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{{Short description|US intelligence officer and diplomat (born 1950)}} | |||
] | |||
{{Infobox officeholder | |||
'''Joseph Cofer Black''' (born 1950, in ]) is an American official. He had a 28-year career in the Directorate of Operations at the ], culminating in his appointment as Director of the CIA's ] (CTC) in June 1999. | |||
| name = Cofer Black | |||
| image = Black jcofer sct.jpg | |||
Testifying at the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the ] in 2002, Black eschewed the offer of anonymity because "I want to look the American people in the eye".<ref> (copy on Federation of American Scientists' website).</ref> (It appears that this is how his identity became known to the public.) | |||
| office = 13th ] | |||
| president = ] | |||
Black was the ] Coordinator for ] with the rank of Ambassador at Large from December 2002 to November 2004. The point man for the U.S. government's international counter-terrorism policy in the first term of the ], he resigned shortly after ] was elected to a second ] term. | |||
| term_start = November 26, 2002 | |||
| term_end = November 15, 2004 | |||
From 2005 until 2008, Black was Vice Chairman of ], a US-based private security firm which is the State Department's biggest security contractor. | |||
| predecessor = ] | |||
| successor = ] | |||
Black is currently the chairman of the privately owned intelligence gathering company ]. | |||
| birth_name = Joseph Cofer Black | |||
| birth_date = {{birth year and age|1950}} | |||
| birth_place = ], ], U.S. | |||
| death_date = | |||
| death_place = | |||
| party = ] | |||
| education = ] (], ]) | |||
| awards = ] | |||
}} | |||
'''Joseph Cofer Black''' (born 1950) is an American former ] officer who served as director of the ] in the years surrounding the ], and was later appointed ] and ] at the ] by ], serving until his resignation in 2004.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Cofer Black |url=https://www.c-span.org/person/?coferblack|access-date=2017-07-09 |publisher=C-SPAN|language=en-us}}</ref> Prior to his roles combatting terrorism, Black served across the globe in a variety of roles with the ] at the CIA. | |||
==Early life and education== | |||
Black was born in 1950, in ], ]. His father was an airline pilot for ], where he flew ] ]s on international routes. Black's father would bring him along to ], ] or ], ] during school breaks for Cofer to explore the ]n countryside. Black attended an all-boys preparatory school at the ]. | |||
==Early life== | |||
In 1973, Black completed his BA at the ] (USC). The next year he earned a Master's degree in ], also at USC. Later that year he left the doctoral program to join the CIA.<ref name="collblack">Steve Coll, ''Ghost Wars'' (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp.266-7; | |||
" |
A native of ], Black completed his BA at the ] in 1973. The next year he earned a master's degree in ], also at USC. He then was accepted to a doctoral program at USC, but left in 1975 to join the CIA.<ref name="collblack">Steve Coll, ''Ghost Wars'' (Penguin, 2005 ed.), pp. 266-267; Cofer had friends in Southern California and made trips camping to Lake Tahoe, CA and Reno, NV." ({{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161225124621/http://www.blackwaterusa.com/press/cofer.asp |date=2016-12-25 }}), ] press release, Feb. 4, 2005.</ref> | ||
==CIA career up to 1999== | ==CIA career up to 1999== | ||
At the CIA, Black trained for the clandestine service and volunteered for ] based on his knowledge of the region from childhood travels with his father across the continent. Initially, he worked as a case officer in ], ] during the ]. He then transferred to ], where he served for two years during the conflict between ]ns and Somalis. He worked in ] during the ]'s war against guerrilla movements opposing the ] system. While assigned to ], ], Black was involved in the ]'s covert action program to arm anti-communist guerrillas in neighboring ].{{Citation needed|date=January 2024}} | |||
At the CIA, Black trained for the clandestine service and volunteered for ] due to his childhood experiences there. During his CIA career, Black served six foreign tours in field management positions. | |||
In 1993, Black transferred from ] to ], ], where he served as CIA ] until 1995. This was at a low point in ], due to the latter's sponsorship of terrorism and the harboring of ] and ] founder ]. Black oversaw the collection of ] (HUMINT) on terrorist cells and support structures; toward the end of his tenure, he was targeted by Al Qaeda for assassination (see Woodward, ''Bush at War'', p. 9). Black was also responsible for the collection of intelligence that led to the 1994 capture of the terrorist known as ]. | |||
Initially, he worked as a case officer in ], ] during the ] next door. He then transferred to ], where he served for two years during the conflict between ]ns and Somalis. He worked in ] during the ]'s war against guerrilla movements opposing the ] system. While assigned to ], ], Black was involved in the ]'s covert action program to arm anti-communist guerrillas in neighboring ]. | |||
In 1995, Black was named the Task Force Chief in the Near East and South Asia Division. From June 1998 through June 1999, he served as the Deputy Chief of the Latin America Division.<ref>Steve Coll, ''Ghost Wars'' (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp. 267, 271; " {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161225124621/http://www.blackwaterusa.com/press/cofer.asp |date=2016-12-25 }}", ] press release, Feb. 4, 2005.</ref> | |||
In 1993, Black transferred from ], ] to ], ], where he served as CIA Station Chief until 1995. This was at a low point in U.S.-Sudanese relations, particularly over the latter country's sponsorship of terror and the harboring of ] founder ]. Black oversaw the collection of ] on terrorist cells and support structures, and toward the end of his tenure, he was targeted by Al Qaeda for assassination. Black was also responsible for the collection of intelligence that directly led to the 1994 capture of the terrorist known as ]. | |||
==Director of CTC (1999–2002)== | |||
In 1995, Black was named the Task Force Chief in the ] and ] Division. From June 1998 through June 1999, he served as the Deputy Chief of the ] Division.<ref>Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp.267, 271; | |||
In June 1999 ] ] named Black director of the CIA's ] (CTC).<ref>Steve Coll, ''Ghost Wars'' (Penguin, 2005 ed.), p. 456.</ref> In this capacity, Black served as the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism as well as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism.<ref name="blackpresscofer">" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161225124621/http://www.blackwaterusa.com/press/cofer.asp |date=2016-12-25 }}," ] press release, Feb. 4, 2005.</ref> Black's promotion was a part of Tenet's "grand plan" for dealing with Al Qaeda. Black was the operational chief in charge of this effort. Tenet also put "Richard," one of his own assistants, in charge of the CTC's ]. Black still headed the CTC at the time of the ] attacks on the World Trade Center. | |||
"", ] press release, Feb. 4, 2005.</ref> | |||
===Al-Qaeda strategy, 1999–2001=== | |||
==Director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, 1999-2002== | |||
In December 1998, CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on ].<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp.436–7, and p.646 note 42; ''9/11 Commission Report'', , p. 357 ().</ref> Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden." In the spring, he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies." | |||
