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{{Short description|Military conflict that deploys nuclear weaponry}}
{{Redirect|Nuclear War}}
{{redirect2|Nuclear War|Nuclear strike}}
{{Dablink|Not to be dane with ] or ], i.e. the achievement of military or political ends through the possession of nuclear weapons without their actual use.}}
] over ] following the detonation of the ] nuclear bomb on 6 August 1945. The ] remain the first and only wartime uses of nuclear weapons in history.]]
{{Refimprove|date=May 1454 b.c.}}
{{War |weapons |width=23.0em}}
{{Nuclear weapons |width=23.0em}}
{{Weapons of mass destruction}}
'''Nuclear warfare''', also known as '''atomic warfare''', is a ] or prepared ] that deploys ]ry. Nuclear weapons are ]; in contrast to ], nuclear warfare can produce destruction in a much shorter time and can have a long-lasting ]. A major nuclear exchange would likely have long-term effects, primarily from the ] released, and could also lead to secondary effects, such as "]",<ref>{{cite book|url=http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=940&page=155|title=7 Possible Toxic Environments Following a Nuclear War – The Medical Implications of Nuclear War 1985 – The National Academies Press|year=1986|doi=10.17226/940|pmid=25032468|isbn=978-0-309-07866-5}}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9056451/nuclear-winter|title=nuclear winter|encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica|date=August 2023 }}</ref><ref name="Martin-1982">{{Cite journal|last=Martin|first=Brian|date=December 1982|title=The global health effects of nuclear war|url=http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/82cab/index.html|journal=Current Affairs Bulletin|volume=59|issue=7}}</ref><ref name="bmartin.cc">{{cite web| url = http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/82jpr.html| title = Critique of Nuclear Extinction – Brian Martin 1982}}</ref><ref name="johnstonsarchive.net">{{Cite web|url=http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/nuclearwar1.html|title=The Effects of a Global Thermonuclear War|website=www.johnstonsarchive.net}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/21437545?selectedversion=NBD238850| title = Long-term worldwide effects of multiple nuclear-weapons detonations. Assembly of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, National Research Council,1975.}}</ref> ], and ].<ref name=Ehrlich>{{cite journal |last1=Ehrlich |first1=P. R.|first2=J. |last2=Harte |first3=M. A. |last3=Harwell |first4=P. H. |last4=Raven |first5=C. |last5=Sagan |first6=G. M. |last6=Woodwell |first7=J. |last7=Berry |first8=E. S. |last8=Ayensu |first9=A. H. |last9=Ehrlich |first10=T. |last10=Eisner |first11=S. J. |last11=Gould |first12=H. D. |last12=Grover |first13=R. |last13=Herrera |first14=R. M. |last14=May |first15=E. |last15=Mayr |first16=C. P. |last16=McKay |first17=H. A. |last17=Mooney |first18=N. |last18=Myers |first19=D. |last19=Pimentel |first20=J. M. |last20=Teal |name-list-style=amp |date= 1983|title=Long-term biological consequences of nuclear war|journal=Science |volume=222 |issue= 4630|pages=1293–1300 |doi=10.1126/science.6658451|pmid= 6658451|bibcode=1983Sci...222.1293E}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thebulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/overview|title=Overview of the Doomsday Clock|work=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}}</ref><ref>The Nuclear Winter: The World After Nuclear War, Sagan, Carl et al., Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985</ref> A global thermonuclear war with ]-era stockpiles, or even with the current smaller stockpiles, may lead to various scenarios including ].<ref>{{cite journal |author=Tonn, Bruce |author2=MacGregor, Donald |name-list-style=amp |doi=10.1016/j.futures.2009.07.009 |title=A singular chain of events |journal=Futures |volume=41 |issue=10 |year=2009 |pages=706–714|s2cid=144553194 }}</ref>


To date, the only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict occurred in 1945 with the American ]. On August 6, 1945, a ] ] device (code name "]") was detonated over the ] city of ]. Three days later, on August 9, a ] ] device (code name "]") was detonated over the Japanese city of ]. Together, these two bombings resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 people and contributed to the ], which occurred before any further nuclear weapons could be deployed.
{{war}}
] ] (ICBM) carried a 9 ] ] warhead, one of the most powerful ]s fielded by the ] during the ].]]


After ], nuclear weapons were also developed by the ] (1949), the ] (1952), ] (1960), and the People's Republic of ] (1964), which contributed to the state of conflict and extreme tension that became known as the ]. In 1974, ], and in 1998, ], two countries that were openly hostile toward each other, developed nuclear weapons. ] (1960s) and ] (2006) are also thought to have developed stocks of nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many. The Israeli government has never admitted nor denied having nuclear weapons, although it is known to have constructed the reactor and reprocessing plant necessary for building nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Hersh|first1=Seymour|title=The Samson Option|date=1991|publisher=Random House|isbn=0-394-57006-5|page=130}}</ref> ] also manufactured several complete nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but subsequently became ] and abandon further production (1990s).<ref>{{Cite web |last=Albright |first=David |title=South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program |url=https://web.mit.edu/SSP/seminars/wed_archives01spring/albright.htm |website=MIT.edu}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=South Africa: Why Countries Acquire and Abandon Nuclear Bombs |url=https://world101.cfr.org/global-era-issues/nuclear-proliferation/south-africa-why-countries-acquire-and-abandon-nuclear#:~:text=On%20March%2024%2C%201993%2C%20in,South%20Africa%20gave%20them%20up. |website=World101| date=27 July 2023 }}</ref> Nuclear weapons have been detonated on over 2,000 occasions for ] and demonstrations.<ref name='1945-1998'>{{cite web|url=http://www.ctbto.org/specials/1945-1998-by-isao-hashimoto/|title="1945–1998" by Isao Hashimoto|access-date=2015-03-16|archive-date=2018-07-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706161741/https://www.ctbto.org/specials/1945-1998-by-isao-hashimoto/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name='Tally'>{{Cite web|url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nucleartesttally|title=The Nuclear Testing Tally &#124; Arms Control Association|website=www.armscontrol.org}}</ref>
'''Nuclear warfare''', or '''freelstonstien warfareing''', is a military conflict or political strategy in which ]ry is detonated on an opponent. Compared to ], nuclear warfare can be vastly more destructive in range and extent of damage. A major nuclear exchange could have severe long-term effects, primarily from ] release but also from possible atmospheric pollution leading to ], that could last for decades, centuries, or even millennia after the initial attack.<ref></ref><ref></ref> Nuclear war is considered to bear ] for civilization on Earth.<ref> from </ref><ref>The Nuclear Winter: The World After Nuclear War, Sagan, Carl et al., Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985</ref>


After the ] in 1991 and the resultant end of the Cold War, the threat of a major nuclear war between the ] was generally thought to have declined.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Robert A. |last=Denemark |title=Nuclear War in the Rivalry Phase of the World-System |journal=Journal of World-Systems Research |date=14 August 2018 |volume=24 |issue=2
The first, and to date only, nuclear war was ]: near the end of the war, the ] dropped atomic bombs on ], ].<ref name="gordin">{{cite book|title= Five days in August|last= Gordin|first= Michael D.|authorlink=|coauthors=|year= 2007|publisher= University Press|location=|isbn= 0691128189|page= 5|pages= 209|url= http://books.google.com/books?id=N7eq7AgZKokC&printsec=frontcover#PPA5,M1|accessdate=2009-03-27}}</ref><ref name="lebaron">{{cite book|title= America's nuclear legacy|last= LeBaron|first= Wayne D.|authorlink=|coauthors=|year= 1998|publisher= Nova Publishers|location=|isbn= 1560725567|page= 16|pages= 320|url= http://books.google.com/books?id=cr81ZHY-6H0C&printsec=frontcover#PPA16,M1|accessdate=2009-03-27}}</ref> At the time of those bombings, the United States was the only country to possess atomic weapons. After World War II, nuclear weapons were also developed by the ], ], the ], and the ], which contributed to the state of conflict and tension that became known as the ]. In the 1970s, ] and 1990s, ], countries openly hostile to each other, developed nuclear weapons. ], ], and ] are also believed to have developed nuclear weapons, although South Africa subsequently abandoned them.
|page=349 |doi=10.5195/jwsr.2018.749 |s2cid=158444919 |url=http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/article/view/749|doi-access=free }}</ref> Since then, concern over nuclear weapons has shifted to the prevention of localized nuclear conflicts resulting from ], and the threat of ]. However, the threat of nuclear war is considered to have resurged after the ], particularly with regard to ].<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Troianovski |first2=Anton |last3=Barnes |first3=Julian E. |date=2022-10-01 |title=In Washington, Putin's Nuclear Threats Stir Growing Alarm |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/01/world/europe/washington-putin-nuclear-threats.html |access-date=2022-10-02 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Could the war in Ukraine go nuclear? |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/international/2022/09/29/could-the-war-in-ukraine-go-nuclear |access-date=2022-10-02 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref>


Since 1947, the ] of the '']'' has visualized how close the world is to a nuclear war. The Doomsday Clock reached high points in 1953, when the Clock was set to two minutes until midnight after the U.S. and the Soviet Union began testing hydrogen bombs, and in 2018, following the failure of world leaders to address tensions relating to nuclear weapons and climate change issues.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/25/politics/doomsday-clock-closer-nuclear-midnight/index.html|title='Doomsday clock' ticks closer to apocalyptic midnight|last=Koran|first=Laura|work=]|date=January 25, 2018}}</ref> Since 2023, the Clock has been set at 90 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Weise |first=Elizabeth |date=2023-01-24 |title=Doomsday Clock 2023 time says the world is closer than ever to global catastrophe |url=https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2023/01/24/doomsday-clock-2023-time-announced/11026446002/ |access-date=2023-01-24 |website=USA Today |language=en}}</ref> The most recent advance of the Clock's time setting was largely attributed to the risk of ] that arose from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Spinazze |first=Gayle |date=2023-01-24 |title=PRESS RELEASE: Doomsday Clock set at 90 seconds to midnight |url=https://thebulletin.org/2023/01/press-release-doomsday-clock-set-at-90-seconds-to-midnight/ |access-date=2023-01-24 |website=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |language=en-US}}</ref>
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the resultant end of the Cold War, the threat of a major nuclear war between the ]s was generally thought to have receded. Since then, concern over nuclear weapons has shifted to the prevention of localized nuclear conflicts resulting from ], and the threat of ].
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==Types of Nuclear Warfare== ==Types of nuclear warfare==
Nuclear warfare scenarios are usually divided into two groups, each with different effects and potentially fought with different types of nuclear armaments.
{{Unreferenced section|date=August 2010}}
The possibility of using nuclear weapons in war is usually divided into two subgroups, each with different effects and potentially fought with different types of nuclear armaments.


The first, a '''limited nuclear war'''<ref name="N.N. Sokov">{{cite book |url=http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation |author=N.N. Sokov |title=Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike "de-escalation" |publisher=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |date=2015 |access-date=2015-12-28 |archive-date=2020-06-09 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200609031156/https://thebulletin.org/2014/03/why-russia-calls-a-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> (sometimes ''attack'' or ''exchange''), refers to the controlled use of nuclear weapons, whereby the implicit threat exists that a nation can still escalate their use of nuclear weapons. For example, using a small number of nuclear weapons against strictly military targets could be escalated through increasing the number of weapons used, or escalated through the selection of different targets. Limited attacks are thought to be a more credible response against attacks that do not justify all-out retaliation, such as an enemy's limited use of nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite book |editor=] |editor2=John Steinbruner |editor3=Charles Zraket |date=1987 |title=Managing Nuclear Operations |location=Washington DC |publisher=Brookings Institution |pages=123–125 |isbn=0-8157-1314-2}}</ref>
The first, a ''limited nuclear war'' (sometimes ''attack'' or ''exchange''), refers to a small scale use of nuclear weapons by one or more parties. A "limited nuclear war" would consist of a limited exchange between two nuclear powers targeting each other's military facilities, either as an attempt to pre-emptively cripple the enemy's ability to attack as a defensive measure or as a prelude to an invasion by conventional forces as an offensive measure. This term would apply to any limited use of nuclear weapons, which may involve either military or civilian targets.{{Dubious|date=August 2010}} {{Whom?|date=August 2010}}


The second, a ''full-scale nuclear war'', consists of large numbers of weapons used in an attack aimed at an entire country, including military, economic and civilian targets. Such an attack would almost certainly destroy the entire economic, social, and military infrastructure of the target nation, and would possibly (depending on the severity of the nuclear exchange) have a devastating effect on Earth's biosphere. The second, a '''full-scale nuclear war''', could consist of large numbers of nuclear weapons used in an attack aimed at an entire country, including military, economic, and civilian targets. Such an attack would almost certainly destroy the entire economic, social, and military infrastructure of the target nation, and would likely have a devastating effect on Earth's biosphere.<ref name=Ehrlich/><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Grover|first1=Herbert D.|last2=Harwell|first2=Mark A.|date=1985-10-01|title=Biological Effects of Nuclear War II: Impact on the Biosphere|journal=BioScience|language=en|volume=35|issue=9|pages=576–583|doi=10.2307/1309966|issn=0006-3568|jstor=1309966}}</ref>


Some ] strategists such as ]<ref>http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/kissinger_henry_t.html</ref> argued that a limited nuclear war could be possible between two heavily armed superpowers (such as the ] and the ]) and if so several predicted that a limited war could "]" into an all-out war. Others{{Who|date=August 2010}} have called limited nuclear war "global nuclear holocaust in slow motion" arguing that once such a war took place others would be sure to follow over a period of decades, effectively rendering the planet uninhabitable in the same way that a "full-scale nuclear war" between superpowers would, only taking a much longer and more agonizing path to reach the same result. Some ] strategists such as ]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/kissinger_henry_t.html|title=Henry Kissinger: The Mike Wallace Interview|access-date=2010-11-24|archive-date=2020-04-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200403232753/http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/multimedia/video/2008/wallace/kissinger_henry_t.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> argued that a limited nuclear war could be possible between two heavily armed superpowers (such as the ] and the ]). Some predict, however, that a limited war could potentially "]" into a full-scale nuclear war. Others{{Who|date=April 2012}} have called limited nuclear war "global ] in slow motion", arguing that—once such a war took place—others would be sure to follow over a period of decades, effectively rendering the planet uninhabitable in the same way that a "full-scale nuclear war" between superpowers would, only taking a much longer (and arguably more agonizing) path to the same result.


Even the most optimistic predictions of the effects of a major nuclear exchange foresee the death of a hundred million people within a very short amount of time; more pessimistic predictions argue that a full-scale nuclear war could bring about the ] or its near extinction with a handful of survivors (mainly in remote areas) reduced ] and ] for centuries after and cause permanent damage to most complex life on the planet, Earth's ecosystems, and the global climate, particularly if predictions of ] are accurate. It is in this latter mode that nuclear warfare is usually alluded to as a ] scenario.{{Whom?|date=August 2010}} Such hypothesized civilization-ending nuclear wars have been a staple of the ] literature and film genre for decades. Even the most optimistic predictions of the effects of a major nuclear exchange foresee the death of many millions of victims within a very short period of time. Such predictions usually include the breakdown of government, professional, and commercial institutions, vital to the continuation of civilization. The resulting loss of vital affordances (food, water and electricity production and distribution, medical and information services, etc.) would account for millions more deaths. More pessimistic predictions argue that a full-scale nuclear war could potentially bring about the ], or at least its ''near'' extinction, with only a relatively small number of survivors (mainly in remote areas) and a reduced ] and ] for centuries afterward. However, such predictions, assuming ] with nuclear arsenals at ] highs, have not been without criticism.<ref name="bmartin.cc"/> Such a horrific catastrophe as global nuclear warfare would almost certainly cause permanent damage to most complex life on the planet, its ecosystems, and the global climate.<ref name="johnstonsarchive.net"/>


A study presented at the annual meeting of the ] in December 2006 asserted that a small-scale regional nuclear war could produce as many direct fatalities as all of ] and disrupt the global climate for a decade or more. In a regional nuclear conflict scenario in which two opposing nations in the ] each used 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (c. 15 kiloton each) on major population centers, the researchers predicted fatalities ranging from 2.6&nbsp;million to 16.7&nbsp;million per country. The authors of the study estimated that as much as five million tons of ] could be released, producing a cooling of several degrees over large areas of North America and ] (including most of the grain-growing regions). The cooling would last for years and could be "catastrophic", according to the researchers.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/12/061211090729.htm| title = ScienceDaily – Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate Global Climate}}</ref>
Either a limited or full-scale nuclear exchange could be an ''accidental nuclear war'', in which a nuclear war is triggered unintentionally. Possible triggers for this scenario have included malfunctioning early warning devices and targeting computers, deliberate malfeasance by rogue military commanders, accidental straying of planes into enemy airspace, reactions to unannounced missile tests during tense diplomatic periods, reactions to military exercises, mistranslated or misscommunicated messages, and so forth. A number of these scenarios did actually occur during the Cold War, though none resulted in a nuclear exchange.<ref>Alan F. Philips, .</ref> Many such scenarios have been depicted in ], such as in the 1962 novel '']'' (released as a film in 1964) and the film '']'', also released in 1964.

Either a limited or full-scale nuclear exchange could occur during an ''accidental nuclear war'', in which the use of nuclear weapons is triggered unintentionally. Postulated triggers for this scenario have included malfunctioning early warning devices and/or targeting computers, deliberate malfeasance by rogue military commanders, consequences of an accidental straying of warplanes into enemy airspace, reactions to unannounced missile tests during tense diplomatic periods, reactions to military exercises, mistranslated or miscommunicated messages, and others.

], though none resulted in the use of nuclear weapons.<ref>Alan F. Philips, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071012030433/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/accidents/20-mishaps-maybe-caused-nuclear-war.htm |date=2007-10-12 }}.</ref> Many such scenarios have been depicted in ], such as in the 1959 film '']'', the 1962 novel '']'', the 1964 film '']'', the 1983 film '']'', and the 1984 film '']''.

===Sub-strategic use===
{{see also|Nuclear bunker buster|Edward Teller#Decision to drop the bombs}}
The above examples envisage nuclear warfare at a strategic level, i.e., ]. However, nuclear powers have the ability to undertake more limited engagements.

"Sub-strategic use" includes the use of either "low-yield" tactical nuclear weapons, or of ] ]s in a very limited role, as compared to exchanges of larger-yield ]s over major ]s. This was described by the UK Parliamentary ] as "the launch of one or a limited number of missiles against an adversary as a means of conveying a political message, warning or demonstration of resolve".<ref>UK Parliament, House of Commons, "Select Committee on Defence, Eighth Report", '''', 20 June 2006. Fetched from URL on 23 December 2012.</ref> It is believed that all current nuclear weapons states possess tactical nuclear weapons, with the exception of the ], which decommissioned its tactical warheads in 1998. However, the UK does possess scalable-yield strategic warheads, and this technology tends to blur the difference between "strategic", "sub-strategic", and "tactical" use or weapons. American, French and British nuclear submarines are believed to carry at least ''some'' missiles with ] warheads for this purpose, potentially allowing a strike as low as one ] (or less) against a single target. Only the ] and the ] have declarative, unqualified, unconditional "]" nuclear weapons policies. India and Pakistan maintain only a ].

