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			{{Short description\|Military strategy seeking total destruction of an enemy's military capacity}}
⚫	A '''~~Battle of annihilation~~''' is a military strategy ~~whereby~~ an attacking army seeks to ~~essentially~~ destroy the military capacity of the opposing army in a single planned pivotal ]. ~~This~~ is ~~achieved~~ through the use of tactical surprise, application of overwhelming force at a key point, or other ] performed immediately before or during the battle~~, in order to break the cohesion of the enemy~~.
			{{Distinguish\|\|text=], a war waged with the intent of obliterating a state or group of people}}
			{{multiple issues\|
			{{refimprove\|date=May 2010}}
			{{original research\|date=December 2018}}
			}}
			{{War}}

		⚫	'''Annihilation''' is a ] in which an attacking ] seeks to entirely destroy the military capacity of the opposing army. This strategy can be executed in a single planned pivotal ], called a "'''battle of annihilation'''". A successful battle of annihilation is accomplished through the use of tactical surprise, application of overwhelming force at a key point, or other tactics performed immediately before or during the battle.
	The intention is that the opposing government will then be forced to ] to prevent the unopposed capture of his capital or other core areas.

	It is not necessary to kill or capture all, or even most, of an opposing army's ~~soldiers~~ to annihilate ~~him~~ in the sense used here. Rather, the destruction of the enemy army as a cohesive military force able to offer further meaningful ~~resistance~~, even if temporarily, is the objective.		The end goal of a battle of annihilation is to cause the leaders of the opposing army to ] due to the complete annihilation of its army and thus inability to further engage in ] or ] military action. It is not necessary to kill or capture all, or even most, of an opposing army's forces to annihilate it in the sense used here. Rather, the destruction of the enemy army as a cohesive military force able to offer further meaningful military offense or defense, even if temporarily, is the objective.

	== Significance ~~of the Term~~ ==		== Significance ==
		⚫	In ancient and classical times, many battles ended with the annihilation of one of the opposing forces, the Battles of ], ] and ] being famous examples. From the ] onward, however, the battle of annihilation strategy fell into disuse, at least in Europe. The greatest exception is seen in the battles of ], with whom the battle of annihilation in the modern sense is most closely associated, and term "Napoleonic battle of annihilation" is sometimes used. The ] is often cited as the paragon of the modern battle of annihilation.

		⚫	Napoleon's victories at ] (1805) and ] (1806) are often cited as the classic battles of annihilation. Napoleon himself was unable to again achieve such decisive results, partly because his enemies then adjusted to his tactics. For example, the ] was a victory but did not result in the desired destruction of the Russian army.
⚫	In ancient and classical times, many battles ended with the annihilation ~~(in the sense used here)~~ of one of the forces -- the ~~battles~~ of ] and ] being famous examples. From the ] onward, however, the battle of annihilation ~~became~~ ~~rare~~, at least in Europe. The greatest exception is seen in the battles of ], ~~and it~~ with ~~Napoleon that~~ the battle of annihilation in the modern sense is most closely associated, ~~so that~~ term "Napoleonic battle of annihilation" is sometimes used, ~~and the~~ ] is often cited as the ~~apotheosis~~ of the modern battle of annihilation.

		⚫	==After Napoleon==
	== Alternatives to the Battle of Annihilation ==
			Nevertheless, strategists, influenced by those of the Napoleonic era, most notably ], held the Napoleonic battle of annihilation to be the proper objective of modern military campaigns. That interpretation was later accredited to the more renowned ], initially by ], who supported arguments for strategies of annihilation with quotes from Clausewitz. However, Clausewitz disliked Jomini personally and his concepts and may have instead emphasized the primacy of the political in warfare, and remained indifferent to theories arguing for any absolute solutions via the application of military force. Nevertheless, that set the stage for mass confusion down the line of strategic thinkers.<ref name=Nagl>J. Nagl, (2005), p. 19.</ref> Clausewitz's trilogies (albeit used out of context) are contested by ], who claims in ''Strategy'' that a poor choice of words by Clausewitz led his interpreters to overestimate the value of battles of annihilation.<ref name=Hart>Hart, B. H. Liddell, (1991), p. 319.</ref> Consequently, at the beginning of the ], many top military commanders mistakenly expected that a battle of annihilation would quickly end the war. However, the size and firepower of armies were making the battle of annihilation more difficult to achieve.

