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{{Short description|Collective judgment, position, and opinion of the community of scientists}}
'''Scientific consensus''' is the collective judgement, position, and ] of the ] of ]s in a ] of study. Consensus implies general agreement, though not necessarily ]. Scientific consensus is not by itself a scientific argument, and it is not part of the ]. Nevertheless, consensus may be based on both scientific arguments and the scientific method. <ref>http://www.greenfacts.org/glossary/abc/consensus.htm</ref>
'''Scientific consensus''' is the generally held judgment, position, and opinion of the ] or the ] of ]s in a ] of study at any particular time.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Ordway |first1=Denise-Marie |date=2021-11-23 |title=Covering scientific consensus: What to avoid and how to get it right |url=https://journalistsresource.org/media/scientific-consensus-news-tips/ |access-date=2022-09-11 |website=The Journalist's Resource |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.greenfacts.org/glossary/abc/consensus.htm|title= Scientific Consensus|publisher= Green Facts|access-date= October 24, 2016}}</ref>


Consensus is achieved through ] at ], the ] process, replication of ] results by others, scholarly ],<ref>{{Cite book|title=Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate|last=Laudan|first=Larry|publisher=University of California Press|year=1984|isbn=0-520-05267-6|location=London, England, UK}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ford|first=Michael|date=2008|title=Disciplinary authority and accountability in scientific practice and learning|url=http://www.bu.edu/hps-scied/files/2012/11/Ford-HPS-Disciplinary-Authority-and-Accountability-in-Scientific-Practice-and-Learning.pdf|journal=Science Education|volume=92|issue=3|page=409|doi=10.1002/sce.20263|quote=Construction of scientific knowledge is first of all public, a collaborative effort among a community of peers working in a particular area. 'Collaborative' may seem a misnomer because individual scientists compete with each other in their debates about new knowledge claims. Yet this sense of collaboration is important: it checks individual scientists from being given authority for new knowledge claims prematurely.|bibcode=2008SciEd..92..404F}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Webster|first=Gregory D.|date=2009|title=The person-situation interaction is increasingly outpacing the person-situation debate in the scientific literature: A 30-year analysis of publication trends, 1978-2007|journal=Journal of Research in Personality|volume=43|issue=2|pages=278–279|doi=10.1016/j.jrp.2008.12.030}}</ref><ref>Horstmann, K. T., & Ziegler, M. (2016). Situational Perception: Its Theoretical Foundation, Assessment, and Links to Personality. In U. Kumar (Ed.), ''The Wiley Handbook of Personality Assessment'' (1st ed., pp. 31–43). Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. ("In ''Personality Assessment'', Walter Mischel focused on the instability of personality and claimed that it is nearly impossible to predict behavior with personality (Mischel, 1968, 2009). This led to the person-situation debate, a controversy in psychology that sought to answer the question whether behavior depended more on the subject's personality or the situation (or both) and has received considerable research attention (Webster, 2009).")</ref> and ]. A conference meant to create a consensus is termed as a consensus conference.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Przepiorka |first1=D. |last2=Weisdorf |first2=D. |last3=Martin |first3=P. |last4=Klingemann |first4=H. G. |last5=Beatty |first5=P. |last6=Hows |first6=J. |last7=Thomas |first7=E. D. |title=1994 Consensus Conference on Acute GVHD Grading |journal=Bone Marrow Transplantation |date=June 1995 |volume=15 |issue=6 |pages=825–828 |pmid=7581076 |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7581076/ |issn=0268-3369}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jennette |first1=J. C. |last2=Falk |first2=R. J. |last3=Bacon |first3=P. A. |last4=Basu |first4=N. |last5=Cid |first5=M. C. |last6=Ferrario |first6=F. |last7=Flores-Suarez |first7=L. F. |last8=Gross |first8=W. L. |last9=Guillevin |first9=L. |last10=Hagen |first10=E. C. |last11=Hoffman |first11=G. S. |last12=Jayne |first12=D. R. |last13=Kallenberg |first13=C. G. |last14=Lamprecht |first14=P. |last15=Langford |first15=C. A. |last16=Luqmani |first16=R. A. |last17=Mahr |first17=A. D. |last18=Matteson |first18=E. L. |last19=Merkel |first19=P. A. |last20=Ozen |first20=S. |last21=Pusey |first21=C. D. |last22=Rasmussen |first22=N. |last23=Rees |first23=A. J. |last24=Scott |first24=D. G. |last25=Specks |first25=U. |last26=Stone |first26=J. H. |last27=Takahashi |first27=K. |last28=Watts |first28=R. A. |title=2012 revised International Chapel Hill Consensus Conference Nomenclature of Vasculitides. |journal=Arthritis and Rheumatism |date=2013 |volume=65 |issue=1 |pages=1–11 |doi=10.1002/art.37715 |pmid=23045170 |url=https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c252d084-1ab1-45cf-8d98-f582618bb2db |language=en |issn=0004-3591|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Antzelevitch |first1=Charles |last2=Brugada |first2=Pedro |last3=Borggrefe |first3=Martin |last4=Brugada |first4=Josep |last5=Brugada |first5=Ramon |last6=Corrado |first6=Domenico |last7=Gussak |first7=Ihor |last8=LeMarec |first8=Herve |last9=Nademanee |first9=Koonlawee |last10=Perez Riera |first10=Andres Ricardo |last11=Shimizu |first11=Wataru |last12=Schulze-Bahr |first12=Eric |last13=Tan |first13=Hanno |last14=Wilde |first14=Arthur |title=Brugada syndrome: report of the second consensus conference: endorsed by the Heart Rhythm Society and the European Heart Rhythm Association |journal=Circulation |date=8 February 2005 |volume=111 |issue=5 |pages=659–670 |doi=10.1161/01.CIR.0000152479.54298.51 |pmid=15655131 |issn=1524-4539|doi-access=free }}</ref> Such measures lead to a situation in which those within the discipline can often recognize such a consensus where it exists; however, communicating to outsiders that consensus has been reached can be difficult, because the "normal" debates through which science progresses may appear to outsiders as contestation.<ref name="Shwed and Bearman 2010">{{cite journal|author1= Shwed Uri|author2= Peter Bearman|title= The Temporal Structure of Scientific Consensus Formation|journal= American Sociological Review|volume= 75|issue= 6|date= December 2010|pages= 817–40|doi= 10.1177/0003122410388488|pmid= 21886269|pmc= 3163460}}</ref> On occasion, scientific institutes issue position statements intended to communicate a summary of the science from the "inside" to the "outside" of the scientific community, or consensus review articles<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Anderegg|first1=William R. L.|last2=Prall|first2=James W.|last3=Harold|first3=Jacob|last4=Schneider|first4=Stephen H.|date=2010-06-07|title=Expert credibility in climate change|journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences|volume=107 |issue=27 |pages=12107–12109 |language=en|doi=10.1073/pnas.1003187107|issn=0027-8424|pmid=20566872|pmc=2901439 |bibcode=2010PNAS..10712107A |doi-access=free }}</ref> or ]s<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Cook|first1=John|last2=Oreskes|first2=Naomi|last3=Doran|first3=Peter T.|last4=Anderegg|first4=William R. L.|last5=Verheggen|first5=Bart|last6=Maibach|first6=Ed W.|last7=Carlton|first7=J. Stuart|last8=Lewandowsky|first8=Stephan|last9=Skuce|first9=Andrew G.|last10=Green|first10=Sarah A.|last11=Nuccitelli|first11=Dana|date=April 2016|title=Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming|journal=Environmental Research Letters|language=en|volume=11|issue=4|pages=048002|doi=10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002|bibcode=2016ERL....11d8002C |s2cid=470384 |issn=1748-9326|doi-access=free|hdl=1983/34949783-dac1-4ce7-ad95-5dc0798930a6|hdl-access=free}}</ref> may be published. In cases where there is little controversy regarding the subject under study, establishing the consensus can be quite straightforward.
] is normally achieved through communication at conferences, the process of publication, replication (reproducible results by others) and ]. These lead to a situation where those within the discipline can often recognize such a consensus where it exists, but communicating that to outsiders can be difficult. On occasion, scientific institutes issue position statements intended to communicate a summary of the science from the "inside" to the "outside". In cases where there is little controversy regarding the subject under study, establishing what the consensus is can be quite straightforward. Scientific consensus may be invoked in popular or political debate on subjects that are controversial within the public sphere but which may not be controversial within the scientific community, such as ].<ref>{{Cite web| title=Statement on the Teaching of Evolution|url=http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2006/pdf/0219boardstatement.pdf |publisher=American Association for the Advancement of Science |date=2006-02-16 |accessdate=2008-05-02}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web| title=NSTA Position Statement: The Teaching of Evolution|url=http://www.nsta.org/about/positions/evolution.aspx|publisher=National Science Teacher Association |date= |accessdate=2008-05-02}}</ref>