Commodore ], former Director of Nuclear Policy at the ], has described "sub-strategic use" as offering the Government "an extra option in the escalatory process before it goes for an all-out strategic strike which would deliver unacceptable damage".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmdfence/986/98605.htm#a11|title=House of Commons - Defence - Eighth Report}}</ref> However, this sub-strategic capacity has been criticized as potentially increasing the "acceptability" of using nuclear weapons. Combined with the trend in the reduction in the worldwide nuclear arsenal as of 2007 is the warhead miniaturization and modernization of the remaining strategic weapons that is presently occurring in all the declared nuclear weapon states, into more "usable" configurations. The ] suggests that this is creating a culture where use of these weapons is more acceptable and therefore is increasing the risk of war, as these modern weapons do not possess the same psychological deterrent value as the large Cold-War era, multi-megaton warheads.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ritter |first=Karl |date=June 12, 2007 |title=Study: World powers risk atomic war |url=https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20070612_Study__World_powers_risk_atomic_war.html |access-date=2022-03-07 |website=] |language=en}}</ref>

In many ways, this present change in the ] can be seen as the complete embracement of the switch from the 1950s ] of "]"<ref>{{cite journal|first=Matthew|last=Jones|title=Targeting China: U.S. Nuclear Planning and 'Massive Retaliation' in East Asia, 1953–1955|journal=Journal of Cold War Studies|year=2008|volume=10|issue=4|pages=37–65|doi=10.1162/jcws.2008.10.4.37|s2cid=57564482}}</ref> to one of "]", which has been growing in importance in the US nuclear war fighting plan/] every decade since.

For example, the United States adopted a policy in 1996 of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at non-state actors ("]") armed with ].<ref>{{citation|author1=Daniel Plesch|author2=Stephen Young|title=Senseless policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sgsAAAAAMBAJ|journal=]|year=1998|volume=54|issue=6|publisher=Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.|page=4|doi=10.1080/00963402.1998.11456892|bibcode=1998BuAtS..54f...4P}}</ref>

Another dimension to the tactical use of nuclear weapons is that of such weapons deployed at sea for use against surface and submarine vessels. Until 1992, vessels of the ] (and their aircraft) deployed various such weapons as bombs, rockets (guided and unguided), torpedoes, and depth charges. Such tactical naval nuclear weapons were considered more acceptable to use early in a conflict because there would be few civilian casualties. It was feared by many planners that such use would probably quickly have escalated into a large-scale nuclear war.<ref>{{cite web|title=Declassified: Nuclear Weapons at Sea, Conclusions and Recommendations|url=https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/02/nuclear-weapons-at-sea/|website=Federation of American Scientists|access-date=2016-04-19}}</ref> This situation was particularly exacerbated by the fact that such weapons at sea were not constrained by the safeguards provided by the ] attached to U.S. Air Force and Army nuclear weapons. It is unknown if the navies of the other nuclear powers yet today deploy tactical nuclear weapons at sea.

The ] emphasised the need for the US to have sub-strategic nuclear weapons as additional layers for its nuclear deterrence.<ref>{{cite web|title=2018 Nuclear Posture Review|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx|website=US Defense Department|access-date=2018-06-26}}</ref>

===Nuclear terrorism===
{{Main|Nuclear terrorism|Nuclear blackmail}}
] by non-state organizations or actors (even individuals) is a largely unknown and understudied factor in nuclear deterrence thinking, as states possessing nuclear weapons are susceptible to retaliation in kind, while sub- or trans-state actors may be less so. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given rise to the possibility that former Soviet nuclear weapons might become available on the ] (so-called 'loose nukes').

A number of other concerns have been expressed about the security of nuclear weapons in newer nuclear powers with relatively less stable governments, such as ], but in each case, the fears have been addressed to some extent by statements and evidence provided by those nations, as well as cooperative programs between nations. Worry remains, however, in many circles that a relative decrease in the security of nuclear weapons has emerged in recent years, and that terrorists or others may attempt to exert control over (or use) nuclear weapons, militarily applicable technology, or nuclear materials and fuel.

Another possible nuclear terrorism threat are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials over a large area using conventional explosives, called ]s. The detonation of a "dirty bomb" would not cause a nuclear explosion, nor would it release enough radiation to kill or injure a large number of people. However, it could cause severe disruption and require potentially very costly decontamination procedures and increased spending on security measures.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs-bg.html|title=Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs|author=US Nuclear Regulatory Commission|date=May 2007|access-date=2010-04-26}}</ref>

Radioactive materials can also be used for targeted assassinations. For example, the ] was described by medical professionals, as "an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of ]."<ref>"Ushering in the era of nuclear terrorism", by Patterson, Andrew J. MD, PhD, ''Critical Care Medicine'', v. 35, pp.&nbsp;953–954, 2007.</ref><ref>"Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Re-thinking Radiological Terror", by James M. Acton; M. Brooke Rogers; Peter D. Zimmerman, DOI: 10.1080/00396330701564760, ''Survival'', Volume 49, Issue 3 September 2007, pages 151–168</ref><ref>"The Litvinenko File: The Life and Death of a Russian Spy", by Martin Sixsmith, True Crime, 2007 ISBN 0-312-37668-5, page 14.</ref><ref name="Bellona"> by Morten Bremer Mærli, ]</ref>

===Alternative conflict resolution===
{{Main|Conflict resolution}}
Alternatives to nuclear warfare include ],<ref name="s977">{{cite journal | last=Hoey | first=Fintan | title=Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and Non-proliferation | journal=Journal of Strategic Studies | volume=39 | issue=4 | date=6 June 2016 | issn=0140-2390 | doi=10.1080/01402390.2016.1168010 | pages=484–501}}</ref> ] and ].


==History== ==History==
{{Main|History of nuclear weapons}} {{Main|History of nuclear weapons|Timeline of nuclear weapons development}}


===1940s===
===Hiroshima to Semipalatinsk===
====Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki====
{{Unreferenced section|date=June 2010}}
] {{Main|Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki}}]
The ] is the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons during war, ] on the ]ese cities of ] and ] in 1945.


During the final stages of ] in 1945, the United States conducted atomic raids on the Japanese cities of ] and ], the first on August 6, 1945, and the second on August 9, 1945. These two events were the only times nuclear weapons have been used in ].<ref>{{Cite book| last = Hakim| first = Joy| title = A History of Us: War, Peace and all that Jazz| publisher=Oxford University Press| year = 1995| location = New York| isbn = 0-19-509514-6 }}</ref>
Immediately after the bombings of Japan, the status of atomic weapons in international and military relations was unclear. Presumably, the United States hoped atomic weapons could offset the Soviet Union's superior conventional ground forces in Eastern Europe, and possibly be used to pressure Soviet leader ] into concessions. Stalin pursued his own atomic capabilities through scientific research and espionage against the American program. The Soviets believed that the Americans, with their limited nuclear arsenal, were unlikely to engage in any new world wars, while the Americans were not confident they could prevent a Soviet takeover of Europe, despite their atomic advantage.


For six months before the atomic bombings, the U.S. ] under ] ] executed low-level ] ]. The most destructive air raid to occur during the process was not the nuclear attacks, but the ]. On the night of March 9–10, 1945, ''Operation Meetinghouse'' commenced and 334 ] ]s took off to raid, with 279 of them dropping 1,665 tons of ] and ]s on ]. The bombing was meant to burn wooden buildings and indeed the bombing caused fire that created a 50&nbsp;m/s wind, which is comparable to tornadoes. Each bomber carried 6 tons of bombs. A total of 381,300 bombs, which amount to 1,783 tons of bombs, were used in the bombing. Within a few hours of the raid, it had killed an estimated 100,000 people and destroyed {{convert|41|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of the city and 267,000 buildings in a single night — the deadliest bombing raid in ] history other than the atomic raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0310-08.htm|title=1945 Tokyo Firebombing Left Legacy of Terror, Pain|work=Common Dreams|access-date=2014-12-08|archive-date=2015-01-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150103023353/http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0310-08.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |url=https://www.wired.com/2011/03/0309incendiary-bombs-kill-100000-tokyo/ |title=March 9, 1945: Burning the Heart Out of the Enemy |author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=9 March 2011 |magazine=Wired |publisher=Condé Nast Digital |access-date=June 8, 2014}}</ref><ref>Wolk (2010), p. 125</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/firebombing-of-tokyo|title=Firebombing of Tokyo|work=HISTORY.com}}</ref> By early August 1945, an estimated 450,000 people had died as the U.S. had intensely firebombed a total of 67 Japanese cities.
Within the United States the authority to produce and develop nuclear weapons was removed from military control and put instead under the civilian control of the ]. This decision reflected an understanding that nuclear weapons had unique risks and benefits separate from other military technology.


In late June 1945, as the U.S. wrapped up the two-and-a-half-month ] (which cost the lives of 260,000 people, including 150,000 civilians),<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Huber/Huber.asp |title=Japan's Battle of Okinawa, March–June 1945|publisher=] |access-date=2016-12-13 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090214183638/http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Huber/Huber.asp |archive-date=February 14, 2009 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World |pages=273 |date=February 4, 2014 |publisher=New Press}}</ref> it was faced with the prospect of invading the ] in an operation codenamed ]. Based on the U.S. casualties from the preceding ], American commanders estimated that between 50,000 and 500,000 U.S. troops would die and at least 600,000–1,000,000 others would be injured while invading the Japanese home islands. The U.S. manufacture of 500,000 ]s from the anticipated high level of casualties during the U.S. invasion of Japan gave a demonstration of how deadly and costly it would be. ] ] realized he could not afford such a horrendous casualty rate, especially since over 400,000 American combatants had already died fighting in both the ] and the ] of the war.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=130&REC=2 |title=United States Dept. of the Army, Army Battle Casualties and Non-Battle Deaths in World War II |publisher=Cgsc.cdmhost.com |access-date=2011-06-15 |archive-date=2010-05-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100512130416/http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=%2Fp4013coll8&CISOPTR=130&REC=2 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
] bomber]]
For several years after ], the US developed and maintained a strategic force based on the ] bomber that would be able to attack any potential enemy from bomber bases in the US. It deployed atomic bombs around the world for potential use in conflicts. Over a period of a few years, many in the US defense community became increasingly convinced of the invincibility of the United States to a nuclear attack. Indeed, it became generally believed that the threat of nuclear war would deter any strike against the United States.


On July 26, 1945, the United States, the ], and the ] issued a ] that called for the ] of Japan. It stated that if Japan did not surrender, it would face "prompt and utter destruction".<ref name=atomicarchive>{{cite web | title = Potsdam Declaration: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender Issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945 | url = http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Hiroshima/Potsdam.shtml | publisher = National Science Digital Library }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | publisher = United States Department of State, Office of the Historian | url = https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/PotsdamConf | title = Milestones: 1937–1945 / The Potsdam Conference, 1945 | url-status = dead | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131029194738/http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/PotsdamConf | archive-date = 2013-10-29 }}</ref> The Japanese government ] this ultimatum, sending a message that they were not going to surrender. In response to the rejection, President Truman authorized the dropping of the atomic bombs. At the time of its use, there were only two atomic bombs available, and despite the fact that more were in production back in ], the third bomb wouldn't be available for combat until September.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Newman|first1=Robert P.|title=Truman and the Hiroshima Cult|date=1995|page=86|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Haf2g1mbsH8C|isbn=978-0-87013-940-6|publisher=MSU Press}}</ref><ref name="Generals">{{cite web |title=The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, A Collection of Primary Sources| publisher=]| date=August 13, 1945| work=National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162 | url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/72.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/72.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live}}</ref>
Many proposals were suggested to put all US nuclear weapons under international control—for example, by the newly formed ] — as an effort to deter both their usage and an arms race. However no terms could be arrived at that would be agreed upon by both the US and the USSR.


]'s back injuries taken in January 1946 by a U.S. Marine photographer]]
]
] of Atomic bomb in Nagasaki]]
On August 29, 1949 the ] tested its ] at ] in ] (see also ]). Scientists in the United States from the Manhattan Project had warned that, in time, the Soviet Union would certainly develop nuclear capabilities of its own. Nevertheless, the effect upon military thinking and planning in the US was dramatic, primarily because American military strategists had not anticipated the Soviets would "catch up" so soon. However, at this time, they had not discovered that the Russians had conducted significant espionage of the project from spies at Los Alamos, the most significant of which was done by the theoretical physicist ]. The first Soviet bomb was more or less a deliberate copy of the ] device.
On August 6, 1945, the uranium-type nuclear weapon codenamed "]" was detonated over the Japanese city of ] with an energy of about {{convert|15|ktonTNT|GJ|abbr=off}}, destroying nearly 50,000 buildings (including the ] of the ] and ]) and killing approximately 70,000 people, including 20,000 Japanese combatants and 20,000 Korean slave laborers.<ref name=eyewitness>Adams, S. & Crawford, A.. 2000. ''World War II.'' First edition. Printed in association with the Imperial War Museum. Eyewitness Books series. New York, Doring Kindersley Limited</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=The Real History of World War II: A New Look at the Past |url=https://archive.org/details/realhistoryofwor00axel |url-access=registration |author=Alan Axelrod |publisher=Sterling |page= |date=May 6, 2008|isbn=9781402740909 }}</ref> Three days later, on August 9, a plutonium-type nuclear weapon codenamed "]" was used against the Japanese city of Nagasaki, with the explosion equivalent to about {{convert|20|ktonTNT|GJ|abbr=off}}, destroying 60% of the city and killing approximately 35,000 people, including 23,200–28,200 Japanese munitions workers, 2,000 Korean slave laborers, and 150 Japanese combatants.<ref>{{cite book |title=Nuke-Rebuke: Writers & Artists Against Nuclear Energy & Weapons (The Contemporary anthology series) |pages=22–29 |date=May 1, 1984 |publisher=The Spirit That Moves Us Press}}</ref> The industrial damage in Nagasaki was high, partly owing to the inadvertent targeting of the industrial zone, leaving 68–80 percent of the non-dock industrial production destroyed.<ref>{{cite book |title=Welcome To Planet Earth – 2050 – Population Zero |author= Robert Hull |date=October 11, 2011 |page=215 |publisher=] |isbn=978-1-4634-2604-0}}</ref> The U.S., despite not having a third device ready to be dropped, gave Japan one last warning that there would be another bombing if they did not surrender, and the target would be ].


Six days after the detonation over Nagasaki, Japan announced ] to the ] on August 15, 1945, signing the ] on September 2, 1945, officially ending the ] and, therefore, World War II, as ] had already signed its ] on May 8, 1945, ending the ]. The two atomic bombings led, in part, to ] adopting of the ], which forbade the nation from developing nuclear armaments.<ref>{{cite web| last = Koizumi | first = Junichiro | author-link = Junichiro Koizumi | title = Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Hiroshima Memorial Service for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony | publisher=Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet | date = August 6, 2005 | url = http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2005/08/06aisatu_e.html | access-date = Nov 28, 2007 }}</ref>
With the monopoly over nuclear technology broken, worldwide nuclear proliferation accelerated. The ] tested its first independent atomic bomb in 1952, followed by ] in 1960 and then the ] in 1964. While much smaller than the arsenals of the USA and the USSR, Western Europe's nuclear reserves were nevertheless a significant factor in strategic planning during the ]. A top-secret ] produced for the British Government in 1959, compiled by the ], estimated that British atomic bombers were capable of destroying key cities and military targets in the Soviet Union, with an estimated 16 million deaths in the USSR (half of whom were estimated to be killed on impact and the rest fatally injured) ''before'' bomber aircraft from the United States' ] reached their targets.


====Immediately after the Japan bombings====
===The 1950s===
After the successful ] July 16, 1945, which was the very first nuclear detonation, the ] lead manager ] recalled:
Though the USSR had nuclear weapon capabilities in the beginning of the ], the US still had an advantage in terms of bombers and weapons. In any exchange of hostilities, the US would have been capable of bombing the USSR, while the USSR would have more difficulties arranging the reverse.
{{blockquote|We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people cried, and most people were silent. I remembered the line from the ] scripture the '']''. ] is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multiarmed form and says, "Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." I suppose we all thought that one way or another.|]|''The Decision To Drop The Bomb''<ref>{{cite journal|title=Oppenheimer's Ghost |date=November–December 2007|first=Jason |last=Pontin |journal=]}}</ref>|source=}}


].]]
The widespread introduction of ]-powered ] upset this imbalance somewhat by reducing the effectiveness of the US bomber fleet. In 1949 ] was placed in command of the ] and instituted a program to update the bomber fleet to one that was all-jet. During the early 1950s the ] and ] were introduced, providing the ability to bomb the USSR more easily.
<!-- Deleted image removed: ] urged the socialist camp not to fear nuclear war with the United States since, even if '' 'half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist'.''<ref>"". TIME. September 20, 1976.</ref>]] -->
Before the development of a capable strategic missile force in the Soviet Union, much of the war-fighting doctrine held by western nations revolved around using a large number of smaller nuclear weapons used in a tactical role. It is debatable whether such use could be considered "limited" however, because it was believed that the US would use their own strategic weapons (mainly bombers at the time) should the USSR deploy any kind of nuclear weapon against civilian targets. ], an American general, was fired by President ], partially because he persistently requested permission to use his own discretion in deciding whether to use atomic weapons on the ] in 1951 (as the ] was raging).<ref></ref>{{Dead link|date=July 2010}}


] the atomic bombings of Japan, the status of atomic weapons in international and military relations was unclear. Presumably, the United States hoped atomic weapons could offset the Soviet Union's larger conventional ground forces in ], and possibly be used to pressure Soviet leader ] into making concessions. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union pursued its own atomic capabilities through a combination of scientific research and ] directed against the American program. The Soviets believed that the Americans, with their limited nuclear arsenal, were unlikely to engage in any new world wars, while the Americans were not confident they could prevent a Soviet takeover of Europe, despite their atomic advantage.
Several scares about the increasing ability of the USSR's strategic bomber forces surfaced during the 1950s. The defensive response by the US was to deploy a fairly strong layered defense consisting of ] and ]s, like the ], and guns, like the ], near larger cities. However this was a small response compared to the construction of a huge fleet of nuclear bombers. The principal nuclear strategy was to massively penetrate the USSR. Because such a large area could not be defended against this overwhelming attack in any credible way, the USSR would lose any exchange.


Within the United States, the authority to produce and develop nuclear weapons was removed from military control and put instead under the civilian control of the ]. This decision reflected an understanding that nuclear weapons had unique risks and benefits that were separate from other military technology known at the time.
This logic became ingrained in US nuclear doctrine and persisted for the duration of the ]. As long as the strategic US nuclear forces could overwhelm their USSR counterparts, a Soviet preemptive strike could be averted. Moreover, the USSR could not afford to build any reasonable counterforce as the economic output of the United States was far larger than that of the Soviets, and they would be unable to achieve nuclear parity.


] bomber.]]
Soviet nuclear doctrine, however, did not match US nuclear doctrine {{Citation needed|date=April 2009}}. Soviet planning expected a large-scale nuclear exchange followed by a conventional war which itself would involve heavy use of tactical nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, US doctrine rather assumed that Soviet doctrine was similar—the ''mutual'' in ] necessarily requiring that the other side see things in much the same way, rather than believing, as the Soviets did, that they could fight a large-scale, combined nuclear and conventional war.


For several years after ], the United States developed and maintained a strategic force based on the ] ] that would be able to attack any potential enemy from bomber bases in the United States. It deployed atomic bombs around the world for potential use in conflicts. Over a period of a few years, many in the American defense community became increasingly convinced of the invincibility of the United States to a nuclear attack. Indeed, it became generally believed that the threat of nuclear war would deter any strike against the United States.
A revolution in nuclear strategic thought occurred with the introduction of the ] (ICBM), which the USSR first successfully tested in August 1957. In order to deliver a warhead to a target, a missile was more cost-effective than a bomber, and enjoyed a higher survivability due to the enormous difficulty of interception of the ICBMs due to their high altitude and speed. The USSR could now afford to achieve nuclear parity with the US in terms of raw numbers, although for a time they appeared to have chosen not to.


