of the moment appealed to them, as some had become tired of the constant violence of the ], and started to look at realizing the economic benefits in the new global economy. Many were willing to take risks for peace.<ref> The Israel-Palestine Conflict, James L. Gelvin</ref>


In order that the Palestinians govern themselves according to ] principles, free and general ] would be held for the council.
Furthermore, the ] (1990-1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value of territory had been overstated, and that the ] psychologically reduced their sense of security.<ref>the gulf conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and war in the new world order, ] and ]</ref> The Gulf War had also shown that a superior air force and technology was more important than territory in winning a war.


Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for issues that would be finalized in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit.
As a result of these and other factors, as much as sixty percent of Israelis supported the Oslo Accords when they were first presented.<ref> The Israel-Palestine Conflict, James L. Gelvin</ref>


The permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians would start "not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period"; the interim period would "begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area".<ref name=dop> (DOP), 13 September 1993. From the Knesset website<br />Article V: 1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.; 2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.</ref> That withdrawal began with the signing of the ] on 4 May 1994,<ref name=nyt_mideast-accord>. Chris Hedges, New York Times, 5 May 1994.<br />"Israel and the P.L.O. signed an agreement today that formally begins Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area of the West Bank – lands occupied for 27 years – and grants Palestinians a measure of self-government for the first time, though not sovereignty."<br />Quote of Yitzhak Rabin: "We do not accept the Palestinian goal of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. We believe there is a separate Palestinian entity short of a state."</ref> thus the interim period would end on 4 May 1999.<ref name=bishara>. Azmi Bishara, Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 1999), pp. 5–16</ref>
For the Palestine Liberation Organization, the deterioration of the ], starting in 1989, presented them with the loss of their most important diplomatic patron, along with a failing relationship between ] and Arafat.


The five-year transitional period would commence with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and ] area. There would be a transfer of authority from the ] to the authorized Palestinians, concerning education and culture, ], ], direct ], and tourism. The council would establish a strong police force, while Israel would continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats.
Another event which pushed the PLO to the accords was the fallout from the Gulf War, which was the cutting off of financial assistance from the ] Gulf states as a result of Arafat having taken a pro-Iraqi stand. This culminated with the PLO not being invited to the Madrid Conference of ] at which Israel discussed peace with ], ], ] and Palestinian groups who were not associated with the PLO.


An ] would be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols.
In ], in the background of the official "Madrid negotiations" in ], Israeli vice-minister of foreign affairs ] and Norwegian researcher ] set up a secret meeting for PLO representative ] and Israeli history professor ]. Qurei and Hirschfeld made a connection and decided to meet again in what was going to be a series of fourteen meetings in Oslo. During the first few meetings a concept of an accord was discussed and agreed upon. ] ] was interested and sent the highest ranking non-political representative and a military lawyer to continue the negotiations. In contrast to the official negotiations in Madrid, where actual meetings between the delegations were often limited to a few hours a day, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations in Norway were usually accommodated in the same residence, they had breakfast, lunch and dinner at the same table, resulting in mutual respect and close friendships. The Norwegian government covered the expenses, provided security and were able to keep the meetings away from the public eye, using the research institute ] as a front.<ref>Gaza First: the secret Norway channel to peace between Israel and the PLO, Jane Corbin</ref>


The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to the Declaration of Principles and the Agreed Minutes pertaining to it were to be regarded as a part of it.
In ], the delegations had reached an agreement which was signed in secrecy by Shimon Peres while visiting Oslo, after which Shimon Peres took the agreement to the United States to the surprise of US negotiator ]. The Palestinians and Israelis still had one more obstacle; they did not yet agree on the wording of a mutual agreement, in which the PLO would acknowledge the state of Israel and pledge to reject violence, and Israel, while not renouncing violence, would recognise the PLO as the official Palestinian authority, allowing Yasser Arafat to return to the ]. Most of the negotiations for this agreement were carried out in a hotel in ], now in full view of the public and the press. An agreement was reached and signed by Yasser Arafat and ], just in time for the official signing in Washington.<ref>Gaza First: the secret Norway channel to peace between Israel and the PLO, Jane Corbin</ref>


== Principles of the Accords == == Content of the Oslo I Accord ==


=== Main articles ===
In essence, the accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the ] and West Bank, and affirmed a Palestinian right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Authority. Palestinian rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than ]). Permanent issues such as ], Palestinian refugees, Israeli colonies <ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/may/05/israel</ref>in the occupied territories, security and borders were deliberately excluded from the Accords and left to be decided. The interim self-government was to be granted in phases.
The Oslo I Accord contains 17 articles.
Until a final status accord was established, West Bank and Gaza would be divided into three zones:
* Area A - full control of the Palestinian Authority.
* Area B - Palestinian civil control and Israeli security control.
* Area C - full Israeli control, except over Palestinian civilians. These areas were Israeli settlements and "security zones."


