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{{Short description|1962–1971 US herbicidal warfare operation in the Vietnam War}}
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'''Operation ''Ranch Hand''''' was a U.S. Military operation during part of the ], lasting from 1962 until 1971. It was part of the overall ] program during the war called "Operation Trail Dust". Ranch Hand involved spraying an estimated 20 million US gallons of ]s and ]s over rural areas of ] in an attempt to deprive the ] of vegetation cover and food, in possible violation of the ].<ref>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJxb7CY13uc</ref>
'''Operation Ranch Hand''' was a U.S. military operation during the ], lasting from 1962 until 1971. Largely inspired by the British use of chemicals ] and ] (]) during the ] in the 1950s, it was part of the overall ] program during the war called "Operation Trail Dust". ''Ranch Hand'' involved spraying an estimated {{convert|19|e6U.S.gal|m3}} of defoliants and herbicides<ref name="Lewis">{{cite journal |first=James G. |last=Lewis |title=Smokey Bear in Vietnam |journal=Environmental History |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=598–603 |year=2006|doi=10.1093/envhis/11.3.598 }}</ref> over rural areas of ] in an attempt to deprive the ] of food and vegetation cover. Areas of Laos and Cambodia were also sprayed to a lesser extent. According to the Vietnamese government, the chemicals caused 400,000 deaths.<ref name=reuters/> The United States government has described these figures as "unreliable".<ref name="ReferenceB"/>
*... the United Nations passed a resolution that the use of any kind of biological or chemical weapon to kill plants in time of war is a violation of that protocol. <ref></ref>
Areas of Laos and Cambodia were also sprayed to a lesser extent. Nearly 20,000 sorties were flown between 1961-71.


The "Ranch Handers" motto was "" a take on the popular US Forestry poster of Smokey the Bear. During the ten years of spraying over 5 million acres of forest and 500,000 acres of crops were heavily damaged or destroyed. Around 20% of the forest of South Vietnam were sprayed at least once.<ref>Vo Quy, June 4, 2009. </ref> Nearly 20,000 sorties were flown between 1961 and 1971.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}} The "Ranch Handers" motto was "Only you can prevent a forest"<ref name="Lewis" /> – a take on the popular ] poster slogan of ]. During the ten years of spraying, over {{convert|5|e6acre|km2|sigfig=1}} of forest and {{convert|500000|acre|km2|sigfig=1}} of crops were heavily damaged or destroyed. Around 20% of the forests of South Vietnam were sprayed at least once.<ref>Vo Quy, 4 June 2009.</ref>


The herbicides were sprayed by the ] flying ]s using the call sign "Hades". The planes were fitted with specially developed spray tanks with a capacity of 1000 gallons of herbicides. A plane sprayed a swath of land that was 80 meters wide and 16 km (~10 miles) long in about 4½ minutes at a rate of about 3 gallons/acre.<ref>Buckingham, William. ''The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia''. Office of Air Force History. pg 132.</ref> Sorties usually consisted of 3 - 5 planes flying side by side. 95% of the herbicides and defoliants used in the war were sprayed by the US Air Force as part of Operation Ranch Hand. The remaining 5% were sprayed by the US ] and other military branches as well as the ] by hand sprayers, spray trucks, helicopters and boats primarily around US military installations.<ref>Stellman, Jeanne et al. '''' Nature. Vol 422. pg 681</ref> The herbicides were sprayed by the ] flying ]s using the call sign "Hades". The planes were fitted with specially developed spray tanks with a capacity of {{convert|1000|U.S.gal|m3|sigfig=1}} of herbicides. A plane sprayed a swath of land that was {{convert|80|m|abbr=on}} wide and {{convert|16|km|abbr=on}} long in about 4½ minutes, at a rate of about {{convert|3|U.S.gal/acre|m3/km2|sigfig=1}}.<ref>{{cite book|last=Buckingham|first=William A. Jr.|title=Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia 1961–1971|url=http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100928-054.pdf|access-date=1 February 2014|year=1982|publisher=Office of Air Force History|location=Washington, DC|isbn=978-0-87000-466-7|page=132|archive-date=23 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161123145823/http://www.afhso.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100928-054.pdf}}</ref> Sorties usually consisted of three to five aircraft flying side by side. 95% of the herbicides and defoliants used in the war were sprayed by the U.S. Air Force as part of Operation Ranch Hand. The remaining 5% were sprayed by the U.S. ], other military branches, and the Republic of Vietnam using hand sprayers, spray trucks, helicopters and boats, primarily around U.S. military installations.<ref name="Stellman">Stellman, Jeanne et al. "" ''Nature''. Vol 422. p. 681</ref>


==Herbicides== == Defoliants ==
]
The herbicides used were sprayed at up to 50 times the concentration than for normal agricultural use.{{citation needed|date=February 2016}} The most common herbicide used was Herbicide Orange, more commonly referred to as ]: a fifty-fifty mixture of two herbicides ] (2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and ] (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid) manufactured for the U.S. Department of Defense primarily by ] and ]. The other most common color-coded ''Ranch Hand'' herbicides were ] (]) that was primarily used against food crops, and ] which was often used when Agent Orange was not available.