Many proposals were suggested to put all American nuclear weapons under international control (by the newly formed ], for example) as an effort to deter both their usage and a ]. However, no terms could be arrived at that would be agreed upon by both the United States and the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Cite web |last=United |first=Nations |title=International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.un.org/en/observances/nuclear-weapons-elimination-day |access-date=2024-02-13 |website=United Nations |language=en}}</ref>{{citation needed|date=June 2020}}
Photos of Soviet missile sites set off a wave of panic in the US military, something the launch of ] would do for the public a few months later. Politicians, notably then-] ] suggested a "]" between the Soviets and the US.<!--This was a savvy political ploy as the US administration almost certainly knew better and also knew that they could not be corrected without violating military security. (Though it should be pointed out, Eisenhower's own ] had also overestimated Soviet nuclear capabilities in their 1957 report). One result of this, however, was that the Soviets believed the vulnerability actually existed, with resulting temptation; luckily cooler heads prevailed. After Kennedy won the 1960 Presidential election, the "missile gap" conveniently went away.--><!--This political interpretation needs to be attributed or made neutral.--> The US military gave missile development programs the highest national priority, and several ] and ]s were designed and deployed to observe Soviet progress.

]

On August 29, 1949, the ] tested its ] at ] in ] (see also ]). Scientists in the United States from the Manhattan Project had warned that, in time, the Soviet Union would certainly develop nuclear capabilities of its own. Nevertheless, the effect upon military thinking and planning in the United States was dramatic, primarily because American military strategists had not anticipated the Soviets would "catch up" so soon. However, at this time, they had not discovered that the Soviets had conducted significant ] of the project from spies at ], the most significant of which was done by the theoretical physicist ].{{citation needed|date=April 2015}} The first Soviet bomb was more or less a deliberate copy of the ] ] device. In the same year the first US-Soviet nuclear war plan was penned in the US with ].

With the monopoly over nuclear technology broken, worldwide nuclear proliferation accelerated. The ] tested its ] in 1952, followed by ] developing its ] in 1960 and then ] developing its ] in 1964. While much smaller than the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, ]'s nuclear reserves were nevertheless a significant factor in strategic planning during the ]. A top-secret ], compiled by the ] and produced for the British Government in 1959, estimated that ] carrying nuclear weapons were capable of destroying key cities and military targets in the Soviet Union, with an estimated 16&nbsp;million deaths in the Soviet Union (half of whom were estimated to be killed on impact and the rest fatally injured) ''before'' bomber aircraft from the ] reached their targets.

===1950s===
Although the Soviet Union had nuclear weapon capabilities at the beginning of the ], the United States still had an advantage in terms of bombers and weapons. In any exchange of hostilities, the United States would have been capable of bombing the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet Union would have more difficulty carrying out the reverse mission.

The widespread introduction of ]-powered ] upset this imbalance somewhat by reducing the effectiveness of the American bomber fleet. In 1949 ] was placed in command of the Strategic Air Command and instituted a program to update the bomber fleet to one that was all-jet. During the early 1950s the ] and ] were introduced, providing the ability to bomb the Soviet Union more easily. Before the development of a capable strategic missile force in the Soviet Union, much of the war-fighting doctrine held by western nations revolved around using a large number of smaller nuclear weapons in a tactical role. It is debatable whether such use could be considered "limited" however because it was believed that the United States would use its own strategic weapons (mainly bombers at the time) should the Soviet Union deploy any kind of nuclear weapon against civilian targets. ], an American general, was fired by President ], partially because he persistently requested permission to use his own discretion in deciding whether to utilize atomic weapons on the ] in 1951 during the ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/5630.html|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20081015161227/http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/China/Nuclear/5630.html|url-status=dead|title=Nuclear Chronology 1945–1959|archivedate=October 15, 2008}}</ref> ], China's communist leader, gave the impression that he would welcome a nuclear war with the capitalists because it would annihilate what he viewed as their imperialist system.<ref name="auto">"". TIME. September 20, 1976.</ref><ref>]. ], 2007. p. 321. {{ISBN|0-674-02530-X}}</ref>

{{blockquote|Let us imagine how many people would die if war breaks out. There are 2.7 billion people in the world, and a third could be lost. If it is a little higher it could be half ... I say that if the worst came to the worst and one-half dies, there will still be one-half left, but imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist. After a few years there would be 2.7 billion people again.| Mao Zedong, 1957<ref>Dikötter, Frank. '']: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62.'' Walker & Company, 2010. p.13. {{ISBN|0-8027-7768-6}}</ref>}}

], including the ] at the ], USA, pictured above during the ] to familiarize their soldiers with conducting operations and counter-measures around nuclear detonations, as the Korean War threatened to expand.]]

The concept of a "Fortress North America" emerged during the Second World War and persisted into the Cold War to refer to the option of defending ] and the United States against their enemies if the rest of the world were lost to them. This option was rejected with the formation of ] and the decision to permanently station troops in Europe.

In the summer of 1951, ] started, in which project analysts such as ] looked at how to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. The emerging development of ] was looked upon as a means to give Western forces a qualitative advantage over the Soviet numerical supremacy in conventional weapons.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.patrickmccray.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/2004-McCray-Vista-Paper.pdf| title = Project Vista, Caltech, and the dilemmas of Lee DuBridge| access-date = 2014-10-07| archive-date = 2017-09-03| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170903225132/http://www.patrickmccray.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/2004-McCray-Vista-Paper.pdf| url-status = dead}}</ref>

Several scares about the increasing ability of the Soviet Union's strategic bomber forces surfaced during the 1950s. The defensive response by the United States was to deploy a fairly strong "layered defense" consisting of ] and ]s, like the ], and guns, like the ], near larger cities. However, this was a small response compared to the construction of a huge fleet of nuclear bombers. The principal ] was to massively penetrate the Soviet Union. Because such a large area could not be defended against this overwhelming attack in any credible way, the Soviet Union would lose any exchange.

This logic became ingrained in American nuclear doctrine and persisted for much of the duration of the ]. As long as the strategic American nuclear forces could overwhelm their Soviet counterparts, a Soviet pre-emptive strike could be averted. Moreover, the Soviet Union could not afford to build any reasonable counterforce, as the economic output of the United States was far larger than that of the Soviets, and they would be unable to achieve "nuclear parity".

Soviet nuclear doctrine, however, did not match American nuclear doctrine.<ref name="kms1.isn.ethz.ch">{{Cite web |url=http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/46280/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/14933a8e-14e8-43d7-a257-6bdab65dba50/en/ZB79_000.pdf |title=Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War |access-date=2011-10-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120402212438/http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/46280/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/14933a8e-14e8-43d7-a257-6bdab65dba50/en/ZB79_000.pdf |archive-date=2012-04-02 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/mar-apr/jenson.html|title=Nuclear Strategy differences in Soviet and American thinking|access-date=2012-06-07|archive-date=2017-01-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170126002842/http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/mar-apr/jenson.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> Soviet military planners assumed they could win a nuclear war.<ref name="kms1.isn.ethz.ch"/><ref>, Richard Pipes, Professor of History Harvard University 1977</ref><ref name="gwu.edu">{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/|title=Candid Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades|website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu}}</ref> Therefore, they ''expected'' a large-scale nuclear exchange, followed by a "conventional war" which itself would involve heavy use of ]s. American doctrine rather assumed that Soviet doctrine was similar, with the ''mutual'' in ] necessarily requiring that the other side see things in much the same way, rather than believing—as the Soviets did—that they could fight a large-scale, "combined nuclear and conventional" war.

In accordance with their doctrine, the Soviet Union conducted ] to explore the possibility of defensive and offensive ] during a ]. The exercise, under the code name of "]", involved the detonation of a nuclear bomb about twice as powerful as that which fell on ] and an army of approximately 45,000 soldiers on ] through the ] immediately after the blast.<ref>], '''' ({{lang|ru|Тень победы}}), Donetsk, 2003, {{ISBN|966-696-022-2}}, pages 353–375.</ref> The exercise was conducted on September 14, 1954, under command of ] ] to the north of ] village in ], ].

A revolution in nuclear strategic thought occurred with the introduction of the ] (ICBM), which the Soviet Union first successfully tested in August 1957. In order to deliver a warhead to a target, a missile was much faster and more cost-effective than a bomber, and enjoyed a higher survivability due to the enormous difficulty of interception of the ICBMs (due to their high altitude and extreme speed). The Soviet Union could now afford to achieve nuclear parity with the United States in raw numbers, although for a time, they appeared to have chosen not to.

Photos of Soviet missile sites set off a wave of panic in the U.S. military, something the launch of ] would do for the American public a few months later. Politicians, notably then-] ] suggested that a "]" existed between the Soviet Union and the United States.<!--This was a savvy political ploy, as the US administration almost certainly knew better, and also knew that they could not be corrected without violating military security. It should be pointed out, though, that Dwight D. Eisenhower's own ] had also overestimated Soviet nuclear capabilities in their 1957 report. One result of this, however, was that the Soviets ''believed'' the vulnerability actually existed, with resulting temptation; luckily, cooler heads prevailed. After Kennedy won the 1960 Presidential election, the "missile gap" (conveniently) went away.--><!--This political interpretation needs to be attributed or made neutral.--> The US military gave missile development programs the highest national priority, and several ] and ]s were designed and deployed to observe Soviet progress.

Early ICBMs and bombers were relatively inaccurate, which led to the concept of ] strikes — attacks directly on the enemy population, which would theoretically lead to a collapse of the enemy's will to fight. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested in extensive protected civilian infrastructure, such as large "nuclear-proof" bunkers and non-perishable food stores. By comparison, smaller scale ] programs were instituted in the United States starting in the 1950s, where schools and other public buildings had basements stocked with non-perishable food supplies, canned water, first aid, and ] and ] radiation-measuring devices. Many of the locations were given "]" designation signs. ] radio information systems were adopted, whereby the commercial radio sector (later supplemented by the ]s) would broadcast on two ] frequencies in the event of a Civil Defense (CD) emergency. These two frequencies, 640 and 1240&nbsp;kHz, were marked with small CD triangles on the tuning dial of radios of the period, as can still be seen on 1950s-vintage radios on online auction sites and museums. A few backyard ]s were built by private individuals.

]'s view on tactical nuclear war in his controversial 1957 book ''Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy'' was that any nuclear weapon exploded in ] mode that was below 500 kilotons in yield and thus averting serious fallout, may be more decisive and less costly in human lives than a protracted conventional war.

A list of targets made by the United States was released sometime during December 2015 by the U.S. ]. The language used to describe targets is "designated ground zeros". The list was released after a request was made during 2006 by William Burr who belongs to a research group at ], and belongs to a previously ] 800-page document. The list is entitled "Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959" and was produced by U.S. ] during the year 1956.<ref>S. Shane – , '']'', Retrieved 2015-12-23</ref>


===1960s=== ===1960s===
] in 1961]]
] reconnaissance photograph of the MRBM launch site in ] (1962).]]
] reconnaissance photograph of the ] launch site in ] (1962)]]
Issues came to a head during the ] in 1962. The Soviet Union placed medium range missiles {{convert|90|mi|km}} from the US - a move considered by many{{Who|date=August 2010}} as a direct response to American ]s placed in Turkey. After intense negotiation, the Soviets ended up removing the missiles from Cuba and decided to institute a massive building program of their own. In exchange, the US dismantled its launch sites in Turkey, although this was done secretly and was not publicly revealed for over two decades. Khrushchev did not even reveal this part of the agreement when he came under fire by political opponents for mishandling the crisis.


In 1960, the United States developed its first ], a range of targeting options, and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched, variants of which were in use from 1961 to 2003. That year also saw the start of the ], an American system of 12 early-warning satellites that provided limited notice of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile launches between 1960 and 1966. The ] was completed in 1964.
By the late 1960s, the number of ICBMs and warheads was so high on both sides that it was believed either the USA or USSR was capable of completely destroying the other country's infrastructure. Thus a ] system known as ] (''MAD'') came into being. It was thought that any full-scale exchange between the powers could not produce a victorious side and thus neither would risk initiating one.

The most powerful atomic bomb ever made, the Tsar Bomba, was tested by the Soviets on October 30, 1961. It was 50 megatons, or equal to 50 million tons of regular explosives.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Broad|first=William J.|date=2021-10-30|title=When the Soviets Set Off the Biggest Nuclear Bomb, J.F.K. Didn't Flinch|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/30/science/tsar-bomba-60.html|access-date=2021-12-17|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> A complex and worrisome situation developed in 1962, in what is called the ]. The Soviet Union placed medium-range ballistic missiles {{convert|90|mi|km}} from the United States, possibly as a direct response to American ]s placed in ]. After intense negotiations, the Soviets ended up removing the missiles from Cuba and decided to institute a massive weapons-building program of their own. In exchange, the United States dismantled its launch sites in Turkey, although this was done secretly and not publicly revealed for over two decades. First Secretary ] did not even reveal this part of the agreement when he came under fire by political opponents for mishandling the crisis. Communication delays during the crisis led to the establishment of the ] to allow reliable, direct communications between the two nuclear powers.

By the late 1960s, the number of ICBMs and warheads was so high on both sides that it was believed that both the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of completely destroying the infrastructure and a large proportion of the population of the other country. Thus, by some western ]s, a ] system known as ] (or ''MAD'') came into being. It was thought that no full-scale exchange between the powers would result in an outright winner, with at best one side emerging the ]. Thus both sides were ] from risking the initiation of a direct confrontation, instead being forced to engage in lower-intensity ].

During this decade the ] began to build subterranean infrastructure such as the ] following the ].


<!--these next two paragraphs should be elsewhere in the text, not in "1960s"--> <!--these next two paragraphs should be elsewhere in the text, not in "1960s"-->
One drawback of this doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. Early ]s were notoriously error-prone. On 78 occasions in 1979, for example, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections potentially threatening to the North American continent. Some of these were trivial errors, spotted quickly. But several went to more serious levels. On September 26, 1983, ] received convincing indications of a US first strike launch against the USSR but positively identified the warning as a false alarm. Though it is unclear what role Petrov's actions played in preventing a nuclear war, he has been honored by the United Nations for his actions. One drawback of the MAD doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. ]s (EWS) were notoriously error-prone. For example, on 78 occasions in 1979 alone, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections that were "potentially threatening to the North American continent". Some of these were trivial errors and were spotted quickly, but several went to more serious levels. On September 26, 1983, ] received convincing indications of an American first strike launch against the Soviet Union, but positively identified the warning as a false alarm. Though it is unclear what role Petrov's actions played in preventing a nuclear war during this incident, he has been honored by the United Nations for his actions.


Similar incidents happened many times in the US, due to failed computer chips,<ref>, ''20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War'', by Alan F. Phillips, M.D., January 1998, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</ref> flights of geese, test programs, and bureaucratic failures to notify early warning military personnel of legitimate launches of test or weather missiles. For many years, US strategic bombers were kept airborne on a rotating basis round the clock, until the number and severity of accidents persuaded policymakers it was not worthwhile. {{Citation needed|date=January 2009}} Similar incidents happened many times in the United States, due to failed ],<ref> {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131226153334/http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1998/01/00_phillips_20-mishaps.htm |date=2013-12-26 }}, ''20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War'', by Alan F. Phillips, M.D., January 1998, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation</ref> misidentifications of large flights of geese, test programs, and bureaucratic failures to notify early warning military personnel of legitimate launches of test or weather missiles. For many years, the ]'s strategic bombers were kept airborne on a daily rotating basis "around the clock" (see ]), until the number and severity of ], the ] in particular,<ref>{{cite news |title=The Cold War's Missing Atom Bombs |url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-nuclear-needle-in-a-haystack-the-cold-war-s-missing-atom-bombs-a-590513.html |work=Der Spiegel |date=14 November 2008}}</ref> persuaded policymakers it was not worthwhile.


===1970s=== ===1970s===
Israel responded to the Arab ] attack on 6 October 1973 by assembling 13 nuclear weapons in a tunnel under the ] when Syrian tanks were sweeping in across the ]. On 8 October 1973, Israeli Prime Minister ] authorized Defense Minister ] to activate the 13 Israeli nuclear warheads and distribute them to ] units, with the intent that they be used if Israel began to be overrun.<ref>Seymour M. Hersh, ''The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy'' (Random House, 1991) p.&nbsp;225.</ref>
By the late 1970s, citizens in the US and USSR (and indeed the entire world) had been living with ] for about a decade. It became deeply ingrained into the popular culture. Such an exchange would have killed many millions of individuals directly and possibly induced a ] which could have led to the death of a large portion of humanity and, potentially, the collapse of global civilization.


On 24 October 1973, as US President ] was preoccupied with the ], Henry Kissinger ordered a ]-3 alert{{dubious|date=August 2021}} preparing American B-52 nuclear bombers for war. Intelligence reports indicated that the USSR was preparing to defend Egypt in its ] with Israel. It had become apparent that if Israel had dropped nuclear weapons on Egypt or Syria, as it prepared to do, then the USSR would have retaliated against Israel, with the US then committed to providing Israeli assistance, possibly escalating to a general nuclear war.<ref name="ReferenceB">Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War, Bernard Brodie</ref>
On May 18, 1974, ] conducted its first nuclear test in the ] test range. The name of the operation was ] and India termed the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion".


By the late 1970s, people in both the ] and the ], along with the rest of the world, had been living with the concept of ] (MAD) for about a decade, and it became deeply ingrained into the psyche and popular culture of those countries.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The threats of nuclear warfare as depicted in the popular culture of the 1960s {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/video/186541/overview-atomic-bomb-Strangelove-threat-warfare-missile |access-date=2024-06-14 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref>
According to the 1980 ] report ''General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General'', it was estimated that in total there were approximately 40,000 nuclear warheads in existence at that time with a total yield of approximately 13,000 ]s. By comparison, when the volcano ] erupted in 1815 (turning 1816 into the ] due to the levels of ash expelled), it exploded with a force of roughly 1,000 megatons. Many people believed that a full-scale nuclear war could result in the ], though not all analysts agreed on the assumptions required for these models.


On May 18, 1974, ] conducted its first nuclear test in the ] test range. The name of the operation was ], and India termed the test as a "]."
The idea that any nuclear conflict would eventually escalate was a challenge for military strategists. This challenge was particularly severe for the United States and its ] allies because it was believed until the 1970s that a Soviet tank invasion of Western ] would quickly overwhelm NATO conventional forces, leading to the necessity of escalating to tactical nuclear weapons.


The Soviet ] early warning ] system was made operational in 1976. The extremely powerful radio transmissions needed for such a system led to much disruption of civilian shortwave broadcasts, earning it the nickname "]".
A number of interesting concepts were developed. Early ICBMs were inaccurate, which led to the concept of ] strikes — attacks directly on the enemy population leading to a collapse of the enemy's will to fight. During the Cold War the USSR invested in extensive protected civilian infrastructure such as large nuclear-proof bunkers and non-perishable food stores. In the US, by comparison, smaller scale ] programs were instituted starting in the 1950s where schools and other public buildings had basements stocked with non-perishable food supplies, canned water, first aid, ] and ] radiation measuring devices. Many of the locations were given "]" designation signs. Also, ] Radio information systems were adopted, whereby the commercial radio sector would broadcast on two AM frequencies in the event of a CD emergency. These two frequencies can be seen on 50's vintage radios on online auction sites and museums, with many of these radios still in use on tabletops across America. Also, the occasional backyard fallout shelter was built by private individuals.