=== Annexes ===
Together with the principles the two groups signed '']'' - the ] recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced ], violence and its desire for the destruction of Israel.
The Oslo I Accord contains four annexes:


==== Annex 1: Conditions of Palestinian Elections ====
The aim of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, an elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on ], and ], an integral part of the whole peace process.
This annex covered ]s, a system of ]s, rules and regulations regarding ]s, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of ], and the possibility of licensing a ].


====Annex 2: Withdrawal of Israeli forces====
In order that the Palestinians should govern themselves according to democratic principles, free and general political elections would be held for the Council.
An agreement on the withdrawal of ] forces from the Gaza Strip and ] area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. Internal security and public order by the ] force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by ]). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
* A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
* Establishment of a joint Palestinian–Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
* Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
* Arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: Gaza–Egypt; and Jericho–Jordan.


====Annex 3: Economic cooperation====
Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for issues that would be finalized in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit.
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli–Palestinian continuing Committee for economic cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:
* Cooperation in the field of water
* Cooperation in the field of electricity
* Cooperation in the field of energy
* Cooperation in the field of finance
* Cooperation in the field of transport and communications
* Cooperation in the field of trade and commerce
* Cooperation in the field of industry
* Cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations
* Cooperation in social welfare issues
* An environmental protection plan
* Cooperation in the field of communication and media


====Annex 4: Regional development====
The five-year transitional period would commence with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and ] area. Permanent status negotiations would begin as soon as possible between Israel and the Palestinians. The negotiations would cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral ] in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the ] countries.


===Agreed Minutes===
There would be a transfer of authority from the IDF to the authorized Palestinians, concerning education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism.
The Oslo I Accord contains some explanations of a number of articles in the Accord, with understandings the parties had agreed on:


====General understandings====
The Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel would continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats.
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians through the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article&nbsp;IV, as set out in the agreed minutes below.


====Specific understandings====
An Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee would be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols.
;Article IV: Council's jurisdiction
It was to be understood that: Jurisdiction of the council would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.


;Article V: Permanent status negotiations issues
A redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would take place.
It was understood that several issues were postponed to permanent status negotiations, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest. The outcome of these permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by the parties.


;Article VI (2): Transferring authority
The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to the Declaration of Principles and the Agreed Minutes pertaining to it, should be regarded as part of it.
===Annexes of the accords===
====Annex 1: Conditions of Elections====
Election agreements, system of elections, rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station. (Source: Reference.com)
====Annex 2: Withdrawal of Israeli forces====
An agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. Internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
*A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
*Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
*Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
*Arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: Gaza - Egypt; and Jericho - Jordan.

====Annex 3: Economic cooperation====
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for economic cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:
*Cooperation in the field of water.
*Cooperation in the field of electricity.
*Cooperation in the field of energy.
*Cooperation in the field of finance.
*Cooperation in the field of transport and communications.
*Cooperation in the field of trade and commerce.
*Cooperation in the field of industry.
*Cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and
*Cooperation in social welfare issues.
*An environmental protection plan.
*Cooperation in the field of communication and media.
====Annex 4: Regional development====
The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the ].

===Agreed minutes of the accords===
====Minute A: General understandings====
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians through the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in the agreed minutes below.
====Minute B: Specific understandings====
=====Article IV: Council's jurisdiction=====
It was to be understood that: Jurisdiction of the Council would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
=====Article VI (2): Transferring authority=====
It was agreed that the transfer of authority would be as follows: The Palestinians would inform the Israelis of the names of the authorized Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that would be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon. It was agreed that the transfer of authority would be as follows: The Palestinians would inform the Israelis of the names of the authorized Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that would be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.


=====Article VII (2): Cooperation===== ;Article VII (2): Cooperation
The Interim Agreement would also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation. The Interim Agreement would also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.


=====Article VII (5): Israel's powers===== ;Article VII (5): Israel's powers
The withdrawal of the military government would not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council. The withdrawal of the military government would not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the council.


=====Article VIII: Police===== ;Article VIII: Police
It was understood that the Interim Agreement would include arrangements for cooperation and coordination. It was also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police would be accomplished in a phased manner. It was understood that the Interim Agreement would include arrangements for cooperation and coordination. It was also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police would be accomplished in a phased manner. The accord stipulated that Israeli and Palestinian police would do joint patrols.