The Agents used are known as the ] with their active ingredients, and years used were as follows:<ref>Stellman, Jeanne et al. Page 682</ref>
The herbicides used were sprayed up to 50 times the concentration that would have been use in normal agricultural use. The most common herbicide used was Herbicide Orange, more commonly referred to as ], a fifty-fifty mixture of two herbicides 2,4-D (2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and 2,4,5-T (]). The other most common color coded herbicides used were ] (]) that was primarily used against food crops and ] (]) often used when Agent Orange was not available.
*]: 100% ''n''-butyl ester 2,4,5-T, used prior to 1966<ref name="Young2009" />
*]: 100% 2,4,5-T (60% ''n''-butyl ester 2,4,5-T, and 40% iso-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T) used prior to 1966<ref name="Young2009" />
The Agents used, their active ingredients and years used were as follow:<ref>Stellman, Jeanne et al. Page 682</ref>
*] (60% - 40% ]: isobutyl ] of 2,4,5-T) used in 1961, 1965 *]: 50% 2,4,5-T (30% ''n''-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T, and 20% iso-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T) and 50% ''n''-butyl ester of ] used 1961–1965
*] (Phytar 560G): 65.6% organic ]ical (] (Ansar 138) and its sodium salt ])<ref name="Young2009" /> used from 1962–1971 in powder and water solution<ref name="HerbicidesMedicine1994"/>
*](n-Butyl ester 2,4,5-T) unclear when used but believed to be at the same time as Pink
*] (Tordon 101): 21.2% (acid weight basis) ] ] of 2,4-D and 5.7% ] used 1966–1971<ref name="Young2009" /><ref name="HerbicidesMedicine1994">{{cite book|author1=Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides|author2=Institute of Medicine|title=Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RjCHcoUE3B8C&pg=PA89|year=1994|publisher=National Academies Press|isbn=978-0-309-55619-4|pages=89–90}}</ref>
*] (50% n-Butyl Ester 2,4-D, 30% n-Butyl ester 2,4,5-T, 20% isobutyl ester 2,4,5-T) used from 1962 - 1965
*] or Herbicide Orange, (HO): 50% ''n''-butyl ester 2,4-D and 50% ''n''-butyl ester 2,4,5-T used 1965–1970
*] (Cacodylic acid ad sodium Cacodylate) used from 1962 - 1971 (in powder and water solution)
*Agent Orange II:50% n-butyl ester 2,4-D and 50% ] ester 2,4,5-T used after 1968.<ref name="Bull2004">{{cite book|author=Stephen Bull|title=Encyclopedia of Military Technology and Innovation|year=2004|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=978-1-57356-557-8|page=6}}</ref><ref name="Vallero2011">{{cite book|author=Daniel Vallero|title=Biomedical Ethics for Engineers: Ethics and Decision Making in Biomedical and Biosystem Engineering|year=2011|publisher=Academic Press|isbn=978-0-08-047610-0|page=73}}</ref>
*] (acid weight basis:21.2% tri-isopropanolamine salts of 2,4-D and 5.7% picloram) used from 1966 - 1971
*Agent Orange III: 66.6% n-butyl 2,4-D and 33.3% n-butyl ester 2,4,5-T.<ref name="Detrick">{{Cite report |publisher=U.S. Army Corps of Engineers St. Louis District |date=4 April 2012 |title=Archives Search Report Findings for Field Testing of 2,4,5-T and Other Herbicides |url=http://www.detrick.army.mil/responsible/ArchivalReport2012.pdf |page=116 |access-date=8 August 2013 |archive-date=22 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161222092755/https://www.detrick.army.mil/responsible/ArchivalReport2012.pdf }}</ref>
*] (50% n-Butyl ester 2,4-D and 50% -Butyl ester 2,4,5-T) used from 1965 - 1970
*Enhanced Agent Orange, Orange Plus, ] (SO), or DOW Herbicide M-3393: standardized Agent Orange mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T combined with an oil-based mixture of ], a proprietary Dow Chemical product called ], an ingredient of Agent White.<ref name="SuperOrange">{{citation|title= Operational Evaluation of Super-Orange (U)- unclassified|last1=Corcoran |first1=Charles A. |date=December 1968|work=Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MAC-V) to Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) message for CINCPAC, USARPAC Ofc Science Adviser |publisher=National Security Archives at George Washington University }}</ref><ref name="DOW">{{Cite report |date=9 September 1966 |title=DGSC-PI Memorandum for the record: Herbicides reformulation thereof (Operation Guns and Butter meeting) |publisher=DOW Chemical Company }}</ref>


The herbicides were procured by the US military from ] (all but Blue), ] (Orange, Purple and Pink), ] (Orange and Purple), Thompson-Hayward Chemical Company (Orange and Pink), ]/Shamrock Company (Orange, Blue, Purple and Pink), ] (Orange), Thompson Chemicals Corporation (Orange and Pink), Agrisect Company (Orange and Purple), Hoffman-Taft Inc (Orange), and the ] Chemical Company (Blue). <ref>Young, Alvin L. ''The History, Use, Disposition and Environmental Fate of Agent Orange''. Springer, 2009. pg. 44.</ref> The herbicides were procured by the U.S. military from ] (all but Agent Blue), ] (Agent Orange, Agent Purple, and Agent Pink), ] (Agent Orange and Agent Purple), Thompson-Hayward Chemical Company (Agent Orange and Agent Pink), ]/Shamrock Company (Agent Orange, Agent Blue, Agent Purple, and Agent Pink), ] (Agent Orange), Thompson Chemicals Corporation (Agent Orange and Agent Pink), Agrisect Company (Agent Orange and Agent Purple), ] (Agent Orange), and the ] Chemical Company (Agent Blue).<ref name="Young2009">Young, Alvin L. ''The History, Use, Disposition and Environmental Fate of Agent Orange''. Springer, 2009. p. 44.</ref> In April 1967, the entire American domestic production of 2,4,5-T was confiscated by the military; foreign sources were also tapped into, including the ] (ICI).<ref name="Schnibben_1992">Der Spiegel, 32/1991: by Cordt Schnibben (accessed 2013-07-30)</ref>


