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	{{redirect3|Operation Citadel|It may also refer to the Australian component of the ]}}
			{{Redirect|Kursk offensive|the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast|2024 Kursk offensive}}
	{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2013}}
			{{Short description|1943 tank battle in the Soviet Union}}
			{{Good article}}
			{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2019}}
	{{Use British English|date=June 2013}}		{{Use British English|date=June 2013}}
	{{Infobox military conflict		{{Infobox military conflict
	| conflict = {{plainlist |		| conflict = Battle of Kursk
			| partof = the ] of ]
	* Battle of Kursk
			| image = Battle of Kursk (map).jpg
	* Operation Citadel
			| image_size = 288
			| caption = German penetration during the attack on the ] salient and Soviet counter-offensive in the northern sector
			| date = {{start date|df=yes|1943|7|5}}&nbsp;– {{End date|df=yes|1943|8|23}}<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=07|day1=05|year1=1943|month2=08|day2=23|year2=1943}})
			| place = ], ], ], ]
			| coordinates = {{Coord|51.7|N|36.1|E|display=inline,title}}
			| territory = {{plainlist |
			*Soviets regain territory along a {{cvt|2000|km|mi}} wide front after the battle.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=171}}
			*Soviets regain initiative to strike in southern Ukraine }}
			| result = Soviet victory
			| combatant1 = {{flagcountry|Nazi Germany}}
			| combatant2 = {{flag|Soviet Union|1936}}
			| commander1 = {{plainlist|
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]}}
			| commander2 = {{plainlist|
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]<br>
			]}}
			| strength1 = {{Bulleted list|1= '''Operation Citadel:''' {{plainlist|
			**780,900{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=338}}
			**2,928 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=338}}
			**9,966 guns and mortars{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=165}}}}
			|2= '''Soviet counter-offensive phase:'''{{plainlist|
			**940,900{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=338}}
			**3,253 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=338}}
			**9,467 guns and mortars{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=100}}}}
			|3= 2,110 aircraft<ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|pp=123–125}}: Figures are from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin.</ref>
	}}		}}
			| strength2 = {{Bulleted list|1= '''Operation Citadel:'''{{plainlist|
	| partof = the ] of ]
			**1,910,361 (including 1,426,352 actual combat soldiers){{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}
	| image = ]
			**5,128 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}
	| caption = SS ] with a ] of the ] during the Battle of Kursk
			**25,013 guns and mortars{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=165}}}}
	|date = {{plainlist | style = margin-left: -3em; |
	* German offensive: 5–16 July 1943		|2= '''Soviet counter-offensive phase:'''{{plainlist|
			**2,500,000{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}
	* Soviet offensive: 12 July&nbsp;– 23 August 1943
			**7,360 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}
			**47,416 guns and mortars{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=100}}}}
			|3= 2,792{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=127–128|loc= figures are from Russian archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow.}}{{efn|name=Breakdown1}} to 3,549{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=20}}{{efn|name=Breakdown2}} aircraft
	}}		}}
			| casualties1 = {{Bulleted list |1= '''Operation Citadel:'''{{efn|name=OpCitPeriod| Operation Citadel refers to the German offensive from 4 to 16 July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 5–23 July.}}<ref name=kosave>U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise – Phase III (KOSAVE II), pp. 5–14 through 5–15.</ref>{{plainlist|
	| place = ], ], ]
			**54,182 men{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|pp=153, 200}}{{efn|name=Breakdown3}}{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=485}}
	| result = {{plainlist |
			**252–323 tanks and assault guns destroyed,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=276}}{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=200}}
	* Decisive Soviet victory{{efn|name=Kharkov}}{{efn|name=Strategic initiative}}
			**1,612 tanks and assault guns damaged<ref name=barba>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bnyTBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 |title=Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume I |isbn=978-1-304-03818-0 |access-date=6 August 2019 |archive-date=23 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823054046/https://books.google.com/books?id=bnyTBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA165 |url-status=live |last1=Askey |first1=Nigel |date=June 2013 |publisher=Lulu.com }}</ref>{{sfn|Searle|2017|p=80}}
	* ]'s offensive power in the ] is crippled
			**159 aircraft{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=154}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=408}}
			**c. 500 guns{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=154}}}}
			|2= '''Battle of Kursk:'''{{efn|name=KurskA}}{{plainlist|
			**Per German incomplete medical data : 165,314 (54,182 during Operation Citadel and 111,132 during the Soviet counter-offensives) {{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|pp=197, 200}}{{efn|name=Breakdown6}} – 203,000{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|pp=117, 116, and endnote 18|ps=: For all participating armies in the Kursk area, there were 203,000 casualties for July and August.}}
			**German strength data: ~380,000–430,000 combat casualties<ref name=Litvinenko2>Цена Курской битвы – часть II. Красная армия победила, потому что воевала лучше. Владимир Литвиненко. Опубликовано в выпуске № 33 (746) за 28 августа 2018 года. Quote: "According to Stephen Newton, as of 5th July, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 17,369, while the tank and motorized divisions were 18,410. On 30th August 1943, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 8,269 men, and the tank and motorized divisions – 10,745 men. Then the average loss of personnel in the Battle of Kursk (excluding replenishment) is the same for infantry divisions were 9,100 men (52%), for tank and motorized divisions were 7,665 men (41%). At the same time, the losses of Army Group Center in the Battle of Kursk can be estimated by extrapolating the above estimate of the losses of the 4th Panzer Army and OG Kempf to the losses of Army Group Center. It should be considered that the losses of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk were 380,000 to 430,000 men"</ref>
			**Soviet claim: 500,000+ combat casualties{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=279}}
			** At least 2,952 tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=230}} (of which, 760{{efn|Exact numbers are unknown; the entire German eastern front lost 1,331 tanks and assault guns for July and August, so the number of 760 is an estimate.{{sfn|Frieser et al|2007|p=201}} }}–1,200{{sfn|Töppel|2017|p=203}} tanks and assault guns destroyed)
			**681 aircraft (for 5–31 July){{sfn|Bergström|2008|p=120}}{{efn|Figures for 5–31 July, as given by the Luftwaffe logistics staff (''Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe'').}}}}
	}}		}}
			| casualties2 = {{Bulleted list
	| territory = Soviets retake some territory along a {{convert|2000|km|mi|abbr=on}} wide front
			|1= '''Operation Citadel:'''{{efn|name=OpCitPeriod}}{{plainlist|
	| combatant1 = {{flagcountry|Nazi Germany|1935}}
			**177,847 men{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001|p=}}{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=485}}
	| combatant2 = {{flag|Soviet Union|1923}}
			**1,614{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001|p=}}–1,956{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=150}} tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged
	| commander1 = {{plainlist |
			**459{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001}}~1,000 aircraft{{sfn|Koltunov|Solovyev|1970|p=366}}}}
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
			|2= '''Battle of Kursk:'''{{efn|name=KurskA}}{{plainlist|
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
			**254,470–450,000 killed, captured or missing{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=427–428}}<br />608,833–1,200,000 wounded or sick{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=132–134}}{{efn|name=Breakdown4}} {{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=427–428}} (of which 74% wounded and 26% sick<ref>N. Ivanov, A. Georgievsky and O. Lobastov. "Soviet health care and military medicine in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945". p. 205</ref>)
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
			**Total: 863,303–1,700,000 (including 710,000 combat casualties){{sfn|Töppel |2017|pp=203, 229}}<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Frieser |first1=Karl-Heinz |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2017 |volume= VIII|isbn= 978-0-19-872346-2|edition=1st |pages=199 |language=en}}</ref>
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
			**6,064{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|p=262}}{{efn|name=Breakdown5}}{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=200}}–7,000{{sfn|Töppel |2017|pp=203–204}} tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged (of which, 60–65% were completely destroyed<ref name=Alexander>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qLOSDQAAQBAJ&dq=%222%2C971+or+nearly+40+per+cent+were+identified%22&pg=PA460 |title=The Red Army and the Second World War |isbn=978-1-107-02079-5 |last1=Hill |first1=Alexander |date=2016|publisher=Cambridge University Press |access-date=20 May 2022 |archive-date=23 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823054046/https://books.google.com/books?id=qLOSDQAAQBAJ&dq=%222%2C971+or+nearly+40+per+cent+were+identified%22&pg=PA460 |url-status=live }}</ref>)
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
			** **1,626{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001}}–3,300 aircraft{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=150}} (] claimed 4,209 Soviet planes downed<ref>{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |author-link=Karl-Heinz Frieser |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-19-872346-2 |edition=1st |volume=VIII |location=Oxford |pages=201–202 |language=en |quote=}}</ref>)
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
			**5,244 guns and mortars{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001}}}}
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
	----
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
	}}		}}
			| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Axis-Soviet War}}
	| commander2 = {{plainlist |
			{{Campaignbox Kursk}}
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
	----
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} Sergey Gorunov
	* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} Vladimir Sudets
	}}		}}
			The '''Battle of Kursk''' was a major ] ] battle between the forces of ] and the ] near ] in southwestern Russia during the summer of 1943, resulting in a Soviet victory. The Battle of Kursk is the single largest battle in the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=xv, 228|ps=: "The Battle of Kursk was the greatest land battle the world has ever seen on a fighting front that epitomized 'total war' ... It was time for the largest set-piece battle in the history of war to begin."}}{{sfn|Töppel|2017|pp=233–234|ps=: "At Kursk, however, no less than 3.5 million soldiers, 12,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and 57,000 guns and mortars were ready for battle. Thus, defined by the number of men and material involved, the Battle of Kursk was without doubt not only the biggest tank clash of the Second World War, but indeed at the same time the largest battle of the Second World War."}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |author-link=Karl-Heinz Frieser |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-19-872346-2 |edition=1st |volume=VIII |location=Oxford |pages=83, 200 |language=en |quote=The battle of Kursk is considered the biggest land battle of the Second World War, indeed the biggest in all of military history. During the fighting the two sides deployed more than 4 million troops, 69,000 cannon and launchers, 13,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and almost 12,000 aircraft. Even the battle of Stalingrad seems small-scale in comparison ... As the Red Army had massed a large part of its forces in the Kursk salient, the outcome was the greatest land battle of the Second World War, indeed the greatest in all the history of war.}}</ref> It ranks only behind the ] several months earlier as the most often-cited turning point in the ].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Edele |first=Mark |date=2018-07-13 |title=The Battle of Kursk: 75 years on |url=https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/the-battle-of-kursk-75-years-on |access-date=2023-08-20 |website=Pursuit |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite thesis |last=McGovern |first=Sean C. |date=2021 |title=The Battle of Kursk: A Comparative Analysis to Stalingrad, Study on Memory, and Russian Environmental Preservation |url=https://harbor.klnpa.org/eaststroudsburg/islandora/object/strou%3A158 |journal=East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania |pages=III |access-date=20 August 2023 |archive-date=23 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823054056/https://harbor.klnpa.org/eaststroudsburg/islandora/object/strou%3A158 |url-status=live }}</ref> It was one of the costliest battles of the Second World War,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cross |first=Robin |url=https://archive.org/details/battleofkurskope0000cros/page/n5/mode/1up |title=The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=9780141391090 |pages=vii}}</ref>{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=269}}<ref>{{Cite web |last=Никитенко |first=Евгений |date=2013-07-05 |title=Геополитическая победа в Курской битве |url=https://russiancouncil.ru/amp/analytics-and-comments/analytics/geopoliticheskaya-pobeda-v-kurskoy-bitve/ |access-date=2024-04-08 |website=russiancouncil.ru |language=ru}}</ref><ref name=":2" /><ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-08-23 |title=Memories of Soviet generals and marshals of the Battle of Kursk |url=https://www.prlib.ru/en/news/1276090 |access-date=2024-04-06 |website=Presidential Library |language=en}}</ref> the single deadliest armoured battle in history,<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Hanson |first=Victor Davis |author-link=Victor Davis Hanson |title=The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won |publisher=Basic Books |year=2020 |isbn=978-1541674103 |edition=Reprint |location=New York |pages=3 |language=en}}</ref> and the opening day of the battle, 5 July, was the single costliest day in the ] in terms of aircraft shot down.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cross |first=Robin |url=https://archive.org/details/battleofkurskope0000cros/page/182 |title=The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=9780141391090 |pages=182}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Roberts |first=Andrew |author-link=Andrew Roberts, Baron Roberts of Belgravia |date=2013-08-31 |title=WWII’s Greatest Battle: How Kursk Changed the War |url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/31/wwii-s-greatest-battle-how-kursk-changed-the-war |access-date=2024-04-06 |work=The Daily Beast |language=en}}</ref> The battle was further marked by fierce ] and ].{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=84, 174, 186, 220–221}}
	| strength1 = {{plainlist |
	* 912,460 men{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=338}}
	* 2,928 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=338}}
	* 9,966 guns and mortars{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=165}}
	* 2,110 aircraft{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=123–125|ps=. Figures are from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin.}}
	}}
	| strength2 = {{plainlist |
	* 1,910,361 men{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}
	* 5,128 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}
	* 25,013 guns and mortars{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=165}}
	* 2,792{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=127–128|loc= figures are from Russian archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow.}}{{efn|name=Breakdown 1}} to 3,549{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=20}}{{efn|name=Breakdown 2}} aircraft
	}}
	| casualties1 = '''Operation Citadel:'''{{efn|name=ReferenceA}}
	{{plainlist |
	* 54,182 men{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=154}}{{efn|name=Breakdown 3}}
	* 323 tanks and assault guns{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=276}}
	* 159 aircraft{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=154}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=408}}
	* ~500 guns{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p={{Page needed|date=September 2010}}|ps=. A rough estimation by Frieser since no numbers are available}}
	}}
	'''Battle of Kursk:'''{{efn|name=KurskA}}
	{{plainlist |
	* 203,000 casualties{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p= 116, 117|ps=. For all participating German armies in the Kursk area, there were 203,000 casualties for July and August}}
	* 760 tanks and assault guns{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=201|ps=. Exact numbers are unknown; the entire German eastern front lost 1,331 tanks and assault guns for July and August, so the number of 760 is an estimate.}}
	* 681 aircraft{{sfn|Bergström|2008|p=120|ps=. Figures for 5–31 July, as given by the Luftwaffe logistics staff (''Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe'').}}
	}}
	| casualties2 = '''Operation Citadel:'''{{efn|name=ReferenceA}}
	{{plainlist |
	* 177,847 men{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001|loc=}}
	* 1,614{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001|ps=, }} – 1,956{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=150}} tanks and assault guns
	* 459{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001}} – 1,961{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=150}} aircraft
	* 3,929 guns{{citation needed|date=May 2013}}
	}}
	'''Battle of Kursk:'''{{efn|name=KurskA}}
	{{plainlist |
	* 863,303 casualties{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=132–134}}{{efn|name=Breakdown 4}}
	* 6,064 tanks and assault guns{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|p=262}}{{efn|name=Breakdown 5}}
	* 1,626 aircraft{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001}}
	* 5,244 guns{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001}}
	}}
	}}
	{{Campaignbox Axis-Soviet War}}
	{{Campaignbox Kursk}}
	]. Green areas show German advances on Kursk]]
	The '''Battle of Kursk''' was a ] engagement between ] and ] forces on the ] near ] ({{convert|450|km|disp=or|sp=uk}} southwest of ]) in the Soviet Union in July and August 1943. The German offensive was code-named '''Operation Citadel''' ({{lang-de|Unternehmen Zitadelle}}) and led to one of the largest ] in history, the ]. The German offensive was countered by two Soviet counteroffensives, ] ({{lang-ru|Полководец Румянцев}}) and ] ({{lang-ru|Кутузов}}). For the Germans, the battle represented the final strategic offensive they were able to mount in the east. For the Soviets, the decisive victory gave the ] the strategic initiative for the rest of the war.
			The battle began with the launch of the German offensive ] ({{langx|de|Unternehmen Zitadelle}}), on 5 July, which had the objective of pinching off the Kursk ] with attacks on the base of the salient from north and south simultaneously. After the German offensive stalled on the northern side of the salient, on 12 July, the Soviets commenced their '''Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation''' with the launch of ] ({{langx|ru|Кутузов}}) against the rear of the German forces on the same side. On the southern side, the Soviets also launched powerful counterattacks the same day, one of which led to a large armoured clash, the ]. On 3 August, the Soviets began the second phase of the Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of the ] (Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, {{lang|ru|Полководец Румянцев}}) against the German forces on the southern side of the salient.
	The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943 by cutting off a large number of forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk Salient assembling for an offensive. By eliminating the Kursk ] they would also shorten their lines of defense, taking the strain off of their overstretched forces. The plan envisioned an envelopment by a pair of pincers breaking through the northern and southern flanks of the salient. It was thought that a victory here would reassert Germany's strength and improve her prestige with allies who were considering withdrawing from the war. In addition, it was hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labor in Germany's armaments industry.
			The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943, by cutting off and enveloping the forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk salient.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=1}} Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with his ], who he thought were considering withdrawing from the war.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=42}} It was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as ].{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=90}} The Soviet government had foreknowledge of the German plans from the ]. Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a ] designed to wear down the German ].{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=65}} The Germans delayed the offensive while they tried to build up their forces and waited for new weapons,{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=12}}{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=94}}{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=16}} giving the Red Army time to construct a series of deep defensive belts{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–67}} and establish a large reserve force for counter-offensives,{{sfn|Glantz| 1989| pp=149–159}} with one German officer describing Kursk as "another ]".<ref name=":2943">{{Cite book |last=Roberts |first=Andrew |author-link=Andrew Roberts, Baron Roberts of Belgravia |title=The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War |publisher=] |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-06-122860-5 |pages=415 |language=en}}</ref>
	The Soviets had intelligence of the German intentions, provided in part by British intelligence service and Enigma intercepts. Aware that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient months in advance, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German ]. German delays in waiting for new weapons, mainly the ] heavy tank and the ] medium tank,{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=94}}{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=16}} gave the Red Army time to construct a series of defensive lines. The defensive preparations included ]s, fortifications, pre-sighted artillery fire zones and anti-tank strong points, which extended approximately {{convert|300|km|abbr=on}} in depth.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–67}} In addition, Soviet mobile formations were moved out of the salient and a large reserve force was formed for strategic counteroffensives.{{sfn|Glantz| 1989| pp=149–159}}
	The Battle of Kursk was the first time a German strategic offensive had been halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its ]s.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=167}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=184}} Though the Soviet Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives following the German attack were their first successful strategic summer offensives of the war.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=66}}		The battle was the final strategic offensive that the Germans were able to launch on the Eastern Front. Because the ] began during the battle, ] was forced to divert troops training in France to meet the Allied threat in the Mediterranean, rather than using them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front.{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=191}} As a result, Hitler cancelled the offensive at Kursk after only a week, in part to divert forces to Italy.{{sfn|Atkinson|2007|p=172}} Germany's heavy losses of men and tanks ensured that the victorious Soviet ] held a strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Battle of Kursk was the first time in the Second World War that a German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its ]s.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=167}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=184}} Though the Red Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives after the German attack at Kursk were their first successful summer offensives of the war.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=66}} The battle has been called the "last gasp of Nazi aggression".<ref name=":2944">{{Cite book |last=Roberts |first=Andrew |author-link=Andrew Roberts, Baron Roberts of Belgravia |title=The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War |publisher=HarperCollins |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-06-122860-5 |pages=427 |language=en}}</ref>
			{{TOC limit}}
	== Background ==		== Background ==
	As the ] slowly ground to its conclusion, the Soviet army moved to a general offensive in the south, pressuring the depleted German forces. Hitler's belief that his own iron will would be the deciding factor in the conflict resulted in German forces being tied down in a rigid defence that did not permit them the liberty to move.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p=189}}{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=26}} Since December Manstein had been strongly requesting "unrestricted operational freedom" to allow him to use the forces in a fluid manner, a request which put him at odds with Hitler.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=27}} Time and again Hitler's policy of holding at all costs resulted in forces being left until their position was untenable, and they were being cut off and destroyed.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p= 210}} By January 1943 a {{convert|160|to|300|km|abbr=on}} wide gap had been created between ] and ]. The advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut off all German forces south of the ], including ] operating in the ].{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=7}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=167}} Meanwhile Army Group Centre was under significant pressure as well. ] fell to the Soviets on 8 February, and ] on the 14th.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=176}} The Soviet ] and ] Fronts, along with the newly created ], prepared for an offensive which envisioned an encirclement of Army Group Centre extending between ] and ].{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=7}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=11}}		As the ] slowly ground to its conclusion, the ] moved to a general offensive in the south, in ]. By January 1943, a {{convert|160|to|300|km|mi|adj=mid|-wide}} gap had opened between German ] and ], and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut off all German forces south of the ], including ] operating in the ].{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=7}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=167}} ] came under significant pressure as well. ] was retaken by the Soviets on 8 February 1943, and ] on 14 February.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=176}} The Soviet ], ], and newly created ] prepared for an offensive which envisioned the encirclement of Army Group Centre between ] and ].{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=7}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=11}} By February 1943 the southern sector of the German front was in strategic crisis.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|p=1 part 8}}
	On 12 February the remaining German forces were reorganized. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South and its units placed under the command of Field Marshal ]. Directly to the north Army Group B was dissolved, and its forces and areas of responsibility were divided between Army Group South and Army Group Center. With this restructuring Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive breach in the German lines.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=8}} January 1943 saw the arrival of the II SS Panzer Corps from France, refitted and up to near full strength.{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=61}} Other armoured units from the ], part of Army Group A, which had slipped out of the trap of the Caucasus, further strengthened Manstein's hand.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=13}}		Since December 1942, Field Marshal ] had been strongly requesting "unrestricted operational freedom" to allow him to use his forces in a fluid manner.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=27}} On 6 February 1943, Manstein met with Hitler at his ] in ] (now Gierłoż, ]) to discuss the proposals he had previously sent. He received an approval from Hitler for a counteroffensive against the Soviet forces advancing in the ] region.{{sfn|Citino|2012|pp=66–67}} On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces were reorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South and placed under Manstein's command. Directly to the north, Army Group B was dissolved, with its forces and areas of responsibility divided between Army Group South and Army Group Centre. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive breach in the German lines.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=8}} On 18 February, Hitler arrived at Army Group South headquarters at ] just hours before the Soviets liberated ], and had to be hastily evacuated on the 19th.{{sfn|Citino|2012|pp=69–70}}
			Once given freedom of action, Manstein intended to utilise his forces to make a series of counterstrokes into the flanks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkov and Kursk.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=8}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} The ] had arrived from France in January 1943, refitted and up to near full strength.{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=61}} Armoured units from the ] of Army Group A had pulled out of the Caucasus and further strengthened Manstein's forces.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=13}}
	By February the Wehrmacht was in crisis. ] arrived at Army Group South headquarters at ] hours before the fall of ] on 18 February. Hitler's decided distrust of the officers of the General Staff, and of Manstein in particular, put him at odds with the erstwhile commanders of the Wehrmacht.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=27}}{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p= 198}} Though Hitler secretly wished to relieve Manstein and saddle him with the blame for Stalingrad and the subsequent battles,{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177|loc= according to ]'s diary.}} he soon realized he could ill afford to lose the man largely regarded as the most capable commander in the Wehrmacht.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p= 63}}{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=26}} Instead Hitler grudgingly gave him the freedom he had requested.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=27}} Once given freedom of action, Manstein explained how he intended to concentrate his forces and make a series of counterstrokes to exploit the Soviets' overstretched lines, with the goal of destroying the Soviet spearheads and retaking Kharkov and Kursk.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=8}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} The ] commenced on 19 February, spearheaded by the three SS divisions of the ]. Manstein's manoeuvre offensive first stabilized the front by cutting off the Soviet spearheads, then encircled and destroyed their main force. The Germans retook Kharkov on 15 March and ] on 18 February.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} The German offensive wrested the initiative from the Soviets. An attack by the Central Front against Army Group Center, launched 25 February, had to be abandoned by 7 March as forces had to be redeployed south to counter the threat of the advancing forces under Manstein.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=10}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=11, 13}} Operations ceased by the end of March due to the onset of the spring ] and the exhaustion of the Wehrmacht. This state of exhaustion was mirrored in the Red Army.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=178}} The counteroffensive failed before retaking Kursk, leaving a salient centred around the town bulging into the German lines.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=178}}
			The operation was hastily prepared and did not receive a name. Later known as ], it commenced on 21 February, as 4th Panzer Army under General Hoth launched a counter-attack. The German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the drive north,{{sfn|Citino|2012|pp=68–70}} retaking Kharkov on 15 March and ] on 18 March.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} A Soviet offensive launched on 25 February by the Central Front against Army Group Centre had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow the attacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=10}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=11, 13}} Exhaustion of both the ] and the Red Army, coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring ], resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=178}} The counteroffensive left a Soviet salient extending {{convert|250|km|mi}} from north to south and {{convert|160|km|mi}} from east to west into the German area of control,{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=157}} centred on the city of Kursk.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=178}}
	=== German plans and preparation ===		=== German plans and preparation ===
	]		]
			The heavy losses sustained by Germany since the opening of ] had resulted in a shortage in infantry and artillery.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=43}} Units were in total 470,000 men understrength.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=374}} For the Wehrmacht to undertake an offensive in 1943, the burden of the offensive, in both attacking the Soviet defences and holding ground on the flanks of the advance, would have to be carried primarily by the panzer divisions.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=262}} On 10 March, Manstein presented a plan whereby the German forces would pinch off the Kursk salient with a rapid offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=184}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}}
	In view of the exposed position of Army Group South, Manstein proposed that the German army should take the strategic defensive. He anticipated that a Soviet offensive would attempt to cut off and destroy Army Group South by a move across the ] toward the ]. In February he proposed waiting for this offensive to develop and then deliver a series of counterattacks into the exposed Soviet flanks.{{sfn|Manstein|1983|p= 445}} Hitler, concerned about potential political implications of taking a defensive stance and preoccupied with the economic potential of holding the Donetz basin, rejected this plan.{{sfn|Manstein|1983|p=446}} On 10 March Manstein presented Hitler with an alternative plan whereby the German forces pinched off the Kursk salient with an offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=184}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}} On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which outlined the intended launch of several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=186}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=354}} As the last enemy resistance in Kharkov was reduced, Manstein attempted to persuade ] of Army Group Centre to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient, to keep the Soviets off balance and maintain the momentum. Kluge refused, noting that his forces were too weak to launch such an attack.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}} Manstein's SS Panzer Corps pushed on northwards and took Belgorod on 18 March, but further advance was thwarted by Soviet forces that had been rushed down from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} By mid-April, amid poor weather and with the German forces exhausted and in need of refitting, the offensives of Operational Order No. 5 could not be undertaken.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=13}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=178, 186}}
			On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which authorised several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=186}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=354}} As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade ], commander of Army Group Centre, to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused, believing that his forces were too weak to launch such an attack.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}} Further Axis advances were blocked by Soviet forces that had been shifted down from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=14}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=177}} By mid-April, amid poor weather and with the German forces exhausted and in need of refitting, the offensives of Operational Order No. 5 were postponed.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=13}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=178, 186}}
	]
			On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6, which called for the Kursk offensive operation, codenamed ''Zitadelle'' ("Citadel"), to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The directive was drafted by ], the ] Chief of Staff.{{sfn|Citino|2012|p=121}} For the offensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defences or to launch an offensive of their own.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=25}} Some military historians have described the operation using the term ] (lightning war); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle.{{efn |name=Blitzkrieg
	Hitler's Operational Order No. 6, issued 15 April, called for the Kursk offensive operation to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. It was deemed critically important to attack before the Soviets had a chance to dig in or launch their own offensive.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=25}} The plan was code named ''Unternehmen Zitadelle'' (Operation Citadel). It was to be a swift and potent strike, featuring a double envelopment with pincers originating from the bases of the salient and directed toward Kursk, which would surround the majority of the Soviet defenders and seal off the salient.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}}{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=24}}{{sfn|Manstein|1983|p=446}}{{sfn|Glantz|2004|p=63, 78, 149, 183, 269, 272, 280}} The northern pincer, formed by the ] under General ] and subordinate to Army Group Center under Kluge, was to cut through the northern face of the salient and drive south toward Kursk. Army Group South, commanded by Manstein, would use the 4th Panzer Army (under ]) and ] (under ]) to penetrate the southern face of the salient, driving northwards to Kursk.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=194,196}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=51–53}} The western face of the salient was to be kept in check by the ] (commanded by ]).{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=194}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=51–53}}
			|Some that consider Operation Citadel as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such are: Lloyd Clark,{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}} Roger Moorhouse,{{sfn|Moorhouse|2011|p=342}} David Glantz,{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=24}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280}} ],{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=63, 78, 149, 269, 272, 280}} Hedley Paul Willmott.{{sfn|Willmott|1990|p=300}} Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson specifically considered only the southern pincer as a "classical blitzkrieg attack".{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=137}} In the informal setting of the International Conference on World War II at ] in 2013, ] used the term to comment on the failure of the operation: "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks".{{sfn|Citino|2013}} In ''The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943'' (2012), Citino did not use the term "blitzkrieg", instead describing Citadel as an attempted operation in the classical tradition of ''Bewegungskrieg'', (literally: "war of movement", or ]), culminating in a ''Kesselschlacht'' (literally: "cauldron battle", or battle of ]).{{sfn|Citino|2012}} Historians Steven Newton {{sfn|Newton|2002}} and Dieter Brand {{sfn|Brand|2003}} do not use 'blitzkrieg' in their characterization of the operation.}}
			Operation Citadel called for a ], directed at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders of five armies and seal off the salient.{{sfn|Nipe|1998}} Army Group Centre would provide General ]'s ] to form the northern pincer. It would cut through the northern face of the salient, driving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the rail line from Soviet attack.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=13}} Army Group South would commit the 4th Panzer Army, under ], and ], under ], to pierce the southern face of the salient. This force would drive north to meet the 9th Army east of Kursk.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=194, 196}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=51–53}} Manstein's main attack was to be delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by the II SS Panzer Corps under ]. The ], commanded by ], would advance on the left while Army Detachment ''Kempf'' would advance on the right.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=197}} The ], under the command of ], would contain the western portion of the salient.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=194}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=51–53}}
	According to ], "Model produced air photographs which showed that the Russians were constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and had withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk."{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=193}} On 27 April Model met with Hitler to review the reconnaissance and express his concerns.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=79}} He argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended Citadel be completely abandoned, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive. Failing that, he believed that Citadel should be radically revised.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=193}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=1–3}}
			On 27 April, Model met with Hitler to review and express his concern regarding intelligence which showed the Red Army constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=79}} He argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended completely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive, or radically revising the plan for Citadel.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=193}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}} Though in mid-April, Manstein had considered the Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}}
	Though in mid-April Manstein had considered the Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=187}} He returned to his earlier assessment that the German forces should take the strategic defensive to allow the anticipated Soviet offensive to weaken their forces on German defences. He would deliver strong counterblows with flanking attacks against the Soviet penetration.{{sfn|Manstein|1983|pp=480–482}} Convinced that the Red Army would deliver its main effort against Army Group South, he proposed to keep the left wing of the army group strong while moving the right wing back in stages to the Dnieper River, followed by a counterattack against the flank of the Red Army advance. The counteroffensive would continue until the ] was reached and the Soviet forces were cut off. This idea was rejected by Hitler, as he did not want to give up so much terrain, even temporarily.{{sfn|Manstein|1983|pp=480–482}}
	General ] (Chief of the ]), the operational planner for Citadel, was still in support of the offensive,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=1–3}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=186}} though he was profoundly concerned with the delay of the offensive till the second week of June.<ref>Healy 2008 p. 83</ref> Hitler acknowledged both Zeitzler's plan and Model's objections as worthy of consideration. He presented these issues at a conference of senior officers held 3–4 May.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}} Three main options were considered: going to the offensive immediately with the forces at hand, delaying the offensive further to await the arrival of the new and better armour, or cancelling or radically revising the operation. Manstein, Model, and ], among others, favoured the third option. ] (Chief of the ] General Staff) supported the first option, as did several others. Kluge and some others strongly argued for the second option. ] (Chief of Staff at OKW) later insisted that any of the options besides the third would suffice.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}} The conference ended without Hitler having voiced his decision, but Citadel was not aborted.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=1–3}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=10}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}} Three days latter OKW ('']''; The overall command for all three services) acted upon the second option, postponing the launch date for Citadel to 12 June.{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=192}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=39}}		Hitler called his senior officers and advisors to ] for a meeting on 4 May. Hitler spoke for about 45 minutes on the reasons to postpone the attack, essentially reiterating Model's arguments.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=49}} A number of options were put forth for comment: going on the offensive immediately with the forces at hand; delaying the offensive further to await the arrival of new and better tanks; radically revising the operation, or cancelling it altogether. Manstein advocated an early attack, but requested two additional infantry divisions, to which Hitler responded that none were available.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=49}} Kluge spoke out strongly against postponement and discounted Model's intelligence.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|pp=49–50}} ], the minister of Armaments and War Production, spoke about the difficulties of rebuilding the armoured formations and the limitations of German industry to replace losses. General ] argued strongly against the operation, stating "the attack was pointless".{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=50}} The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was not aborted.{{sfn|Showalter|2013|p=50}} Three days later, ], Hitler's conduit for controlling the military, postponed the launch date for Citadel to 12 June.{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=192}}
	]		]
	Following this meeting Guderian continued to voice his concerns over an operation that would likely degrade the panzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. He believed that the offensive as planned was a misuse of the panzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he had laid out as the essential elements for a successful panzer attack.{{efn|name=Achtung Panzer!}} In Guderian's opinion the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they would be needed for the pending defence of Western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked: "Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?" Hitler replied: "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach." Guderian concluded, "In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it alone."{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=23}}
			Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his concerns over an operation that would likely degrade the panzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. He considered the offensive, as planned, to be a misuse of the panzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he had laid out as the essential elements for a successful panzer attack – surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain.{{efn | Guderian developed and advocated the strategy of concentrating armoured formations at the point of attack (]) and deep penetration. In '']'' he listed three elements: surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. Of these, surprise was by far the most important.{{sfn|Guderian|1937|p=205}} }} In his opinion, the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they would be needed for the pending defence of western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked,
	]
			{{blockquote|
	Despite these reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory phase, were hopeful that the offensive would revitalize German strategic fortunes in the East. As the challenges offered by Citadel increased, he focused more and more on the expected new weapons that he believed were the key to victory: the ] (Tiger I), the ] (Elefant or Ferdinand), and the ] tank. He postponed the operation to await their arrival.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=193}}{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=86}} Receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations in the Kursk area, he delayed the offensive again to allow for more equipment to reach the front.{{sfn|Clark|1966|p=327}} With pessimism for Citadel increasing due to the delays, in June ] (Chief of the OKW Operations Staff) instructed the armed forces propaganda office to portray it as a limited counteroffensive when it finally commences.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=55}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}}<ref> — Retrieved 02 June 2013</ref> Due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy and delays in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again, to 20 June.{{efn|name=Microfilm}} On 17–18 June, following a discussion where the OKW Operations Staff suggested abandoning the offensive, he further postponed until 3 July.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=170}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=55}}{{sfn|Mulligan|1987|p=329}} It was not until 1 July that Hitler announced 5 July, the final launch date.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=170}}{{sfn|Mulligan|1987|p=329}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=223}}
			Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?
			}}
			Hitler replied, "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach." Guderian concluded, "In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it alone."{{sfn|Guderian|1952|p=308}}{{efn| Writing after the war, in his autobiography '']'', "I urged him earnestly to give up the plan of attack. The great commitment certainly would not bring us equivalent gains."<ref>Guderian 1952 p308</ref> }}
	The weeks leading up to the attack saw a massive build-up of troops and resources by both sides. The total German forces that were slated for Citadel including the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, Army Detachment ''Kempf'', 2nd Army, and 9th Army, numbered around fifty divisions.{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=63}} Of these, 12 were ] divisions and 5 were panzergrenadier divisions.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=51–53}} By the time the German buildup was complete, the forces arrayed amounted to about 777,000 men, 2,451 ]s and ]s (70 per cent of the German armour on the ]), and 7,417 ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=194}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}}{{efn|name=1 July 1943}}
			Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory phase, were hopeful that the offensive would revitalise German strategic fortunes in the east. As the challenges offered by Citadel increased, he focused more and more on the expected new weapons that he believed were the key to victory: principally the ], but also the ] ] and greater numbers of the ] heavy tank.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=12}} He postponed the operation in order to await their arrival.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=193}} Receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler further delayed the offensive to allow for more equipment to reach the front.
			With pessimism for Citadel increasing with each delay, in June, ], the Chief of Staff at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propaganda office to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=55}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=183}}<ref>. Dial Pixpex News. Retrieved 2 June 2013</ref> Due to concerns of an Allied landing in the south of France or in Italy and delays in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again, this time to 20 June.{{efn|name=Microfilm}} Zeitzler was profoundly concerned with the delays,{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=83}} but he still supported the offensive.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=1–3}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=186}} On 17–18 June, following a discussion in which the OKW Operations Staff suggested abandoning the offensive, Hitler further postponed the operation until 3 July{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=55}} then, on 1 July, Hitler announced 5 July as the launch date of the offensive.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=170}}{{sfn|Mulligan|1987|p=329}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=223}}
			], designed in response to the poor roads of Russia, moves ] up shortly before the Kursk offensive.]]
			A three-month quiet period had descended upon the Eastern Front as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Germans attempted to build up their forces. The Germans used this period for specialised training of their assault troops.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=132}} All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waffen-SS had built a full-scale duplicate Soviet strong point that was used to practice the techniques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to get back up to strength. The German forces to be used in the offensive included 12 ] divisions and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tank strengths greater than their neighbouring panzer divisions. However, the force was markedly deficient in infantry divisions, which were essential to hold ground and to secure the flanks.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=25}} By the time the Germans initiated the offensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and ]s (70 percent of the German armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 ] and ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=194}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}}{{efn|name="1 July 1943"}} The Battle of Kursk would engulf more than 70% of Germany's military force on the Eastern Front.<ref name=":2" />
	=== Soviet plans and preparation ===		=== Soviet plans and preparation ===
			In 1943, an offensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk and Western Fronts against Army Group Centre was abandoned shortly after it began in early March, when the southern flank of the Central Front was threatened by Army Group South.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=7}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=11, 13}} Soviet intelligence received information about German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an intended German offensive in the Kursk sector through the ] in ]. The Soviets verified the intelligence via their spy in Britain, ], at the ] at ], who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow.{{sfn|Copeland, ''Colossus''}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=188, 190–191}} Cairncross also provided Soviet intelligence with identifications of the ] airfields in the region.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=471}} Soviet politician ] wrote that on 27 March 1943, Soviet leader ] notified him of a possible German attack in the Kursk sector.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/mikoyan/04.html |title=ВОЕННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА – – Микоян А.И. Так было |publisher=Militera.lib.ru |access-date=6 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100704040443/http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/mikoyan/04.html |archive-date=4 July 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref> Stalin and some senior officers were eager to strike first once the ''rasputitsa'' ended,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=28–29|loc= mentions ] and ]}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189|loc= mentions Stalin}} but a number of key officers, including Deputy Supreme Commander ], recommended a strategic defensive before going on the offensive. In a letter to the '']'' and Stalin, on 8 April, Zhukov wrote:
	]
			]
	In 1943, an offensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk, and Western Fronts against Army Group Centre was abandoned shortly after it began in early March, when the southern flank of the Central Front was threatened by Army Group South.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=7}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=11, 13}} Soviet intelligence received information about German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov as well as details of an intended German offensive in the Kursk sector through the ] in Switzerland. The Soviets verified the intelligence via their spy in Britain, ] at the ] at ], who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow.{{sfn|''Innovation News''|2011}}{{sfn|Copeland, ''Colossus''}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=188, 190–191}} ] wrote that on 27 March 1943 he was notified by ] about a possible German attack in the Kursk sector.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/mikoyan/04.html |title=ВОЕННАЯ ЛИТЕРАТУРА – – Микоян А.И. Так было |publisher=Militera.lib.ru |date= |accessdate=2010-08-06| archiveurl= http://web.archive.org/web/20100704040443/http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/mikoyan/04.html| archivedate= 4 July 2010 <!--DASHBot-->| deadurl= no}}</ref> Stalin and some senior officers were eager to strike first once the rasputitsa ended,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=28–29|loc= mentions ] and ]}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189|loc= mentions Stalin}} but a number of key officers, including Deputy Supreme Commander ], recommended a strategic defensive before going on the offensive. In a letter to '']'' and Stalin on 8 April, Zhukov wrote:
			{{blockquote|In the first phase the enemy, collecting their best forces—including 13–15 tank divisions and with the support of a large number of aircraft—will strike Kursk with their Kromskom-Orel grouping from the north-east and their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the south-east... I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to an offensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=168}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189}}}}
			Stalin consulted with his frontline commanders and senior officers of the General Staff from 12 to 15 April 1943. In the end he and the Stavka agreed that the Germans would probably target Kursk.<ref name="rokossovsky15"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160519232528/http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/rokossovsky/15.html |date=19 May 2016 }} (in Russian). Militera.lib.ru. Retrieved 17 June 2013.</ref> Stalin believed the decision to defend would give the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans would be drawn into a trap where their armoured power would be destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a major Soviet counteroffensive.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=190}} They decided to meet the enemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wear out the German groupings before launching their own offensive.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189}}{{sfn| Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=28}} Preparation of defences and fortifications began by the end of April, and continued until the German attack in early July.{{sfn| Glantz|House|2004|pp=28–29}}<ref name="rokossovsky15"/> The two-month delay between the German decision to attack the Kursk salient and its implementation allowed the Red Army ample time to thoroughly prepare.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=192}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=39}}
	{{quote | In the first phase the enemy, collecting their best forces—including 13–15 tank divisions and with the support of a large number of aircraft—will strike Kursk with their Kromskom-Orel grouping from the north-east and their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the south-east.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zhukov1/17.html| title=Разгром фашистских войск на Курской дуге| trans_title=The defeat of the Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge| accessdate= 17 June 2013|quote=на первом этапе противник, собрав максимум своих сил, в том числе до 13–15 танковых дивизий, при поддержке большого количества авиации нанесёт удар своей орловско-кромской группировкой в обход Курска с северо-востока и белгородско-харьковской группировкой в обход Курска с юго-востока.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book | url=http://books.google.ca/books?id=bcpBAAAAIAAJ&q=Belgorod-Kharkov#search_anchor| title=Google Books preview – The memoirs of Marshal Zhukov| accessdate=8 May 2013| publisher=''This is for the verification of the presented English translation of the original Russian text''| year=1971}}</ref><p>I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to an offensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=168}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189}}}}
			The ], commanded by ], was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front, commanded by ], defended the northern face. Waiting in reserve was the ], commanded by ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=204}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=195}} In February 1943, the Central Front had been reconstructed from the ], which had been part of the northern pincer of ] and had been responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=202}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://bse.sci-lib.com/article117708.html |title=Фронты Советских Вооружённых Сил во время Великой Отечественной войны 1941–45 |work=sci-lib.com |access-date=8 May 2013 |archive-date=21 December 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131221105132/http://bse.sci-lib.com/article117708.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
	Stalin consulted from 12 to 15 April 1943 with his front-line commanders and senior officers of the General Staff, and in the end he and ''Stavka'' agreed that Kursk was the likely German target.<ref name="rokossovsky15"> {{ru icon}} — Retrieved: 17 June 2013</ref> Stalin believed the decision to defend would give the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans would be drawn into a trap where their armoured power would be destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a major Soviet offensive.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=190}} They decided to meet the enemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wear out the German groupings before launching their own offensive.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189}}{{sfn| Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=28}} Preparation of defences and fortifications began by the end of April and continued until the German attack in early July.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=28–29}}<ref name="rokossovsky15"/> The two-month delay between the German decision to attack the Kursk salient and its implementation allowed the Red Army ample time to thoroughly prepare.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=192}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=39}}
			]
			The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed three main defensive belts in their sectors, with each subdivided into several zones of fortification.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–65}} The Soviets employed the labour of over 300,000 civilians.{{efn|name=Civilian labour}} Fortifying each belt was an interconnected web of minefields, barbed-wire fences, ]es, deep entrenchments for infantry, ], ] armoured vehicles, and machine-gun bunkers.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=211}} Behind the three main defensive belts were three more belts prepared as fallback positions; the first was not fully occupied or heavily fortified, and the last two, though sufficiently fortified, were unoccupied with the exception of a small area in the immediate environs of Kursk.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–65}}{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|pp=41, 49}} The combined depth of the three main defensive zones was about {{convert|40|km}}. The six defensive belts on either side of Kursk were {{convert|130|-|150|km|mi}} deep.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|pp=41, 49}} If the Germans managed to break through these defences they would still be confronted by additional defensive belts to the east, manned by the Steppe Front. These brought the total depth of the defences to nearly {{convert|300|km}}.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–65}}
			The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug {{convert|4200|km}} and {{convert|5000|km}} of trenches respectively,{{sfn|''Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} laid out in criss-cross pattern for ease of movement.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=211}} The Soviets built more than 686 bridges and about {{convert|2000|km}} of roads in the salient.{{sfn|''Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} Red Army ]s laid 503,993 ]s and 439,348 ]s, with the highest concentration in the first main defensive belt.{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=211}} The minefields at Kursk achieved densities of 2,500 anti-personnel and 2,200 anti-tank mines per kilometre, six times the density used in the ].{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=19|loc=Glantz states 1,500 anti-tank mines per kilometre and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometre.}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=65|loc= Glantz states there were 2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile.}}<ref name=":2942">{{Cite book |last=Roberts |first=Andrew |author-link=Andrew Roberts, Baron Roberts of Belgravia |title=The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War |publisher=] |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-06-122860-5 |pages=415 |language=en |quote=Furthermore, 2,200 anti-tank and 2,500 anti-personnel mines had been laid across every single mile of the front, a density four times that which had defended Stalingrad and six times that of Moscow.}}</ref> For example, the ] of the Voronezh Front, was spread out over nearly {{convert|64|km}} of front and was protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines in its first defensive belt with a further 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}}{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=39}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=67}} Furthermore, mobile obstacle detachments were tasked with laying more mines directly in the path of advancing enemy armoured formations.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein| 1999|p=290}} These units, consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with mines at division level and one company of combat engineers normally equipped with 500–700 mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves at every level of command.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}}
	]
			In a letter dated 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germans would attack the salient with a strong armoured force:
	The ], commanded by ], was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front, commanded by ], defended the northern face. Waiting in reserve was the ], commanded by ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=204}}{{sfn|Glantz|2013|p=195}} In February 1943 the Central Front had been reconstructed from the ], which had been part of the northern pincer of ], responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army in the Stalingrad pocket.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=202}}<ref></ref>
			{{blockquote | We can expect the enemy to put greatest reliance in this year's offensive operations on his tank divisions and air force, since his infantry appears to be far less prepared for offensive operations than last year&nbsp;... In view of this threat, we should strengthen the anti-tank defences of the Central and Voronezh fronts, and assemble as soon as possible.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189}} }}
			Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank defence.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}} Dug-in tanks and ]s further strengthened the anti-tank defences.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=211}}{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}} Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level of command, mostly as anti-tank strong points with the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and the remainder amply spread out elsewhere.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}} Each anti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles, and five to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as by infantry with ]s.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=24}} Independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during counterattacks.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=24}}
	The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed three main defensive belts in their sectors, with each subdivided into several zones of fortification.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}} {{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–65}} The Soviets availed themselves of the labour of over 300,000 civilians.{{efn|name=Civilian labour}} Fortifying each echelon was an interconnected web of minefields, barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches, deep entrenchments for infantry, ], dug-in armoured vehicles, and machine gun bunkers.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=211}} Behind the three main defensive belts were three more belts prepared as fallback positions; the first was not fully occupied or heavily fortified, and the last two, though sufficiently fortified, were mostly not occupied.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–65}}{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|pp=41, 49}} The combined depth of the three main defensive zones was about {{convert|40|km}}. The six defensive belts on either side of Kursk were {{convert|130|-|150|km|mi}}.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|pp=41, 49}} If the Germans managed to break through these defences they would still be confronted by additional defensive belts to the east, manned by the Steppe Front. These brought the total depth of the defences to nearly {{convert|300|km}}.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=64–65}}