=====Article X: Designating officials===== ;Article X: Designating officials
It was agreed that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee which would reach decisions by agreement. It was agreed that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee which would reach decisions by agreement.


=====Annex II: Israel's continuing responsibilities===== ;Article XI: Israel's continuing responsibilities
It was understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel would continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians would be allowed to continue using roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. It was understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel would continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of ] and ]. Israeli military forces and civilians would be allowed to continue using roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.


==Reactions==
== The acceptance of the accords by both parties ==
{{more citations needed|section|date=September 2016}}
The accords aroused in both parties, the Israeli and the Palestinian, a wave of hope for an end to the conflict, but skeptics abounded everywhere.


===In Israel===
In Israel, a strong debate over the accords took place; the ] supported them, while the ] opposed them. After a two-day discussion in the ] on the government proclamation in the issue of the accord and the exchange of the letters, on 23 ] a vote of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained.
In Israel, a strong debate over the accords took place; the ] supported them, while the ] opposed them. After a two-day discussion in the ] on the government proclamation in the issue of the accord and the exchange of the letters, on 23 September 1993, a vote of confidence was held in which 61&nbsp;Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained.


On both sides (Israel and Palestine), there were fears of the other side's intentions. Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were entering into a tactical peace agreement, and that they were not sincere about wanting to reach peace and coexistence with Israel. They saw it as part of the ] which calls for a national authority "over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated" until "the liberation of all Palestinian territory" and understood it as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords as a step to reach a final goal.
The Palestinian reactions to the accords were not homogeneous, either. ], the group that represented the Palestinians in the negotiations, accepted the accords, but Hamas, ] and the ], which were known as the "refusal organizations", objected to the accords because their charters refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist in ].


Jerusalem's new mayor and later Prime Minister ] opposed the agreement and called it a "dark cloud over the city". He favored to bring more Jews to East Jerusalem and expand Jerusalem to the east.<ref name=FMEP_April_1994> {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20131227155947/http://www.fmep.org/reports/archive/vol.-4/no.-2/jerusalems-new-mayor-adopts-begin-shamir-settlement-policies |date=27 December 2013 }}. FMEP, Settlement Report | Vol. 4 No. 2 | March–April 1994</ref>
On both sides there were fears of the other side's intentions. Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were entering into a tactical peace agreement, and that they were not sincere at all to reach peace and coexistence with Israel, but saw it as part of the ] (which is called in Israel ''Tokhnit HaSHlavim'' or ''Torat HaSHlavim''). For evidence they brought statements of Arafat's in Palestinian forums in which he compared the accord to the ] that ] signed with the sons of the ]. Those statements would then be understood as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords in accordance with historical-religious precedent, with no intention of honoring it.


===In Palestine===
For a time after the signing of the agreements, Israel refrained from building new settlements although the Oslo agreements stipulated no such ban. However, it continued construction within existing settlements that fell far short of the 1991-92 level. The Israeli's trust in the accords was undermined by the fact, according to the Israeli government, that after the signing of the accords the attacks against Israel did not cease and even intensified,<ref> (online copy), Government Press Office, Office of the Prime Minister of Israel, published September 11, 1998</ref> which some explained as an attempt by certian Palestinian organizations to thwart the peace process. Others believed that the Palestinian Authority had no interest in stopping these attacks and was instead endorsing them. As evidence, they showed that when violence flared up in September 1996, Palestinian police turned their guns on the Israelis in clashes which left 61 Palestinians and 15 Israeli soldiers dead. <ref></ref> Important sections of the Israeli public opposed the process; notably, the Jewish settlers feared that it would lead to them losing their homes.'''
Palestinian reactions were also divided. ], the group that represented the Palestinians in the negotiations, accepted the accords. But Hamas, ] and the ] objected to the accords.


Many Palestinians feared that Israel was not serious about dismantling their settlements in the West Bank, especially around Jerusalem. They feared they might even accelerate their settlement program in the long run, by building more settlements and expanding existing ones. <ref>http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/Kemp/052602existential_threats_to_israel_an.htm</ref> On both sides (Israel and Palestine), there were fears of the other side's intentions. Many Palestinians feared that Israel was not serious about dismantling their settlements in the West Bank, especially around Jerusalem. They feared they might even accelerate their settlement program in the long run, by building more settlements and expanding existing ones.<ref> {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110106141627/http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/articles/Kemp/052602existential_threats_to_israel_an.htm |date=6 January 2011 }}</ref>