65% of the herbicides used contained ] that was found to have been contaminated with ] a known human carcinogen.{{fact|need to specify when and how it became known}} About 12 million gallons of dioxin contaminated herbicides were sprayed over Southeast Asia during American combat operations.<ref name=pellow>Pellow, David N. ''Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice'', (), MIT Press, 2007, p. 159, (ISBN 026216244X).</ref>. 65% of the herbicides used contained ] that <!-- either "HAD(earlier! ~1957) been found to have been" or "was KNOWN to be" or, lets KISS: -->was contaminated with ],<ref name="Stellman" /> a <!-- human ] by all ].{{Citation needed|reason=need to specify when and how it became known|date=July 2010}} -->"''known human carcinogen''<!--italics in orig.-->... by several different routes of exposure, including oral, dermal, and ]".<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130217045309/http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/profiles/Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin.pdf |date=17 February 2013 }} (accessed 2013-07-30)</ref> About {{convert|12,000,000|U.S.gal|abbr=on}} of ]-contaminated herbicides were sprayed over ] (mainly in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) during American combat operations in the Vietnam War.<ref name=pellow>Pellow, David N. ''Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice'', (), MIT Press, 2007, p. 159, ({{ISBN|0-262-16244-X}}).</ref>


In 2005, the ] government confirmed that it supplied Agent Orange chemicals to the ] during the conflict. Since the early 1960s, and up until 1987, it manufactured the ''2,4,5T'' herbicide at a plant in ], which was then shipped to U.S. military bases in ].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=500855&ObjectID=9006182 |title=Government probes claims NZ exported Agent Orange |accessdate=2005-01-11 |format= |work=The New Zealand Harald }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1279024.htm |title=NZ admits supplying Agent Orange during war |accessdate=2005-01-09 |work=Australian Broadcasting Corporation }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.safe2use.com/ca-ipm/01-05-16c.htm |title=THE POISONING OF NEW ZEALAND |accessdate=2005-11-17 |work=Safe 2 Use }}</ref> In 2005, a New Zealand government minister was quoted and widely reported as saying that Agent Orange chemicals had been supplied from New Zealand to the United States military during the conflict. Shortly after, the same minister claimed to have been mis-quoted, although this point was less widely reported. From 1962 to 1987, ''2,4,5-T'' herbicide had been manufactured at an Ivon Watkins-Dow plant in ] for domestic use, however it has not been proven that the herbicide had been exported for use by the U.S military in Vietnam.<ref>'At a price: manufacturing Agent Orange in NZ? ', URL: https://vietnamwar.govt.nz/memory/price-manufacturing-agent-orange-nz, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 04-Jul-2014</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=500855&ObjectID=9006182 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120716215858/http://subs.nzherald.co.nz/feature/story.cfm?c_id=500855&ObjectID=9006182 |archive-date=16 July 2012 |title=Government probes claims NZ exported Agent Orange |access-date=11 January 2005 |work=The New Zealand Herald |first=Kevin |last=Taylor |date=11 January 2005 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1279024.htm |title=NZ admits supplying Agent Orange during war |access-date=9 January 2005 |publisher=Australian Broadcasting Corporation }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=9006308 |title=MP denies evidence of Agent Orange exports |access-date=12 January 2005 |work=The New Zealand Herald|date=12 January 2005}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.safe2use.com/ca-ipm/01-05-16c.htm |title=The Poisoning of New Zealand |access-date=17 November 2005 |work=Safe 2 Use }}</ref>


==Operations== ==Operations==
For most of the war 'Operation Ranch Hand' was based out of the Bien Hoa Air Base (1966 - 1970) for operations in the ] region where the ] ]s were vulnerable to attack from the undergrowth at the water's edge. The storage, mixing, loading, washing and parking ramp was just off the inside taxiway between the Hot Cargo Ramp and the Control Tower. For operations along the central coast and the ] regions Ranch Hand operated out of the Da Nang Air Base (1964-71). Other bases of operation included Phu Cat AB (1968 - 1970), Ton San Nhut AB (1962-66), Nha Trang AB (1968-69) Phan Rang AB (1970-72), and Tuy Hoa AB (1971-72).<ref>Young. Alvin L. Pg 62.</ref> Other bases were also used as temporary staging areas for Ranch Hand. The Da Nang, Bien Hoa and Phu Cat Air bases are still heavily contaminated with dioxin from the herbicides and have been placed a priority list for containment and clean-up by the Vietnamese government. For most of the war, Operation Ranch Hand was based at ] (1966–1970), for operations in the ] region where U.S. Navy patrol boats were vulnerable to attack from areas of undergrowth along the water's edge. Storage, mixing, loading, and washing areas and a parking ramp were located just off the base's inside taxiway between the Hot Cargo Ramp and the control tower. For operations along the central coast and the ] regions, ''Ranch Hand'' operated out of ] (1964–1971). Other bases of operation included ] (1968–1970), ] (1962–1966), ] (1968–69), ] (1970–1972), and ] (1971–1972).<ref>Young. Alvin L. p. 62.</ref> Other bases were also used as temporary staging areas for ''Ranch Hand''. The Da Nang, Bien Hoa and Phu Cat Air bases are still heavily contaminated with ] from the herbicides, and have been placed on a priority list for containment and clean-up by the Vietnamese government.