			]
	Red Army ]s laid 503,663 ]s and 439,348 ]s, with the highest concentration in the first main defensive belt. More than {{convert|4800|km}} of trenches were dug, laid out in criss-cross pattern for ease of movement.{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=211}} The minefields at Kursk achieved densities of 1,700 anti-personnel and 1,500 anti-tank mines per kilometre, about four times the density used in the ].{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=19|loc=Glantz states 1,500 anti-tank mines per kilometre and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometre.}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=65|loc= Glantz states there were 2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile.}}{{sfn|Healy|1992|p=31|loc=Healy states there were 2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile.}} The ] of the Voronezh Front, spread out over nearly {{convert|64|km}} of front, was protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines in its first defensive belt and another 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}}{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=39}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=67}}
			Soviet preparations also included increased activity of ], who attacked German communications and supply lines.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=74}} The attacks were mostly behind Army Group North and Army Group Centre.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=12}} In June 1943, partisans operating in the occupied area behind Army Group Centre destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222 railway wagons and 44 bridges, and in the Kursk sector there were 1,092 partisan attacks on railways.{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=58}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=208|loc= Clark states 300 locomotives instead of 298.}} These attacks delayed the build-up of German supplies and equipment, and required the diversion of German troops to suppress the partisans, delaying their training for the offensive.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=12}} Central Partisan Headquarters coordinated many of these attacks. In June ] (VVS) flew over 800 sorties at night to resupply the partisan groups operating behind Army Group Centre.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=151}} The VVS also provided communication and sometimes even daylight air-support for major partisan operations.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=74}}
	Mobile obstacle detachments were tasked with laying more mines directly in the path of advancing armoured formations.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein| 1999|p=290}} These units, consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with mines at division level and one company of combat engineers normally equipped with 500–700 mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves at every level of command.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}}
			Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry manning the defences to help them overcome the tank phobia that had been evident since the start of the German invasion.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=90}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=267}} Soldiers were packed into trenches and tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear were gone.{{efn|Nikolai Litvin, a Soviet anti-tank gunner present at the battle of Kursk, recalls his experience during the special training to overcome tank phobia. "The tanks continued to advance closer and closer. Some comrades became frightened, leaped out of the trenches, and began to run away. The commander saw who was running and quickly forced them back into the trenches, making it sternly clear that they had to stay put. The tanks reached the trench line and, with a terrible roar, clattered overhead&nbsp;... it was possible to conceal oneself in a trench from a tank, let it pass right over you, and remain alive." {{sfn|Litvin|Britton|2007|pp=12–13}} }}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=267}} This training exercise was referred to by the soldiers as "ironing".{{sfn|''Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} In combat, the soldiers would spring up in the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the spearheading armoured vehicles. The separated armoured vehicles – now vulnerable to infantry armed with ] anti-tank rifles, demolition charges and ]s – could then be disabled or destroyed at point-blank range.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=267–268}} These types of attacks were mostly effective against the Ferdinand tank destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondary armament.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=267–268}} The soldiers were also promised financial rewards for each tank destroyed, with the ] providing a bounty of 1,000 ]s for each destroyed tank.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=113}}
	In his letter of 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germans would attack the salient with a strong armoured force:
			The Soviets employed '']'' (military deception) to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and to conceal the movement of men and materiel.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=210}}{{sfn|Gerwehr|Glenn|2000|p=33}} These included camouflaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airfields and depots, generating false radio-traffic, and spreading rumours among the Soviet frontline troops and the civilian population in the German-held areas.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=241}} Movement of forces and supplies to and from the salient took place at night only. Ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with the landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and fires were forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motor transport in and around them forbidden.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=78}}{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=135}}
	{{quote | We can expect the enemy to put greatest reliance in this year's offensive operations on his tank divisions and air force, since his infantry appears to be far less prepared for offensive operations than last year&nbsp;... In view of this threat, we should strengthen the anti-tank defences of the Central and Voronezh fronts, and assemble as soon as possible.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=189}} }}
			According to a Soviet General Staff report, 29 of the 35 major Luftwaffe raids on Soviet airfields in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airfields.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=241}} According to historian ], in contrast, Soviet aviation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=472}} The Soviet deception efforts were so successful that German estimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=222}} The result was not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=78}}
	Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank defence.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}} Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns further strengthened the anti-tank defences.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=211}}{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}} Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level of command mostly as anti-tank strong points, with the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and the remainder amply spread out in elsewhere.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=20}} Each anti-tank strong point typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles, and five to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as infantry with automatic weapons.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=24}} Independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during counterattacks.{{sfn|Glantz|1986|p=24}}
			<!--- ]--->
	Soviet preparations included increased activity of ]s, who attacked on German communications and supply lines.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=74}} For June 1943 alone, in the occupied area behind Army Group Centre, 298 locomotives, 1,222 rail wagons, and 44 bridges were destroyed by partisans, while in the Kursk sector there were 1,092 partisan attacks against railways.{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=208|loc= Clark states 300 locomotives instead of 298.}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=58}} Many of these attacks were coordinated through the Central Partisan Headquarters. ] flew in supplies and provided communication and sometimes even air support for major undertakings.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=74}}
			The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the ] medium tank, on which the Red Army attempted to concentrate production. The tank arm also contained large numbers of the ] light tank. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s.{{When|date=June 2017}} In the salient itself the Soviets assembled a large number of ] tanks. These included U.S.-manufactured ] medium tanks and British-built ], ] and ] infantry tanks. However, the T-34 made up the bulk of the Soviet armour.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=172}} Without including the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front, the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend the salient.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=168}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=204|loc=provides similar but more specific figures}} This amounted to 26 percent of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortars and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent of its tanks.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=168}} One source states that in the ] the Soviets used fourteen field armies and one tank army, while at Kursk they used twenty-two full-strength field armies and five tank armies.<ref name=":0">{{Cite thesis |last=Ramos |first=Enrique |date=1995 |title=Analysis and Significance of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA299270.pdf |publisher=Defense Technical Information Center |pages=iii, 2 |access-date=20 August 2023 |archive-date=23 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823054106/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA299270.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref> According to one source, the Soviets concentrated 80% of their entire air fleet for use at the Battle of Kursk.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=400}} According to some historians, the Soviets employed 40% of their manpower and 75% of their armoured forces to the battle.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ferguson |first=Niall |author-link=Niall Ferguson |title=The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2006 |isbn=1-59420-100-5 |location=New York |pages=533 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Overy |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Overy |date=2014 |editor-last=White |editor-first=Jon |editor2-last=Hoskins |editor2-first=Alex |title=All About History: Story of World War II |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gGnUoQEACAAJ |access-date=2024-04-01 |magazine=All About History |publisher=Imagine Publishing |page=142 |isbn=978-1910-155-295}}</ref>
			=== Contest for aerial supremacy ===
	] machine gun crew in action]]
			By 1943 the Luftwaffe's strength on the ] had started to weaken after Stalingrad, and the siphoning of resources to ].{{sfn|Muller|1992|p=106}} The Luftwaffe forces in the east were further depleted with ] being shifted back to Germany ] against the escalating ].{{sfn|Beevor|2012|pp=471–472}} By the end of June, only 38.7 percent of the Luftwaffe's total aircraft remained in the east.{{sfn|Murray|1983|p=158}} In 1943 the Luftwaffe could still achieve local aerial superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of German aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were slated for Citadel.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=472}} The goal of the Luftwaffe remained unchanged. The priority was to gain ], then to ] from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point had been reached in the land battle, to render ].<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1995|pp=53–76}}</ref>
			] ] ground attack aircraft during the battle of Kursk]]
			The changing strengths between the two opponents prompted the Luftwaffe to make operational changes for the battle. Previous offensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwaffe raids against opposing airfields to achieve aerial superiority. By this point in the war Red Army equipment reserves were extensive and the Luftwaffe commanders realised that aircraft could be easily replaced, making such raids futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned. In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers flying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted during Citadel.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=186}}
	Special training was provided to the infantry manning the defences to help them overcome the tank phobia that had been evident since the ].{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=90}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=267}} Soldiers were packed into trenches and tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear were gone.{{efn|name=Fear of tanks}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=267}} In combat the soldiers would spring up in the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the spearheading ], which could then be disabled or destroyed at point-blank range.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=267}} Due to their lack of secondary armament like ]s, this tactic would be successfully used against ] tanks. Once they were isolated from their supporting infantry they became vulnerable to infantry armed with ]s, demolition charges, and ]s.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=268}}
			The Luftwaffe command understood that their support would be crucial for the success of Citadel, but problems with supply shortfalls hampered their preparations. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the Luftwaffe's ability to build up essential stockpiles of petrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlike Red Army units there were no reserves of aircraft that could be used to replace damaged aircraft over the course of the operation.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=160}} Fuel was the most significant limiting factor.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=159}} To help build up supplies for the support of Citadel, the Luftwaffe greatly curtailed its operations during the last week of June.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=104}} Despite this conservation of resources, the Luftwaffe did not have the resources to sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=103}}
	The Soviets employed ] (deception techniques) to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and to conceal the movement of men and materiel.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=210}}{{sfn|Gerwehr|Glenn|2000|p=33}} These included camouflaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airfields and depots, generating false radio traffic, and spreading rumours among the Soviet front line troops and the civilian population in the German-held areas.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein| 1999|p=241}} Movement of forces and supplies to and from the salient was carried out only at night. Ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with the landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and fires were forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motor transport in and around them were forbidden.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=78}}{{sfn| Glantz|Orenstein| 1999|p=135}}
			For Citadel, the Luftwaffe confined its operations to the direct support of the forces on the ground.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=105}} In this mission the Luftwaffe continued to make use of the ] "Stuka" dive-bombers. A new development to this aircraft was the ] cannon, one of which could be slung under each wing of the Stuka in a ]. Half of the Stuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equipped with these ''Kanonenvogel'' (literally "cannon-bird") tankbuster aircraft.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=79–81, 102, 106, 114, 118}} The air groups were also strengthened by the recent arrival of the ], with its 30&nbsp;mm ], and ] ground attack ("jabo") version of the ].{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=104}}
	According to a Soviet General Staff report, 29 of the 35 major Luftwaffe raids on Soviet airfields in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were on dummy airfields.{{sfn| Glantz|Orenstein| 1999|p=241}} So successful were Soviet efforts at deception that German estimates issued in mid-June placed total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=77}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=222}} The result was not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=78}} Without including the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front, the Soviets had massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, and 2,792 aircraft to defend the salient.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=168}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=204|loc=provides similar but more specific figures}} This amounted to 26 per cent of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26 per cent of its mortars and artillery, 35 per cent of its aircraft, and 46 per cent of its tanks.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=168}}
			In the months preceding the battle, ] supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The VVS formations encountered displayed better training, and were flying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness and skill than the Luftwaffe had seen earlier.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=155}} The introduction of the ] and ] fighters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the ] and the ], had become available as well. The VVS also fielded large numbers of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Red Army and VVS formations would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=186}}
	=== State of the Luftwaffe and Soviet Air Force ===
	{{Refimprove section|date=May 2013}}
	]]]
	In the early stages of the war, the Red Air Force, while numerically superior, suffered from a lack of training, poor operational management and obsolete aircraft. By 1943 Allied actions in Western Europe were beginning to have an impact on German military strength. Although ] hardly constituted Stalin's much demanded ], the operations in the Mediterranean and Africa did begin to take a toll on German strength. Air losses in the Luftwaffe were significant, with 40% of their air casualties in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943 occurring in the battles over ] and ].{{citation needed|date=May 2013}} German ], a tenuous proposition from the outset, was no longer a certainty over the area of operation. The Soviet Air Force outnumbered the Luftwaffe and was gaining in quality as well. Both air forces possessed effective ground-attack aircraft capable of destroying armour: the Soviet ] and the German ]G ''Stuka'' (Initially the Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added ] calibre cannon in underslung ]).{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=79–81, 102, 106, 114, 118}}
	The Red Air Force improved throughout the war, and by the Battle of Kursk neither side had anything other than local air supremacy.{{citation needed|date=October 2011}} With the coming of 1943, more modern aircraft were available to Soviet pilots, such as the ] and ] fighters. Pilot training also improved to some degree. In the battle, both German and Soviet formations suffered from many air attacks.{{citation needed|date=October 2011}}
	== Opposing forces ==		== Opposing forces ==
	{{see also|Battle of Kursk order of battle}}		{{see also|Battle of Kursk order of battle}}
	=== Wehrmacht ===		=== Germans ===
			] with a ] tank, in June 1943 before the battle]]
	{| class="wikitable collapsible collapsed" style="width: 100%; margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"
			For the operation, the Germans used four armies along with a large portion of their total tank strength on the Eastern Front. On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army Group Centre based in the northern side of the salient contained 335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south, the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf", of Army Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 combat soldiers) and 100,000–108,000 men (66,000 combat soldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, that held the western side of the salient contained an estimated 110,000. In total, the German forces had a total strength of 777,000–779,000 men, and the three attacking armies contained 438,271 combat soldiers.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=112}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}} Army Group South was equipped with more ], infantry and artillery than the 9th Army of Army Group Center.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=196}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}} The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 1,377&nbsp;tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Army possessed 988&nbsp;tanks and assault guns.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=112}}
			German industry produced 2,816 tanks and self-propelled guns between April and June, of which 156 were Tigers and 484 Panthers. At Kursk, a total of 259 Panther tanks, about 211 Tigers, and 90 Ferdinands were used.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.oocities.org/armysappersforward/kursk.htm |title=WWII Battle of Kursk: Mine/Countermine operations |work=oocities.org |access-date=20 October 2016 |archive-date=23 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823054640/http://www.oocities.org/armysappersforward/kursk.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>
			The two new Panther battalions – the 51st and 52nd – together equipped with 200 Panthers, for which the offensive had been delayed, were attached to the ] in the XLVIII Panzer Corps of Army Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalions arriving on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little time to perform reconnaissance or to orient themselves to the terrain they found themselves in. This was a breach of the methods of the ''Panzerwaffe'', considered essential for the successful use of armour.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}}{{sfn|Healy|1992|p=41}}{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=61}} Though led by experienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crews were new recruits and had little time to become familiar with their new tanks, let alone train together to function as a unit. The two battalions came direct from the training ground and lacked combat experience.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=201}}{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=143}} In addition, the requirement to maintain radio silence until the start of the attack meant that the Panther units had little training in battalion-level radio procedures.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=201}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} Furthermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing problems with their transmissions, and proved mechanically unreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost 16 Panthers due to mechanical breakdown, leaving only 184 available for the launching of the offensive.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=205}}
			July and August 1943 saw the heaviest German ammunition expenditure on the Eastern Front up to that point, with 236,915 tons consumed in July and 254,648 in August. The previous peak had been 160,645 tons in September 1942.{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=140}}
			{| class="wikitable collapsible" style=" margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"
	|-		|-
	! colspan="6" | Order of battle: Army Group Centre (Field Marshal ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=475–477|loc= The 2nd Panzer Army and 2nd Army are not included in the order of battle in the source. The 2nd Panzer Army did not take part in Operation Citadel, but played a significant part in Operation ]. The 2nd Army was tasked with pushing the western face of the salient once the encirclement was completed, but never got do so since the northern and southern pincers failed to meet at Kursk.}}		|+Order of battle: Army Group Centre (Field Marshal ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=475–477|loc= The 2nd Panzer Army and 2nd Army are not included in the order of battle in the source. The 2nd Panzer Army did not take part in Operation Citadel, but played a significant part in ]. The 2nd Army was tasked with pushing the western face of the salient once the encirclement was completed, but never got do so since the northern and southern pincers failed to meet at Kursk.}}
	|-		|-
	! ]		! ]
	! Army Commander		! Army commander
	! Note		! Note
	! ]		! style=width:130px; | ]
	! Corps Commander		! Corps commander
	! ]		! ]
	|-		|-
Line 190:		Line 211:
	|		|
	| XX Army Corps		| XX Army Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ], ], 137th, and 251st Infantry Divisions		| ], ], 137th, and 251st Infantry Divisions
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 197:		Line 218:
	|		|
	| XLVI Panzer Corps		| XLVI Panzer Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ], 31st, ], and 258th Infantry Divisions		| ], 31st, ], and 258th Infantry Divisions
	|-|		|-|
	|		|
Line 204:		Line 225:
	|		|
	| ]		| ]
	| ]		| ]
	| ] Panzer Division; 86th and ] Infantry Divisions		| ] Panzer Division; 86th and ] Infantry Divisions
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 211:		Line 232:
	|		|
	| XLVII Panzer Corps		| XLVII Panzer Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ], ], and ] Panzer Divisions; ] Infantry Division		| ], ], and ] Panzer Divisions; ] Infantry Division
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 218:		Line 239:
	|		|
	| XXIII Army Corps		| XXIII Army Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ] and 383rd Infantry Divisions; ] Assault Division		| ] and 383rd Infantry Divisions; ] Assault Division
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 226:		Line 247:
	| Army Reserve		| Army Reserve
	|		|
	| ] and ] Panzer Divisions; ] Panzergrenadier Division		| ] and ] Panzer Divisions; ] Panzergrenadier Division
	|-		|-
	| ]		| ]
Line 232:		Line 253:
	|		|
	| XXXV Army Corps		| XXXV Army Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| 34th, 56th, 262nd, and ] Infantry Divisions		| 34th, 56th, 262nd, and ] Infantry Divisions
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 239:		Line 260:
	|		|
	| LIII Army Corps		| LIII Army Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ], 211th, and 293rd Infantry Divisions; 25th Panzergrenadier Division		| ], 211th, and 293rd Infantry Divisions; 25th Panzergrenadier Division
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 246:		Line 267:
	|		|
	| LV Army Corps		| LV Army Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ], 112th, 134th, 296th, and 339th Infantry Divisions		| ], 112th, 134th, 296th, and 339th Infantry Divisions
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 261:		Line 282:
	|		|
	|		|
	| ] (joined 2nd Panzer Army on 12 July 1943)		| ] (joined 2nd Panzer Army on 12 July 1943)
	|-		|-
	| ]		| ]
Line 271:		Line 292:
	|}		|}
	{| class="wikitable collapsible collapsed" style="width: 100%; margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"		{| class="wikitable collapsible" style=" margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"
	|-		|-
	! colspan="6" | Order of battle: Army Group South (Field Marshal ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=475–477}}		|+ Order of battle: Army Group South (Field Marshal ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=475–477}}
	|-		|-
	! ]		! Army
	! Army Commander		! Army commander
	! Note		! Note
	! ]		! style=width:130px; | Corps
	! Corps Commander		! Corps commander
	! ]		! Divisions
	|-		|-
	| ]		| ]
Line 287:		Line 307:
	|		|
	| LII Army Corps		| LII Army Corps
	| General ]		| General ]
	| 57th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions		| 57th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions
	|-		|-
Line 294:		Line 314:
	|		|
	| XLVIII Panzer Corps		| XLVIII Panzer Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ] and ] Panzer Divisions; 167th Infantry Division: ]		| ] and ] Panzer Divisions; 167th Infantry Division; ]
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 301:		Line 321:
	|		|
	| ]		| ]
	| General ]		| ''General der Waffen-SS'' ]
	| ], ], and the ] SS Panzergrenadier Divisions		| ], ], and the ] SS Panzergrenadier Divisions
	|-		|-
Line 308:		Line 328:
	|		|
	| III Panzer Corps		| III Panzer Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| 6th, 7th, and 19th Panzer Divisions; 168th Infantry Division		| 6th, 7th, and 19th Panzer Divisions; 168th Infantry Division
	|-		|-
Line 315:		Line 335:
	|		|
	| Corps "Raus"		| Corps "Raus"
	| ]		| ]
	| 106th and 320th Infantry Divisions		| 106th and 320th Infantry Divisions
	|-		|-
Line 322:		Line 342:
	|		|
	| XLII Army Corps		| XLII Army Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| 39th, 161st, and 282nd Infantry Divisions		| 39th, 161st, and 282nd Infantry Divisions
	|-		|-
Line 329:		Line 349:
	|		|
	| XXIV Panzer Corps		| XXIV Panzer Corps
	| ]		| ]
	| ] and the ] (''Wiking'') Panzer Division		| ] and the ] Panzer Division
	|-		|-
	| ]		| ]
	|		|
	|		|
	|]		|]
	|		|
	|		|
Line 341:		Line 361:
	=== Red Army ===		=== Red Army ===
			The Red Army used two ] for the defence of Kursk, and created a third front behind the battle area which was held as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts fielded 12 armies, with 711,575 men (510,983 combat soldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) respectively. In reserve, the Steppe Front had an additional 573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the Soviet force was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combat soldiers.
	{| class="wikitable collapsible collapsed" style="width: 100%; margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"
			Soviet armour strength included 4,869 tanks and 259 SPGs.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.angelfire.com/wi2/foto/ww2/proh/page4.html |title=Strengths and Losses |access-date=12 August 2017 |archive-date=23 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823054600/https://www.angelfire.com/wi2/foto/ww2/proh/page4.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Overall a third of the Soviet tanks at Kursk were ], but in some units this proportion was considerably higher. Of the 3,600 tanks in the Central and Voronezh Fronts in July 1943, 1,061 were light as ] and T-70 tanks. With very thin armour and small guns, they were unable to effectively engage the frontal armour of German medium and heavy tanks or AFVs.<ref>{{cite book |author=Walter S. Dunn Jr. |title=Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=o-y3DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA88 |year=2008 |publisher=Stackpole Books |isbn=978-1-4617-5122-9 |page=88 |access-date=6 August 2019 |archive-date=23 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823054639/https://books.google.com/books?id=o-y3DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA88 |url-status=live }}</ref>
			The most capable Soviet tank at Kursk was the T-34. However, the original version was armed only with a 76.2mm gun, which struggled against uparmoured Panzer IVs, and the frontal armour of Tigers and Panthers was essentially impenetrable. Only the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns had the power to destroy the Tiger at short range, but they were not equal to the Tiger's 88mm gun at long range, and there were very few SU-122s and SU-152s at Kursk.
			{| class="wikitable collapsible " style="margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"
	|-		|-
	! colspan="6" | Order of battle: Central Front (Army General ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=478–484}}		|+Order of battle: Central Front (Army General ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=478–484}}
	|-		|-
	! ]		! ]
	! Army Commander		! Army Commander
	! Note		! Note
	! ]		! style=width:160px; | ]
	! ]		! ]
	|-		|-
	| ]		| ]
	| ]		| ]
	|		|
	| 17th Guards Rifle Corps		| 17th Guards Rifle Corps
Line 376:		Line 402:
	|-		|-
	| 48th Army		| 48th Army
	| Prokofiy Romanenko		| ]
	|		|
	| 42nd Rifle Corps		| 42nd Rifle Corps
Line 413:		Line 439:
	|-		|-
	| 70th Army		| 70th Army
	| Ivan Galanin		| ]
	|		|
	| 28th Rifle Corps		| 28th Rifle Corps
Line 419:		Line 445:
	|-		|-
	| 2nd Tank Army		| 2nd Tank Army
	| Alexei Rodin		| ]
	|		|
	| 3rd Tank Corps		| 3rd Tank Corps
Line 427:		Line 453:
	|		|
	|		|
	| 16th Tank Corps		| ]
	|		|
	|-		|-
Line 433:		Line 459:
	|		|
	|		|
	| 9th Tank Corps		| ]
	|		|
	|-		|-
Line 442:		Line 468:
	|		|
	|-		|-
	|]		|]
	|General ]		|General ]
	|		|
Line 461:		Line 487:
	|}		|}
	{| class="wikitable collapsible collapsed" style="width: 100%; margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"		{| class="wikitable collapsible" style="margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"
	|-		|-
	! colspan="6" | Order of battle: Voronezh Front (Army General ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=478–484}}		|+Order of battle: Voronezh Front (Army General ]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=478–484}}
	|-		|-
	! ]		! ]
	! Army Commander		! Army Commander
	! Note		! Note
	! ]		! style=width:160px; | ]
	! ]		! ]
	|-		|-
	| 6th Guards Army		| ]
	| Ivan Chistyakov		| ]
	|		|
	| 22nd Guards Rifle Corps		| 22nd Guards Rifle Corps
	| 67st, 71st, and 90th Guards Rifle Divisions		| ], 71st Rifle Division and the ]
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 490:		Line 516:
	|-		|-
	| ]		| ]
	| Mikhail Shumilov		| ]
	|		|
	| 24th Guards Rifle Corps		| 24th Guards Rifle Corps
Line 505:		Line 531:
	|		|
	| Independent Divisions		| Independent Divisions
	| 213th Rifle Division		| ]
	|-		|-
	| ]		| ]
Line 544:		Line 570:
	|-		|-
	| 69th Army		| 69th Army
	| Vasily Kryuchenkin		| ]
	|		|
	| 48th Rifle Corps		| 48th Rifle Corps
Line 558:		Line 584:
	| ]		| ]
	|		|
	| 6th Tank Corps		| ]
	|		|
	|-		|-
Line 576:		Line 602:
	|		|
	|		|
	| 35th Guards Rifle Corps		| ]
	| 92nd, 93rd, and 94th Guards Rifle Divisions		| 92nd, 93rd, and 94th Guards Rifle Divisions
	|-		|-
Line 583:		Line 609:
	|		|
	| 2nd Guards Tank Corps		| 2nd Guards Tank Corps
	|		|
	|-		|-
	|		|
Line 622:		Line 648:
	|}		|}
	{| class="wikitable collapsible collapsed" style="width: 100%; margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"		{| class="wikitable collapsible" style="margin-left: 0; margin-right: 0;"
	|-		|-
	! colspan="6" | Order of battle: Steppe Front (]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=478–484}}{{efn|name=Steppe Front}}		|+Order of battle: Steppe Front (]){{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=478–484}}{{efn| name = Steppe Front | This order of battle does not show the complete composition of the Steppe Front. In addition to the units listed below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd Armies.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=204}} Perhaps the order of battle below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel.}}
	|-		|-
	! ]		! ]
	! Army Commander		! Army Commander
	! Note		! Note
	! ]		! style=width:200px; | ]
	! ]		! ]
	|-		|-
	| 5th Guards Army		| 5th Guards Army
	| Alexei Zhadov		| ]
	|		|
	| 32nd Guards Rifle Corps		| 32nd Guards Rifle Corps
Line 648:		Line 674:
	|		|
	| Independent Divisions		| Independent Divisions
	| 42nd Guards Rifle Division and 10th Tank Corps		| 42nd Guards Rifle Division and ]
	|-		|-
	|-		|-
Line 655:		Line 681:
	|		|
	| Independent 10th Tank Corps		| Independent 10th Tank Corps
	|		|
	|-		|-
	| 5th Guards Tank Army		| 5th Guards Tank Army
Line 696:		Line 722:
	=== Comparison of strength ===		=== Comparison of strength ===
	==== German offensive phase ====
	{| class="wikitable"		{| class="wikitable"
			|+Operation Citadel
	|+ Strengths, as tallied by David M. Glantz and Karl-Heinz Frieser
	|-		|-
	! rowspan="2" | German offensive phase (Citadel)		! rowspan="2" |
	! colspan="3" | Men		! colspan="3" | Men
Line 716:		Line 741:
	! German		! German
	|-		|-
	! Frieser{{refn|group=nc|Frieser uses combat strengths.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=100}}}}		! Frieser{{efn|name=CombatStrength |Frieser uses combat strengths.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=100}} }}
	| style="text-align: right;" | 1,426,352		| style="text-align: right;" | 1,426,352
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2.8:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 2.8:1
	| style="text-align: right;" | 518,271		| style="text-align: right;" | 518,271
	| style="text-align: right;" | 4,938{{refn|group=nc|Frieser counts only operational tanks.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=91}}}}		| style="text-align: right;" | 4,938{{efn|name=FrieserTanks| Frieser counts only operational tanks.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=91}}}}
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 2:1
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2,465		| style="text-align: right;" | 2,465
Line 727:		Line 752:
	| style="text-align: right;" | 7,417		| style="text-align: right;" | 7,417
	|-		|-
	! Glantz{{refn|group=nc|Glantz uses total strengths.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}}}		! Glantz{{efn|Glantz uses total strengths.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=337}}}}
	| style="text-align: right;" | 1,910,361		| style="text-align: right;" | 1,910,361
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2.5:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 2.5:1
Line 737:		Line 762:
	| style="text-align: right;" |		| style="text-align: right;" |
	| style="text-align: right;" |		| style="text-align: right;" |
	|-
	| colspan="11" | {{refbegin}}{{reflist|group=nc}}{{refend}}
	|}		|}
	For their attack, the Wehrmacht used three armies and a large proportion of their tanks on the eastern front. The 9th Army in the north had 335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers), and in the south the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 223,907 men (149,271) and 100,000 men (66,000) respectively, a grand total of 778,907 men (518,271) for all three armies.
	The Red Army used two Fronts (the equivalent of ]s) for the defence, and one Front as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts fielded 12 armies. The Central Front had 711,575 men (510,983 combat soldiers), the Voronezh Front had 625,591 men (446,236) and the Steppe Front had 573,195 men (449,133) for a grand total of 1,910,361 (1,426,352).
	==== Soviet offensive phase ====
	{| class="wikitable"		{| class="wikitable"
			|+Red Army offensive phase
	|+ Strengths, as tallied by David M. Glantz and Karl-Heinz Frieser
	|-		|-
	! rowspan="2" | Soviet offensive phase		! rowspan="2" |
	! colspan="3" | Men		! colspan="3" | Men
	! colspan="3" | Tanks		! colspan="3" | Tanks
Line 764:		Line 782:
	! German		! German
	|-		|-
			! Frieser{{efn|name=CombatStrength }}
	! Frieser{{refn|group=nd|Frieser uses combat strengths.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=100}}}}
	| style="text-align: right;" | 1,987,463		| style="text-align: right;" | 1,987,463
	| style="text-align: right;" | 3.2:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 3.2:1
Line 770:		Line 788:
	| style="text-align: right;" | 8,200		| style="text-align: right;" | 8,200
	| style="text-align: right;" | 3:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 3:1
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2,699{{refn|group=nd|Frieser counts only operational tanks.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=91}}}}		| style="text-align: right;" | 2,699{{efn|name=FrieserTanks }}
	| style="text-align: right;" | 47,416		| style="text-align: right;" | 47,416
	| style="text-align: right;" | 5:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 5:1
	| style="text-align: right;" | 9,467		| style="text-align: right;" | 9,467
	|-		|-
	! Glantz{{refn|group=nd|Glantz uses total strengths.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=346}}}}		! Glantz{{efn|Glantz uses total strengths.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=346}}}}
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2,500,000		| style="text-align: right;" | 2,500,000
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2.7:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 2.7:1
	| style="text-align: right;" | 940,900		| style="text-align: right;" | 940,900
	| style="text-align: right;" | 7,360{{refn|group=nd|Glantz does not count reinforcements.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=345}}}}		| style="text-align: right;" | 7,360{{efn|Glantz does not count reinforcements.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=345}}}}
	| style="text-align: right;" | 2.3:1		| style="text-align: right;" | 2.3:1
	| style="text-align: right;" | 3,253		| style="text-align: right;" | 3,253
Line 785:		Line 803:
	| style="text-align: right;" |		| style="text-align: right;" |
	| style="text-align: right;" |		| style="text-align: right;" |
	|-
	| colspan="11" | {{refbegin}}{{reflist|group=nd}}{{refend}}
	|}		|}
	When the Red Army launched their ], the German 2nd Panzer Army was attacked by two Soviet Fronts: ] and ]. The 107,000 men of the 2nd Panzer Army and some reinforcements in the south brought the Wehrmacht troops to approximately 950,000 men (approximately 650,000 combat soldiers). The two Soviet Fronts brought the Red Army to 2,629,458 men (1,987,463 combat soldiers).
	== Overview of sub-operations ==
	]
	For the Wehrmacht, the Battle of Kursk was the strategic offensive '''Operation Citadel''' ({{lang-de|Unternehmen Zitadelle}}).
	For the Soviets, the Battle of Kursk was a part of the series of operations conducted during the ] (1 July – 31 December) and it is subdivided as:{{sfn|Glantz|1990|pp=82–113|ps=. {{Verify source|date=September 2008}} Reason for verification: the massive page range of 30 pages suggests a summary and perhaps speculative interpretation of the cited source}}
	* ] (includes the German ''Operation Citadel'') (5–23 July 1943)
	: ] (5–11 July)
	: ] (5–23 July)
	:: ] (12 July 1943)
	: ]
	* ] (''Operation Kutuzov'') (12 July – 18 August 1943)
	: ] (12 July – 18 August)
	: ] (15 July – 18 August)
	: ]
	* ] (''Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev'') (3–23 August 1943)
	: ] (3–23 August)
	: ] (3–23 August)
	: ] (12–23 August)
	: ]
	The exact definition of the "Kursk" battle varies. The Germans saw it only as Operation Citadel (4 to 16 July), while the Soviets combined Citadel with the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives, Operation ] and Operation ], as a single strategic event extending from 4 July to 23 August.
	== Prelude ==
	]
	After two months of delay the Germans were ready to launch their attack. By this time they had added 90 Ferdinand Panzerjägers (tank destroyers), as well as 270 Tigers, late-model Panzer Mark IVs and even some captured ]s.{{sfn|Töppel|2001|pp=33–34}} The Luftwaffe had also brought in new aircraft, including 79 ]s and a large number of ]s.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=124–125}} In total they brought together some 777,000 men, 3,000 tanks and assault guns and 2,110 aircraft.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=123–125}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}}
	The start date for the offensive had been moved back repeatedly. On 1 July Hitler announced 5&nbsp;July as the start date. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from the ], the British ] at ] (both through official channels and from the Soviet spy ]),<ref name="copeland.colossus">{{cite book |last=Copeland |first=Jack |editor-first=B. Jack |editor-last=Copeland |title=Colossus The Secrets of Bletchley Park's Codebreaking Computers |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2010 |pages=1–6 |chapter=Introduction | isbn=978-0-19-957814-6 }}</ref> and the Lucy spy ring whose sources allegedly included officers in the ] and other parts of the Nazi administration. Moscow was alerted just hours after Hitler's announcement, and the following day on 2 July, ] ] warned the Front commanders, ], ] and ], that the anticipated German offensive would begin no later than 6&nbsp;July.{{sfn|Mulligan|1987|pp=236, 254}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=223}}
	=== Preliminary actions ===		=== Preliminary actions ===
	]		] and ] halftrack. June 1943]]
	Preliminary fighting started in the southern face of the salient on the evening of 4 July 1943, when the German forces launched a ] in preparation for the main assault scheduled for 5 July.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=81}} The ] of the 4th Panzer Army stormed Soviet command and observation posts positioned on the high ground of the first main belt of defence manned by men from the 6th Guards Army. By 16:00 on 4 July, elements of the Panzergrenadier Division "Großdeutschland", 11th and ] Panzer Divisions had seized the village of Butovo. They then stormed Gertsovka, which was secured before the first hour of 5 July.{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=224}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=81}} The preliminary attacks and troop movements confirmed to the Soviet command that the main offensive was imminent. Having received these reports, at around 22:30 on 4 July Vatutin ordered 600 guns, ], and ]s of the Voronezh Front to bombard the forward German positions, particularly those of the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=226}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}}{{sfn|Clark|1966|p=329}}
			Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on the evening of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launched attacks to seize high ground for artillery observation posts prior to the main assault.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=81}} During these attacks, a number of Red Army command and observation posts along the first main belt of defence were captured. By 16:00, elements of the Panzergrenadier Division "Großdeutschland", ] and 11th Panzer Divisions had seized the village of Butovo and proceeded to capture Gertsovka before midnight.{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=224}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=81}} At around 22:30, Vatutin ordered 600 guns, mortars and ]s, of the Voronezh Front, to bombard the forward German positions, particularly those of the II SS Panzer Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=226}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}}
	]
	In ] headquarters, reports of the anticipated attack continued to come in. At around 02:00, Zhukov authorized the planned preemptive artillery bombardment to begin. The effect of the Soviet bombardment was limited. The bombardment delayed the German formations from 40 minutes to as much as three hours, but failed in its goal of disrupting the German schedule as intended. As the Soviet artillery fell silent, the Germans launched their own artillery bombardment. This lasted 80 minutes in the northern sector and some 50 minutes in the south. After the barrage the ground forces advanced, supported by ] from the Luftwaffe.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=227, 233}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=84–86}}
			To the north, at Central Front headquarters, reports of the anticipated German offensive came in. At around 02:00 5 July, Zhukov ordered his preemptive artillery bombardment to begin. The hope was to disrupt German forces concentrating for the attack, but the outcome was less than hoped for. The bombardment delayed the German formations but failed in the goal of disrupting their schedule or inflicting substantial losses. The Germans began their own artillery bombardment at about 05:00, which lasted 80 minutes in the northern face and 50 minutes in the southern face. After the barrage, the ground forces attacked, aided by close air support provided by the Luftwaffe.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=227, 233}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=84–86}}{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=77}}
	During the early morning German artillery bombardment, the ] launched a large raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground. This failed, and the Soviets suffered considerable losses.{{efn|name=Air operation}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=236}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}} That day, the Red Air Force lost 176 aircraft, whereas the Luftwaffe lost 26.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=236}} The ] – the air unit attached to the Central Front – suffered lighter losses in the preemptive attack than the ] attached to the Voronehz Front; and therefore, unlike in the southern face of the salient where the Luftwaffe had gained and maintained air superiority on 5 July, the control of the skies over the northern face was even.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=236, 263}} In the days immediately following the first day of the offensive, the Red Air Force began to assert its dominance as the Luffwaffe's chronic shortage of fuel, lubricants and spare parts began to hamper serviceability.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=281}} Also the strong Soviet resistance met by the ground forces obliged close air support to take precedence over the ongoing battle for air superiority, giving the much more preponderant Red Air Force the opportunity to seize control of the air space.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=281}} The grim consequences of the overwhelming preponderance of the Red Air Force over the Luftwaffe had been further aggravated by the fact that by mid-1943, the Luftwaffe could no longer boast the significant technical superiority it once held over its adversary.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=201}}
			In the early morning of 5 July, the VVS launched a large raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground. This effort failed, and the VVS units suffered considerable losses.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=236}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=59}} The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The German ] stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=26–27}} The VVS lost 176 aircraft on 5 July, compared to the 26 aircraft lost by the Luftwaffe.{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|pp=77–78}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=236}} The losses of the VVS ] operating in the northern face were lighter than those suffered by the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=263}} The Luftwaffe was able to gain and maintain air superiority over the southern face until 10–11 July, when the VVS began to obtain ascendancy {{sfn|Clark|2012|p=236}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=137}} but the control of the skies over the northern face was ] until the VVS began to gain air superiority on 7 July, which it maintained for the rest of the operation.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=263, 314}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=118}}
	== Operation at the northern face ==
			== Operation along the northern face ==
	=== German offensive ===
	] tanks spearhead the assault in the northern sector]]		]s with their motorcycles prepare to move out.]]
			Model's main attack was delivered by XLVII Panzer Corps, supported by 45 Tigers of the attached ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} Covering their left flank was XLI Panzer Corps, with an attached regiment of 83 ''Ferdinand'' tank destroyers. On the right flank, XLVI Panzer Corps consisted at this time of four infantry divisions with just nine tanks and 31 assault guns.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} To the left of XLI Panzer Corps was XXIII Army Corps, which consisted of the reinforced ] and two regular infantry divisions. While the corps contained no tanks, it did have 62 assault guns.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} Opposing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed in three heavily fortified defensive belts.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}}
			===Initial German advance===
	Model's main attack was delivered by XLVII Panzer Corps, to which was also attached 45 Tigers of the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} Covering the left flank of the main attacking corps was XLI Panzer Corps, to which was attached a regiment of 83 operational '']'' ]s, and covering the right flank was XLVI Panzer Corps, which was only a panzer corps in name – consisting of four infantry divisions and just nine tanks and 31 ]s.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} To the left of XLI Panzer Corps was XXIII Army Corps which consisted of a reinforced assault infantry division – the ] – with two regular infantry divisions. The corps had no tanks, but it did have 62 assault guns.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} Therefore from west to east, the 9th Army's attacking force was positioned as follows: XLVI Panzer Corps, XLVII Panzer Corps, XLI Panzer Corps and XXIII Army Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} Opposing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed in three main heavily fortified defensive belts.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}}
			Model chose to make his initial attacks using infantry divisions reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks, and supported by artillery and the Luftwaffe. In doing so he sought to maintain the armoured strength of his panzer divisions to be used for exploitation once the Red Army defences were breached. Once a breakthrough had been achieved the panzer forces would move through and advance towards Kursk.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} Jan Möschen, a major in Model's staff, later commented that Model expected a breakthrough on the second day. If a breakthrough did occur the briefest delay in bringing up the panzer divisions would give the Red Army time to react. His corps commanders thought that a breakthrough was extremely unlikely.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}}
			Following a preliminary bombardment and Red Army counter bombardments, the 9th Army opened its attack at 05:30 on 5 July. {{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=86}} Nine infantry divisions and one panzer division, with attached assault guns, heavy tanks and tank destroyers, pushed forward.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}} Two companies of Tiger tanks were attached to the 6th Infantry Division and were the largest single grouping of Tigers employed that day.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=264}} Opposing them were the 13th and 70th Armies of the Central Front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}}
	Model had decided not to employ his armoured force at the start of the offensive in order to prevent it from being worn out while breaking the Soviet defences and being unable to exploit any breakthrough. Therefore his initial attack force, tasked with breaking the first line of defence, consisted of mostly infantry and artillery with Luftwaffe support. His plan was that once a breakthrough was achieved, the panzer divisions would then be released for a drive straight to Kursk.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=195}} Jan Möschen, a major in Model's staff, later commented that Model expected a breakthrough on the second day and that the corps commanders thought it would be extremely unlikely given Model's tactics of infantry first and then armour, and even if it did occur, the briefest delay in waiting for the panzer divisions to be brought up to exploit the breakthrough would only give the Soviets more time to react and plug the gap.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}}
			] Anna Sokolova, sanitary instructor of an anti-tank battery of the 15th Rifle Division, bandages a wounded soldier as an 82 mm mortar fires in the background]]
			The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps spearheaded the advance. Behind them the remaining two panzer divisions followed, ready to exploit any breakthrough.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=264}} The heavily mined terrain and fortified positions of the ] slowed the advance. By 08:00 safe lanes had been cleared through the minefield.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=264}} That morning information obtained from prisoner interrogation identified a weakness at the boundary of the 15th and ]s caused by the German preliminary bombardment.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=265}} The Tigers were redeployed and struck towards this area. Red Army formations countered with a force of around 90 T-34s. In the resulting three-hour battle, Red Army armoured units lost 42 tanks while the Germans lost two Tigers and a further five more immobilized with track damage.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=265}} While the Red Army counter-attack was defeated and the first defensive belt breached, the fighting had delayed the Germans long enough for the rest of 29th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army – initially deployed behind the first belt – to move forward and seal the breach.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=266}} Red Army minefields were covered by artillery fire, making efforts to clear paths through the fields difficult and costly. ] and ] remote-controlled engineer mine-clearing vehicles met with limited success. Of the ]'s 45 Ferdinands sent into battle, all but 12 of them were immobilized by mine damage before 17:00. Most of these were later repaired and returned to service, but the recovery of these very large vehicles was difficult.{{sfn|Münch|1997|pp=50–52}}
			On the first day, the XLVII Panzer Corps penetrated {{cvt|6|mi}} into the Red Army defences before stalling,{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=120, 266}} and the XLI Panzer Corps reached the heavily fortified small town of Ponyri, in the second defensive belt, which controlled the roads and railways leading south to Kursk.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=309}} The German advance {{cvt|5|to|6|mi}} into the Red Army lines cost 1,287&nbsp;men killed and missing and a further 5,921&nbsp;wounded.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=108}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=120, 266}}
	As the German preliminary bombardment on the early morning of 5 July ended, by 05:00 the 9th Army was attacking the northern face of the salient with one panzer division – the 20th, (of XLVII Panzer Corps) – and nine infantry divisions equipped with assault guns, a regiment of ''Ferdinand''s and two companies of Tigers from the 505 Heavy Tank Battalion.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}} Both companies of Tigers were attached to the 6th Infantry Division (of XLVII Panzer Corps), and were the largest single group of Tigers employed on that day.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=264}} Dug-in in the path of the attack were the 70th and 13th Armies of the Central Front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}}
			===Red Army counter-attack===
	]
			] during a lull in the fighting, 7 July 1943]]
	The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions, operating in tight cooperation, spearheaded the advance of the XLVII Panzer Corps, with the remaining two panzer divisions following behind at a safe distance and poised to exploit any breakthrough.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=264}} The heavily mined terrain overlooking the carefully positioned artillery and tanks, and the fortified positions of the troops of the 15th Rifle Division (of the 29th Rifle Corps), immediately slowed the attack down. It was not until 08:00 that safe lanes were cleared through the minefield.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=264}} That morning information from the intelligence staff of the attacking divisions, obtained via prisoner interrogation, had identified a weakness at the boundary of the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions caused by the German preliminary bombardment.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=265}} The Tigers quickly struck towards the area. The armoured attack provoked a Soviet counterattack delivered by about 90 T-34s. In the resulting three-hour battle, the Soviets lost 42 tanks for two destroyed Tigers and five more immobilized due to damaged tracks.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=265}} Although the counter-attack was defeated, resulting in the breach of the Soviet first defensive belt, it succeeded in stalling the German advance for the duration of the battle and buying time for the rest of 29th Rifle Corps lodged beyond the first belt to adequately prepare itself.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=266}} By the time the attacking forces of the XLVII Panzer Corps had reorganized and attacked the positions beyond the first defensive belt, Soviet resistance had stiffened and become unbreakable. The attack faltered after a bloody confrontation and at {{convert|6|to|8|mi}} into the Soviet defences, XLVII Panzer Corps was held for the rest of the day.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=120, 266}}
			Rokossovsky ordered the 17th Guards and 18th Guards Rifle Corps with the 2nd Tank Army and 19th Tank Corps, backed up by close air support, to counterattack the German 9th Army the following day on 6 July. However, due to poor coordination, only the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army commenced the counterattack on the dawn of 6 July after the preparatory artillery barrage. The 16th Tank Corps, fielding about 200 tanks, attacked the XLVII Panzer Corps and ran into the Tiger tanks of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, which knocked out 69 tanks and forced the rest to withdraw to the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=93, 117}} Later that morning, the XLVII Panzer Corps responded with its own attack against the 17th Guards Rifle Corps entrenched around the village Olkhovatka in the second defensive belt. The attack commenced with an artillery barrage and was spearheaded by the 24 serviceable Tigers of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion,{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=120, 306}} but it failed to break the Red Army defence at Olkhovatka, and the Germans suffered heavy casualties.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=93}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=308}} Olkhovatka was on high ground that provided a clear view of much of the frontline.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=117}} At 18:30, the 19th Tank Corps joined the 17th Guards Rifle Corps further bolstering resistance.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=93}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=308}} Rokossovsky also decided to dig in most of his remaining tanks to minimize their exposure.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=478}} Ponyri, defended by the ] of the 29th Rifle Corps, was also concertedly attacked on 6 July by the German 292nd and 86th Infantry, 78th Assault Infantry and 9th Panzer Divisions, but the Germans were unable to dislodge the defenders from the heavily fortified village.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=309–311}}
			===Ponyri and Olkhovatka===
	The 9th Army attacked on a {{convert|45|km|adj=on|sp=uk}} wide front. The Germans soon found themselves delayed in the extensive minefields the Russians had laid in preparation for the attack. Engineer units were brought up to clear paths through the fields, but were hampered by Russian fire. A few ] and ] remote-controlled engineer vehicles were used to clear lanes through the minefields, with limited success. These vehicles lacked marking systems to show the following tanks where the cleared lanes lay. Red Army units covering the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delayed the German engineer teams clearing the mines manually, and losses amongst the engineers were high. The end of the day found the 9th Army far short of its objectives for 5 July.{{citation needed|date=May 2013}}
			]
	]
			Over the next three days from 7 to 10 July, Model concentrated the effort of the 9th Army at Ponyri and Olkhovatka, which both sides considered as vital positions.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=115}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=313}} In response, Rokossovsky pulled forces from other parts of the front to these sectors.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=121}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=91}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=312}} The Germans attacked Ponyri on 7 July, and captured half of the town after intense ]. A Soviet counterattack the following morning forced the Germans to withdraw, and a series of counterattacks ensued by both sides with control of the town being exchanged several times over the next few days. By 10 July, the Germans had secured most of the town, but Soviet counterattacks continued.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=115, 120–121}} The back and forth battles for Ponyri and the nearby Hill&nbsp;253.5 were battles of attrition, with heavy casualties on both sides. The intensity led it to being referred to by the troops as "mini-Stalingrad"{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=309}} and by military historian Paul Carell as the "Stalingrad of the Kursk salient".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cross |first=Robin |url=https://archive.org/details/battleofkurskope0000cros/page/n5/mode/1up |title=The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=9780141391090 |pages=187}}</ref> The ] of the 9th Army described the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attrition battle".{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=110}} German attacks on Olkhovatka and the nearby village of Teploe failed to penetrate the Soviet defences; including a powerful concerted attack on 10 July by about 300 German tanks and assault guns from the 2nd, 4th, and 20th Panzer Divisions, supported by every available Luftwaffe air power in the northern face.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=118, 121}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=94}}
	The ] began the attack with 45 ''Ferdinand''s. All but 12 of them were immobilized in unmarked German and Soviet minefields before 17:00 on 5 July. Most of these were later repaired and returned to service.{{sfn|Münch|1997|pp=50–52}} During the first day of the offensive, German units penetrated {{convert|8|km|sp=uk}} into the Soviet lines, for the loss of 1,287&nbsp;killed and missing and 5,921&nbsp;wounded.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=108}}
			]
			On 9 July a meeting between Kluge, Model, Joachim Lemelsen and Josef Harpe was held at the headquarters of the XLVII Panzer Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=309}} It had become clear to the German commanders that the 9th Army lacked the strength to obtain a breakthrough, and their Soviet counterparts had also realized this, but Kluge wished to maintain the pressure on the Soviets in order to aid the southern offensive.{{sfn|Healy|2010|pp=286–287}}
			While the operation on the northern side of the salient began with a {{convert|45|km|mi|abbr=on|adj=mid|-wide}} attack front, by 6 July it had been reduced to {{convert|40|km|mi|abbr=on|adj=mid|-wide}}. The following day the attack frontage dropped to {{convert|15|km|mi|abbr=on|adj=mid|-wide}}, and on both the 8 and 9 July penetrations of only {{convert|2|km|mi|abbr=on|adj=mid|-wide}} occurred. By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the German advance.{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=204}}
	Although excellent against any Soviet tank, the ''Ferdinand'' had some problems. Guderian noted in his diary:
			On 12 July the Soviets launched ], their counter-offensive upon the Orel salient, which threatened the flank and rear of Model's 9th Army. The 12th Panzer Division, thus far held in reserve and slated to be committed to the northern side of the Kursk salient,{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=287}} along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, 18th Panzer and 20th Panzer Divisions were redeployed to face the Soviet spearheads.{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|pp=95–96}}
	{{quote|Incapable of close-range fighting since they lacked sufficient ammunition (armour-piercing and high-explosive) for their guns and this defect was aggravated by the fact that they had no machine-guns. Once they had broken through into the enemy's infantry zone, they literally had to go quail-shooting with cannon. They did not manage to neutralise, let alone destroy, the enemy's rifle and machine guns, so that our own infantry was unable to follow up behind them. By the time they reached the Soviet artillery they were on their own.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=268}}{{sfn|Clark|1966|p=333}} }}
			== Operation along the southern face ==
	On the second day, the Central Front under Rokossovsky started a counterattack against the German 9th Army, directed against the XLVI Tank Corps. The Red Army attacked with the 2nd Tank Army and the XIX Tank Corps.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=108}} Soviet tanks there sustained heavy losses in their first combat with the Tiger tanks of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. The 107th and 164th Tank Brigade lost 69 tanks and the Soviet counterattack was stopped.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=93}} After the encounter with the German Tigers, Rokossovsky decided to dig in most of his remaining tanks to minimize their exposure.<ref>Rokossovsky, p. 266.</ref>
			At around 04:00 on 5 July, the German attack commenced with a preliminary bombardment. Manstein's main attack was delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, which was organized into densely concentrated spearheads,{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=112}} and which included some of the finest divisions in the German Army, with the forces under Hoth's command regarded as "the most powerful striking force ever assembled under a single German commander".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cross |first=Robin |url=https://archive.org/details/battleofkurskope0000cros/page/n5/mode/1up |title=The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=9780141391090 |pages=150}}</ref> In fifty minutes, Hoth's bombardment expended more shells than the combined total fired by German forces during the ] and ].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cross |first=Robin |url=https://archive.org/details/battleofkurskope0000cros/page/n5/mode/1up |title=The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=9780141391090 |pages=171}}</ref> The 4th Panzer Army was opposed by the Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and 23rd Guards Rifle Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} The Soviets had constructed three fortified defensive belts to slow and weaken the attacking armoured forces.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}} Though they had been provided superb intelligence, the Voronezh Front headquarters had still not been able to pinpoint the location where the Germans would place their offensive weight.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}}