			A contrast may be seen between Confederate General ] and Union
⚫	~~At first blush~~, it might seem that annihilation of the opposing army is the obvious object of any ]. ~~This is not true~~, ~~however. Many~~ battles have been fought to cause an enemy army simply to ], or to suffer ]; and many campaigns have been waged to avoid rather than seek such a battle.
			General ]. Lee, when on the offensive, usually maneuvered with the intent of forcing a battle of annihilation. His archetypal attempt was at the ] in which a classic Napoleonic flanking maneuver defeated but was not able to destroy the Union Army under ]. Lee may be faulted for attempting to achieve a battle of annihilation, particularly at the ]. In contrast, Grant was noted for waging campaigns of maneuver. During the ], he forced ]'s army into a siege position in which it was forced to surrender without a battle. In the Virginia campaign of 1864 against Lee, he continually maneuvered around Lee and forced him to withdraw further and further south until he had to choose between abandoning the Confederate capital, Richmond, or withdrawing into siege lines. ] may also be cited. Rather than pursuing the chimera of destroying ]'s army, Sherman chose to operate directly against the Confederate economy. His ], directly away from Hood, was basically the opposite of a Napoleonic strategy.

			During the ], the Prussians (and later the Germans) made their own version of the battle of annihilation by destroying entire armies relatively quickly by means of rapid troop movement and ] of the enemy. Those tactics came into fruition during the decisive battles of ] and ] in which two main French armies were completely annihilated at the same time and relatively quickly, rendering France almost completely defenseless against the German invasion.
	Reasons for not seeking a battle of annihilation include:

		⚫	The Napoleonic ideal was still alive at the beginning of ]. In fact, the Germans were able to execute a battle of annihilation against the Russian 2nd Army at the ] during the war's opening weeks. However, attempts to create such a result on the ] resulted in great slaughter to no effect. Armies were now too large to have flanks to turn and had too much firepower and too much defensive depth to be broken by assault.
⚫	* Avoidance of the risk and cost associated with such a battle.
⚫	* Lack of means to attempt such a battle.
⚫	* Ability to achieve desired objectives through other means.
⚫	* Accepted practice.
⚫	* Political concerns.

		⚫	Since World War I, the paradigm of armies maneuvering in the empty countryside for weeks and then meeting in a battle lasting usually a single day no longer applies (at least to wars between ]). Instead, armies are deployed in more-or-less continuous lines that stretch perhaps hundreds of miles. Thus, the battle of annihilation may be considered to be mainly of historical interest, except for secondary campaigns.
	=== Risk and Cost ===

			The tactics executed by the Prussians during the ] later served to inspire the ] during ], with ] executing a battle of annihilation by charging straight into the enemy's weak point and attempt to encircle and destroy separate ]. The tactics became spectacularly successful during the German invasions of ], ] and the ] until they themselves became annihilated by the Soviets in battles such as ],<ref>{{cite report \|author=S. J. Lewis \|date=2003 \|title=Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Combat \|url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA446541.pdf#page=43 \| chapter = The Battle of Stalingrad \|publisher=U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press For Leavenworth, KS \|page=23 \|access-date=2024-04-26 \|quote=Stalingrad also represents one of the high points in the art of campaigning, clearly a decisive battle of annihilation with profound strategic implications.}}</ref> ] and ].
	A successful battle of annihilation usually requires exposing one's own army to loss in a way that more conservative tactics do not. For example, attempting to turn an enemy's flank generally requires one to separate the flanking force from one's main body. This exposes the attacking force to ]. Attempting to pierce the enemy's center is usually costly in itself, and also exposes the ] force to a destructive counterstroke.

			During the ], the ]'s strategy was fixated on the goal of luring the numerically-superior ] into a single decisive battle of annihilation, which would force the United States to sue for peace. That was at least partially the motivation behind the surprise ] and the ] but was loosely followed for as long as the IJN was capable of offensive operations. The goal was never achieved for several reasons. First, the ] was wary of committing all of its forces to one major battle. Further, the IJN concentrated so much of its efforts on preparing for a single massive showdown, which never truly occurred, that it neglected devoting resources towards protecting its naval supply lines, which soon fell prey to a ] when they were extensively targeted by US submarines. Even Japanese victories such as the ] failed to annihilate their opponents utterly. The hoped-for "decisive battle" against the US Navy never came, and the IJN was gradually ground down through attrition.
	This was an especially important consideration during the pre-Napoleonic era, when armies were relatively small forces composed of professional career soldiers and losses were difficult to replace.