In June 1999 CIA chief ] named Cofer Black director of the CIA's ] (CTC).<ref>Steve Coll, ''Ghost Wars'' (Penguin, 2005 edn), p.456.</ref> In this capacity, Black served as the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism as well as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism.<ref name="blackpresscofer">"", ] press release, Feb. 4, 2005.</ref> Black's promotion was a part of Tenet's grand "Plan" for dealing with ]. Black was the operational chief in charge of this effort. Tenet also put "Richard", one of his own assistants, in charge of the CTC's ]. | |||
The CTC had produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, the ], the ], and other partners. The strategy was referred to as "the Plan." | |||
Black still headed the CTC at the time of the attacks of ]. | |||
<blockquote>... Black and his new bin Laden unit wanted to "project" into Afghanistan, to "penetrate" bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations—as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. Black wanted recruitments and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could "blend" into the region's Muslim populations.</blockquote> | |||
===Al-Qaeda strategy, 1999-2001=== | |||
In December 1998 CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on ].<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp.436-7, and p.646 note 42; ''9/11 Commission Report'', , p.357 ().</ref> Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden". In the spring he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies". | |||
Parallel with these developments, in November–December 1999, ], ], ], and ] visited Afghanistan, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as ].<ref>''9/11 Commission Report'', , pp. 155–8, 168 . Data derived from subsequent intelligence interrogations of captives.</ref> Working with a Malaysian security unit, the CIA watched al-Hazmi and his companion ] as they attended a January 2000 Al Qaeda conference in ], later determined to be where decisions about the "planes operation" were made.<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp. 487–88.</ref> | |||
The CTC had produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and "previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, and to ], the FBI, and other partners." The strategy "was called simply, 'the Plan'." | |||
According to an internal CIA report on the performance of the agency prior to the 9/11 attacks, Black was criticized for not informing the FBI that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had subsequently entered the United States.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/september11/story/0,11209,1557179,00.html |work=The Guardian |location=London |title=Tenet could face 9/11 reprimand |first=David |last=Fickling |date=August 26, 2005 |access-date=April 30, 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Giraldi |first=Philip |url=http://www.amconmag.com/2005_08_01/article3.html |title=Deep Background | The American Conservative |publisher=Amconmag.com |date=2005-08-01 |access-date=2012-10-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181225172227/https://www.theamericanconservative.com/ |archive-date=2018-12-25 |url-status=dead }}</ref> In addition, the ] found that while Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to information on the two hijackers, the 9/11 Commission found no such evidence of this.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch8.htm |title=National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States |publisher=9-11commission.gov |date= |access-date=2012-10-20}}</ref> | |||
<blockquote> | |||
... Black and his new bin Laden unit wanted to "project" into Afghanistan, to "penetrate" bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations — as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. ... Black wanted recruitments, and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could "blend" into the region's Muslim populations. | |||
</blockquote> | |||
The CIA increasingly concentrated its resources on counter-terrorism, so that resources for this particular activity increased sharply. Some of the Plan's more modest aspirations were translated into action. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and Al Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11," said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan."<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp. 457, 466–72, 485, and p. 654 note 7; {{dead link|date=December 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}; ''9/11 Commission Report'', , pp. 142–3 (); George Tenet, ''At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA'' (Harper Press, 2007), pp. 119, 120.</ref> | |||
Black also arranged for a CIA team, headed by "Richard", who was in charge of the CTC's ], to visit Northern-Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, to discuss operations against bin Laden. The mission was codenamed "JAWBREAKER-5", the fifth in a series of such missions since autumn 1997. The team went in late October 1999, and stayed for seven days. "The Bin Laden unit was satisfied that its reporting on Bin Ladin would now have a second source." Contemplated operations would be coordinated with the CIA's other prospective efforts against ]. | |||
During the summer of 2001, Tenet, Black, and one of Black's top assistants—"Rich B" (i.e. "Richard")—were active in conveying the dangers of Al Qaeda to the new Bush administration. At a meeting with National Security Adviser ] and others on July 10, 2001, "Rich" predicted a "spectacular" terrorist attack against US interests "in the coming weeks or months" ... "Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible." After the meeting, "Rich and Cofer congratulated each other," feeling that at last the CIA had gotten the full attention of the administration. At an internal CIA update in late July, "Rich" dramatically predicted, "They're coming here!" (i.e. the United States).<ref>George Tenet, ''At The Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA'' (Harper Press, 2007), pp. 145, 149, 150–3, 158.</ref> | |||
<blockquote> | |||
Once Cofer Black had finalized his operational plan .... Allen created a dedicated al-Qa'ida cell with officers from across the intelligence community. This cell met daily, brought focus to penetrating the Afghan sanctuary, and ensured that collection initiatives were synchronized with operational plans. Allen met with on a weekly basis to review initiatives under way. His efforts were enabling operations and pursuing longer-range, innovative initiatives around the world against al-Qa'ida. ... | |||
</blockquote> | |||
One of the ways by which CIA/CTC surveilled ] in his Afghan base was the ] reconnaissance drone. A joint CIA-] program of flights in autumn 2000 (dubbed "Afghan Eyes") produced probable sightings of the Al Qaeda leader. Black became a "vocal advocate" of arming the aircraft with missiles to ] bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. Throughout 2001, Black and "Richard" continued to press for Predators armed with adapted ]. Legal and technical issues delayed the program. Black urged Tenet to promote the matter at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001. The CIA chief did so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft." | |||
It is not clear what relation this "Qaeda cell", which appeared to duplicate the function of the ], had to the unit. | |||
===September 11, 2001=== | |||
Parallel with these developments, in November-December 1999 ], ], ] and ] visited Afghanistan, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as ].<ref>''9/11 Commission Report'', , pp.155-8, 168 . Data derived from subsequent intelligence interrogations of captives.</ref> Working with a Malaysian security unit, the CIA watched al-Hazmi and his companion ] as they attended a Qaeda conference in ] in January 2000 (later determined to be where decisions about the "planes operation" were made). | |||