			===Initial German advance===
	The next two days of the attack saw heavy fighting around the strong point of Ponyri (on the Orel–Kursk railway), which was one of the most heavily fortified positions in the northern sector. Both sides saw this area as a vital point. The Soviets had placed 70&nbsp;anti-tank guns per kilometre in this region.<ref>Piekalkiewice, ''Unternehmen Zitadelle'', p. 154.</ref> The German 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions attacked Ponyri and captured the town after intense house-to-house fighting on 7 July. A Soviet counterattack forced a German withdrawal and a series of counterattacks ensued by both sides, with control of the town being exchanged many times. By the evening of 8 July the German units had secured most of the town. The ''Ferdinand''s were called into action to take Hill&nbsp;253.5 and succeeded on 9 July. This attack developed into a battle of attrition, with heavy casualties on both sides. The historian John Keegan called Ponyri "the new ]", a reference to Fort Douamount – a central part of the ] in World War I.{{sfn|Keegan|2006|p=72}} The German frontline units were exhausted, while the Soviets brought up their reserves.{{citation needed|date=May 2013}}
			==== XLVIII Panzer Corps ====
			] self-propelled artillery battery in position to provide fire support]]
			The ] division ''Großdeutschland'' (]), was the strongest division in the 4th Panzer Army. It was supported on its flanks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} The ]s and ] of the ''Großdeutschland'' had been supplemented by a company of 15 Tiger tanks, which were used to spearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July, ''Großdeutschland'', backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on a three-kilometre front upon the ] of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} The Panzerfüsilier Regiment, advancing on the left wing, stalled in a minefield and subsequently 36 Panthers were immobilized. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage of Soviet anti-tank and artillery fire, which inflicted numerous casualties. Engineers were moved up and cleared paths through the minefield but suffered casualties in the process. The combination of fierce resistance, minefields, thick mud and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. With paths cleared, the regiment resumed its advance towards Gertsovka. In the ensuing battle, many casualties were suffered including the regimental commander Colonel Kassnitz. Due to the fighting, and the marshy terrain south of the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream, the regiment once more bogged down.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=238, 240}}{{sfn|Healy|1992|p=41}}
			The panzergrenadier regiment of ''Großdeutschland'', advancing on the right wing, pushed through to the village of Butovo.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=242}} The tanks were deployed in a '']'' (arrow) formation to minimise the effects of the Soviet ] defence, with the Tigers leading and the Panzer IIIs, IVs and assault guns fanning out to the flanks and rear. They were followed by infantry and combat engineers.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=242}} Attempts by the VVS to impede the advance were repulsed by the Luftwaffe.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=241}}
	Model paused to rearrange his units and renewed his attack on 10 July with additional air support, but his gains were small. Fresh Soviet formations repelled German attacks and only limited penetrations were achieved; the diary of the 9th Army describes the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attrition battle".{{efn|name=War diary}} Model called off the new attack.{{citation needed|date=May 2013}}
			The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left flank of ''Großdeutschland'', made good progress and by the end of the day had captured Gertsovka and reached Mikhailovka.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=197, 68}} The 167th Infantry Division, on the right flank of the 11th Panzer Division, also made sufficient progress, reaching Tirechnoe by the end of the day. By the end of 5 July, a wedge had been created in the first belt of the Soviet defences.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=246}}
	With the cancellation of the attack came a change in German plans. Model accepted that his forces did not have enough power to advance directly through the Soviet defensive strongpoints. He decided to bypass the heights of Ol'chovatka and shift the '']'' to XLVI&nbsp;Panzer Corps. He also decided to use the uncommitted 12th&nbsp;Panzer Division. For the first time in the northern sector, a heavy concentration of tanks was planned. By 12 July the German northern forces had lost only 63&nbsp;tanks and assault guns.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=111}}
			==== II SS Panzer Corps ====
	Soviet formations, including the 3rd Tank Army and the 11th Guards Army, commenced a flanking attack against the German 2nd&nbsp;Panzer Army, positioned to the left (north) and rear of 9th&nbsp;Army. The Soviet forces established a deep penetration and threatened German supply routes to the forward 9th Army units and a successful Soviet advance on Orel threatened to encircle the 9th&nbsp;Army.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=111}}{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=205}}
			<!---]--->
			<!----]--->
			], while combat engineers prepare charges to breach it.]]
			To the east, during the night of 4–5 July, SS combat engineers had infiltrated no-man's land and cleared lanes through the Soviet minefields.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=247}} At dawn, 5 July, the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps – ], ] and the ] – attacked the 52nd Guards Rifle Division of the 6th Guards Army. The main assault was led by a spearhead of 42 Tigers among 494 tanks and assault guns attacking on a twelve-kilometre front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=247}} ''Totenkopf'', the strongest of the three divisions, advanced towards Gremuchhi and screened the right flank. The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division advanced on the left flank towards Bykovka. The 2nd SS Panzer Division advanced between the two formations in the center.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=247}} Following closely behind the tanks were the infantry and combat engineers, coming forward to demolish obstacles and clear trenches. The advance was well supported by the ''Luftwaffe'', which greatly aided in breaking Soviet strong points and artillery positions.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=248}}
			By 09:00, the II SS Panzer Corps had broken through the Soviet first belt of defence along its entire front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=250}} While probing positions between the first and second Soviet defensive belts, at 13:00, the 2nd SS Panzer Division vanguard came under fire from two T-34 tanks, which were destroyed. Forty more Soviet tanks soon engaged the division. The ] clashed with the 2nd SS Panzer Division in a four-hour battle, resulting in the Soviet tanks withdrawing. The engagement bought enough time for units of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rifle Corps, lodged in the Soviet second belt, to prepare itself and be reinforced with additional ]s.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=252–253}} By the early evening, 2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the minefields on the perimeter of the Soviet second belt of defence.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=254}} The 1st SS Division had secured Bykovka by 16:10, then pushed forward towards the second belt of defence at Yakovlevo but its attempts to break through were rebuffed. By the end of the day, the 1st SS Division had sustained 97 dead, 522 wounded and 17 missing and lost about 30 tanks.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=254}} Together with the 2nd SS Panzer Division, it had forced a wedge far into the defences of the 6th Guards Army.
	=== The end of Citadel in the north ===
	With the threat of being cut off, the 9th Army was compelled to withdraw.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=204–205}} Their part in the offensive was over, and the opportunity of cutting off Soviet forces in the salient by envelopment from a double pincer strike was lost. The German armour losses in the north were comparatively light – 143&nbsp;vehicles between 5 and 14 July.{{sfn|Restayn|Moller|2002|pp=333–336}} The Soviet Central Front lost some 526 tanks.{{efn|name=Tank losses}} Those Russian units that retreated did so on orders, and in a controlled fashion.
			The 3rd SS Panzer Division was making slow progress. They had managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment, 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps), from the rest of the division but its attempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the flank of the neighbouring 375th Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps) had failed when the regiment was reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade. Hausser, the commander of II SS Panzer Corps, requested aid from the III Panzer Corps to his right but it had no units to spare. By the end of the day, the 3rd SS Division had made very limited progress due in part to a tributary of the Donets river. The lack of progress undermined the advance made by its sister divisions and exposed the right flank of the corps to Soviet forces.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=255}} The temperatures, reaching over 30 degrees Celsius, and frequent thunderstorms made fighting conditions difficult.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=81}}
	== Operation at the southern face ==
			The 6th Guards Army, which confronted the attack by the XLVIII ''Panzer Korps'' and II SS ''Panzer Korps'', was reinforced with tanks from the 1st Tank Army, the ] and the 5th Guards Tank Corps. The 51st and 90th Guards Rifle divisions were moved up to the vicinity of Pokrovka (not Prokhorovka, {{convert|40|km|mi}} to the north-east), in the path of the 1st SS Panzer Division.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=246}} The 93rd Guards Rifle Division was deployed further back, along the road leading from Pokrovka to Prokhorovka.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}}
	=== German offensive ===
	]
			==== Army Detachment ''Kempf'' ====
	Von Manstein's troops (Army Group South) were equipped with more ], infantry and artillery than Model's in the north (Army Group Centre).{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=196}}{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=112}} The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 1,377&nbsp;tanks and assault guns, while the 9th&nbsp;Army possessed 988&nbsp;tanks and assault guns.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=112}}
			] anti-tank rifle team during the fighting]]
			Facing Army Detachment ''Kempf'', consisting of III Panzer Corps and Corps ''Raus'' (commanded by ]), was the ], dug in on the high ground on the eastern bank of the Northern Donets. The two German corps were tasked with crossing the river, breaking through the 7th Guards Army and covering the right flank of the ]. The ], equipped with 45 Tigers, was also attached to the III Panzer Corps, with one company of 15 Tigers attached to each of the corps' three panzer divisions.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}}
			At the Milkhailovka bridgehead, just south of Belgorod, eight infantry battalions of the ] crossed the river under heavy Soviet bombardment. Part of a company of Tigers from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion was able to cross before the bridge was destroyed.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}} The rest of the 6th Panzer Division was unable to cross further south due to a traffic jam at the crossing, and remained on the western bank of the river throughout the day. Those units of the division that had crossed the river attacked Stary Gorod, but were unable to break through due to poorly cleared minefields and strong resistance.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=256–257}}
	At around 04:00 the German attack commenced with a preliminary bombardment. Mainstein's main attack was delivered by the 4th Panzer Army (commanded by ]), of which its right flank was covered by Army Detachment "Kempf" (commanded by ]).{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=197}} The strike of the 4th Panzer Army was spearheaded by the ] (commanded by ]), which was actively supported on its right by the ] (commanded by ]); its left flank was covered by the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=197}} Directly facing the 4th Panzer Army was the Soviet ], which was composed of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and 23rd Guards Rifle Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} The defence of the southern face of the salient by the Voronezh Front was deployed in three main heavily fortified defensive belts, with the third line composed of front reserves.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}} The Voronezh Front headquarters had not been able to pinpoint where the Germans would place their offensive weight{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=203}} and this forced them to spread out their defences.{{citation needed|date=May 2013}} And also Manstein, unlike his northern counterpart, had organized his tanks into densely concentrated spearheads; this proved more successful.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=112}}
	]
			To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the ] crossed the river but was delayed by mines, moving forward {{convert|8|km|mi}} by the end of the day. Luftwaffe bombed the bridgehead in a ] incident, wounding 6th Panzer Division commander ] and ] of the 19th Panzer Division.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=481}} Further south, infantry and tanks of ] crossed the river. A new bridge had to be built specifically for the Tigers, causing further delays. Despite a poor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke into the first belt of the Soviet defence and pushed on between Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing {{convert|10|km|mi}}, the furthest ''Kempf'' got during the day.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=257–259}}
	The Panzergrenadier Division ''Großdeutschland'' (commanded by ]), was the main attacking force of the ], and was supported on its flanks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} ''Großdeutschland'' was allotted 384 tanks in total, but not all were operational on the first day of the offensive.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} The division's ]s and ]s had been supplemented by a company of 15 Tigers and the 200 Panthers of the 51st and 52nd Panzer Battalions. Both of the Panther units were attached to the Panzerfüsilier Regiment of ''Großdeutschland'', and arrived at the front on 1 July and 30 June respectively, just before the launch of the offensive. This left little time for the battalions to orientate themselves to the terrain and conduct reconnaissance.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}}{{sfn|Healy|1992|p=41}}{{sfn|Dunn|1997|p=61}} Though led by experienced panzer commanders, the units still needed training, and the two battalions had no large-unit combat experience.<ref name="Healy2008">Healy 2008 p. 201</ref><ref>Nipe 2010 p. 143</ref> In addition, the requirement to maintain radio silence until the start of the attack meant that the Panther units would have little training in radio procedures.<ref name="Healy2008"/> The new Panthers were still experiencing problems with their transmissions, and proved mechanically unreliable. By the morning of 5 July 184 of the original 200 were available for the launching of the offensive.<ref>Healy 2008 p. 205</ref>
			<!---]-->
	At ] on 5 July, ''Großdeutschland'', backed by heavy artillery support and led by its tank units, advanced on a two-mile front straight into the ] (of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps).{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=237}} That morning, the Panzerfüsilier Regiment, advancing as the left wing of the division, after initial rapid progress stalled, when it plunged into a minefield and 36 Panthers were disabled. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage of Soviet anti-tank and artillery fire. ]s were moved up immediately to clear paths through the minefield but a constant barrage made it very costly.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=238}}{{sfn|Healy|1992|p=41}} Heavy casualties were sustained in the ensuing battle, including the commander of the Panzerfüsilier Regiment, Colonel Kassnitz.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=240}} However, attempts by the Red Air Force to impede the advance of the XLVIII Panzer Corps were repulsed by the Luftwaffe. Therefore, although XLVIII Panzer Corps reported on the morning of 5 July: "The entire corps sector is under heavy attack by Soviet Il-2 ground-attack planes and bombers," this was only relative to what it was used to facing. Ultimately, many more enemy aircraft were repelled than managed to break through the Luftwaffe defence cordon.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=241}}
			Operating to the south of 7th Panzer Division, were the ] and the ] of Corps ''Raus''. The two formations attacked across a {{convert|32|km|mi}} front without armour support. The advance began well, with the crossing of the river and a swift advance against the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=259}} Corps ''Raus'' took the village of Maslovo Pristani, penetrating the first Red Army defence line. A Soviet counter-attack supported by about 40 tanks was beaten off, with the assistance from artillery and flak batteries. After having suffered 2,000 casualties since the morning and still facing considerable resistance from the Soviet forces, the corps dug in for the night.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=260}}
	], Kursk, July 1943]]
	Meanwhile, the Panzergrenadier Regiment of ''Großdeutschland'', advancing as the right wing of the division, pushed through more successfully to the village of Butovo.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=242}} Leading the way were the Tigers, which were employed in a ], with the lighter ]s, ]s and ]s fanning out to the rear. They were followed by infantry and combat engineers.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=242}} The Panzerfüsilier Regiment also resumed its advance towards Gertsovka once safe paths were cleared through the minefields, but it was bogged down again just south of the village by the marshy ground surrounding the Berezovyy stream. The Red Air Force made another attempt to cripple the advancing forces, leading the commander of XLVIII Panzer Corps, Otto von Knobelsdorff, to report to Manstein:{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=242}}
	] from the ] division resting after a rainstorm during the Battle of Kursk{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=308–309}}]]
	{{quote | Soviet air forces repeatedly attack the large concentrations of tanks and infantry near the crossings at Berezovyy. There are heavy losses, especially among officers. ''Großdeutschland''{{'}}s Command Post received a direct hit, killing the adjutant of the grenadier regiment and two other officers.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=242}} }}
	The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left flank of ''Großdeutschland'', made good progress and by the end of 5 July had taken Gertsovka{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=197}} and advanced past it to reach Mikhailovka.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=68}} The 167th Infantry Division on the right flank of the 11th Panzer Division also made sufficient progress, advancing to the vicinity of Tirechnoe by the end of the day (5 July). These successes meant that by the end of the first day a wedge had been speared deep into the Soviet first line of defence by the XLVIII Panzer Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=246}}		Delaying the progress of ''Kempf'' allowed Red Army forces time to prepare their second belt of defence to meet the German attack on 6 July. The 7th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack of III Panzer Corps and Corps "Raus", was reinforced with two rifle divisions from the reserve. The 15th Guards Rifle Division was moved up to the second belt of defence, in the path of the III Panzer Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=260}}
			=== Development of the battle ===
	] Tiger I lands a direct hit on a T-34 somewhere during the battle of Kursk on 10 July.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=308–309}} The quality of the optics of the Tiger I and the high velocity ] it mounted allowed it to destroy targets at long range]]
			] unit]]
			By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves, except for three rifle divisions under the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively contain the 4th Panzer Army.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=260}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=101}} The XLVIII Panzer Corps along the ] axis, where the third defensive belt was mostly unoccupied, now had only the Red Army second defensive belt blocking it from breakthrough into the unfortified Soviet rear.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=113, 133}}{{sfn|Zamulin|2011|p=159}} This forced the ''Stavka'' to commit their strategic reserves to reinforce the Voronezh Front: the ] and ] Armies, both from the Steppe Front, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps from the ].{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=113}}{{sfn|Zamulin|2011|p=159}} Ivan Konev objected to this premature piecemeal commitment of the strategic reserve, but a personal call from Stalin silenced his complaints.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=287–288}} In addition, on 7 July Zhukov ordered the ] – the air fleet serving the Southwestern Front – to support the 2nd Air Army in serving the Voronezh Front.{{sfn|Zamulin|2011|p=159}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=478–484|loc=The Soviet order of battle}}{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=72}} On 7 July, the 5th Guards Tank Army began advancing to ]. 5th Guards Tank Army commander, Lieutenant General ], described the journey:
			{{blockquote | By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds, settling in a solid layer on roadside bushes, grain fields, tanks and trucks. The dark red disc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks, self-propelled guns, ]s, ]s and trucks were advancing in an unending flow. The faces of the soldiers were dark with dust and exhaust fumes. It was intolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirst and their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to their bodies.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=478}}}}
			The 10th Tank Corps, then still subordinate to the 5th Guards Army, was rushed ahead of the rest of the army, arriving at Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July, and 2nd Tank Corps arrived at ], {{cvt|25|mi|km|order=flip}} southeast of Prokhorovka, by morning of 8 July.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=114}} Vatutin ordered a powerful counterattack by the 5th Guards, 2nd Guards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, in all fielding about 593 tanks and self-propelled guns and supported by most of the Front's available air power, which aimed to defeat the II SS Panzer Corps and therefore expose the right flank of XLVIII Panzer Corps. Simultaneously, the 6th Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzer Corps and prevent it from breaking through to the free Soviet rear. Although intended to be concerted, the counterattack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks due to poor coordination.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=114, 133–135}} The 10th Tank Corps' attack began on the dawn of 8 July but they ran straight into the antitank fire of the 2nd and 3rd SS Divisions, losing most of its forces. Later that morning, the 5th Guards Tank Corps' attack was repelled by the 3rd SS Division. The 2nd Tank Corps joined in the afternoon and was also repelled.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=114, 133–135}} The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, masked by the forest around the village Gostishchevo, {{cvt|10|mi|km|order=flip}} north of Belgorod, with its presence unknown to the II SS Panzer Corps, advanced towards the 167th Infantry Division. But it was detected by German air reconnaissance just before the attack had materialized, and was subsequently decimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed with MK 103 anti-tank cannons and at least 50 tanks were destroyed.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=135|loc=tank losses are given as 50}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=299|loc= tank losses are given as 50 in the first air raid and another 30 in subsequent air raids}} This marked the first time in military history an attacking tank formation had been defeated by air power alone.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=135}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=298–299}} Although a fiasco, the Soviet counterattack succeeded in stalling the advance of the II SS Panzer Corps throughout the day.{{sfn|Bauman|1998|pp=8–4 to 8–5}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=298–299}}
	==== II SS Panzer Corps ====
	]
	At dawn on 5 July, the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps (commanded by Paul Hausser) – ] (commanded by ]), 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division ''Das Reich'' (commanded by ]) and the ] (commanded by ]) – attacked the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps, of the 6th Guards Army). All three SS divisions were elite formations with fearsome reputations.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=246}} During the night of 4–5 July, SS combat engineers had infiltrated no-man's land and cleared lanes through the Soviet minefields.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=247}} The main assault of the corps was led by a ] headed by 42 Tigers; in total 494 tanks and assault guns attacked across a seven and half mile front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=247}} The 3rd SS Division ''Totenkopf'', the strongest of the three divisions, screened the right flank of the attack by advancing towards Gremuchhi, with the 1st SS Division ''Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' on the left flank, advanced towards Bykovka and the 2nd SS Panzer Division moved in-between.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=247}} The advance, although it was not seriously impeded by minefields, was met with a massive barrage of artillery and anti-tank fire but the corps was supremely well supported by the Luftwaffe, which greatly aided in softening up the Soviet positions. The infantry and combat engineer units followed the armoured spearhead closely, demolishing obstacles and emptying trenches.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=248}}
	]]]		]
			<!---]--->
			By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced about {{convert|29|km|mi}} since the start of Citadel and broken through the first and second defensive belts.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=68, 279|loc= map on page 68 shows 18–20 miles}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=130|loc= the map shows 18–20 miles}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=90|loc=this places it at 28&nbsp;km at the end of 7 July}}{{sfn|Bauman|1998|pp=8–5 to 8–6|loc=this places it at 23&nbsp;km}} However, slow progress by the ] caused Hoth to shift elements of the II SS-Panzer Corps to the west to help the XLVIII Panzer Corps regain its momentum. On 10 July the full effort of the corps was shifted back to its own forward progress. The direction of their advance now shifted from Oboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka. Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since early May, and it was a part of the 4th Panzer Army's plan since the outset of the offensive.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=6}}{{sfn|Brand|2003}} By this time, however, the Soviets had shifted reserve formations into its path. The defensive positions were manned by the ], reinforced by the ] and 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=350–353}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=169, 171}}
			Though the German advance in the south was slower than planned, it was faster than the Soviets expected.{{citation needed|date=June 2017}} On 9 July, the first German units reached the ]. The next day, the first German infantry crossed the river. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses remained lower than the Soviets'.{{sfn|Yeide|2014|p=178}} At this point, Hoth turned the II SS Panzer Corps away from Oboyan to attack toward the northeast in the direction of Prokhorovka.{{sfn|Healy|2010|pp=301–302}}{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=7}} The main concern of Manstein and Hausser was the inability of Army Detachment ''Kempf'' to advance and protect the eastern flank of the II SS Panzer Corps. On 11 July, Army Detachment ''Kempf'' finally achieved a breakthrough. In a surprise night attack, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge across the Donets.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=311}} Once across, Breith made every effort to push troops and vehicles across the river for an advance on Prokhorovka from the south. A linkup with the II SS Panzer Corps would result with the Soviet 69th Army becoming encircled.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=324}}
	By 0900 hours on 5 July, the II SS Panzer Corps had advanced deep into the Soviet first line of defence along its entire front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=250}} While probing positions between the first and second Soviet defensive belts, at 1300 hours, the 2nd SS Panzer Division's vanguard came under fire from two T-34 tanks, which were quickly dispatched, but soon 40 more engaged the division. It was not long before a ferocious battle between units of the ] and the 2nd SS Panzer Division was underway. The battle lasted four hours, ending with the withdrawal of the 1st Guards Tank Army. However, the battle bought time for units of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rifle Corps lodged in the Soviet second line to prepare itself and be reinforced with more anti-tank guns.{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=252–253}} By the early evening of 5 July, 2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the minefields that marked the outer perimeter of the Soviet second line of defence.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=254}} The 1st SS Division, operating on the 2nd SS Panzer Division's left, had secured Bykovka at 1610 hours and pushed forward towards the second line of defence at Yakovlevo, but attempts to breakthrough were rebuffed. By the end of the day, the 1st SS Division had sustained 97 dead, 522 wounded, 17 missing and lost about 30 tanks.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=254}} Together with the 2nd SS Panzer Division, it had forced a wedge far into the defences of the ].
			=== Battle of Prokhorovka ===
	The 3rd SS Division, operating as the right flank of II SS Panzer Corps made very limited progress, which meant that the corps' developing penetration was precarious. The division managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps) from the rest of its parent division, but attempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the flank of the neighbouring 375th Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps), failed when the regiment was reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=255}} Furthermore, the northern movement of the 3rd SS Division was stifled by a tributary of the Lipovyi-Donets river. Paul Hausser, the commander of II SS Panzer Corps, called on III Panzer Corps (commanded by ]) (of the Army Detachment "Kempf") on his right flank to lend some support, but his request was refused because the Army Detachment "Kempf" was facing serious challenges of its own. By the end of 5 July, the 3rd SS Division's attainment was far short of expectation, leaving the right flank of the 2nd SS Panzer Division exposed.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=255}}
	==== Army Detachment "Kempf" ====
	Facing the Army Detachment "Kempf" was the ], dug in on the high ground on the eastern bank of the ]. The III Panzer Corps and Corps "Raus" (commanded by ]) (both of Army Detachment "Kempf"), were tasked with crossing the ], smash through the 7th Guards Army and support the right flank of the ].{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}} The ] – equipped with 45 Tigers – was also attached to the III Panzer Corps, split up so that one company of 15 Tigers was attached to each of the three panzer divisions of the III Panzer Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}} Although the river was bridged during the night of 4 July by combat engineers, the crossing points were targeted by the Soviet artillery during the preemptive bombardment.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}}
	At the Milkhailovka bridgehead just south of ], eight infantry battalions of the ] (of the III Panzer Corps) assembled there were subjected to heavy artillery fire during the Soviet preliminary bombardment. Eventually most of the infantry got across to the eastern banks, but when a company of the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion began to cross the bridge in order to support the infantry, it too was targeted by Soviet artillery and the bridge was destroyed. Although some of the tanks of the company managed to get across, the rest of the 6th Panzer Division had to be redeployed southward to another crossing.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}} ], battalion commander, described it thus:
	{{quote | Suddenly, a red sunrise arose on the far side as hundreds of ] hurled their rockets exactly onto the crossing site. The bridge was totally demolished and the engineers, unfortunately, suffered heavy losses. Never have I hugged the dirt so tightly as when these terrible shells sprayed their thin fragments just above the ground.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}} }}
	With the need for redeployment of the remnants of the 6th Panzer Division to another crossing, it became clear that the division was falling behind the agreed schedule. But the predicament was further aggravated when it was reported to ], commander of the 6th Panzer Division, that the designated crossing was already clogged with traffic. Failing to find another crossing, the remnants of the 6th remained on the western bank of the river for 5 July.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=256}} Meanwhile, units of the 6th Panzer Division that had succeeded in getting onto the eastern bank of the river through the original crossing launched an attack led by Tigers on Stary Gorod, but it stalled due to poorly cleared minefields and strong resistance.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=257}}
	To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the ] (of III Panzer Corps) successfully crossed the river but immediately ran into Soviet mines, which stalled the Tigers spearheading the advance. The division later recovered and managed to advance to a depth of about five miles by the end of 5 July.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=257}}
	To the south of the 19th Panzer Division, the infantry and light and medium tanks of ] managed to cross the bridges but the Tigers could not, due to their weight. Attempts were made to drive the Tigers across the river to relieve the infantry and lighter tanks that were already taking a tremendous pounding on the opposite bank, but that was unsuccessful due to their weight and the massive Soviet artillery bombardment. Eventually, combat engineers constructed bridges strong enough to take the Tigers across, where they relieved the beleaguered infantry.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=258}} Despite a poor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke into the first line of the Soviet defence and pushed on between Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing about {{convert|10|km}} by the end of 5 July, which was the best achieved in Army Detachment "Kempf"'s sector for the day.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=259}}
	]
	Operating to the south of 7th Panzer Division, were the two infantry divisions – ] and ] Infantry Divisions – of Corps "Raus". The two formations advanced across a 20 mile front, and devoid of tanks, apparently only made little progress. The advance began well with the successful crossing of the river and a swift advance against the ]. The Soviet defenders were taken by surprise with the speed of the advance.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=259}} Erhard Raus, later wrote:
	{{quote | The advancing infantry surprised them and had no difficulty ferreting them out. But when the infantry reached the two to three mile deep zone of the battle positions prepared in the preceding months, they had to make extensive use of hand grenades in order to mop up maze of densely dug-in trenches and bunkers, some of which were a dozen or more feet deep. At the same time, artillery and flak fired ] against the enemy heavy weapons that had resumed fire from rear positions. They also fired on reserves infiltrating through the trench system, as well as against Russian medium artillery.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=259}} }}
	After a fierce battle involving some hand-to-hand fighting, Corps "Raus" took the village of Maslovo Pristani, punching a hole in the first Soviet line of defence. However, the lodgement was nearly lost when a Soviet counterattack supported by about 40 tanks crashed into the corps. The counterattack was eventually rebuffed with the assistance of artillery and flak batteries; however, having suffered about 2,000 casualties since the start of the offensive that morning and still facing considerable resistance, the corps could penetrate no further and therefore dug-in for the night of 5 July.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=260}}
	By the end of 5 July, Army Group South's attack against the Voronezh Front had failed to dislodge the Soviet defenders. Although several of the divisions of the 4th Panzer Army had blown large holes in the Soviet first line of defence, they still remained short of cracking the second line, and even so, exposed vulnerable flanks; many other attacking units had barely breached the first line.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=260}} Along the entire southern face of the salient, the German thrust had been slowed, allowing the Soviets time to prepare their second line of defence to meet the German attack on 6 July.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=260}} The ], which had soaked up the attack of III Panzer Corps and Corps "Raus", was reinforced with two rifle divisions from the reserve, the 15th Guards Rifle Division was also moved up to the second line of defence right in the path of III Panzer Corps.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=260}} The 6th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack by XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps, was reinforced with about 1,000 tanks from the independent ] and the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the ]. The 51st and 90th Guards Rifle Division were moved up to the vicinity of Pokrovka (not to be confused with Prokhorovka 25 miles to its northeast,{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=246}}) right in the path of the 1st SS Division. And right behind them, the 93rd Guards Rifle Division was spread out on the road leading to Prokhorovka from Pokrovka.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=261}}
	==== The Soviets counter-attack ====
	The steady progress of the German units forced the Soviet leaders to commit some of their strategic reserves, as nearly all operational reserves were in action. The ] had been formed in the months leading up to the operation as a central reserve. As early as 6 July, ''Stavka'' decided to send the 2nd and 10th&nbsp;Tank Corps and the 5th&nbsp;Guards Tank Army to the southern sector; a day later, other formations got their marching orders. Vatutin planned an operational counterstrike against the German units, but decided to cancel it after the failure of the northern counterattack. Instead of seeking open battle against the German tanks, Vatutin let his tanks dig in, as Rokossovsky did in the north.{{sfn|Glantz|House|p=102}} Zhukov protested against this use of tanks, but Vatutin's decision stood.
	German officers reported that they were slowed down by the "silent tanks" (''Schweigepanzer'') – tanks dug into fortified emplacements – because it cost much time to overcome these camouflaged "bases".{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=116}} Despite the order to dig-in many of their tanks, the Soviet units still had enough tanks to launch some counterattacks. On 7 July a German Tiger I commanded by SS&nbsp;''Unterscharführer'' ] met a group of about 50&nbsp;T-34s. In the ensuing battle, Staudegger knocked out 22&nbsp;T-34s; he was the first Tiger commander to be awarded the Knight's Cross.<ref>Wendt p.18</ref>
	The Germans' advance was slowed. The first German units reached the ] on 9 July. The next day the first infantry units crossed the river. By 10 July, German units in the south had lost 166 tanks. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses were low.<ref>Geheime Kommandosache</ref> On 11 July Army Detachment "Kempf" achieved a breakthrough, and its III Panzer Corps penetrated deep into the Soviet lines. The next night the 6th&nbsp;Panzer Division took a bridge over the Donets with a swift surprise attack.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=118}} III Panzer Corps then advanced on Prokhorovka from the south and the II SS Panzer Corps from the west, almost trapping the Soviet 69th&nbsp;Army. At this moment Manstein thought the final breakthrough was achieved, and that, now free of the minefields, he could operate freely and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in the open.{{sfn|Manstein|1983|p=500}} The Soviets began moving their tank reserves toward the spearheads of Army Group South.{{citation needed|date=June 2013}}
	==== Prokhorovka ====
	{{main|Battle of Prokhorovka}}		{{main|Battle of Prokhorovka}}
	]		]
			Throughout 10 and 11 July, the II-SS Panzer Corps continued its attack toward Prokhorovka, reaching within {{convert|3|km}} of the settlement by the night of 11 July.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=164–170}} That same night, Hausser issued orders for the attack to continue the next day. The plan was for the 3rd SS Panzer Division to drive northeast until it reached the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road. Once there, they were to strike southeast to attack the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka from the flanks and rear. The 1st and 2nd SS Panzer divisions were to wait until 3rd SS Panzer Division attack had destabilised the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka; and once underway, the 1st SS Panzer Division was to attack the main Soviet defences dug in on the slopes southwest of Prokhorovka. To the division's right, the 2nd SS Panzer Division was to advance eastward, then turn southward away from Prokhorovka to roll up the Soviet lines opposing the III Panzer Corps' advance and force a gap.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=310}} During the night of 11 July, Rotmistrov moved his ] to an assembly area just behind Prokhorovka in preparation for a massive attack the following day.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=309}}{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=77}} At 5:45 Leibstandarte headquarters started receiving reports of the sound of tank engines as the Soviets moved into their assembly areas.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=363}} Soviet artillery and Katyusha regiments were redeployed in preparation for the counterattack.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=482}}
	The Red Army did enough, at great cost, to stop a German breakthrough. In that sense Prokhorovka remains a crucial turning point of the battle and of the conflict on the ]. On the morning of 12 July, Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough, grouped the armoured formations on the right wing of the 4th&nbsp;Panzer Army and advanced on ]. At the same time the ] launched a series of attacks as part of a larger counteroffensive in an attempt to throw the Germans off balance. The opposing forces clashed south and west of Prokhorovka.
	In stifling heat, an eight-hour battle began.{{citation needed|date=June 2013}} The German forces found themselves heavily outnumbered by the 5th&nbsp;Guards Tank Army; who, moving mainly at night, had brought 593&nbsp;tanks and 37 self-propelled guns into position at Stary Oskol.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=77}}
	The Soviet 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the 3rd SS Division ''Totenkopf'' to a standstill by getting in close to the German armour and attacking the more vulnerable sides of the Tigers. The II SS Panzer Corps was soon forced onto the defensive. Although the German formation held, it lost half of its ] in a prolonged engagement; although many of these losses were repairable, and hence temporary. By the night of 11–12 July, the only success the Germans had to show for their losses was a captured bridgehead over the Donets river at Rzavets. The 1st SS Division ''Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler'' had been stopped by the Soviet 18th&nbsp;Tank Corps, while III Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Division were checked by the ] and two other Soviet reserve corps.{{sfn|Healy|1992|pp=84–87}}
	The Luftwaffe had complete air superiority over Prokhorovka, due to the ''VVS'' being concentrated against the units flanking II SS Panzer Corps. Waves of Hs&nbsp;129s and Ju&nbsp;87s inflicted losses on the 5th&nbsp;Guards Tank Army. Although Soviet tank losses are unknown, a report from the 29th&nbsp;Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery . due to continuous air attacks, they were unable to advance further and shifted to the defence".{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=79–80}}
	The battle can best be described as a costly tactical loss for the Red Army but an operational draw. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives that day. After the battle was over, the Soviets held the area and were able to recover their disabled tanks and wounded crews.{{sfn|Clark|1966|p=337}}{{sfn|Healy|1992|pp=76–77}}
	Tank losses in the battle have been a contentious subject. Red Army losses have been given from 200 to 822&nbsp;tanks, but the records show about 300 complete losses and as many damaged. German losses have been reported to be as low as 80 and as high as several hundred. The Soviets claim the Germans lost 400 tanks in this battle and 3,500 soldiers killed,<ref>{{cite web | url = http://militera.lib.ru/h/samsonov2/11.html | title = чпеообс мйфетбфхтб – – уБНУПОПЧ б.н. лТБИ ЖБЫЙУФУЛПК БЗТЕУУЙЙ 1939–1945 | publisher = Militera.lib.ru | date = | accessdate = 2010-08-06 }}</ref> but newer research suggests only about 500 deaths and much lower tank losses, with only a few completely destroyed and about 40–80 damaged.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=81}}{{sfn|Brand|2003}}{{sfn| Frieser| 2007| pp=130, 132}}{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=275}}
			At around 08:00, a Soviet artillery barrage began. At 08:30, Rotmistrov radioed his tankers: "Steel, Steel, Steel!", the order to commence the attack.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=187|loc=in Moscow time}}{{sfn|Barbier|2002|p=139}}{{sfn|Zamulin|2011|p=349}} Down off the west slopes, before Prokhorovka, came the massed armour of five tank brigades from the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=304}} The Soviet tanks advanced down the corridor, carrying ] of the 9th Guards Airborne Division on the tanks.{{sfn|Brand|2003}} To the north and east, the 3rd SS Panzer Division was engaged by the Soviet 33rd Guards Rifle Corps. Tasked with flanking the Soviet defences around Prokhorovka, the unit first had to beat off a number of attacks before they could go over onto the offensive. Most of the division's tank losses occurred late in the afternoon as they advanced through mine fields against well-hidden Soviet anti-tank guns. Although the 3rd SS succeeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road, their hold was tenuous and it cost the division half of its armour. The majority of German tank losses suffered at Prokhorovka occurred here. To the south, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps had been thrown back by the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 2nd SS Panzer Division also repelled attacks from the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=341}} Luftwaffe local air superiority over the battlefield also contributed to the Soviet losses, partly due to the VVS being directed against the German units on the flanks of II SS Panzer Corps.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=79–80}} By the end of the day, the Soviets had fallen back to their starting positions.{{sfn|Brand|2003}}
	=== The end of Citadel in the south ===
	]
	While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 July, in the south the overall situation still hung in the balance, even after 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, had breached the first two defensive belts. They believed that they were about to break through the last belt but at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial defences; some of them did not have troops deployed. Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major elements of their reserve forces had been committed. Nevertheless, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves.
			Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives. Although the Soviet counterattack failed with heavy losses, throwing them back onto the defensive, they did enough to stop a German breakthrough.{{sfn|Brand|2003}}
	On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely depleted, the Germans then had to face Operation ], a Soviet offensive to smash the German forces in the Belgorod–Kharkov area which was launched on 3&nbsp;August. Belgorod fell on 5&nbsp;August, and on 23&nbsp;August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resistance from German forces. With the capture of Kharkov, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk over.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=171}}
	== Termination of Operation Citadel ==		== Termination of Operation Citadel ==
			]
	On the night of 9–10 July, the ] mounted an ] of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned ] and ] to his '']'' headquarters in ] and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Citadel. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Citadel was on the brink of victory: "on no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves which he had committed were decisively beaten". In an uncommon reversal of their roles, Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 16 July, he ordered a withdrawal and cancelled the operation. The following day, on 17 July, OKH ordered the entire ''SS Panzer Corps'' to be withdrawn and transferred to Italy.{{sfn|Clark|1966|pp=337–338}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=218}}
			On the evening of 12 July, Hitler summoned Kluge and Manstein to his headquarters at Görlitz in East Prussia (now Gierłoż, Poland).{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=353}} Two days earlier, the Western Allies had ]. The threat of further Allied landings in Italy or along southern France made Hitler believe it was essential to stop the offensive and move forces from Kursk to Italy. Kluge welcomed the news, as he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive counter-offensive against his sector but Manstein was less welcoming. Manstein's forces had just spent a week fighting through a maze of defensive works and he believed they were on the verge of breaking through to more open terrain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Manstein stated, "On no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he committed completely beaten".{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=354}} Hitler agreed temporarily to allow the continuation of the offensive in the southern part of the salient, but the following day he ordered Manstein's reserve – the XXIV Panzer Corps – to move south to support the 1st Panzer Army.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=355}}
	Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs,{{sfn|Manstein|1983|p=504}} and by some historians.<ref>Engelmann, Zitadelle p. 5.</ref> For example, it has been pointed out that the SS&nbsp;Panzer Corps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.{{sfn|Carell|Osers|1966–1971|p={{Page needed|date=September 2010}}}}
			The offensive continued in the southern part with the launch of ] on 14 July. After three days, on 17 July, the II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to end its offensive operations and begin to withdraw, marking the end of Operation Roland. One division was transferred to Italy and the other two were sent south to meet new Soviet offensives.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=218, 223}} The strength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatly underestimated by German intelligence and the Red Army soon went onto the offensive.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=355}} In his post-war memoirs '']'' (Lost Victories), Manstein was highly critical of Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle; however, the veracity of Manstein's claims of a near victory is debatable as the quantity of Soviet reserves was far greater than he realized. These reserves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards Tank Army, which launched ] a couple of weeks later.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=22}}{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=109}} The result was a battle of attrition Manstein's forces were ill-prepared for and which they had little chance of winning.{{sfn|Kasdorf|2000|p=32}}
	Only one German division, the 1st SS Panzer (''Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler''), departed for Italy, without their equipment. The remainder stayed to face the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.
			During Operation Citadel, the Luftwaffe flew 27,221 sorties in support with 193 combat losses (a 0.709 per cent loss rate per sortie). Soviet units from 5 to 8 July conducted 11,235 sorties with combat losses of 556 aircraft (4.95 per cent per sortie).{{sfn|Koltunov|Solovyev|1970|p=366}} Germans were destroying Soviet armour and aircraft at a ratio of 1:6. Despite German unit performance, the Wehrmacht was now lacking strategic reserves. In late 1943 just 25 per cent of Luftwaffe day fighters were on the Eastern Front, due to British and US air attacks on Italy and Germany.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Peck |first=Michael |date=2021-02-13 |title=The Real History of WWII's Battle of Kursk and Why it Did NOT Spell the End for Nazi Germany |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/real-history-wwiis-battle-kursk-and-why-it-did-not-spell-end-nazi-germany-178213 |access-date=2023-08-20 |website=The National Interest |language=en |archive-date=28 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230328052304/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/real-history-wwiis-battle-kursk-and-why-it-did-not-spell-end-nazi-germany-178213 |url-status=live }}</ref>
	=== Reasons for the failure of Citadel ===
			== Soviet Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation ==
	==== Northern analysis ====
			]
	A number of factors explain the 9th Army's lack of progress, mainly the combination of Soviet defensive planning and German lack of concentration of force. German armour was committed piecemeal rather than in strength, and often without sufficient infantry support.{{sfn|Restayn|Moller|2002|p=333}} Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovsky had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had ] those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The ], which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and anti-tank guns than the other Central Front units and held the strongest defensive positions in the salient.
			During the defensive preparations in the months leading up to Citadel, the Soviets also planned and prepared counteroffensive operations that would be launched after the German offensive had halted.
			=== In the north: Operation Kutuzov ===
	Model's decision not to use his Panzer divisions as a concentrated force can be seen as the most significant reason for the poor penetration of the northern pincer.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=107}} His army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and they were committed in a more piecemeal fashion because Model was afraid of being attacked on his northern flank by the Bryansk Front. Model placed his most powerful corps, ''Gruppe'' "Esebeck" (2 Panzer Division and 10 Panzer Grenadier Division), in a reserve position behind the front to use it as a "fire brigade" against a Soviet penetrations on his flank.
			{{main|Operation Kutuzov}}
			Soviet offensive operations were planned to begin after the strength of the German forces had been dissipated by their Kursk offensive. As the German momentum in the north slowed, the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov on 12 July against Army Group Centre in the Orel salient, directly north of the Kursk salient. The Bryansk Front, under the command of ], attacked the eastern face of the Orel salient while the Western Front, commanded by ], attacked from the north. The Western Front's assault was led by the ], under Lieutenant General ], and was supported by the 1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviet spearheads sustained heavy casualties, but pushed through and in some areas achieved significant penetrations. These thrusts endangered German supply routes and threatened the 9th Army with encirclement.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|pp=111, 185}}{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=205}} With this threat, 9th Army was compelled to go over fully to the defensive.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=204–205}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|pp=95–96}}
	A review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration shows the success of the Red Army defensive tactics. While it began with a {{convert|45|km|mi|adj=mid|-wide|sp=uk}} attack front on 5 July, the next day the German 9th&nbsp;Army's front was reduced to 40&nbsp;km. This dropped to 15&nbsp;km wide by 7 July and to only 2&nbsp;km on 8–9 July. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: five&nbsp;km on the first day, four on the second, never more than two&nbsp;km on each succeeding day. By 10 July the 9th&nbsp;Army had been stopped.{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=204}}
			The thinly stretched 2nd Panzer Army stood in the way of this Soviet force. The German commanders had been wary of such an attack and forces were quickly withdrawn from the Kursk offensive to meet the Soviet offensive.
	==== Southern analysis ====
	The German forces made steady progress, but, as in the north, attack frontage width and penetration depth dropped as the attack proceeded, though the trend was not as marked as in the north. A {{convert|30|km|mi|adj=mid|-wide|sp=uk}} attack frontage on 5 July became {{convert|20|km|abbr=on}} wide by 7&nbsp;July and {{convert|15|km|abbr=on}} by 9&nbsp;July. The depth of penetration dropped from {{convert|9|km|abbr=on}} on 5 July to {{convert|5|km|abbr=on}} on 8 July and {{convert|2|-|3|km|abbr=on}} each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled.{{citation needed|date=May 2013}}
			Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel salient and inflicted substantial losses on the German military, paving the way for the ].{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=188}} Soviet losses were heavy, but were replaced.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=297}} The offensive allowed the Soviets to seize the strategic initiative, which they retained for the remainder of the war.
	Red Army minefields and artillery were successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans allowed their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order.{{citation needed|date=May 2013}}
			=== In the south: Operation Rumyantsev ===
	German losses can be seen in the example of the ''Großdeutschland'' Division, which had begun the operation with 118&nbsp;tanks. On 10 July, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had three&nbsp;Tigers, six&nbsp;Panthers, and 11&nbsp;Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII&nbsp;Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38&nbsp;Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on 5 July.{{citation needed|date=May 2013}}
			{{main|Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation}}
			Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the main Soviet offensive for 1943. Its aim was to destroy the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, and cut off the extended southern portion of Army Group South.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=241}} After the heavy losses sustained by the Voronezh Front, during Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and refit, delaying the start of the offensive until 3 August. ], launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and ]s into the Donbas, drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces that would face the main blow.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=245}} The offensive was initiated by the Voronezh Front and Steppe Fronts against the northern wing of Army Group South. They drove through the German positions, making broad and deep penetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated Belgorod.
	====Military historian opinions====
	Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser points out these reasons for the failure of Operation Citadel:
	* The Soviets had numerical superiority. Frieser points out that the biggest problem of the OKW was the shortage of infantry. The OKH had no operational reserve, while the Red Army could field an entire ] (]) as reserve. That the Red Army had more tanks than the Wehrmacht had less influence on the outcome, according to Frieser.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=149}}{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=132–134}}{{sfn|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|pp=116, 117}}
	* Repeated delays by Hitler gave the Red Army enough time to turn the bulge around Kursk into an enormous fortress. Senior officers like Manstein and Zeitzler pushed for a fast attack to catch the Red Army unprepared and low on morale after the third battle of Kharkov. The overlap with the ] made Hitler's date for the attack the "most adverse possible".<ref>Magenheimer, die Militärstrategie Deutschlands 1940–1945 p.244</ref>
			By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been reached. The Soviet advance was finally halted by a counter-attack by the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. In the ensuing tank battles, the Soviet armies suffered heavy losses in armour.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=196}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=249}} After this setback, the Soviets focused on Kharkov. After heavy fighting the city was liberated on 23 August. This battle is referred to by the Germans as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets refer to it as the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=70}}
	] and Soviet military expert ] draws these conclusions:
	* The German defeat at Kursk did not come about by the "often-exaggerated numerical superiority" of the Soviet armed forces. The principal factor at Kursk was the revolution in Soviet command, staff, operational and tactical techniques. The General Staff had learned lessons from previous battles and disseminated "war experience" based on an "exhaustive" analysis of battles, operations and campaigns. These lessons were added to Soviet doctrine (]), producing new procedures.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=176}} Glantz and House have asserted the tank strength was almost even, between 1:1 and 1.5:1 in the Soviets' favour.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|pp=149–150}}
	* The Soviets introduced new operational and tactical techniques, and had solved many of the problems of integrating arms and services into "a true ] operation". He emphasizes "sophisticated understanding of intelligence, deception, and anti-tank defence". Similar improvements were made in the combined use of artillery, tanks, engineers and infantry to break German defences on a narrow front. At Prokhorovka, and in the ''Kutuzov'' operations, the Red Army gained experience with mobile armoured formations and mechanized corps that became the hallmark of ]. These formations demonstrated their ability to match the best efforts of the German Panzer force. Operations still needed to be perfected to reduce huge casualties. Nevertheless, the German command recognized that at Kursk they faced an entirely new and more competent Red Army than in earlier battles.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=176}}{{sfn|Glantz|1991|pp=132–133}}
	* Defensive tactics had improved. Skilful use of anti-tank artillery in strong points and the use of separate tank brigades, tank regiments and self-propelled gun units to support them offered mobile defence support. These units participated in wearing down tactical attacks against enemy spearheads. The transitional year of 1943 was decisive for the Soviet war effort. Operational and tactical techniques tested and smoothed out in 1943; they would be refined further and perfected in 1944 and 1945. "The elementary education the Red Army received in 1941–42 gave way to the secondary education of 1943. In 1944 and 1945 the Soviets would accomplish university-level and graduate study in the conduct of war"{{sfn|Glantz|1991|pp= 136–137}}
	]
	Military expert ] offers these insights about the Red Army at Kursk:
	* The popular perception of Soviet victory "by numbers" was a myth created by German generals in their memoirs written in the 1950s. He rejects the caricature of the Red Army relying on mass rather than tactical skill, but accepts that at the tactical end (the ] and ] level), the Red Army was not particularly impressive and received significantly poorer training.<ref>Zagola 1989, p. 6.</ref> Zaloga points out that there were still many tactical lessons to be learned, but by 1943 the gap between Soviet and German tank crew training had "narrowed greatly", and the Soviets were soon at a comparable level with the Germans.<ref name="Zagola 1989, p. 18">Zagola 1989, p. 18.</ref>
	* The Soviets, in terms of operational art, were adept at using mobile tank formations.<ref name="Zagola 1989, p. 18" /> Zaloga asserts that Soviet operational methods were superior, allowing Soviet field commanders to bluff, baffle and overwhelm their opponents.<ref>Zagola 1989, p. 7.</ref>
			== Results ==
	Historian ] makes the following observations:
			] on the former battlefield, commemorates the Red Army losses and victory.]]
	* The quality of the two air forces were even. The Soviets had introduced air-to-ground communications, radar, a proper maintenance system, and depots for forward fuel reserves. This allowed aircraft to fly twenty missions in the heat of the battle (while the Luftwaffe suffered shortages).{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=48–49}}{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=192}}
			Soviet journalist and writer ] noted the devastation of the battle;<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ferguson |first=Niall |author-link=Niall Ferguson |title=The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2006 |isbn=1-59420-100-5 |location=New York |pages=534 |language=en}}</ref>{{blockquote|Villages destroyed by fire, shattered towns, stumps of trees, cars bogged down in green slime, field hospitals, hastily dug graves – it all merges into one.}}The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough;<ref name="THE BATTLE OF KURSK: 75 YEARS ON">{{Cite web |url=https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/the-battle-of-kursk-75-years-on |title=The Battle of Kursk: 75 Years On – The human and material toll of the world's largest tank battle was horrendous as the Wehrmacht's tactical edge was overwhelmed by superior means of destruction |last=Edele |first=Mark |date=18 July 2018 |website=Pursuit |access-date=2019-05-05 |archive-date=5 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190505225046/https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/the-battle-of-kursk-75-years-on |url-status=live }}</ref> the maximum depth of the German advance was {{convert|8|–|12|km|mi}} in the north and {{convert|35|km|mi}} in the south.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=166}} The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armour than in previous years, were unable to break through the deep Soviet defences and were caught off guard by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This result changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with the Soviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The Soviet victory was costly, with the Red Army losing considerably more men and materiel than the German Army. The Soviet Union's larger industrial potential and pool of manpower allowed them to absorb and replace its losses.<ref name="THE BATTLE OF KURSK: 75 YEARS ON"/> Guderian wrote:
	* The Soviet tanks were not inferior in quality. Although the T-34 model (with its 76&nbsp;mm main gun) was out-ranged by the German Tiger I and the Panther, the T-34 was faster and more manoeuvrable than the Tiger, and the latter had too many mechanical difficulties{{sfn|Overy|1995|p=207}} at the ]. To counter the Tiger tank, the Soviets used their tanks in a "hand-to-hand" combat role. Crews were ordered to close the distance so that range would not become an issue.{{sfn|Overy|1995|pp=207–209}} According to Glantz and House, the Soviet tanks pressed home their initial attacks despite significant German advantages: the range of the German tanks' 88&nbsp;mm gun, German air superiority and attacking a well-dug-in enemy in flat rolling terrain. Even so, the loss ratio was less than 2:1 – 320 German and 400 Soviet AFVs.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=167}}
			{{blockquote|With the failure of ''Zitadelle'' we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front ... Needless to say the exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=121}}}}
			With victory, the initiative firmly passed to the Red Army. For the remainder of the war the Germans were limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never able to regain the initiative or launch a major offensive on the Eastern Front.{{sfn|Jacobsen|Rohwer|1965|p=251}} British historian Robin Cross stated that "the Red Army had turned the tide at ]; it had seized the psychological advantage for the first time. But it was in the terrible killing grounds near Kursk that Hitler's panzers, and his ambitions, were dealt a blow from which they never recovered" and that "Failure at Kursk had dealt the Ostheer heavier psychological and material blows than it had suffered at Stalingrad".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cross |first=Robin |url=https://archive.org/details/battleofkurskope0000cros/page/n5/mode/1up |title=The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943 |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=9780141391090 |pages=251}}</ref> Further, the Western Allied landings in Italy opened a new ], further diverting German resources and attention.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=171}}