The first aerial spraying of herbicides was a test run conducted on August 10, 1961 in a village north of Dak To against foliage. Testing continued over the next year and even though there was doubt in the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House to the efficacy of the herbicides "Operation Ranch Hand" began in early 1962. Individual spray runs had to be approved by President ] until November 1962 when Kennedy gave the authority to approve most spray runs to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and the US Ambassador to South Viet Nam. Ranch Hand was given final approval to spray targets in eastern Laos in December 1965.<ref>Buckingham, William. Chapter IV.</ref> The first aerial spraying of herbicides was a test run conducted on 10 August 1961 in a village north of ] against foliage.<ref name="Buckingham">{{cite book |url=https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/28/2001329797/-1/-1/0/AFD-100928-054.pdf |title=Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia 1961–1971 |first=William A. |last=Buckingham Jr. |publisher=Office of Air Force History |year=1982}}</ref>{{rp|11}} Testing continued over the next year and even though there was doubt in the ], ] and the White House as to the efficacy of the herbicides, Operation Ranch Hand began in early 1962. Individual spray runs had to be approved by President ] until November 1962, when Kennedy gave the authority to approve most spray runs to the ] and the ]. ''Ranch Hand'' was given final approval to spray targets in eastern Laos in December 1965.<ref name="Buckingham" />{{rp|45–68}}


The issue of whether or not to allow crop destruction was under great debate due to its potential of violating the Geneva Convention. The president of South Vietnam, ] began to push the ] in Vietnam and the White House to begin crop destruction in September 1961 but it was not until October 1962 when the White House gave approval for limited testing of Agent Blue against crops in an area believed to be controlled by the Viet Cong.<ref>Buckingham, William. Chapter V.</ref> Soon after crop destruction became an integral part of the Ranch Hand program. The issue of whether or not to allow crop destruction was under great debate due to its potential of violating the ].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm |title=Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) |publisher=U.S. Department of State |date=25 September 2002 |access-date=24 August 2013}}</ref> However, American officials pointed out that the British had previously used 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D (virtually identical to America's use in Vietnam) on a large scale throughout the ] in the 1950s in order to destroy bushes, crops, and trees in effort to deny communist insurgents the cover they needed to ambush passing convoys.<ref>{{cite book |title=The Global Politics of Pesticides: Forging Consensus from Conflicting Interests |page=61 |author=Bruce Cumings |year=1998 |publisher=]}}</ref> Indeed, ] ] told President Kennedy on 24 November 1961, that "he use of defoliant does not violate any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is an accepted tactic of war. Precedent has been established by the British during the emergency in Malaya in their use of aircraft for destroying crops by chemical spraying."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d275 |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume I, Vietnam, 1961, Document 275 |publisher=History.state.gov |access-date=2014-02-24}}</ref> The president of South Vietnam, ] began to push the ] in Vietnam and the ] to begin crop destruction in September 1961, but it was not until October 1962 when the White House gave approval for limited testing of Agent Blue against crops in an area believed to be controlled by the Viet Cong.{{citation needed|date=October 2023}} Soon after, crop destruction became an integral part of the ''Ranch Hand'' program.


The targets for the spray runs were carefully selected to satisfy the strategic and ] goals of the US and South Vietnamese military. The runs were surveyed to pinpoint the target area and then placed on a priority list. Due to the low altitude required for spraying, (ideally 150 feet above ground), the C-123s were escorted by fighter planes that would strafe or bomb the target area in order to draw out any ground fire if the area was believed to be 'hot'. Runs were planned to enable as straight a run as possible to limit the amount of time the planes were at low altitude. Data on the spray runs, their targets, the herbicide used and amount used, the weather and other details were kept and later put into a data base called the HERBICIDE REPORTING SYSTEM or HERBS tapes. Targets for the spray runs were carefully selected to satisfy the strategic and psychological operations goals of the U.S. and South Vietnamese military. Spray runs were surveyed to pinpoint the target area and then placed on a priority list. Due to the low altitude (ideally {{convert|150|ft|abbr=on}} required for spraying, the C-123s were escorted by fighter aircraft or helicopter gunship that would strafe or bomb the target area in order to draw out any ground fire if the area was believed to be 'hot'. Spray runs were planned to enable as straight a run as possible to limit the amount of time the planes flew at low altitude. Data on the spray runs, their targets, the herbicide used and amount used, weather conditions and other details were recorded and later put into a database called the Herbicide Reporting System (HERBS) tapes.


The effectiveness of the spraying was influenced by many factors including weather and terrain. Spray runs occurred during the early morning hours before temperatures rose above 85 degrees and the winds picked up. Mangroves in the Delta region required only one spraying and did not survive once defoliated. Whereas dense forests in the uplands required two or more spray runs. Within two to three weeks of spraying the leaves would drop from the trees which would remain bare until the next rainy season. In order to defoliate the lower stories of forest cover one or more follow-up spray runs were needed. About 10 percent of the trees sprayed died from a single spray run. Multiple spraying resulted in increased mortality for the trees as did following the herbicide missions with napalm or bombing strikes.<ref>Westing, Arthur. '''Ecological Effects of Military Defoliation on the Forests of South Vietnam'''. ''BioSciece'' Vol 21, No 17. (September 1. 1971), pp 893-898.</ref> The effectiveness of the spraying was influenced by many factors including weather and terrain. Spray runs occurred during the early morning hours before temperatures rose above {{convert|85|F|abbr=on}} and the winds picked up. Mangroves in the Delta region required only one spraying and did not survive once defoliated, whereas dense forests in the uplands required two or more spray runs. Within two to three weeks of spraying, the leaves would drop from the trees, which would remain bare until the next rainy season. In order to defoliate the lower stories of forest cover, one or more follow-up spray runs were needed. About 10 percent of the trees sprayed died from a single spray run. Multiple spraying resulted in increased mortality for the trees, as did following up the herbicide missions with napalm or bombing strikes.<ref>Westing, Arthur. ''Ecological Effects of Military Defoliation on the Forests of South Vietnam''. ''BioScience'', Vol. 21, No 17. (1 September. 1971), pp. 893–898.</ref>
==The End of the Operation==