After the attacks on the ] and ], some CTC staff refused an order to evacuate the ] at ]. This included the shift of the Global Response Center on the exposed sixth floor, which Black would eventually argue had "a key function in a crisis like this." CIA Director Tenet finally accepted that Black wouldn't leave, and that their lives would be put at risk.<ref>Tenet, ''At The Center of the Storm'', pp. 164-65. The conversation is a virtual replica of that given in Bob Woodward, '']'' (2002/3) ().</ref> | |||
The CTC obtained passenger lists from the planes that had been turned into weapons that morning, noting the presence of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. This was the first "absolute proof" that the attacks were an Al Qaeda plot.<ref>Tenet, ''At The Center of the Storm'', p. 167.</ref> The CTC had first come across the names in connection with potential terrorist activity in the winter of 1999–2000 (see above). | |||
<blockquote> | |||
"We surveil them. We surveil the guy they're there to meet," Black recalled. "not close enough to hear what they're saying, but we're covering, taking pictures, watching their behavior. They're acting kind of spooky. They're not using the phone in the apartment. They're going around, walking in circles, just like junior spies. Going up to phone booths, making a lot of calls. It's like, 'Who are these dudes?'"<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp.487-88.</ref> | |||
</blockquote> | |||
=== Post 9/11: Global War on Terror === | |||
According to an internal CIA report on the performance of the agency prior to the 9/11 attacks, Cofer Black was criticized for not passing on information to the FBI that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had subsequently entered the United States. <ref>http://www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/0,11209,1557179,00.html</ref><ref>http://www.amconmag.com/2005_08_01/article3.html</ref> In addition, the 9/11 Commission found that while Black testified before Congress’s Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to information on the two hijackers, the 9/11 Commission found no such evidence of this. <ref>http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch8.htm</ref> | |||
On September 13, 2001, Black briefed President George W. Bush in the White House Situation Room and outlined a CIA-led campaign in Afghanistan in which small teams of CIA officers and Green Berets would work with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government and expel Al Qaeda. Black told Bush: "When we're through with them, they will have flies walking across their eyeballs."<ref>Harnden, Toby, "First Casualty: The Untold Story of the CIA Mission to Avenge 9/11". Little, Brown, 2021. p. 46</ref> Black told Bush that the CIA's planning efforts had put them in a better position to respond after the attacks. Tenet later said, | |||
<blockquote>How could community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against ] in ninety-two countries around the world?<ref>Tenet, ''At the Center of the Storm'', pp. 121-2.</ref></blockquote> | |||
The CIA increasingly concentrated its diminished resources on counter-terrorism, so that resources for this particular activity increased sharply. At least some of the Plan's more modest aspirations were translated into action. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and al-Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11", said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan."<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'', pp.457, 466-72, 485, and p.654 note 7; ; ''9/11 Commission Report'', , pp.142-3 (); George Tenet, ''At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA'' (Harper Press, 2007), pp.119, 120.</ref> | |||
A "war council" (i.e. a restricted group of the ]) chaired by President Bush at ] was convened on September 15, 2001. Black was present. Tenet proposed first to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence and mount covert operations. The teams would act jointly with military ] units. President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been "a turning point in his thinking."<ref>''9/11 Commission Report'', , p. 332 (; Tenet, ''At the Center of the Storm'', p. *.)</ref><ref>Woodward, ''Bush at War'', pp. 52.</ref> | |||
During the summer of 2001, Tenet, Black, and one of Black's top assistants, "Rich B" (i.e. "Richard"), were active in advertising the dangers of ] to the new Bush administration. At a meeting with National Security Adviser ] and others on July 10, "Rich" predicted a "spectacular" terrorist attack against US interests "in the coming weeks or months" ... "Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible". After the meeting, "Rich and Cofer congratulated each other", feeling that at last the CIA had gotten the full attention of the administration. At an internal CIA update in late July, "Rich" dramatically predicted, "They're coming here!" (i.e. the USA).<ref>George Tenet, ''At The Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA'' (Harper Press, 2007), pp.145, 149, 150-3, 158.</ref> | |||
Black and ] then flew to Moscow to seek help from Russian diplomatic and intelligence officers, as Afghanistan was in their sphere of influence. The Russians indicated their willingness to help and would not obstruct CIA activities. They warned Black about guerilla fighters being a major problem for the Russian army in Afghanistan, and provided a team to the CIA to assist with extensive on-the-ground intelligence, especially about topography and caves.<ref>Woodward, ''Bush at War'', p. 103.</ref> | |||
One of the ways in which CIA/CTC surveiled ] in his Afghan base was with the ] reconnaissance drone. A joint CIA-USAF program of flights in autumn 2000 (dubbed "Afghan Eyes") produced probable sightings of the Qaeda leader. Black became a "vocal advocate" of arming the aircraft with missiles to assassinate bin Laden and other Qaeda leaders. During the new Bush administration in 2001, Black and "Richard" continued to press for Predators armed with adapted Hellfire anti-tank missiles. Legal and technical issues delayed the program. Black urged Tenet to promote the matter at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001. The CIA chief duly did so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft". ].] | |||
The CIA geared up to take the lead in the attack on Al Qaeda and the ] in Afghanistan. The Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team, led by ], entered the country on September 26, 2001. A new branch was added to the CTC—CTC Special Operations, or CTC/SO. ], the former head of CTC operations, was recalled to head it. Black told him, "Your mission is to find al-Qa'ida, engage it, and destroy it."<ref>Tenet, ''At The Center Of The Storm'', pp. 211, 217, 221-3.</ref> | |||
===September 11, 2001=== | |||
After the ] strikes on the ] and ], some CTC staff were exempted from an order to evacuate the CIA headquarters building at Langley. They included the shift of the Global Response Center on the exposed sixth floor, which Black argued had "a key function in a crisis like this". ] finally agreed with Black that their lives would have to be put at risk.<ref>Tenet, ''At The Center Of The Storm'', pp.164-65. The conversation is a virtual replica of that given in Bob Woodward, ''Bush At War'' (2002/3) ().</ref> | |||
Testifying at the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks in 2002, Black declined the offer of anonymity because "I want to look the American people in the eye."<ref> (copy on Federation of American Scientists' website).</ref> | |||
The CTC obtained passenger lists from "the planes that had been turned into weapons that morning". " CTC analyst raced over to the printing plant" (where most CIA staff had been evacuated) and pointed out the names ] and ], who they had "been looking for for the last few weeks". This was the first "absolute proof" that the attacks were a Qaeda plot.<ref>Tenet, ''At The Center Of The Storm'', p.167.</ref> (The CTC had first come across the names in connection with potential terrorist activity in the winter of 1999-2000 .) | |||