	=== ~~Lack~~ ~~of Means =~~==		== Alternatives ==
		⚫	Initially, it might seem that annihilation of the opposing army is the obvious object of any ]. However, many battles have been fought to cause an enemy army simply to ] or to suffer ], and many campaigns have been waged to avoid, rather than seek, such a battle. Reasons for not seeking a battle of annihilation include the following:

		⚫	:* Avoidance of the risk and cost associated with such a battle
	From the Renaissance until the advent of ], armies were slow ''on the battlefield'' (not necessarily slow operationally). This was due to the declining efficacy of ] and to the advent of ], which is difficult to move. This made it difficult to move quickly enough to prevent an enemy from countering a battle stratagem, or, failing that, to withdraw safely.
		⚫	:* Lack of means to attempt such a battle
		⚫	:* Ability to achieve desired objectives through other means
		⚫	:* Accepted practice
		⚫	:* Political concerns
			:* Possibility for enemy to declare fight to the death
			:* Fear of repercussions

			== See also ==
	In later times, the classic Napoleonic battle of annihilation has been rendered difficult or impossible by the great size and defensive ] of modern armies.
			* ]
			* '']''
			* ]
			* ] (antithesis)

			== References ==
	=== Using Other Means ===
			{{reflist}}

			== Sources ==
	If the object of war is to destroy the enemy's ability to resist politically, this may be achieved by other, less expensive, methods.
			* J. Nagl. (2005). ''Learning to eat soup with a knife''. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
			* Hart, B. H. Liddell. (1991) Strategy, Second Revised Edition. New York, Meridian.

			]
	For example, one may attempt to ] one's army in such a way as to cut off the enemy from his base of supplies. If this done successfully, the enemy may be forced to seek terms with his army intact. This sort of campaign was typical of ] armies, and is especially associated with the campaigns of ].
			]

	The ] of 1940 offers an example. After the Germans broke into the French rear at ], they were able to surround the main Allied armies and render their position untenable. No great battle of annihilation was required. (Alternatively, the Germans considered instead striking toward Paris. Capture of the French capital might have broken the French morale and ''political'' will to resist.)

	=== Accepted Practice ===

	In warfare, as in many avenues of human endeavor, the optimal application of material means is sometimes limited by the failure of imagination. A successful battle of annihilation generally requires great skill and daring on the part of the attacking commander. If a commander's training, experience, and peer relationships have not prepared him to expect a battle of annihilation, this alone may prevent him envisioning such a battle.

	=== Political Considerations ===

	If a war has limited political objectives, this may require the adoption of limited military strategy, including the disinclination to pursue a battle of annihilation.

	In the ], the Allied (mostly American) forces could have sought and probably won a battle of annihilation against the ]. It was decided, however, that the annihilation of the Republican Guard might have led to the dissolution of the Iraqi state, not a desired political objective.

	Some historians have speculated that Hitler declined to seek the destruction of the British army at ] in 1940 for political reasons -- to show magnimity by allowing the British to withdraw, facilitating a political end to the war. (This is disputed -- other historians feel that Hitler simply wanted to avoid the risk to his armored formations that a battle of annihilation would have required.)

⚫	== After Napoleon ==

⚫	Napoleon's victories at A] (1805) and ] (1806) are often cited as the classic battles of annihilation. Napoleon himself was unable to again achieve such decisive results, partly ~~due to~~ his enemies' ~~adjusting~~ to his tactics. For example, ], ~~while~~ a victory, did not result in the desired destruction of the Russian army.

	Nevertheless, post-Napoleonic strategists, most notably ], held the Napoleonic battle of annihilation to be the proper objective of modern military campaigns.

	Consequently, at the beginning of the ], many top military commanders, expected a battle of annihilation to quickly end the war. This did not occur. Already, the size and firepower of armies was making the battle of annihilation harder to achieve.

	A contrast may be seen between the Confederate general ] and the Union general ]. Lee, when on the offensive, usually maneuvered with the intent of forcing a battle of annihilation. His archetypical attempt was at the ], where a classic Napoleonic flanking maneuver defeated but was not able to destroy the Union Army under ].

	Lee may be faulted for attempting to achieve a battle of annihilation, particularly at ], in an age when this stratagem was becoming obsolete.