==Scientific community reaction==
The use of herbicides in the Vietnam war was controversial from the beginning, particularly for crop destruction. The scientific community began to protest the use of herbicides in Vietnam as early as 1964 when the Federation of American Scientists objected to the use of chemical and biological weapons that they felt violated the Geneva Agreements of 1925. The ] (AAAS) issued a resolution in 1966 calling for a field investigation of the herbicide program in Vietnam. In 1967 seventeen Noble Laureates and 5000 other scientists signed a petition asking for the immediate end to the use of herbicides in Vietnam. Press coverage of the controversial use of herbicides in Vietnam increased in the late 1960s.
The use of herbicides in the Vietnam War was controversial from the beginning, particularly for crop destruction. The scientific community began to protest the use of herbicides in Vietnam as early as 1964, when the ] objected to the use of defoliants.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam.|last=Institute of Medicine (US) Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides|date=1994|chapter=History of the Controversy Over the Use of Herbicides|publisher=National Academies Press (US) |access-date=2016-03-27|chapter-url=https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK236351/}}</ref> The ] (AAAS) issued a resolution in 1966 calling for a field investigation of the herbicide program in Vietnam.<ref name=":0" /> In 1967, seventeen ]s and 5,000 other scientists signed a petition asking for the immediate end to the use of herbicides in Vietnam.<ref name=":0" />


In 1970 AAAS sent a team of scientist to conduct field test of the ecological impacts of the herbicide program in Vietnam. Parallel these studies in 1969 a report authored by K. Diane Courtney and others found that 2,4,5-T could cause birth defects and still births in mice. This, and follow-up studies, led the US government to restrict the use of 2,4,5-T in the US in April 1970. The Department of Defense followed suit in Vietnam by 'temporarily' suspending the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, though they continued to rely on Agent White for defoliation until supplies ran out and the last defoliation run took place on May 9, 1970. Sporadic crop destruction sorties using Agent Blue continued throughout 1970 until the final Ranch Hand run was flown on January 7, 1971. In 1970, AAAS sent a team of scientists—the Herbicide Assessment Commission (HAC), consisting of Matthew Meselson, ], John Constable, and Robert Cook—to conduct field tests of the ecological impacts of the herbicide program in Vietnam.<ref name=":0" /> A 1969 study by the ] found that 2,4,5-T could cause birth defects and stillbirths in mice. The U.S. government suspended the military use of 2,4,5-T in the U.S. in April 1970.<ref name=":0" /> Sporadic crop destruction sorties using Agent Blue and Agent White continued throughout 1970 until the final ''Ranch Hand'' run was flown on 7 January 1971.<ref name=":0" />

==Human impact==
The use of herbicides as a defoliant had long-term ] and their land and ecology,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/us/agent-oranges-long-legacy-for-vietnam-and-veterans.html|title=Agent Orange's Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans|first=Clyde|last=Haberman|date=11 May 2014|website=]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4494347.stm|title=The legacy of Agent Orange|date=29 April 2005|website=News.bbc.co.uk}}</ref> as well as on those ] from 1978 to the early 1990s. According to the Vietnamese government, the US program exposed approximately 4.8 million Vietnamese people to Agent Orange, resulting in 400,000 deaths due to a range of cancers and other ailments.<ref name=reuters>Reuters, 10 Aug. 2009 </ref>

Hindsight corrective studies indicate that previous estimates of Agent Orange exposure were biased by government intervention and under-guessing, such that current estimates for dioxin release are almost double those previously predicted.<ref name=":2" /> According to the Vietnamese Government, census data indicates that the United States military directly sprayed upon millions of Vietnamese during strategic Agent Orange use.<ref name=":2">{{cite journal | last1 = Stellman | first1 = Jeanne M. | last2 = Stellman | first2 = Steven D. | last3 = Christian | first3 = Richard | last4 = Weber | first4 = Tracy | last5 = Tomasallo | first5 = Carrie | title = The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam | journal = Nature | volume = 422 | issue = 6933| pages = 681–687| doi=10.1038/nature01537 | pmid=12700752 | date=April 2003| bibcode = 2003Natur.422..681S | s2cid = 4419223 }}</ref>

According to the Vietnamese government, the program caused three million Vietnamese health problems, with 150,000 children born with severe birth defects,<ref name="BBC">{{cite news |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55795651.amp|title=Vietnam War: French court to hear landmark Agent Orange case|date=2021-01-25 |access-date=2021-08-08 |work=]}}</ref> and 24% of the area of Vietnam being defoliated. The ] estimates that up to one million people were disabled or have health problems as a result of exposure to Agent Orange.<ref name="Jessica King">{{cite news |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/10/world/asia/vietnam-us-agent-orange/ |title=U.S. in first effort to clean up Agent Orange in Vietnam |first=Jessica |last=King |date=2012-08-10 |access-date=2012-08-11 |work=] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130303060725/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/10/world/asia/vietnam-us-agent-orange |archive-date=2013-03-03 |url-status=live }}</ref> The United States government has described these figures as "unreliable".<ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Defoliation |editor-last=Tucker|editor-first=Spencer C.|encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War : a Political, Social, and Military History|year=2011|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-1-85109-961-0|edition=2nd}}</ref> According to the Department of Veteran Affairs, 2.6 million U.S. military personnel were exposed and hundreds of thousands of veterans are eligible for treatment for Agent Orange-related illnesses.<ref name="Jessica King"/><ref>{{Cite book|title=War and Shadows: The Haunting of Vietnam|last=Gustafson|first=Mai L.|publisher=Cornell University Press|year=1978|location=Ithaca and London|page=125}}</ref><ref>News Australia. 25 May 2015, </ref>

==See also==
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ], destruction of remaining stocks from Johnson Atoll in 1977
* ]


==References== ==References==
{{Reflist}} {{Reflist|colwidth=35em}}

==Further reading==
*Buckingham, William A. Jr. . Office of Air Force History, 1982.