	Sir ], a World War II historian who worked at Bletchley Park during the war, has said:
	* Information decrypted by ] was given to the Soviets, which helped them prepare for the offensive. The Soviets had a spy at Bletchley Park (John Cairncross), who was giving them decrypts of German military communications. Hinsley said that some speculate that without Ultra, Germany would have won at Kursk, and "Hitler could have carved up Russia". Ultra decrypts were also given to the Soviets concerning German plans for Stalingrad.{{sfn|Hinley|1996}}
			Soviet air forces dropped about 20,000 tons of bombs during the battle, 4 times more than in the ], and 2.5 times more than in the Battle of Stalingrad.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=П.в |first=Казьмин |last2=Д.а |first2=Кузнецов |date=2010 |title=Боевая авиация в битве на Курской дуге |url=https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/boevaya-aviatsiya-v-bitve-na-kurskoy-duge |journal=Современные технологии обеспечения гражданской обороны и ликвидации последствий чрезвычайных ситуаций |issue=1 (1) |pages=112–114}}</ref>
	== Soviet counteroffensives ==
			Though the location, plan of attack and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the liberty to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military matters progressively increased while his attention to the political aspects of the war decreased.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p=216}} The opposite was true for Stalin; throughout the Kursk campaign, he trusted the judgment of his commanders, and as their decisions led to battlefield success, it increased his trust in their military judgment. Stalin stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resulting in the Red Army being entrusted with higher levels of autonomy during the war.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=9}}
	=== In the north: Operation ''Kutuzov'' ===
	{{main|Operation Kutuzov}}
	]
	The Soviets had offensive operations of their own planned for the summer of 1943, one of which, Operation ''Kutusov'', was launched on 12 July against the German forces (Army Group Centre) in the Orel salient north of Kursk. It kicked off before the German attack on Kursk had concluded. Two Soviet Fronts, the ] under the command of ] and the ] commanded by ], attacked the eastern and northern faces of the Orel salient respectively, which was defended by the 2nd&nbsp;Panzer Army. The southern face of the salient was also attacked, and German forces were withdrawn from the Kursk offensive to meet Operation ''Kutuzov''.
			However, while it is accurate that Hitler interfered in military operational planning and that Stalin generally provided his generals with greater autonomy, this characterization oversimplifies the strategic context surrounding the Battle of Kursk. Hitler's decisions to delay the offensive were not merely capricious but were based on substantial logistical concerns, notably the preparation of new Panther and Tiger tanks, which he believed were essential for a successful summer campaign. Recent examinations of wartime documents reveal that Stalin's trust in his generals was underpinned by a well-coordinated defense strategy that had been meticulously planned and robustly fortified by early June 1943. The Soviet forces, contrary to the implications of passive or reactive strategies, were proactively prepared and strategically positioned, with manpower and artillery strengths reaching over 80 percent of their July capacity by mid-May, effectively nullifying the advantage a swifter German offensive might have achieved. This suggests that Soviet readiness and strategic placement, rather than mere autonomy, were crucial in determining the outcome at Kursk. Moreover, the detailed preparation and anticipation of the German offensive's axis highlight a sophisticated level of strategic defense that goes beyond the simple dichotomy of command autonomy versus interference, reflecting a deep integration of military readiness and strategic foresight.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Zamulin |first=Valeriy N. |title=Could Germany Have Won the Battle of Kursk if It Had Started in Late May or the Beginning of June 1943? |journal=The Journal of Slavic Military Studies |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=606-617 |year=2014 |doi=10.1080/13518046.2014.963418 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.963418}}</ref>
	Operation ''Kutuzov'' was successful in diverting German reserves earmarked for Operation Citadel. The Soviets also reduced the Orel salient and inflicted substantial losses on the German army, setting the stage for the ].{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=188}} Although Soviet losses in the operation were heavy, they were better able to replace them.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=297}} Operation ''Kutuzov'' allowed the Soviets to seize the strategic initiative, which they held through the remainder of the war.
			All told, 239 Red Army personnel were awarded the USSR's highest degree of distinction, the title Hero of the Soviet Union (HSU), for their valour in the Battle of Kursk. Two women, Guards Senior Sergeants ] and ], were awarded the HSU title posthumously for their valour under fire while serving as combat medics. Borovichenko was assigned to the 32nd Guards Artillery Regiment, ], 5th Guards Army and Mareseva served in a medical platoon in the 214th Guards Rifle Regiment, ], 7th Guards Army.{{sfn|Empric|2020|p=6}}
	=== In the south: Operation ''Polkovodets Rumyantsev'' ===
	{{main|Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev}}
	]
	]
			The Battle of Kursk is cited by some as being the true turning point of the ],{{sfn|Barbier|2002|pp=170–171}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ferguson |first=Niall |author-link=Niall Ferguson |title=The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West |publisher=Penguin Publishing |year=2006 |isbn=1-59420-100-5 |location=New York |pages=533–535 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":2" /> however, this has been thoroughly criticized.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |author-link=Karl-Heinz Frieser |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-19-872346-2 |edition=1st |volume=VIII |location=Oxford |pages=83, 138, 154, 156, 170, 1214 |language=en}}</ref>
	Operation ] was intended as the main Soviet offensive for 1943. Its aim was to degrade the German 4th Panzer Army and cut off the extended southern portion of Army Group South.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=241}} After the heavy losses sustained by the Voronezh Front during Operation Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and refit, delaying the start of the offensive until 3 August. Diversionary attacks launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and ]s into the ] drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces in the path of the main blow.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=245}} The offensive was initiated by the Voronezh Front and Steppe Fronts against the northern wing of Army Group South. They drove through the German positions and made broad, deep penetrations past their lines. By 5 August the Soviets had taken Belgorod, and by the 12th they had reached the outskirts of Kharkov. The advance was finally checked by a counter-attack on 12&nbsp;August by the 2nd&nbsp;SS "Das&nbsp;Reich" and 3rd SS&nbsp; "Totenkopf" divisions. In the ensuing tank battles the Soviet armies were checked, suffering heavy losses in their armour.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=196}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=249}} After this setback the Soviet troops focused on Kharkov and captured it after heavy fighting on 23&nbsp;August. The battle is usually referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation by the Soviets.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=70}}
	== Results ==		== Casualties ==
			Soldier Antonius John who participated in the battle expressed that:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |author-link=Karl-Heinz Frieser |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-19-872346-2 |edition=1st |volume=VIII |location=Oxford |pages=206 |language=en |quote=}}</ref>
	] Cathedral on the former battlefield commemorates the Red Army losses and victory]]
			{{blockquote|events were on an apocalyptic scale. Scenes like the end of the world threatened to drive a person witnessing them to despair unless he had nerves of steel. Verdun, the Somme, and Stalingrad are comparable dates from history.}}The casualties suffered by the two combatants are difficult to determine, due to several factors. German equipment losses were complicated by the fact that they made determined efforts to recover and repair tanks. Tanks disabled one day might be back in action the next day.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=366}} German personnel losses are clouded by the lack of access to German unit records, which were seized at the end of the war. Many were transferred to the United States national archives and were not made available until 1978, while others were taken by the Soviet Union, which declined to confirm their existence.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=vi}} However, for comparison, military historian ] notes that the total combined fatalities of the ] (3,419) were less than a third of the fatalities incurred daily at the Battle of Kursk.<ref name=":122">{{Cite book |last=Hanson |first=Victor Davis |author-link=Victor Davis Hanson |title=The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won |publisher=Basic Books |year=2020 |isbn=978-1541674103 |edition=Reprint |location=New York |pages=200 |language=en}}</ref>
	The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armour than in previous years, were unable to break through the in-depth Soviet defences, and were surprised by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This was an outcome that few had predicted, and it changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front. The victory had not been cheap; the Red Army, although preventing the Germans from achieving their goals, lost considerably more men and materiel than the Wehrmacht.
			=== Soviet losses ===
	{{quotation|With the failure of ''Zitadelle'' we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front... Needless to say the Russians exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=121}} — ]}}
			] during the Battle of Kursk at Pokrovka, {{convert|40|km}} southwest of ].]]
	From this point on the initiative had firmly passed to the Red Army. For the remainder of the war the German army was limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never able to regain the initiative.<ref>Jacobsen p. 251</ref> A new front had opened in ], diverting some of Germany's resources and attention.{{sfn|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=171}} Both sides suffered great losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk and never again launched a major offensive in the East.
			The Russian military historian ], who based his figures on the Soviet archives, is considered by historian ] as the most reliable source for Soviet casualty figures.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=274}} Krivosheyev calculated total Soviet losses during the German offensive as 177,877.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=274}} The Central Front suffered 15,336 ] and 18,561 medical casualties, for a total of 33,897. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 irrecoverable casualties and 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892. The Steppe Front suffered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties and 42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=275}}
			During the two Soviet offensives, total casualties amounted to 685,456 men. During Operation Kutuzov, Soviet losses amounted to 112,529 irrecoverable casualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total loss of 429,890.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=276}} The Western Front reported 25,585 irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical casualties. The Bryansk Front suffered 39,173 irrecoverable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. The Central Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and 117,271 medical casualties.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=276}} Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev totaled 255,566 men, with 71,611 listed as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955 as medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339 irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties, for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 irrecoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, for a total of 98,273.<ref>G.F. Krivosheyev (1993) {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151102211430/http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/SovietLosses.pdf |date=2 November 2015 }}. Military Publishing House Moscow. Retrieved 4 July 2015.</ref>
	Though the location, plan of attack and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the liberty to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military matters progressively increased, while his attention to the political aspects of the war decreased.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p=216}} By the end of the war he was attempting to make tactical decisions on battlefields of which he had no direct knowledge. The German Army went from loss to loss as Hitler attempted to stubbornly hold on to every inch of ground that had been captured, with little understanding of the benefits of a mobile defence, nor regard to the loss of life in his army.{{sfn|Liddell Hart|1948|p=218}} His attempts to ] the day-to-day operations were increasingly limiting as Germany's conflict expanded into a three-front war. The opposite was true for Stalin. Throughout the Kursk campaign he trusted the judgment of his commanders, and upon these plans justified on the battlefield he came to trust their military judgment more and more. He stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions. The Red Army gained more freedom of action and became more and more fluid as the war continued.
	{{quotation|Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, but the Battle of Kursk was the beginning of the end. — ]{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=82}} }}
			Russian historian ] places the losses of the Red Army much higher, giving the figures of 450,000 killed, 50,000 missing (POWs), and 1.2 million wounded throughout the course of the battle, which Glantz states might be inflated, but nonetheless acknowledges that official Soviet figures are most likely conservative.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Б.В.Соколов. Правда о Великой Отечественной войне |url=http://www.lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/HIST/sokolov.txt_with-big-pictures.html |access-date=2024-04-07 |website=www.lib.ru}}</ref>{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|pp=428}} ] also mentions Sokolov and states that Soviet losses are clearly understated.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |author-link=Karl-Heinz Frieser |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-19-872346-2 |edition=1st |volume=VIII |location=Oxford |pages=200 |language=en |quote=}}</ref> The German historian Roman Töppel states that official Soviet losses are underestimated by 40%, giving a number of 1.2 million, with him having consulted armies and units archives.{{sfn|Töppel|2017|p=203}} Further, Töppel notes Russian historians critical of the official report estimate losses ranging from 910,000 to 2.3 million men, with Sokolov going as high as 999,300 Soviet casualties at Kursk.{{sfn|Töppel|2017|p=203}}
	=== Casualties ===
	The casualties between the two combatant nations are difficult to determine, due to several factors. In regard to the German army, equipment losses were complicated by the fact that the German army had an aggressive tank recovery and repair program. Tanks knocked out one day from mine damage often appeared again a day or two later once the tracks or running gear had been repaired.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=366}} Personnel losses are clouded by the loss of access to German unit records, which were seized by the victors following at the end of the war. Many of these records were taken to the United States national archives and not made available until 1978, while others were seized by the Soviets, who declined to even confirm their existence.{{sfn|Nipe|2010|p=vi}}
			]
	==== Soviet ====
			Soviet equipment losses during the German offensive came to 1,614&nbsp;tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed or damaged of the 3,925 vehicles committed to the battle.{{sfn|Krivosheev|2001|p=}} Soviet losses were roughly three times those of the Germans.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=367}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|2004|p=345}} During Operation Kutuzov, 2,349&nbsp;tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of an initial strength of 2,308; a loss of over 100&nbsp;percent. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 1,864&nbsp;tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of the 2,439 employed. The loss ratio suffered by the Soviets was roughly 5:1 in favour of the Germans.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|pp=276–277}} Large Soviet reserves of equipment and their high rate of tank production enabled the Soviet tank armies to quickly replace lost equipment and maintain their fighting strength.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=367}} The Red Army repaired many of its damaged tanks; many Soviet tanks were rebuilt up to four times to keep them in the fight. Soviet tank strength went back up to 2,750 tanks by 3 August due to the repair of damaged vehicles.<ref>Peter Strassner, ''European Volunteers: 5 SS Panzer Division Wiking'', p. 119; U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise – Phase III (KOSAVE II), pp. 5–12; Healy, ''Kursk'', pp. 85–88; and Steve Zaloga ''T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941–45'', Osprey p. 34</ref>
	]
	], who based his figures on the Soviet archives, is considered by David Glantz as the most reliable source for Soviet casualty figures. Krivosheyev calculates total Soviet losses during the German offensive of Operation Citadel at 177,877 casualties.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=274}} This is broken down from the three Soviet Fronts or army groups as follows: the ] suffered 15,336 of what the Soviet's termed ]. It also lost 18,561 ] for total casualties of 33,897 men. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 irrecoverable casualties and 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892, and the Steppe Front suffered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties with 42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=275}}
			According to the historian Christer Bergström, VVS losses during the German offensive amounted to 677 aircraft on the northern flank and 439 on the southern flank. Total casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates total Soviet air losses between 12 July and 18 August, during the German offensive and the Operation Kutuzov counteroffensive, were 1,104 aircraft.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=121}} Frieser states that the official Soviet figure of 1,626 planes lost "seems completely unbelievable", and cites Sokolov's minimum of 3,300 and cites ''Luftwaffe'' as being more reliable due to the strictness of data, with 4,209 Soviet planes downed.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |author-link=Karl-Heinz Frieser |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-19-872346-2 |edition=1st |volume=VIII |location=Oxford |pages=201–202 |language=en |quote=}}</ref>
	For the Soviet counter-offensives, Soviet losses during Operation Kutuzov at 112,529 irrecoverable casualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total loss of 429,890 men.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=276}} The Western Front reported the loss of 25,585 as irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical casualties. The Bryansk Front suffered 39,173 irrecoverable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. The Central Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and 117,271 medical casualties.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=276}} Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev were 255,566 men, with 71,611 listed as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955 as medical casualties. Between the Fronts involved the casualties broke down as follows: the Voronezh Front lost 48,339 irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties, for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 irrecoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, for a total of 98,273. The total Soviet casualties for their two counter-offensives were 685,456 men.
			=== German losses ===
	Soviet materiel losses during the German offensive operations at Kursk amounted to 2,586&nbsp;tanks and self-propelled guns. This represents over a 50% loss of the 3,925 vehicles committed to the battle, roughly seven times the number of German losses. Materiel losses during Operation Kutuzov totaled 2,349&nbsp;tanks and self-propelled guns. This is out of an initial strength of 2,308, over 100&nbsp;percent. The materiel losses in the Polkovodets Rumyantsev operation were also heavy. Krivosheyev's numbers of 1,864&nbsp;tanks and self-propelled guns out of 2,439 engaged also reflect well over a 50&nbsp;percent rate of loss. The loss ratio was roughly 5:1 in the Germans' favour.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|pp=276–277}}]Large reserves of equipment and the high rate of Soviet production enabled the Soviet tank armies to rapidly replace lost equipment and maintain their fighting strength.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=367}} Frieser supports Krivosheyev's casualty figures for men and armour.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|pp=150, 200|loc= and the pages onward}}
			In Soviet and German data, the human losses figures are not equivalent. In Soviet figures, both combat and non-combat losses (sick, deserted, accident...) were counted. In German, they did not count non-combat losses, and did not take into account the number of the missing, or died in hospitals from wounds, they counted only "''front-line losses''".<ref name=ria>{{Cite web |url=https://ria.ru/20181015/1530696810.html |title=В академии Генштаба оценили потери Красной армии под Прохоровкой, 15 October 2018 |date=15 October 2018 |access-date=28 February 2023 |archive-date=28 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230228011058/https://ria.ru/20181015/1530696810.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
			]
			Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive record, calculated that during Citadel 54,182 casualties were suffered. Of these, 9,036 were killed, 1,960 were reported missing and 43,159 were wounded. The 9th Army suffered 23,345 casualties, while Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=154}} Throughout the Soviet offensives, 111,114 casualties were suffered. In facing Operation Kutuzov, 14,215 men were killed, 11,300 were reported missing (presumed killed or captured) and 60,549 were wounded.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=202}} During Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 25,068 casualties were incurred, including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casualties for the three battles were approximately 170,000, with 46,500 killed or missing (per German military medical data).<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Frieser |first=Karl-Heinz |author-link=Karl-Heinz Frieser |title=Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-0-19-872346-2 |edition=1st |volume=VIII |location=Oxford |pages=200 |language=en |quote=}}</ref>
			However, German personnel losses are clouded by the lack of access to German unit records, which were seized at the end of the war.{{sfn|Nipe|2011|p=vi}} Heersarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/Army Group are based on the reports of the German troops, the numbers are understated. According to the 10-day reports, the losses of the 6th German Army from 11 to 31 August 1943 were only 5,122 men (in the report of the commander of this army, General ], and the commander of the GA "South", von Manstein, they reported this army lost 6,814 non-commissioned officers and soldiers only from 18 to 21 August). According to Niklas Zetterling with Anders Frankson, the 9th German Army lost from 4 to 9 July 1943 were 26,692 men; 1.46 times more than Heersarzt 10-Day reports.<ref name=Litvinenko2/> According to ], as of 5 July, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 17,369, while the tank and motorized divisions were 18,410. On 30 August 1943, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 8,269 men, and the tank and motorized divisions – 10,745 men. Then the average loss of personnel in the Battle of Kursk (excluding replenishment) is the same for infantry divisions: 9,100 men (52%); for tank and motorized divisions: 7,665 men (41%). At the same time, the losses of Army Group Center in the Battle of Kursk can be estimated by extrapolating the above estimate of the losses of the 4th Panzer Army and OG Kempf to the losses of Army Group Center. It should be considered that the losses of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk were 380,000 to 430,000 men.<ref name=Litvinenko2 /> The Germans lost in the Battle of Kursk can be estimated from the balance of the armed forces of Germany from 1 June 1943 to 1 June 1944. The Wehrmacht's losses for this period were 3,705,500 men. The average two-month loss – 623,000 men, and the loss of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk accounted for 61–75 percent of the Wehrmacht's total losses in July–August 1943. Estimates of 380,000–430,000 casualties in the Battle of Kursk does not contradict the balance of its strength.<ref name=Litvinenko2 />
	According to Christer Bergström, Red Air Force losses amounted to 677 aircraft on the northern flank and 439 on the southern flank of the bulge during the German offensive. Other unit casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates total Soviet air losses between 12&nbsp;July and 18&nbsp;August during the German offensive and the Operation Kutuzov counteroffensive were 1,104.{{sfn|Bergström|2008|p=121}}
			] tanks destroyed at Kursk]]
	==== German ====
			During Citadel, 252 to 323 tanks and assault guns were destroyed. By 5 July, when the Battle of Kursk started, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within two days, this had dropped to 40.<ref name="Jentz 1995, pp. 130–132">{{harvnb|Jentz|1995|pp=130–132}}</ref> On 17 July 1943 after Hitler had ordered a stop to the German offensive, Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of the Panthers,
	German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive record, calculated that the Wehrmacht suffered 54,182 casualties in total during the German offensive of Operation Citadel. Of these 9,036 personnel were killed in action, another 1,960 were reported missing and 43,159 wounded. The German 9th Army (under the command of ]) suffered 23,345 casualties while Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=154}}
			{{blockquote|Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days. By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the frontline. 25 Panthers had been lost as total write-offs (23 were hit and burnt and two had caught fire during the approach march). A hundred Panthers were in need of repair (56 were damaged by hits and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown) and 60 percent of the mechanical breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair service... On the evening of 11 July, 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total write-offs and 131 were in need of repair. A slow increase in the combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10 July) attests to the heavy fighting.<ref name="Jentz 1995, pp. 130–132"/>}}
	]
			By 16 July, Army Group South counted 161&nbsp;tanks and 14 assault guns lost. Up to 14 July, the 9th Army reported they had lost as write-offs 41&nbsp;tanks and 17 assault guns. These losses break down as 109 Panzer IVs, 42 Panthers, 38 Panzer IIIs, 31 assault guns, 19 ''Ferdinand''s, 10 Tigers and three ]s.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=151}} Before the Germans ended their offensive at Kursk, the Soviets began their counter-offensive and pushed the Germans back into a steady retreat. Thus, a report on 11 August 1943 showed that the numbers of write-offs in Panthers swelled to 156, with only 9 operational. The German Army was forced into a fighting retreat and increasingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles.<ref name="Jentz 1995 p. 134">{{harvnb|Jentz|1995|p=134}}</ref> On the Eastern Front, 50 Tiger tanks were lost during July and August, with some 240 damaged. Most of these occurred during their offensive at Kursk.{{sfn|Jentz|Doyle|1993|p=41}} Between 600 and 1,612 tanks and assault guns sustained damage in the period from 5 to 18 July.<ref name=kosave /><ref name=barba /> The total number of German tanks and assault guns destroyed during July and August on the Eastern Front amount to 1,331. Of these, Frieser estimates that 760 were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=202}} and Beevor writes that "the Red Army had lost five armoured vehicles for every German ] destroyed".{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=485}} Töppel's estimate is higher, up to 1,200 were destroyed{{sfn|Töppel|2017|p=203}} In total at least 2,952 German tanks and assault guns were destroyed or damaged during the battle of Kursk.{{sfn|Glantz|Orenstein|1999|p=230}}
	For the Soviet counter-offensives Frieser reports 86,064 German casualties, with 14,215 killed, 11,300 missing (presumed killed or captured), and 60,549 wounded during Operation Kutuzov.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=202}} For Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, Frieser states the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS units suffered 25,068 casualties, including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casualties for the three battles were about 170,000 men.
	In terms of equipment losses, Frieser reports the Wehrmacht lost 252 tanks and assault guns during the German offensive of Operation Citadel. Army Group South submitted losses of 161&nbsp;tanks and 14 assault guns by 16&nbsp;July. The 9th Army reported the loss of 41&nbsp;tanks and 17 assault guns up to and including 14&nbsp;July. Among these were 10 Tigers and 42 Panthers, as well as 19 ''Elefant'' heavy tank destroyers. Other losses included 109 Panzer IVs, 38 Panzer IIIs, three ]s and 31 assault guns.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=151}}		Frieser reports Luftwaffe losses at 524 aircraft, with 159 lost during the German offensive, 218 destroyed during Operation Kutuzov and 147 lost during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.{{sfn|Frieser et al |2007|p=204}} In reviewing the reports of the quartermaster of the Luftwaffe, Bergström presents different figures. Between 5 and 31 July, Bergström reports 681 aircraft lost or damaged (335 for ] and 346 for ''Luftflotte 6'') with 420 being written off (192 from ''Fliegerkorps&nbsp;VIII'' and 229 from ''Luftflotte&nbsp;6'').{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=120}}
	As stated above, the number of tank losses for the German offensive of Operation Citadel and the Soviet counter offensives is difficult to establish. Frieser gives the number of 1,331&nbsp;tanks destroyed for the entire ] for July and August, and estimates the number of tanks destroyed during the Battle of Kursk at 760.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=202}}
	Frieser reports German aircraft losses totalled 524 planes, with 159 lost during the German offensive of Operation Citadel, while 218 were destroyed during Operation Kutuzov and a further 147 during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.{{sfn|Frieser|2007|p=204}}
	Christer Bergström established similar numbers on review of the reports of the ''Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe''. The Luftwaffe reported losses of 681 aircraft lost or damaged from July 5 to July 31 (335 for ''Fliegerkorps&nbsp;VIII'' and 346 for ''Luftflotte&nbsp;6''). Of this total 420 were written off; 192 from ] and 229 from ].{{sfn|Bergström|2008|p=120}}
	== Notes ==		== Notes ==
			{{notelist
	{{notes
	| notes =		| refs =
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = Kharkov		| name = Breakdown1
			| The breakdown as shown in Bergstrom (2007) is as follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Army and 611 of 17th Air Army on the southern sector (Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern sector (Central Front). {{harvnb|Bergström|2007|pp=21, 127–128}}.
	| "With the final destruction of German forces at Kharkov, the Battle of Kursk came to an end. Having won the strategic initiative, the ] advanced along a {{convert|2000|km|mi|sp=uk}} front." {{harvnb|Taylor|Kulish|1974|p=171}}.
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = Strategic initiative		| name = Breakdown2
			| The breakdown as shown by Zetterling and Frankson is: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army (Central Front), 881 of 2nd Air Army (]), 735 of 17th Air Army (only as a secondary support for Voronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army (]) and 320 of ]. {{harvnb|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=20}}
	| "After Kursk, Germany could not even pretend to hold the strategic initiative in the East." {{harvnb|Glantz|House|1995|p=175}}.
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = Breakdown 1		| name = Breakdown3
	| The breakdown as shown in {{harvtxt|Bergström|2007|pp=127–128}} is as follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Army and 611 of 17th Air Army on the southern sector (Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern sector (Central Front).{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|p=21}}.		| The breakdown as shown in Frieser is as follows: 9,063 ], 43,159 ] and 1,960 ]. {{harvnb|Frieser et al |2007|p=154}}
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = Breakdown 2		| name = KurskA
			| The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the German offensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent Soviet counteroffensives, from 4 July to 23 August.
	| The breakdown as shown in {{harvtxt|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=20}} is as follows: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army (Central Front), 881 of 2nd Air Army (]), 735 of 17th Air Army (only as a secondary support for Voronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army (]) and 320 of ].
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = ReferenceA		| name = Breakdown4
			| The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev is: ]: 177,847; ]: 429,890; ]: 255,566. {{harvnb|Krivosheev|1997|pp=132–134}}
	| Operation Citadel refers to the German offensive from 4 to 16&nbsp;July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 5–23&nbsp;July.
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = Breakdown 3		| name = Breakdown5
			| Krivosheev's breakdown is: ]; 1,614. ]; 2,586. ]; 1,864. {{harvnb|Krivosheev|1997|p=262}}
	| The breakdown as shown in {{harvtxt|Frieser|2007|p=154}} is as follows:
	9,063 ], 43,159 ] and 1,960 ].
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = KurskA		| name = Breakdown6
			| Frieser et al: 86,064, of whom 25,515 dead or missing; ] 25,068 men, of whom 8,933 dead or missing. {{harvnb|Frieser et al |2007|pp=197, 200}}
	| The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the German offensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent Soviet counteroffensives, from 4 July to 23 August.
	}}
	{{efn
	| name = Breakdown 4
	| The breakdown as shown in {{harvtxt|Krivosheev|1997|pp=132–134}} is as follows: ]: 177,847; ]: 429,890; ]: 255,566.
	}}
	{{efn
	| name = Breakdown 5
	| The breakdown as shown in {{harvtxt|Krivosheev|1997|p=262}} is as follows: ]; 1,614. ]; 2,586. ]; 1,864.
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
Line 1,089:		Line 1,016:
	}}		}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = 1 July 1943		| name = "1 July 1943"
	| According to {{harvtxt|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}} these figures are for 1 July 1943 and accounts for only units that eventually fought in Operation Citadel (4th Panzer Army, part of Army Detachment "Kempf", 2nd Army and 9th Army). The figure for German manpower refers to ration strength (which includes non-combatants and wounded soldiers still in medical installations). The figures for guns and mortars are estimates based on the strength and number of units slated for the operation; the figure for tanks and assault guns include those in workshops.		| According to Zetterling and Frankson these figures are for 1 July 1943 and accounts for only units that eventually fought in Operation Citadel (4th Panzer Army, part of Army Detachment "Kempf", 2nd Army and 9th Army). The figure for German manpower refers to ration strength (which includes non-combatants and wounded soldiers still in medical installations). The figures for guns and mortars are estimates based on the strength and number of units slated for the operation; the figure for tanks and assault guns include those in workshops. {{harvnb|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=18}}
	}}		}}
	{{efn
	| name = Achtung Panzer!
	| Guderian developed and advocated the strategy of concentrating armoured formations at the point of attack (]) and deep penetration. In ''"Achtung Panzer!"'' he described what he believed were essential elements for a successful panzer attack. He listed three elements: surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. Of these, surprise was by far the most important.{{harvnb|Guderian|1937|p=205}}
	}}
	{{efn		{{efn
	| name = Civilian labour		| name = Civilian labour
	| Over 105,000 in April and as much as 300,000 in June, according to {{harvtxt|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}.		| Over 105,000 in April and as much as 300,000 in June. {{harvnb|Zetterling|Frankson|2000|p=22}}.
	}}
	{{efn
	| name = Fear of tanks
	| Nikolai Litvin, a Soviet anti-tank gunner present at the battle of Kursk, recalls his experience during the special training to overcome tank phobia. "The tanks continued to advance closer and closer. Some comrades became frightened, leaped out of the trenches, and began to run away. The commander saw who was running and quickly forced them back into the trenches, making it sternly clear that they had to stay put. The tanks reached the trench line and, with a terrible roar, clattered overhead&nbsp;... it was possible to conceal oneself in a trench from a tank, let it pass right over you, and remain alive." {{harvnb|Litvin|Britton|2007|pp=12–13}}.
	}}
	{{efn
	| name = Steppe Front
	| This order of battle does not show the complete composition of the Steppe Front. In addition to the units listed below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd Armies. {{harvnb|Clark|2012|p=204}}. Perhaps the order of battle below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel.
	}}
	{{efn
	| name = Air operation
	| The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The German ''Freya'' radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel. {{harvnb|Bergström|2007|pp=26–27}}.
	}}
	{{efn
	| name = War diary
	| KTB AOK9 9 July (Daily war diary of the 9th Army). {{harvnb|Frieser|2007|p=110}}.
	}}
	{{efn
	| name = Tank losses
	| 651 knocked out tanks, 526 write offs. Primary source: CAMO (Ministry of Defence of Russia). {{harvnb|Frieser|2007|p=111}}.
	}}		}}
	}}		}}
	== Citations ==		== See also ==
			* ]
	{{reflist|20em}}
	== References ==		== References ==
	{{refbegin}}		{{Reflist|20em}}
			== Sources ==
	* {{cite book
			*{{cite book |last=Atkinson |first=Rick |author-link=Rick Atkinson |year=2007 |title=The Day of Battle, The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944 |series=The Liberation Trilogy |volume=II |location=New York |publisher=Henry Holt |isbn=978-0-8050-6289-2}}
	| last = Bergström
			*{{cite book |last=Beevor |first=Antony |title=The Second World War |publisher=Back Bay Books |location=New York |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-316-02374-0 |url=https://archive.org/details/secondworldwar00beev}}
	| first = Christer
			*{{cite journal |last1=Bellamy |first1=Christopher |title=Implications for Military and Strategic Thought |journal=RUSI Journal |date=October 2003 |volume=148 |issue=5 |pages=84–88}}
	| title = Kursk&nbsp;— The Air Battle: July 1943
			*{{cite book |last=Bergström |first=Christer |title=Kursk&nbsp;– The Air Battle: July 1943 |publisher=Chevron/Ian Allan |location=Hersham |year=2007 |isbn=978-1-903223-88-8}}
	| publisher = Chervron/Ian Allen
			*{{cite book |last=Bergström |first=Christer |title=Bagration to Berlin&nbsp;– The Final Air Battle in the East: 1941–1945 |publisher=Chevron/Ian Allan |location=Burgess Hill |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-903223-91-8}}
	| location = Hersham
			*{{cite book |last=Barbier |first=Mary Kathryn |title=Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943 |publisher=Zenith Imprint |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-760312-54-4 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/kurskgreatesttan0000barb}}
	| year = 2007
			*{{cite journal |last=Brand |first=Dieter |title=Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil II) |journal=Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift |year=2003 |issue=6 |publisher=Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport |language=de |url=http://www.bmlv.gv.at/omz/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=158 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141101065858/http://www.bmlv.gv.at/omz/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=158 |archive-date=1 November 2014 }}
	| isbn = 978-1-903223-88-8
			*{{cite book |last=Bauman |first=Walter |title=Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise – Phase II (KOSAVE II) |publisher=US Army Concepts Analysis Agency |url=http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA360311 |format=PDF |location=Maryland |year=1998 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130620053903/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA360311 |archive-date=20 June 2013 }} – A study of the southern sector of the Battle of Kursk conducted by the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency and directed by Walter J. Bauman, using data collected from military archives in Germany and Russia by The Dupuy Institute (TDI).
	| ref = harv
			*{{cite book |last=Citino |first=Robert M. |author-link=Robert M. Citino |title=The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 |year=2012 |publisher=University Press of Kansas |location=Lawrence |isbn=978-0-7006-1826-2 <!-- not the work but a book review |url=https://kuecprd.ku.edu/~upress/cgi-bin/978-0-7006-1826-2.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161007091533/https://kuecprd.ku.edu/~upress/cgi-bin/978-0-7006-1826-2.html |archive-date=7 October 2016 --> }}
	}}
			*{{cite AV media |title=Kursk, The Epic Armored Engagement |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6xLMUifbxQ |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/N6xLMUifbxQ |archive-date=2021-12-11 |url-status=live |publisher=via the official channel of ]; session by the historians |author-link=Robert Citino |first1=Robert |last1=Citino |first2=Jonathan |last2=Parshall |work=2013 International Conference on WWII |year=2013 |ref={{harvid|Citino|2013}}}}{{cbignore}}
	* {{cite book
			*{{cite book |last=Clark |first=Lloyd |title=Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943 |publisher=Headline Publishing Group |location=London |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-7553-3639-5}}
	| last = Bergström
			*{{cite web |last=Copeland |first=B. Jack |title=Colossus, The First Large Scale Electronic Computer |url=http://www.colossus-computer.com/colossus1.html |website= colossus-computer.com|access-date=14 June 2013 |ref={{sfnRef|Copeland, ''Colossus''}}}}
	| first = Christer
			*{{cite journal |last=Corum |first=James |title=The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941 |journal=The Journal of Military History |volume=59 |number=1 |date=January 1995 |pages=53–76 |doi=10.2307/2944364 |issn=1543-7795 |jstor=2944364}}
	| title = Bagration to Berlin&nbsp;— The Final Air Battle in the East: 1941–1945
			*{{cite book |last=Dunn |first=Walter |title=Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943 |publisher=Greenwood Press |location=Westport, Conn |year=1997 |isbn=978-0-275-95733-9}}
	| publisher = Chervron/Ian Allen
			*{{cite book |last=Empric |first=Bruce E. |year=2020 |title=Tigers on the Steppe: Red Army Valor in the Battle of Kursk |publisher=Teufelsberg Press |location=Seattle |isbn=979-8-6316-6333-6}}
	| location = Burgess Hill
			*{{cite book |last1=Frieser |first1=Karl-Heinz |author-link1=Karl-Heinz Frieser |first2=Klaus |last2=Schmider |first3=Klaus |last3=Schönherr |first4=Gerhard |last4=Schreiber |first5=Kristián |last5=Ungváry |author-link5=Krisztián Ungváry |first6=Bernd |last6=Wegner |series=] |volume=VIII |title=Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten |trans-title=The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts |publisher=Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt |location=München |year=2007 |isbn=978-3-421-06235-2 |language=de |ref={{harvid|Frieser et al|2007}}}}
	| year = 2008
			*{{cite book |last1=Gerwehr |first1=Scott |last2=Glenn |first2=Russell W. |title=The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations |year=2000 |publisher=Rand |location=Santa Monica |isbn=0-8330-4831-7}}
	| isbn = 978-1-903223-91-8
			*{{cite journal |last=Glantz |first=David M. |author-link=David Glantz |title=Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 |journal=U.S. Army Command and General Staff College |location=Ft. Belvoir |date=September 1986 |volume=Soviet Army Studies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute |issue=CSI Report No. 11 |url=http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/glantz2.pdf |oclc=320412485 |access-date=7 September 2011 |archive-date=18 May 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150518092529/http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/glantz2.pdf }}
	| ref = harv
			*{{cite book |last=Glantz |first=David M. |year=1989 |title=Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War |publisher=Routledge |location=London |isbn=978-0-7146-3347-3}}
	}}
			*{{cite book |last1=Glantz |first1=David M. |last2=House |first2=Jonathan |title=When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler |publisher=University of Kansas Press |location=Lawrence |year=1995 |isbn=978-0-7006-0899-7 |url=https://archive.org/details/whentitansclashe00glan_0}}
	* {{cite book
			*{{cite book |last1=Glantz |first1=David M. |last2=Orenstein |first2=Harold S. |year=1999 |title=The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study |url=https://archive.org/details/battleforkursk190000unse |publisher=Frank Cass |location=London; Portland, OR |isbn=0-7146-4933-3}} – This report, commissioned by the Soviet General Staff in 1944, was designed to educate the Red Army on how to conduct war operations. It was classified secret until its declassification in 1964, and was subsequently translated to English and edited by Orenstein and Glantz. Its original title was ''Collection of materials for the study of war experience, no. 11'' ({{langx|ru|link=no|Сборник материалов по изучению опыта Великой Отечественной войны № 11|italic=yes|translit=Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny № 11}})
	| last = Barbier
			*{{cite book |last1=Glantz |first1=David M. |first2=Jonathan M. |last2=House |title=The Battle of Kursk |publisher=University Press of Kansas |location=Lawrence |year=2004 |orig-date=1999 |isbn=978-0-7006-1335-9}}
	| first = Mary Kathryn
			*{{cite book |last=Glantz |first=David M. |title=Soviet Military Intelligence in War |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2013 |location=London |isbn=978-1-136-28934-7}}
	| title = Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943
			*{{cite AV media |people=Grazhdan, Anna (director); Artem Drabkin & Aleksey Isaev (writers); Valeriy Babich, Vlad Ryashin, ''et al.'' (producers) |date=2011 |title=Operation Barbarossa |series=Soviet Storm: World War II in the East |medium=television documentary |url=http://www.starmediafilm.com/en/historical/velikaya_vojna |publisher=Star Media |access-date=19 March 2015 |ref={{sfnRef|''Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402141931/http://www.starmediafilm.com/en/historical/velikaya_vojna |archive-date=2 April 2015 }}
	| publisher = Zenith Imprint
			*{{cite book |last=Guderian |first=Heinz |title=Achtung – Panzer! |publisher=Sterling Press |year=1937 |isbn=0-304-35285-3}}
	| year = 2002
			*{{cite book |last=Guderian |first=Heinz |title=Panzer Leader |publisher=Da Capo |location=New York |year=1952 |isbn=0-306-81101-4}}
	| isbn = 978-0-760312-54-4
			*{{cite book |last1=Hartmann |first1=Christian |author-link1=Christian Hartmann (historian) |title=Operation Barbarossa:Nazi Germany's War in the East, 1941–1945 |date=2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-966078-0 |edition=First}}
	| ref = harv
			*{{cite book |last=Healy |first=Mark |title=Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the East |series=Campaign 16 |publisher=Osprey |location=London |year=1992 |isbn=978-1-85532-211-0}}
	}}
			*{{cite book |title=Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4–17 July 1943 |last=Healy |first=Mark |publisher=History Press |location=Stroud |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-7524-5716-1}}
	* {{cite journal
			*{{cite book |last1=Jacobsen |first1=Hans Adolf |last2=Rohwer |first2=Jürgen |year=1965 |title=Decisive battles of World War II; the German view |location=New York |publisher=Putnam |oclc=1171523193}}
	| last = Brand
			*{{cite book |last1=Jentz |first1=Tom |year=1993 |last2=Doyle |first2=Hillary |others=illustrated by Peter Sarson |title=Tiger I Heavy Tank 1942–45 |publisher=] |series=New Vanguard No.5 |isbn=978-1-85532-337-7}}
	| first = Dieter
			*{{Cite book |last=Jentz |first=Thomas |title=Germany's Panther Tank |publisher=Schiffer Pub |location=Atglen |year=1995 |isbn=0-88740-812-5}}
	| title = Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil II)
			*{{citation |last=Kasdorf |first=Bruno |title=The Battle of Kursk – An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles |publisher=] |url=http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/ADA377406.pdf |date=6 April 2000}}
	| journal = Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift
			*{{cite book |last=Krivosheev |first=Grigoriy |author-link=Grigoriy Krivosheyev |title=Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century |location=London |publisher=Greenhill Books |year=1997 |isbn=1-85367-280-7}}
	| year = 2003
			*{{cite book |last=Krivosheev |first=Grigoriy |author-link=Grigoriy Krivosheyev |title=Россия и СССР в войнах XX века: Потери вооруженных сил: Статистическое исследование |trans-title=Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: Loss of Armed Forces: Statistical Study |language=ru |year=2001 |publisher=Olma Press |location=Moscow |isbn=978-5-224-01515-3}}
	| issue = 6
			*{{cite book |last1=Koltunov |first1=Grigoriy |last2=Solovyev |first2=Boris |year=1970 |title=Kurskaya bitva |language=ru |location=Moscow |publisher=Voenizdat |oclc=1180810844}}
	| publisher = Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport
			*{{cite book |last=Liddell Hart |first=Basil Henry |author-link=B. H. Liddell Hart |title=The German Generals Talk |year=1948 |publisher=Morrow |location=New York}}
	| language = German
			*{{cite book |last1=Litvin |first1=Nikolai |last2=Britton |first2=Stuart |title=800 Days on the Eastern Front: A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II |year=2007 |publisher=University of Kansas Press |location=Lawrence |series=Modern War Studies |isbn=978-0-7006-1517-9}}
	| jstor =
			*{{cite book |last=Willmott |first=Hedley Paul |title=The Great Crusade: A new complete history of the Second World War |publisher=Free Press |location=New York |year=1990 |isbn=978-0-02-934715-7}}
	| url = http://www.bmlv.gv.at/omz/ausgaben/artikel.php?id=158
			*{{cite book |last=Moorhouse |first=Roger |title=Berlin at war: Life and Death in Hitler's capital, 1939–45 |publisher=Vintage |location=London |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-09-955189-8}}
	| ref = harv}}
			*{{cite book |last=Muller |first=Richard |title=The German Air War in Russia, 1941–1945 |publisher=The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America |location=Baltimore |year=1992 |isbn=1-877853-13-5}}
	* {{cite book
			*{{cite journal |last=Mulligan |first=Timothy P. |year=1987 |title=Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943 |journal=Journal of Contemporary History |volume=22 |issue=2 |pages=235–260 |doi=10.1177/002200948702200203 |s2cid=162709461 |url=http://jch.sagepub.com/cgi/content/citation/22/2/235 |format=PDF |access-date=25 July 2007 |archive-date=23 February 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090223193149/http://jch.sagepub.com/cgi/content/citation/22/2/235 }}
	| last1 = Carell
			*{{cite book |last=Münch |first=Karlheinz |title=Combat History of Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653: Formerly the Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 197 1940–1942 |year=1997 |publisher=] |location=Winnipeg |isbn=0-921991-37-1}}
	| first1 = Paul
			*{{cite book |last=Murray |first=Williamson |title=Strategy for defeat: the Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 |publisher=Air University Press |location=Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala |year=1983}}
	| last2 = Osers
			*{{cite book |last=Newton |first=Steven |title=Kursk: The German View |publisher=Da Capo Press |location=Cambridge |year=2002 |isbn=0-306-81150-2}}
	| first2 = Ewald
			*{{cite web |last=Nipe |first=George |title=Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory |url=http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-germanys-lost-victory-in-world-war-ii.htm |access-date=17 July 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150810061215/http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-kursk-germanys-lost-victory-in-world-war-ii.htm |archive-date=10 August 2015 |date=1998}}
	| authorlink1 = Paul Carell
			*{{cite book |last=Nipe |first=George |title=Blood, Steel, and Myth: The II. SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka, July 1943 |year=2011 |publisher=Newbury |location=Southbury, Conn |isbn=978-0-9748389-4-6}}
	| others = Translated from the German ''Unternehmen Barbarossa''
			*{{cite book |last=Overy |first=Richard |author-link=Richard Overy |title=Why the Allies Won |publisher=Norton Press |location=New York |year=1995 |isbn=978-0-393-03925-2}}
	| title = Hitler's War on Russia: V1: Hitler Moves East, V2: Scorched Earth
			*{{cite book |last=Searle |first=Alaric |year=2017 |title=Armoured Warfare: A Military, Political and Global History |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HN4CDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA80 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-4411-9813-6}}
	| year = 1966–1971
			*{{cite book |last=Showalter |first=Dennis E. |author-link=Dennis Showalter |title=Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk, The Turning Point of World War II |year=2013 |publisher=Random House |location=New York |isbn=978-1-4000-6677-3}}
	| publisher = Corgi
			*{{cite journal |last1=Showalter |first1=Dennis |title=The Crucible |author-link=Dennis Showalter |journal=MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History |date=2013 |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=28–37 |url=http://www.historynet.com/the-crucible-at-kursk.htm |ref={{harvid|Showalte MHQ|2013}}}}
	| location = London
			*{{cite book |last1=Taylor |first1=A.J.P |last2=Kulish |first2=V.M. |author-link1=A. J. P. Taylor |title=A History of World War Two |year=1974 |publisher=Octopus Books |location=London |isbn=0-7064-0399-1 |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofworldwa00tayl}}
	| isbn = 978-0-552-08638-7
			*{{cite book |last=Töppel |first=Roman |year=2017 |title=Kursk 1943: Die größte Schlacht des Zweiten Weltkriegs |trans-title=Kursk 1943: The Largest Battle of the Second World War |language=de |publisher=Schöningh |location=Paderborn |isbn=978-3-506-78187-1}}
	| ref = harv
			*{{cite journal |last1=Weiss |first1=Thomas J II |title=Fire Support at the Battle of Kursk |journal=Field Artillery |date=2000 |issue=4 |url=http://cdm15766.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15766coll2/id/499 |access-date=17 June 2015}}
	}}
			*{{cite book |last=Yeide |first=Harry |title=Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies |publisher=Zenith Press |year=2014 |isbn=978-0-7603-4592-4}}
	* {{cite book
			*{{cite book |last=Zamulin |first=Valeriy |title=Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative |publisher=Helion & Company |location=Solihull |year=2011 |isbn=978-1-906033-89-7}}
	| last = Clark
			*{{cite book |last1=Zetterling |first1=Niklas |last2=Frankson |first2=Anders |title=Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis |series=Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War |publisher=Frank Cass |location=London |year=2000 |isbn=0-7146-5052-8}}
	| first = Alan
	| authorlink = Alan Clark
	| title = Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945
	| publisher = Morrow
	| location = New York
	| year = 1966
	| oclc = 40117106
	| isbn = 0-688-04268-6
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Clark
	| first = Lloyd
	| title = Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943
	| publisher = Headline Publishing Group
	| location = London
	| year = 2012
	| isbn = 978-0-7553-3639-5
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite web
	| last = Copeland
	| first = B. Jack
	| title = Colossus, The First Large Scale Electronic Computer
	| url = http://www.colossus-computer.com/colossus1.html
	| accessdate = 14 June 2013
	| ref = {{sfnRef|Copeland, .27.27Colossus.27.27}}
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Dunn
	| first = Walter
	| title = Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943
	| publisher = Greenwood Press
	| location = Westport, Conn
	| year = 1997
	| isbn = 978-0-275-95733-9
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Frieser
	| first = Karl-Heinz
	| coauthors = Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schönherr, Gerhard Schreiber, Kristián Ungváry, Bernd Wegner
	| title = Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg – Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten
	| publisher = Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt München
	| location = München
	| year = 2007
	| isbn = 978-3-421-06235-2
	| language = German
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last1 = Gerwehr
	| first1 = Scott
	| last2 = Glenn
	| first2 = Russell W.
	| title = The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations
	| year = 2000
	| publisher = Rand
	| location = Santa Monica
	| isbn = 0-8330-4831-7
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite journal
	| last = Glantz
	| first = David M.
	| authorlink = David Glantz
	| title = Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943
	| journal = U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
	| location= Ft. Belvoir
	| month = September
	| year = 1986
	| volume = Soviet Army Studies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute
	| issue = CSI Report No. 11
	| url = http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/glantz2.pdf
	| accessdate =
	| oclc = 320412485
	| ref = harv
	}}
			==Further reading==
	* {{cite book
			*{{cite book |last=Battistelli |first=Pier Paolo |title=Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |year=2013 |orig-date=2008 |isbn=978-1-47280002-2}}
	| last = Glantz
			*{{cite book |last=Clark |first=Alan |author-link=Alan Clark |title=Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945 |publisher=Morrow |location=New York |year=1966 |oclc=40117106 |isbn=0-688-04268-6}}
	| first = David M.
			*{{cite book |last=Glantz |first=David M. |title=The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II |publisher=Presidio Press |location=Novato, CA |year=1990 |isbn=0-89141-380-4}}
	| year = 1989
			*{{Citation |last=Hill |first=Alexander |title=The Red Army and the Second World War |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2017 |isbn=978-1-1070-2079-5}}.
	| title = Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War
			*{{cite web |last=Hinley |first=Sir Harry |title=The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War |work=CL |publisher=CAM |place=] |year=1996 |url=http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/Historical/hinsley.html |access-date=13 June 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110622015407/http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/Historical/hinsley.html |archive-date=22 June 2011 }}
	| publisher = Routledge
			*{{cite book |editor-last=Keegan |editor-first=John |editor-link=John Keegan |title=Atlas of World War II |publisher=Collins |location=London |year=2006 |isbn=0-00-721465-0}}
	| location = London
			*{{cite book |last=Pinkus |first=Oscar |title=The war aims and strategies of Adolf Hitler |publisher=McFarland |location=Jefferson, NC |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-78642054-4}}
	| isbn = 978-0-7146-3347-3
			*{{cite thesis |last=Töppel |first=Roman |title=Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 – Legenden, Mythen, Propaganda |year=2001 |degree=MA |language=de |publisher=Technical University |location=Dresden |ref=none}}
	| ref = harv
			*{{cite book |last=Weingartner |first=James |title=Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: A Military History, 1933–45 |publisher=Battery Press |year=1991 |location=Nashville |page=81}}
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Glantz
	| first = David M.
	| title = The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II
	| publisher = Presidio Press
	| location = Novato, CA
	| year = 1990
	| isbn = 0-89141-380-4
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last1 = Glantz
	| first1 = David M.
	| last2 = House
	| first2 = Jonathon
	| title = When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler
	| publisher = University of Kansas Press
	| location = Lawrence, Kansas
	| year = 1995
	| isbn = 978-0-7006-0899-7
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Glantz
	| first = David M.
	| last2 = Orenstein
	| first2 = Harold S.
	| year = 1999
	| title = The Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study
	| publisher = Frank Cass
	| location = London; Portland, OR
	| isbn = 0-7146-4933-3
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Glantz
	| first = David M.
	| first2 = Jonathan M.
	| last2 = House
	| title = The Battle of Kursk
	| publisher = University Press of Kansas
	| location = Lawrence, Kansas
	| year = 2004
	| origyear = 1999
	| isbn = 978-070061335-9
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Glantz
	| first = David M.
	| title = Soviet Military Intelligence in War
	| publisher = Taylor & Francis
	| year = 2013
	| location = London
	| isbn = 978-1-136-28934-7
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Guderian
	| first = Heinz
	| title = Achtung - Panzer!
	| publisher = Sterling Press
	| location =
	| year = 1937
	| isbn = 0-304-35285-3
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Healy
	| first = Mark
	| title = Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the East
	| publisher = Osprey
	| location = London
	| year = 1992
	| isbn = 978-1-85532-211-0
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| title = Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4–17 July 1943
	| last = Healy
	| first = Mark
	| publisher = History Press
	| location = Stroud
	| year = 2010
	| isbn = 978-0-7524-5716-1
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite web
	| last = Hinley
	| first = Sir Harry
	| title = The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War
	| work = cl.cam.ac.uk
	| year = 1996
	| url = http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/Historical/hinsley.html
	| accessdate = 13 June 2013
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* Jacobsen, Hans Adolf and Jürgen Rohwer ''Decisive battles of World War II; the German view''. New York, NY: Putnam (1965) ISBN
	* {{cite journal
	| last = Kasdorf
	| first = Bruno
	| title = The Battle of Kursk – An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles
	| publisher = ]
	| url = http://www.theblackvault.com/documents/ADA377406.pdf
	| format = PDF
	| year=2000
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| editor-last = Keegan
	| editor-first = John
	| editor-link = John Keegan
	| title = Atlas of World War II
	| publisher = Collins
	| location = London
	| year = 2006
	| isbn = 0-00-721465-0
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Krivosheev
	| first = Grigoriy
	| authorlink = Grigoriy Krivosheyev
	| title = Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century
	| location = London
	| publisher = Greenhill Books
	| year = 1997
	| isbn = 1-85367-280-7
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Krivosheev
	| first = Grigoriy
	| authorlink = Grigoriy Krivosheyev
	| title = Россия и СССР в войнах XX века: Потери вооруженных сил: Статистическое исследование
	| trans_title = Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: Loss of Armed Forces: Statistical Study
	| language = Russian
	| year= 2001
	| publisher = Olma Press
	| location = Moscow
	| isbn = 978-5-224-01515-3
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Liddell Hart
	| first = Basil Henry
	| authorlink = B. H. Liddell Hart
	| title = The German Generals Talk
	| year = 1948
	| publisher = Morrow
	| location = New York
	| isbn =
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last1 = Litvin
	| first1 = Nikolai
	| last2 = Britton
	| first2 = Stuart
	| title = 800 Days on the Eastern Front: A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II
	| year = 2007
	| publisher = University of Kansas Press
	| location = Lawrence, Kansas
	| series = Modern War Studies
	| isbn = 978-0-7006-1517-9
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Manstein
	| first = Erich von
	| authorlink = Erich von Manstein
	| title = ]
	| publisher = Monch
	| location = München
	| year = 1983
	| origyear = 1955
	| language = German
	| trans_title = Lost Victories
	| isbn = 978-3-7637-5051-1
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite journal
	| last = Mulligan
	| first = Timothy P.
	| year = 1987
	| title = Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk, 1943
	| journal = Journal of Contemporary History
	| volume = 22
	| issue = 2
	| pages = 235–260
	| doi = 10.1177/002200948702200203
	| url = http://jch.sagepub.com/cgi/content/citation/22/2/235
	| format = PDF
	| ref = harv
	}}
	*{{cite book
	| last = Münch
	| first = Karlheinz
	| title = Combat History of Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653: Formerly the Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 197 1940–1942
	| year = 1997
	| publisher = J. J. Fedorowicz
	| location = Winnipeg
	| isbn = 0-921991-37-1
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Nipe
	| first = George
	| title = Blood, Steel, and Myth: The II. SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka, July 1943
	| year = 2010
	| publisher = Newbury
	| location = Southbury, Conn
	| isbn =
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Overy
	| first = Richard
	| authorlink = Richard Overy
	| title = Why the Allies Won
	| publisher = Norton Press
	| location = New York
	| year = 1995
	| isbn = 978-0-393-03925-2
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite web
	| title = Rebuilt Codebreaker Machine Cracked Nazi Secrets in World War II
	| date = 27 May 2011
	| work = Innovation News
	| publisher = TechMediaNetwork
	| url = http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/tunny-code-breaker-nazi-secrets-2020/
	| archiveurl = http://web.archive.org/web/20110623024442/http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/tunny-code-breaker-nazi-secrets-2020/
	| archivedate =23 June 2011
	| accessdate = 14 June 2013
	| ref = {{sfnRef|.27.27Innovation News.27.27|2011}}
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Restayn
	| first = Jean
	| first2 = N.
	| last2 = Moller
	| title = Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album, Volume 1: The South
	| year = 2002
	| publisher = J.J. Fedorowicz
	| location = Altona, MB
	| isbn = 0-921991-70-3
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last1 = Taylor
	| first1 = A.J.P
	| last2 = Kulish
	| first2 = V.M
	| authorlink1 = A. J. P. Taylor
	| title = A History Of World War Two
	| year = 1974
	| publisher = Octopus Books
	| location = London
	| isbn = 0-7064-0399-1
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite journal
	| last = Töppel
	| first = Roman
	| title = Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 – Legenden, Mythen, Propaganda
	| year = 2001
	| format = MA thesis
	| language = German
	| publisher = Technical University
	| location = Dresden
	| ref = harv
	}}
	* {{cite book
	| last = Zetterling
	| first = Niklas
	| last2 = Frankson
	| first2 = Anders
	| title = Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis
	| series = Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War
	| publisher = Frank Cass
	| location = London
	| year = 2000
	| isbn = 0-7146-5052-8
	| ref = harv
	}}
	{{refend}}
	== Further reading ==
	* irbergui (YouTube id), , ], Retrieved 2008-09-19
	* Licari, Michael J. , , Retrieved 2008-09-19
	* Licari, Michael J. , , Retrieved 2008-09-19
	* {{cite book | last = Mawdsley | first = Evan | title = Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941–1945 | year = 2007 | isbn = 0-340-61392-0 | publisher = Hodder Arnold | location = London }}
	* {{cite book | editor1-last = Newton | editor1-first = Steven H. | title = Kursk: The German View. Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders | publisher = Da Capo | year = 2002 | location = Cambridge, Mass. | isbn = 978-0-306-81150-0 }}
	* {{cite book | last = Nipe | first = George | title = Decision In the Ukraine, Summer 1943, II. SS and III. Panzerkorps | publisher = J.J. Fedorowicz | location = Winnipeg | year = 1996 | isbn = 0-921991-35-5 }}
	* {{cite book | last = Restayn | first = Jean | first2 = N. | last2 = Moller | title = Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album, Volume 2: The North | year = 2006 | publisher = J.J. Fedorowicz | location = Altona, MB | isbn = 0-921991-72-X }}
	* {{cite book | last = Robbins | first = David L. | title = Last Citadel | year = 2004 | publisher = Orion | location = London | isbn = 0-7528-5925-0 }}
	* Wilson, Alan. , 6 February 1999.<!--Retrieved 2008-09-19--> —Information from the US Army KOSAVE II study on the southern face battle
	* Wilson, Alan. (maps), 27 October 1999<!--Retrieved 2008-09-19-->
	== External links ==		== External links ==
			*Licari, Michael J. . Archived from on 2014-09-12. Retrieved 1 November 2014.
	{{Commons-inline|Battle of Kursk}}
			*Licari, Michael J. . Archived from on 2014-09-11. Retrieved 1 November 2014.
			*Wilson, Alan. , 6 February 1999.<!--Retrieved 2008-09-19--> – Information from the US Army KOSAVE II study on the southern face battle
			*Wilson, Alan. (maps), 27 October 1999<!--Retrieved 2008-09-19-->
			*"Fighting a Lost War: The German Army in 1943": {{YouTube|1SdO-btKuds}}, lecture by ], via the official channel of the ]
	{{World War II}}		{{World War II}}
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			{{Authority control}}
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Latest revision as of 02:46, 5 January 2025