	In contrast, Grant was noted for waging campaigns of maneuver. In the ] campaign, he forced ]'s army into a siege position where it was forced to surrender without a battle.

	In the Virginia campaign of 1864 against Lee, he continually maneuvered around Lee, forcing him to withdraw further and further south until he had to choose between abandoning the Confederate capital of Richmond or withdrawing into siege lines.

	] may also be cited. Rather than pursuing the chimera of destroying ]'s army, he chose to operate directly against the Confederate economy. His famous march through Georgia, directly ''away'' from Hood, was basically the opposite of a Napoleonic strategy.

	Thus the quest for a battle of annihilation was not successful during the American Civil War. (A Confederate army was destroyed at the ], but this was not battle of annihilation in the sense discussed here; it was simply the overrunning of an already weak and demoralized army.)

⚫	The Napoleonic ideal was still alive at the beginning of ]. In fact, the Germans were able to execute a battle of annihilation against the Russian 2nd Army at the ] in the war's opening weeks. ~~But~~ attempts to create such a result on the ] resulted in great slaughter to no effect. Armies were now too large to have flanks to turn, and had too much firepower and too much defensive depth to be broken by assault.

⚫	Since World War I, the paradigm of armies maneuvering in the empty countryside for weeks and then meeting in a battle lasting (usually) a single day no longer applies (at least to wars between ]). Instead, armies are deployed in more-or-less continuous lines ~~stretching~~ perhaps hundreds of miles. Thus the battle of annihilation may be considered to be mainly of historical interest, except for secondary campaigns.

Latest revision as of 14:50, 20 October 2024

Military strategy seeking total destruction of an enemy's military capacity Not to be confused with War of annihilation, a war waged with the intent of obliterating a state or group of people.

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Annihilation is a military strategy in which an attacking army seeks to entirely destroy the military capacity of the opposing army. This strategy can be executed in a single planned pivotal battle, called a "battle of annihilation". A successful battle of annihilation is accomplished through the use of tactical surprise, application of overwhelming force at a key point, or other tactics performed immediately before or during the battle.

The end goal of a battle of annihilation is to cause the leaders of the opposing army to sue for peace due to the complete annihilation of its army and thus inability to further engage in offensive or defensive military action. It is not necessary to kill or capture all, or even most, of an opposing army's forces to annihilate it in the sense used here. Rather, the destruction of the enemy army as a cohesive military force able to offer further meaningful military offense or defense, even if temporarily, is the objective.

Significance

In ancient and classical times, many battles ended with the annihilation of one of the opposing forces, the Battles of Cannae, Zama and Adrianople being famous examples. From the Renaissance onward, however, the battle of annihilation strategy fell into disuse, at least in Europe. The greatest exception is seen in the battles of Napoleon Bonaparte, with whom the battle of annihilation in the modern sense is most closely associated, and term "Napoleonic battle of annihilation" is sometimes used. The Battle of Austerlitz is often cited as the paragon of the modern battle of annihilation.

Napoleon's victories at Austerlitz (1805) and Jena (1806) are often cited as the classic battles of annihilation. Napoleon himself was unable to again achieve such decisive results, partly because his enemies then adjusted to his tactics. For example, the Battle of Borodino was a victory but did not result in the desired destruction of the Russian army.

After Napoleon

Nevertheless, strategists, influenced by those of the Napoleonic era, most notably Antoine-Henri Jomini, held the Napoleonic battle of annihilation to be the proper objective of modern military campaigns. That interpretation was later accredited to the more renowned Carl von Clausewitz, initially by Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who supported arguments for strategies of annihilation with quotes from Clausewitz. However, Clausewitz disliked Jomini personally and his concepts and may have instead emphasized the primacy of the political in warfare, and remained indifferent to theories arguing for any absolute solutions via the application of military force. Nevertheless, that set the stage for mass confusion down the line of strategic thinkers. Clausewitz's trilogies (albeit used out of context) are contested by Liddell Hart, who claims in Strategy that a poor choice of words by Clausewitz led his interpreters to overestimate the value of battles of annihilation. Consequently, at the beginning of the American Civil War, many top military commanders mistakenly expected that a battle of annihilation would quickly end the war. However, the size and firepower of armies were making the battle of annihilation more difficult to achieve.