== External links == == External links ==
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Latest revision as of 03:31, 10 November 2024

1962–1971 US herbicidal warfare operation in the Vietnam War

Four-plane defoliant run, part of Operation Ranch Hand
"Smokey Bear" parody

Operation Ranch Hand was a U.S. military operation during the Vietnam War, lasting from 1962 until 1971. Largely inspired by the British use of chemicals 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D (Agent Orange) during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s, it was part of the overall herbicidal warfare program during the war called "Operation Trail Dust". Ranch Hand involved spraying an estimated 19 million U.S. gallons (72,000 m) of defoliants and herbicides over rural areas of South Vietnam in an attempt to deprive the Viet Cong of food and vegetation cover. Areas of Laos and Cambodia were also sprayed to a lesser extent. According to the Vietnamese government, the chemicals caused 400,000 deaths. The United States government has described these figures as "unreliable".

Nearly 20,000 sorties were flown between 1961 and 1971. The "Ranch Handers" motto was "Only you can prevent a forest" – a take on the popular U.S. Forest Service poster slogan of Smokey Bear. During the ten years of spraying, over 5 million acres (20,000 km) of forest and 500,000 acres (2,000 km) of crops were heavily damaged or destroyed. Around 20% of the forests of South Vietnam were sprayed at least once.

The herbicides were sprayed by the U.S. Air Force flying C-123s using the call sign "Hades". The planes were fitted with specially developed spray tanks with a capacity of 1,000 U.S. gallons (4 m) of herbicides. A plane sprayed a swath of land that was 80 m (260 ft) wide and 16 km (9.9 mi) long in about 4½ minutes, at a rate of about 3 U.S. gallons per acre (3 m/km). Sorties usually consisted of three to five aircraft flying side by side. 95% of the herbicides and defoliants used in the war were sprayed by the U.S. Air Force as part of Operation Ranch Hand. The remaining 5% were sprayed by the U.S. Chemical Corps, other military branches, and the Republic of Vietnam using hand sprayers, spray trucks, helicopters and boats, primarily around U.S. military installations.

Defoliants

Map of herbicide usage during the Vietnam war.

The herbicides used were sprayed at up to 50 times the concentration than for normal agricultural use. The most common herbicide used was Herbicide Orange, more commonly referred to as Agent Orange: a fifty-fifty mixture of two herbicides 2,4-D (2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and 2,4,5-T (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid) manufactured for the U.S. Department of Defense primarily by Monsanto Corporation and Dow Chemical. The other most common color-coded Ranch Hand herbicides were Agent Blue (cacodylic acid) that was primarily used against food crops, and Agent White which was often used when Agent Orange was not available.

The Agents used are known as the Rainbow Herbicides with their active ingredients, and years used were as follows:

  • Agent Green: 100% n-butyl ester 2,4,5-T, used prior to 1966
  • Agent Pink: 100% 2,4,5-T (60% n-butyl ester 2,4,5-T, and 40% iso-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T) used prior to 1966
  • Agent Purple: 50% 2,4,5-T (30% n-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T, and 20% iso-butyl ester of 2,4,5-T) and 50% n-butyl ester of 2,4-D used 1961–1965
  • Agent Blue (Phytar 560G): 65.6% organic Arsenicical (cacodylic acid (Ansar 138) and its sodium salt sodium cacodylate) used from 1962–1971 in powder and water solution
  • Agent White (Tordon 101): 21.2% (acid weight basis) triisopropanolamine salts of 2,4-D and 5.7% picloram used 1966–1971
  • Agent Orange or Herbicide Orange, (HO): 50% n-butyl ester 2,4-D and 50% n-butyl ester 2,4,5-T used 1965–1970
  • Agent Orange II:50% n-butyl ester 2,4-D and 50% isooctyl ester 2,4,5-T used after 1968.
  • Agent Orange III: 66.6% n-butyl 2,4-D and 33.3% n-butyl ester 2,4,5-T.
  • Enhanced Agent Orange, Orange Plus, Super Orange (SO), or DOW Herbicide M-3393: standardized Agent Orange mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T combined with an oil-based mixture of picloram, a proprietary Dow Chemical product called Tordon 101, an ingredient of Agent White.

The herbicides were procured by the U.S. military from Dow Chemical Company (all but Agent Blue), Monsanto (Agent Orange, Agent Purple, and Agent Pink), Hercules Inc. (Agent Orange and Agent Purple), Thompson-Hayward Chemical Company (Agent Orange and Agent Pink), Diamond Alkali/Shamrock Company (Agent Orange, Agent Blue, Agent Purple, and Agent Pink), United States Rubber Company (Agent Orange), Thompson Chemicals Corporation (Agent Orange and Agent Pink), Agrisect Company (Agent Orange and Agent Purple), Hoffman-Taff Inc. (Agent Orange), and the Ansul Chemical Company (Agent Blue). In April 1967, the entire American domestic production of 2,4,5-T was confiscated by the military; foreign sources were also tapped into, including the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI).

65% of the herbicides used contained 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid that was contaminated with 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzodioxin, a "known human carcinogen... by several different routes of exposure, including oral, dermal, and intraperitoneal". About 12,000,000 U.S. gal (45,000,000 L; 10,000,000 imp gal) of dioxin-contaminated herbicides were sprayed over Southeast Asia (mainly in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) during American combat operations in the Vietnam War.