Popular or political debate on subjects that are controversial within the public sphere but not necessarily controversial within the scientific community may invoke scientific consensus: note such topics as ],<ref>{{Cite web| title= Statement on the Teaching of Evolution|url= http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2006/pdf/0219boardstatement.pdf |publisher= American Association for the Advancement of Science |date= 2006-02-16 |access-date= 2008-05-02}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web| title= NSTA Position Statement: The Teaching of Evolution|url= http://www.nsta.org/about/positions/evolution.aspx|publisher= National Science Teacher Association |access-date= 2008-05-02}}</ref> ],<ref> ''nationalacademies.org''</ref> the safety of ]s,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Nicolia|first1=Allesandro|last2=Manzo|first2=Alberto|last3=Veronesi|first3=Fabio|last4=Rosellini|first4=Daniele|date=2013|title=An overview of the last 10 years of genetically engineered crop safety research|url=https://doi.org/10.3109/07388551.2013.823595|journal=Critical Reviews in Biotechnology|volume=34|issue=1|pages=77–88|doi=10.3109/07388551.2013.823595|pmid=24041244|s2cid=9836802}}</ref> or the lack of a link between ].<ref name="Shwed and Bearman 2010" />


== How consensus can change over time == == Change of consensus over time ==
{{See also|Sociology of the history of science}}
There are many philosophical and historical theories as to how scientific consensus changes over time. Because the history of scientific change is extremely complicated, and because there is a tendency to project "winners" and "losers" onto the past in relation to the ''current'' scientific consensus, it is very difficult to come up with accurate and rigorous models for scientific change.<ref name="Pickering 1993">{{Cite book | last = Pickering| first= Andrew| author-link=Andrew Pickering |title = The Mangle of Practice | year = 1995 |publisher = Chicago University Press | location = IL | isbn = 978-0-226-66802-4 }}</ref> This is made exceedingly difficult also in part because each of the various branches of science functions in somewhat different ways with different forms of evidence and experimental approaches.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.nap.edu/read/1864/chapter/4|title="Responsible Science: Ensuring the Integrity of the Research Process: Volume I" |website= NAP.edu|year=1992 |doi=10.17226/1864 |pmid=25121265 |isbn=978-0-309-04731-9 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kerr|first1=John R.|last2=Wilson|first2=Marc Stewart|date=2018-07-06|title=Changes in perceived scientific consensus shift beliefs about climate change and GM food safety|journal=PLOS ONE|language=en|volume=13|issue=7|pages=e0200295|doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0200295|issn=1932-6203|pmc=6034897|pmid=29979762|bibcode=2018PLoSO..1300295K|doi-access=free}}</ref>


Most models of scientific change rely on new data produced by scientific ]. ] proposed that since no amount of experiments could ever ''prove'' a scientific theory, but a single experiment could ''disprove'' one, science should be based on ].<ref name="PopperLSR">{{Cite book | last = Popper| first= Karl Raimund| author-link=Karl Popper |title = The Logic of Scientific Discovery | year = 1934 | edition = 2002| publisher = Routledge Classics | location = New York | isbn = 978-0-415-27844-7 }} Originally published in German as {{cite book |title=Logik der Forschung: zur Erkenntnistheorie der modenen Naturwissenschaft |series=Schriften zur Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung |year=1935 |publisher=Springer | location=Vienna |oclc=220936200}}</ref> Whilst this forms a logical theory for science, it is in a sense "timeless" and does not necessarily reflect a view on how science should progress over time.
There are many philosophical and historical theories as to how scientific consensus changes over time. Because the history of scientific change is extremely complicated, and because there is a tendency to project "winners" and "losers" onto the past in relation to our ''current'' scientific consensus, it is very difficult to come up with accurate and rigorous models for scientific change. This is made exceedingly difficult also in part because each of the various branches of science functions in somewhat different ways with different forms of evidence and experimental approaches.


Among the most influential challengers of this approach was ], who argued instead that experimental ] always provide some data which cannot fit completely into a theory, and that falsification alone did not result in scientific change or an undermining of scientific consensus. He proposed that scientific consensus worked in the form of "]s", which were interconnected theories and underlying assumptions about the nature of the theory itself which connected various researchers in a given field. Kuhn argued that only after the accumulation of many "significant" anomalies would scientific consensus enter a period of "crisis". At this point, new theories would be sought out, and eventually one paradigm would triumph over the old one a series of ]s rather than a linear progression towards truth. Kuhn's model also emphasized more clearly the social and personal aspects of theory change, demonstrating through historical examples that scientific consensus was never truly a matter of pure logic or pure facts.<ref name="KuhnSSR">{{Cite book | last = Kuhn| first= Thomas S. |title=The Structure of Scientific Revolutions |year = 1962 | edition = 1996| publisher = University of Chicago Press, Chicago| isbn = 978-0-226-45808-3 | title-link= The Structure of Scientific Revolutions }}</ref> However, these periods of 'normal' and 'crisis' science are not mutually exclusive. Research shows that these are different modes of practice, more than different historical periods.<ref name="Shwed and Bearman 2010" />
Most models of scientific change rely on new data produced by scientific ]. The philosopher ] proposed that since no amount of experiments could ever ''prove'' a scientific theory, but a single experiment could ''disprove'' one, all scientific progress should be based on a process of ], where experiments are designed with the hope of finding empirical data that the current theory could not account for, indicating its falseness and the requirement for a new theory.<ref name="PopperLSR">{{Citation | last = Popper| name= Karl| title = The Logic of Scientific Discovery | year = 1934 | edition = 2002| pages=| publisher = Routledge Classics, New York | id = ISBN 978-0415278447 }}</ref>


==Perception and public opinion==
Among the most influential challengers of this approach was the historian ], who argued instead that experimental data always provide some data which cannot fit completely into a theory, and that falsification alone did not result in scientific change or an undermining of scientific consensus. He proposed that scientific consensus worked in the form of "]s", which were interconnected theories and underlying assumptions about the nature of the theory itself which connected various researchers in a given field. Kuhn argued that only after the accumulation of many "significant" anomalies would scientific consensus enter a period of "crisis". At this point, new theories would be sought out, and eventually one paradigm would triumph over the old one &mdash; a cycle of ]s rather than a linear progression towards truth. Kuhn's model also emphasized more clearly the social and personal aspects of theory change, demonstrating through historical examples that scientific consensus was never truly a matter of pure logic or pure facts.<ref name="KuhnSSR">{{Citation | last = Kuhn| name= Thomas S.| title = The Structure of Scientific Revolutions| year = 1962 | edition = 1996| pages=| publisher = University of Chicago Press, Chicago| id = ISBN 978-0226458083 }}</ref>
]
Perception of whether a scientific consensus exists on a given issue, and how strong that conception is, has been described as a "]" upon which other beliefs and then action are based.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Scientists are from Mars, Laypeople are from Venus: An Evidence-Based Rationale for Communicating the Consensus on Climate|journal=Reports of the National Center for Science Education|date=November–December 2014|volume=34|issue=6|url=http://reports.ncse.com/index.php/rncse/article/viewFile/347/599|access-date=2018-04-12|archive-date=2017-02-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170207164815/http://reports.ncse.com/index.php/rncse/article/viewFile/347/599|url-status=dead}}</ref>


== Politicization of science ==
Lastly, some more radical philosophers, such as ], have maintained that scientific consensus is purely idiosyncratic and maintains no relationship to any outside truth.<ref>Paul K. Feyerabend, ''Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge.'' Atlantic Highlands : Humanities Press, 1975.</ref> These points of view, while provoking much discussion, have generally not caught on, even with philosophers.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}}
{{Main article|Politicization of science}}


In public policy debates, the assertion that there exists a consensus of scientists in a particular field is often used as an argument for the validity of a theory. Similarly arguments for a ''lack'' of scientific consensus are often used to support doubt about the theory. {{citation needed|date=February 2018}}
: ''See:'' ]


For example, the ] is that ]s have increased in recent decades and that the trend is caused primarily by human-induced ].<ref name="OreskesBeyondTheIvoryTower">{{Cite journal| last = Oreskes| first = Naomi| author-link = Naomi Oreskes| title = Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change| journal = Science| volume = 306| page = 1686| date = December 2004| doi = 10.1126/science.1103618| pmid = 15576594| issue = 5702| doi-access = free}}</ref><ref name = "AmericasClimateChoices-2010-SciPanel">{{Cite book| publisher=The National Academies Press| isbn = 978-0-309-14588-6| title = Advancing the Science of Climate Change| location = Washington, D.C.| year = 2010| url = http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12782| doi = 10.17226/12782}}</ref><ref name="USNAS-2008-ClimateChoices">{{cite web|title=Understanding and Responding to Climate Change|url=http://dels-old.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/climate_change_2008_final.pdf|publisher=]|access-date=30 May 2010|year=2008|archive-date=23 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130423073539/http://dels-old.nas.edu/dels/rpt_briefs/climate_change_2008_final.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> The ] ] published an article in '']'' reporting that a survey of the abstracts of 928 science articles published between 1993 and 2003 showed none which disagreed explicitly with the notion of ].<ref name="OreskesBeyondTheIvoryTower"/> In an editorial published in '']'', Oreskes stated that those who opposed these scientific findings are amplifying the normal range of scientific uncertainty about any facts into an appearance that there is a great scientific disagreement, or a lack of scientific consensus.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Oreskes |first1=Naomi |author-link=Naomi Oreskes|title=Undeniable Global Warming |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26065-2004Dec25.html |access-date=26 December 2004 |newspaper=The Washington Post |ref=B07 |date= December 26, 2004 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080511222144/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26065-2004Dec25.html |archive-date=11 May 2008}}</ref> Oreskes's findings were replicated by other methods that require no interpretation.<ref name="Shwed and Bearman 2010" />
== Scientific consensus and the scientific minority ==
In a standard application of the psychological principle of ], scientific research which supports the existing scientific consensus is usually more favorably received than research which contradicts the existing consensus. In some cases, those who question the current paradigm are at times heavily criticized for their assessments. Research which questions a well supported scientific theory is usually more closely scrutinized in order to assess whether it is well researched and carefully documented. This caution and careful scrutiny is used to ensure that science is protected from a premature divergence away from ideas supported by extensive research and toward new ideas which have yet to stand the testing by extensive research. However, this often results in conflict between the supporters of new ideas and supporters of more dominant ideas, both in cases where the new idea is later accepted and in cases where it is later abandoned.


The theory of ] is also supported by an overwhelming scientific consensus; it is one of the most reliable and empirically tested theories in science.<ref name="NAS">{{cite journal | author=National Academy of Science Institute of Medicine | title=Science, Evolution, and Creationism | journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | pages= | publisher=National Academy Press | year=2008 | volume=105 | issue=1 | isbn=978-0-309-10586-6 | url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780309105866/page/3 |doi-access=free | doi=10.17226/11876 | pmid=18178613 | pmc=2224205 | url-access=registration }}</ref><ref>"That this controversy is one largely manufactured by the proponents of creationism and intelligent design may not matter, and as long as the controversy is taught in classes on current affairs, politics, or religion, and not in science classes, neither scientists nor citizens should be concerned." George J. Annas, ], Volume 354:2277–81 May 25, 2006</ref> Opponents of evolution claim that there is significant dissent on evolution within the scientific community.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Gould |first1=Stephen Jay |author-link1=Stephen Jay Gould |title=Evolution as Fact and Theory |url=http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/gould_fact-and-theory.html |website=Stephen Jay Gould Archive |access-date=1 January 2019 |archive-date=17 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190317103915/http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/gould_fact-and-theory.html |url-status=dead }} in ''Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes.'' New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994: 253–62.</ref> The ], a plan to promote ], depended greatly on seeding and building on public perceptions of absence of consensus on evolution.<ref>{{usurped|1=}} Discovery Institute, ''www.antievolution.org'' 1999.</ref>
] in his 1962 ] '']'' discussed this problem in detail.<ref name="KuhnSSR"/> Several examples of new concepts gaining acceptance when supported by accumulating evidence are present in the relatively recent ]. For example:


The inherent ], where theories are never ''proven'' but can only be ''disproven'' (see ]), poses a problem for politicians, policymakers, lawyers, and business professionals. Where scientific or philosophical questions can often languish in uncertainty for decades within their disciplinary settings, policymakers are faced with the problems of making sound decisions based on the currently available data, even if it is likely not a final form of the "truth". The tricky part is discerning what is close enough to "final truth". For example, social action against smoking probably came too long after science was 'pretty consensual'.<ref name="Shwed and Bearman 2010" />
* the theory of ] proposed by ] and supported by ] and ] but soundly rejected by most geologists until indisputable evidence and an acceptable mechanism was presented after 50 years of rejection.
* the theory of ] presented by ] and initially rejected by biologists but now generally accepted.
* the theory of ] proposed by ] and ] which is still debated but becoming more accepted in ].
* the theory of ]s -proteinaceous infectious particles causing ] diseases- proposed by ] and at first rejected because pathogenicity was believed to depend on ]s now widely accepted due to accumulating evidence.
* the theory of ] as the cause of stomach ulcers. This theory was first postulated in 1982 by ] and ] however it was widely rejected by the medical community believing that no bacterium could survive for long in the acidic environment of the stomach. Marshall demonstrated his findings by drinking a brew of the bacteria and consequently developing ulcers, subsequently curing himself with antibiotic medication. In 2005, Warren and Marshall were awarded the ] for their work on ''H. pylori''<ref>http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-wellbeing/health-news/nobel-for-scientist-who-poisoned-himself-to-prove-his-ulcer-theory-509513.html</ref>


Certain domains, such as the approval of certain technologies for public consumption, can have vast and far-reaching political, economic, and human effects should things run awry with the predictions of scientists. However, insofar as there is an expectation that policy in a given field reflect knowable and pertinent data and well-accepted models of the relationships between observable phenomena, there is little good alternative for policy makers than to rely on so much of what may fairly be called 'the scientific consensus' in guiding policy design and implementation, at least in circumstances where the need for policy intervention is compelling. While science cannot supply 'absolute truth' (or even its complement 'absolute error') its utility is bound up with the capacity to guide policy in the direction of increased public good and away from public harm. Seen in this way, the demand that policy rely only on what is proven to be "scientific truth" would be a prescription for policy paralysis and amount in practice to advocacy of acceptance of all of the quantified and unquantified costs and risks associated with policy inaction.<ref name="Shwed and Bearman 2010" />
For every new idea that has gained acceptance, there are far more examples of new ideas that were shown to be wrong. Two of the classics are ] and ]. However, most new ideas that have gained consesus were shown to be correct. This is because new ideas are typically being put forth by an individual and acceptance involves a great many individuals verifiying and/or duplicating scientific results.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}}


No part of policy formation on the basis of the ostensible scientific consensus precludes persistent review either of the relevant scientific consensus or the tangible results of policy. Indeed, the same reasons that drove reliance upon the consensus drives the continued evaluation of this reliance over time – and adjusting policy as needed.{{citation needed|date=February 2018}}
== Uncertainty and scientific consensus in policy making ==
{{Main|Politicization of science}}

In public policy debates, the assertion that there exists a consensus of scientists in a particular field is often used as an argument for the validity of a theory and as support for a course of action. Similarly arguments for a ''lack'' of scientific consensus are often encouraged by sides who stand to gain from a more ambiguous policy.

For example, many people of various backgrounds (political, scientific, media, action groups, and so on) have argued that there is a ]. The ] ] published an article in '']'' reporting that a survey of the abstracts of 928 science articles published between 1993 and 2003 showed none which disagreed explicitly with the notion of ].<ref name="Oreskes_science">Naomi Oreskes, "" ''Science'' 306:5702 (3 December 2004): p. 1686. Accessed 7 July 2006.</ref> In an editorial published in the '']'', Oreskes stated that those who opposed these scientific findings are amplifying the normal range of scientific uncertainty about any facts into an appearance that there is a great scientific disagreement, or a lack of scientific consensus.<ref name="Oreskes_washpost">Naomi Oreskes, "" ''Washington Post'' (26 December 2004): B07.</ref>

The theory of ] is an accepted part of the science of biology, to the extent that few observations in biology can be understood without reference to natural selection and common descent. Opponents of evolution claim that there is significant dissent on evolution within the scientific community.<ref name="gould"/> The ], an ambitious plan to supplant ] seen as inimical to religion, with a religion-friendly theistic science, depended greatly on seeding and building on public perceptions of absence of consensus on evolution.<ref> Discovery Institute, 1999.</ref> ] has argued that creationists misunderstand the nature of the debate within the scientific community, which is not about "if" evolution occurred, but "how" it occurred.<ref name="gould">Stephen Jay Gould, "" May 1981; in ''Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes.'' New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994: 253-262.</ref>

The inherent uncertainty in science, where theories are never ''proven'' but can only be ''disproven'' (see ]), poses a problem for politicians, policymakers, lawyers, and business professionals. Where scientific or philosophical questions can often languish in uncertainty for decades within their disciplinary settings, policymakers are faced with the problems of making sound decisions based on the currently available data, even if it is likely not a final form of the "truth". In this respect, going along with the "scientific consensus" of the day can prove dangerous in some situations: nothing looks worse on a record than making drastic decisions based on theories which later turned out to be false, such as the ] of thousands of mentally ill patients in the US during the 1930s under the false notion that it would end mental illness.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}}

Certain domains, such as the approval of certain technologies for public consumption, can have vast and far-reaching political, economic, and human effects should things run awry of the predictions of scientists. One might observe though, that in so far as there is an expectation that policy in a given field reflect knowable and pertinent data, and well attested and accepted models of the relationships between observable phenomena, there is little good alternative for policy makers than to rely on so much of what may fairly be called 'the scientific consensus' in guiding policy design and implementation, at least in circumstances where the need for policy intervention is compelling. While science cannot supply 'absolute truth' (or even its complement 'absolute error') its utility is bound up with the capacity to guide policy in the direction of increased public good and away from public harm. Seen in this way, the demand that policy rely only on what is proven to be "scientific truth" would be a prescription for policy paralysis and amount in practice to advocacy of acceptance of all of the quantified and unquantified costs and risks associated with policy inaction.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}}

Such considerations informed the development of 'the ]' most famously as Principle 15 of the ] of 1992. This stated that lack of scientific certainty was no reason to postpone action to avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm to the environment. Those who oppose robust and ubiquitous action to mitigate what the IPCC-led consensus sees as driving climate change frequently cite 'skepticism' as at the heart of 'true science' in an attempt to imply that concepts such as 'scientific consensus' can have no standing and thus play no role in public policy.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}} Yet where this argument is not simply an instantiation of special pleading for 'business-as-usual' policies one can argue that this simply makes a false amalgam between scientific methodology as an intellectual discipline and scientifically informed policy formation, which is the benchmark for rational public policy in all areas where debates about the quality and significance of measurable real-world phenomena are pertinent.{{Citation needed|date=September 2009}}

No part of policy formation on the basis of the ostensible scientific consensus precludes persistent review either of the relevant scientific consensus or the tangible results of policy. Indeed, the same reasons that drove relying on the consensus drive evaluating this reliance over time—and adjusting policy as needed.


== See also == == See also ==
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== Notes == == Notes ==
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{{Science and technology studies}}


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Latest revision as of 19:15, 22 September 2024

Collective judgment, position, and opinion of the community of scientists

Scientific consensus is the generally held judgment, position, and opinion of the majority or the supermajority of scientists in a particular field of study at any particular time.

Consensus is achieved through scholarly communication at conferences, the publication process, replication of reproducible results by others, scholarly debate, and peer review. A conference meant to create a consensus is termed as a consensus conference. Such measures lead to a situation in which those within the discipline can often recognize such a consensus where it exists; however, communicating to outsiders that consensus has been reached can be difficult, because the "normal" debates through which science progresses may appear to outsiders as contestation. On occasion, scientific institutes issue position statements intended to communicate a summary of the science from the "inside" to the "outside" of the scientific community, or consensus review articles or surveys may be published. In cases where there is little controversy regarding the subject under study, establishing the consensus can be quite straightforward.

Popular or political debate on subjects that are controversial within the public sphere but not necessarily controversial within the scientific community may invoke scientific consensus: note such topics as evolution, climate change, the safety of genetically modified organisms, or the lack of a link between MMR vaccinations and autism.

Change of consensus over time

See also: Sociology of the history of science

There are many philosophical and historical theories as to how scientific consensus changes over time. Because the history of scientific change is extremely complicated, and because there is a tendency to project "winners" and "losers" onto the past in relation to the current scientific consensus, it is very difficult to come up with accurate and rigorous models for scientific change. This is made exceedingly difficult also in part because each of the various branches of science functions in somewhat different ways with different forms of evidence and experimental approaches.

Most models of scientific change rely on new data produced by scientific experiment. Karl Popper proposed that since no amount of experiments could ever prove a scientific theory, but a single experiment could disprove one, science should be based on falsification. Whilst this forms a logical theory for science, it is in a sense "timeless" and does not necessarily reflect a view on how science should progress over time.

Among the most influential challengers of this approach was Thomas Kuhn, who argued instead that experimental data always provide some data which cannot fit completely into a theory, and that falsification alone did not result in scientific change or an undermining of scientific consensus. He proposed that scientific consensus worked in the form of "paradigms", which were interconnected theories and underlying assumptions about the nature of the theory itself which connected various researchers in a given field. Kuhn argued that only after the accumulation of many "significant" anomalies would scientific consensus enter a period of "crisis". At this point, new theories would be sought out, and eventually one paradigm would triumph over the old one – a series of paradigm shifts rather than a linear progression towards truth. Kuhn's model also emphasized more clearly the social and personal aspects of theory change, demonstrating through historical examples that scientific consensus was never truly a matter of pure logic or pure facts. However, these periods of 'normal' and 'crisis' science are not mutually exclusive. Research shows that these are different modes of practice, more than different historical periods.

Perception and public opinion

The public substantially underestimates the degree of scientific consensus that humans are causing climate change. Studies from 2019 to 2021 found scientific consensus to range from 98.7 to 100%.

Perception of whether a scientific consensus exists on a given issue, and how strong that conception is, has been described as a "gateway belief" upon which other beliefs and then action are based.

Politicization of science

Main article: Politicization of science

In public policy debates, the assertion that there exists a consensus of scientists in a particular field is often used as an argument for the validity of a theory. Similarly arguments for a lack of scientific consensus are often used to support doubt about the theory.

For example, the scientific consensus on the causes of global warming is that global surface temperatures have increased in recent decades and that the trend is caused primarily by human-induced emissions of greenhouse gases. The historian of science Naomi Oreskes published an article in Science reporting that a survey of the abstracts of 928 science articles published between 1993 and 2003 showed none which disagreed explicitly with the notion of anthropogenic global warming. In an editorial published in The Washington Post, Oreskes stated that those who opposed these scientific findings are amplifying the normal range of scientific uncertainty about any facts into an appearance that there is a great scientific disagreement, or a lack of scientific consensus. Oreskes's findings were replicated by other methods that require no interpretation.

The theory of evolution through natural selection is also supported by an overwhelming scientific consensus; it is one of the most reliable and empirically tested theories in science. Opponents of evolution claim that there is significant dissent on evolution within the scientific community. The wedge strategy, a plan to promote intelligent design, depended greatly on seeding and building on public perceptions of absence of consensus on evolution.

The inherent uncertainty in science, where theories are never proven but can only be disproven (see falsifiability), poses a problem for politicians, policymakers, lawyers, and business professionals. Where scientific or philosophical questions can often languish in uncertainty for decades within their disciplinary settings, policymakers are faced with the problems of making sound decisions based on the currently available data, even if it is likely not a final form of the "truth". The tricky part is discerning what is close enough to "final truth". For example, social action against smoking probably came too long after science was 'pretty consensual'.

Certain domains, such as the approval of certain technologies for public consumption, can have vast and far-reaching political, economic, and human effects should things run awry with the predictions of scientists. However, insofar as there is an expectation that policy in a given field reflect knowable and pertinent data and well-accepted models of the relationships between observable phenomena, there is little good alternative for policy makers than to rely on so much of what may fairly be called 'the scientific consensus' in guiding policy design and implementation, at least in circumstances where the need for policy intervention is compelling. While science cannot supply 'absolute truth' (or even its complement 'absolute error') its utility is bound up with the capacity to guide policy in the direction of increased public good and away from public harm. Seen in this way, the demand that policy rely only on what is proven to be "scientific truth" would be a prescription for policy paralysis and amount in practice to advocacy of acceptance of all of the quantified and unquantified costs and risks associated with policy inaction.

No part of policy formation on the basis of the ostensible scientific consensus precludes persistent review either of the relevant scientific consensus or the tangible results of policy. Indeed, the same reasons that drove reliance upon the consensus drives the continued evaluation of this reliance over time – and adjusting policy as needed.

See also

Notes

  1. Ordway, Denise-Marie (2021-11-23). "Covering scientific consensus: What to avoid and how to get it right". The Journalist's Resource. Retrieved 2022-09-11.
  2. "Scientific Consensus". Green Facts. Retrieved October 24, 2016.
  3. Laudan, Larry (1984). Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate. London, England, UK: University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-05267-6.
  4. Ford, Michael (2008). "Disciplinary authority and accountability in scientific practice and learning" (PDF). Science Education. 92 (3): 409. Bibcode:2008SciEd..92..404F. doi:10.1002/sce.20263. Construction of scientific knowledge is first of all public, a collaborative effort among a community of peers working in a particular area. 'Collaborative' may seem a misnomer because individual scientists compete with each other in their debates about new knowledge claims. Yet this sense of collaboration is important: it checks individual scientists from being given authority for new knowledge claims prematurely.
  5. Webster, Gregory D. (2009). "The person-situation interaction is increasingly outpacing the person-situation debate in the scientific literature: A 30-year analysis of publication trends, 1978-2007". Journal of Research in Personality. 43 (2): 278–279. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2008.12.030.
  6. Horstmann, K. T., & Ziegler, M. (2016). Situational Perception: Its Theoretical Foundation, Assessment, and Links to Personality. In U. Kumar (Ed.), The Wiley Handbook of Personality Assessment (1st ed., pp. 31–43). Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. ("In Personality Assessment, Walter Mischel focused on the instability of personality and claimed that it is nearly impossible to predict behavior with personality (Mischel, 1968, 2009). This led to the person-situation debate, a controversy in psychology that sought to answer the question whether behavior depended more on the subject's personality or the situation (or both) and has received considerable research attention (Webster, 2009).")
  7. Przepiorka, D.; Weisdorf, D.; Martin, P.; Klingemann, H. G.; Beatty, P.; Hows, J.; Thomas, E. D. (June 1995). "1994 Consensus Conference on Acute GVHD Grading". Bone Marrow Transplantation. 15 (6): 825–828. ISSN 0268-3369. PMID 7581076.
  8. Jennette, J. C.; Falk, R. J.; Bacon, P. A.; Basu, N.; Cid, M. C.; Ferrario, F.; Flores-Suarez, L. F.; Gross, W. L.; Guillevin, L.; Hagen, E. C.; Hoffman, G. S.; Jayne, D. R.; Kallenberg, C. G.; Lamprecht, P.; Langford, C. A.; Luqmani, R. A.; Mahr, A. D.; Matteson, E. L.; Merkel, P. A.; Ozen, S.; Pusey, C. D.; Rasmussen, N.; Rees, A. J.; Scott, D. G.; Specks, U.; Stone, J. H.; Takahashi, K.; Watts, R. A. (2013). "2012 revised International Chapel Hill Consensus Conference Nomenclature of Vasculitides". Arthritis and Rheumatism. 65 (1): 1–11. doi:10.1002/art.37715. ISSN 0004-3591. PMID 23045170.
  9. Antzelevitch, Charles; Brugada, Pedro; Borggrefe, Martin; Brugada, Josep; Brugada, Ramon; Corrado, Domenico; Gussak, Ihor; LeMarec, Herve; Nademanee, Koonlawee; Perez Riera, Andres Ricardo; Shimizu, Wataru; Schulze-Bahr, Eric; Tan, Hanno; Wilde, Arthur (8 February 2005). "Brugada syndrome: report of the second consensus conference: endorsed by the Heart Rhythm Society and the European Heart Rhythm Association". Circulation. 111 (5): 659–670. doi:10.1161/01.CIR.0000152479.54298.51. ISSN 1524-4539. PMID 15655131.
  10. ^ Shwed Uri; Peter Bearman (December 2010). "The Temporal Structure of Scientific Consensus Formation". American Sociological Review. 75 (6): 817–40. doi:10.1177/0003122410388488. PMC 3163460. PMID 21886269.
  11. Anderegg, William R. L.; Prall, James W.; Harold, Jacob; Schneider, Stephen H. (2010-06-07). "Expert credibility in climate change". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 107 (27): 12107–12109. Bibcode:2010PNAS..10712107A. doi:10.1073/pnas.1003187107. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 2901439. PMID 20566872.
  12. Cook, John; Oreskes, Naomi; Doran, Peter T.; Anderegg, William R. L.; Verheggen, Bart; Maibach, Ed W.; Carlton, J. Stuart; Lewandowsky, Stephan; Skuce, Andrew G.; Green, Sarah A.; Nuccitelli, Dana (April 2016). "Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming". Environmental Research Letters. 11 (4): 048002. Bibcode:2016ERL....11d8002C. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/4/048002. hdl:1983/34949783-dac1-4ce7-ad95-5dc0798930a6. ISSN 1748-9326. S2CID 470384.
  13. "Statement on the Teaching of Evolution" (PDF). American Association for the Advancement of Science. 2006-02-16. Retrieved 2008-05-02.
  14. "NSTA Position Statement: The Teaching of Evolution". National Science Teacher Association. Retrieved 2008-05-02.
  15. "Joint Science Academies' Statement" nationalacademies.org
  16. Nicolia, Allesandro; Manzo, Alberto; Veronesi, Fabio; Rosellini, Daniele (2013). "An overview of the last 10 years of genetically engineered crop safety research". Critical Reviews in Biotechnology. 34 (1): 77–88. doi:10.3109/07388551.2013.823595. PMID 24041244. S2CID 9836802.
  17. Pickering, Andrew (1995). The Mangle of Practice. IL: Chicago University Press. ISBN 978-0-226-66802-4.
  18. "Responsible Science: Ensuring the Integrity of the Research Process: Volume I". 1992. doi:10.17226/1864. ISBN 978-0-309-04731-9. PMID 25121265. {{cite book}}: |website= ignored (help)
  19. Kerr, John R.; Wilson, Marc Stewart (2018-07-06). "Changes in perceived scientific consensus shift beliefs about climate change and GM food safety". PLOS ONE. 13 (7): e0200295. Bibcode:2018PLoSO..1300295K. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0200295. ISSN 1932-6203. PMC 6034897. PMID 29979762.
  20. Popper, Karl Raimund (1934). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2002 ed.). New York: Routledge Classics. ISBN 978-0-415-27844-7. Originally published in German as Logik der Forschung: zur Erkenntnistheorie der modenen Naturwissenschaft. Schriften zur Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung. Vienna: Springer. 1935. OCLC 220936200.
  21. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996 ed.). University of Chicago Press, Chicago. ISBN 978-0-226-45808-3.
  22. "Public perceptions on climate change" (PDF). PERITIA Trust EU - The Policy Institute of King's College London. June 2022. p. 4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 July 2022.
  23. Powell, James (20 November 2019). "Scientists Reach 100% Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming". Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society. 37 (4): 183–184. doi:10.1177/0270467619886266. S2CID 213454806.
  24. Lynas, Mark; Houlton, Benjamin Z.; Perry, Simon (19 October 2021). "Greater than 99% consensus on human caused climate change in the peer-reviewed scientific literature". Environmental Research Letters. 16 (11): 114005. Bibcode:2021ERL....16k4005L. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/ac2966. S2CID 239032360.
  25. Myers, Krista F.; Doran, Peter T.; Cook, John; Kotcher, John E.; Myers, Teresa A. (20 October 2021). "Consensus revisited: quantifying scientific agreement on climate change and climate expertise among Earth scientists 10 years later". Environmental Research Letters. 16 (10): 104030. Bibcode:2021ERL....16j4030M. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/ac2774. S2CID 239047650.
  26. "Scientists are from Mars, Laypeople are from Venus: An Evidence-Based Rationale for Communicating the Consensus on Climate". Reports of the National Center for Science Education. 34 (6). November–December 2014. Archived from the original on 2017-02-07. Retrieved 2018-04-12.
  27. ^ Oreskes, Naomi (December 2004). "Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change". Science. 306 (5702): 1686. doi:10.1126/science.1103618. PMID 15576594.
  28. Advancing the Science of Climate Change. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 2010. doi:10.17226/12782. ISBN 978-0-309-14588-6.
  29. "Understanding and Responding to Climate Change" (PDF). United States National Academy of Sciences. 2008. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 April 2013. Retrieved 30 May 2010.
  30. Oreskes, Naomi (December 26, 2004). "Undeniable Global Warming". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 11 May 2008. Retrieved 26 December 2004.
  31. National Academy of Science Institute of Medicine (2008). "Science, Evolution, and Creationism". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 105 (1). National Academy Press: 3–4. doi:10.17226/11876. ISBN 978-0-309-10586-6. PMC 2224205. PMID 18178613.
  32. "That this controversy is one largely manufactured by the proponents of creationism and intelligent design may not matter, and as long as the controversy is taught in classes on current affairs, politics, or religion, and not in science classes, neither scientists nor citizens should be concerned." Intelligent Judging – Evolution in the Classroom and the Courtroom George J. Annas, New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 354:2277–81 May 25, 2006
  33. Gould, Stephen Jay. "Evolution as Fact and Theory". Stephen Jay Gould Archive. Archived from the original on 17 March 2019. Retrieved 1 January 2019. in Hen's Teeth and Horse's Toes. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994: 253–62.
  34. "The Wedge Document" Discovery Institute, www.antievolution.org 1999.
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