===In Lebanon===
== Criticisms of the Oslo Accords ==
On 13 September 1993 the ] opened fire on an anti-Oslo demonstration in south ] organised by ] killing nine people and wounding thirty.<ref>] No 461, 22 October 1993, Publishers ], ]; Editor ]; September chronology p.13</ref>
The Oslo Accords may appear not to have considered factors that would have externally influenced its interpretations. For example, the ] is often blamed for destabilizing the Palestinians' trust in the process. Also, the expansion of the ]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/stats_data/settler_population_growth/sources_population_growth_1991-2003.html |title=Sources of Population Growth: Total Israeli Population and Settler Population, 1991 - 2003
|accessdate=2007-12-12 |first= |last=Settlements information}}</ref> and blockades which caused the deterioration of economic conditions caused frustration and a corresponding drop in support for the accord and those who stood behind its ratification.


=== Nobel Peace Prize ===
Some academics have argued that the principles of the Oslo Accord simply cannot be accepted by both parties as it could serve only to separate further still the Israelis and Palestinians: both of whom believe they have a valid claim to the land they are fighting over, by creating a superior one over an inferior other.
]


In 1994 Israeli Prime Minister ], Israeli Foreign Minister ], and PLO Chairman ] received the ] following the signing on the Oslo Accords,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/press.html |title=Press Release – The Nobel Peace Prize 1994 |publisher=Nobel Foundation |date=1994-10-14 |access-date=2013-10-30}}</ref> "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/ |title=The Nobel Peace Prize 1994 |publisher=Nobel Foundation |access-date=2013-10-30}}</ref> The Accords have not resulted in peace to date.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Guyatt|first1=Nicholas|title=The absence of peace : understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict|date=2006|publisher=Zed books|location=London; New York, N.Y.|isbn=978-1856495806|edition=Repr.}}</ref>
There have been suggested alternatives to boundary setting and creating principles that divide the Israeli and Palestinians. One alternative that has the potential to be accepted by both parties is to rethink the principles of the Oslo Accord and move a peace process towards the creation of a ] that promotes co-existence rather than to continuing to divide. An argument for this as a possible way of reconciliation is that neither side can wholly justify a claim for homogeneity. Palestine has a varied history of occupancy, such as the ], ] and ]ites in ] times.<ref>R. Garaudy ‘The Case of Israel’ London, ]. p 32. </ref> Also, some Israeli and Palestinian thinkers have previously argued for a bi-national state as a more attractive alternative to separatism.<ref>], ‘Truth & Reconciliation’, ], http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/412/op2.htm </ref>


==Remarks from Benjamin Netanyahu==
==Subsequent negotiations==
In a 2001 video, ], reportedly unaware he was being recorded, said: "They asked me before the election if I'd honor ... I said I would, but I'm going to interpret the accords in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67&nbsp;borders. How did we do it? Nobody said what defined military zones were. Defined military zones are security zones; as far as I'm concerned, the entire Jordan Valley is a defined military zone. Go argue."<ref name=huffingtonpost>{{Cite news|title=Netanyahu In 2001: 'America Is A Thing You Can Move Very Easily'|newspaper=HuffPost|date=16 July 2010|url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/16/netanyahu-in-2001-america_n_649427.html|first=Curtis|last=Wong}}</ref><ref name=washingtonpost>{{Cite news |title=Netanyahu: 'America is a thing you can move very easily' |author=Glenn Kessler |newspaper=The Washington Post|date=16 July 2010|url=http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/07/netanyahu_america_is_a_thing_y.html|archive-url=https://archive.today/20121216141357/http://voices.washingtonpost.com/checkpoint-washington/2010/07/netanyahu_america_is_a_thing_y.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=16 December 2012}}</ref> Netanyahu then explained how he conditioned his signing of the 1997 Hebron agreement on American consent that there be no withdrawals from "specified military locations", and insisted he be allowed to specify which areas constituted a "military location"—such as the whole of the Jordan Valley. "Why is that important? Because from that moment on I stopped the Oslo Accords", Netanyahu affirmed.<ref name="Levy 15.07.2010">{{cite news |url=http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/tricky-bibi-1.302053 |title=Tricky Bibi |author=Gideon Levy |date=15 July 2010 |newspaper=Haaretz |access-date=23 September 2011}}</ref>
However, this is clearly consistent with ]'s October 1995 statement to the Knesset on the ratification of the interim Oslo agreement: "B. The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term."<ref name="Rabin1995">{{cite web |url=http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1995/10/PM+Rabin+in+Knesset-+Ratification+of+Interim+Agree.htm |author=Yitzhak Rabin |date=5 October 1995 |title=Ratification of the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement |work=Speech to Knesset |publisher=MFA Library |access-date=23 September 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Netanyahu: to the left of Rabin |url=http://samsonblinded.org/news/netanyahu-to-the-left-of-rabin-2-21374 |newspaper=Israeli Uncensored News |date=11 March 2011 |access-date=17 March 2013 |archive-date=26 June 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130626180200/http://samsonblinded.org/news/netanyahu-to-the-left-of-rabin-2-21374 |url-status=dead }}</ref>