"Kursk offensive" redirects here. For the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, see 2024 Kursk offensive. 1943 tank battle in the Soviet Union

Battle of Kursk
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
German penetration during the attack on the Kursk salient and Soviet counter-offensive in the northern sector
Date 5 July 1943 (1943-07-05) – 23 August 1943 (1943-08-23) (1 month, 2 weeks and 4 days) Location Kursk, Kursk Oblast, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union51°42′N 36°06′E / 51.7°N 36.1°E / 51.7; 36.1 Result Soviet victory Territorial changes Soviets regain territory along a 2,000 km (1,200 mi) wide front after the battle. Soviets regain initiative to strike in southern Ukraine
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein Günther von Kluge Hermann Hoth Werner Kempf Walter Model Otto Deßloch Robert Ritter von Greim Heinz Guderian Alfred Jodl	Georgy Zhukov Vasily Sokolovsky Konstantin Rokossovsky Aleksandr Vasilevsky Nikolai Vatutin Ivan Konev Pavel Rotmistrov Sergei Rudenko Kirill Moskalenko Markian Popov Alexander Novikov
Strength
Operation Citadel: 780,900 2,928 tanks 9,966 guns and mortars Soviet counter-offensive phase: 940,900 3,253 tanks 9,467 guns and mortars 2,110 aircraft	Operation Citadel: 1,910,361 (including 1,426,352 actual combat soldiers) 5,128 tanks 25,013 guns and mortars Soviet counter-offensive phase: 2,500,000 7,360 tanks 47,416 guns and mortars 2,792 to 3,549 aircraft
Casualties and losses
Operation Citadel: 54,182 men 252–323 tanks and assault guns destroyed, 1,612 tanks and assault guns damaged 159 aircraft c. 500 guns Battle of Kursk: Per German incomplete medical data : 165,314 (54,182 during Operation Citadel and 111,132 during the Soviet counter-offensives) – 203,000 German strength data: ~380,000–430,000 combat casualties Soviet claim: 500,000+ combat casualties At least 2,952 tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged (of which, 760–1,200 tanks and assault guns destroyed) 681 aircraft (for 5–31 July)	Operation Citadel: 177,847 men 1,614–1,956 tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged 459~1,000 aircraft Battle of Kursk: 254,470–450,000 killed, captured or missing 608,833–1,200,000 wounded or sick (of which 74% wounded and 26% sick) Total: 863,303–1,700,000 (including 710,000 combat casualties) 6,064–7,000 tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged (of which, 60–65% were completely destroyed) **1,626–3,300 aircraft (Luftwaffe claimed 4,209 Soviet planes downed) 5,244 guns and mortars