During the "war on terror" Black is said to have played a "leading role in many of the 's more controversial programs, including the ]/kidnapping and torture /] of al-Qaeda suspects and the detention of some of them in ] ."<ref>Dana Hedgpeth. , ''The Washington Post'', Nov. 3, 2007.</ref> A small group of officials within the CIA's Counter-terrorism Center was put in charge of supporting the prisons and managing the interrogations.<ref name="December 9">{{Cite web|first=Tessa|last=Berenson|title=Torture Report: A Timeline of the Interrogation Program |date=9 December 2014 |url=https://time.com/3625181/senate-torture-report-timeline/ |access-date=2022-01-12 |publisher=Time |language=en}}</ref> By some accounts, ] was taken into custody in March 2002 in Pakistan, and after initial U.S. interrogation and treatment for gunshot wounds, sent to a secret CIA torture center in Thailand, where he was waterboarded in April or May 2002.<ref name="December 9"/> | |||
===After 9/11: the "war on terror"=== | |||
The CIA's planning efforts had put them in a better position to respond after the attacks. As Tenet put it, | |||
==Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (2002–2004)== | |||
<blockquote> | |||
Black was appointed as the US Department of State's ] for counter-terrorism in late 2002. He held this position until November 2004.<ref name="blackpresscofer"/> | |||
How could community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against ] in ninety-two countries around the world?<ref>Tenet, ''At the Center of the Storm'', pp.121-2.</ref></blockquote> | |||
==Private sector work (2005–present)== | |||
This was at a "war council" (a restricted group of the ]) chaired by President Bush at Camp David on September 15, 2001. Cofer Black was also present. Tenet proposed firstly to send CIA teams into Afghanistan which would collect intelligence and mount covert operations. The teams would act jointly with military ] units. "President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking."<ref>''9/11 Commission Report'', , p.332 (; Tenet, ''At the Center of the Storm'', p.*.)</ref> | |||
=== Blackwater === | |||
From 2005 to 2008, Black was Vice Chairman of ] (later renamed Blackwater Worldwide, then Xe, and finally Academi), a US-based ] which was "the biggest of the State Department's three private security contractors".<ref>Matthew Lee, "", Associated Press, September 22, 2007. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071013010114/http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j5bT6zBuFB23rj9mMRTJbqC0xHYg |date=October 13, 2007 }}</ref> | |||
In March 2006, Black allegedly suggested at an international conference in ], that Blackwater USA was ready to move towards providing security professionals up to ] size for humanitarian efforts and ]. Black denies the allegation. Critics have suggested this may be going too far in putting political decisions in the hands of privately owned corporations.<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060523015246/http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm?story=102251&ran=202519&tref=po|date=May 23, 2006}}</ref> The company denies this was ever said.<ref>{{cite web|last=Curry|first=Chris|date=July 23, 2006|title=Inside America's Private Army|url=http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=107950&ran=140774|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926231848/http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=107950&ran=140774|archivedate=September 26, 2007|access-date=August 9, 2007|website=]}}</ref> | |||
Bob Woodward's ] mentions two meetings Black was present at while implementing this plan with memorable Blackisms. In a September 13 meeting with Bush<ref>Woodward, ''Bush at War'', pp.52.</ref> Black said | |||
Black resigned in 2008 reportedly after learning of illegal payments to Iraqi officials.<ref>MARK MAZZETTI and JAMES RISEN, "", ''The New York Times'', Nov. 10, 2009, p.A01.</ref> | |||
<blockquote> | |||
Now he noted the desired end was capture the al Qaeda and render them to law enforcement so they could be brought to justice. With regret, however, he had learned that the al Qaeda do not surrender, and they would not negotiate. The great martyred Northern Alliance leader ] had once told him "We've been fighting these guys for years and I've never captured one of these bastards". The reason was that any time one of their units was overrun they bunched together and detonated a hand grenade. So the task would be killing al Qaeda Black said. | |||
<P> | |||
"When we're through with them they will have flies walking across their eyeballs" he said. It was an image of death that left a lasting impression on a number of war cabinet ministers. Black became known in Bush's inner circle as the "flies on the eyeballs guy" ... Black's enthusiasm was infectious ... Powell, for one, saw that Bush was tired of rhetoric. The President wanted to kill somebody<ref>Woodward, ''Bush at War'', pp.53.</ref>. | |||
</blockquote> | |||
=== Blackbird Technologies & Total Intelligence Solutions === | |||
Later Black used the same technique to impress the Russians.<ref>Woodward, ''Bush at War'', pp.103.</ref> | |||
From 2009 to 2014, Black joined Blackbird Technologies as Vice President for Global Operations.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Black Hat ® Technical Security Conference: USA 2011 // Venue |url=https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-us-11/bh-us-11-speaker_bios.html |access-date=2024-04-11 |website=www.blackhat.com}}</ref> Blackbird was a technology contractor to intelligence, defense and corporate clients,{{Cn|date=August 2024}} before being acquired by Raytheon in 2014. Black later served as chairman of ] (Total Intel), a private intelligence gathering group. This company was created in February 2007 by the Prince Group, the holding company that owns Blackwater. Total Intel was formed by the merger of The Black Group LLC (also led by Black), ], and Technical Defense.<ref>Dana Hedgpeth, "", ''The Washington Post'', Nov. 3, 2007, p.A01.</ref> As of 2021, Total Intel has been absorbed by ], a business intelligence and crisis response consulting group. Black appears on the firm's list of consultants.<ref>{{Cite web|date=September 2, 2008|title=About OODA|url=https://www.ooda.com/about/|url-status=live|access-date=2021-02-22|website=OODA - Enabling Intelligent Action|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120110233336/http://www.ooda.com:80/about/ |archive-date=2012-01-10 }}</ref> | |||
<blockquote> | |||
] and Cofer flew to Moscow to seek help from top Russian diplomatic and intelligence officials. | |||
<P> | |||
"We're in a war," Black told the Russians. "We're coming. Regardless of what you do, we're coming anyway." He knew Afghanistan was in their sphere of influence and they would be queasy. "At the very least we want you to look away." He did not want the Russians trying to gum up CIA operations. "From my humble position, I think this is a historical opportunity. Let's get out of the last century into the next one. | |||
<P> | |||
The Russians indicated they would help and certainly not obstruct. One noted that Afghanistan was ambush heaven, where the guerrilla fighters had demolished the Russian army. "With regret," the Russian said, "I have to say that you're really going to get the hell kicked out of you". | |||
<P> | |||
"We're going to kill them," Black said. "We're going to put their heads on sticks. We're going to rock their world." | |||
<P> | |||
The Russians soon sent a team to the CIA to provide extensive on-the-ground intelligence, especially about the topography and caves of Afghanistan. | |||
</blockquote> | |||
=== Mitt Romney presidential campaigns === | |||