==Additional agreements==
In addition to the first accord, namely the ''Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government'', other more specific accords are often informally also known as "Oslo":
{{Main|Oslo Accords#Additional agreements}}


In addition to the first accord, the parties concluded:
===Oslo 2===


*The ] or Cairo Agreement, signed on 4 May 1994, which initiated a partial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho area, and the establishment of the ]
*The '']'' (also called ''Oslo 2''), signed in ], ] gave the Palestinians self-rule in ], ], ], ], ], ], ], and some 450 villages.
*The ] (also known as Oslo 2), signed on 28 September 1995 gave Palestinians self-rule in ], ], ], ], ], ], ], and some 450&nbsp;villages.


After 1995, a number of additional agreements were concluded to implement the Oslo Accords.
===Additional agreements===
Additional Israeli-Palestinian documents related to the Oslo Accords are:


==Consequences of the accord==
*''], (], ]),
In 2013 the ] stated, "The Oslo Accord divided the ] of ]—in two. In a small, fortified area of its old city quarters—a small group of Israeli settlers reside, surrounded by more than 120,000 Palestinians".<ref>{{cite news|title=I Hebron går hatet i arv|url=http://www.nrk.no/fordypning/i-hebron-gar-hatet-i-arv-1.11220115|publisher=]|date= 2013-09-15|trans-title=In Hebron the hatred is handed down as inheritance|language=no}}</ref>
*''], signed in ] on ], ],
*'']'' (] ]),
*'']'' (] ]),
*'']'' (] ]),
*''] signed at ] on ], ]
*'']'' (]/] ])
*'']'' (] ])
*'']'' (], ])


==Loss of credibility== ==See also==
*]
*]
*]


'''People'''
Since the start of the ], the Oslo Accords are viewed with increasing disfavor by both the Palestinian and Israeli public. In May 2000, seven years after the Oslo Accords and five months before the start of the ], a survey by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at the ] found that: 39% of all Israelis supported the Accords and that 32% believed that the Accords would result in peace in the next few years.<ref></ref>. By contrast, the May 2004 survey found that 26% of all Israelis supported the Accords and 18% believed that the Accords would result in peace in the next few years. Many Palestinians
*] alias Abu Ala—PLO negotiator during the Oslo peace process
believed that the Oslo Accords had turned the PLO leadership into a tool of the Israeli state in suppressing their own people.
*]—Israeli negotiator during the Oslo peace process
While benefiting a small elite, the conditions of most Palestinians worsened. This was seen as one of the causes for the
*]—Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, provided political cover, facilities and finances for the negotiations
].
*]—Israeli negotiator during the Oslo peace process

*]—Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs
==Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties==
*]—Norwegian facilitator during the negotiations
*]
*]—formed first Israeli negotiating team with Hirschfeld, before official Israeli involvement
*]
*]—former Director General of the ], was Head of the Israeli negotiating team
*]
*]
*]
*]
*Oslo Accords (1993)
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]


==References== ==References==
{{reflist|2}} {{Reflist}}

==Bibliography==
*] ''Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America''. *] ''Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America''.
*Clinton, Bill (2005). ''My Life''. Vintage. ISBN 1-4000-3003-X. *Clinton, Bill (2005). ''My Life''. Vintage. {{ISBN|978-1-4000-3003-3}}.
*Eran, Oded. "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." ''The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East''. Ed. ]. New York: Continuum, 2002. *Eran, Oded. "Arab–Israel Peacemaking". ''The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East''. Ed. ]. New York: Continuum, 2002.


==External links== == External links ==
* {{Commons category-inline|Oslo Accord}}
*
* {{wikisource-inline|Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements}}
* from the
*. Knesset website, 28 December 1977


{{Israeli-Palestinian conflict |Diplomacy}}
==See also==
{{Arab–Israeli diplomacy}}
*]
{{Presidency of Bill Clinton}}
*]
*]
*]
*]


]
===Issues===
*]
*]
*]