In 2005, a New Zealand government minister was quoted and widely reported as saying that Agent Orange chemicals had been supplied from New Zealand to the United States military during the conflict. Shortly after, the same minister claimed to have been mis-quoted, although this point was less widely reported. From 1962 to 1987, 2,4,5-T herbicide had been manufactured at an Ivon Watkins-Dow plant in New Plymouth for domestic use, however it has not been proven that the herbicide had been exported for use by the U.S military in Vietnam.

Operations

For most of the war, Operation Ranch Hand was based at Bien Hoa Air Base (1966–1970), for operations in the Mekong Delta region where U.S. Navy patrol boats were vulnerable to attack from areas of undergrowth along the water's edge. Storage, mixing, loading, and washing areas and a parking ramp were located just off the base's inside taxiway between the Hot Cargo Ramp and the control tower. For operations along the central coast and the Ho Chi Minh trail regions, Ranch Hand operated out of Da Nang Air Base (1964–1971). Other bases of operation included Phù Cát Air Base (1968–1970), Tan Son Nhut Air Base (1962–1966), Nha Trang Air Base (1968–69), Phan Rang Air Base (1970–1972), and Tuy Hoa Air Base (1971–1972). Other bases were also used as temporary staging areas for Ranch Hand. The Da Nang, Bien Hoa and Phu Cat Air bases are still heavily contaminated with dioxin from the herbicides, and have been placed on a priority list for containment and clean-up by the Vietnamese government.

The first aerial spraying of herbicides was a test run conducted on 10 August 1961 in a village north of Đắk Tô against foliage. Testing continued over the next year and even though there was doubt in the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House as to the efficacy of the herbicides, Operation Ranch Hand began in early 1962. Individual spray runs had to be approved by President John F. Kennedy until November 1962, when Kennedy gave the authority to approve most spray runs to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam. Ranch Hand was given final approval to spray targets in eastern Laos in December 1965.

The issue of whether or not to allow crop destruction was under great debate due to its potential of violating the Geneva Protocol. However, American officials pointed out that the British had previously used 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D (virtually identical to America's use in Vietnam) on a large scale throughout the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s in order to destroy bushes, crops, and trees in effort to deny communist insurgents the cover they needed to ambush passing convoys. Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told President Kennedy on 24 November 1961, that "he use of defoliant does not violate any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is an accepted tactic of war. Precedent has been established by the British during the emergency in Malaya in their use of aircraft for destroying crops by chemical spraying." The president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem began to push the U.S. Military Advisory Group in Vietnam and the White House to begin crop destruction in September 1961, but it was not until October 1962 when the White House gave approval for limited testing of Agent Blue against crops in an area believed to be controlled by the Viet Cong. Soon after, crop destruction became an integral part of the Ranch Hand program.

Targets for the spray runs were carefully selected to satisfy the strategic and psychological operations goals of the U.S. and South Vietnamese military. Spray runs were surveyed to pinpoint the target area and then placed on a priority list. Due to the low altitude (ideally 150 ft (46 m) required for spraying, the C-123s were escorted by fighter aircraft or helicopter gunship that would strafe or bomb the target area in order to draw out any ground fire if the area was believed to be 'hot'. Spray runs were planned to enable as straight a run as possible to limit the amount of time the planes flew at low altitude. Data on the spray runs, their targets, the herbicide used and amount used, weather conditions and other details were recorded and later put into a database called the Herbicide Reporting System (HERBS) tapes.

The effectiveness of the spraying was influenced by many factors including weather and terrain. Spray runs occurred during the early morning hours before temperatures rose above 85 °F (29 °C) and the winds picked up. Mangroves in the Delta region required only one spraying and did not survive once defoliated, whereas dense forests in the uplands required two or more spray runs. Within two to three weeks of spraying, the leaves would drop from the trees, which would remain bare until the next rainy season. In order to defoliate the lower stories of forest cover, one or more follow-up spray runs were needed. About 10 percent of the trees sprayed died from a single spray run. Multiple spraying resulted in increased mortality for the trees, as did following up the herbicide missions with napalm or bombing strikes.

Scientific community reaction

The use of herbicides in the Vietnam War was controversial from the beginning, particularly for crop destruction. The scientific community began to protest the use of herbicides in Vietnam as early as 1964, when the Federation of American Scientists objected to the use of defoliants. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) issued a resolution in 1966 calling for a field investigation of the herbicide program in Vietnam. In 1967, seventeen Nobel laureates and 5,000 other scientists signed a petition asking for the immediate end to the use of herbicides in Vietnam.

In 1970, AAAS sent a team of scientists—the Herbicide Assessment Commission (HAC), consisting of Matthew Meselson, Arthur Westing, John Constable, and Robert Cook—to conduct field tests of the ecological impacts of the herbicide program in Vietnam. A 1969 study by the Bionetics Research Laboratory found that 2,4,5-T could cause birth defects and stillbirths in mice. The U.S. government suspended the military use of 2,4,5-T in the U.S. in April 1970. Sporadic crop destruction sorties using Agent Blue and Agent White continued throughout 1970 until the final Ranch Hand run was flown on 7 January 1971.

Human impact

The use of herbicides as a defoliant had long-term destructive effects on the people of Vietnam and their land and ecology, as well as on those who fled in the mass exodus from 1978 to the early 1990s. According to the Vietnamese government, the US program exposed approximately 4.8 million Vietnamese people to Agent Orange, resulting in 400,000 deaths due to a range of cancers and other ailments.

Hindsight corrective studies indicate that previous estimates of Agent Orange exposure were biased by government intervention and under-guessing, such that current estimates for dioxin release are almost double those previously predicted. According to the Vietnamese Government, census data indicates that the United States military directly sprayed upon millions of Vietnamese during strategic Agent Orange use.