v t e Eastern Front

Naval warfare Baltic Sea Black Sea Arctic Ocean 1941 Barbarossa Brest Białystok–Minsk 1st Baltic Brody Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina 1st Smolensk Uman Odessa 1st Kiev Tallinn Leningrad Sea of Azov 1st Kharkov 1st Crimea Sevastopol Rostov Gorky Moscow Finland Kerch Chechnya Air war 1941 1942 Lyuban Barvenkovo–Lozovaya Rzhev Toropets–Kholm Demyansk Kholm Bamberg 2nd Kharkov Case Blue Caucasus Rzhev–Sychyovka Sinyavino Stalingrad Velikiye Luki Mars Little Saturn 1943 Iskra Ostrogozhsk–Rossosh Voronezh–Kharkov Polar Star 3rd Kharkov Gorky Blitz Kursk 1st Donbas Belgorod-Kharkov 2nd Donbas 2nd Smolensk Lenino Dnieper Nevel 2nd Kiev 1944 Dnieper–Carpathian Leningrad–Novgorod Narva 2nd Crimea 1st Jassy–Kishinev Karelia Bagration Lvov–Sandomierz Doppelkopf 2nd Jassy–Kishinev Dukla Pass 2nd Baltic Belgrade Debrecen Petsamo–Kirkenes Courland Gumbinnen Budapest 1945 Vistula–Oder Western Carpathian East Prussia Silesia Breslau Solstice East Pomerania Lake Balaton Moravia–Ostrava Vienna Bratislava–Brno Berlin Prague Prague uprising

v t e Battle of Kursk
Citadel Prokhorovka Kutuzov Roland Polkovodets Rumyantsev Belgorod Kharkov Order of Battle

The Battle of Kursk was a major World War II Eastern Front battle between the forces of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union near Kursk in southwestern Russia during the summer of 1943, resulting in a Soviet victory. The Battle of Kursk is the single largest battle in the history of warfare. It ranks only behind the Battle of Stalingrad several months earlier as the most often-cited turning point in the European theatre of the war. It was one of the costliest battles of the Second World War, the single deadliest armoured battle in history, and the opening day of the battle, 5 July, was the single costliest day in the history of aerial warfare in terms of aircraft shot down. The battle was further marked by fierce house-to-house fighting and hand-to-hand combat.

The battle began with the launch of the German offensive Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle), on 5 July, which had the objective of pinching off the Kursk salient with attacks on the base of the salient from north and south simultaneously. After the German offensive stalled on the northern side of the salient, on 12 July, the Soviets commenced their Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of Operation Kutuzov (Russian: Кутузов) against the rear of the German forces on the same side. On the southern side, the Soviets also launched powerful counterattacks the same day, one of which led to a large armoured clash, the Battle of Prokhorovka. On 3 August, the Soviets began the second phase of the Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, Полководец Румянцев) against the German forces on the southern side of the salient.

The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943, by cutting off and enveloping the forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk salient. Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with his allies, who he thought were considering withdrawing from the war. It was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labour in the German armaments industry. The Soviet government had foreknowledge of the German plans from the Lucy spy ring. Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German armoured spearhead. The Germans delayed the offensive while they tried to build up their forces and waited for new weapons, giving the Red Army time to construct a series of deep defensive belts and establish a large reserve force for counter-offensives, with one German officer describing Kursk as "another Verdun".

The battle was the final strategic offensive that the Germans were able to launch on the Eastern Front. Because the Allied invasion of Sicily began during the battle, Adolf Hitler was forced to divert troops training in France to meet the Allied threat in the Mediterranean, rather than using them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front. As a result, Hitler cancelled the offensive at Kursk after only a week, in part to divert forces to Italy. Germany's heavy losses of men and tanks ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army held a strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Battle of Kursk was the first time in the Second World War that a German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its strategic depths. Though the Red Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives after the German attack at Kursk were their first successful summer offensives of the war. The battle has been called the "last gasp of Nazi aggression".

Background

As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclusion, the Red Army moved to a general offensive in the south, in Operation Little Saturn. By January 1943, a 160-to-300-kilometre-wide (99 to 186 mi) gap had opened between German Army Group B and Army Group Don, and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut off all German forces south of the Don River, including Army Group A operating in the Caucasus. Army Group Center came under significant pressure as well. Kursk was retaken by the Soviets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February. The Soviet Bryansk, Western, and newly created Central Fronts prepared for an offensive which envisioned the encirclement of Army Group Centre between Bryansk and Smolensk. By February 1943 the southern sector of the German front was in strategic crisis.

Since December 1942, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had been strongly requesting "unrestricted operational freedom" to allow him to use his forces in a fluid manner. On 6 February 1943, Manstein met with Hitler at his headquarters in Görlitz (now Gierłoż, Poland) to discuss the proposals he had previously sent. He received an approval from Hitler for a counteroffensive against the Soviet forces advancing in the Donbas region. On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces were reorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South and placed under Manstein's command. Directly to the north, Army Group B was dissolved, with its forces and areas of responsibility divided between Army Group South and Army Group Centre. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive breach in the German lines. On 18 February, Hitler arrived at Army Group South headquarters at Zaporizhia just hours before the Soviets liberated Kharkov, and had to be hastily evacuated on the 19th.

Once given freedom of action, Manstein intended to utilise his forces to make a series of counterstrokes into the flanks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkov and Kursk. The II SS Panzer Corps had arrived from France in January 1943, refitted and up to near full strength. Armoured units from the 1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had pulled out of the Caucasus and further strengthened Manstein's forces.

The operation was hastily prepared and did not receive a name. Later known as Third Battle of Kharkov, it commenced on 21 February, as 4th Panzer Army under General Hoth launched a counter-attack. The German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the drive north, retaking Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod on 18 March. A Soviet offensive launched on 25 February by the Central Front against Army Group Centre had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow the attacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein. Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring rasputitsa, resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March. The counteroffensive left a Soviet salient extending 250 kilometres (160 mi) from north to south and 160 kilometres (99 mi) from east to west into the German area of control, centred on the city of Kursk.

German plans and preparation

The heavy losses sustained by Germany since the opening of Operation Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantry and artillery. Units were in total 470,000 men understrength. For the Wehrmacht to undertake an offensive in 1943, the burden of the offensive, in both attacking the Soviet defences and holding ground on the flanks of the advance, would have to be carried primarily by the panzer divisions. On 10 March, Manstein presented a plan whereby the German forces would pinch off the Kursk salient with a rapid offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided.

On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which authorised several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient. As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade Günther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Centre, to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused, believing that his forces were too weak to launch such an attack. Further Axis advances were blocked by Soviet forces that had been shifted down from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod. By mid-April, amid poor weather and with the German forces exhausted and in need of refitting, the offensives of Operational Order No. 5 were postponed.

On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6, which called for the Kursk offensive operation, codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"), to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The directive was drafted by Kurt Zeitzler, the OKH Chief of Staff. For the offensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defences or to launch an offensive of their own. Some military historians have described the operation using the term blitzkrieg (lightning war); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle.

Operation Citadel called for a double envelopment, directed at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders of five armies and seal off the salient. Army Group Centre would provide General Walter Model's 9th Army to form the northern pincer. It would cut through the northern face of the salient, driving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the rail line from Soviet attack. Army Group South would commit the 4th Panzer Army, under Hermann Hoth, and Army Detachment Kempf, under Werner Kempf, to pierce the southern face of the salient. This force would drive north to meet the 9th Army east of Kursk. Manstein's main attack was to be delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by the II SS Panzer Corps under Paul Hausser. The XLVIII Panzer Corps, commanded by Otto von Knobelsdorff, would advance on the left while Army Detachment Kempf would advance on the right. The 2nd Army, under the command of Walter Weiss, would contain the western portion of the salient.

On 27 April, Model met with Hitler to review and express his concern regarding intelligence which showed the Red Army constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk. He argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended completely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive, or radically revising the plan for Citadel. Though in mid-April, Manstein had considered the Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings.

Hitler called his senior officers and advisors to Munich for a meeting on 4 May. Hitler spoke for about 45 minutes on the reasons to postpone the attack, essentially reiterating Model's arguments. A number of options were put forth for comment: going on the offensive immediately with the forces at hand; delaying the offensive further to await the arrival of new and better tanks; radically revising the operation, or cancelling it altogether. Manstein advocated an early attack, but requested two additional infantry divisions, to which Hitler responded that none were available. Kluge spoke out strongly against postponement and discounted Model's intelligence. Albert Speer, the minister of Armaments and War Production, spoke about the difficulties of rebuilding the armoured formations and the limitations of German industry to replace losses. General Heinz Guderian argued strongly against the operation, stating "the attack was pointless". The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was not aborted. Three days later, OKW, Hitler's conduit for controlling the military, postponed the launch date for Citadel to 12 June.

Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his concerns over an operation that would likely degrade the panzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. He considered the offensive, as planned, to be a misuse of the panzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he had laid out as the essential elements for a successful panzer attack – surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. In his opinion, the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they would be needed for the pending defence of western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked,

Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front?

Hitler replied, "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach." Guderian concluded, "In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it alone."

Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory phase, were hopeful that the offensive would revitalise German strategic fortunes in the east. As the challenges offered by Citadel increased, he focused more and more on the expected new weapons that he believed were the key to victory: principally the Panther tank, but also the Ferdinand tank destroyer and greater numbers of the Tiger heavy tank. He postponed the operation in order to await their arrival. Receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler further delayed the offensive to allow for more equipment to reach the front.

With pessimism for Citadel increasing with each delay, in June, Alfred Jodl, the Chief of Staff at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propaganda office to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive. Due to concerns of an Allied landing in the south of France or in Italy and delays in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again, this time to 20 June. Zeitzler was profoundly concerned with the delays, but he still supported the offensive. On 17–18 June, following a discussion in which the OKW Operations Staff suggested abandoning the offensive, Hitler further postponed the operation until 3 July then, on 1 July, Hitler announced 5 July as the launch date of the offensive.

A three-month quiet period had descended upon the Eastern Front as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Germans attempted to build up their forces. The Germans used this period for specialised training of their assault troops. All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waffen-SS had built a full-scale duplicate Soviet strong point that was used to practice the techniques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to get back up to strength. The German forces to be used in the offensive included 12 panzer divisions and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tank strengths greater than their neighbouring panzer divisions. However, the force was markedly deficient in infantry divisions, which were essential to hold ground and to secure the flanks. By the time the Germans initiated the offensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and assault guns (70 percent of the German armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mortars. The Battle of Kursk would engulf more than 70% of Germany's military force on the Eastern Front.

Soviet plans and preparation

In 1943, an offensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk and Western Fronts against Army Group Centre was abandoned shortly after it began in early March, when the southern flank of the Central Front was threatened by Army Group South. Soviet intelligence received information about German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an intended German offensive in the Kursk sector through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. The Soviets verified the intelligence via their spy in Britain, John Cairncross, at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow. Cairncross also provided Soviet intelligence with identifications of the Luftwaffe airfields in the region. Soviet politician Anastas Mikoyan wrote that on 27 March 1943, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin notified him of a possible German attack in the Kursk sector. Stalin and some senior officers were eager to strike first once the rasputitsa ended, but a number of key officers, including Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov, recommended a strategic defensive before going on the offensive. In a letter to the Stavka and Stalin, on 8 April, Zhukov wrote:

In the first phase the enemy, collecting their best forces—including 13–15 tank divisions and with the support of a large number of aircraft—will strike Kursk with their Kromskom-Orel grouping from the north-east and their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the south-east... I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to an offensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force.

Stalin consulted with his frontline commanders and senior officers of the General Staff from 12 to 15 April 1943. In the end he and the Stavka agreed that the Germans would probably target Kursk. Stalin believed the decision to defend would give the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans would be drawn into a trap where their armoured power would be destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a major Soviet counteroffensive. They decided to meet the enemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wear out the German groupings before launching their own offensive. Preparation of defences and fortifications began by the end of April, and continued until the German attack in early July. The two-month delay between the German decision to attack the Kursk salient and its implementation allowed the Red Army ample time to thoroughly prepare.

The Voronezh Front, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin, was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front, commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky, defended the northern face. Waiting in reserve was the Steppe Front, commanded by Ivan Konev. In February 1943, the Central Front had been reconstructed from the Don Front, which had been part of the northern pincer of Operation Uranus and had been responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad.

The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed three main defensive belts in their sectors, with each subdivided into several zones of fortification. The Soviets employed the labour of over 300,000 civilians. Fortifying each belt was an interconnected web of minefields, barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches, deep entrenchments for infantry, anti-tank obstacles, dug-in armoured vehicles, and machine-gun bunkers. Behind the three main defensive belts were three more belts prepared as fallback positions; the first was not fully occupied or heavily fortified, and the last two, though sufficiently fortified, were unoccupied with the exception of a small area in the immediate environs of Kursk. The combined depth of the three main defensive zones was about 40 kilometres (25 mi). The six defensive belts on either side of Kursk were 130–150 kilometres (81–93 mi) deep. If the Germans managed to break through these defences they would still be confronted by additional defensive belts to the east, manned by the Steppe Front. These brought the total depth of the defences to nearly 300 kilometres (190 mi).

The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug 4,200 kilometres (2,600 mi) and 5,000 kilometres (3,100 mi) of trenches respectively, laid out in criss-cross pattern for ease of movement. The Soviets built more than 686 bridges and about 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) of roads in the salient. Red Army combat engineers laid 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines, with the highest concentration in the first main defensive belt. The minefields at Kursk achieved densities of 2,500 anti-personnel and 2,200 anti-tank mines per kilometre, six times the density used in the defence of Moscow. For example, the 6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, was spread out over nearly 64 kilometres (40 mi) of front and was protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines in its first defensive belt with a further 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt. Furthermore, mobile obstacle detachments were tasked with laying more mines directly in the path of advancing enemy armoured formations. These units, consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with mines at division level and one company of combat engineers normally equipped with 500–700 mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves at every level of command.

In a letter dated 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germans would attack the salient with a strong armoured force:

We can expect the enemy to put greatest reliance in this year's offensive operations on his tank divisions and air force, since his infantry appears to be far less prepared for offensive operations than last year ... In view of this threat, we should strengthen the anti-tank defences of the Central and Voronezh fronts, and assemble as soon as possible.

Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank defence. Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns further strengthened the anti-tank defences. Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level of command, mostly as anti-tank strong points with the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and the remainder amply spread out elsewhere. Each anti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles, and five to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as by infantry with automatic firearms. Independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during counterattacks.

Soviet preparations also included increased activity of Soviet partisans, who attacked German communications and supply lines. The attacks were mostly behind Army Group North and Army Group Centre. In June 1943, partisans operating in the occupied area behind Army Group Centre destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222 railway wagons and 44 bridges, and in the Kursk sector there were 1,092 partisan attacks on railways. These attacks delayed the build-up of German supplies and equipment, and required the diversion of German troops to suppress the partisans, delaying their training for the offensive. Central Partisan Headquarters coordinated many of these attacks. In June Soviet Air Forces (VVS) flew over 800 sorties at night to resupply the partisan groups operating behind Army Group Centre. The VVS also provided communication and sometimes even daylight air-support for major partisan operations.

Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry manning the defences to help them overcome the tank phobia that had been evident since the start of the German invasion. Soldiers were packed into trenches and tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear were gone. This training exercise was referred to by the soldiers as "ironing". In combat, the soldiers would spring up in the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the spearheading armoured vehicles. The separated armoured vehicles – now vulnerable to infantry armed with PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles, demolition charges and molotov cocktails – could then be disabled or destroyed at point-blank range. These types of attacks were mostly effective against the Ferdinand tank destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondary armament. The soldiers were also promised financial rewards for each tank destroyed, with the People's Commissariat of Defence providing a bounty of 1,000 roubles for each destroyed tank.

The Soviets employed maskirovka (military deception) to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and to conceal the movement of men and materiel. These included camouflaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airfields and depots, generating false radio-traffic, and spreading rumours among the Soviet frontline troops and the civilian population in the German-held areas. Movement of forces and supplies to and from the salient took place at night only. Ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with the landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and fires were forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motor transport in and around them forbidden.

According to a Soviet General Staff report, 29 of the 35 major Luftwaffe raids on Soviet airfields in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airfields. According to historian Antony Beevor, in contrast, Soviet aviation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground. The Soviet deception efforts were so successful that German estimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks. The result was not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions.

The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34 medium tank, on which the Red Army attempted to concentrate production. The tank arm also contained large numbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s. In the salient itself the Soviets assembled a large number of lend-lease tanks. These included U.S.-manufactured M3 Lee medium tanks and British-built Churchill, Matilda II and Valentine infantry tanks. However, the T-34 made up the bulk of the Soviet armour. Without including the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front, the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend the salient. This amounted to 26 percent of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortars and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent of its tanks. One source states that in the Battle of Stalingrad the Soviets used fourteen field armies and one tank army, while at Kursk they used twenty-two full-strength field armies and five tank armies. According to one source, the Soviets concentrated 80% of their entire air fleet for use at the Battle of Kursk. According to some historians, the Soviets employed 40% of their manpower and 75% of their armoured forces to the battle.

Contest for aerial supremacy

By 1943 the Luftwaffe's strength on the Eastern Front had started to weaken after Stalingrad, and the siphoning of resources to North Africa. The Luftwaffe forces in the east were further depleted with fighter units being shifted back to Germany to defend against the escalating Allied bombing campaign. By the end of June, only 38.7 percent of the Luftwaffe's total aircraft remained in the east. In 1943 the Luftwaffe could still achieve local aerial superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of German aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were slated for Citadel. The goal of the Luftwaffe remained unchanged. The priority was to gain aerial supremacy, then to isolate the battlefield from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point had been reached in the land battle, to render close air support.

The changing strengths between the two opponents prompted the Luftwaffe to make operational changes for the battle. Previous offensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwaffe raids against opposing airfields to achieve aerial superiority. By this point in the war Red Army equipment reserves were extensive and the Luftwaffe commanders realised that aircraft could be easily replaced, making such raids futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned. In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers flying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted during Citadel.

The Luftwaffe command understood that their support would be crucial for the success of Citadel, but problems with supply shortfalls hampered their preparations. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the Luftwaffe's ability to build up essential stockpiles of petrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlike Red Army units there were no reserves of aircraft that could be used to replace damaged aircraft over the course of the operation. Fuel was the most significant limiting factor. To help build up supplies for the support of Citadel, the Luftwaffe greatly curtailed its operations during the last week of June. Despite this conservation of resources, the Luftwaffe did not have the resources to sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began.

For Citadel, the Luftwaffe confined its operations to the direct support of the forces on the ground. In this mission the Luftwaffe continued to make use of the Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka" dive-bombers. A new development to this aircraft was the "Bordkanone" 3,7 cm cannon, one of which could be slung under each wing of the Stuka in a gun pod. Half of the Stuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equipped with these Kanonenvogel (literally "cannon-bird") tankbuster aircraft. The air groups were also strengthened by the recent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129, with its 30 mm MK 103 cannon, and the F-subtype ground attack ("jabo") version of the Focke-Wulf Fw 190.

In the months preceding the battle, Luftflotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The VVS formations encountered displayed better training, and were flying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness and skill than the Luftwaffe had seen earlier. The introduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 fighters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2 "Shturmovik" and the Pe-2, had become available as well. The VVS also fielded large numbers of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Red Army and VVS formations would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort.

Opposing forces

See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle

Germans

For the operation, the Germans used four armies along with a large portion of their total tank strength on the Eastern Front. On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army Group Centre based in the northern side of the salient contained 335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south, the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf", of Army Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 combat soldiers) and 100,000–108,000 men (66,000 combat soldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, that held the western side of the salient contained an estimated 110,000. In total, the German forces had a total strength of 777,000–779,000 men, and the three attacking armies contained 438,271 combat soldiers. Army Group South was equipped with more armoured vehicles, infantry and artillery than the 9th Army of Army Group Center. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Army possessed 988 tanks and assault guns.

German industry produced 2,816 tanks and self-propelled guns between April and June, of which 156 were Tigers and 484 Panthers. At Kursk, a total of 259 Panther tanks, about 211 Tigers, and 90 Ferdinands were used.

The two new Panther battalions – the 51st and 52nd – together equipped with 200 Panthers, for which the offensive had been delayed, were attached to the Großdeutschland Division in the XLVIII Panzer Corps of Army Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalions arriving on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little time to perform reconnaissance or to orient themselves to the terrain they found themselves in. This was a breach of the methods of the Panzerwaffe, considered essential for the successful use of armour. Though led by experienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crews were new recruits and had little time to become familiar with their new tanks, let alone train together to function as a unit. The two battalions came direct from the training ground and lacked combat experience. In addition, the requirement to maintain radio silence until the start of the attack meant that the Panther units had little training in battalion-level radio procedures. Furthermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing problems with their transmissions, and proved mechanically unreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost 16 Panthers due to mechanical breakdown, leaving only 184 available for the launching of the offensive.

July and August 1943 saw the heaviest German ammunition expenditure on the Eastern Front up to that point, with 236,915 tons consumed in July and 254,648 in August. The previous peak had been 160,645 tons in September 1942.

Order of battle: Army Group Centre (Field Marshal Günther von Kluge)

Army	Army commander	Note	Corps	Corps commander	Divisions
9th Army	Walter Model		XX Army Corps	Rudolf Freiherr von Roman	45th, 72nd, 137th, and 251st Infantry Divisions
			XLVI Panzer Corps	Hans Zorn	7th, 31st, 102nd, and 258th Infantry Divisions
			XLI Panzer Corps	Josef Harpe	18th Panzer Division; 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions
			XLVII Panzer Corps	Joachim Lemelsen	2nd, 9th, and 20th Panzer Divisions; 6th Infantry Division
			XXIII Army Corps	Johannes Frießner	216th and 383rd Infantry Divisions; 78th Assault Division
			Army Reserve		4th and 12th Panzer Divisions; 10th Panzergrenadier Division
2nd Panzer Army	Erich-Heinrich Clößner		XXXV Army Corps	Lothar Rendulic	34th, 56th, 262nd, and 299th Infantry Divisions
			LIII Army Corps	Friedrich Gollwitzer	208th, 211th, and 293rd Infantry Divisions; 25th Panzergrenadier Division
			LV Army Corps	Erich Jaschke	110th, 112th, 134th, 296th, and 339th Infantry Divisions
			Army reserve		5th Panzer Division
Army Group Reserve					8th Panzer Division (joined 2nd Panzer Army on 12 July 1943)
Luftflotte 6					I Flieger Division

Order of battle: Army Group South (Field Marshal Erich von Manstein)

Army	Army commander	Note	Corps	Corps commander	Divisions
4th Panzer Army	Hermann Hoth		LII Army Corps	General Eugen Ott	57th, 255th, and 332nd Infantry Divisions
			XLVIII Panzer Corps	Otto von Knobelsdorff	3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions; 167th Infantry Division; Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland
			II SS Panzer Corps	General der Waffen-SS Paul Hausser	1st (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler), 2nd (Das Reich), and the 3rd (Totenkopf) SS Panzergrenadier Divisions
Army Detachment Kempf	Werner Kempf		III Panzer Corps	Hermann Breith	6th, 7th, and 19th Panzer Divisions; 168th Infantry Division
			Corps "Raus"	Erhard Raus	106th and 320th Infantry Divisions
			XLII Army Corps	Franz Mattenklott	39th, 161st, and 282nd Infantry Divisions
Army Group Reserve			XXIV Panzer Corps	Walter Nehring	5th SS (Wiking) Panzergrenadier Division and the 17th Panzer Division
Luftflotte 4			VIII Fliegerkorps

Red Army

The Red Army used two Fronts for the defence of Kursk, and created a third front behind the battle area which was held as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts fielded 12 armies, with 711,575 men (510,983 combat soldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) respectively. In reserve, the Steppe Front had an additional 573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the Soviet force was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combat soldiers.

Soviet armour strength included 4,869 tanks and 259 SPGs. Overall a third of the Soviet tanks at Kursk were light tanks, but in some units this proportion was considerably higher. Of the 3,600 tanks in the Central and Voronezh Fronts in July 1943, 1,061 were light as T-60 and T-70 tanks. With very thin armour and small guns, they were unable to effectively engage the frontal armour of German medium and heavy tanks or AFVs.

The most capable Soviet tank at Kursk was the T-34. However, the original version was armed only with a 76.2mm gun, which struggled against uparmoured Panzer IVs, and the frontal armour of Tigers and Panthers was essentially impenetrable. Only the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns had the power to destroy the Tiger at short range, but they were not equal to the Tiger's 88mm gun at long range, and there were very few SU-122s and SU-152s at Kursk.

Order of battle: Central Front (Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky)

Army	Army Commander	Note	Corps	Divisions
13th Army	Nikolay Pukhov		17th Guards Rifle Corps	6th, 70th, and 75th Guards Rifle Divisions
			18th Guards Rifle Corps	2nd, 3rd, and 4th Airborne Guards Rifle Divisions
			15th Rifle Corps	8th, 74th, and 148th Rifle Divisions
			29th Rifle Corps	15th, 81st, and 307th Rifle Divisions
48th Army	Prokofy Romanenko		42nd Rifle Corps	16th, 202nd, 399th, 73rd, 137th, 143rd, and 170th Rifle Divisions
60th Army	Ivan Chernyakhovsky		24th Rifle Corps	42nd and 112th Rifle Divisions
			30th Rifle Corps	121st, 141st, and 322nd Rifle Divisions
			Independent Divisions	55th Rifle Division
65th Army	Pavel Batov		18th Rifle Corps	69th, 149th, and 246th Rifle Divisions
			27th Rifle Corps	60th, 193rd, 181st, 194th, and 354th Rifle Divisions; 37th Guards Rifle Division
70th Army	Ivan Galanin		28th Rifle Corps	132nd, 211th, 102nd, 106th, 140th, 162nd, and 280th Rifle Divisions
2nd Tank Army	Alexey Rodin		3rd Tank Corps
			16th Tank Corps
Front Assets (Independent Units)			9th Tank Corps
			19th Tank Corps
16th Air Army	General Sergei Rudenko		3rd Bombing Air Corps
			6th Fighter Air Corps
			6th Mixed Air Corps

Order of battle: Voronezh Front (Army General Nikolai Vatutin)

Army	Army Commander	Note	Corps	Divisions
6th Guards Army	Ivan Chistyakov		22nd Guards Rifle Corps	67th Guards Rifle Division, 71st Rifle Division and the 90th Guards Rifle Division
			23rd Guards Rifle Corps	51st and 52nd Guards Rifle Divisions; 375th Rifle Division
			Independent Divisions	89th Guards Rifle Division
7th Guards Army	Mikhail Shumilov		24th Guards Rifle Corps	15th, 36th, and 72nd Guards Rifle Divisions
			25th Guards Rifle Corps	73rd, 78th, and 81st Guards Rifle Divisions
			Independent Divisions	213th Rifle Division
38th Army	Nikandr Chibisov		50th Rifle Corps	167th, 232nd, and 340th Rifle Divisions
			51st Rifle Corps	180th and 240th Rifle Divisions
			Independent Divisions	204th Rifle Division
40th Army	Kirill Moskalenko		47th Rifle Corps	161st, 206th, and 237th Rifle Divisions
			52nd Rifle Corps	100th, 219th, and 309th Rifle Divisions
			Independent Divisions	184th Rifle Division
69th Army	Vasily Kryuchenkin		48th Rifle Corps	107th, 183rd, and 307th Rifle Divisions
			49th Rifle Corps	111th and 270th Rifle Divisions
1st Guards Tank Army	Mikhail Katukov		6th Tank Corps
			31st Tank Corps
			3rd Mechanized Corps
Front Assets (Independent Units)			35th Guards Rifle Corps	92nd, 93rd, and 94th Guards Rifle Divisions
			2nd Guards Tank Corps
			3rd Guards Tank Corps
2nd Air Army	Stepan Krasovsky		1st Bombing Air Corps
			1st Assault Air Corps
			4th Fighter Air Corps
			5th Fighter Air Corps
Elements of the 17th Air Army

Order of battle: Steppe Front (Ivan Konev)

Army	Army Commander	Note	Corps	Divisions
5th Guards Army	Alexei Zhadov		32nd Guards Rifle Corps	13th and 66th Guards Rifle Divisions; 6th Airborne Guards Rifle Division
			33rd Guards Rifle Corps	95th and 97th Guards Rifle Divisions; 9th Airborne Guards Rifle Division
			Independent Divisions	42nd Guards Rifle Division and 10th Tank Corps
			Independent 10th Tank Corps
5th Guards Tank Army	Pavel Rotmistrov		5th Guards Mechanized Corps
			29th Tank Corps
5th Air Army	S. Gorunov		7th Mixed Air Corps
			8th Mixed Air Corps
			3rd Fighter Air Corps
			7th Fighter Air Corps

Comparison of strength

Operation Citadel

	Men			Tanks			Guns
	Soviet	Ratio	German	Soviet	Ratio	German	Soviet	Ratio	German
Frieser	1,426,352	2.8:1	518,271	4,938	2:1	2,465	31,415	4:1	7,417
Glantz	1,910,361	2.5:1	780,900	5,128	1.7:1	2,928

Red Army offensive phase

	Men			Tanks			Guns
	Soviet	Ratio	German	Soviet	Ratio	German	Soviet	Ratio	German
Frieser	1,987,463	3.2:1	625,271	8,200	3:1	2,699	47,416	5:1	9,467
Glantz	2,500,000	2.7:1	940,900	7,360	2.3:1	3,253

Preliminary actions

Fighting started on the southern face of the salient on the evening of 4 July 1943, when German infantry launched attacks to seize high ground for artillery observation posts prior to the main assault. During these attacks, a number of Red Army command and observation posts along the first main belt of defence were captured. By 16:00, elements of the Panzergrenadier Division "Großdeutschland", 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions had seized the village of Butovo and proceeded to capture Gertsovka before midnight. At around 22:30, Vatutin ordered 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers, of the Voronezh Front, to bombard the forward German positions, particularly those of the II SS Panzer Corps.

To the north, at Central Front headquarters, reports of the anticipated German offensive came in. At around 02:00 5 July, Zhukov ordered his preemptive artillery bombardment to begin. The hope was to disrupt German forces concentrating for the attack, but the outcome was less than hoped for. The bombardment delayed the German formations but failed in the goal of disrupting their schedule or inflicting substantial losses. The Germans began their own artillery bombardment at about 05:00, which lasted 80 minutes in the northern face and 50 minutes in the southern face. After the barrage, the ground forces attacked, aided by close air support provided by the Luftwaffe.

In the early morning of 5 July, the VVS launched a large raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground. This effort failed, and the VVS units suffered considerable losses. The air operation is misunderstood in most accounts. The German Freya radar stations at Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet air formations approaching Belgorod and were not responsible for the failure of the entire Soviet preemptive air strike on the eve of Operation Citadel. The VVS lost 176 aircraft on 5 July, compared to the 26 aircraft lost by the Luftwaffe. The losses of the VVS 16th Air Army operating in the northern face were lighter than those suffered by the 2nd Air Army. The Luftwaffe was able to gain and maintain air superiority over the southern face until 10–11 July, when the VVS began to obtain ascendancy but the control of the skies over the northern face was evenly contested until the VVS began to gain air superiority on 7 July, which it maintained for the rest of the operation.

Operation along the northern face

Model's main attack was delivered by XLVII Panzer Corps, supported by 45 Tigers of the attached 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. Covering their left flank was XLI Panzer Corps, with an attached regiment of 83 Ferdinand tank destroyers. On the right flank, XLVI Panzer Corps consisted at this time of four infantry divisions with just nine tanks and 31 assault guns. To the left of XLI Panzer Corps was XXIII Army Corps, which consisted of the reinforced 78th Assault Infantry Division and two regular infantry divisions. While the corps contained no tanks, it did have 62 assault guns. Opposing the 9th Army was the Central Front, deployed in three heavily fortified defensive belts.

Initial German advance

Model chose to make his initial attacks using infantry divisions reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks, and supported by artillery and the Luftwaffe. In doing so he sought to maintain the armoured strength of his panzer divisions to be used for exploitation once the Red Army defences were breached. Once a breakthrough had been achieved the panzer forces would move through and advance towards Kursk. Jan Möschen, a major in Model's staff, later commented that Model expected a breakthrough on the second day. If a breakthrough did occur the briefest delay in bringing up the panzer divisions would give the Red Army time to react. His corps commanders thought that a breakthrough was extremely unlikely.

Following a preliminary bombardment and Red Army counter bombardments, the 9th Army opened its attack at 05:30 on 5 July. Nine infantry divisions and one panzer division, with attached assault guns, heavy tanks and tank destroyers, pushed forward. Two companies of Tiger tanks were attached to the 6th Infantry Division and were the largest single grouping of Tigers employed that day. Opposing them were the 13th and 70th Armies of the Central Front.

The 20th Panzer and 6th Infantry Divisions of the XLVII Panzer Corps spearheaded the advance. Behind them the remaining two panzer divisions followed, ready to exploit any breakthrough. The heavily mined terrain and fortified positions of the 15th Rifle Division slowed the advance. By 08:00 safe lanes had been cleared through the minefield. That morning information obtained from prisoner interrogation identified a weakness at the boundary of the 15th and 81st Rifle Divisions caused by the German preliminary bombardment. The Tigers were redeployed and struck towards this area. Red Army formations countered with a force of around 90 T-34s. In the resulting three-hour battle, Red Army armoured units lost 42 tanks while the Germans lost two Tigers and a further five more immobilized with track damage. While the Red Army counter-attack was defeated and the first defensive belt breached, the fighting had delayed the Germans long enough for the rest of 29th Rifle Corps of the 13th Army – initially deployed behind the first belt – to move forward and seal the breach. Red Army minefields were covered by artillery fire, making efforts to clear paths through the fields difficult and costly. Goliath and Borgward IV remote-controlled engineer mine-clearing vehicles met with limited success. Of the 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion's 45 Ferdinands sent into battle, all but 12 of them were immobilized by mine damage before 17:00. Most of these were later repaired and returned to service, but the recovery of these very large vehicles was difficult.

On the first day, the XLVII Panzer Corps penetrated 6 mi (9.7 km) into the Red Army defences before stalling, and the XLI Panzer Corps reached the heavily fortified small town of Ponyri, in the second defensive belt, which controlled the roads and railways leading south to Kursk. The German advance 5 to 6 mi (8.0 to 9.7 km) into the Red Army lines cost 1,287 men killed and missing and a further 5,921 wounded.

Red Army counter-attack

Rokossovsky ordered the 17th Guards and 18th Guards Rifle Corps with the 2nd Tank Army and 19th Tank Corps, backed up by close air support, to counterattack the German 9th Army the following day on 6 July. However, due to poor coordination, only the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army commenced the counterattack on the dawn of 6 July after the preparatory artillery barrage. The 16th Tank Corps, fielding about 200 tanks, attacked the XLVII Panzer Corps and ran into the Tiger tanks of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, which knocked out 69 tanks and forced the rest to withdraw to the 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army. Later that morning, the XLVII Panzer Corps responded with its own attack against the 17th Guards Rifle Corps entrenched around the village Olkhovatka in the second defensive belt. The attack commenced with an artillery barrage and was spearheaded by the 24 serviceable Tigers of the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion, but it failed to break the Red Army defence at Olkhovatka, and the Germans suffered heavy casualties. Olkhovatka was on high ground that provided a clear view of much of the frontline. At 18:30, the 19th Tank Corps joined the 17th Guards Rifle Corps further bolstering resistance. Rokossovsky also decided to dig in most of his remaining tanks to minimize their exposure. Ponyri, defended by the 307th Rifle Division of the 29th Rifle Corps, was also concertedly attacked on 6 July by the German 292nd and 86th Infantry, 78th Assault Infantry and 9th Panzer Divisions, but the Germans were unable to dislodge the defenders from the heavily fortified village.

Ponyri and Olkhovatka

Over the next three days from 7 to 10 July, Model concentrated the effort of the 9th Army at Ponyri and Olkhovatka, which both sides considered as vital positions. In response, Rokossovsky pulled forces from other parts of the front to these sectors. The Germans attacked Ponyri on 7 July, and captured half of the town after intense house-to-house fighting. A Soviet counterattack the following morning forced the Germans to withdraw, and a series of counterattacks ensued by both sides with control of the town being exchanged several times over the next few days. By 10 July, the Germans had secured most of the town, but Soviet counterattacks continued. The back and forth battles for Ponyri and the nearby Hill 253.5 were battles of attrition, with heavy casualties on both sides. The intensity led it to being referred to by the troops as "mini-Stalingrad" and by military historian Paul Carell as the "Stalingrad of the Kursk salient". The war diary of the 9th Army described the heavy fighting as a "new type of mobile attrition battle". German attacks on Olkhovatka and the nearby village of Teploe failed to penetrate the Soviet defences; including a powerful concerted attack on 10 July by about 300 German tanks and assault guns from the 2nd, 4th, and 20th Panzer Divisions, supported by every available Luftwaffe air power in the northern face.

On 9 July a meeting between Kluge, Model, Joachim Lemelsen and Josef Harpe was held at the headquarters of the XLVII Panzer Corps. It had become clear to the German commanders that the 9th Army lacked the strength to obtain a breakthrough, and their Soviet counterparts had also realized this, but Kluge wished to maintain the pressure on the Soviets in order to aid the southern offensive.

While the operation on the northern side of the salient began with a 45 km-wide (28 mi) attack front, by 6 July it had been reduced to 40 km-wide (25 mi). The following day the attack frontage dropped to 15 km-wide (9.3 mi), and on both the 8 and 9 July penetrations of only 2 km-wide (1.2 mi) occurred. By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the German advance.

On 12 July the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov, their counter-offensive upon the Orel salient, which threatened the flank and rear of Model's 9th Army. The 12th Panzer Division, thus far held in reserve and slated to be committed to the northern side of the Kursk salient, along with the 36th Motorized Infantry, 18th Panzer and 20th Panzer Divisions were redeployed to face the Soviet spearheads.

Operation along the southern face

At around 04:00 on 5 July, the German attack commenced with a preliminary bombardment. Manstein's main attack was delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, which was organized into densely concentrated spearheads, and which included some of the finest divisions in the German Army, with the forces under Hoth's command regarded as "the most powerful striking force ever assembled under a single German commander". In fifty minutes, Hoth's bombardment expended more shells than the combined total fired by German forces during the Polish Campaign and French Campaign. The 4th Panzer Army was opposed by the Soviet 6th Guards Army, which was composed of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and 23rd Guards Rifle Corps. The Soviets had constructed three fortified defensive belts to slow and weaken the attacking armoured forces. Though they had been provided superb intelligence, the Voronezh Front headquarters had still not been able to pinpoint the location where the Germans would place their offensive weight.

Initial German advance

XLVIII Panzer Corps

The panzergrenadier division Großdeutschland (Walter Hörnlein), was the strongest division in the 4th Panzer Army. It was supported on its flanks by the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions. The Panzer IIIs and IVs of the Großdeutschland had been supplemented by a company of 15 Tiger tanks, which were used to spearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July, Großdeutschland, backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on a three-kilometre front upon the 67th Guards Rifle Division of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. The Panzerfüsilier Regiment, advancing on the left wing, stalled in a minefield and subsequently 36 Panthers were immobilized. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage of Soviet anti-tank and artillery fire, which inflicted numerous casualties. Engineers were moved up and cleared paths through the minefield but suffered casualties in the process. The combination of fierce resistance, minefields, thick mud and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. With paths cleared, the regiment resumed its advance towards Gertsovka. In the ensuing battle, many casualties were suffered including the regimental commander Colonel Kassnitz. Due to the fighting, and the marshy terrain south of the village, surrounding the Berezovyy stream, the regiment once more bogged down.

The panzergrenadier regiment of Großdeutschland, advancing on the right wing, pushed through to the village of Butovo. The tanks were deployed in a Panzerkeil (arrow) formation to minimise the effects of the Soviet Pakfront defence, with the Tigers leading and the Panzer IIIs, IVs and assault guns fanning out to the flanks and rear. They were followed by infantry and combat engineers. Attempts by the VVS to impede the advance were repulsed by the Luftwaffe.

The 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the left flank of Großdeutschland, made good progress and by the end of the day had captured Gertsovka and reached Mikhailovka. The 167th Infantry Division, on the right flank of the 11th Panzer Division, also made sufficient progress, reaching Tirechnoe by the end of the day. By the end of 5 July, a wedge had been created in the first belt of the Soviet defences.

II SS Panzer Corps

To the east, during the night of 4–5 July, SS combat engineers had infiltrated no-man's land and cleared lanes through the Soviet minefields. At dawn, 5 July, the three divisions of II SS Panzer Corps – SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf – attacked the 52nd Guards Rifle Division of the 6th Guards Army. The main assault was led by a spearhead of 42 Tigers among 494 tanks and assault guns attacking on a twelve-kilometre front. Totenkopf, the strongest of the three divisions, advanced towards Gremuchhi and screened the right flank. The 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division advanced on the left flank towards Bykovka. The 2nd SS Panzer Division advanced between the two formations in the center. Following closely behind the tanks were the infantry and combat engineers, coming forward to demolish obstacles and clear trenches. The advance was well supported by the Luftwaffe, which greatly aided in breaking Soviet strong points and artillery positions.

By 09:00, the II SS Panzer Corps had broken through the Soviet first belt of defence along its entire front. While probing positions between the first and second Soviet defensive belts, at 13:00, the 2nd SS Panzer Division vanguard came under fire from two T-34 tanks, which were destroyed. Forty more Soviet tanks soon engaged the division. The 1st Guards Tank Army clashed with the 2nd SS Panzer Division in a four-hour battle, resulting in the Soviet tanks withdrawing. The engagement bought enough time for units of the 23rd Soviet Guards Rifle Corps, lodged in the Soviet second belt, to prepare itself and be reinforced with additional anti-tank guns. By the early evening, 2nd SS Panzer Division had reached the minefields on the perimeter of the Soviet second belt of defence. The 1st SS Division had secured Bykovka by 16:10, then pushed forward towards the second belt of defence at Yakovlevo but its attempts to break through were rebuffed. By the end of the day, the 1st SS Division had sustained 97 dead, 522 wounded and 17 missing and lost about 30 tanks. Together with the 2nd SS Panzer Division, it had forced a wedge far into the defences of the 6th Guards Army.

The 3rd SS Panzer Division was making slow progress. They had managed to isolate the 155th Guards Regiment, 52nd Guards Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps), from the rest of the division but its attempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the flank of the neighbouring 375th Rifle Division (of the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps) had failed when the regiment was reinforced by the 96th Tank Brigade. Hausser, the commander of II SS Panzer Corps, requested aid from the III Panzer Corps to his right but it had no units to spare. By the end of the day, the 3rd SS Division had made very limited progress due in part to a tributary of the Donets river. The lack of progress undermined the advance made by its sister divisions and exposed the right flank of the corps to Soviet forces. The temperatures, reaching over 30 degrees Celsius, and frequent thunderstorms made fighting conditions difficult.

The 6th Guards Army, which confronted the attack by the XLVIII Panzer Korps and II SS Panzer Korps, was reinforced with tanks from the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps. The 51st and 90th Guards Rifle divisions were moved up to the vicinity of Pokrovka (not Prokhorovka, 40 kilometres (25 mi) to the north-east), in the path of the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 93rd Guards Rifle Division was deployed further back, along the road leading from Pokrovka to Prokhorovka.

Army Detachment Kempf

Facing Army Detachment Kempf, consisting of III Panzer Corps and Corps Raus (commanded by Erhard Raus), was the 7th Guards Army, dug in on the high ground on the eastern bank of the Northern Donets. The two German corps were tasked with crossing the river, breaking through the 7th Guards Army and covering the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, equipped with 45 Tigers, was also attached to the III Panzer Corps, with one company of 15 Tigers attached to each of the corps' three panzer divisions.

At the Milkhailovka bridgehead, just south of Belgorod, eight infantry battalions of the 6th Panzer Division crossed the river under heavy Soviet bombardment. Part of a company of Tigers from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion was able to cross before the bridge was destroyed. The rest of the 6th Panzer Division was unable to cross further south due to a traffic jam at the crossing, and remained on the western bank of the river throughout the day. Those units of the division that had crossed the river attacked Stary Gorod, but were unable to break through due to poorly cleared minefields and strong resistance.

To the south of the 6th Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer Division crossed the river but was delayed by mines, moving forward 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) by the end of the day. Luftwaffe bombed the bridgehead in a friendly fire incident, wounding 6th Panzer Division commander Walther von Hünersdorff and Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski of the 19th Panzer Division. Further south, infantry and tanks of 7th Panzer Division crossed the river. A new bridge had to be built specifically for the Tigers, causing further delays. Despite a poor start, the 7th Panzer Division eventually broke into the first belt of the Soviet defence and pushed on between Razumnoe and Krutoi Log, advancing 10 kilometres (6.2 mi), the furthest Kempf got during the day.

Operating to the south of 7th Panzer Division, were the 106th Infantry Division and the 320th Infantry Division of Corps Raus. The two formations attacked across a 32 kilometres (20 mi) front without armour support. The advance began well, with the crossing of the river and a swift advance against the 72nd Guards Rifle Division. Corps Raus took the village of Maslovo Pristani, penetrating the first Red Army defence line. A Soviet counter-attack supported by about 40 tanks was beaten off, with the assistance from artillery and flak batteries. After having suffered 2,000 casualties since the morning and still facing considerable resistance from the Soviet forces, the corps dug in for the night.

Delaying the progress of Kempf allowed Red Army forces time to prepare their second belt of defence to meet the German attack on 6 July. The 7th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack of III Panzer Corps and Corps "Raus", was reinforced with two rifle divisions from the reserve. The 15th Guards Rifle Division was moved up to the second belt of defence, in the path of the III Panzer Corps.

Development of the battle

By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves, except for three rifle divisions under the 69th Army; yet it could not decisively contain the 4th Panzer Army. The XLVIII Panzer Corps along the Oboyan axis, where the third defensive belt was mostly unoccupied, now had only the Red Army second defensive belt blocking it from breakthrough into the unfortified Soviet rear. This forced the Stavka to commit their strategic reserves to reinforce the Voronezh Front: the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies, both from the Steppe Front, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps from the Southwestern Front. Ivan Konev objected to this premature piecemeal commitment of the strategic reserve, but a personal call from Stalin silenced his complaints. In addition, on 7 July Zhukov ordered the 17th Air Army – the air fleet serving the Southwestern Front – to support the 2nd Air Army in serving the Voronezh Front. On 7 July, the 5th Guards Tank Army began advancing to Prokhorovka. 5th Guards Tank Army commander, Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov, described the journey:

By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds, settling in a solid layer on roadside bushes, grain fields, tanks and trucks. The dark red disc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery tractors, armoured personnel carriers and trucks were advancing in an unending flow. The faces of the soldiers were dark with dust and exhaust fumes. It was intolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirst and their shirts, wet with sweat, stuck to their bodies.

The 10th Tank Corps, then still subordinate to the 5th Guards Army, was rushed ahead of the rest of the army, arriving at Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July, and 2nd Tank Corps arrived at Korocha, 40 km (25 mi) southeast of Prokhorovka, by morning of 8 July. Vatutin ordered a powerful counterattack by the 5th Guards, 2nd Guards, 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, in all fielding about 593 tanks and self-propelled guns and supported by most of the Front's available air power, which aimed to defeat the II SS Panzer Corps and therefore expose the right flank of XLVIII Panzer Corps. Simultaneously, the 6th Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzer Corps and prevent it from breaking through to the free Soviet rear. Although intended to be concerted, the counterattack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks due to poor coordination. The 10th Tank Corps' attack began on the dawn of 8 July but they ran straight into the antitank fire of the 2nd and 3rd SS Divisions, losing most of its forces. Later that morning, the 5th Guards Tank Corps' attack was repelled by the 3rd SS Division. The 2nd Tank Corps joined in the afternoon and was also repelled. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, masked by the forest around the village Gostishchevo, 16 km (10 mi) north of Belgorod, with its presence unknown to the II SS Panzer Corps, advanced towards the 167th Infantry Division. But it was detected by German air reconnaissance just before the attack had materialized, and was subsequently decimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed with MK 103 anti-tank cannons and at least 50 tanks were destroyed. This marked the first time in military history an attacking tank formation had been defeated by air power alone. Although a fiasco, the Soviet counterattack succeeded in stalling the advance of the II SS Panzer Corps throughout the day.

By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced about 29 kilometres (18 mi) since the start of Citadel and broken through the first and second defensive belts. However, slow progress by the XLVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth to shift elements of the II SS-Panzer Corps to the west to help the XLVIII Panzer Corps regain its momentum. On 10 July the full effort of the corps was shifted back to its own forward progress. The direction of their advance now shifted from Oboyan due north to the northeast, toward Prokhorovka. Hoth had discussed this move with Manstein since early May, and it was a part of the 4th Panzer Army's plan since the outset of the offensive. By this time, however, the Soviets had shifted reserve formations into its path. The defensive positions were manned by the 2nd Tank Corps, reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and 301st Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps.

Though the German advance in the south was slower than planned, it was faster than the Soviets expected. On 9 July, the first German units reached the Psel River. The next day, the first German infantry crossed the river. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses remained lower than the Soviets'. At this point, Hoth turned the II SS Panzer Corps away from Oboyan to attack toward the northeast in the direction of Prokhorovka. The main concern of Manstein and Hausser was the inability of Army Detachment Kempf to advance and protect the eastern flank of the II SS Panzer Corps. On 11 July, Army Detachment Kempf finally achieved a breakthrough. In a surprise night attack, the 6th Panzer Division seized a bridge across the Donets. Once across, Breith made every effort to push troops and vehicles across the river for an advance on Prokhorovka from the south. A linkup with the II SS Panzer Corps would result with the Soviet 69th Army becoming encircled.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Main article: Battle of Prokhorovka

Throughout 10 and 11 July, the II-SS Panzer Corps continued its attack toward Prokhorovka, reaching within 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) of the settlement by the night of 11 July. That same night, Hausser issued orders for the attack to continue the next day. The plan was for the 3rd SS Panzer Division to drive northeast until it reached the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road. Once there, they were to strike southeast to attack the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka from the flanks and rear. The 1st and 2nd SS Panzer divisions were to wait until 3rd SS Panzer Division attack had destabilised the Soviet positions at Prokhorovka; and once underway, the 1st SS Panzer Division was to attack the main Soviet defences dug in on the slopes southwest of Prokhorovka. To the division's right, the 2nd SS Panzer Division was to advance eastward, then turn southward away from Prokhorovka to roll up the Soviet lines opposing the III Panzer Corps' advance and force a gap. During the night of 11 July, Rotmistrov moved his 5th Guards Tank Army to an assembly area just behind Prokhorovka in preparation for a massive attack the following day. At 5:45 Leibstandarte headquarters started receiving reports of the sound of tank engines as the Soviets moved into their assembly areas. Soviet artillery and Katyusha regiments were redeployed in preparation for the counterattack.

At around 08:00, a Soviet artillery barrage began. At 08:30, Rotmistrov radioed his tankers: "Steel, Steel, Steel!", the order to commence the attack. Down off the west slopes, before Prokhorovka, came the massed armour of five tank brigades from the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The Soviet tanks advanced down the corridor, carrying mounted infantrymen of the 9th Guards Airborne Division on the tanks. To the north and east, the 3rd SS Panzer Division was engaged by the Soviet 33rd Guards Rifle Corps. Tasked with flanking the Soviet defences around Prokhorovka, the unit first had to beat off a number of attacks before they could go over onto the offensive. Most of the division's tank losses occurred late in the afternoon as they advanced through mine fields against well-hidden Soviet anti-tank guns. Although the 3rd SS succeeded in reaching the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka road, their hold was tenuous and it cost the division half of its armour. The majority of German tank losses suffered at Prokhorovka occurred here. To the south, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps had been thrown back by the 1st SS Panzer Division. The 2nd SS Panzer Division also repelled attacks from the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Luftwaffe local air superiority over the battlefield also contributed to the Soviet losses, partly due to the VVS being directed against the German units on the flanks of II SS Panzer Corps. By the end of the day, the Soviets had fallen back to their starting positions.

Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives. Although the Soviet counterattack failed with heavy losses, throwing them back onto the defensive, they did enough to stop a German breakthrough.

Termination of Operation Citadel

On the evening of 12 July, Hitler summoned Kluge and Manstein to his headquarters at Görlitz in East Prussia (now Gierłoż, Poland). Two days earlier, the Western Allies had invaded Sicily. The threat of further Allied landings in Italy or along southern France made Hitler believe it was essential to stop the offensive and move forces from Kursk to Italy. Kluge welcomed the news, as he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive counter-offensive against his sector but Manstein was less welcoming. Manstein's forces had just spent a week fighting through a maze of defensive works and he believed they were on the verge of breaking through to more open terrain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Manstein stated, "On no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he committed completely beaten". Hitler agreed temporarily to allow the continuation of the offensive in the southern part of the salient, but the following day he ordered Manstein's reserve – the XXIV Panzer Corps – to move south to support the 1st Panzer Army.

The offensive continued in the southern part with the launch of Operation Roland on 14 July. After three days, on 17 July, the II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to end its offensive operations and begin to withdraw, marking the end of Operation Roland. One division was transferred to Italy and the other two were sent south to meet new Soviet offensives. The strength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatly underestimated by German intelligence and the Red Army soon went onto the offensive. In his post-war memoirs Verlorene Siege (Lost Victories), Manstein was highly critical of Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle; however, the veracity of Manstein's claims of a near victory is debatable as the quantity of Soviet reserves was far greater than he realized. These reserves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards Tank Army, which launched Operation Rumyantsev a couple of weeks later. The result was a battle of attrition Manstein's forces were ill-prepared for and which they had little chance of winning.

During Operation Citadel, the Luftwaffe flew 27,221 sorties in support with 193 combat losses (a 0.709 per cent loss rate per sortie). Soviet units from 5 to 8 July conducted 11,235 sorties with combat losses of 556 aircraft (4.95 per cent per sortie). Germans were destroying Soviet armour and aircraft at a ratio of 1:6. Despite German unit performance, the Wehrmacht was now lacking strategic reserves. In late 1943 just 25 per cent of Luftwaffe day fighters were on the Eastern Front, due to British and US air attacks on Italy and Germany.

Soviet Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation

During the defensive preparations in the months leading up to Citadel, the Soviets also planned and prepared counteroffensive operations that would be launched after the German offensive had halted.

In the north: Operation Kutuzov

Main article: Operation Kutuzov

Soviet offensive operations were planned to begin after the strength of the German forces had been dissipated by their Kursk offensive. As the German momentum in the north slowed, the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov on 12 July against Army Group Centre in the Orel salient, directly north of the Kursk salient. The Bryansk Front, under the command of Markian Popov, attacked the eastern face of the Orel salient while the Western Front, commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky, attacked from the north. The Western Front's assault was led by the 11th Guards Army, under Lieutenant General Hovhannes Bagramyan, and was supported by the 1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviet spearheads sustained heavy casualties, but pushed through and in some areas achieved significant penetrations. These thrusts endangered German supply routes and threatened the 9th Army with encirclement. With this threat, 9th Army was compelled to go over fully to the defensive.

The thinly stretched 2nd Panzer Army stood in the way of this Soviet force. The German commanders had been wary of such an attack and forces were quickly withdrawn from the Kursk offensive to meet the Soviet offensive.

Operation Kutuzov reduced the Orel salient and inflicted substantial losses on the German military, paving the way for the liberation of Smolensk. Soviet losses were heavy, but were replaced. The offensive allowed the Soviets to seize the strategic initiative, which they retained for the remainder of the war.

In the south: Operation Rumyantsev

Main article: Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev was intended as the main Soviet offensive for 1943. Its aim was to destroy the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, and cut off the extended southern portion of Army Group South. After the heavy losses sustained by the Voronezh Front, during Citadel, the Soviets needed time to regroup and refit, delaying the start of the offensive until 3 August. Diversionary attacks, launched two weeks earlier across the Donets and Mius Rivers into the Donbas, drew the attention of German reserves and thinned the defending forces that would face the main blow. The offensive was initiated by the Voronezh Front and Steppe Fronts against the northern wing of Army Group South. They drove through the German positions, making broad and deep penetrations. By 5 August, the Soviets had liberated Belgorod.

By 12 August, the outskirts of Kharkov had been reached. The Soviet advance was finally halted by a counter-attack by the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions. In the ensuing tank battles, the Soviet armies suffered heavy losses in armour. After this setback, the Soviets focused on Kharkov. After heavy fighting the city was liberated on 23 August. This battle is referred to by the Germans as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov, while the Soviets refer to it as the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation.

Results

Soviet journalist and writer Ilya Ehrenburg noted the devastation of the battle;

Villages destroyed by fire, shattered towns, stumps of trees, cars bogged down in green slime, field hospitals, hastily dug graves – it all merges into one.

The campaign was a strategic Soviet success. For the first time, a major German offensive had been stopped before achieving a breakthrough; the maximum depth of the German advance was 8–12 kilometres (5.0–7.5 mi) in the north and 35 kilometres (22 mi) in the south. The Germans, despite using more technologically advanced armour than in previous years, were unable to break through the deep Soviet defences and were caught off guard by the significant operational reserves of the Red Army. This result changed the pattern of operations on the Eastern Front, with the Soviet Union gaining the operational initiative. The Soviet victory was costly, with the Red Army losing considerably more men and materiel than the German Army. The Soviet Union's larger industrial potential and pool of manpower allowed them to absorb and replace its losses. Guderian wrote:

With the failure of Zitadelle we have suffered a decisive defeat. The armoured formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come. It was problematical whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front ... Needless to say the exploited their victory to the full. There were to be no more periods of quiet on the Eastern Front. From now on, the enemy was in undisputed possession of the initiative.

With victory, the initiative firmly passed to the Red Army. For the remainder of the war the Germans were limited to reacting to Soviet advances, and were never able to regain the initiative or launch a major offensive on the Eastern Front. British historian Robin Cross stated that "the Red Army had turned the tide at Stalingrad; it had seized the psychological advantage for the first time. But it was in the terrible killing grounds near Kursk that Hitler's panzers, and his ambitions, were dealt a blow from which they never recovered" and that "Failure at Kursk had dealt the Ostheer heavier psychological and material blows than it had suffered at Stalingrad". Further, the Western Allied landings in Italy opened a new front, further diverting German resources and attention.

Soviet air forces dropped about 20,000 tons of bombs during the battle, 4 times more than in the Battle of Moscow, and 2.5 times more than in the Battle of Stalingrad.

Though the location, plan of attack and timing were determined by Hitler, he blamed the defeat on his General Staff. Unlike Stalin, who gave his commanding generals the liberty to make important command decisions, Hitler's interference in German military matters progressively increased while his attention to the political aspects of the war decreased. The opposite was true for Stalin; throughout the Kursk campaign, he trusted the judgment of his commanders, and as their decisions led to battlefield success, it increased his trust in their military judgment. Stalin stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions, resulting in the Red Army being entrusted with higher levels of autonomy during the war.

However, while it is accurate that Hitler interfered in military operational planning and that Stalin generally provided his generals with greater autonomy, this characterization oversimplifies the strategic context surrounding the Battle of Kursk. Hitler's decisions to delay the offensive were not merely capricious but were based on substantial logistical concerns, notably the preparation of new Panther and Tiger tanks, which he believed were essential for a successful summer campaign. Recent examinations of wartime documents reveal that Stalin's trust in his generals was underpinned by a well-coordinated defense strategy that had been meticulously planned and robustly fortified by early June 1943. The Soviet forces, contrary to the implications of passive or reactive strategies, were proactively prepared and strategically positioned, with manpower and artillery strengths reaching over 80 percent of their July capacity by mid-May, effectively nullifying the advantage a swifter German offensive might have achieved. This suggests that Soviet readiness and strategic placement, rather than mere autonomy, were crucial in determining the outcome at Kursk. Moreover, the detailed preparation and anticipation of the German offensive's axis highlight a sophisticated level of strategic defense that goes beyond the simple dichotomy of command autonomy versus interference, reflecting a deep integration of military readiness and strategic foresight.

All told, 239 Red Army personnel were awarded the USSR's highest degree of distinction, the title Hero of the Soviet Union (HSU), for their valour in the Battle of Kursk. Two women, Guards Senior Sergeants Mariya Borovichenko and Zinaida Mareseva, were awarded the HSU title posthumously for their valour under fire while serving as combat medics. Borovichenko was assigned to the 32nd Guards Artillery Regiment, 13th Guards Rifle Division, 5th Guards Army and Mareseva served in a medical platoon in the 214th Guards Rifle Regiment, 73rd Guards Rifle Division, 7th Guards Army.

The Battle of Kursk is cited by some as being the true turning point of the European theatre of World War II, however, this has been thoroughly criticized.

Casualties

Soldier Antonius John who participated in the battle expressed that:

events were on an apocalyptic scale. Scenes like the end of the world threatened to drive a person witnessing them to despair unless he had nerves of steel. Verdun, the Somme, and Stalingrad are comparable dates from history.

The casualties suffered by the two combatants are difficult to determine, due to several factors. German equipment losses were complicated by the fact that they made determined efforts to recover and repair tanks. Tanks disabled one day might be back in action the next day. German personnel losses are clouded by the lack of access to German unit records, which were seized at the end of the war. Many were transferred to the United States national archives and were not made available until 1978, while others were taken by the Soviet Union, which declined to confirm their existence. However, for comparison, military historian Victor Davis Hanson notes that the total combined fatalities of the Battle of Midway (3,419) were less than a third of the fatalities incurred daily at the Battle of Kursk.

Soviet losses

The Russian military historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev, who based his figures on the Soviet archives, is considered by historian David Glantz as the most reliable source for Soviet casualty figures. Krivosheyev calculated total Soviet losses during the German offensive as 177,877. The Central Front suffered 15,336 irrecoverable casualties and 18,561 medical casualties, for a total of 33,897. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 irrecoverable casualties and 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892. The Steppe Front suffered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties and 42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.

During the two Soviet offensives, total casualties amounted to 685,456 men. During Operation Kutuzov, Soviet losses amounted to 112,529 irrecoverable casualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total loss of 429,890. The Western Front reported 25,585 irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical casualties. The Bryansk Front suffered 39,173 irrecoverable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. The Central Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and 117,271 medical casualties. Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev totaled 255,566 men, with 71,611 listed as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955 as medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339 irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties, for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 irrecoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, for a total of 98,273.

Russian historian Boris Sokolov places the losses of the Red Army much higher, giving the figures of 450,000 killed, 50,000 missing (POWs), and 1.2 million wounded throughout the course of the battle, which Glantz states might be inflated, but nonetheless acknowledges that official Soviet figures are most likely conservative. Karl-Heinz Frieser also mentions Sokolov and states that Soviet losses are clearly understated. The German historian Roman Töppel states that official Soviet losses are underestimated by 40%, giving a number of 1.2 million, with him having consulted armies and units archives. Further, Töppel notes Russian historians critical of the official report estimate losses ranging from 910,000 to 2.3 million men, with Sokolov going as high as 999,300 Soviet casualties at Kursk.

Soviet equipment losses during the German offensive came to 1,614 tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed or damaged of the 3,925 vehicles committed to the battle. Soviet losses were roughly three times those of the Germans. During Operation Kutuzov, 2,349 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of an initial strength of 2,308; a loss of over 100 percent. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 1,864 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of the 2,439 employed. The loss ratio suffered by the Soviets was roughly 5:1 in favour of the Germans. Large Soviet reserves of equipment and their high rate of tank production enabled the Soviet tank armies to quickly replace lost equipment and maintain their fighting strength. The Red Army repaired many of its damaged tanks; many Soviet tanks were rebuilt up to four times to keep them in the fight. Soviet tank strength went back up to 2,750 tanks by 3 August due to the repair of damaged vehicles.

According to the historian Christer Bergström, VVS losses during the German offensive amounted to 677 aircraft on the northern flank and 439 on the southern flank. Total casualties are uncertain. Bergström's research indicates total Soviet air losses between 12 July and 18 August, during the German offensive and the Operation Kutuzov counteroffensive, were 1,104 aircraft. Frieser states that the official Soviet figure of 1,626 planes lost "seems completely unbelievable", and cites Sokolov's minimum of 3,300 and cites Luftwaffe as being more reliable due to the strictness of data, with 4,209 Soviet planes downed.

German losses

In Soviet and German data, the human losses figures are not equivalent. In Soviet figures, both combat and non-combat losses (sick, deserted, accident...) were counted. In German, they did not count non-combat losses, and did not take into account the number of the missing, or died in hospitals from wounds, they counted only "front-line losses".

Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive record, calculated that during Citadel 54,182 casualties were suffered. Of these, 9,036 were killed, 1,960 were reported missing and 43,159 were wounded. The 9th Army suffered 23,345 casualties, while Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties. Throughout the Soviet offensives, 111,114 casualties were suffered. In facing Operation Kutuzov, 14,215 men were killed, 11,300 were reported missing (presumed killed or captured) and 60,549 were wounded. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 25,068 casualties were incurred, including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casualties for the three battles were approximately 170,000, with 46,500 killed or missing (per German military medical data).

However, German personnel losses are clouded by the lack of access to German unit records, which were seized at the end of the war. Heersarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/Army Group are based on the reports of the German troops, the numbers are understated. According to the 10-day reports, the losses of the 6th German Army from 11 to 31 August 1943 were only 5,122 men (in the report of the commander of this army, General Carl Holidt, and the commander of the GA "South", von Manstein, they reported this army lost 6,814 non-commissioned officers and soldiers only from 18 to 21 August). According to Niklas Zetterling with Anders Frankson, the 9th German Army lost from 4 to 9 July 1943 were 26,692 men; 1.46 times more than Heersarzt 10-Day reports. According to Stephen Newton, as of 5 July, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 17,369, while the tank and motorized divisions were 18,410. On 30 August 1943, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 8,269 men, and the tank and motorized divisions – 10,745 men. Then the average loss of personnel in the Battle of Kursk (excluding replenishment) is the same for infantry divisions: 9,100 men (52%); for tank and motorized divisions: 7,665 men (41%). At the same time, the losses of Army Group Center in the Battle of Kursk can be estimated by extrapolating the above estimate of the losses of the 4th Panzer Army and OG Kempf to the losses of Army Group Center. It should be considered that the losses of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk were 380,000 to 430,000 men. The Germans lost in the Battle of Kursk can be estimated from the balance of the armed forces of Germany from 1 June 1943 to 1 June 1944. The Wehrmacht's losses for this period were 3,705,500 men. The average two-month loss – 623,000 men, and the loss of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk accounted for 61–75 percent of the Wehrmacht's total losses in July–August 1943. Estimates of 380,000–430,000 casualties in the Battle of Kursk does not contradict the balance of its strength.

During Citadel, 252 to 323 tanks and assault guns were destroyed. By 5 July, when the Battle of Kursk started, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within two days, this had dropped to 40. On 17 July 1943 after Hitler had ordered a stop to the German offensive, Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of the Panthers,

Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days. By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the frontline. 25 Panthers had been lost as total write-offs (23 were hit and burnt and two had caught fire during the approach march). A hundred Panthers were in need of repair (56 were damaged by hits and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown) and 60 percent of the mechanical breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair service... On the evening of 11 July, 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total write-offs and 131 were in need of repair. A slow increase in the combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10 July) attests to the heavy fighting.

By 16 July, Army Group South counted 161 tanks and 14 assault guns lost. Up to 14 July, the 9th Army reported they had lost as write-offs 41 tanks and 17 assault guns. These losses break down as 109 Panzer IVs, 42 Panthers, 38 Panzer IIIs, 31 assault guns, 19 Ferdinands, 10 Tigers and three flame tanks. Before the Germans ended their offensive at Kursk, the Soviets began their counter-offensive and pushed the Germans back into a steady retreat. Thus, a report on 11 August 1943 showed that the numbers of write-offs in Panthers swelled to 156, with only 9 operational. The German Army was forced into a fighting retreat and increasingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles. On the Eastern Front, 50 Tiger tanks were lost during July and August, with some 240 damaged. Most of these occurred during their offensive at Kursk. Between 600 and 1,612 tanks and assault guns sustained damage in the period from 5 to 18 July. The total number of German tanks and assault guns destroyed during July and August on the Eastern Front amount to 1,331. Of these, Frieser estimates that 760 were destroyed during the Battle of Kursk. and Beevor writes that "the Red Army had lost five armoured vehicles for every German panzer destroyed". Töppel's estimate is higher, up to 1,200 were destroyed In total at least 2,952 German tanks and assault guns were destroyed or damaged during the battle of Kursk.

Frieser reports Luftwaffe losses at 524 aircraft, with 159 lost during the German offensive, 218 destroyed during Operation Kutuzov and 147 lost during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. In reviewing the reports of the quartermaster of the Luftwaffe, Bergström presents different figures. Between 5 and 31 July, Bergström reports 681 aircraft lost or damaged (335 for Fliegerkorps VIII and 346 for Luftflotte 6) with 420 being written off (192 from Fliegerkorps VIII and 229 from Luftflotte 6).

Notes

1. The breakdown as shown in Bergstrom (2007) is as follows: 1,030 aircraft of 2nd Air Army and 611 of 17th Air Army on the southern sector (Voronezh Front), and 1,151 on the northern sector (Central Front). Bergström 2007, pp. 21, 127–128.
2. The breakdown as shown by Zetterling and Frankson is: 1,050 aircraft of 16th Air Army (Central Front), 881 of 2nd Air Army (Voronezh Front), 735 of 17th Air Army (only as a secondary support for Voronezh Front), 563 of the 5th Air Army (Steppe Front) and 320 of Long Range Bomber Command. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 20
3. ^ Operation Citadel refers to the German offensive from 4 to 16 July, but Soviet losses are for the period of 5–23 July.
4. The breakdown as shown in Frieser is as follows: 9,063 Killed in action, 43,159 Wounded in action and 1,960 Missing in action. Frieser et al 2007, p. 154
5. ^ The whole Battle of Kursk refers to the period of the German offensive (Operation Citadel) and the subsequent Soviet counteroffensives, from 4 July to 23 August.
6. Frieser et al: 86,064, of whom 25,515 dead or missing; Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive Operation 25,068 men, of whom 8,933 dead or missing. Frieser et al 2007, pp. 197, 200
7. Exact numbers are unknown; the entire German eastern front lost 1,331 tanks and assault guns for July and August, so the number of 760 is an estimate.
8. Figures for 5–31 July, as given by the Luftwaffe logistics staff (Generalquartiermeister der Luftwaffe).
9. The breakdown as shown in Krivosheev is: Kursk-defence: 177,847; Orel-counter: 429,890; Belgorod-counter: 255,566. Krivosheev 1997, pp. 132–134
10. Krivosheev's breakdown is: Kursk-defence; 1,614. Orel-counter; 2,586. Belgorod-counter; 1,864. Krivosheev 1997, p. 262
11. Some that consider Operation Citadel as envisioning a blitzkrieg attack or state it was intended as such are: Lloyd Clark, Roger Moorhouse, David Glantz, Jonathan House, Hedley Paul Willmott. Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson specifically considered only the southern pincer as a "classical blitzkrieg attack". In the informal setting of the International Conference on World War II at The National WWII Museum in 2013, Robert M. Citino used the term to comment on the failure of the operation: "The operation misfired from the start. There was no strategic breakthrough—no "blitzkrieg", no war of movement. Instead it turned into World War I with tanks". In The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 (2012), Citino did not use the term "blitzkrieg", instead describing Citadel as an attempted operation in the classical tradition of Bewegungskrieg, (literally: "war of movement", or maneuver warfare), culminating in a Kesselschlacht (literally: "cauldron battle", or battle of encirclement). Historians Steven Newton and Dieter Brand do not use 'blitzkrieg' in their characterization of the operation.
12. Guderian developed and advocated the strategy of concentrating armoured formations at the point of attack (schwerpunkt) and deep penetration. In Achtung – Panzer! he listed three elements: surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. Of these, surprise was by far the most important.
13. Writing after the war, in his autobiography Panzer Leader, "I urged him earnestly to give up the plan of attack. The great commitment certainly would not bring us equivalent gains."
14. Source includes: German Nation Archive microfilm publication T78, Records of the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) Roll 343, Frames 6301178–180, which confirms Hitler's teleprinter messages to Rommel about reinforcing southern Italy with armoured forces that were already destined to be used for Citadel.
15. According to Zetterling and Frankson these figures are for 1 July 1943 and accounts for only units that eventually fought in Operation Citadel (4th Panzer Army, part of Army Detachment "Kempf", 2nd Army and 9th Army). The figure for German manpower refers to ration strength (which includes non-combatants and wounded soldiers still in medical installations). The figures for guns and mortars are estimates based on the strength and number of units slated for the operation; the figure for tanks and assault guns include those in workshops. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 18
16. Over 105,000 in April and as much as 300,000 in June. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 22.
17. Nikolai Litvin, a Soviet anti-tank gunner present at the battle of Kursk, recalls his experience during the special training to overcome tank phobia. "The tanks continued to advance closer and closer. Some comrades became frightened, leaped out of the trenches, and began to run away. The commander saw who was running and quickly forced them back into the trenches, making it sternly clear that they had to stay put. The tanks reached the trench line and, with a terrible roar, clattered overhead ... it was possible to conceal oneself in a trench from a tank, let it pass right over you, and remain alive."
18. This order of battle does not show the complete composition of the Steppe Front. In addition to the units listed below, there are also the 4th Guards, 27th, 47th and 53rd Armies. Perhaps the order of battle below represents only the formations relevant to Operation Citadel.
19. ^ Frieser uses combat strengths.
20. ^ Frieser counts only operational tanks.
21. Glantz uses total strengths.
22. Glantz uses total strengths.
23. Glantz does not count reinforcements.

See also

• Battle of Chawinda

References

1. ^ Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 171.
2. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 338.
3. ^ Glantz & House 1995, p. 165.
4. ^ Frieser et al 2007, p. 100.
5. Bergström 2007, pp. 123–125: Figures are from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin.
6. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 337.
7. Bergström 2007, pp. 127–128, figures are from Russian archives; Russian aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum, Moscow..
8. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 20.
9. ^ U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise – Phase III (KOSAVE II), pp. 5–14 through 5–15.
10. Frieser et al 2007, pp. 153, 200.
11. ^ Beevor 2012, p. 485.
12. Glantz & House 2004, p. 276.
13. ^ Frieser et al 2007, p. 200.
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15. Searle 2017, p. 80.
16. ^ Frieser et al 2007, p. 154.
17. Clark 2012, p. 408.
18. Frieser et al 2007, pp. 197, 200.
19. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 117, 116, and endnote 18: For all participating armies in the Kursk area, there were 203,000 casualties for July and August.
20. ^ Цена Курской битвы – часть II. Красная армия победила, потому что воевала лучше. Владимир Литвиненко. Опубликовано в выпуске № 33 (746) за 28 августа 2018 года. Quote: "According to Stephen Newton, as of 5th July, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 17,369, while the tank and motorized divisions were 18,410. On 30th August 1943, the average number of infantry divisions in the 4th Tank Army and OG "Kempf" was 8,269 men, and the tank and motorized divisions – 10,745 men. Then the average loss of personnel in the Battle of Kursk (excluding replenishment) is the same for infantry divisions were 9,100 men (52%), for tank and motorized divisions were 7,665 men (41%). At the same time, the losses of Army Group Center in the Battle of Kursk can be estimated by extrapolating the above estimate of the losses of the 4th Panzer Army and OG Kempf to the losses of Army Group Center. It should be considered that the losses of the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk were 380,000 to 430,000 men"
21. Glantz & House 2004, p. 279.
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29. ^ Krivosheev 2001.
30. ^ Koltunov & Solovyev 1970, p. 366.
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36. Krivosheev 1997, p. 262.
37. Töppel 2017, pp. 203–204.
38. Hill, Alexander (2016). The Red Army and the Second World War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-02079-5. Archived from the original on 23 August 2023. Retrieved 20 May 2022.
39. Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2017). Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Vol. VIII (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 201–202. ISBN 978-0-19-872346-2.
40. Clark 2012, pp. xv, 228: "The Battle of Kursk was the greatest land battle the world has ever seen on a fighting front that epitomized 'total war' ... It was time for the largest set-piece battle in the history of war to begin."
41. Töppel 2017, pp. 233–234: "At Kursk, however, no less than 3.5 million soldiers, 12,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and 57,000 guns and mortars were ready for battle. Thus, defined by the number of men and material involved, the Battle of Kursk was without doubt not only the biggest tank clash of the Second World War, but indeed at the same time the largest battle of the Second World War."
42. Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2017). Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Vol. VIII (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 83, 200. ISBN 978-0-19-872346-2. The battle of Kursk is considered the biggest land battle of the Second World War, indeed the biggest in all of military history. During the fighting the two sides deployed more than 4 million troops, 69,000 cannon and launchers, 13,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and almost 12,000 aircraft. Even the battle of Stalingrad seems small-scale in comparison ... As the Red Army had massed a large part of its forces in the Kursk salient, the outcome was the greatest land battle of the Second World War, indeed the greatest in all the history of war.
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46. Showalter 2013, p. 269.
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51. Roberts, Andrew (31 August 2013). "WWII's Greatest Battle: How Kursk Changed the War". The Daily Beast. Retrieved 6 April 2024.
52. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 84, 174, 186, 220–221.
53. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 1.
54. Healy 2010, p. 42.
55. Healy 2010, p. 90.
56. Healy 2010, p. 65.
57. ^ Newton 2002, p. 12.
58. Dunn 1997, p. 94.
59. Kasdorf 2000, p. 16.
60. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 64–67.
61. Glantz 1989, pp. 149–159.
62. Roberts, Andrew (2012). The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. HarperCollins. p. 415. ISBN 978-0-06-122860-5.
63. Dunn 1997, p. 191.
64. Atkinson 2007, p. 172.
65. Glantz & House 1995, p. 167.
66. Glantz 2013, p. 184.
67. Glantz 1986, p. 66.
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69. ^ Kasdorf 2000, p. 7.
70. Clark 2012, p. 167.
71. Clark 2012, p. 176.
72. Glantz & House 2004, p. 11.
73. Hartmann 2013, p. 1 part 8.
74. Healy 2010, p. 27.
75. Citino 2012, pp. 66–67.
76. ^ Kasdorf 2000, p. 8.
77. Citino 2012, pp. 69–70.
78. ^ Clark 2012, p. 177.
79. ^ Dunn 1997, p. 61.
80. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 13.
81. Citino 2012, pp. 68–70.
82. Kasdorf 2000, p. 10.
83. ^ Glantz & House 2004, pp. 11, 13.
84. ^ Clark 2012, p. 178.
85. Glantz & House 1995, p. 157.
86. Healy 2010, p. 43.
87. Newton 2002, p. 374.
88. Showalter 2013, p. 262.
89. Clark 2012, p. 184.
90. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 14.
91. ^ Clark 2012, p. 186.
92. Glantz & House 2004, p. 354.
93. Clark 2012, pp. 178, 186.
94. Citino 2012, p. 121.
95. ^ Clark 2012, p. 187.
96. Glantz & House 2004, p. 25.
97. Moorhouse 2011, p. 342.
98. ^ Glantz 1986, p. 24.
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100. Willmott 1990, p. 300.
101. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 137.
102. Citino 2013.
103. Citino 2012.
104. Newton 2002.
105. ^ Brand 2003.
106. Nipe 1998.
107. Newton 2002, p. 13.
108. Clark 2012, pp. 194, 196.
109. ^ Glantz & House 2004, pp. 51–53.
110. Clark 2012, p. 197.
111. ^ Clark 2012, p. 194.
112. Healy 2010, p. 79.
113. ^ Clark 2012, p. 193.
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115. ^ Showalter 2013, p. 49.
116. Showalter 2013, pp. 49–50.
117. ^ Showalter 2013, p. 50.
118. ^ Glantz 2013, p. 183.
119. ^ Clark 2012, p. 192.
120. Guderian 1937, p. 205.
121. Guderian 1952, p. 308.
122. Guderian 1952 p308
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125. Healy 2010, p. 83.
126. Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 170.
127. Mulligan 1987, p. 329.
128. Clark 2012, p. 223.
129. Healy 2010, p. 132.
130. Newton 2002, p. 25.
131. ^ Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 18.
132. Copeland, Colossus.
133. Clark 2012, pp. 188, 190–191.
134. Beevor 2012, p. 471.
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136. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 28–29, mentions Nikolai Vatutin and Mikhail Malinin.
137. Clark 2012, p. 189, mentions Stalin.
138. ^ Taylor & Kulish 1974, p. 168.
139. ^ Clark 2012, p. 189.
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141. Clark 2012, p. 190.
142. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 28.
143. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 28–29.
144. Barbier 2002, p. 39.
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146. Glantz 2013, p. 195.
147. Clark 2012, p. 202.
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150. ^ Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 22.
151. ^ Glantz & House 2004, pp. 64–65.
152. ^ Clark 2012, p. 211.
153. ^ Glantz & Orenstein 1999, pp. 41, 49.
154. ^ Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa 2011.
155. Glantz 1986, p. 19, Glantz states 1,500 anti-tank mines per kilometre and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometre..
156. Glantz & House 2004, p. 65, Glantz states there were 2,400 anti-tank and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile..
157. Roberts, Andrew (2012). The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. HarperCollins. p. 415. ISBN 978-0-06-122860-5. Furthermore, 2,200 anti-tank and 2,500 anti-personnel mines had been laid across every single mile of the front, a density four times that which had defended Stalingrad and six times that of Moscow.
158. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 39.
159. Glantz & House 2004, p. 67.
160. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 290.
161. ^ Glantz 1986, p. 20.
162. ^ Healy 2010, p. 74.
163. Barbier 2002, p. 58.
164. Clark 2012, p. 208, Clark states 300 locomotives instead of 298..
165. Newton 2002, p. 151.
166. Glantz & House 1995, p. 90.
167. ^ Clark 2012, p. 267.
168. Litvin & Britton 2007, pp. 12–13.
169. ^ Clark 2012, pp. 267–268.
170. Healy 2010, p. 113.
171. Clark 2012, p. 210.
172. Gerwehr & Glenn 2000, p. 33.
173. ^ Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 241.
174. ^ Healy 2010, p. 78.
175. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 135.
176. ^ Beevor 2012, p. 472.
177. Clark 2012, p. 222.
178. Healy 2010, p. 172.
179. Clark 2012, p. 204, provides similar but more specific figures.
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181. Glantz & House 2004, p. 400.
182. Ferguson, Niall (2006). The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: Penguin Publishing. p. 533. ISBN 1-59420-100-5.
183. Overy, Richard (2014). White, Jon; Hoskins, Alex (eds.). "All About History: Story of World War II". All About History. Imagine Publishing. p. 142. ISBN 978-1910-155-295. Retrieved 1 April 2024.
184. Muller 1992, p. 106.
185. Beevor 2012, pp. 471–472.
186. Murray 1983, p. 158.
187. Corum 1995, pp. 53–76
188. ^ Newton 2002, p. 186.
189. Newton 2002, p. 160.
190. Newton 2002, p. 159.
191. ^ Healy 2010, p. 104.
192. Healy 2010, p. 103.
193. Healy 2010, p. 105.
194. Bergström 2007, pp. 79–81, 102, 106, 114, 118.
195. Newton 2002, p. 155.
196. ^ Frieser et al 2007, p. 112.
197. Clark 2012, p. 196.
198. "WWII Battle of Kursk: Mine/Countermine operations". oocities.org. Archived from the original on 23 August 2023. Retrieved 20 October 2016.
199. ^ Clark 2012, p. 237.
200. ^ Healy 1992, p. 41.
201. ^ Healy 2010, p. 201.
202. Nipe 2011, p. 143.
203. Healy 2010, p. 205.
204. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 140.
205. Clark 2012, pp. 475–477, The 2nd Panzer Army and 2nd Army are not included in the order of battle in the source. The 2nd Panzer Army did not take part in Operation Citadel, but played a significant part in Operation Kutuzov. The 2nd Army was tasked with pushing the western face of the salient once the encirclement was completed, but never got do so since the northern and southern pincers failed to meet at Kursk..
206. Clark 2012, pp. 475–477.
207. "Strengths and Losses". Archived from the original on 23 August 2023. Retrieved 12 August 2017.
208. Walter S. Dunn Jr. (2008). Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. Stackpole Books. p. 88. ISBN 978-1-4617-5122-9. Archived from the original on 23 August 2023. Retrieved 6 August 2019.
209. ^ Clark 2012, pp. 478–484.
210. Frieser et al 2007, p. 91.
211. Glantz & House 2004, p. 346.
212. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 345.
213. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 81.
214. ^ Barbier 2002, p. 59.
215. Clark 2012, p. 224.
216. Clark 2012, p. 226.
217. Clark 2012, pp. 227, 233.
218. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 84–86.
219. Newton 2002, p. 77.
220. ^ Clark 2012, p. 236.
221. Bergström 2007, pp. 26–27.
222. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 77–78.
223. Clark 2012, p. 263.
224. Glantz & House 2004, p. 137.
225. Clark 2012, pp. 263, 314.
226. Glantz & House 2004, p. 118.
227. ^ Clark 2012, p. 195.
228. ^ Clark 2012, p. 261.
229. Glantz & House 2004, p. 86.
230. ^ Clark 2012, p. 264.
231. ^ Clark 2012, p. 265.
232. Clark 2012, p. 266.
233. Münch 1997, pp. 50–52.
234. ^ Clark 2012, pp. 120, 266.
235. ^ Clark 2012, p. 309.
236. Frieser et al 2007, p. 108.
237. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 93, 117.
238. Clark 2012, pp. 120, 306.
239. ^ Glantz & House 2004, p. 93.
240. ^ Clark 2012, p. 308.
241. Glantz & House 2004, p. 117.
242. ^ Beevor 2012, p. 478.
243. Clark 2012, pp. 309–311.
244. Glantz & House 2004, p. 115.
245. Clark 2012, p. 313.
246. Glantz & House 2004, p. 121.
247. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 91.
248. Clark 2012, p. 312.
249. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 115, 120–121.
250. Cross, Robin (2002). The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943. Penguin Publishing. p. 187. ISBN 9780141391090.
251. Frieser et al 2007, p. 110.
252. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 118, 121.
253. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 94.
254. Healy 2010, pp. 286–287.
255. Overy 1995, p. 204.
256. Healy 2010, p. 287.
257. ^ Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 95–96.
258. Cross, Robin (2002). The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943. Penguin Publishing. p. 150. ISBN 9780141391090.
259. Cross, Robin (2002). The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943. Penguin Publishing. p. 171. ISBN 9780141391090.
260. Clark 2012, p. 238, 240.
261. ^ Clark 2012, p. 242.
262. Clark 2012, p. 241.
263. Clark 2012, pp. 197, 68.
264. ^ Clark 2012, p. 246.
265. ^ Clark 2012, p. 247.
266. Clark 2012, p. 248.
267. Clark 2012, p. 250.
268. Clark 2012, pp. 252–253.
269. ^ Clark 2012, p. 254.
270. Clark 2012, p. 255.
271. ^ Clark 2012, p. 256.
272. Clark 2012, pp. 256–257.
273. Beevor 2012, p. 481.
274. Clark 2012, pp. 257–259.
275. Clark 2012, p. 259.
276. ^ Clark 2012, p. 260.
277. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 101.
278. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 113, 133.
279. ^ Zamulin 2011, p. 159.
280. Glantz & House 2004, p. 113.
281. Clark 2012, pp. 287–288.
282. Clark 2012, pp. 478–484, The Soviet order of battle.
283. Nipe 2011, p. 72.
284. Glantz & House 2004, p. 114.
285. ^ Glantz & House 2004, pp. 114, 133–135.
286. Glantz & House 2004, p. 135, tank losses are given as 50.
287. Clark 2012, p. 299, tank losses are given as 50 in the first air raid and another 30 in subsequent air raids.
288. Glantz & House 2004, p. 135.
289. ^ Clark 2012, pp. 298–299.
290. Bauman 1998, pp. 8–4 to 8–5.
291. Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 18–20 miles.
292. Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 18–20 miles.
293. Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 90, this places it at 28 km at the end of 7 July.
294. Bauman 1998, pp. 8–5 to 8–6, this places it at 23 km.
295. Newton 2002, p. 6.
296. Clark 2012, pp. 350–353.
297. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 169, 171.
298. Yeide 2014, p. 178.
299. Healy 2010, pp. 301–302.
300. Newton 2002, p. 7.
301. Nipe 2011, p. 311.
302. Nipe 2011, p. 324.
303. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 164–170.
304. Nipe 2011, p. 310.
305. Nipe 2011, p. 309.
306. Bergström 2007, p. 77.
307. Clark 2012, p. 363.
308. Beevor 2012, p. 482.
309. Glantz & House 2004, p. 187, in Moscow time.
310. Barbier 2002, p. 139.
311. Zamulin 2011, p. 349.
312. Nipe 2011, p. 304.
313. Nipe 2011, p. 341.
314. Bergström 2007, pp. 79–80.
315. Healy 2010, p. 353.
316. Healy 2010, p. 354.
317. ^ Healy 2010, p. 355.
318. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 218, 223.
319. Kasdorf 2000, p. 22.
320. Healy 2010, p. 109.
321. Kasdorf 2000, p. 32.
322. Peck, Michael (13 February 2021). "The Real History of WWII's Battle of Kursk and Why it Did NOT Spell the End for Nazi Germany". The National Interest. Archived from the original on 28 March 2023. Retrieved 20 August 2023.
323. Frieser et al 2007, pp. 111, 185.
324. Overy 1995, p. 205.
325. Overy 1995, pp. 204–205.
326. Frieser et al 2007, p. 188.
327. Glantz & House 1995, p. 297.
328. Glantz & House 2004, p. 241.
329. Glantz & House 2004, p. 245.
330. Frieser et al 2007, p. 196.
331. Glantz & House 2004, p. 249.
332. Glantz & House 1995, p. 70.
333. Ferguson, Niall (2006). The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: Penguin Publishing. p. 534. ISBN 1-59420-100-5.
334. ^ Edele, Mark (18 July 2018). "The Battle of Kursk: 75 Years On – The human and material toll of the world's largest tank battle was horrendous as the Wehrmacht's tactical edge was overwhelmed by superior means of destruction". Pursuit. Archived from the original on 5 May 2019. Retrieved 5 May 2019.
335. Glantz & House 1995, p. 166.
336. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 121.
337. Jacobsen & Rohwer 1965, p. 251.
338. Cross, Robin (2002). The Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel 1943. Penguin Publishing. p. 251. ISBN 9780141391090.
339. П.в, Казьмин; Д.а, Кузнецов (2010). "Боевая авиация в битве на Курской дуге". Современные технологии обеспечения гражданской обороны и ликвидации последствий чрезвычайных ситуаций (1 (1)): 112–114.
340. Liddell Hart 1948, p. 216.
341. Glantz & House 2004, p. 9.
342. Zamulin, Valeriy N. (2014). "Could Germany Have Won the Battle of Kursk if It Had Started in Late May or the Beginning of June 1943?". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 27 (4): 606–617. doi:10.1080/13518046.2014.963418.
343. Empric 2020, p. 6.
344. Barbier 2002, pp. 170–171.
345. Ferguson, Niall (2006). The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: Penguin Publishing. pp. 533–535. ISBN 1-59420-100-5.
346. Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2017). Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Vol. VIII (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 83, 138, 154, 156, 170, 1214. ISBN 978-0-19-872346-2.
347. Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2017). Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Vol. VIII (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 206. ISBN 978-0-19-872346-2.
348. Healy 2010, p. 366.
349. ^ Nipe 2011, p. vi.
350. Hanson, Victor Davis (2020). The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won (Reprint ed.). New York: Basic Books. p. 200. ISBN 978-1541674103.
351. ^ Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 274.
352. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 275.
353. ^ Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 276.
354. G.F. Krivosheyev (1993) "Soviet Armed Forces Losses in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts: A Statistical Study" Archived 2 November 2015 at the Wayback Machine. Military Publishing House Moscow. Retrieved 4 July 2015.
355. "Б.В.Соколов. Правда о Великой Отечественной войне". www.lib.ru. Retrieved 7 April 2024.
356. Glantz & House 2004, pp. 428.
357. ^ Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2017). Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Vol. VIII (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 200. ISBN 978-0-19-872346-2.
358. ^ Healy 2010, p. 367.
359. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, pp. 276–277.
360. Peter Strassner, European Volunteers: 5 SS Panzer Division Wiking, p. 119; U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise – Phase III (KOSAVE II), pp. 5–12; Healy, Kursk, pp. 85–88; and Steve Zaloga T-34/76 Medium Tank 1941–45, Osprey p. 34
361. Frieser, Karl-Heinz (2017). Germany and the Second World War: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Vol. VIII (1st ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 201–202. ISBN 978-0-19-872346-2.
362. "В академии Генштаба оценили потери Красной армии под Прохоровкой, 15 October 2018". 15 October 2018. Archived from the original on 28 February 2023. Retrieved 28 February 2023.
363. ^ Frieser et al 2007, p. 202.
364. ^ Jentz 1995, pp. 130–132
365. Frieser et al 2007, p. 151.
366. Jentz 1995, p. 134
367. Jentz & Doyle 1993, p. 41.
368. Frieser et al 2007, p. 204.
369. Bergström 2007, p. 120.

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Further reading

• Battistelli, Pier Paolo (2013) . Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-47280002-2.
• Clark, Alan (1966). Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945. New York: Morrow. ISBN 0-688-04268-6. OCLC 40117106.
• Glantz, David M. (1990). The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II. Novato, CA: Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-380-4.
• Hill, Alexander (2017), The Red Army and the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-1-1070-2079-5.
• Hinley, Sir Harry (1996). "The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War". CL. UK: CAM. Archived from the original on 22 June 2011. Retrieved 13 June 2013.
• Keegan, John, ed. (2006). Atlas of World War II. London: Collins. ISBN 0-00-721465-0.
• Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The war aims and strategies of Adolf Hitler. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. ISBN 978-0-78642054-4.
• Töppel, Roman (2001). Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 – Legenden, Mythen, Propaganda (MA thesis) (in German). Dresden: Technical University.
• Weingartner, James (1991). Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: A Military History, 1933–45. Nashville: Battery Press. p. 81.

External links

• Licari, Michael J. The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality. Archived from the original on 2014-09-12. Retrieved 1 November 2014.
• Licari, Michael J. A Review Essay: Books on the Battle of Kursk. Archived from the original on 2014-09-11. Retrieved 1 November 2014.
• Wilson, Alan. Kursk – Raw Data to Download, 6 February 1999. – Information from the US Army KOSAVE II study on the southern face battle
• Wilson, Alan. The Kursk Region, July 1943 (maps), 27 October 1999
• "Fighting a Lost War: The German Army in 1943": Video on YouTube, lecture by Robert Citino, via the official channel of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center

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General	Topics Air warfare of World War II In Europe Blitzkrieg Comparative military ranks Cryptography Declarations of war Diplomacy Governments in exile Home front Australian United Kingdom United States Lend-Lease Manhattan Project British contribution Military awards Military equipment Military production Naval history Nazi plunder Opposition Technology Allied cooperation Mulberry harbour Total war Strategic bombing Puppet states Women Art and World War II Music in World War II Weather events during World War II Theaters Asia and Pacific China South-East Asia Pacific North and Central Pacific South-West Pacific Indian Ocean Europe Western Front Eastern Front Mediterranean and Middle East North Africa East Africa Italy West Africa Atlantic timeline Americas Aftermath Chinese Civil War Cold War Decolonization Division of Korea First Indochina War Expulsion of Germans Greek Civil War Indonesian National Revolution Keelhaul Marshall Plan Occupation of Germany Occupation of Japan Osoaviakhim Paperclip Soviet occupations Baltic Hungary Poland Romania Territorial changes of Germany Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany United Nations War crimes Allied war crimes Soviet war crimes British war crimes United States war crimes German war crimes forced labour Wehrmacht war crimes The Holocaust Aftermath Response Nuremberg trials Italian war crimes Japanese war crimes Nanjing Massacre Unit 731 Prosecution Croatian war crimes Genocide of Serbs Persecution of Jews Romanian war crimes Sexual violence German military brothels Camp brothels Rape during the occupation of Germany  / Japan  / Poland Rape during the liberation of France  / Serbia Sook Ching Comfort women Rape of Manila Marocchinate
Participants	Allies Algeria Australia Belgium Brazil Bulgaria (from September 1944) Canada China Cuba Czechoslovakia Denmark Ethiopia Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) Finland (from September 1944) France Free France Greece India Italy (from September 1943) Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands Newfoundland New Zealand Norway Philippines Poland Romania (from August 1944) Sierra Leone South Africa Southern Rhodesia Soviet Union Tuva United Kingdom British Empire United States Puerto Rico Yugoslavia Axis Albania protectorate Bulgaria (until September 1944) Wang Jingwei regime Independent State of Croatia Finland (until September 1944) German Reich Hungary Azad Hind French Indochina Iraq Italy (until September 1943) Italian Social Republic Empire of Japan Manchukuo Philippines Romania (until August 1944) Slovak Republic Thailand Vichy France Collaboration Neutral Afghanistan Andorra Bhutan Ireland Liechtenstein Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland Tibet Vatican City Resistance Albania Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech lands Denmark Dutch East Indies Estonia Ethiopia France Germany Greece Hong Kong Italy Japan Jews Korea Korean Liberation Army Korean Volunteer Army Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malaya Netherlands Northeast China Norway Philippines Poland Romania Thailand Soviet Union Slovakia Western Ukraine Vietnam Quốc dân Đảng Viet Minh Yugoslavia POWs Finnish prisoners in the Soviet Union German prisoners Soviet Union Azerbaijan United States United Kingdom Italian prisoners in the Soviet Union Japanese prisoners Soviet Union German atrocities against Polish POWs Soviet prisoners Finland atrocities by Germans Polish prisoners in the Soviet Union Romanian prisoners in the Soviet Union
Timeline	Prelude Africa Second Italo-Ethiopian War Asia Second Sino-Japanese War Battles of Khalkhin Gol Europe Anschluss Munich Agreement Occupation of Czechoslovakia Operation Himmler Italian invasion of Albania 1939 Invasion of Poland Battle of the Atlantic Phoney War First Battle of Changsha Battle of South Guangxi Winter War 1939–1940 Winter Offensive 1940 Norwegian campaign German invasion of Denmark Battle of Zaoyang–Yichang German invasion of Luxembourg German invasion of the Netherlands German invasion of Belgium Battle of France Dunkirk evacuation Battle of Britain Battle of the Mediterranean North Africa West Africa British Somaliland Hundred Regiments Offensive Baltic states Eastern Romania Japanese invasion of French Indochina Italian invasion of Greece Compass 1941 Battle of South Henan Battle of Shanggao Invasion of Yugoslavia German invasion of Greece Battle of Crete Anglo-Iraqi War Battle of South Shanxi Syria–Lebanon campaign East African campaign Invasion of the Soviet Union Summer War Finland (Silver Fox) Lithuania Battle of Kiev Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran Second Battle of Changsha Siege of Leningrad Battle of Moscow Bombing of Gorky Siege of Sevastopol Attack on Pearl Harbor Japanese invasion of Thailand Fall of Hong Kong Fall of the Philippines Battle of Guam Battle of Wake Island Malayan campaign Battle of Borneo Japanese invasion of Burma Third Battle of Changsha Greek famine of 1941–1944 1942 Fall of Singapore Battle of the Java Sea St Nazaire Raid Battle of Christmas Island Battle of the Coral Sea Battle of Madagascar Zhejiang-Jiangxi campaign Battle of Gazala Battle of Dutch Harbor Battle of Midway Aleutian Islands campaign Kiska Attu Blue First Battle of El Alamein Battle of Stalingrad Kokoda Track campaign Rzhev Jubilee Second Battle of El Alamein Guadalcanal campaign Torch Chinese famine of 1942–1943 1943 Black May Tunisian campaign Battle of West Hubei Battle of Attu Bombing of Gorky Battle of Kursk Allied invasion of Sicily Smolensk Solomon Islands campaign Cottage Battle of the Dnieper Allied invasion of Italy Armistice of Cassibile Burma Northern Burma and Western Yunnan Changde Second Battle of Kiev Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign Tarawa Makin Bengal famine of 1943 1944 Tempest Monte Cassino / Anzio Korsun–Cherkassy Narva Ichi-Go Overlord Neptune Mariana and Palau Bagration Western Ukraine Second Battle of Guam Tannenberg Line Warsaw Uprising Eastern Romania Liberation of Paris Dragoon Gothic Line Belgrade offensive Lapland Market Garden Estonia Crossbow Pointblank Vietnamese famine of 1944–1945 Philippines (1944–1945) Leyte Syrmian Front Hungary Budapest Burma (1944–1945) Ardennes Bodenplatte Dutch famine of 1944–1945 1945 Vistula–Oder Battle of Manila Battle of Iwo Jima Indochina Vienna offensive Project Hula Western invasion of Germany Bratislava–Brno offensive Battle of Okinawa Second Guangxi campaign West Hunan Italy (Spring 1945) Battle of Berlin Prague offensive Surrender of Germany document Borneo Taipei Naval bombardment of Japan Manchuria Atomic bombings Debate South Sakhalin Kuril Islands Shumshu Surrender of Japan Potsdam Declaration document End of World War II in Asia
World portal Bibliography Category

v t e Tank battles
World War I	Battle of Cambrai (1917)
World War II	Battle of Khalkhin Gol Battle of Tomaszów Lubelski Battle of Hannut Battle of Sedan (1940) Battle of Brody (1941) Operation Crusader Battle of Gazala Battle of Stalingrad (Operation Winter Storm) Second Battle of El Alamein Battle of Kursk (Battle of Prokhorovka) Operation Goodwood Battle of Radzymin Battle of Studzianki Battle of the Dukla Pass Battle of Arracourt Battle of the Bulge
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965	Operation Grand Slam Battle of Asal Uttar Battle of Phillora Battle of Chawinda
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971	Battle of Chamb Battle of Basantar
Yom Kippur War	Operation Badr Valley of Tears Battle of the Chinese Farm
Iran–Iraq War	Operation Nasr
Gulf War	Battle of 73 Easting Battle of Norfolk Battle of Medina Ridge Battle of Al Busayyah
Russo-Ukrainian War	Battle of Novoazovsk Mariupol offensive Battle of Debaltseve Battle of Vuhledar

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