===People===
*] - academic who made first secret contacts with Ahmed Qurei in London.
*] and ] - Norwegian facilitators during the negotiations.
*] - Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
*] - Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, provided political cover, facilities and finances for the negotiations.
*] - currently negotiator for the ], was head of the Palestinian negotiating team.
*] - former Director General of the ], was Head of the Israeli negotiating team.
*] - Chief lawyer for the Israeli negotiating team.
*] - currently Director General of the ], formed first Israeli negotiating team with Hirschfeld, before official Israeli involvement.
*] - former Minister of Justice and head of ], was initiator of negotiations, and conducted numerous meetings in Israel, West Bank and worldwide.
*] - currently President of Israel, was the ] and received ].
*] - Israeli prime minister who initated official governmental negotiations with the ], signed the ], and was assassinated by a Jewish-religious fundamentalist in 1995. Received ].
*] - US president who encouraged the parties to meet and negotiate, hosted the Oslo Accords signing ceremonies and also convened the ] summit in 2000.
*] - was Chairman and President of the ], previously Chairman of the ], initiated official PLO negotiations with Israel. Received ].
*] - currently Presdient of the ], was the lead drafter of the Oslo Accords, and maintained communications between negotiators and Arafat throughout the negotiations process.
*] - religious student at ] Law School who assassinated Yitzhak Rabin to prevent Israeli withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Currently serving life in prison.
*] - currently Minister of Defense, was the Israeli prime minister during ] summit in 2000. Previously, was the ] of the ] between 1992-1995.

{{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}}

]
]
] ]
]

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
] ]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
] ]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Latest revision as of 17:53, 4 December 2024

1993 Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization agreement

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. President Bill Clinton, and Yasser Arafat at the Oslo Accords signing ceremony on 13 September 1993
Part of a series on
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Israeli–Palestinian
peace process
History
Camp David Accords1978
Madrid Conference1991
Oslo Accords1993 / 95
Hebron Protocol1997
Wye River Memorandum1998
Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum1999
Camp David Summit2000
The Clinton Parameters2000
Taba Summit2001
Road Map2003
Agreement on Movement and Access2005
Annapolis Conference2007
Mitchell-led talks2010–11
Kerry-led talks2013–14
Primary concerns
Secondary concerns
International brokers
Proposals
Projects / groups / NGOs

The Oslo I Accord or Oslo I, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or short Declaration of Principles (DOP), was an attempt in 1993 to set up a framework that would lead to the resolution of the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It was the first face-to-face agreement between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Negotiations concerning the agreement, an outgrowth of the Madrid Conference of 1991, were conducted secretly in Oslo, Norway, hosted by the Fafo institute, and completed on 20 August 1993; the Oslo Accords were subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993, in the presence of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. President Bill Clinton. The documents themselves were signed by Mahmoud Abbas for the PLO, foreign Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the United States and foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev for Russia.

The Accord provided for the creation of a Palestinian interim self-government, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The Palestinian Authority would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. The Accords also called for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Remaining issues such as the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders would be part of the "permanent status negotiations" during this period.

In August 1993, the delegations had reached an agreement, which was signed in secrecy by Peres while visiting Oslo. In the Letters of Mutual Recognition, the PLO acknowledged the State of Israel and pledged to reject violence, and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and as partner in negotiations. Yasser Arafat was allowed to return to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In 1995, the Oslo I Accord was followed by Oslo II.

Signing of the accords

Principles of the Accords

Main article: Oslo Accords

In essence, the accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and affirmed a Palestinian right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. Palestinian rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which "permanent status negotiations" would commence in order to reach a final agreement.

The negotiations would cover major issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, and security and borders were to be decided at these permanent status negotiations (Article V). Israel was to grant interim self-government to the Palestinians in phases.

Along with the principles, the two groups signed Letters of Mutual Recognition—the Israeli government recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism as well as other violence, and its desire for the destruction of the Israeli state.

The aim of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations was to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, an elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, an integral part of the whole peace process.

In order that the Palestinians govern themselves according to democratic principles, free and general political elections would be held for the council.

Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for issues that would be finalized in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit.

The permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians would start "not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period"; the interim period would "begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area". That withdrawal began with the signing of the Gaza–Jericho Agreement on 4 May 1994, thus the interim period would end on 4 May 1999.

The five-year transitional period would commence with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. There would be a transfer of authority from the Israel Defense Forces to the authorized Palestinians, concerning education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The council would establish a strong police force, while Israel would continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats.

An Israeli–Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee would be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols.

The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to the Declaration of Principles and the Agreed Minutes pertaining to it were to be regarded as a part of it.

Content of the Oslo I Accord

Main articles

The Oslo I Accord contains 17 articles.

Annexes

The Oslo I Accord contains four annexes:

Annex 1: Conditions of Palestinian Elections

This annex covered election agreements, a system of elections, rules and regulations regarding election campaigns, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a TV station.