The idea that any nuclear conflict would eventually escalate was a challenge for military strategists. This challenge was particularly severe for the United States and its ] allies. It was believed (until the 1970s) that a Soviet tank offensive into Western Europe would quickly overwhelm NATO conventional forces, leading to the necessity of the West escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, one of which was the ].
This strategy had one major and possibly critical flaw, soon realised by military analysts but highly underplayed by the US military: Conventional ] forces in the European theatre of war were outnumbered by similar Soviet and ] forces, and while the western countries invested heavily in high-tech conventional weapons to counter this imbalance, it was assumed that in case of a major Soviet attack (commonly perceived as the "red tanks rolling towards the ]" scenario) that NATO, in the face of conventional defeat, would soon have no other choice but to resort to tactical nuclear strikes. Most analysts agreed that once the first nuclear exchange had occurred, escalation to global nuclear war would become almost inevitable. According to then Secretary of State ] by 1976 the USA had a 6-to-1 advantage in the number of nuclear warheads over the Soviet Union.<ref name="StudiesIntell85">{{cite web
|url=http://cryptome.org/nara/wh/wh-76-0727.pdf
|title=Memorandum of Conversation: J. Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia, President Ford, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, et al.
|date=July 27, 1976
|publisher=The White House
|accessdate=2011-01-03
}}</ref>


This strategy had one major (and possibly critical) flaw, which was soon realized by military analysts but highly underplayed by the U.S. military: conventional ] forces in the European theatre of war were far outnumbered by similar Soviet and ] forces, and it was assumed that in case of a major Soviet attack (commonly envisioned as the "Red tanks rolling towards the ]" scenario) that NATO—in the face of quick conventional defeat—would soon have no other choice but to resort to tactical nuclear strikes against these forces. Most analysts agreed that once the first nuclear exchange had occurred, escalation to global nuclear war would likely become inevitable. The ]'s vision of an atomic war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces was simulated in the top-secret exercise ] in 1979. The British government exercised their vision of a Soviet nuclear attack with ] in early 1980.
As missile technology improved, the emphasis moved to counter-force strikes: ones that directly attacked the enemy's means of waging war. This was the predominant doctrine from the late 1960s onwards. Additionally the development of warheads (at least in the US) moved towards delivering a small explosive force more accurately and with a "cleaner" blast (with fewer long-lasting ] ]s). In any conflict therefore, damage would have been initially limited to military targets, there may well have been "withholds" for targets near civilian areas. The argument was that the destruction of a city would be a military advantage to the ''attacked''. The enemy had used up weapons and a threat in the destruction while the attacked was relieved of the need to defend the city and still had their entire military potential untouched.


Large hardened nuclear ]s were built across European countries in anticipation of local US and European forces falling back as the conventional NATO defense from the Soviet Union, named ], was believed to only be capable of stalling the Soviets for a short time.
Only if a nuclear conflict were extended into a number of "spasm" strikes would direct strikes against civilians occur, as the more accurate weapons would be expended early; if one side were "losing", the potential for using less accurate submarine-launched missiles would occur.


===The 1980s=== ===1980s===
] ] and the paths of its reentry vehicles.]] ] ] and the paths of its reentry vehicles.]]
]s during the 1980s. The resulting ] is indicated with the darkest considered as "lethal" to relatively fall-out free yellow zones.]] ]-estimated primary ] targets for Soviet ]s in 1990. The resulting ] is indicated with the darkest considered as lethal to lesser fall-out yellow zones.<ref>{{cite web|title= Continental US Fallout Pattern for Prevailing Winds (FEMA-196/September 1990) |url= http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-17 |website= ] |url-status= dead |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20110315084044/http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-17 |archive-date= March 15, 2011}}</ref>{{failed verification|date=May 2014|reason=the map in the source is different}}]]
In the late seventies and early eighties the balance, in terms of nuclear weapons, shifted towards the Soviets{{Citation needed|date=January 2010}}. However, with the ascension to the presidency by ], the US renewed its commitment to a powerful military, which required large spending on military programs. These programs, originally part of President Jimmy Carter's defense budget, included spending on conventional and nuclear weapons systems, as well as defensive systems like ].


In the late 1970s and, particularly, during the early 1980s under U.S. President ], the United States renewed its commitment to a more powerful military, which required a large increase in spending on U.S. military programs. These programs, which were originally part of the defense budget of U.S. President ], included spending on conventional and nuclear weapons systems. Under Reagan, defensive systems like the ] were emphasized as well.
Another major shift in nuclear doctrine was the development of the ]-launched ballistic (nuclear) missile, the ]. It was hailed by some military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs, which can move with stealth virtually anywhere in the world, give a nation a "]" capability. Before the advent of SLBMs, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus a first strike was much less of a feasible option, and nuclear war was held to be less likely.


Another major shift in nuclear doctrine was the development and the improvement of the ]-launched, nuclear-armed, ballistic missile, or ]. It was hailed by many military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs—which can move with "stealth" (greatly lessened detectability) virtually anywhere in the world—give a nation a "]" capability (i.e., after absorbing a "first strike"). Before the advent of the SLBM, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a near-certain retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus, a first strike was a much less feasible (or desirable) option, and a deliberately initiated nuclear war was thought to be less likely to start.
However, it was soon realized that submarines could "sneak up" close to enemy coastlines and decrease the warning time—the time between detection of the launch and impact of the missile—from as much as half an hour to under three minutes. This effect was especially significant to the United States, Britain, and China, with their capitals all within {{convert|100|mi|km|-1.6}} of their coasts. Moscow was more secure from this type of threat. This greatly increased the credibility of a "surprise first strike" by one of the factions and theoretically made it possible to knock out or disrupt the ] before a counterstrike could be ordered. It strengthened the notion that a nuclear war could be "won", resulting not only in greatly increased tension, and increasing calls for ] control systems, but also in a dramatic increase in military spending. The submarines and their missile systems were very expensive (one fully equipped nuclear powered nuclear missile submarine could easily cost more than the entire ] of a ] nation),<ref>{{cite news|url=http://americanhistory.si.edu/subs/history/timeline/cost/index.html|title=The Cost of Submarines|accessdate=2008-07-13|work=Fast Attacks and Boomers}}</ref> but the greatest cost came in the development of both sea- and land-based anti-submarine defenses and in improving and strengthening the chain of command. As a result, military spending skyrocketed.


However, it was soon realized that submarines could approach enemy coastlines undetected and decrease the warning time (the time between detection of the missile launch and the impact of the missile) from as much as half an hour to possibly under three minutes. This effect was especially significant to the United States, Britain and China, whose capitals of ], ], and ] all lay within 100 miles (160&nbsp;km) of their coasts. ] was much more secure from this type of threat, due to its considerable distance from the sea. This greatly increased the credibility of a "surprise first strike" by one faction and (theoretically) made it possible to knock out or disrupt the ] of a target nation before any counterstrike could be ordered (known as a "]"). It strengthened the notion that a nuclear war could possibly be "won", resulting not only in greatly increased tensions and increasing calls for ] control systems, but also in a dramatic increase in military spending. The submarines and their missile systems were very expensive, and one fully equipped nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed missile submarine could cost more than the entire ] of a ].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://americanhistory.si.edu/subs/history/timeline/cost/index.html|title=The Cost of Submarines|access-date=2008-07-13|work=Fast Attacks and Boomers}}</ref> It was also calculated, however, that the greatest cost came in the development of ''both'' sea- and land-based anti-submarine defenses and in improving and strengthening the "chain of command", and as a result, military spending skyrocketed.
South Africa developed a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and early 1980s. It was operational for a brief period before being dismantled in the early 1990s.


] developed a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and early 1980s. It was operational for a brief period before being dismantled in the early 1990s.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Liberman |first1=Peter |title=The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb |journal=International Security |date=2001 |volume=26 |issue=2 |pages=45–86 |doi=10.1162/016228801753191132 |jstor=3092122 |s2cid=57562545 }}</ref>
On Sept. 1, 1983, ] was shot down by Soviet Jet Fighters. On the 26th, a Soviet early warning station under the command of ] falsely detected 5 inbound ]s from US. Petrov correctly assessed the situation as a false alarm, and hence did not report his finding to his superiors. It is quite possible that this prevented World War III, as the Soviet policy at that time was immediate nuclear response upon discovering inbound ballistic missiles.{{Citation needed|date=August 2010}}


According to the 1980 ] report ''General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General'', it was estimated that there were a total of about 40,000 ] at that time, with a potential combined explosive yield of approximately 13,000 ]. By comparison, the largest volcanic eruption in ] when the volcano ] erupted in 1815—turning 1816 into the ] due to the levels of ] ] aerosols and ash expelled—it exploded with a force of roughly 33 billion tons of TNT or 33,000 megatons of TNT this is about 2.2 million ],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/tambora-1815-just-how-big-was-the-eruption|title = Tambora 1815: Just How Big Was the Eruption?}}</ref> and ejected {{convert|175|km3|cumi|abbr=on}} of mostly rock/],<ref name="Stothers1984">{{cite journal | last = Stothers | first = Richard B. | journal = ] | title = The Great Tambora Eruption in 1815 and Its Aftermath | volume = 224 | issue = 4654 | year = 1984 | pages = 1191–1198 | doi = 10.1126/science.224.4654.1191 | pmid = 17819476|bibcode = 1984Sci...224.1191S | s2cid = 23649251 }}</ref> that included 120&nbsp;million ]s of sulfur dioxide as ].<ref name="Oppenheimer2003">{{cite journal | last = Oppenheimer | first = Clive | title = Climatic, environmental and human consequences of the largest known historic eruption: Tambora volcano (Indonesia) 1815 | journal = Progress in Physical Geography | volume = 27 | issue = 2 | year = 2003 | pages = 230–259 | doi = 10.1191/0309133303pp379ra| bibcode = 2003PrPG...27..230O | s2cid = 131663534 }}</ref> A larger eruption, approximately 74,000 years ago, in ] produced {{convert|2800|km3|abbr=on}} of tephra, forming ],<ref name=USGS>{{cite web |url= http://hvo.wr.usgs.gov/volcanowatch/2005/05_04_28.html |title=Supersized eruptions are all the rage! |date=April 28, 2005 |publisher=]}}</ref> and produced an estimated {{convert|6000|e6t|ST}} of sulfur dioxide.<ref name=robock2009>{{cite journal| author1=Robock, A.|author2=C.M. Ammann|author3=L. Oman|author4=D. Shindell|author5=S. Levis|author6=G. Stenchikov| title=Did the Toba volcanic eruption of ~74k BP produce widespread glaciation?| journal=] | year=2009 | volume=114 |issue=D10 | pages= D10107| doi=10.1029/2008JD011652| bibcode=2009JGRD..11410107R| doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Huang | first1 = C.Y.| last2 = Zhao | first2 = M.X.| last3 = Wang | first3 = C.C.| last4 = Wei | first4 = G.J.| title = Cooling of the South China Sea by the Toba Eruption and correlation with other climate proxies ~71,000 years ago| journal = Geophysical Research Letters | year = 2001 | volume = 28 | issue = 20 | pages = 3915–3918| doi = 10.1029/2000GL006113 | bibcode=2001GeoRL..28.3915H| doi-access = free }}</ref> The explosive energy of the eruption may have been as high as equivalent to 20,000,000 megatons (Mt) of TNT,<ref name="ocw.nd.edu">{{cite web|url=http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-18|title=Lecture 18 — Notre Dame OpenCourseWare|access-date=September 23, 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141010114324/http://ocw.nd.edu/physics/nuclear-warfare/notes/lecture-18|archive-date=October 10, 2014}}</ref>{{better source needed|date=September 2014}} while the asteroid created ], that is connected with the extinction of the dinosaurs corresponds to at least 70,000,000&nbsp;Mt of energy, which is roughly 7000 times the maximum arsenal of the US and Soviet Union.<ref name="ocw.nd.edu"/>
The world came unusually close to nuclear war (although perhaps not as close as during the Cuban Missile Crisis) when the Soviet Union thought the NATO military exercise ] was a cover up to begin a nuclear strike. The Soviets responded by readying their nuclear arsenal. Soviet fears of an attack went away once the exercise concluded without incident.
] missiles in Europe, Bonn, West Germany, 1981]]


However, comparisons with ] are more misleading than helpful due to the different ]s released, the likely ] fuzing height of nuclear weapons and the globally scattered location of these potential nuclear detonations all being in contrast to the singular and subterranean nature of a ].<ref name="Martin-1982" /> Moreover, assuming the entire world stockpile of weapons were grouped together, it would be difficult, due to the ] effect, to ensure the individual weapons would go off all at once. Nonetheless, many people believe that a full-scale nuclear war would result, through the nuclear winter effect, in the ], though not all analysts agree on the assumptions that underpin these nuclear winter models.<ref name="bmartin.cc"/>
===Post–Cold War===
Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War and greatly reduced tensions between the United States and Russia (the Soviet Union's formal successor state), both nations remained in a "nuclear stand-off" due to the continuing presence of a significant number of warheads in both nations. Additionally, the end of the Cold War led the United States to become increasingly concerned with the development of nuclear technology by other nations outside of the former Soviet Union. In 1995, a branch of the US Strategic Command produced an outline of forward-thinking strategies in the document "]".


On 26 September 1983, a Soviet early warning station under the command of ] falsely detected 5 inbound ]s from the US. Petrov correctly assessed the situation as a false alarm, and hence did not report his finding to his superiors. It is quite possible that his actions prevented "]", as the Soviet policy at that time was ] upon discovering inbound ballistic missiles.<ref>{{cite news |first=Tony |last=Long |newspaper=] |title=The Man Who Saved the World by Doing ... Nothing |url=https://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2007/09/dayintech_0926 |date=26 September 2007 }}</ref>
The former chair of the United Nations disarmament committee states there are more than 16,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons ready for deployment and another 14,000 in storage. The U.S. has nearly 7,000 ready for action and 3,000 in storage and Russia has about 8,500 on hand and 11,000 in storage, he said. ] has 400 nuclear weapons, ] 200, ] 350, ] 120, and ] 90. ] is confirmed as having nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many (a common estimate is between 1 and 10). ] is also widely believed to ]. NATO has stationed 480 US nuclear weapons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, with several other countries in pursuit of an arsenal of their own.<ref></ref>


The world came unusually close to nuclear war in November 1983 when the Soviet Union thought that the NATO military exercise ] was a ruse or "cover-up" to begin a nuclear first strike. The Soviets responded by raising readiness and preparing their nuclear arsenal for ]. Soviet fears of an attack ceased once the exercise concluded without incident.
A key development in nuclear warfare in the 2000s has been the ] of nuclear weapons to the ], with ] and ] both publicly testing nuclear devices and ] conducting an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The US Geological Survey measured a 4.2 magnitude earthquake in the area where the test occurred. A further test was announced by the North Korean government on May 25, 2009.<ref></ref> ], meanwhile, has embarked on a nuclear program which, while officially for civilian purposes, has come under scrutiny by the United Nations and individual states.


=== Post-Cold War ===
Recent studies undertaken by the ] cite the enduring India-Pakistan conflict as the most likely to escalate into nuclear war. During the ] in 1999, Pakistan came close to using its nuclear weapons in case of further deterioration.<ref></ref> Pakistan's foreign minister had even warned that it would "use any weapon in our arsenal", hinting at a nuclear strike against India;<ref>“Pakistan May Use Any Weapon,” The News, Islamabad,
{{See also|Second Cold War}}
May 31, 1999</ref> the statement was condemned by the international community with Pakistan denying it later on. It remains the only war between two declared nuclear powers. The ] again stoked fears of nuclear war between the two countries.


Although the ] ended the ] in 1991 and greatly reduced the political tensions between the ] and the ], the Soviet Union's formal successor state, both countries remained in a "nuclear stand-off" due to the continuing presence of a very large number of deliverable nuclear warheads on both sides. Additionally, the end of the Cold War led the United States to become increasingly concerned with the development of nuclear technology by other nations outside of the former Soviet Union. In 1995, a branch of the U.S. Strategic Command produced an outline of forward-thinking strategies in the document "]".
Despite these very serious threats, relations between India and Pakistan have been improving somewhat over the last few years. A bus line directly linking Indian and Pakistani-administered ] has recently been established. However, with the ], India does not rule out war with Pakistan.


In 1995, a ] launched from the ] caused a high alert in ], known as the ]. The Russians thought it might be a nuclear missile launched from an American submarine.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/nuclear-false-alarms.html |title=False Alarms in the Nuclear Age |author=Forden, Geoffrey |date=November 6, 2001 |publisher=Public Broadcasting System |work=NOVA }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=Pry, Peter |title=War scare: Russia and America on the nuclear brink |publisher=Praeger |location=New York |year=1999 |chapter=Black Brant XII |pages=214–227 |isbn=0-275-96643-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WigJ8ZsWE1QC&pg=PA214}}</ref>
Another flashpoint which has analysts worried is a possible conflict between the ] and the ] over ]. Although economic forces have decreased the possibility of military conflict, there remains the worry that increasing military buildup (] is rapidly increasing their naval capacity) and a move toward ] could spin out of control.


In 1996, a Russian ], ], which is believed to be a counterpart to the US ], was completed.<ref name="web.archive.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.windowonheartland.net/2012/02/russias-top-secret-bases.html |title=WINDOW ON HEARTLAND Geopolitical notes on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130424050959/http://www.windowonheartland.net/2012/02/russias-top-secret-bases.html |archive-date=April 24, 2013 }}</ref> It was designed to resist US ],<ref name="web.archive.org"/> and is believed to host the Russian ] alternate command post, a post for the general staff built to compensate for the vulnerability of older Soviet era command posts in the Moscow region. In spite of this, the primary command posts for the ] remains ] in Moscow and the secondary is the Kosvinsky Mountain in the ].{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} The timing of the Kosvinsky facilities completion date is regarded as one explanation for U.S. interest in a new nuclear "bunker buster" Earth-penetrating warhead and the declaration of the deployment of the ] mod 11 in 1997; Kosvinsky is protected by about 1000 feet of ].{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}
] is another possibility as it is thought to possess between one hundred and four hundred nuclear warheads. It has been asserted that the submarines which Israel received from ] have been adapted to carry missiles with nuclear warheads, so as to give Israel a ] capacity.<ref></ref> Israel has been involved in wars with its neighbours on numerous occasions, and its small geographic size would mean that in the event of future wars the Israeli military might have very little time to react to a future invasion or other major threat; the situation could escalate to nuclear warfare very quickly in some scenarios.


] on 7 July 2017<br />{{Leftlegend|#008cff|Yes}} {{Leftlegend|#ff0000|No}}{{Leftlegend|#c0c0c0|Did not vote}}]]
In the Persian Gulf, ] appears to many observers to be in the process of developing a nuclear weapon, which has heightened fears of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East, either with Israel or with Iran's ] neighbors.
As a consequence of the ], American forces immediately increased their readiness to the highest level in 28 years, closing the blast doors of the NORAD's ] for the first time due to a non-exercise event. But unlike similar increases during the Cold War, Russia immediately decided to stand down a large military exercise in the Arctic region, in order to minimize the risk of incidents, rather than following suit.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1115putinspeaks|title=Context of '(After 11:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Russian President Putin Speaks with President Bush'|access-date=April 28, 2013|archive-date=February 15, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130215191043/http://historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1115putinspeaks|url-status=dead}}</ref>


The former chair of the ] ] committee stated that there are more than 16,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons ready for deployment and another 14,000 in storage, with the U.S. having nearly 7,000 ready for use and 3,000 in storage, and Russia having about 8,500 ready for use and 11,000 in storage. In addition, ] is thought to possess about 400 nuclear weapons, ] about 200, ] about 350, ] about 80–100, and ] 100–110. ] is confirmed as having nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many, with most estimates between 1 and 10. ] is also widely believed to ]. NATO has ] about 480 American nuclear weapons in ], ], ], ], and ], and several other nations are thought to be in pursuit of an arsenal of their own.<ref> Non functioning link</ref>
===Potential consequences of a regional nuclear war===
A study presented at the annual meeting of the ] in December 2006 asserted that even a small-scale, regional nuclear war could produce as many direct fatalities as all of ] and disrupt the global climate for a decade or more. In a regional nuclear conflict scenario in which two opposing nations in the ] each used 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (ca. 15 kiloton each) on major populated centers, the researchers estimated fatalities from 2.6 million to 16.7 million per country. Also, as much as five million tons of ] would be released, which would produce a cooling of several degrees over large areas of North America and ], including most of the grain-growing regions. The cooling would last for years and could be "catastrophic" according to the researchers.<ref></ref>


]'s nuclear policy was significantly affected by the ].<ref name="Chakma2004">{{cite book|author=Bhumitra Chakma|title=Strategic Dynamics and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in South Asia: A Historical Analysis|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L2qmF8E8C9EC&pg=PA133|year=2004|publisher=Peter Lang|isbn=978-3-03910-382-9|page=133}}</ref> The 1971 war and India's nuclear program played a role in Pakistan's decision to go nuclear.<ref name="Chakma2012">{{citation|first=Bhumitra|last=Chakma|title=Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XTbOO0gVgR0C|date=12 October 2012|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-134-13254-6|page=156}}</ref> India and Pakistan both decided not to participate in the NPT.<ref>{{harvnb|Chakma|2012|p=16}}</ref> Pakistan's nuclear policy became fixated on India because India refused to join the ] and remained open to nuclear weapons.<ref name="Khan2014">{{cite book|author=Zafar Khan|title=Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XW8KBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA35|date=17 July 2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-317-67601-0|page=23}}</ref> Impetus by Indian actions spurred Pakistan's nuclear research.<ref name="Hymans2012">{{cite book|author=Jacques E. C. Hymans|title=Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wc-hZbyPhgsC&pg=PA244|date=16 February 2012|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-76700-2|page=244}}</ref> After nuclear weapons construction was started by President ]'s command, the chair of ] Usmani quit in objection.<ref>{{harvnb|Chakma|2012|p=139}}</ref> The ] between Pakistan and India occurred after both acquired nuclear weapons.<ref>{{citation|first=Dr Bhumitra|last=Chakma|title=The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=W-yhAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA213|date=28 April 2013|publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.|isbn=978-1-4094-7641-2|page=213}}</ref> It is believed by some that nuclear weapons are the reason a big war has not broken out in the subcontinent.<ref>{{citation|first=Bhumitra|last=Chakma|title=South Asia's Nuclear Security|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oW7fBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT54|date=17 December 2014|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-1-317-58688-3}}</ref> India and Pakistan still have a risk of nuclear conflict on the issue of war over ]. Nuclear capability deliverable by sea were claimed by Pakistan in 2012.<ref name="Gregory2015">{{cite book|author=Shaun Gregory|title=Democratic Transition and Security in Pakistan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=acfMCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA250|date=23 October 2015|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-317-55011-2|page=250}}</ref> The aim was to achieve a "minimum credible deterrence".<ref>{{harvnb|Chakma|2014|p=–}}</ref> Pakistan's nuclear program culminated in the tests at ].<ref>{{harvnb|Chakma|2013|p=234}}</ref> One of the aims of Pakistan's programs is fending off potential annexation and maintaining independence.<ref>{{harvnb|Chakma|2012|p=140}}</ref>
===Sub-strategic use===
The above examples envisage nuclear warfare at a strategic level, i.e. ]. However, many nuclear powers are believed to have the ability to launch more limited engagements.


A key development in nuclear warfare throughout the 2000s and early 2010s is the ] of nuclear weapons to the ], with ] and ] both publicly testing several nuclear devices, and ] conducting an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The ] measured a 4.2 magnitude earthquake in the area where the North Korean test is said to have occurred. A further test was announced by the North Korean government on May 25, 2009.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8067438.stm|title=BBC NEWS – Asia-Pacific – N Korea faces new UN resolution|date=26 May 2009}}</ref> ], meanwhile, has embarked on a nuclear program which, while officially for civilian purposes, has come under close scrutiny by the United Nations and many individual states.
The United Kingdom has reserved the possibility of launching a sub-strategic nuclear strike against an enemy, described by its Parliamentary ] as "the launch of one or a limited number of missiles against an adversary as a means of conveying a political message, warning or demonstration of resolve". This would see the deployment of ] in a very limited role rather than the battlefield exchanges of ]. Such a strategy is based on the assumption that an enemy country such as the ] or the ] with a larger stockpile of nuclear weapons would not retaliate with far greater force than had been used by Britain.{{Citation needed|date=May 2009}}


Recent studies undertaken by the ] cite the enduring ] as the one "flash point" most likely to escalate into a nuclear war. During the ] in 1999, Pakistan came close to using its nuclear weapons in case the conventional military situation underwent further deterioration.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1989886.stm|title=Pakistan 'prepared nuclear strike'|work=BBC News|date = 16 May 2002}}</ref> Pakistan's foreign minister had even warned that it would "use any weapon in our arsenal", hinting at a nuclear strike against India.<ref>"Pakistan May Use Any Weapon," The News, Islamabad, May 31, 1999</ref> The statement was condemned by the international community, with Pakistan denying it later on. This conflict remains the only war (of any sort) between two declared nuclear powers. The ] again stoked fears of nuclear war between the two countries. Despite these very serious and relatively recent threats, relations between India and Pakistan have been improving somewhat over the last few years. However, with the ], tensions again worsened.
British ]armed ] nuclear submarines are believed to carry some missiles for this purpose, potentially allowing a strike as low as one ] against a single target. Former Defence Secretary ] argued that this capacity offset the reduced credibility of fullscale strategic nuclear attack following the end of the Cold War.
{{External media |float=right | image1 = }}
]
Another potential geopolitical issue that is considered particularly worrisome by military analysts is a possible conflict between the ] and the ] over ]. Although economic forces are thought to have reduced the possibility of a military conflict, there remains concern about the increasing military buildup of ] (China is rapidly increasing its naval capacity), and that any move toward ] could potentially spin out of control.


] is thought to possess somewhere between one hundred and four hundred nuclear warheads. It has been asserted that the ]s which Israel received from Germany have been adapted to carry nuclear-armed ], so as to give Israel a ] capability.<ref>{{cite news|work = The Boston Globe|url= https://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/08/25/israel_buys_2_nuclear_capable_submarines_from_germany/|first = Ramit |date = 25 August 2006|last = Plushnick-Masti |title= Israel buys 2 nuclear-capable submarines from Germany|agency=Associated Press}}</ref> Israel has been involved in wars with its neighbors in the ] (and with other "]s" in ] and ]) on numerous prior occasions, and its small geographic size and population could mean that, in the event of future wars, the ] might have very little time to react to an invasion or other major threat. Such a situation could escalate to nuclear warfare very quickly in some scenarios.
Commodore ], former Director of Nuclear Policy at the ], has described it as offering the Government "an extra option in the escalatory process before it goes for an all-out strategic strike which would deliver unacceptable damage".<ref></ref>


On March 7, 2013, North Korea threatened the United States with a ].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-attack-idUSBRE9260BR20130307|title=North Korea threatens nuclear strike, U.N. expands sanctions|work=Reuters|date=2013-03-07|access-date=2013-05-07}}</ref> On April 9, North Korea urged foreigners to leave ], stating that both countries were on the verge of nuclear war.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/north-korea-urges-foreigners-to-leave-south-korea-1.1314913|title=North Korea urges foreigners to leave South Korea|publisher=CBC|date=2013-04-09|access-date=2013-05-07}}</ref> On April 12, North Korea stated that a nuclear war was unavoidable. The country declared Japan as its first target.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/391376/North-Korea-states-nuclear-war-is-unavoidable-as-it-declares-first-target-will-be-Japan|title=North Korea states 'nuclear war is unavoidable' as it declares first target will be Japan|publisher=Express|author=Meredith, Charlotte|date=2013-04-12|access-date=2013-05-07}}</ref>
However, this sub-strategic capacity has been criticized as potentially increasing the acceptability of using nuclear weapons. The related consideration of new generations of limited-yield nuclear weapons by the United States has also alarmed anti-nuclear groups, who believe it will make the use of nuclear weapons more acceptable.


In 2014, when ] and ] worsened over the ], the Russian state-owned television channel ] stated that "Russia is the only country in the world that is really capable of turning the USA into radioactive ash."<ref>{{cite news| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-russia-kiselyov/russia-can-turn-us-to-radioactive-ash-kremlin-backed-journalist-idUSL6N0MD0P920140316| work= Reuters| date = 16 March 2014|title = Russia can turn US to radioactive ash - Kremlin-backed journalist|first =Lidia |last =Kelly}}</ref> U.S. Secretary of Defense ] considered proposing deployment of ]s in Europe that could pre-emptively destroy Russian weapons.<ref>"". ]. June 5, 2015.</ref>
Similarly, the United States adopted a policy in 1996 of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at "non-state actors" armed with ].<ref>Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, "Senseless policy", '''', November/December 1998, page 4. Fetched from URL on 18 April 2011.</ref>


In August 2017, ] warned that it might launch mid-range ballistic missiles into waters within {{convert|18|to|24|mi|km}} of ], following an ] between the governments of North Korea and the United States.<ref>{{cite news |last=Horton |first=Alex |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/09/why-north-korea-threatened-guam-the-tiny-u-s-territory-with-big-military-power/ |title=Why North Korea threatened Guam, the tiny U.S. territory with big military power |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=August 9, 2017 }}</ref><ref name=cnbc-20170810>{{cite news |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/10/north-koreas-missile-threat-to-guam-crafted-for-maximum-drama.html |title=North Korea's missile threat to Guam crafted for 'maximum drama,' says former CIA analyst |last=Daniels |first=Jeff |publisher=CNBC News |date=August 10, 2017 |access-date=August 11, 2017}}</ref> ] between North Korea and the United States, including threats by both countries that they could use nuclear weapons against one another, prompted a heightened state of readiness in ]. The perceived ballistic missile threat broadcast all over Hawaii on 13 January 2018 was a ].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/world/asia/hawaii-false-alarm-north-korea-nuclear.html|work=The New York Times|title=Hawaii False Alarm Hints at Thin Line Between Mishap and Nuclear War|first=Max|last=Fisher|date=January 14, 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hawaii-missile-alert-20180113-story.html|work=Los Angeles Times|title=False alert of missile attack sparks panic in Hawaii|date=January 13, 2018}}</ref>
==Nuclear terrorism==
{{Main|Nuclear terrorism}}
] by non-state organizations is an unknown factor in nuclear deterrence thinking, as states possessing nuclear weapons are susceptible to retaliation in kind, but sub- or trans-state actors are not. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the possibility that former Soviet nuclear weapons might become available on the ] (so-called 'loose nukes'), while no warheads are known to have been mislaid, it has been alleged that ] might be unaccounted for.


In October 2018, the former Soviet leader ] commented that U.S. withdrawal from the ] is "not the work of a great mind" and that "a new arms race has been announced".<ref>{{cite news |title=Gorbachev says Trump's nuclear treaty withdrawal 'not the work of a great mind' |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/22/gorbachev-says-trumps-nuclear-treaty-withdrawal-not-the-work-of-a-great-mind.html |last=Ellyatt |first=Holly |agency=CNBC |date=22 October 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://thehill.com/policy/defense/413383-trump-stokes-debate-about-new-cold-war-arms-race|title=Trump stokes debate about new Cold War arms race|first=Ian|last=Swanson|date=27 October 2018|website=The Hill}}</ref>
Another possible nuclear terrorism threat are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials over a large area using conventional explosives, called ]s. The detonation of a dirty bomb would not cause a nuclear explosion, nor would it release enough radiation to kill or injure a lot of people. However, it could cause severe disruption and require potentially costly decontamination.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs-bg.html|title=Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs|author=US Nuclear Regulatory Commission|date=2007-05|accessdate=2010-04-26}}</ref>


In early 2019, more than 90% of world's 13,865 nuclear weapons were owned by Russia and the United States.<ref>{{cite news |first=Kelsey |last=Reichmann |title=Here's how many nuclear warheads exist, and which countries own them |url=https://www.defensenews.com/global/2019/06/16/heres-how-many-nuclear-warheads-exist-and-which-countries-own-them/ |work=] |date=16 June 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Global Nuclear Arsenal Declines, But Future Cuts Uncertain Amid U.S.-Russia Tensions |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/nuclear-weapons-russia-start-inf-warheads/30003088.html |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |date=17 June 2019}}</ref>
==See also==
{{Wikinews|Bush and Putin suggest potential for World War III}}
* ]
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* ]
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* ]


In 2019, ] warned that Russia would deploy ] in Europe if the United States deployed ] there. Journalist ] listed the targets in the United States, which includes ], ], ], ], and ]. ] ] denies the existence of the target list.<ref>{{cite news| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-russia/after-putins-warning-russian-tv-lists-nuclear-targets-in-u-s-idUSKCN1QE1DM| work= Reuters| date = 25 February 2019|title = After Putin's warning, Russian TV lists nuclear targets in U.S.|first = Andrew|last = Osborn}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = http://tass.com/politics/1046259| work= TASS|title = Kremlin clarifies Putin never directly declared intention to aim missiles at US|date = 25 February 2019}}</ref>
'''Cold war:'''
* ]
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* ]
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On February 24, 2022, in a televised address preceding the start of Russia's ], Russian President ] stated that Russia "is today one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world... No one should have any doubts that a direct attack on our country will lead to defeat and dire consequences for any potential aggressor." Later in the same speech, Putin stated: "Now a few important, very important words for those who may be tempted to intervene in ongoing events. Whoever tries to hinder us, and even more so to create threats for our country, for our people, should know that Russia's response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences that you have never experienced in your history."<ref>{{cite news |title=Defiant Putin goes to war in Ukraine with a warning for U.S., NATO |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-ukraine-invasion-putin-war-warning-us-nato-rcna17497 |access-date=3 October 2022 |work=NBC News |date=24 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Full text: Putin's declaration of war on Ukraine|url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine |access-date=3 October 2022 |work=www.spectator.co.uk |date=24 February 2022}}</ref> On February 27, 2022, Putin publicly put his nuclear forces on alert, stating that NATO powers had made "aggressive statements".<ref>{{cite news |title=Putin puts nuclear deterrent forces on 'high alert' amid spiraling tensions over Ukraine |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-orders-nuclear-deterrent-forces-high-alert-tensions-build-ukrain-rcna17853 |access-date=3 October 2022 |work=NBC News |date=27 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref> On April 14, ''The New York Times'' reported comments by CIA director ], who said "potential desperation" could lead President Putin to order the use of ]s.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sanger |first1=David E. |last2=Barnes |first2=Julian E. |date=14 April 2022 |title=C.I.A. Director Airs Concern That Putin Might Turn to Nuclear Weapons |work=] |publication-place=Washington, D.C. |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/14/us/politics/putin-nuclear-weapons.html |url-status=live |url-access=limited |access-date=28 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220414234618/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/14/us/politics/putin-nuclear-weapons.html |archive-date=14 April 2022}}</ref> On September 21, 2022, days before declaring the annexation of additional parts of Ukraine, Putin claimed in a national television address that high NATO officials had made statements about the possibility of "using nuclear weapons of mass destruction against Russia", and stated "if the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people... It's not a bluff." ] characterized Putin's statements as a "thinly veiled" threat that Putin was willing to risk nuclear conflict if necessary to win the war with Ukraine.<ref>{{cite news |title=Here's how seriously the West should take Putin's latest nuclear threats |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/nuclear-threat-putin-ukraine-war-bluffing-rcna48713 |access-date=3 October 2022 |work=NBC News |date=22 September 2022 |language=en}}</ref> ], director of the Nuclear Information Project at the ], stated that "if you start detonating nuclear weapons in the you potentially get ] that you can't control — it could rain over your own troops as well, so it might not be an advantage to do that in the field."<ref>{{cite news |title=Nuclear weapons expert says we should be 'extraordinarily concerned' about Putin nuking Ukraine |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/expert-extraordinarily-concerned-russia-could-use-nuclear-weapons-2022-9 |work=Business Insider |date=30 September 2022 |access-date=2 October 2022 |archive-date=2 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221002181053/https://www.businessinsider.com/expert-extraordinarily-concerned-russia-could-use-nuclear-weapons-2022-9 |url-status=live }}</ref>
'''Proliferation:'''
* ]
* ]
* ]


According to a peer-reviewed study published in the journal '']'' in August 2022,<ref>{{cite journal |title=Global food insecurity and famine from reduced crop, marine fishery and livestock production due to climate disruption from nuclear war soot injection |journal=] |date=15 August 2022 |doi=10.1038/s43016-022-00573-0 |last1=Xia |first1=Lili |last2=Robock |first2=Alan |last3=Scherrer |first3=Kim |last4=Harrison |first4=Cheryl S. |last5=Bodirsky |first5=Benjamin Leon |last6=Weindl |first6=Isabelle |last7=Jägermeyr |first7=Jonas |last8=Bardeen |first8=Charles G. |last9=Toon |first9=Owen B. |last10=Heneghan |first10=Ryan |volume=3 |issue=8 |pages=586–596 |pmid=37118594 |s2cid=251601831 |doi-access=free |hdl=11250/3039288 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> a full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia would kill 360 million people directly, with a further 5 billion people dying from ]. More than 2 billion people would die from a smaller-scale nuclear war between India and Pakistan.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Diaz-Maurin |first1=François |title=Nowhere to hide: How a nuclear war would kill you — and almost everyone else |url=https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/nowhere-to-hide-how-a-nuclear-war-would-kill-you-and-almost-everyone-else/ |work=] |date=20 October 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=World Nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia would kill more than 5 billion people – just from starvation, study finds |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear-war-5-billion-people-starvation-deaths-study/ |work=CBS News |date=16 August 2022}}</ref>
'''US specific:'''
* ]
* ]
* ]
* '']''


==Survival==
'''Post nuclear exchange:'''
{{see also|Nuclear famine|Nuclear War Survival Skills|Civil defense}}
* ]
The predictions of the effects of a major ] nuclear exchange include millions of city dweller deaths within a short period of time. Some 1980s predictions had gone further and argued that a full-scale nuclear war could eventually bring about ].<ref name=Ehrlich/> Such predictions, sometimes but not always based on total war with nuclear arsenals at ] highs, received contemporary criticism.<ref name="bmartin.cc"/> On the other hand, some 1980s governmental predictions, such as ]'s ] and NATO's ], have received criticism from groups such as the ] for being overly optimistic. CRP-2B, for instance, infamously predicted that 80% of Americans would survive a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, a figure that neglected nuclear war's impacts on healthcare infrastructure, the food supply, and the ecosystem and assumed that all major cities could be successfully evacuated within 3–5 days.<ref>{{cite conference |url=https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/lib-www/la-pubs/00173165.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/lib-www/la-pubs/00173165.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |title=NUCLEAR WINTER: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF HUMAN SURVIVAL |last1=Bumstead |first1=Pamela |date=December 6, 1985 |publisher=American Anthropological Association |location=Washington, DC |conference=84th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association
* ]
}}</ref> A number of Cold War publications advocated preparations that could purportedly enable a large proportion of civilians to survive even a total nuclear war. Among the most famous of these is '']''.<ref name="NWSS1">{{cite book|last=Kearny|first=Cresson H|title=Nuclear War Survival Skills|year=1986|publisher=Oak Ridge National Laboratory|location=Oak Ridge, TN|isbn=0-942487-01-X|pages=6–11|url=http://www.oism.org/nwss/s73p911.htm}}</ref>
* ]


To avoid injury and death from a nuclear weapon's heat flash and blast effects, the two most far-ranging prompt ], schoolchildren were taught to ] by the early Cold War ]. Such advice is once again being given in case of ].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/01/the-unexpected-return-of-duck-and-cover/68776/|title=The Unexpected Return of 'Duck and Cover'|author=Glenn Harlan Reynolds|work=The Atlantic|date=4 January 2011}}</ref>
'''General:'''

* ]
], or "Radiogardase", is stockpiled in the US, along with ] and ], as pharmaceuticals useful in treating internal exposure to harmful ] in fallout.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.remm.nlm.gov/sns.htm|title=Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)|access-date=2013-10-23|archive-date=2013-10-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131018122046/http://www.remm.nlm.gov/sns.htm|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* ]

* ]
Publications on adapting to a changing diet and supplying nutritional food sources following a nuclear war, with particular focus on agricultural ], include ''Nutrition in the postattack environment'' by the ].<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5052.html |url-access=subscription |title=Nutrition in the postattack environment |website=The RAND Corporation |date=January 1966 |last=Pogrund |first=Robert Seymour}}</ref>
* ]

The British government developed a public alert system for use during a nuclear attack with the expectation of a ] before detonation. The United States expected a warning time of anywhere from half an hour (for land-based missiles) to less than three minutes (for submarine-based weapons). Many countries maintain plans for ] following a nuclear attack or similar disasters. These range from a ], intended to ensure the survival of some form of government leadership, to the Soviet ] system, which allows for retaliation even if all Soviet leadership were destroyed. Nuclear submarines are given ]: orders on what action to take in the event that an enemy nuclear strike has destroyed the government.

A number of other countries around the world have taken significant efforts to maximize their survival prospects in the event of large calamities, both natural and manmade. For example, metro stations in ], ], were constructed {{convert|110|m|ft}} below ground, and were designed to serve as nuclear shelters in the event of war, with each station entrance built with thick steel blast doors.<ref>{{cite book|last=Robinson|first=Martin|title=Korea|url=https://archive.org/details/koreakore00robi|url-access=registration|year=2007|publisher=Lonely Planet|isbn=978-1-74104-558-1|author2=Bartlett, Ray |author3=Whyte Rob |page=}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Springer|first=Chris|title=Pyongyang: the hidden history of the North Korean capital|year=2003|publisher=Entente Bt|isbn=978-963-00-8104-7|page=125}}</ref> An example of privately funded ]s is the ] in ], Canada, and ] have been constructed with an emphasis on post-war networking and reconstruction.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://tvblogs.nationalgeographic.com/2012/03/27/doomsday-preppers-its-gonna-get-worse-tonight-at-9p-etpt/|title=Doomsday Preppers: It's Gonna Get Worse Tonight at 9P et/pt|work=] Blogs|access-date=2013-10-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029215900/http://tvblogs.nationalgeographic.com/2012/03/27/doomsday-preppers-its-gonna-get-worse-tonight-at-9p-etpt/|archive-date=2013-10-29|url-status=dead}}</ref>
In ], the majority of homes have an underground ] and fallout shelter. The country has an overcapacity of such shelters and can accommodate slightly more than the nation's population size.<ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304231204576405700994655570?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_sections_world | work=The Wall Street Journal | first=Deborah | last=Ball | title=Swiss Renew Push for Bomb Shelters | date=2011-06-25}}</ref><ref>{{cite news| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/6347519.stm | work=BBC News | first=Imogen | last=Foulkes | title=Swiss still braced for nuclear war | date=2007-02-10}}</ref>

While the nuclear fallout shelters described above are the ideal long-term protection methods against dangerous radiation exposure in the event of a nuclear catastrophe, it is also necessary to have ] for medical and security personnel to safely assist in containment, evacuation, and many other necessary public safety objectives which ensue as a result of nuclear detonation. There are many basic shielding strategies used to protect against the deposition of radioactive material from external radiation environments. Respirators that protect against internal deposition are used to prevent the inhalation and ingestion of radioactive material and dermal protective equipment which is used to protect against the deposition of material on external structures like skin, hair, and clothing. While these protection strategies do slightly reduce the exposure, they provide almost no protection from externally penetrating ], which is the cause of ] and can be extremely lethal in high dosages. Naturally, shielding the entire body from high-energy gamma radiation is optimal, but the required mass to provide adequate attenuation makes functional movement nearly impossible.

Recent scientific studies have shown the feasibility of partial body shielding as a viable protection strategy against externally penetrating gamma radiation. The concept is based in providing sufficient attenuation to only the most radio-sensitive organs and tissues in efforts to defer the onset of acute radiation syndrome, the most immediate threat to humans from high doses of gamma radiation. Acute radiation syndrome is a result of irreversible bone marrow damage from high-energy radiation exposure. Due to the regenerative property of ]s found in bone marrow, it is only necessary to protect enough bone marrow to repopulate the exposed areas of the body with the shielded supply. Because 50% of the body's supply of bone marrow is stored in the pelvic region which is also in close proximity to other radio-sensitive organs in the abdomen, the lower torso is a logical choice as the primary target for protection.<ref>Waterman, Gideon; Kase, Kenneth; Orion, Itzhak; Broisman, Andrey; Milstein, Oren (2017-09). "Selective Shielding of Bone Marrow". ''Health Physics''. '''113''' (3): 195–208. {{doi|10.1097/hp.0000000000000688}}. ] 0017-9078.</ref>

==In fiction==
{{main|List of nuclear holocaust fiction}}
{{see also|Nuclear_weapons_in_popular_culture#In_fiction.2C_film.2C_and_theater|label 1=Nuclear weapons in fiction, film, and theater|apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic fiction}}
Nuclear warfare and weapons are staple elements of ].

==See also==
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==References== ==References==
{{Reflist}} {{Reflist|30em}}

== Further reading ==
* Louis Beres, ''Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics''. The risks and consequences of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980. {{ISBN|9780226043609}}
* ] and David Wright, "Broken Shield: Missiles designed to destroy incoming nuclear warheads fail frequently in tests and could increase global risk of mass destruction", '']'', vol. 320, no. no. 6 (June 2019), pp.&nbsp;62–67. "Nuclear-armed missiles are a political problem that technology cannot solve.... Current U.S. ] plans are being driven largely by ], ] and ]. Missile defenses will not allow us to escape our vulnerability to ]s. Instead large-scale developments will create barriers to taking real steps toward ]s—by blocking further cuts in nuclear arsenals and potentially spurring new deployments." (p.&nbsp;67.)
* ], "The New Nuclear Threat", '']'', vol. LXVII, no. 13 (20 August 2020), pp.&nbsp;19–21. "owerful reasons to doubt that there could be a limited nuclear war those that emerge from any study of history, a knowledge of how humans act under pressure, or experience of government." (p.&nbsp;20.)
* , a project of ] of India, USI, Discusses the possibility of a nuclear war in ] from the ]n point of view.
* ], "The Nuclear Worrier" (review of ], ''The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a ] Planner'', New York, Bloomsbury, 2017, {{ISBN|9781608196708}}, 420 pp.), '']'', vol. LXV, no. 1 (18 January 2018), pp.&nbsp;13–15.
* , conference and forum at the ], Boston, October 12, 2009. Four panels: "The Race to Build the Bomb and the Decision to Use It", "Cuban Missile Crisis and the First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty", "The Cold War and the Nuclear Arms Race", and "Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and the Presidency".
* Tom Stevenson, "A Tiny Sun" (review of ], ''The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War'', Simon and Schuster, 2021, 384 pp.; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ''The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age'', Cornell, 2020, 180 pp.), '']'', vol. 44, no. 4 (24 February 2022), pp.&nbsp;29–32. "Nuclear strategists systematically underestimate the chances of nuclear accident... here have been too many close calls for accidental use to be discounted." (p.&nbsp;32.)


==External links== ==External links==
{{Commons category|Nuclear warfare}}
*
{{wikiquote}}
* - slideshow by '']''
* – slideshow by '']''
*'''' (1979) — handbook produced by the United States Office of Technology Assessment (hosted by the ])
*'''' (1987) — assessment of the effects of a major Soviet attack on the United States produced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (hosted by the ]) * '' {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160828040127/http://fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/7906/ |date=2016-08-28 }}'' (1979) — handbook produced by the United States Office of Technology Assessment (hosted by the ])
*'''' (1979/1987) — handbook produced by ] (use menu at left to navigate) * '''' (1987) — assessment of the effects of a major Soviet attack on the United States produced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (hosted by the ])
* '''' (1979/1987) — handbook produced by ] (use menu at left to navigate)
* OpenCourseWare from the ]
*
* at HavenWorks.com
* *
* by Alan F. Philips, M.D.
*
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130329133717/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/index.htm |date=2013-03-29 }} Interactive Timeline of the Nuclear Age
* by Alan F. Philips, M.D.
*
*
* Interactive Timeline of the Nuclear Age
*
* DeVolpi, Alexander, Vladimir E. Minkov, Vadim A. Simonenko, and George S. Stanford. 2004. ''Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry'', Vols. 1 and 2. Fidlar Doubleday. * DeVolpi, Alexander, Vladimir E. Minkov, Vadim A. Simonenko, and George S. Stanford. 2004. ''Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry'', Vols. 1 and 2. Fidlar Doubleday.
* An in depth history of American air weapons and nuclear bombs from the reference book ''American Combat Planes of the 20th Century'' by Ray Wagner * {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130724001350/http://www.americancombatplanes.com/nuclear_1.html |date=2013-07-24 }} An in depth history of American air weapons and nuclear bombs from the reference book ''American Combat Planes of the 20th Century'' by Ray Wagner
*
{{Nuclear Technology}}
* – a 3D nuclear weapons effects simulator powered by Google Maps.
*


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Latest revision as of 19:03, 9 January 2025

Military conflict that deploys nuclear weaponry "Nuclear War" and "Nuclear strike" redirect here. For other uses, see Nuclear War (disambiguation).
The mushroom cloud over Hiroshima following the detonation of the Little Boy nuclear bomb on 6 August 1945. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain the first and only wartime uses of nuclear weapons in history.
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Nuclear warfare, also known as atomic warfare, is a military conflict or prepared political strategy that deploys nuclear weaponry. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction; in contrast to conventional warfare, nuclear warfare can produce destruction in a much shorter time and can have a long-lasting radiological result. A major nuclear exchange would likely have long-term effects, primarily from the fallout released, and could also lead to secondary effects, such as "nuclear winter", nuclear famine, and societal collapse. A global thermonuclear war with Cold War-era stockpiles, or even with the current smaller stockpiles, may lead to various scenarios including human extinction.

To date, the only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict occurred in 1945 with the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 6, 1945, a uranium gun-type device (code name "Little Boy") was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days later, on August 9, a plutonium implosion-type device (code name "Fat Man") was detonated over the Japanese city of Nagasaki. Together, these two bombings resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 people and contributed to the surrender of Japan, which occurred before any further nuclear weapons could be deployed.

After World War II, nuclear weapons were also developed by the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and the People's Republic of China (1964), which contributed to the state of conflict and extreme tension that became known as the Cold War. In 1974, India, and in 1998, Pakistan, two countries that were openly hostile toward each other, developed nuclear weapons. Israel (1960s) and North Korea (2006) are also thought to have developed stocks of nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many. The Israeli government has never admitted nor denied having nuclear weapons, although it is known to have constructed the reactor and reprocessing plant necessary for building nuclear weapons. South Africa also manufactured several complete nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but subsequently became the first country to voluntarily destroy their domestically made weapons stocks and abandon further production (1990s). Nuclear weapons have been detonated on over 2,000 occasions for testing purposes and demonstrations.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the resultant end of the Cold War, the threat of a major nuclear war between the two nuclear superpowers was generally thought to have declined. Since then, concern over nuclear weapons has shifted to the prevention of localized nuclear conflicts resulting from nuclear proliferation, and the threat of nuclear terrorism. However, the threat of nuclear war is considered to have resurged after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, particularly with regard to Russian threats to use nuclear weapons during the invasion.

Since 1947, the Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has visualized how close the world is to a nuclear war. The Doomsday Clock reached high points in 1953, when the Clock was set to two minutes until midnight after the U.S. and the Soviet Union began testing hydrogen bombs, and in 2018, following the failure of world leaders to address tensions relating to nuclear weapons and climate change issues. Since 2023, the Clock has been set at 90 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been. The most recent advance of the Clock's time setting was largely attributed to the risk of nuclear escalation that arose from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Types of nuclear warfare

Nuclear warfare scenarios are usually divided into two groups, each with different effects and potentially fought with different types of nuclear armaments.

The first, a limited nuclear war (sometimes attack or exchange), refers to the controlled use of nuclear weapons, whereby the implicit threat exists that a nation can still escalate their use of nuclear weapons. For example, using a small number of nuclear weapons against strictly military targets could be escalated through increasing the number of weapons used, or escalated through the selection of different targets. Limited attacks are thought to be a more credible response against attacks that do not justify all-out retaliation, such as an enemy's limited use of nuclear weapons.

The second, a full-scale nuclear war, could consist of large numbers of nuclear weapons used in an attack aimed at an entire country, including military, economic, and civilian targets. Such an attack would almost certainly destroy the entire economic, social, and military infrastructure of the target nation, and would likely have a devastating effect on Earth's biosphere.

Some Cold War strategists such as Henry Kissinger argued that a limited nuclear war could be possible between two heavily armed superpowers (such as the United States and the Soviet Union). Some predict, however, that a limited war could potentially "escalate" into a full-scale nuclear war. Others have called limited nuclear war "global nuclear holocaust in slow motion", arguing that—once such a war took place—others would be sure to follow over a period of decades, effectively rendering the planet uninhabitable in the same way that a "full-scale nuclear war" between superpowers would, only taking a much longer (and arguably more agonizing) path to the same result.

Even the most optimistic predictions of the effects of a major nuclear exchange foresee the death of many millions of victims within a very short period of time. Such predictions usually include the breakdown of government, professional, and commercial institutions, vital to the continuation of civilization. The resulting loss of vital affordances (food, water and electricity production and distribution, medical and information services, etc.) would account for millions more deaths. More pessimistic predictions argue that a full-scale nuclear war could potentially bring about the human extinction, or at least its near extinction, with only a relatively small number of survivors (mainly in remote areas) and a reduced quality of life and life expectancy for centuries afterward. However, such predictions, assuming total war with nuclear arsenals at Cold War highs, have not been without criticism. Such a horrific catastrophe as global nuclear warfare would almost certainly cause permanent damage to most complex life on the planet, its ecosystems, and the global climate.

A study presented at the annual meeting of the American Geophysical Union in December 2006 asserted that a small-scale regional nuclear war could produce as many direct fatalities as all of World War II and disrupt the global climate for a decade or more. In a regional nuclear conflict scenario in which two opposing nations in the subtropics each used 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (c. 15 kiloton each) on major population centers, the researchers predicted fatalities ranging from 2.6 million to 16.7 million per country. The authors of the study estimated that as much as five million tons of soot could be released, producing a cooling of several degrees over large areas of North America and Eurasia (including most of the grain-growing regions). The cooling would last for years and could be "catastrophic", according to the researchers.

Either a limited or full-scale nuclear exchange could occur during an accidental nuclear war, in which the use of nuclear weapons is triggered unintentionally. Postulated triggers for this scenario have included malfunctioning early warning devices and/or targeting computers, deliberate malfeasance by rogue military commanders, consequences of an accidental straying of warplanes into enemy airspace, reactions to unannounced missile tests during tense diplomatic periods, reactions to military exercises, mistranslated or miscommunicated messages, and others.

A number of these scenarios actually occurred during the Cold War, though none resulted in the use of nuclear weapons. Many such scenarios have been depicted in popular culture, such as in the 1959 film On the Beach, the 1962 novel Fail-Safe, the 1964 film Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, the 1983 film WarGames, and the 1984 film Threads.

Sub-strategic use

See also: Nuclear bunker buster and Edward Teller § Decision to drop the bombs

The above examples envisage nuclear warfare at a strategic level, i.e., total war. However, nuclear powers have the ability to undertake more limited engagements.

"Sub-strategic use" includes the use of either "low-yield" tactical nuclear weapons, or of variable yield strategic nuclear weapons in a very limited role, as compared to exchanges of larger-yield strategic nuclear weapons over major population centers. This was described by the UK Parliamentary Defence Select Committee as "the launch of one or a limited number of missiles against an adversary as a means of conveying a political message, warning or demonstration of resolve". It is believed that all current nuclear weapons states possess tactical nuclear weapons, with the exception of the United Kingdom, which decommissioned its tactical warheads in 1998. However, the UK does possess scalable-yield strategic warheads, and this technology tends to blur the difference between "strategic", "sub-strategic", and "tactical" use or weapons. American, French and British nuclear submarines are believed to carry at least some missiles with dial-a-yield warheads for this purpose, potentially allowing a strike as low as one kiloton (or less) against a single target. Only the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India have declarative, unqualified, unconditional "no first use" nuclear weapons policies. India and Pakistan maintain only a credible minimum deterrence.

Commodore Tim Hare, former Director of Nuclear Policy at the British Ministry of Defence, has described "sub-strategic use" as offering the Government "an extra option in the escalatory process before it goes for an all-out strategic strike which would deliver unacceptable damage". However, this sub-strategic capacity has been criticized as potentially increasing the "acceptability" of using nuclear weapons. Combined with the trend in the reduction in the worldwide nuclear arsenal as of 2007 is the warhead miniaturization and modernization of the remaining strategic weapons that is presently occurring in all the declared nuclear weapon states, into more "usable" configurations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute suggests that this is creating a culture where use of these weapons is more acceptable and therefore is increasing the risk of war, as these modern weapons do not possess the same psychological deterrent value as the large Cold-War era, multi-megaton warheads.

In many ways, this present change in the balance of terror can be seen as the complete embracement of the switch from the 1950s Eisenhower doctrine of "massive retaliation" to one of "flexible response", which has been growing in importance in the US nuclear war fighting plan/SIOP every decade since.

For example, the United States adopted a policy in 1996 of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at non-state actors ("terrorists") armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Another dimension to the tactical use of nuclear weapons is that of such weapons deployed at sea for use against surface and submarine vessels. Until 1992, vessels of the United States Navy (and their aircraft) deployed various such weapons as bombs, rockets (guided and unguided), torpedoes, and depth charges. Such tactical naval nuclear weapons were considered more acceptable to use early in a conflict because there would be few civilian casualties. It was feared by many planners that such use would probably quickly have escalated into a large-scale nuclear war. This situation was particularly exacerbated by the fact that such weapons at sea were not constrained by the safeguards provided by the Permissive Action Link attached to U.S. Air Force and Army nuclear weapons. It is unknown if the navies of the other nuclear powers yet today deploy tactical nuclear weapons at sea.

The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review emphasised the need for the US to have sub-strategic nuclear weapons as additional layers for its nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear terrorism

Main articles: Nuclear terrorism and Nuclear blackmail

Nuclear terrorism by non-state organizations or actors (even individuals) is a largely unknown and understudied factor in nuclear deterrence thinking, as states possessing nuclear weapons are susceptible to retaliation in kind, while sub- or trans-state actors may be less so. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given rise to the possibility that former Soviet nuclear weapons might become available on the black market (so-called 'loose nukes').

A number of other concerns have been expressed about the security of nuclear weapons in newer nuclear powers with relatively less stable governments, such as Pakistan, but in each case, the fears have been addressed to some extent by statements and evidence provided by those nations, as well as cooperative programs between nations. Worry remains, however, in many circles that a relative decrease in the security of nuclear weapons has emerged in recent years, and that terrorists or others may attempt to exert control over (or use) nuclear weapons, militarily applicable technology, or nuclear materials and fuel.

Another possible nuclear terrorism threat are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials over a large area using conventional explosives, called dirty bombs. The detonation of a "dirty bomb" would not cause a nuclear explosion, nor would it release enough radiation to kill or injure a large number of people. However, it could cause severe disruption and require potentially very costly decontamination procedures and increased spending on security measures.

Radioactive materials can also be used for targeted assassinations. For example, the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko was described by medical professionals, as "an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism."

Alternative conflict resolution

Main article: Conflict resolution

Alternatives to nuclear warfare include nuclear deterrence, nuclear disarmament and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

History

Main articles: History of nuclear weapons and Timeline of nuclear weapons development

1940s

Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Main article: Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Mushroom cloud from the atomic explosion over Nagasaki rising 18,000 m (59,000 ft) into the air on the morning of August 9, 1945.

During the final stages of World War II in 1945, the United States conducted atomic raids on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first on August 6, 1945, and the second on August 9, 1945. These two events were the only times nuclear weapons have been used in combat.

For six months before the atomic bombings, the U.S. 20th Air Force under General Curtis LeMay executed low-level incendiary raids against Japanese cities. The most destructive air raid to occur during the process was not the nuclear attacks, but the Operation Meetinghouse raid on Tokyo. On the night of March 9–10, 1945, Operation Meetinghouse commenced and 334 Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers took off to raid, with 279 of them dropping 1,665 tons of incendiaries and explosives on Tokyo. The bombing was meant to burn wooden buildings and indeed the bombing caused fire that created a 50 m/s wind, which is comparable to tornadoes. Each bomber carried 6 tons of bombs. A total of 381,300 bombs, which amount to 1,783 tons of bombs, were used in the bombing. Within a few hours of the raid, it had killed an estimated 100,000 people and destroyed 41 km (16 sq mi) of the city and 267,000 buildings in a single night — the deadliest bombing raid in military aviation history other than the atomic raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By early August 1945, an estimated 450,000 people had died as the U.S. had intensely firebombed a total of 67 Japanese cities.

In late June 1945, as the U.S. wrapped up the two-and-a-half-month Battle of Okinawa (which cost the lives of 260,000 people, including 150,000 civilians), it was faced with the prospect of invading the Japanese home islands in an operation codenamed Operation Downfall. Based on the U.S. casualties from the preceding island-hopping campaigns, American commanders estimated that between 50,000 and 500,000 U.S. troops would die and at least 600,000–1,000,000 others would be injured while invading the Japanese home islands. The U.S. manufacture of 500,000 Purple Hearts from the anticipated high level of casualties during the U.S. invasion of Japan gave a demonstration of how deadly and costly it would be. President Harry S. Truman realized he could not afford such a horrendous casualty rate, especially since over 400,000 American combatants had already died fighting in both the European and the Pacific theaters of the war.

On July 26, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China issued a Potsdam Declaration that called for the unconditional surrender of Japan. It stated that if Japan did not surrender, it would face "prompt and utter destruction". The Japanese government ignored this ultimatum, sending a message that they were not going to surrender. In response to the rejection, President Truman authorized the dropping of the atomic bombs. At the time of its use, there were only two atomic bombs available, and despite the fact that more were in production back in mainland U.S., the third bomb wouldn't be available for combat until September.

A photograph of Sumiteru Taniguchi's back injuries taken in January 1946 by a U.S. Marine photographer
Hypocenter of Atomic bomb in Nagasaki

On August 6, 1945, the uranium-type nuclear weapon codenamed "Little Boy" was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima with an energy of about 15 kilotons of TNT (63,000 gigajoules), destroying nearly 50,000 buildings (including the headquarters of the 2nd General Army and Fifth Division) and killing approximately 70,000 people, including 20,000 Japanese combatants and 20,000 Korean slave laborers. Three days later, on August 9, a plutonium-type nuclear weapon codenamed "Fat Man" was used against the Japanese city of Nagasaki, with the explosion equivalent to about 20 kilotons of TNT (84,000 gigajoules), destroying 60% of the city and killing approximately 35,000 people, including 23,200–28,200 Japanese munitions workers, 2,000 Korean slave laborers, and 150 Japanese combatants. The industrial damage in Nagasaki was high, partly owing to the inadvertent targeting of the industrial zone, leaving 68–80 percent of the non-dock industrial production destroyed. The U.S., despite not having a third device ready to be dropped, gave Japan one last warning that there would be another bombing if they did not surrender, and the target would be Tokyo.

Six days after the detonation over Nagasaki, Japan announced its surrender to the Allied Powers on August 15, 1945, signing the Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 1945, officially ending the Pacific War and, therefore, World War II, as Germany had already signed its Instrument of Surrender on May 8, 1945, ending the war in Europe. The two atomic bombings led, in part, to post-war Japan's adopting of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which forbade the nation from developing nuclear armaments.

Immediately after the Japan bombings

After the successful Trinity nuclear test July 16, 1945, which was the very first nuclear detonation, the Manhattan project lead manager J. Robert Oppenheimer recalled:

We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people cried, and most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture the Bhagavad Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multiarmed form and says, "Now, I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds." I suppose we all thought that one way or another.

— J. Robert Oppenheimer, The Decision To Drop The Bomb
J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Immediately after the atomic bombings of Japan, the status of atomic weapons in international and military relations was unclear. Presumably, the United States hoped atomic weapons could offset the Soviet Union's larger conventional ground forces in Eastern Europe, and possibly be used to pressure Soviet leader Joseph Stalin into making concessions. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union pursued its own atomic capabilities through a combination of scientific research and espionage directed against the American program. The Soviets believed that the Americans, with their limited nuclear arsenal, were unlikely to engage in any new world wars, while the Americans were not confident they could prevent a Soviet takeover of Europe, despite their atomic advantage.

Within the United States, the authority to produce and develop nuclear weapons was removed from military control and put instead under the civilian control of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. This decision reflected an understanding that nuclear weapons had unique risks and benefits that were separate from other military technology known at the time.

Convair B-36 bomber.

For several years after World War II, the United States developed and maintained a strategic force based on the Convair B-36 bomber that would be able to attack any potential enemy from bomber bases in the United States. It deployed atomic bombs around the world for potential use in conflicts. Over a period of a few years, many in the American defense community became increasingly convinced of the invincibility of the United States to a nuclear attack. Indeed, it became generally believed that the threat of nuclear war would deter any strike against the United States.

Many proposals were suggested to put all American nuclear weapons under international control (by the newly formed United Nations, for example) as an effort to deter both their usage and a nuclear arms race. However, no terms could be arrived at that would be agreed upon by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

American and Soviet/Russian nuclear stockpiles.

On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan (see also Soviet atomic bomb project). Scientists in the United States from the Manhattan Project had warned that, in time, the Soviet Union would certainly develop nuclear capabilities of its own. Nevertheless, the effect upon military thinking and planning in the United States was dramatic, primarily because American military strategists had not anticipated the Soviets would "catch up" so soon. However, at this time, they had not discovered that the Soviets had conducted significant nuclear espionage of the project from spies at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the most significant of which was done by the theoretical physicist Klaus Fuchs. The first Soviet bomb was more or less a deliberate copy of the Fat Man plutonium device. In the same year the first US-Soviet nuclear war plan was penned in the US with Operation Dropshot.

With the monopoly over nuclear technology broken, worldwide nuclear proliferation accelerated. The United Kingdom tested its first independent atomic bomb in 1952, followed by France developing its first atomic bomb in 1960 and then China developing its first atomic bomb in 1964. While much smaller than the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, Western Europe's nuclear reserves were nevertheless a significant factor in strategic planning during the Cold War. A top-secret White paper, compiled by the Royal Air Force and produced for the British Government in 1959, estimated that British V bombers carrying nuclear weapons were capable of destroying key cities and military targets in the Soviet Union, with an estimated 16 million deaths in the Soviet Union (half of whom were estimated to be killed on impact and the rest fatally injured) before bomber aircraft from the U.S. Strategic Air Command reached their targets.

1950s

Although the Soviet Union had nuclear weapon capabilities at the beginning of the Cold War, the United States still had an advantage in terms of bombers and weapons. In any exchange of hostilities, the United States would have been capable of bombing the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet Union would have more difficulty carrying out the reverse mission.

The widespread introduction of jet-powered interceptor aircraft upset this imbalance somewhat by reducing the effectiveness of the American bomber fleet. In 1949 Curtis LeMay was placed in command of the Strategic Air Command and instituted a program to update the bomber fleet to one that was all-jet. During the early 1950s the B-47 Stratojet and B-52 Stratofortress were introduced, providing the ability to bomb the Soviet Union more easily. Before the development of a capable strategic missile force in the Soviet Union, much of the war-fighting doctrine held by western nations revolved around using a large number of smaller nuclear weapons in a tactical role. It is debatable whether such use could be considered "limited" however because it was believed that the United States would use its own strategic weapons (mainly bombers at the time) should the Soviet Union deploy any kind of nuclear weapon against civilian targets. Douglas MacArthur, an American general, was fired by President Harry Truman, partially because he persistently requested permission to use his own discretion in deciding whether to utilize atomic weapons on the People's Republic of China in 1951 during the Korean War. Mao Zedong, China's communist leader, gave the impression that he would welcome a nuclear war with the capitalists because it would annihilate what he viewed as their imperialist system.

Let us imagine how many people would die if war breaks out. There are 2.7 billion people in the world, and a third could be lost. If it is a little higher it could be half ... I say that if the worst came to the worst and one-half dies, there will still be one-half left, but imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist. After a few years there would be 2.7 billion people again.

— Mao Zedong, 1957
The U.S. and USSR conducted hundreds of nuclear tests, including the Desert Rock exercises at the Nevada Test Site, USA, pictured above during the Korean War to familiarize their soldiers with conducting operations and counter-measures around nuclear detonations, as the Korean War threatened to expand.

The concept of a "Fortress North America" emerged during the Second World War and persisted into the Cold War to refer to the option of defending Canada and the United States against their enemies if the rest of the world were lost to them. This option was rejected with the formation of NATO and the decision to permanently station troops in Europe.

In the summer of 1951, Project Vista started, in which project analysts such as Robert F. Christy looked at how to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. The emerging development of tactical nuclear weapons was looked upon as a means to give Western forces a qualitative advantage over the Soviet numerical supremacy in conventional weapons.

Several scares about the increasing ability of the Soviet Union's strategic bomber forces surfaced during the 1950s. The defensive response by the United States was to deploy a fairly strong "layered defense" consisting of interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles, like the Nike, and guns, like the M51 Skysweeper, near larger cities. However, this was a small response compared to the construction of a huge fleet of nuclear bombers. The principal nuclear strategy was to massively penetrate the Soviet Union. Because such a large area could not be defended against this overwhelming attack in any credible way, the Soviet Union would lose any exchange.

This logic became ingrained in American nuclear doctrine and persisted for much of the duration of the Cold War. As long as the strategic American nuclear forces could overwhelm their Soviet counterparts, a Soviet pre-emptive strike could be averted. Moreover, the Soviet Union could not afford to build any reasonable counterforce, as the economic output of the United States was far larger than that of the Soviets, and they would be unable to achieve "nuclear parity".

Soviet nuclear doctrine, however, did not match American nuclear doctrine. Soviet military planners assumed they could win a nuclear war. Therefore, they expected a large-scale nuclear exchange, followed by a "conventional war" which itself would involve heavy use of tactical nuclear weapons. American doctrine rather assumed that Soviet doctrine was similar, with the mutual in mutually assured destruction necessarily requiring that the other side see things in much the same way, rather than believing—as the Soviets did—that they could fight a large-scale, "combined nuclear and conventional" war.

In accordance with their doctrine, the Soviet Union conducted large-scale military exercises to explore the possibility of defensive and offensive warfare during a nuclear war. The exercise, under the code name of "Snowball", involved the detonation of a nuclear bomb about twice as powerful as that which fell on Nagasaki and an army of approximately 45,000 soldiers on maneuvers through the hypocenter immediately after the blast. The exercise was conducted on September 14, 1954, under command of Marshal Georgy Zhukov to the north of Totskoye village in Orenburg Oblast, Russia.

A revolution in nuclear strategic thought occurred with the introduction of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which the Soviet Union first successfully tested in August 1957. In order to deliver a warhead to a target, a missile was much faster and more cost-effective than a bomber, and enjoyed a higher survivability due to the enormous difficulty of interception of the ICBMs (due to their high altitude and extreme speed). The Soviet Union could now afford to achieve nuclear parity with the United States in raw numbers, although for a time, they appeared to have chosen not to.

Photos of Soviet missile sites set off a wave of panic in the U.S. military, something the launch of Sputnik would do for the American public a few months later. Politicians, notably then-U.S. Senator John F. Kennedy suggested that a "missile gap" existed between the Soviet Union and the United States. The US military gave missile development programs the highest national priority, and several spy aircraft and reconnaissance satellites were designed and deployed to observe Soviet progress.

Early ICBMs and bombers were relatively inaccurate, which led to the concept of countervalue strikes — attacks directly on the enemy population, which would theoretically lead to a collapse of the enemy's will to fight. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invested in extensive protected civilian infrastructure, such as large "nuclear-proof" bunkers and non-perishable food stores. By comparison, smaller scale civil defense programs were instituted in the United States starting in the 1950s, where schools and other public buildings had basements stocked with non-perishable food supplies, canned water, first aid, and dosimeter and Geiger counter radiation-measuring devices. Many of the locations were given "fallout shelter" designation signs. CONELRAD radio information systems were adopted, whereby the commercial radio sector (later supplemented by the National Emergency Alarm Repeaters) would broadcast on two AM radio frequencies in the event of a Civil Defense (CD) emergency. These two frequencies, 640 and 1240 kHz, were marked with small CD triangles on the tuning dial of radios of the period, as can still be seen on 1950s-vintage radios on online auction sites and museums. A few backyard fallout shelters were built by private individuals.

Henry Kissinger's view on tactical nuclear war in his controversial 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was that any nuclear weapon exploded in air burst mode that was below 500 kilotons in yield and thus averting serious fallout, may be more decisive and less costly in human lives than a protracted conventional war.

A list of targets made by the United States was released sometime during December 2015 by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. The language used to describe targets is "designated ground zeros". The list was released after a request was made during 2006 by William Burr who belongs to a research group at George Washington University, and belongs to a previously top-secret 800-page document. The list is entitled "Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959" and was produced by U.S. Strategic Air Command during the year 1956.

1960s

More than 100 US-built missiles having the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads were deployed in Italy and Turkey in 1961
RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance photograph of the MRBM launch site in San Cristóbal, Cuba (1962)

In 1960, the United States developed its first Single Integrated Operational Plan, a range of targeting options, and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched, variants of which were in use from 1961 to 2003. That year also saw the start of the Missile Defense Alarm System, an American system of 12 early-warning satellites that provided limited notice of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile launches between 1960 and 1966. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System was completed in 1964.

The most powerful atomic bomb ever made, the Tsar Bomba, was tested by the Soviets on October 30, 1961. It was 50 megatons, or equal to 50 million tons of regular explosives. A complex and worrisome situation developed in 1962, in what is called the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union placed medium-range ballistic missiles 90 miles (140 km) from the United States, possibly as a direct response to American Jupiter missiles placed in Turkey. After intense negotiations, the Soviets ended up removing the missiles from Cuba and decided to institute a massive weapons-building program of their own. In exchange, the United States dismantled its launch sites in Turkey, although this was done secretly and not publicly revealed for over two decades. First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev did not even reveal this part of the agreement when he came under fire by political opponents for mishandling the crisis. Communication delays during the crisis led to the establishment of the Moscow–Washington hotline to allow reliable, direct communications between the two nuclear powers.

By the late 1960s, the number of ICBMs and warheads was so high on both sides that it was believed that both the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of completely destroying the infrastructure and a large proportion of the population of the other country. Thus, by some western game theorists, a balance of power system known as mutually assured destruction (or MAD) came into being. It was thought that no full-scale exchange between the powers would result in an outright winner, with at best one side emerging the pyrrhic victor. Thus both sides were deterred from risking the initiation of a direct confrontation, instead being forced to engage in lower-intensity proxy wars.

During this decade the People's Republic of China began to build subterranean infrastructure such as the Underground Project 131 following the Sino-Soviet split.

One drawback of the MAD doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. Early Warning Systems (EWS) were notoriously error-prone. For example, on 78 occasions in 1979 alone, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections that were "potentially threatening to the North American continent". Some of these were trivial errors and were spotted quickly, but several went to more serious levels. On September 26, 1983, Stanislav Petrov received convincing indications of an American first strike launch against the Soviet Union, but positively identified the warning as a false alarm. Though it is unclear what role Petrov's actions played in preventing a nuclear war during this incident, he has been honored by the United Nations for his actions.

Similar incidents happened many times in the United States, due to failed computer chips, misidentifications of large flights of geese, test programs, and bureaucratic failures to notify early warning military personnel of legitimate launches of test or weather missiles. For many years, the U.S. Air Force's strategic bombers were kept airborne on a daily rotating basis "around the clock" (see Operation Chrome Dome), until the number and severity of accidents, the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash in particular, persuaded policymakers it was not worthwhile.

1970s

Israel responded to the Arab Yom Kippur War attack on 6 October 1973 by assembling 13 nuclear weapons in a tunnel under the Negev desert when Syrian tanks were sweeping in across the Golan Heights. On 8 October 1973, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir authorized Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to activate the 13 Israeli nuclear warheads and distribute them to Israeli air force units, with the intent that they be used if Israel began to be overrun.

On 24 October 1973, as US President Richard Nixon was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal, Henry Kissinger ordered a DEFCON-3 alert preparing American B-52 nuclear bombers for war. Intelligence reports indicated that the USSR was preparing to defend Egypt in its Yom Kippur War with Israel. It had become apparent that if Israel had dropped nuclear weapons on Egypt or Syria, as it prepared to do, then the USSR would have retaliated against Israel, with the US then committed to providing Israeli assistance, possibly escalating to a general nuclear war.

By the late 1970s, people in both the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the rest of the world, had been living with the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) for about a decade, and it became deeply ingrained into the psyche and popular culture of those countries.

On May 18, 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test in the Pokhran test range. The name of the operation was Smiling Buddha, and India termed the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion."

The Soviet Duga early warning over-the-horizon radar system was made operational in 1976. The extremely powerful radio transmissions needed for such a system led to much disruption of civilian shortwave broadcasts, earning it the nickname "Russian Woodpecker".

The idea that any nuclear conflict would eventually escalate was a challenge for military strategists. This challenge was particularly severe for the United States and its NATO allies. It was believed (until the 1970s) that a Soviet tank offensive into Western Europe would quickly overwhelm NATO conventional forces, leading to the necessity of the West escalating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, one of which was the W-70.

This strategy had one major (and possibly critical) flaw, which was soon realized by military analysts but highly underplayed by the U.S. military: conventional NATO forces in the European theatre of war were far outnumbered by similar Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, and it was assumed that in case of a major Soviet attack (commonly envisioned as the "Red tanks rolling towards the North Sea" scenario) that NATO—in the face of quick conventional defeat—would soon have no other choice but to resort to tactical nuclear strikes against these forces. Most analysts agreed that once the first nuclear exchange had occurred, escalation to global nuclear war would likely become inevitable. The Warsaw Pact's vision of an atomic war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces was simulated in the top-secret exercise Seven Days to the River Rhine in 1979. The British government exercised their vision of a Soviet nuclear attack with Square Leg in early 1980.

Large hardened nuclear weapon storage areas were built across European countries in anticipation of local US and European forces falling back as the conventional NATO defense from the Soviet Union, named REFORGER, was believed to only be capable of stalling the Soviets for a short time.

1980s

Montage of the launch of a Trident C4 SLBM and the paths of its reentry vehicles.
FEMA-estimated primary counterforce targets for Soviet ICBMs in 1990. The resulting fall-out is indicated with the darkest considered as lethal to lesser fall-out yellow zones.

In the late 1970s and, particularly, during the early 1980s under U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the United States renewed its commitment to a more powerful military, which required a large increase in spending on U.S. military programs. These programs, which were originally part of the defense budget of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, included spending on conventional and nuclear weapons systems. Under Reagan, defensive systems like the Strategic Defense Initiative were emphasized as well.

Another major shift in nuclear doctrine was the development and the improvement of the submarine-launched, nuclear-armed, ballistic missile, or SLBM. It was hailed by many military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs—which can move with "stealth" (greatly lessened detectability) virtually anywhere in the world—give a nation a "second strike" capability (i.e., after absorbing a "first strike"). Before the advent of the SLBM, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a near-certain retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus, a first strike was a much less feasible (or desirable) option, and a deliberately initiated nuclear war was thought to be less likely to start.

However, it was soon realized that submarines could approach enemy coastlines undetected and decrease the warning time (the time between detection of the missile launch and the impact of the missile) from as much as half an hour to possibly under three minutes. This effect was especially significant to the United States, Britain and China, whose capitals of Washington D.C., London, and Beijing all lay within 100 miles (160 km) of their coasts. Moscow was much more secure from this type of threat, due to its considerable distance from the sea. This greatly increased the credibility of a "surprise first strike" by one faction and (theoretically) made it possible to knock out or disrupt the chain of command of a target nation before any counterstrike could be ordered (known as a "decapitation strike"). It strengthened the notion that a nuclear war could possibly be "won", resulting not only in greatly increased tensions and increasing calls for fail-deadly control systems, but also in a dramatic increase in military spending. The submarines and their missile systems were very expensive, and one fully equipped nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed missile submarine could cost more than the entire GNP of a developing country. It was also calculated, however, that the greatest cost came in the development of both sea- and land-based anti-submarine defenses and in improving and strengthening the "chain of command", and as a result, military spending skyrocketed.

South Africa developed a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and early 1980s. It was operational for a brief period before being dismantled in the early 1990s.

According to the 1980 United Nations report General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General, it was estimated that there were a total of about 40,000 nuclear warheads in existence at that time, with a potential combined explosive yield of approximately 13,000 megatons. By comparison, the largest volcanic eruption in recorded history when the volcano Mount Tambora erupted in 1815—turning 1816 into the Year Without A Summer due to the levels of global dimming sulfate aerosols and ash expelled—it exploded with a force of roughly 33 billion tons of TNT or 33,000 megatons of TNT this is about 2.2 million Hiroshima Bombs, and ejected 175 km (42 cu mi) of mostly rock/tephra, that included 120 million tonnes of sulfur dioxide as an upper estimate. A larger eruption, approximately 74,000 years ago, in Mount Toba produced 2,800 km (670 cu mi) of tephra, forming lake Toba, and produced an estimated 6,000 million tonnes (6.6×10 short tons) of sulfur dioxide. The explosive energy of the eruption may have been as high as equivalent to 20,000,000 megatons (Mt) of TNT, while the asteroid created Chicxulub impact, that is connected with the extinction of the dinosaurs corresponds to at least 70,000,000 Mt of energy, which is roughly 7000 times the maximum arsenal of the US and Soviet Union.

Protest against the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe, Bonn, West Germany, 1981

However, comparisons with supervolcanoes are more misleading than helpful due to the different aerosols released, the likely air burst fuzing height of nuclear weapons and the globally scattered location of these potential nuclear detonations all being in contrast to the singular and subterranean nature of a supervolcanic eruption. Moreover, assuming the entire world stockpile of weapons were grouped together, it would be difficult, due to the nuclear fratricide effect, to ensure the individual weapons would go off all at once. Nonetheless, many people believe that a full-scale nuclear war would result, through the nuclear winter effect, in the human extinction, though not all analysts agree on the assumptions that underpin these nuclear winter models.

On 26 September 1983, a Soviet early warning station under the command of Stanislav Petrov falsely detected 5 inbound intercontinental ballistic missiles from the US. Petrov correctly assessed the situation as a false alarm, and hence did not report his finding to his superiors. It is quite possible that his actions prevented "World War III", as the Soviet policy at that time was immediate nuclear response upon discovering inbound ballistic missiles.

The world came unusually close to nuclear war in November 1983 when the Soviet Union thought that the NATO military exercise Able Archer 83 was a ruse or "cover-up" to begin a nuclear first strike. The Soviets responded by raising readiness and preparing their nuclear arsenal for immediate use. Soviet fears of an attack ceased once the exercise concluded without incident.

Post-Cold War

See also: Second Cold War

Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War in 1991 and greatly reduced the political tensions between the United States and the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union's formal successor state, both countries remained in a "nuclear stand-off" due to the continuing presence of a very large number of deliverable nuclear warheads on both sides. Additionally, the end of the Cold War led the United States to become increasingly concerned with the development of nuclear technology by other nations outside of the former Soviet Union. In 1995, a branch of the U.S. Strategic Command produced an outline of forward-thinking strategies in the document "Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence".

In 1995, a Black Brant sounding rocket launched from the Andøya Space Center caused a high alert in Russia, known as the Norwegian Rocket Incident. The Russians thought it might be a nuclear missile launched from an American submarine.

In 1996, a Russian continuity of government facility, Kosvinsky Mountain, which is believed to be a counterpart to the US Cheyenne Mountain Complex, was completed. It was designed to resist US earth-penetrating nuclear warheads, and is believed to host the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces alternate command post, a post for the general staff built to compensate for the vulnerability of older Soviet era command posts in the Moscow region. In spite of this, the primary command posts for the Strategic Rocket Forces remains Kuntsevo in Moscow and the secondary is the Kosvinsky Mountain in the Ural Mountains. The timing of the Kosvinsky facilities completion date is regarded as one explanation for U.S. interest in a new nuclear "bunker buster" Earth-penetrating warhead and the declaration of the deployment of the B-61 mod 11 in 1997; Kosvinsky is protected by about 1000 feet of granite.

UN vote on adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017
  Yes   No  Did not vote

As a consequence of the September 11 attacks, American forces immediately increased their readiness to the highest level in 28 years, closing the blast doors of the NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center for the first time due to a non-exercise event. But unlike similar increases during the Cold War, Russia immediately decided to stand down a large military exercise in the Arctic region, in order to minimize the risk of incidents, rather than following suit.

The former chair of the United Nations disarmament committee stated that there are more than 16,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons ready for deployment and another 14,000 in storage, with the U.S. having nearly 7,000 ready for use and 3,000 in storage, and Russia having about 8,500 ready for use and 11,000 in storage. In addition, China is thought to possess about 400 nuclear weapons, Britain about 200, France about 350, India about 80–100, and Pakistan 100–110. North Korea is confirmed as having nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many, with most estimates between 1 and 10. Israel is also widely believed to possess usable nuclear weapons. NATO has stationed about 480 American nuclear weapons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, and several other nations are thought to be in pursuit of an arsenal of their own.

Pakistan's nuclear policy was significantly affected by the 1965 war with India. The 1971 war and India's nuclear program played a role in Pakistan's decision to go nuclear. India and Pakistan both decided not to participate in the NPT. Pakistan's nuclear policy became fixated on India because India refused to join the Non-proliferation Treaty and remained open to nuclear weapons. Impetus by Indian actions spurred Pakistan's nuclear research. After nuclear weapons construction was started by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's command, the chair of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Usmani quit in objection. The 1999 war between Pakistan and India occurred after both acquired nuclear weapons. It is believed by some that nuclear weapons are the reason a big war has not broken out in the subcontinent. India and Pakistan still have a risk of nuclear conflict on the issue of war over Kashmir. Nuclear capability deliverable by sea were claimed by Pakistan in 2012. The aim was to achieve a "minimum credible deterrence". Pakistan's nuclear program culminated in the tests at Chagai. One of the aims of Pakistan's programs is fending off potential annexation and maintaining independence.

A key development in nuclear warfare throughout the 2000s and early 2010s is the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the developing world, with India and Pakistan both publicly testing several nuclear devices, and North Korea conducting an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The U.S. Geological Survey measured a 4.2 magnitude earthquake in the area where the North Korean test is said to have occurred. A further test was announced by the North Korean government on May 25, 2009. Iran, meanwhile, has embarked on a nuclear program which, while officially for civilian purposes, has come under close scrutiny by the United Nations and many individual states.

Recent studies undertaken by the CIA cite the enduring India-Pakistan conflict as the one "flash point" most likely to escalate into a nuclear war. During the Kargil War in 1999, Pakistan came close to using its nuclear weapons in case the conventional military situation underwent further deterioration. Pakistan's foreign minister had even warned that it would "use any weapon in our arsenal", hinting at a nuclear strike against India. The statement was condemned by the international community, with Pakistan denying it later on. This conflict remains the only war (of any sort) between two declared nuclear powers. The 2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoff again stoked fears of nuclear war between the two countries. Despite these very serious and relatively recent threats, relations between India and Pakistan have been improving somewhat over the last few years. However, with the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, tensions again worsened.

External image
image icon A geopolitical example of nuclear strike plan of ROC Army in Kinmen history. Effective Radius: 10 km; Pop.: 1.06 million
Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue), small stockpile with regional range (light blue).

Another potential geopolitical issue that is considered particularly worrisome by military analysts is a possible conflict between the United States and the People's Republic of China over Taiwan. Although economic forces are thought to have reduced the possibility of a military conflict, there remains concern about the increasing military buildup of China (China is rapidly increasing its naval capacity), and that any move toward Taiwan independence could potentially spin out of control.

Israel is thought to possess somewhere between one hundred and four hundred nuclear warheads. It has been asserted that the Dolphin-class submarines which Israel received from Germany have been adapted to carry nuclear-armed Popeye cruise missiles, so as to give Israel a second strike capability. Israel has been involved in wars with its neighbors in the Middle East (and with other "non-state actors" in Lebanon and Palestine) on numerous prior occasions, and its small geographic size and population could mean that, in the event of future wars, the Israel Defense Forces might have very little time to react to an invasion or other major threat. Such a situation could escalate to nuclear warfare very quickly in some scenarios.

On March 7, 2013, North Korea threatened the United States with a pre-emptive nuclear strike. On April 9, North Korea urged foreigners to leave South Korea, stating that both countries were on the verge of nuclear war. On April 12, North Korea stated that a nuclear war was unavoidable. The country declared Japan as its first target.

In 2014, when Russia-United States and Russia-NATO relations worsened over the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Russian state-owned television channel Russia 1 stated that "Russia is the only country in the world that is really capable of turning the USA into radioactive ash." U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter considered proposing deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe that could pre-emptively destroy Russian weapons.

In August 2017, North Korea warned that it might launch mid-range ballistic missiles into waters within 18 to 24 miles (29 to 39 km) of Guam, following an exchange of threats between the governments of North Korea and the United States. Escalating tensions between North Korea and the United States, including threats by both countries that they could use nuclear weapons against one another, prompted a heightened state of readiness in Hawaii. The perceived ballistic missile threat broadcast all over Hawaii on 13 January 2018 was a false missile alarm.

In October 2018, the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev commented that U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is "not the work of a great mind" and that "a new arms race has been announced".

In early 2019, more than 90% of world's 13,865 nuclear weapons were owned by Russia and the United States.

In 2019, Vladimir Putin warned that Russia would deploy nuclear missiles in Europe if the United States deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles there. Journalist Dmitry Kiselyov listed the targets in the United States, which includes The Pentagon, Camp David, Fort Ritchie, McClellan Air Force Base, and Jim Creek Naval Radio Station. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denies the existence of the target list.

On February 24, 2022, in a televised address preceding the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia "is today one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world... No one should have any doubts that a direct attack on our country will lead to defeat and dire consequences for any potential aggressor." Later in the same speech, Putin stated: "Now a few important, very important words for those who may be tempted to intervene in ongoing events. Whoever tries to hinder us, and even more so to create threats for our country, for our people, should know that Russia's response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences that you have never experienced in your history." On February 27, 2022, Putin publicly put his nuclear forces on alert, stating that NATO powers had made "aggressive statements". On April 14, The New York Times reported comments by CIA director William Burns, who said "potential desperation" could lead President Putin to order the use of tactical nuclear weapons. On September 21, 2022, days before declaring the annexation of additional parts of Ukraine, Putin claimed in a national television address that high NATO officials had made statements about the possibility of "using nuclear weapons of mass destruction against Russia", and stated "if the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people... It's not a bluff." NBC News characterized Putin's statements as a "thinly veiled" threat that Putin was willing to risk nuclear conflict if necessary to win the war with Ukraine. Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, stated that "if you start detonating nuclear weapons in the you potentially get radioactive fallout that you can't control — it could rain over your own troops as well, so it might not be an advantage to do that in the field."

According to a peer-reviewed study published in the journal Nature Food in August 2022, a full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia would kill 360 million people directly, with a further 5 billion people dying from starvation. More than 2 billion people would die from a smaller-scale nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Survival

See also: Nuclear famine, Nuclear War Survival Skills, and Civil defense

The predictions of the effects of a major countervalue nuclear exchange include millions of city dweller deaths within a short period of time. Some 1980s predictions had gone further and argued that a full-scale nuclear war could eventually bring about human extinction. Such predictions, sometimes but not always based on total war with nuclear arsenals at Cold War highs, received contemporary criticism. On the other hand, some 1980s governmental predictions, such as FEMA's CRP-2B and NATO's Carte Blanche, have received criticism from groups such as the Federation of American Scientists for being overly optimistic. CRP-2B, for instance, infamously predicted that 80% of Americans would survive a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, a figure that neglected nuclear war's impacts on healthcare infrastructure, the food supply, and the ecosystem and assumed that all major cities could be successfully evacuated within 3–5 days. A number of Cold War publications advocated preparations that could purportedly enable a large proportion of civilians to survive even a total nuclear war. Among the most famous of these is Nuclear War Survival Skills.

To avoid injury and death from a nuclear weapon's heat flash and blast effects, the two most far-ranging prompt effects of nuclear weapons, schoolchildren were taught to duck and cover by the early Cold War film of the same name. Such advice is once again being given in case of nuclear terrorist attacks.

Prussian blue, or "Radiogardase", is stockpiled in the US, along with potassium iodide and DPTA, as pharmaceuticals useful in treating internal exposure to harmful radioisotopes in fallout.

Publications on adapting to a changing diet and supplying nutritional food sources following a nuclear war, with particular focus on agricultural radioecology, include Nutrition in the postattack environment by the RAND corporation.

The British government developed a public alert system for use during a nuclear attack with the expectation of a four-minute warning before detonation. The United States expected a warning time of anywhere from half an hour (for land-based missiles) to less than three minutes (for submarine-based weapons). Many countries maintain plans for continuity of government following a nuclear attack or similar disasters. These range from a designated survivor, intended to ensure the survival of some form of government leadership, to the Soviet Dead Hand system, which allows for retaliation even if all Soviet leadership were destroyed. Nuclear submarines are given letters of last resort: orders on what action to take in the event that an enemy nuclear strike has destroyed the government.

A number of other countries around the world have taken significant efforts to maximize their survival prospects in the event of large calamities, both natural and manmade. For example, metro stations in Pyongyang, North Korea, were constructed 110 metres (360 ft) below ground, and were designed to serve as nuclear shelters in the event of war, with each station entrance built with thick steel blast doors. An example of privately funded fallout shelters is the Ark Two Shelter in Ontario, Canada, and autonomous shelters have been constructed with an emphasis on post-war networking and reconstruction. In Switzerland, the majority of homes have an underground blast and fallout shelter. The country has an overcapacity of such shelters and can accommodate slightly more than the nation's population size.

While the nuclear fallout shelters described above are the ideal long-term protection methods against dangerous radiation exposure in the event of a nuclear catastrophe, it is also necessary to have mobile protection equipment for medical and security personnel to safely assist in containment, evacuation, and many other necessary public safety objectives which ensue as a result of nuclear detonation. There are many basic shielding strategies used to protect against the deposition of radioactive material from external radiation environments. Respirators that protect against internal deposition are used to prevent the inhalation and ingestion of radioactive material and dermal protective equipment which is used to protect against the deposition of material on external structures like skin, hair, and clothing. While these protection strategies do slightly reduce the exposure, they provide almost no protection from externally penetrating gamma radiation, which is the cause of acute radiation syndrome and can be extremely lethal in high dosages. Naturally, shielding the entire body from high-energy gamma radiation is optimal, but the required mass to provide adequate attenuation makes functional movement nearly impossible.

Recent scientific studies have shown the feasibility of partial body shielding as a viable protection strategy against externally penetrating gamma radiation. The concept is based in providing sufficient attenuation to only the most radio-sensitive organs and tissues in efforts to defer the onset of acute radiation syndrome, the most immediate threat to humans from high doses of gamma radiation. Acute radiation syndrome is a result of irreversible bone marrow damage from high-energy radiation exposure. Due to the regenerative property of hematopoietic stem cells found in bone marrow, it is only necessary to protect enough bone marrow to repopulate the exposed areas of the body with the shielded supply. Because 50% of the body's supply of bone marrow is stored in the pelvic region which is also in close proximity to other radio-sensitive organs in the abdomen, the lower torso is a logical choice as the primary target for protection.

In fiction

Main article: List of nuclear holocaust fiction See also: Nuclear weapons in fiction, film, and theater and apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic fiction

Nuclear warfare and weapons are staple elements of speculative fiction.

See also

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Further reading

  • Louis Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics. The risks and consequences of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980. ISBN 9780226043609
  • Laura Grego and David Wright, "Broken Shield: Missiles designed to destroy incoming nuclear warheads fail frequently in tests and could increase global risk of mass destruction", Scientific American, vol. 320, no. no. 6 (June 2019), pp. 62–67. "Nuclear-armed missiles are a political problem that technology cannot solve.... Current U.S. missile defense plans are being driven largely by technology, politics and fear. Missile defenses will not allow us to escape our vulnerability to nuclear weapons. Instead large-scale developments will create barriers to taking real steps toward reducing nuclear risks—by blocking further cuts in nuclear arsenals and potentially spurring new deployments." (p. 67.)
  • Jessica T. Mathews, "The New Nuclear Threat", The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVII, no. 13 (20 August 2020), pp. 19–21. "owerful reasons to doubt that there could be a limited nuclear war those that emerge from any study of history, a knowledge of how humans act under pressure, or experience of government." (p. 20.)
  • "Possibility of Nuclear War in Asia: An Indian Perspective", a project of United Service Institution of India, USI, Discusses the possibility of a nuclear war in Asia from the Indian point of view.
  • Thomas Powers, "The Nuclear Worrier" (review of Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, New York, Bloomsbury, 2017, ISBN 9781608196708, 420 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXV, no. 1 (18 January 2018), pp. 13–15.
  • "Presidency in the Nuclear Age", conference and forum at the JFK Library, Boston, October 12, 2009. Four panels: "The Race to Build the Bomb and the Decision to Use It", "Cuban Missile Crisis and the First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty", "The Cold War and the Nuclear Arms Race", and "Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and the Presidency".
  • Tom Stevenson, "A Tiny Sun" (review of Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War, Simon and Schuster, 2021, 384 pp.; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, Cornell, 2020, 180 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 44, no. 4 (24 February 2022), pp. 29–32. "Nuclear strategists systematically underestimate the chances of nuclear accident... here have been too many close calls for accidental use to be discounted." (p. 32.)

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