A contrast may be seen between Confederate General Robert E. Lee and Union General Ulysses S. Grant. Lee, when on the offensive, usually maneuvered with the intent of forcing a battle of annihilation. His archetypal attempt was at the Battle of Chancellorsville in which a classic Napoleonic flanking maneuver defeated but was not able to destroy the Union Army under Joseph Hooker. Lee may be faulted for attempting to achieve a battle of annihilation, particularly at the Battle of Gettysburg. In contrast, Grant was noted for waging campaigns of maneuver. During the Battle of Vicksburg, he forced John C. Pemberton's army into a siege position in which it was forced to surrender without a battle. In the Virginia campaign of 1864 against Lee, he continually maneuvered around Lee and forced him to withdraw further and further south until he had to choose between abandoning the Confederate capital, Richmond, or withdrawing into siege lines. William Tecumseh Sherman may also be cited. Rather than pursuing the chimera of destroying John Bell Hood's army, Sherman chose to operate directly against the Confederate economy. His famous march through Georgia, directly away from Hood, was basically the opposite of a Napoleonic strategy.

During the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussians (and later the Germans) made their own version of the battle of annihilation by destroying entire armies relatively quickly by means of rapid troop movement and rapid encirclement of the enemy. Those tactics came into fruition during the decisive battles of Metz and Sedan in which two main French armies were completely annihilated at the same time and relatively quickly, rendering France almost completely defenseless against the German invasion.

The Napoleonic ideal was still alive at the beginning of World War I. In fact, the Germans were able to execute a battle of annihilation against the Russian 2nd Army at the Battle of Tannenberg during the war's opening weeks. However, attempts to create such a result on the Western Front resulted in great slaughter to no effect. Armies were now too large to have flanks to turn and had too much firepower and too much defensive depth to be broken by assault.

Since World War I, the paradigm of armies maneuvering in the empty countryside for weeks and then meeting in a battle lasting usually a single day no longer applies (at least to wars between major powers). Instead, armies are deployed in more-or-less continuous lines that stretch perhaps hundreds of miles. Thus, the battle of annihilation may be considered to be mainly of historical interest, except for secondary campaigns.

The tactics executed by the Prussians during the Franco-Prussian War later served to inspire the blitzkrieg during World War II, with highly-mobile formations executing a battle of annihilation by charging straight into the enemy's weak point and attempt to encircle and destroy separate enemy pockets. The tactics became spectacularly successful during the German invasions of Poland, France and the Soviet Union until they themselves became annihilated by the Soviets in battles such as Stalingrad, Belorussia and Berlin.

During the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Navy's strategy was fixated on the goal of luring the numerically-superior United States Pacific Fleet into a single decisive battle of annihilation, which would force the United States to sue for peace. That was at least partially the motivation behind the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway but was loosely followed for as long as the IJN was capable of offensive operations. The goal was never achieved for several reasons. First, the US Navy was wary of committing all of its forces to one major battle. Further, the IJN concentrated so much of its efforts on preparing for a single massive showdown, which never truly occurred, that it neglected devoting resources towards protecting its naval supply lines, which soon fell prey to a Fabian strategy when they were extensively targeted by US submarines. Even Japanese victories such as the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands failed to annihilate their opponents utterly. The hoped-for "decisive battle" against the US Navy never came, and the IJN was gradually ground down through attrition.

Alternatives

Initially, it might seem that annihilation of the opposing army is the obvious object of any military campaign. However, many battles have been fought to cause an enemy army simply to retreat or to suffer attrition, and many campaigns have been waged to avoid, rather than seek, such a battle. Reasons for not seeking a battle of annihilation include the following:

Avoidance of the risk and cost associated with such a battle
Lack of means to attempt such a battle
Ability to achieve desired objectives through other means
Accepted practice
Political concerns
Possibility for enemy to declare fight to the death
Fear of repercussions

References

J. Nagl, (2005), p. 19.
Hart, B. H. Liddell, (1991), p. 319.
S. J. Lewis (2003). "The Battle of Stalingrad". Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Combat (PDF) (Report). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press For Leavenworth, KS. p. 23. Retrieved 2024-04-26. Stalingrad also represents one of the high points in the art of campaigning, clearly a decisive battle of annihilation with profound strategic implications.

Sources

J. Nagl. (2005). Learning to eat soup with a knife. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Hart, B. H. Liddell. (1991) Strategy, Second Revised Edition. New York, Meridian.

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