Annex 2: Withdrawal of Israeli forces

An agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. Internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

  • A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
  • Establishment of a joint Palestinian–Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
  • Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
  • Arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: Gaza–Egypt; and Jericho–Jordan.

Annex 3: Economic cooperation

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli–Palestinian continuing Committee for economic cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

  • Cooperation in the field of water
  • Cooperation in the field of electricity
  • Cooperation in the field of energy
  • Cooperation in the field of finance
  • Cooperation in the field of transport and communications
  • Cooperation in the field of trade and commerce
  • Cooperation in the field of industry
  • Cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations
  • Cooperation in social welfare issues
  • An environmental protection plan
  • Cooperation in the field of communication and media

Annex 4: Regional development

The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G7 countries.

Agreed Minutes

The Oslo I Accord contains some explanations of a number of articles in the Accord, with understandings the parties had agreed on:

General understandings

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians through the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in the agreed minutes below.

Specific understandings

Article IV
Council's jurisdiction

It was to be understood that: Jurisdiction of the council would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.

Article V
Permanent status negotiations issues

It was understood that several issues were postponed to permanent status negotiations, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest. The outcome of these permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by the parties.

Article VI (2)
Transferring authority

It was agreed that the transfer of authority would be as follows: The Palestinians would inform the Israelis of the names of the authorized Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that would be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

Article VII (2)
Cooperation

The Interim Agreement would also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5)
Israel's powers

The withdrawal of the military government would not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the council.

Article VIII
Police

It was understood that the Interim Agreement would include arrangements for cooperation and coordination. It was also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police would be accomplished in a phased manner. The accord stipulated that Israeli and Palestinian police would do joint patrols.

Article X
Designating officials

It was agreed that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee which would reach decisions by agreement.

Article XI
Israel's continuing responsibilities

It was understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel would continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians would be allowed to continue using roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Reactions

This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.
Find sources: "Oslo I Accord" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (September 2016) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

In Israel

In Israel, a strong debate over the accords took place; the left wing supported them, while the right wing opposed them. After a two-day discussion in the Knesset on the government proclamation in the issue of the accord and the exchange of the letters, on 23 September 1993, a vote of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained.

On both sides (Israel and Palestine), there were fears of the other side's intentions. Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were entering into a tactical peace agreement, and that they were not sincere about wanting to reach peace and coexistence with Israel. They saw it as part of the PLO's Ten Point Program which calls for a national authority "over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated" until "the liberation of all Palestinian territory" and understood it as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords as a step to reach a final goal.

Jerusalem's new mayor and later Prime Minister Ehud Olmert opposed the agreement and called it a "dark cloud over the city". He favored to bring more Jews to East Jerusalem and expand Jerusalem to the east.

In Palestine

Palestinian reactions were also divided. Fatah, the group that represented the Palestinians in the negotiations, accepted the accords. But Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine objected to the accords.

On both sides (Israel and Palestine), there were fears of the other side's intentions. Many Palestinians feared that Israel was not serious about dismantling their settlements in the West Bank, especially around Jerusalem. They feared they might even accelerate their settlement program in the long run, by building more settlements and expanding existing ones.

In Lebanon

On 13 September 1993 the Lebanese Army opened fire on an anti-Oslo demonstration in south Beirut organised by Hizbollah killing nine people and wounding thirty.

Nobel Peace Prize

Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat receiving the Nobel Peace Prize following the Oslo Accords

In 1994 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat received the Nobel Peace Prize following the signing on the Oslo Accords, "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East". The Accords have not resulted in peace to date.

Remarks from Benjamin Netanyahu

In a 2001 video, Netanyahu, reportedly unaware he was being recorded, said: "They asked me before the election if I'd honor ... I said I would, but I'm going to interpret the accords in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders. How did we do it? Nobody said what defined military zones were. Defined military zones are security zones; as far as I'm concerned, the entire Jordan Valley is a defined military zone. Go argue." Netanyahu then explained how he conditioned his signing of the 1997 Hebron agreement on American consent that there be no withdrawals from "specified military locations", and insisted he be allowed to specify which areas constituted a "military location"—such as the whole of the Jordan Valley. "Why is that important? Because from that moment on I stopped the Oslo Accords", Netanyahu affirmed. However, this is clearly consistent with Yitzhak Rabin's October 1995 statement to the Knesset on the ratification of the interim Oslo agreement: "B. The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term."

Additional agreements

Main article: Oslo Accords § Additional agreements

In addition to the first accord, the parties concluded:

After 1995, a number of additional agreements were concluded to implement the Oslo Accords.

