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{{Short description|1941–1942 invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and its allies}}
{{good article}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2022}}
{{Infobox military conflict {{Infobox military conflict
|conflict=Operation Barbarossa | conflict = Operation Barbarossa
| partof = the ] of ]
|image=]
| image = Operation Barbarossa collage.jpg
|caption= German soldiers advancing deep into the Russian interior, June 1941
| image_size = 270
|partof= the ] of ]
| caption = Clockwise from top-left:<br>
|place= ], including present-day ], ], ], ], ], ], and ]
{{flatlist|
|date= 22 June – 5 December 1941<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=06|day1=22|year1=1941|month2=12|day2=05|year2=1941}})
* German soldiers advance through northern Russia
|result= * Opening of the ]
* German flamethrower crew burns down a house in the background
* Failure of the ] to defeat the ]
* German ] stuck in the snow with white camouflage paint
* Soviet victory, despite huge losses in men, materiel and landmass
* Soviet ]s over German positions near Moscow

* Soviet POWs on the way to prison camps
|combatant1={{unbulleted list|{{flagcountry|Nazi Germany}}
* Soviet soldiers fire artillery
|{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Italy}}
|{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Hungary}}
|{{flagcountry|Kingdom of Romania}}
|{{flagcountry|Slovak Republic (1939–1945)}}
|{{flag|Finland}}{{ref label|aaa|a}}}}
|combatant2={{flag|Soviet Union|1923}}
|commander1={{unbulleted list|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ''']'''
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}}]
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
|{{flagicon|Kingdom of Hungary}} ]
|{{flagicon|Romania}} ]
|{{flagicon|Finland}} ]{{ref label|aaa|a}}}}
|commander2={{unbulleted list|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ''']'''
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]{{Executed}}
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]{{KIA}}}}
|units1=
{{Collapsible list
|title = Axis armies
|'''{{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]'''
|]
|]
|]
|'''{{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]'''
|]
|]
|]
|]
|]
|'''{{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]'''
|]
|]
|]
|]
|{{flagicon|ROU}} ]
|{{flagicon|ROU}} ]
----
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
|{{flagicon|Finland}} ]{{ref label|aaa|a}}
}} }}
| date = ] – ]<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=06|day1=22|year1=1941|month2=12|day2=05|year2=1941}})
|units2=
| place = {{hlist|Central Europe|]|Eastern Europe|Mainly the ]}}
{{Collapsible list
| result = See {{slink||Aftermath}}
|title = Soviet armies
| territory = Axis captured approximately {{cvt|600,000|sqmi|sqkm}} of Soviet territory but failed to reach the ]
|'''{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]'''
| combatant1 = {{indented plainlist|
|]
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ''']'''{{efn|Germany's allies, in total, provided a significant number of troops and material to the front. There were also numerous units under German command recruited in ] and sympathetic ] or neutral states, including the Spanish ], the ], the ], the ], and the ].}}
|]
* {{flagcountry|Kingdom of Romania}}
|]
* {{flag|Finland}}
|]
* {{flagcountry|Fascist Italy (1922–1943)}}{{efn|The ] from Croatia was attached to the ]}}
| ]
* {{flagcountry|Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)}}
|]
* {{flagcountry|Slovak Republic (1939–1945)|name=Slovakia}}
|'''{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]'''
|]
|]
|]
|'''{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]'''
|]
|]
|]
|]
|]
|]
|]
| ]
|]
|]
|]
|'''{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]'''
|]
|]
|]
|]
|]
|]
|'''{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1923}} ]'''
|]
|]
|]
}} }}
| combatant2 = {{indented plainlist|
|strength1='''Frontline strength''' <br /> 3.8 million personnel{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=73}}{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9}}<br /> 3,350 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=73}}<br /> 2,770 aircraft{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}<br /> 7,200 artillery pieces{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=73}}{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ''']'''
|strength2='''Frontline Strength''' <br /> 2.68 million personnel{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9}} <br /> 11,000 tanks{{sfn|Mercatante|2012|p=64}} <br /> 7,133 military aircraft{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=28}}
}}
|casualties1='''Total military casualties:''' <br /> 800,000+
| commander1 = {{plainlist|
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ''']'''
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{nowrap|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]}}
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ]
* {{flagicon|Kingdom of Romania}} ]
* {{flagicon|FIN}} ]
}}
| commander2 = {{indented plainlist|
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ''']'''
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{nowrap|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]}}
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{nowrap|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]}}
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]{{Executed}}