According to the Vietnamese government, the program caused three million Vietnamese health problems, with 150,000 children born with severe birth defects, and 24% of the area of Vietnam being defoliated. The Red Cross of Vietnam estimates that up to one million people were disabled or have health problems as a result of exposure to Agent Orange. The United States government has described these figures as "unreliable". According to the Department of Veteran Affairs, 2.6 million U.S. military personnel were exposed and hundreds of thousands of veterans are eligible for treatment for Agent Orange-related illnesses.

See also

References

  1. ^ Lewis, James G. (2006). "Smokey Bear in Vietnam". Environmental History. 11 (3): 598–603. doi:10.1093/envhis/11.3.598.
  2. ^ Reuters, 10 Aug. 2009 "Vietnam Seeks Funds for Agent Orange Victims"
  3. ^ Tucker, Spencer C., ed. (2011). "Defoliation". The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War : a Political, Social, and Military History (2nd ed.). ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-85109-961-0.
  4. Vo Quy, "Statement to the House Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Global Environment," 4 June 2009.
  5. Buckingham, William A. Jr. (1982). Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia 1961–1971 (PDF). Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History. p. 132. ISBN 978-0-87000-466-7. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 November 2016. Retrieved 1 February 2014.
  6. ^ Stellman, Jeanne et al. "The extent and patterns of usage of Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam." Nature. Vol 422. p. 681
  7. Stellman, Jeanne et al. Page 682
  8. ^ Young, Alvin L. The History, Use, Disposition and Environmental Fate of Agent Orange. Springer, 2009. p. 44.
  9. ^ Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides; Institute of Medicine (1994). Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam. National Academies Press. pp. 89–90. ISBN 978-0-309-55619-4.
  10. Stephen Bull (2004). Encyclopedia of Military Technology and Innovation. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 6. ISBN 978-1-57356-557-8.
  11. Daniel Vallero (2011). Biomedical Ethics for Engineers: Ethics and Decision Making in Biomedical and Biosystem Engineering. Academic Press. p. 73. ISBN 978-0-08-047610-0.
  12. Archives Search Report Findings for Field Testing of 2,4,5-T and Other Herbicides (PDF) (Report). U.S. Army Corps of Engineers St. Louis District. 4 April 2012. p. 116. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 December 2016. Retrieved 8 August 2013.
  13. Corcoran, Charles A. (December 1968), "Operational Evaluation of Super-Orange (U)- unclassified", Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MAC-V) to Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) message for CINCPAC, USARPAC Ofc Science Adviser, National Security Archives at George Washington University
  14. DGSC-PI Memorandum for the record: Herbicides reformulation thereof (Operation Guns and Butter meeting) (Report). DOW Chemical Company. 9 September 1966.
  15. Der Spiegel, 32/1991: Der Tod aus Ingelheim by Cordt Schnibben (accessed 2013-07-30)
  16. Report on Carcinogens, Twelfth Edition (2011) Archived 17 February 2013 at the Wayback Machine (accessed 2013-07-30)
  17. Pellow, David N. Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice, (Google Books), MIT Press, 2007, p. 159, (ISBN 0-262-16244-X).
  18. 'At a price: manufacturing Agent Orange in NZ? ', URL: https://vietnamwar.govt.nz/memory/price-manufacturing-agent-orange-nz, (Ministry for Culture and Heritage), updated 04-Jul-2014
  19. Taylor, Kevin (11 January 2005). "Government probes claims NZ exported Agent Orange". The New Zealand Herald. Archived from the original on 16 July 2012. Retrieved 11 January 2005.
  20. "NZ admits supplying Agent Orange during war". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 9 January 2005.
  21. "MP denies evidence of Agent Orange exports". The New Zealand Herald. 12 January 2005. Retrieved 12 January 2005.
  22. "The Poisoning of New Zealand". Safe 2 Use. Retrieved 17 November 2005.
  23. Young. Alvin L. p. 62.
  24. ^ Buckingham Jr., William A. (1982). Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia 1961–1971 (PDF). Office of Air Force History.
  25. "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol)". U.S. Department of State. 25 September 2002. Retrieved 24 August 2013.
  26. Bruce Cumings (1998). The Global Politics of Pesticides: Forging Consensus from Conflicting Interests. Earthscan. p. 61.
  27. "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume I, Vietnam, 1961, Document 275". History.state.gov. Retrieved 24 February 2014.
  28. Westing, Arthur. Ecological Effects of Military Defoliation on the Forests of South Vietnam. BioScience, Vol. 21, No 17. (1 September. 1971), pp. 893–898.
  29. ^ Institute of Medicine (US) Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides (1994). "History of the Controversy Over the Use of Herbicides". Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam. National Academies Press (US). Retrieved 27 March 2016.
  30. Haberman, Clyde (11 May 2014). "Agent Orange's Long Legacy, for Vietnam and Veterans". The New York Times.
  31. "The legacy of Agent Orange". News.bbc.co.uk. 29 April 2005.
  32. ^ Stellman, Jeanne M.; Stellman, Steven D.; Christian, Richard; Weber, Tracy; Tomasallo, Carrie (April 2003). "The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam". Nature. 422 (6933): 681–687. Bibcode:2003Natur.422..681S. doi:10.1038/nature01537. PMID 12700752. S2CID 4419223.
  33. "Vietnam War: French court to hear landmark Agent Orange case". BBC. 25 January 2021. Retrieved 8 August 2021.
  34. ^ King, Jessica (10 August 2012). "U.S. in first effort to clean up Agent Orange in Vietnam". CNN. Archived from the original on 3 March 2013. Retrieved 11 August 2012.
  35. Gustafson, Mai L. (1978). War and Shadows: The Haunting of Vietnam. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. p. 125.
  36. News Australia. 25 May 2015, "Vietnam's Horrific Legacy: The Children of Agent Orange"

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