The CIA geared up to take the lead in the attack on al-Qaeda and the ] in ]. The ] team, led by ], entered the country once more on September 26, 2001. A new branch was added to the CTC — ], or CTC/SO. ], the former head of CTC operations, was recalled to head it. Black told him, "Your mission is to find al-Qa'ida, engage it, and destroy it".<ref>Tenet, ''At The Center Of The Storm'', pp.211, 217, 221-3.</ref> | |||
On April 26, 2007, Black was chosen by ] to head a campaign counter-terrorism policy advisory group during the ]'s ].<ref>{{cite web|date=2007-09-13|title=Romney names terrorism policy advisers - National Politics Blog - Political Intelligence|url=http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2007/09/romney_names_te.html?p1=MEWell_Pos3|access-date=2012-10-20|publisher=Boston.com}}</ref> | |||
In October 2011, Black was chosen by Romney to serve as "Special Adviser" on all foreign policy issues during his ].<ref>{{cite web|date=2011-10-06|title=Mitt Romney Announces Foreign Policy And National Security Advisory Team|url=http://www.mittromney.com/blogs/mitts-view/2011/10/mitt-romney-announces-foreign-policy-and-national-security-advisory-team|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20121011191606/http://www.mittromney.com/blogs/mitts-view/2011/10/mitt-romney-announces-foreign-policy-and-national-security-advisory-team|archivedate=2012-10-11|access-date=2012-10-20|publisher=Mittromney.com}}</ref> | |||
During the "war on terror" Black played a "leading role in many of the 's more controversial programs, including the rendition and interrogation of al-Qaeda suspects and the detention of some of them in secret prisons ."<ref>Dana Hedgpeth, , ''Washington Post'', Nov. 3, 2007.</ref> | |||
== |
=== Burisma === | ||
In February 2017, the Ukrainian oil and gas corporation ] announced the addition of Black to the company's board of directors, leading the company's security and strategic development efforts.<ref name="Nwazor">{{Cite web|url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/former-cia-director-joins-burisma-and-it-is-good-news_us_58adf600e4b01f4ab51c75a4|title=Former CIA Director Joins Burisma, and It Is Good News|last=Nwazor|first=Toby|date=2017-02-22|website=Huffington Post|language=en-US|access-date=2017-07-09}}</ref> | |||
===US Department of State's Ambassador (2002 - 2004)=== | |||
Black became the US Department of State's Ambassador-at-Large — roving ambassador — for counter-terrorism in late 2002. He held this position until November 2004. | |||
In the wake of the ], a report from '']'' associated Black's role at the firm with a group of "well-connected operatives in Washington to help persuade Ukrainian prosecutors to drop criminal cases against it."<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Grove|first1=Thomas|last2=Cullison|first2=Alan|date=2019-11-07|title=Ukraine Company's Campaign to Burnish Its Image Stretched Beyond Hunter Biden|language=en-US|work=]|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-companys-campaign-to-burnish-its-image-stretched-beyond-hunter-biden-11573154199|url-status=live|access-date=2021-02-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201101061943/https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-companys-campaign-to-burnish-its-image-stretched-beyond-hunter-biden-11573154199|archive-date=November 1, 2020|issn=0099-9660}}</ref> | |||
<blockquote> | |||
As the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism , Ambassador Black's office, S/CT, had primary responsibility for developing, coordinating and implementing U.S. counter-terrorism policy. On behalf of the Secretary of State, Ambassador Black represented the Department on the Counter-terrorism Security Group. His office played a leading role on the Department of State's counter-terrorism task forces organized to coordinate responses to international terrorist incidents. responsibilities included coordinating U.S. Government efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation with foreign governments, including the policy and planning of the Department's Antiterrorism Training Assistance Program.<ref name="blackpresscofer"/> | |||
</blockquote> | |||
During the 2020 presidential election, the Trump campaign shared an article from a conservative opinion outlet advancing a conspiracy theory connecting Black's work with Burisma and his connection to Mitt Romney's presidential campaigns. The campaign used the article to attempt to tie Romney to the growing Hunter Biden email controversy and discredit his vote to convict Trump during his ] as a product of corrupt collusion with the Bidens.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Nguyen|first=Tina|date=February 10, 2020|title=Trump world's latest attack on Romney: Tie him to Burisma|url=https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/10/trump-romney-burisma-113401|url-status=live|access-date=2021-02-22|website=]|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200211100700/https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/10/trump-romney-burisma-113401 |archive-date=2020-02-11 }}</ref> Romney associates contradicted the claims.<ref name=":0" /> | |||
===Defense Corporations (2005 - present)=== | |||
From 2005 to 2008 Black was Vice Chairman of ] (later renamed ]), a US-based private security firm which is "the biggest of the State Department's three private security contractors".<ref>Matthew Lee, "", Associated Press, September 22, 2007.</ref> Black resigned in 2008 reportedly after learning of illegal payments to Iraqi officials.<ref>MARK MAZZETTI and JAMES RISEN, "", ''The New York times'', Nov. 10, 2009, p.A01.</ref> | |||
=== Mueller investigation === | |||
Black is also Chairman of ] (Total Intel), a private intelligence gathering group. This company was created in February 2007 by the Prince Group, the holding company that owns Blackwater. Total Intel was formed by the merger of The Black Group LLC (also led by Black), Terrorism Research Center, Inc., and Technical Defense.<ref>Dana Hedgpeth, "", ''Washington Post'', Nov. 3, 2007, p.A01.</ref> | |||
Black's name appears in volume five of the 2020 ] report on ] produced following the investigation by ] ]. ], executive at ], an Israeli ] specializing in ] and ] campaigns, testified that apart from their pitch to the ], the firm had proposed projects to three other clients: Russian oligarchs ] and ], and Blackwater founder ], whom Black had introduced to Zamel in 2016.<ref>{{Cite report|url=https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf|title=Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election|date=November 10, 2020|volume=5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities|pages=696–699}}</ref> | |||
=== Other roles === | |||
In March 2006 Black allegedly suggested at an international conference in Amman, Jordan, that Blackwater USA was ready to move towards providing security professionals up to ] size for humanitarian efforts and low intensity conflicts. Black denies the allegation. Critics have suggested this may be going too far in putting political decisions in the hands of privately owned corporations.<ref></ref> The company denies this was ever said.<ref> </ref> | |||
In January 2016 Black became an independent director of publicly traded biotechnology company ] (NWBO), a ]-based development-stage ] company developing cancer ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nwbio.com/nw-bio-announces-appointment-of-two-new-independent-directors-with-biotechpharma-expertise-and-cybersecurityinvestigations-expertise/|title = NW Bio Announces Appointment of Two New Independent Directors with Biotech/Pharma Expertise and Cybersecurity/Investigations Expertise|date = 25 January 2016}}</ref> | |||
==Awards== | |||
==Mitt Romney Presidential Campaign== | |||
In addition to numerous exceptional performance awards and meritorious citations, Ambassador Black received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal; the CIAs highest achievement award, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, the George HW Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Donavan award, and the Exceptional Collector Award. | |||
On April 26, 2007 Black was chosen by ], a ] candidate in the ], to head his counter-terrorism policy advisory group.<ref></ref> Thus a person who failed to stop 9-11 is head of counter terrorism of GOP candidate. | |||
<ref>, Official State Department Bio.</ref> | |||
== |
==See also== | ||
*] | |||
In addition to numerous exceptional performance awards and meritorious citations, Black received the ], the ], and the ] for 1994.<ref name="blackpresscofer"/> | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
=== Citations === | |||
<!--See http://en.wikipedia.org/Wikipedia:Footnotes | |||
{{Reflist|2}} | |||
for an explanation of how to generate footnotes using the <ref> tags--> | |||
{{reflist|2}} | |||
=== General and cited references === | |||
* {{cite book | title = ] | author = ] | year = 2004 | publisher = Penguin Press | isbn = 1-59420-007-6}} | |||
{{refbegin}} | |||
* {{cite book | title = ] | author = ] | year = 2005 | publisher = Penguin Press | isbn = 0-14303-466-9}} | |||
* {{cite book | title = Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 | author = Steve Coll | year = 2004 | publisher = Penguin Press | isbn = 1-59420-007-6| title-link = Ghost Wars | author-link = Steve Coll }} | |||
* ], , '']'', December 4, 2005 | |||
* ], , '']'', December 4, 2005 | |||
* {{cite book | title = First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan | author = ] | year = 2006 | publisher = Presido Press | id = ISBN 089141875X}} | |||
* {{cite book | title = |
* {{cite book | title = First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan | author = Gary Schroen | year = 2006 | publisher = Presidio Press | isbn = 0-89141-875-X | url = https://archive.org/details/firstin00gary | author-link = Gary Schroen }} | ||
* {{cite book | title = |
* {{cite book | title = Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander | author = Gary Berntsen | year = 2005 | publisher = Crown Publishers | isbn = 0-307-23740-0 | url = https://archive.org/details/jawbreakerattack00bern | author-link = Gary Berntsen }} | ||
* {{cite book | title = Bush at War | author = Bob Woodward | year = 2002 | publisher = Simon and Schuster | isbn = 0-7432-4461-3| title-link = Bush at War | author-link = Bob Woodward }} | |||
{{refend}} | |||
==External links== | ==External links== | ||
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Latest revision as of 05:16, 7 October 2024
US intelligence officer and diplomat (born 1950)Cofer Black | |
---|---|
13th Coordinator for Counterterrorism | |
In office November 26, 2002 – November 15, 2004 | |
President | George W. Bush |
Preceded by | Frank Taylor |
Succeeded by | Henry A. Crumpton |
Personal details | |
Born | Joseph Cofer Black 1950 (age 74–75) Stamford, Connecticut, U.S. |
Political party | Independent |
Education | University of Southern California (BA, MA) |
Awards | National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal |
Joseph Cofer Black (born 1950) is an American former CIA officer who served as director of the Counterterrorism Center in the years surrounding the September 11th attacks, and was later appointed Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department by President George W. Bush, serving until his resignation in 2004. Prior to his roles combatting terrorism, Black served across the globe in a variety of roles with the Directorate of Operations at the CIA.
Early life
A native of Ridgefield, Connecticut, Black completed his BA at the University of Southern California in 1973. The next year he earned a master's degree in international relations, also at USC. He then was accepted to a doctoral program at USC, but left in 1975 to join the CIA.
CIA career up to 1999
At the CIA, Black trained for the clandestine service and volunteered for Africa based on his knowledge of the region from childhood travels with his father across the continent. Initially, he worked as a case officer in Lusaka, Zambia during the Rhodesian Bush War. He then transferred to Somalia, where he served for two years during the conflict between Ethiopians and Somalis. He worked in South Africa during the National Party government's war against guerrilla movements opposing the apartheid system. While assigned to Kinshasa, Zaire, Black was involved in the Reagan Administration's covert action program to arm anti-communist guerrillas in neighboring Angola.
In 1993, Black transferred from London to Khartoum, Sudan, where he served as CIA station chief until 1995. This was at a low point in U.S.-Sudanese relations, due to the latter's sponsorship of terrorism and the harboring of Carlos the Jackal and Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Black oversaw the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) on terrorist cells and support structures; toward the end of his tenure, he was targeted by Al Qaeda for assassination (see Woodward, Bush at War, p. 9). Black was also responsible for the collection of intelligence that led to the 1994 capture of the terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal.
In 1995, Black was named the Task Force Chief in the Near East and South Asia Division. From June 1998 through June 1999, he served as the Deputy Chief of the Latin America Division.
Director of CTC (1999–2002)
In June 1999 Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet named Black director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). In this capacity, Black served as the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism as well as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism. Black's promotion was a part of Tenet's "grand plan" for dealing with Al Qaeda. Black was the operational chief in charge of this effort. Tenet also put "Richard," one of his own assistants, in charge of the CTC's bin Laden tracking unit. Black still headed the CTC at the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.
Al-Qaeda strategy, 1999–2001
In December 1998, CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on Osama bin Laden. Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden." In the spring, he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies."
The CTC had produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, the NSA, the FBI, and other partners. The strategy was referred to as "the Plan."
... Black and his new bin Laden unit wanted to "project" into Afghanistan, to "penetrate" bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations—as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. Black wanted recruitments and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could "blend" into the region's Muslim populations.
Parallel with these developments, in November–December 1999, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Nawaf al-Hazmi visited Afghanistan, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as 9/11. Working with a Malaysian security unit, the CIA watched al-Hazmi and his companion Khalid al-Mihdhar as they attended a January 2000 Al Qaeda conference in Kuala Lumpur, later determined to be where decisions about the "planes operation" were made.
According to an internal CIA report on the performance of the agency prior to the 9/11 attacks, Black was criticized for not informing the FBI that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had subsequently entered the United States. In addition, the 9/11 Commission found that while Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to information on the two hijackers, the 9/11 Commission found no such evidence of this.
The CIA increasingly concentrated its resources on counter-terrorism, so that resources for this particular activity increased sharply. Some of the Plan's more modest aspirations were translated into action. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and Al Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11," said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan."