Consequences of the accord

In 2013 the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation stated, "The Oslo Accord divided the metropolis of Hebron—in two. In a small, fortified area of its old city quarters—a small group of Israeli settlers reside, surrounded by more than 120,000 Palestinians".

See also

People

  • Ahmed Qurei alias Abu Ala—PLO negotiator during the Oslo peace process
  • Yossi Beilin—Israeli negotiator during the Oslo peace process
  • Jan Egeland—Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, provided political cover, facilities and finances for the negotiations
  • Yair Hirschfeld—Israeli negotiator during the Oslo peace process
  • Johan Jørgen Holst—Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Mona Juul—Norwegian facilitator during the negotiations
  • Ron Pundak—formed first Israeli negotiating team with Hirschfeld, before official Israeli involvement
  • Uri Savir—former Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, was Head of the Israeli negotiating team

References

  1. "Text: 1993 Declaration of Principles". Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. BBC. 29 November 2001.
  2. Mattar, Philip (2005). Encyclopedia of the Palestinians – Google Books. Infobase. ISBN 978-0-8160-6986-6. Retrieved 30 October 2013.
  3. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), 13 September 1993. From the Knesset website
    Article V: 1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.; 2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
  4. Mideast accord: the overview; Rabin and Arafat sign accord ending Israel's 27-year hold on Jericho and the Gaza Strip. Chris Hedges, New York Times, 5 May 1994.
    "Israel and the P.L.O. signed an agreement today that formally begins Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area of the West Bank – lands occupied for 27 years – and grants Palestinians a measure of self-government for the first time, though not sovereignty."
    Quote of Yitzhak Rabin: "We do not accept the Palestinian goal of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. We believe there is a separate Palestinian entity short of a state."
  5. 4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not to Declare?. Azmi Bishara, Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 1999), pp. 5–16
  6. Jerusalem's New Mayor Adopts Begin-Shamir Settlement Policies Archived 27 December 2013 at archive.today. FMEP, Settlement Report | Vol. 4 No. 2 | March–April 1994
  7. Archived 6 January 2011 at the Wayback Machine
  8. Middle East International No 461, 22 October 1993, Publishers Lord Mayhew, Dennis Walters MP; Editor Michael Adams; September chronology p.13
  9. "Press Release – The Nobel Peace Prize 1994". Nobel Foundation. 14 October 1994. Retrieved 30 October 2013.
  10. "The Nobel Peace Prize 1994". Nobel Foundation. Retrieved 30 October 2013.
  11. Guyatt, Nicholas (2006). The absence of peace : understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Repr. ed.). London; New York, N.Y.: Zed books. ISBN 978-1856495806.
  12. Wong, Curtis (16 July 2010). "Netanyahu In 2001: 'America Is A Thing You Can Move Very Easily'". HuffPost.
  13. Glenn Kessler (16 July 2010). "Netanyahu: 'America is a thing you can move very easily'". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 16 December 2012.
  14. Gideon Levy (15 July 2010). "Tricky Bibi". Haaretz. Retrieved 23 September 2011.
  15. Yitzhak Rabin (5 October 1995). "Ratification of the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement". Speech to Knesset. MFA Library. Retrieved 23 September 2011.
  16. "Netanyahu: to the left of Rabin". Israeli Uncensored News. 11 March 2011. Archived from the original on 26 June 2013. Retrieved 17 March 2013.
  17. "I Hebron går hatet i arv" [In Hebron the hatred is handed down as inheritance] (in Norwegian). NRK. 15 September 2013.

Bibliography

  • Bregman, Ahron Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America.
  • Clinton, Bill (2005). My Life. Vintage. ISBN 978-1-4000-3003-3.
  • Eran, Oded. "Arab–Israel Peacemaking". The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002.

External links

Israeli–Palestinian conflict
Participants
Israelis
Palestinians
Principals
Other groups
Third-party groups
Individuals
Israelis
Palestinians
Background
1920–1948
 
1948–1970
Palestinian
insurgency
1968–1982
 
1973–1987
First Intifada
1987–1991
Second Intifada
2000–2005
Palestinian dissident
campaigns
2006–present
Gaza–Israel
conflict
2006–present
Diplomacy/law
Timeline
1948–1991
1990s
2000s
2010s
United Nations
Analysis
Diplomacy and peace proposals in the Arab–Israeli conflict
Background
1948–1983
1991–2016
2019–present
Bill Clinton
Presidency
(timeline)

Life and
legacy
Speeches
Elections
U.S. House
Gubernatorial
Presidential
Books
Namesakes
Popular
culture
Family
Categories: