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{{short description|Approach to warfare}}
{{Multiple issues|{{expert-subject|date=November 2009}}{{confusing|date=November 2009}}}}
{{more citations needed|date=April 2009}}
{{history of war}}
{{Use British English|date=November 2022}}
'''Combined arms''' is an approach to ]fare which seeks to integrate different ] of a ] to achieve mutually complementary effects (for example, using infantry and armor in an urban environment, where one supports the other, or both support each other). Combined arms doctrine contrasts with segregated arms where each military unit is composed of only one type of soldier or weapon system. Segregated arms is the traditional method of unit/force organisation, employed to provide maximum ] and concentration of force in a given weapon or unit type.
{{Use dmy dates|date=July 2022}}
], ], and ] units of the ] together as part of ] during the ]]]
{{War}}
'''Combined arms''' is an approach to ] that seeks to integrate different ] of a ] to achieve mutually complementary effects—for example, using ] and ] in an ] in which each supports the other.<ref>{{cite book |title=ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations |publisher=Department of the Army |date=16 May 2012 |access-date=29 September 2014 |pages=1–14 |url=http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160322114809/http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf |archive-date=22 March 2016 |url-status=dead}}</ref>


According to the strategist ], combined arms can be distinguished from the concept of "supporting arms" as follows:
Though the lower-] units of a combined arms team may be of similar types, a balanced mixture of such units are combined into an effective higher-echelon unit, whether formally in a table of organization or informally in an '']'' solution to a battlefield problem. For example an ]—the modern paragon of combined arms doctrine—consists of a mixture of ], ], ], ], and perhaps even ] units, all coordinated and directed by a unified ].
<blockquote>Combined arms hits the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously in such a manner that the actions he must take to defend himself from one make him more vulnerable to another. In contrast, supporting arms is hitting the enemy with two or more arms in sequence, or if simultaneously, then in such combination that the actions the enemy must take to defend himself from one also defends himself from the other(s).<ref>{{cite book |title=Maneuver Warfare Handbook|author=Lind, William S. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DdHDg-IunLoC |page=12 |publisher=Westview Press |date=1985|isbn=9780813346298 }}</ref></blockquote>


Though the lower-] units of a combined arms team may be of similar types, a balanced mixture of such units are combined into an effective higher-echelon unit, whether formally in a table of organization or informally in an ''ad hoc'' solution to a battlefield problem. For example, an ], the modern paragon of combined arms doctrine, consists of a mixture of ], ], ], ], ] and ] units, all of which are co-ordinated and directed by a unified ].<ref>{{cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLorCiYziMQ-j08Z5o6U-0g |medium=video |title=Combined Arms Breach |publisher=OEC G&V |year=c. 2015 |quote=This visualization was developed for the Maneuver Center of Excellence and is closely based upon the National Training Center Breach and Assault exercise executed circa 1990. This visualization demonstrates viable TTPs as discussed in ATTP 3-90-4 for the conduct of the combined arms breach against a hypothetical enemy.}}</ref>
Also, most modern military units can, if the situation requires it, call on yet more branches of the military, such as ] or ], to support their operations. The mixing of arms is sometimes pushed down below the level where homogeneity ordinarily prevails, for example by temporarily attaching a tank company to an infantry battalion.

Also, most modern military units can, if the situation requires it, call on yet more branches of the military, such as infantry requesting ], Cyberwarfare or ] support; or the bombing or shelling by ] or ] to augment their ground offensive or protect their land forces. The mixing of arms is sometimes pushed down below the level at which homogeneity ordinarily prevails, such as by temporarily attaching a tank company to an infantry battalion.


==Ancient warfare== ==Ancient warfare==
{{no references|section|date=August 2023}}
Combined arms operations dates back to antiquity, where armies would usually field a screen of ] to protect their spearmen during the approach to contact. Especially in the case of the Greek ] however, the focus of military thinking lay almost exclusively on the heavy infantry. In more elaborate situations armies of various nationalities fielded different combinations of light, medium, or heavy infantry, cavalry, chariotry, camelry, elephantry, and artillery (mechanical weapons); the ancient ] is an excellent example of this. Combined arms in this context was how to best use the cooperating units, variously armed with side-arms, spears, or missile weapons in order to coordinate an attack in time and space that would best disrupt and then destroy the enemy.
Combined arms operations date back to antiquity, where armies would usually field a screen of ]s to protect their spearmen during the approach to contact. Especially in the case of the Greek ], however, the focus of military thinking lay almost exclusively on the heavy infantry. In more elaborate situations armies of various nationalities fielded different combinations of light, medium, or heavy infantry, light or heavy cavalry, chariotry, camelry, elephantry, and artillery (mechanical weapons). Combined arms in this context was how to best use the cooperating units, variously armed with side-arms, spears, or missile weapons in order to coordinate an attack to disrupt and then destroy the enemy.


] greatly improved upon the limited combined arms tactics of the Greek city-states and combined the newly created Macedonian Phalanx with heavy cavalry and other forces. The Phalanx would hold the opposing line in place, until the heavy cavalry could smash and break the enemy line by achieving ]. ] greatly improved upon the limited combined arms tactics of the Greek city-states and combined the newly created Macedonian phalanx with heavy cavalry and other forces. The phalanx would hold the opposing line in place, until the heavy cavalry could smash and break the enemy line by achieving local superiority.


The pre-Marian ] was a combined arms force and consisted of five classes of troops. Lightly equipped ] acted as skirmishers armed with light javelins. The ] and ] formed the main attacking strength of the legion with sword and ], whilst the ] formed the defensive backbone of the legion fighting as a ] with long spears and large shields. The fifth class were the ], the cavalry, used for scouting, pursuit and to guard the flanks. The early Republic ] was a combined arms force and consisted of five classes of troops. Lightly equipped ] acted as skirmishers armed with light javelins. The ] and ] formed the main attacking strength of the legion with ] and ], whilst the ] formed the defensive backbone of the legion fighting as spearmen (initially as a denser Greek ] and later as a looser spear wall formation) with long spears and large shields. The fifth class of troops were the ] (the cavalry), which were used for scouting, pursuit and to guard the flanks.


After the ] the Legion was notionally a unit of heavy infantrymen armed with just ] and ], and fielded with a small attached auxiliary skirmishers and missile troops, and incorporated a small cavalry unit. The Legion then became notionally a unit of heavy infantrymen armed with just sword and pilum, and fielded with a small attached auxiliary skirmishers and missile troops, and incorporated a small cavalry unit. The legion was sometimes also incorporated into a higher-echelon combined arms unit – e.g., in one period it was customary for a general to command two legions plus two similarly sized units of auxiliaries, lighter units useful as screens or for combat in rough terrain. Later during the Roman Empire, auxiliary soldiers outnumbered the core legionary troops.


The army of the ] is also an example, fielding mêlée infantry (equipped with a variety of different weapons ranging from swords to pikes to halberd-like weapons), archers, crossbowmen, and cavalry (ranging from horse archers to heavy lancers). One recorded tactical formation during the Han dynasty included three ranks of halberds, swordsmen, and spearmen, supported by crossbows, and with cavalry on the flanks.
The legion was sometimes also incorporated into a higher-echelon combined arms unit—e.g., in one period it was customary for a general to command two legions plus two similarly sized units of auxiliaries, lighter units useful as screens or for combat in rough terrain.


Civilizations such as the ]s and ]s also were known to have fielded a combination of infantry supported by powerful cavalry.
The army of the ] is also an example, fielding melee infantry, crossbowmen, and cavalry (ranging from horse archers to heavy lancers).

Civilizations such as the ]s and ]s also were known to have fielded a combination of infantry supported by powerful cavalry.


==Middle Ages== ==Middle Ages==
At the ] (1066) English infantry fighting from behind a shield wall were defeated by a Norman army consisting of archers, foot soldiers (infantry), and mounted knights (cavalry). One of the tactics used by the Normans was to tempt the English to leave the shield wall to attack retreating Norman infantry only to destroy them in the open with cavalry. Likewise Scottish ]s – which had been developed to counter the charges by English heavy cavalry, and had been used successfully against English cavalry at the ] (1297) – were destroyed at the ] (1298) by English archers acting in concert with mounted knights. Both Hastings and Falkirk showed how combined arms could be used to defeat enemies relying on only one arm.<ref>{{cite book |last=Hamilton |first=John |year=2010 |title=Knights and Heroes, Fantasy and Folklore |id=Set 2 |publisher=ABDO Publishing Company |isbn=9781617842856 |page=18 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LkN6AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA18}}</ref>
In the 6th century, the ] ] wrote the '']'', a manual of war that codified a number of military reforms of the time. These reforms would remain relatively unchanged for 500 years. Today, the ''Strategikon'' is considered the first sophisticated formulation of combined arms theory.{{citation needed|date=December 2011}}


The English victories of ], ] and ] were examples of a simple form of combined arms, with a combination of dismounted knights forming a foundation for formations of English ]. The lightly protected longbowmen could down their French opponents at a distance, whilst the armoured men-at-arms could deal with any Frenchmen who made it to the English lines. This is the crux of combined arms: to allow a combination of forces to achieve what would be impossible for its constituent elements to do alone. The English victories of ], ] and ] were examples of a simple form of combined arms, with a combination of dismounted knights forming a foundation for formations of English ]. The lightly protected longbowmen could down their French opponents at a distance, whilst the armoured men-at-arms could deal with any Frenchmen who made it to the English lines. This is the crux of combined arms: to allow a combination of forces to achieve what would be impossible for its constituent elements to do alone.


During the Middle Ages military forces used combined arms as a method of winning battles and furthering a war leader or king's long-term goals. Some historians claim that during the Middle Ages there was no strategic or tactical art to military combat.{{who|date=November 2022}} Kelly DeVries uses the Merriam-Webster definition of combat "as a general military engagement".<ref name=DeVries1966>{{cite book |author=DeVries, Kelly |year=1996 |title=Infantry Warfare in the early Fourteenth Century |page=18 |location=Rochester, NY |publisher=Boydell Press}}</ref> In the pursuit of a leader's goals and self-interest tactical and strategic thinking was used along with taking advantage of the terrain and weather in choosing when and where to give battle. The simplest example is the combination of different specialties such as archers, infantry, cavalry (knights or shock mounted troops), and even peasant militia. At times, each force fought on its own and won or lost depending on the opposing military competence. During the Middle Ages leaders utilized a combination of these skilled and unskilled forces to win battles. An army that has multiple skills available can engage a larger force that incorporates mainly one or two types of troops.
During the late Middle Ages in Western Europe, fighting men were principally organized on the basis of a combined arms team, or a ]. The Lance consisted of a landholder and the men in his direct service: the men he rode to war with. The classic example of a Lance, as in the royal French and their opposing Burgundian forces, featured one noble heavy cavalryman, commonly known as a ], supported by at least two ] (professional soldiers, as opposed to gentry, who carried similar arms as knights, only lighter and cheaper), two mounted archers, and between two and six ]s or ]s, non-combatant support troops in the service of the knight.


Each type of military formation – infantry, archers, cavalry, or peasants – has certain advantages that the other does not have. Infantry allows a force to hold ground and in the event of overwhelming enemy forces withdraw into terrain that mounted troops cannot maneuver as easily, thus negating the advantage of the horse. Archers provide standoff with their bows or crossbows. Cavalry can maneuver faster and provide fast attack before the enemy has had time to prepare defenses. Peasants are more numerous and cheaper on the royal coffers. Over the long term the army can cross-train and learn the skills of the specialties to increase ]. This is known as a combat multiplier today. The combination of the different skills help provide a commander the flexibility to minimize risk when it comes to engagements. The overall objective of any military force is to fight and win, while also preserving the largest number of combatants to carry on the larger strategic aims of the king. This can be seen in some of the engagements during the Middle Ages.
As the vast majority of Medieval European warfare consisted of performing raids and long-range patrols, the lance was an important method of providing shock effect, ranged firepower, and logistical support for a knightly retinue out for plunder. For the rare occurrence of a ], the most senior of the gentry would break up the lances, organizing the men into the more familiar en bloc formation of individual arms: sergeants dismounting to form the main battle line with archers and crossbowmen in support.


==15th to 18th centuries==
The knights would remain mounted and act as scouts, flank defense, and in rare instances, the main frontal assault force. The Sergeants, also known as Men-At-Arms, were principally professional soldiers of common birth, although this was not always the case. As the number of truly professional soldiers was very low, the Lances were often supplemented by large numbers of drafted peasants, local ] {{citation needed|date=July 2007}} and ].
Generally the savanna cavalries of ] used a combined arms approach, seldom operating without supporting infantry.<ref>Thornton, pp. 28–34</ref>


The ] army of the ] kings, composed of heavily armoured '']'' (professional versions of the medieval ]), ] and ] ] ], and heavy cannons took form during the transition from the medieval way of war to the ].
The shortcomings of early ]s forced the Spanish Army to adopt the combined arms ]. The slow firing ]ers being protected by ] and the cumbersome pikemen in turn protected by agile sword and ] men. The success of the tercio inspired similar formations and tactics being adopted by the armies of other nations.


The late ] saw the development of combined ] formations in Europe, starting with the ''colunelas'' of the Spanish general ], evolving into the '']s'' of ] and the ] during the ].
For example the English ] consisted of intermixed musketeers and pikemen forming a base of manoeuvre for ].


In Japan, at the ] (長篠の戦い) in 1575, forces of the ] successfully employed combined arms against the ], which heavily relied on cavalry. The Oda army erected ]s to protect their ] ] that shot down the Takeda cavalry while their ] cut down any enemies who managed to approach melee range.
The massed tercio declined with improvements in artillery, for smaller more flexible units. As muskets improved, the ratio of pikes to muskets declined until with the invention of the ], their number was reduced to a handful of shortened ] which were retained only as badges of rank.


The 17th century saw increasing use of combined arms at lower (regimental) level. King ] was the proponent of the idea. For fire support he attached teams of "commanded musketeers" to cavalry units and fielded light 3-pounder guns to provide infantry units with organic artillery.
==17th to 19th centuries==
17th century saw increasing use of combined arms at lower (regimental) level. King ] was the proponent of the idea. For fire support he attached teams of "commanded musketeers" to cavalry units and fielded light 3-pounder guns to provide infantry units with organic artillery.


In the eighteenth century, the concept of the legion was revived. Legions now consisted of ]s, ], ]s and ] in a ] sized force. These legions often combined professional military personnel with ]. Perhaps the most notable example is the use of ], light infantry and light ] in advance detachments by France's ] during the ].
In Japan, in ] (長篠の戦い) in 1575, forces of ] successfully employed combined arms against ] army which heavily relied on cavalry. The Oda army erected palisades to protect their ] ] that downed Takeda's cavalry while their ] cut down any enemies who managed to approach melee range.


==Napoleonic Wars==
In the eighteenth century, the concept of the legion was revived. Legions now consisted of ]eers, ], ]s and ] in a ] sized force. These legions often combined professional military personnel with ]. Perhaps the most notable example is the use of ], ] and light ] in advance detachments by France's ] during the ]. This was not a new idea, having been used by the ]'s use of ].
After 25&nbsp;years of near continuous warfare, the armies that met at the ] in 1815 were organized in a similar manner – into corps which contained infantry, cavalry and artillery (see ]), and used similar combined arms tactics. Within each corps were divisions of infantry or cavalry made up of brigades and an artillery unit. An army would usually also have reserves of all three arms under the direct command of the army commander which could be sent in support of any corps or division of a corps to increase any arm which the army general considered necessary. The ] commanded by ] during the battle failed to break Wellington's squares of infantry and Ney's failure to supplement his cavalry with sufficient horse artillery to break the squares open is usually given as a major contributing factor in the failure. It is an example of why generals needed to use combined arms to overcome the tactics used by enemy officers to frustrate an attack by a single arm of an army.<ref>{{cite book |last=Haythornthwaite |first=Philip |year=2007 |title=The Waterloo Armies: Men, organization and tactics |edition=illustrated |publisher=Pen and Sword|isbn=9781844155996 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AcyXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA12 |page=12}}</ref>


In contrast the ] suffered 478&nbsp;casualties from an initial strength of 750&nbsp;because of their exposure to attack by French combined arms. They were located near the centre of Wellington's line, but unlike most of the rest of Wellington's infantry were in a declivity on the exposed side of the ] ]. Exposed as they were, they were forced to stand in square for most of the day for fear of cavalry attack and so made an easy dense target for Napoleon's massed artillery.<ref>{{cite book |last=Weller |first=Jac |year=2010 |title=Wellington at Waterloo |edition=illustrated, reprint |page=166 |publisher=Frontline Books |isbn=9781848325869 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w8-XAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA166}}</ref>
===Napoleonic Wars===
After 25 years of near continuous warfare, the armies that met at the ] were organised in a similar manner–into corps which contained infantry, cavalry and artillery (see ]), and used similar combined arms tactics. Within each corps were divisions of infantry or cavalry made up of brigades and an artillery unit. An army would usually also have reserves of all three arms under the direct command of the army commander which could be sent in support of any corps or division of a corps to increase any arm which the army general considered necessary. The ] commanded by ] during the battle failed to break Wellington's squares of infantry and Nay's failure to supplement his cavalry with sufficient horse artillery to break the squares open is usually given as a major contributing factor in the failure. It is an example of why generals needed to use combined arms to frustrate the tactics used by enemy officers to frustrate an attack by a single arm of an army.<ref>{{Citation |last=Haythornthwaite |first=Philip |year=2007 |title=The Waterloo Armies: Men, Organization and Tactics |edition=illustrated |publisher=Pen and Sword|isbn=9781844155996|page=}}</ref>

In contrast the ] suffered 478 casualties from am initial strength of 750 because of their exposure to attack by French combined arms. The were located near the centre of Wellington's line, but unlike most of the rest of Wellington's infantry were in a declivity on the exposed side of the ] ]. Exposed as they were, they were forced to stand in square for most of the day for fear of cavalry attack and so made an easy dense target for Napoleon's massed artillery.<ref>{{Citation|last=Weller |first=Jac |year=2010 |title=Wellington at Waterloo |edition=illustrated, reprint |publisher=Frontline Books |isbn=9781848325869 |page=}}</ref>


==20th-century developments== ==20th-century developments==
]]]
The development of modern combined arms tactics began in the ]. Early in the war, fighting descended into stagnant ]. Generals on both sides applied conventional military thinking to the new weapons and situations that they faced. In these early stages, tactics typically comprised heavy artillery barrages followed by massed frontal assaults against well entrenched enemies. These tactics were largely unsuccessful and resulted in large loss of life.


===First World War===
As the war progressed new combined arms tactics were developed, often described then as the "all arms battle". These included direct close ] ] for attacking soldiers (the ]), ] and mutual support of ]s and infantry. One of the first instances of combined arms was the ], in which the British used tanks, artillery, infantry, small arms and air power to break through enemy lines.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-on-land/61-battlefields/955-cambrai-1917-myth-great-tank-battle.html |title=Cambrai 1917: The Myth of the Great Tank Battle |publisher=Westernfrontassociation.com |date=2009-05-31 |accessdate=2014-02-27}}</ref> Previously such a battle would have lasted months with many hundreds of thousands of casualties. Co-ordination and pre-planning were the key elements, and the use of combined arms tactics in the ] in 1918 allowed the Allied forces to exploit breakthroughs in the enemy trenches, forcing the surrender of the ].
The development of modern combined arms tactics began in the ]. Early in the Western Front, fighting descended into stagnant ]. Generals on both sides applied conventional military thinking to the new weapons and situations that they faced. In these early stages, tactics typically consisted of heavy artillery barrages followed by massed frontal assaults against well entrenched enemies. These tactics were largely unsuccessful and resulted in large loss of life.


As the war progressed new combined arms tactics were developed, often described then as the "all arms battle". These included direct close ] ] for attacking soldiers (the ]), ] and mutual support of ]s and infantry. One of the first instances of combined arms was the ], in which the British used tanks, artillery, infantry, small arms and air power to break through enemy lines.<ref>{{cite web |last=Palmer |first=Peter J. |url=http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-on-land/61-battlefields/955-cambrai-1917-myth-great-tank-battle.html |title=Cambrai 1917: The myth of the great tank battle |website=WesternFrontAssociation.com |date=2009-05-31 |access-date=April 5, 2017 |df=dmy-all |archive-date=4 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304002249/http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-on-land/61-battlefields/955-cambrai-1917-myth-great-tank-battle.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> Previously such a battle would have lasted months with many hundreds of thousands of casualties. Co-ordination and planning were the key elements, and the use of combined arms tactics in the ] in 1918 allowed the Allied forces to exploit breakthroughs in the enemy trenches, forcing the surrender of the ].
After the First World War there was a significant degree of experimentation with the new technologies, including in the UK, France and the Soviet Union. By the late 1930s it was the Soviet military theoreticians who had developed and implemented a fully integrated combined arms ] with some cooperation by the ]'s ].{{citation needed|date=May 2010}} In fact the implementation was so widespread that the ]'s armies were known as Combined Arms (Общевойсковая) armies to distinguish them from the Tank Army. Some 95 of these were formed during WWII.{{citation needed|date=May 2010}}


===Second World War===
The Soviet doctrine continued in development after the end of WWII, and in attempting to further integrate the Arms and Services in combat had by the early 1960s developed the first Infantry Fighting Vehicle in the shape of the ].
In World War II combined arms was a fundamental part of some operational doctrines like ]'s ],<ref name=cab92/> or the Soviet ] doctrine, which was based on combining tanks, mobile units (mechanised infantry or cavalry) and infantry, while supported by artillery.<ref name=oart>Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr. Military Review, November–December 2018.</ref>


===Cold War years===
In 1963 the ] formalized the concept of the ], which combined Marine aviation and Marine ground units for expeditionary missions.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.usmc.mil/13thmeu/Thunderingthird/basics.htm|title=What is a Marine Expeditionary Unit|work=Home of the Thundering Third|publisher=United States Marine Corps|accessdate=2007-11-26|archiveurl=http://web.archive.org/web/20071117103710/http://www.usmc.mil/13thmeu/Thunderingthird/basics.htm|archivedate=2007-11-17}}</ref>
In 1963 the ] formalized the concept of the ], which combined Marine aviation and Marine ground units for expeditionary missions.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.usmc.mil/13thmeu/Thunderingthird/basics.htm |title=What is a Marine expeditionary unit? |work=Home of the Thundering Third |publisher=United States Marine Corps |date=2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071117103710/http://www.usmc.mil/13thmeu/Thunderingthird/basics.htm |archive-date=17 November 2007 |df=dmy-all}}</ref>


The ] had a profound influence on the development of the US Army's combined arms doctrine. Due to the very difficult terrain that prevented access to the enemy held ], troops were often deployed by ]. For this reason, US troops in Vietnam saw six times more combat than in preceding wars, due to less time spent on logistic delays. The result; an infantry unit increased in effectiveness by a factor of four for its size, when supported with helicopter-delivered ammunition, food and fuel.<ref>pp. 111–132, Stanton</ref> In time the US Army in Vietnam also learned to combine helicopter operations and ] with the armoured and ] units operating from ]s as well as the US ] and ] ] units supporting them.<ref>pp. 299–352, Schlight</ref> The ] had a profound influence on the development of the US Army's combined arms doctrine. Due to the very difficult terrain that prevented access to the enemy-held ], troops were often deployed by ]. For this reason, US troops in Vietnam saw six times more combat than in preceding wars, due to less time spent on logistic delays. The result: an infantry unit increased in effectiveness by a factor of four for its size, when supported with helicopter-delivered ammunition, food and fuel.<ref>{{cite book |last=Stanton |first=Shelby |year=1999 |title=The 1st Cav in Vietnam: Anatomy of a division |pages=111–132 |publisher=Presidio Press |location=Novato}}</ref> In time the US Army in Vietnam also learned to combine helicopter operations and ] with the armoured and artillery units operating from ]s as well as the US ] and ] ] units supporting them.<ref>{{cite book |last=Schlight |first=John |title=Help from Above: Air Force close air support of the Army 1946–1973 |year=2003 |pages=299–352 |publisher=Air Force History and Museums Program |location=Washington, D.C.}}
</ref>


] was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces.<ref name=oart/>
In the ], helicopters were treated much like flying light tanks. They were almost always the first assault element to make contact in a battle, and often the most effective. ] and ] made them less vulnerable to fire from ]. Although the Soviet Army proved effective in its operations as independent unit in combined arms operations, the social nature of the conflict, the ] and the inadequate ] crippled overall effort by the ] command, eventually forcing a ] of Soviet troops from ].


In the 1991 ], ] used a mix of strikes by fixed-wing aircraft including ] and precision bombing in combination with large numbers of strikes by ]. During the ground assault phase, tanks and other ]s supported by attack aircraft swept over remaining forces. The front line moved forward at upwards of 40–50&nbsp;km/h at the upper limit of the Army's tracked vehicles.<ref name=scales98>Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Robert H. Scales, Potomac Books, Inc., 1998</ref><ref name=cab92>Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992</ref><ref name=stewart10>War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm : August 1990-March 1991. Richard Winship Stewart, Government Printing Office, 2010</ref><ref name=schubert95>The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Frank N. Schubert, Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995</ref>
===Post Cold War (1991 to Present)===
In the 1991 ] a mix of strikes by fixed-wing aircraft including ] and precision bombing was used in combination with large numbers of strikes by attack helicopters. During the ground assault phase tanks and other ]'s supported by attack aircraft swept over remaining forces. The front line moved forward at upwards of 40–50&nbsp;km/h at the upper limit of the Army's tracked vehicles.


===Post Cold War (1992–present)===
In 2000, the US Army began developing a new set of doctrines intended to use information superiority to wage warfare. Six pieces of equipment were crucial for this: ], an air-borne look-down radar ], ], the lowly ] ] digital radio, and ruggedized ]s. The mix is supplemented by satellite photos and passive reception of enemy radio emissions, forward observers with digital target designation, specialized scouting aircraft, anti-artillery radars and gun-laying software for artillery. Everything feeds into the network.
]]]


In 2000, the US Army began developing a new set of doctrines intended to use information superiority to wage warfare. Six pieces of equipment were crucial for this: ] (for ]), ] (for ]), ], ] (for ground and airborne communications), and ]. The mix is supplemented by satellite photos and passive reception of enemy radio emissions, forward observers with digital target designation, specialized scouting aircraft, anti-artillery radars and ] software for artillery.
Based on this doctrine, many U.S. ground vehicles moved across the landscape alone. If they encountered an enemy troop or vehicle concentration, they would assume a defensive posture, lay down as much covering fire as they could, ]s for requested air and artillery assets. Within a few minutes, on station aircraft would direct their missions to cover the ground vehicle. Within a half hour heavy attack forces would concentrate to relieve the isolated vehicle. In an hour and a half the relieved vehicle would be resupplied.


Based on this doctrine, many US ground vehicles moved across the landscape alone. If they encountered an enemy troop or vehicle concentration, they would assume a defensive posture, lay down as much covering fire as they could, ]s for requested air and artillery assets. Within a few minutes, on station aircraft would direct their missions to cover the ground vehicle. Within a half-hour heavy attack forces would concentrate to relieve the isolated vehicle. In an hour and a half the relieved vehicle would be resupplied.
In 2011, Russia began organizing into a Combined Arms military.<ref> {{dead link|date=February 2014}}</ref>

In 2020, the ] established a ] to test the viability of full integration of infantry, armor, and aircraft into a single battalion command structure. The unit fields ] main battle tanks, ] multirole fighters, ] and ] drones, and ] helicopters.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gross |first=Judah Ari |date= |title=In 1st drill, IDF's Ghost Unit tests out new tactics with jets, tanks and robots |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-1st-drill-idfs-ghost-unit-tests-out-new-tactics-with-jets-tanks-and-robots/ |access-date= |work=The Times of Israel}}</ref>


==See also== ==See also==
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* ] * ]
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==References== ==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}
{{More footnotes|date=April 2009}}

{{Reflist}}
=== Bibliography ===
*Thornton, John Kelly (1999). ''Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800''. Routledge. {{ISBN|1857283937}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite web |last=House |first=Jonathan M. |title=Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A survey of 20th-century tactics, doctrine, and organization |url=https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16040coll3/id/9 |agency=US Army Command General Staff College |publisher=University Press of the Pacific |year=1984}}
* {{cite book |last=Perry |first=Roland |title=Monash: The Outsider Who Won a War |publisher=Random House |location=Sydney |year=2004}}


{{Authority control}}
==Bibliography==
* {{cite web |last=House |first=Jonathan M. |title=Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization |url=http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/house.pdf |publisher=US Army Command General Staff College, or University Press of the Pacific|year=1984}}
* Perry, Roland, ''Monash: The Outsider Who Won a war'', Random House, Sydney, 2004
* Stanton, Shelby, ''The 1st Cav in Vietnam: Anatomy of a Division'', Presidio Press, Novato, 1999
* Schlight, John, ''Help from Above: Air Force Close Air Support of the Army 1946–1973'', Air Force History and Museums program, Washington D.C., 2003


{{DEFAULTSORT:Combined Arms}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Combined Arms}}
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Latest revision as of 21:19, 27 December 2024

Approach to warfare
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Combined arms is an approach to warfare that seeks to integrate different combat arms of a military to achieve mutually complementary effects—for example, using infantry and armour in an urban environment in which each supports the other.

According to the strategist William S. Lind, combined arms can be distinguished from the concept of "supporting arms" as follows:

Combined arms hits the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously in such a manner that the actions he must take to defend himself from one make him more vulnerable to another. In contrast, supporting arms is hitting the enemy with two or more arms in sequence, or if simultaneously, then in such combination that the actions the enemy must take to defend himself from one also defends himself from the other(s).

Though the lower-echelon units of a combined arms team may be of similar types, a balanced mixture of such units are combined into an effective higher-echelon unit, whether formally in a table of organization or informally in an ad hoc solution to a battlefield problem. For example, an armoured division, the modern paragon of combined arms doctrine, consists of a mixture of mechanized infantry, tank, artillery, reconnaissance, close air support and helicopter units, all of which are co-ordinated and directed by a unified command structure.

Also, most modern military units can, if the situation requires it, call on yet more branches of the military, such as infantry requesting space warfare, Cyberwarfare or Electromagnetic warfare support; or the bombing or shelling by military aircraft or naval forces to augment their ground offensive or protect their land forces. The mixing of arms is sometimes pushed down below the level at which homogeneity ordinarily prevails, such as by temporarily attaching a tank company to an infantry battalion.

Ancient warfare

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Combined arms operations date back to antiquity, where armies would usually field a screen of skirmishers to protect their spearmen during the approach to contact. Especially in the case of the Greek hoplites, however, the focus of military thinking lay almost exclusively on the heavy infantry. In more elaborate situations armies of various nationalities fielded different combinations of light, medium, or heavy infantry, light or heavy cavalry, chariotry, camelry, elephantry, and artillery (mechanical weapons). Combined arms in this context was how to best use the cooperating units, variously armed with side-arms, spears, or missile weapons in order to coordinate an attack to disrupt and then destroy the enemy.

Philip II of Macedon greatly improved upon the limited combined arms tactics of the Greek city-states and combined the newly created Macedonian phalanx with heavy cavalry and other forces. The phalanx would hold the opposing line in place, until the heavy cavalry could smash and break the enemy line by achieving local superiority.

The early Republic Roman Legion was a combined arms force and consisted of five classes of troops. Lightly equipped velites acted as skirmishers armed with light javelins. The hastati and principes formed the main attacking strength of the legion with swords and pila, whilst the triarii formed the defensive backbone of the legion fighting as spearmen (initially as a denser Greek phalanx and later as a looser spear wall formation) with long spears and large shields. The fifth class of troops were the equites (the cavalry), which were used for scouting, pursuit and to guard the flanks.

The Legion then became notionally a unit of heavy infantrymen armed with just sword and pilum, and fielded with a small attached auxiliary skirmishers and missile troops, and incorporated a small cavalry unit. The legion was sometimes also incorporated into a higher-echelon combined arms unit – e.g., in one period it was customary for a general to command two legions plus two similarly sized units of auxiliaries, lighter units useful as screens or for combat in rough terrain. Later during the Roman Empire, auxiliary soldiers outnumbered the core legionary troops.

The army of the Han dynasty is also an example, fielding mêlée infantry (equipped with a variety of different weapons ranging from swords to pikes to halberd-like weapons), archers, crossbowmen, and cavalry (ranging from horse archers to heavy lancers). One recorded tactical formation during the Han dynasty included three ranks of halberds, swordsmen, and spearmen, supported by crossbows, and with cavalry on the flanks.

Civilizations such as the Carthaginians and Sassanids also were known to have fielded a combination of infantry supported by powerful cavalry.

Middle Ages

At the Battle of Hastings (1066) English infantry fighting from behind a shield wall were defeated by a Norman army consisting of archers, foot soldiers (infantry), and mounted knights (cavalry). One of the tactics used by the Normans was to tempt the English to leave the shield wall to attack retreating Norman infantry only to destroy them in the open with cavalry. Likewise Scottish sheltrons – which had been developed to counter the charges by English heavy cavalry, and had been used successfully against English cavalry at the Battle of Stirling Bridge (1297) – were destroyed at the Battle of Falkirk (1298) by English archers acting in concert with mounted knights. Both Hastings and Falkirk showed how combined arms could be used to defeat enemies relying on only one arm.

The English victories of Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt were examples of a simple form of combined arms, with a combination of dismounted knights forming a foundation for formations of English longbowmen. The lightly protected longbowmen could down their French opponents at a distance, whilst the armoured men-at-arms could deal with any Frenchmen who made it to the English lines. This is the crux of combined arms: to allow a combination of forces to achieve what would be impossible for its constituent elements to do alone.

During the Middle Ages military forces used combined arms as a method of winning battles and furthering a war leader or king's long-term goals. Some historians claim that during the Middle Ages there was no strategic or tactical art to military combat. Kelly DeVries uses the Merriam-Webster definition of combat "as a general military engagement". In the pursuit of a leader's goals and self-interest tactical and strategic thinking was used along with taking advantage of the terrain and weather in choosing when and where to give battle. The simplest example is the combination of different specialties such as archers, infantry, cavalry (knights or shock mounted troops), and even peasant militia. At times, each force fought on its own and won or lost depending on the opposing military competence. During the Middle Ages leaders utilized a combination of these skilled and unskilled forces to win battles. An army that has multiple skills available can engage a larger force that incorporates mainly one or two types of troops.

Each type of military formation – infantry, archers, cavalry, or peasants – has certain advantages that the other does not have. Infantry allows a force to hold ground and in the event of overwhelming enemy forces withdraw into terrain that mounted troops cannot maneuver as easily, thus negating the advantage of the horse. Archers provide standoff with their bows or crossbows. Cavalry can maneuver faster and provide fast attack before the enemy has had time to prepare defenses. Peasants are more numerous and cheaper on the royal coffers. Over the long term the army can cross-train and learn the skills of the specialties to increase combat effectiveness. This is known as a combat multiplier today. The combination of the different skills help provide a commander the flexibility to minimize risk when it comes to engagements. The overall objective of any military force is to fight and win, while also preserving the largest number of combatants to carry on the larger strategic aims of the king. This can be seen in some of the engagements during the Middle Ages.

15th to 18th centuries

Generally the savanna cavalries of West Africa used a combined arms approach, seldom operating without supporting infantry.

The French army of the Valois kings, composed of heavily armoured gendarmes (professional versions of the medieval knight), Swiss and Landsknecht mercenary pikemen, and heavy cannons took form during the transition from the medieval way of war to the early modern period.

The late 15th century saw the development of combined pike and shot formations in Europe, starting with the colunelas of the Spanish general Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, evolving into the tercios of Habsburg Spain and the Imperial Army of the Holy Roman Emperor during the 16th century.

In Japan, at the battle of Nagashino (長篠の戦い) in 1575, forces of the Oda clan successfully employed combined arms against the Takeda clan, which heavily relied on cavalry. The Oda army erected palisades to protect their ashigaru musketeers that shot down the Takeda cavalry while their samurai cut down any enemies who managed to approach melee range.

The 17th century saw increasing use of combined arms at lower (regimental) level. King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden was the proponent of the idea. For fire support he attached teams of "commanded musketeers" to cavalry units and fielded light 3-pounder guns to provide infantry units with organic artillery.

In the eighteenth century, the concept of the legion was revived. Legions now consisted of musketeers, light infantry, dragoons and artillery in a brigade sized force. These legions often combined professional military personnel with militia. Perhaps the most notable example is the use of light cavalry, light infantry and light horse artillery in advance detachments by France's La Grande Armée during the Napoleonic Wars.

Napoleonic Wars

After 25 years of near continuous warfare, the armies that met at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 were organized in a similar manner – into corps which contained infantry, cavalry and artillery (see Order of battle of the Waterloo Campaign), and used similar combined arms tactics. Within each corps were divisions of infantry or cavalry made up of brigades and an artillery unit. An army would usually also have reserves of all three arms under the direct command of the army commander which could be sent in support of any corps or division of a corps to increase any arm which the army general considered necessary. The great French cavalry charge commanded by Marshal Ney during the battle failed to break Wellington's squares of infantry and Ney's failure to supplement his cavalry with sufficient horse artillery to break the squares open is usually given as a major contributing factor in the failure. It is an example of why generals needed to use combined arms to overcome the tactics used by enemy officers to frustrate an attack by a single arm of an army.

In contrast the 27th (Inniskilling) suffered 478 casualties from an initial strength of 750 because of their exposure to attack by French combined arms. They were located near the centre of Wellington's line, but unlike most of the rest of Wellington's infantry were in a declivity on the exposed side of the Mont-Saint-Jean escarpment. Exposed as they were, they were forced to stand in square for most of the day for fear of cavalry attack and so made an easy dense target for Napoleon's massed artillery.

20th-century developments

American aircraft, infantry, and armored vehicles working together during the Vietnam War

First World War

The development of modern combined arms tactics began in the First World War. Early in the Western Front, fighting descended into stagnant trench warfare. Generals on both sides applied conventional military thinking to the new weapons and situations that they faced. In these early stages, tactics typically consisted of heavy artillery barrages followed by massed frontal assaults against well entrenched enemies. These tactics were largely unsuccessful and resulted in large loss of life.

As the war progressed new combined arms tactics were developed, often described then as the "all arms battle". These included direct close artillery fire support for attacking soldiers (the creeping barrage), air support and mutual support of tanks and infantry. One of the first instances of combined arms was the Battle of Cambrai, in which the British used tanks, artillery, infantry, small arms and air power to break through enemy lines. Previously such a battle would have lasted months with many hundreds of thousands of casualties. Co-ordination and planning were the key elements, and the use of combined arms tactics in the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918 allowed the Allied forces to exploit breakthroughs in the enemy trenches, forcing the surrender of the Central Powers.

Second World War

In World War II combined arms was a fundamental part of some operational doctrines like Heinz Guderian's Blitzkrieg, or the Soviet deep battle doctrine, which was based on combining tanks, mobile units (mechanised infantry or cavalry) and infantry, while supported by artillery.

Cold War years

In 1963 the United States Marine Corps formalized the concept of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, which combined Marine aviation and Marine ground units for expeditionary missions.

The Vietnam War had a profound influence on the development of the US Army's combined arms doctrine. Due to the very difficult terrain that prevented access to the enemy-held areas of operation, troops were often deployed by air assault. For this reason, US troops in Vietnam saw six times more combat than in preceding wars, due to less time spent on logistic delays. The result: an infantry unit increased in effectiveness by a factor of four for its size, when supported with helicopter-delivered ammunition, food and fuel. In time the US Army in Vietnam also learned to combine helicopter operations and airmobile infantry with the armoured and artillery units operating from fire support bases as well as the US brown-water navy and USAF close air support units supporting them.

AirLand Battle was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces.

In the 1991 Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf used a mix of strikes by fixed-wing aircraft including carpet bombing and precision bombing in combination with large numbers of strikes by attack helicopters. During the ground assault phase, tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles supported by attack aircraft swept over remaining forces. The front line moved forward at upwards of 40–50 km/h at the upper limit of the Army's tracked vehicles.

Post Cold War (1992–present)

South Korean combat vehicles and infantry in Gyeonggi Province

In 2000, the US Army began developing a new set of doctrines intended to use information superiority to wage warfare. Six pieces of equipment were crucial for this: AWACS (for Airborne early warning and control), JSTARS (for Airborne ground surveillance), GPS, VHF SINCGARS (for ground and airborne communications), and ruggedized computers. The mix is supplemented by satellite photos and passive reception of enemy radio emissions, forward observers with digital target designation, specialized scouting aircraft, anti-artillery radars and gun-laying software for artillery.

Based on this doctrine, many US ground vehicles moved across the landscape alone. If they encountered an enemy troop or vehicle concentration, they would assume a defensive posture, lay down as much covering fire as they could, designate the targets for requested air and artillery assets. Within a few minutes, on station aircraft would direct their missions to cover the ground vehicle. Within a half-hour heavy attack forces would concentrate to relieve the isolated vehicle. In an hour and a half the relieved vehicle would be resupplied.

In 2020, the Israel Defense Forces established a dedicated combined arms battalion to test the viability of full integration of infantry, armor, and aircraft into a single battalion command structure. The unit fields Merkava Mk.4 main battle tanks, F-16D multirole fighters, Heron and Hermes 450 drones, and AH-64 Apache helicopters.

See also

References

  1. ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations (PDF). Department of the Army. 16 May 2012. pp. 1–14. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 March 2016. Retrieved 29 September 2014.
  2. Lind, William S. (1985). Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Westview Press. p. 12. ISBN 9780813346298.
  3. Combined Arms Breach (video). OEC G&V. c. 2015. This visualization was developed for the Maneuver Center of Excellence and is closely based upon the National Training Center Breach and Assault exercise executed circa 1990. This visualization demonstrates viable TTPs as discussed in ATTP 3-90-4 for the conduct of the combined arms breach against a hypothetical enemy.
  4. Hamilton, John (2010). Knights and Heroes, Fantasy and Folklore. ABDO Publishing Company. p. 18. ISBN 9781617842856. Set 2.
  5. DeVries, Kelly (1996). Infantry Warfare in the early Fourteenth Century. Rochester, NY: Boydell Press. p. 18.
  6. Thornton, pp. 28–34
  7. Haythornthwaite, Philip (2007). The Waterloo Armies: Men, organization and tactics (illustrated ed.). Pen and Sword. p. 12. ISBN 9781844155996.
  8. Weller, Jac (2010). Wellington at Waterloo (illustrated, reprint ed.). Frontline Books. p. 166. ISBN 9781848325869.
  9. Palmer, Peter J. (31 May 2009). "Cambrai 1917: The myth of the great tank battle". WesternFrontAssociation.com. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 5 April 2017.
  10. ^ Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992
  11. ^ Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr. A History of Operational Art Military Review, November–December 2018.
  12. "What is a Marine expeditionary unit?". Home of the Thundering Third. United States Marine Corps. 2007. Archived from the original on 17 November 2007.
  13. Stanton, Shelby (1999). The 1st Cav in Vietnam: Anatomy of a division. Novato: Presidio Press. pp. 111–132.
  14. Schlight, John (2003). Help from Above: Air Force close air support of the Army 1946–1973. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program. pp. 299–352.
  15. Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Robert H. Scales, Potomac Books, Inc., 1998
  16. War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm : August 1990-March 1991. Richard Winship Stewart, Government Printing Office, 2010
  17. The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Frank N. Schubert, Center of Military History, United States Army, 1995
  18. Gross, Judah Ari. "In 1st drill, IDF's Ghost Unit tests out new tactics with jets, tanks and robots". The Times of Israel.

Bibliography

  • Thornton, John Kelly (1999). Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800. Routledge. ISBN 1857283937

Further reading

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