During the summer of 2001, Tenet, Black, and one of Black's top assistants—"Rich B" (i.e. "Richard")—were active in conveying the dangers of Al Qaeda to the new Bush administration. At a meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and others on July 10, 2001, "Rich" predicted a "spectacular" terrorist attack against US interests "in the coming weeks or months" ... "Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible." After the meeting, "Rich and Cofer congratulated each other," feeling that at last the CIA had gotten the full attention of the administration. At an internal CIA update in late July, "Rich" dramatically predicted, "They're coming here!" (i.e. the United States).
One of the ways by which CIA/CTC surveilled Osama bin Laden in his Afghan base was the Predator reconnaissance drone. A joint CIA-Air Force program of flights in autumn 2000 (dubbed "Afghan Eyes") produced probable sightings of the Al Qaeda leader. Black became a "vocal advocate" of arming the aircraft with missiles to target bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. Throughout 2001, Black and "Richard" continued to press for Predators armed with adapted Hellfire anti-tank missiles. Legal and technical issues delayed the program. Black urged Tenet to promote the matter at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001. The CIA chief did so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft."
September 11, 2001
After the attacks on the World Trade Center and The Pentagon, some CTC staff refused an order to evacuate the CIA headquarters at Langley. This included the shift of the Global Response Center on the exposed sixth floor, which Black would eventually argue had "a key function in a crisis like this." CIA Director Tenet finally accepted that Black wouldn't leave, and that their lives would be put at risk.
The CTC obtained passenger lists from the planes that had been turned into weapons that morning, noting the presence of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. This was the first "absolute proof" that the attacks were an Al Qaeda plot. The CTC had first come across the names in connection with potential terrorist activity in the winter of 1999–2000 (see above).
Post 9/11: Global War on Terror
On September 13, 2001, Black briefed President George W. Bush in the White House Situation Room and outlined a CIA-led campaign in Afghanistan in which small teams of CIA officers and Green Berets would work with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government and expel Al Qaeda. Black told Bush: "When we're through with them, they will have flies walking across their eyeballs." Black told Bush that the CIA's planning efforts had put them in a better position to respond after the attacks. Tenet later said,
How could community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against al-Qa'ida in ninety-two countries around the world?
A "war council" (i.e. a restricted group of the National Security Council) chaired by President Bush at Camp David was convened on September 15, 2001. Black was present. Tenet proposed first to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence and mount covert operations. The teams would act jointly with military Special Operations units. President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been "a turning point in his thinking."
Black and Armitage then flew to Moscow to seek help from Russian diplomatic and intelligence officers, as Afghanistan was in their sphere of influence. The Russians indicated their willingness to help and would not obstruct CIA activities. They warned Black about guerilla fighters being a major problem for the Russian army in Afghanistan, and provided a team to the CIA to assist with extensive on-the-ground intelligence, especially about topography and caves.
The CIA geared up to take the lead in the attack on Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team, led by Gary Schroen, entered the country on September 26, 2001. A new branch was added to the CTC—CTC Special Operations, or CTC/SO. Hank Crumpton, the former head of CTC operations, was recalled to head it. Black told him, "Your mission is to find al-Qa'ida, engage it, and destroy it."
Testifying at the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks in 2002, Black declined the offer of anonymity because "I want to look the American people in the eye."
During the "war on terror" Black is said to have played a "leading role in many of the 's more controversial programs, including the rendition/kidnapping and torture /interrogation of al-Qaeda suspects and the detention of some of them in secret prisons ." A small group of officials within the CIA's Counter-terrorism Center was put in charge of supporting the prisons and managing the interrogations. By some accounts, Abu Zubaydah was taken into custody in March 2002 in Pakistan, and after initial U.S. interrogation and treatment for gunshot wounds, sent to a secret CIA torture center in Thailand, where he was waterboarded in April or May 2002.
Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (2002–2004)
Black was appointed as the US Department of State's Ambassador-at-Large for counter-terrorism in late 2002. He held this position until November 2004.
Private sector work (2005–present)
Blackwater
From 2005 to 2008, Black was Vice Chairman of Blackwater USA (later renamed Blackwater Worldwide, then Xe, and finally Academi), a US-based private military contractor which was "the biggest of the State Department's three private security contractors".
In March 2006, Black allegedly suggested at an international conference in Amman, Jordan, that Blackwater USA was ready to move towards providing security professionals up to brigade size for humanitarian efforts and low intensity conflicts. Black denies the allegation. Critics have suggested this may be going too far in putting political decisions in the hands of privately owned corporations. The company denies this was ever said.
Black resigned in 2008 reportedly after learning of illegal payments to Iraqi officials.
Blackbird Technologies & Total Intelligence Solutions
From 2009 to 2014, Black joined Blackbird Technologies as Vice President for Global Operations. Blackbird was a technology contractor to intelligence, defense and corporate clients, before being acquired by Raytheon in 2014. Black later served as chairman of Total Intelligence Solutions (Total Intel), a private intelligence gathering group. This company was created in February 2007 by the Prince Group, the holding company that owns Blackwater. Total Intel was formed by the merger of The Black Group LLC (also led by Black), Terrorism Research Center, Inc., and Technical Defense. As of 2021, Total Intel has been absorbed by OODA group, a business intelligence and crisis response consulting group. Black appears on the firm's list of consultants.
Mitt Romney presidential campaigns
On April 26, 2007, Black was chosen by Mitt Romney to head a campaign counter-terrorism policy advisory group during the Republican's 2008 U.S. presidential campaign.
In October 2011, Black was chosen by Romney to serve as "Special Adviser" on all foreign policy issues during his 2012 presidential campaign.
Burisma
In February 2017, the Ukrainian oil and gas corporation Burisma announced the addition of Black to the company's board of directors, leading the company's security and strategic development efforts.
In the wake of the Hunter Biden email controversy, a report from The Wall Street Journal associated Black's role at the firm with a group of "well-connected operatives in Washington to help persuade Ukrainian prosecutors to drop criminal cases against it."
During the 2020 presidential election, the Trump campaign shared an article from a conservative opinion outlet advancing a conspiracy theory connecting Black's work with Burisma and his connection to Mitt Romney's presidential campaigns. The campaign used the article to attempt to tie Romney to the growing Hunter Biden email controversy and discredit his vote to convict Trump during his first impeachment trial as a product of corrupt collusion with the Bidens. Romney associates contradicted the claims.
Mueller investigation
Black's name appears in volume five of the 2020 Senate Intelligence Committee report on Russian interference in the 2016 presidential elections produced following the investigation by special prosecutor Robert Mueller. Joel Zamel, executive at Psy-Group, an Israeli private intelligence agency specializing in honey traps and perception manipulation campaigns, testified that apart from their pitch to the Trump campaign, the firm had proposed projects to three other clients: Russian oligarchs Oleg Deripaska and Dmitri Rybolovlev, and Blackwater founder Erik Prince, whom Black had introduced to Zamel in 2016.
Other roles
In January 2016 Black became an independent director of publicly traded biotechnology company Northwest Biotherapeutics (NWBO), a Maryland-based development-stage biopharmaceutical company developing cancer immunotherapies.
Awards
In addition to numerous exceptional performance awards and meritorious citations, Ambassador Black received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal; the CIAs highest achievement award, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, the George HW Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Donavan award, and the Exceptional Collector Award.
See also
References
Citations
- "Cofer Black". C-SPAN. Retrieved 2017-07-09.
- Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 ed.), pp. 266-267; Cofer had friends in Southern California and made trips camping to Lake Tahoe, CA and Reno, NV."Ambassador Cofer Black Becomes Vice-Chairman at Blackwater USA (Archived 2016-12-25 at the Wayback Machine), Blackwater USA press release, Feb. 4, 2005.
- Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp. 267, 271; "Ambassador Cofer Black Becomes Vice-Chairman at Blackwater USA Archived 2016-12-25 at the Wayback Machine", Blackwater USA press release, Feb. 4, 2005.
- Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 ed.), p. 456.
- ^ "Ambassador Cofer Black Becomes Vice-Chairman at Blackwater USA Archived 2016-12-25 at the Wayback Machine," Blackwater USA press release, Feb. 4, 2005.
- Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.436–7, and p.646 note 42; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 11, p. 357 (HTML version).
- 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 5, pp. 155–8, 168 HTML version. Data derived from subsequent intelligence interrogations of captives.
- Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 487–88.
- Fickling, David (August 26, 2005). "Tenet could face 9/11 reprimand". The Guardian. London. Retrieved April 30, 2010.
- Giraldi, Philip (2005-08-01). "Deep Background | The American Conservative". Amconmag.com. Archived from the original on 2018-12-25. Retrieved 2012-10-20.
- "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States". 9-11commission.gov. Retrieved 2012-10-20.
- Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 457, 466–72, 485, and p. 654 note 7; Tenet statement to the Joint Inquiry on 9/11, Oct. 17, 2002; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 4, pp. 142–3 (HTML version); George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (Harper Press, 2007), pp. 119, 120.
- George Tenet, At The Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (Harper Press, 2007), pp. 145, 149, 150–3, 158.
- Tenet, At The Center of the Storm, pp. 164-65. The conversation is a virtual replica of that given in Bob Woodward, Bush At War (2002/3) (Publisher's extract from chapter 1).
- Tenet, At The Center of the Storm, p. 167.
- Harnden, Toby, "First Casualty: The Untold Story of the CIA Mission to Avenge 9/11". Little, Brown, 2021. p. 46
- Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 121-2.
- 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 10, p. 332 (HTML version; Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. *.)
- Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 52.
- Woodward, Bush at War, p. 103.
- Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm, pp. 211, 217, 221-3.
- Testimony of Cofer Black (copy on Federation of American Scientists' website).
- Dana Hedgpeth. "Blackwater's Owner Has Spies for Hire", The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 2007.
- ^ Berenson, Tessa (9 December 2014). "Torture Report: A Timeline of the Interrogation Program". Time. Retrieved 2022-01-12.
- Matthew Lee, "Feds Target Blackwater in Weapons Probe", Associated Press, September 22, 2007. Archived October 13, 2007, at the Wayback Machine
- Archived May 23, 2006, at the Wayback Machine
- Curry, Chris (July 23, 2006). "Inside America's Private Army". The Virginian-Pilot. Archived from the original on September 26, 2007. Retrieved August 9, 2007.
- MARK MAZZETTI and JAMES RISEN, "Blackwater Said to Approve Iraqi Payoffs After Shootings", The New York Times, Nov. 10, 2009, p.A01.
- "Black Hat ® Technical Security Conference: USA 2011 // Venue". www.blackhat.com. Retrieved 2024-04-11.
- Dana Hedgpeth, "Blackwater's Owner Has Spies for Hire", The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 2007, p.A01.
- "About OODA". OODA - Enabling Intelligent Action. September 2, 2008. Archived from the original on 2012-01-10. Retrieved 2021-02-22.
- "Romney names terrorism policy advisers - National Politics Blog - Political Intelligence". Boston.com. 2007-09-13. Retrieved 2012-10-20.
- "Mitt Romney Announces Foreign Policy And National Security Advisory Team". Mittromney.com. 2011-10-06. Archived from the original on 2012-10-11. Retrieved 2012-10-20.
- Nwazor, Toby (2017-02-22). "Former CIA Director Joins Burisma, and It Is Good News". Huffington Post. Retrieved 2017-07-09.
- Grove, Thomas; Cullison, Alan (2019-11-07). "Ukraine Company's Campaign to Burnish Its Image Stretched Beyond Hunter Biden". Wall Street Journal. ISSN 0099-9660. Archived from the original on November 1, 2020. Retrieved 2021-02-22.
- ^ Nguyen, Tina (February 10, 2020). "Trump world's latest attack on Romney: Tie him to Burisma". POLITICO. Archived from the original on 2020-02-11. Retrieved 2021-02-22.
- Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election (PDF) (Report). Vol. 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities. November 10, 2020. pp. 696–699.
- "NW Bio Announces Appointment of Two New Independent Directors with Biotech/Pharma Expertise and Cybersecurity/Investigations Expertise". 25 January 2016.
- Link text, Official State Department Bio.
General and cited references
- Steve Coll (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Press. ISBN 1-59420-007-6.
- Dana Priest, "Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake: German Citizen Released After Months in 'Rendition'", The Washington Post, December 4, 2005
- Gary Schroen (2006). First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan. Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-875-X.
- Gary Berntsen (2005). Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander. Crown Publishers. ISBN 0-307-23740-0.
- Bob Woodward (2002). Bush at War. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-4461-3.
External links
- "Cofer Black". The Center for Torture Accountability. Archived from the original on 2009-05-12. Retrieved 2009-05-27.
- Appearances on C-SPAN
Diplomatic posts | ||
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Preceded byFrank Taylor | Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2002–2004 |
Succeeded byHenry Crumpton |
Blackwater | |
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- 1950 births
- American chief executives
- American spies
- Blackwater (company) people
- Canterbury School (Connecticut) alumni
- Living people
- People from Stamford, Connecticut
- People of the Central Intelligence Agency
- Recipients of the Distinguished Intelligence Medal
- USC School of International Relations alumni
- United States Ambassadors-at-Large
- University of Southern California alumni
- United States Coordinators for Counterterrorism