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]{{KIA}}
* {{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ]}}
| units1 = {{Collapsible list
|title = ''Axis armies'':
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ''''']'''''
* ]
* ]
* ]
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ''''']'''''
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
|{{flagicon|Nazi Germany}} ''''']'''''
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* {{flagicon|Kingdom of Romania}} ]
* {{flagicon|Kingdom of Romania}} ]
|''Independent armies:''
* {{flagicon|Nazi Germany|1935}} ]
* {{flagicon|Finland}} ]
}}
| units2 = {{Collapsible list
|title = ''Soviet armies'':
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ''''']'''''
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ''''']'''''
* ]
* ]
* ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ''''']'''''
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
|{{nowrap|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ''''']'''''}}
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
|{{flagicon|Soviet Union|1936}} ''''']'''''
* ]
* ]
* ]
}}
| strength1 = '''Frontline strength (22&nbsp;June 1941)'''
{{indented plainlist|
* 3.8&nbsp;million personnel{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=73}}{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9}}
* 3,350–3,795 tanks{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=73}}{{sfn|Liedtke|2016|p=220}}{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=80}}
* 3,030–3,072 other AFVs{{sfn|Liedtke|2016|p=220|loc= of which 259 assault guns}}{{efn|Of the AFVs, Askey reports there were 301 assault guns, 257 tank destroyers and self-propelled guns, 1,055 armoured half-tracks, 1,367 armoured cars, 92 combat engineer and ammunition transport vehicles. {{sfn|Askey|2014|p=80}}}}
* 2,770–5,369 aircraft{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=129}}
* 7,200–23,435 artillery pieces{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=73}}{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=80}}
* 17,081 mortars{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=80}}
* 600,000 horses{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=384}}
* 600,000 vehicles{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=384}}
}}
| strength2 = '''Frontline strength (22&nbsp;June 1941)'''
{{indented plainlist|
* 2.6–2.9&nbsp;million personnel{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9|loc=states 2.68 million}}{{sfn|Glantz|1998|pp=10–11, 101, 293|loc=states 2.9 million}}
* 11,000 tanks{{sfn|Mercatante|2012|p=64}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=76}}
* 7,133–9,100 military aircraft{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=28|loc= states 7,133 aircraft}}{{sfn|Mercatante|2012|p=64|loc=states 9,100 aircraft}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=76|loc=states 9,100 aircraft}}
}}
| casualties1 = '''Total military casualties:'''<br />1,000,000+{{efn|881,788 of which are German{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=178}}}}
{{Collapsible list {{Collapsible list
|title = Breakdown |title = Breakdown
|'''Casualties of 1941:''' |'''Casualties of 1941:'''
---- ----
(according to ] medical reports) According to ] medical reports (including ]):{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=178}}
* 186,452 killed
* 167,347 killed in action for the three army groups{{sfn|"Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941"}}
* 40,157 missing
* 600,584 wounded in action for the three army groups{{sfn|"Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941"}}
* 655,179 wounded in action{{Efn|Excludes an additional 395,799 who were deemed unfit for service due to non-combat causes, transported out of their Army Group sectors for treatment, and treated in divisional/local medical facilities. 98% of those 395,799 eventually returned to active duty service, usually after relatively short treatment, meaning about 8,000 became permanent losses. Askey 2014, p. 178.}}
* 34,527 missing in action for the three army groups{{sfn|"Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941"}}
* 8,000 evacuated sick
* 28,445 killed, wounded or missing in action for ]{{sfn|"Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941"}}
----
* 11,000 captured by the Soviets (according to Red Army reports){{sfn|"Red Army and NKVD figures, 1941-1945"}}
* 2,827 aircraft destroyed{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=117}}

* 2,735 tanks destroyed{{sfn|Liedtke|2016|p=220}}{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=185}}
* 104 assault guns destroyed{{sfn|Liedtke|2016|p=220}}{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=185}}
---- ----
'''Other involved country losses'''
* |3,827 aircraft destroyed{{sfn|Bergstrom|2007|p=117}}
* {{flagicon|Kingdom of Romania}} 114,000+ casualties (at least 39,000 dead or missing){{sfn|Axworthy|1995|pp=58, 286}}
* |2,839 tanks destroyed
* {{nowrap|{{flagicon|FIN}} 75,000 casualties<br>(26,355 dead) in Karelia{{sfn|Vehviläinen|2002|p=96}}}}<br />5,000+ casualties during ].{{sfn|Ziemke|1959|p=184}}
* |2,464 tanks destroyed
* {{flagicon|Fascist Italy (1922–1943)}} 8,700 casualties{{sfn|Kirchubel|2013|loc= chpt. "Opposing Armies"}}
* {{flagicon|Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946)}} 4,420 casualties{{Efn|855 killed, 2,288 wounded in action, 277 missing and captured, 1,000 sick and injured{{sfn|Andaházi Szeghy|2016|pp=151–152, 181}}}}
}} }}
|casualties2='''Total military casualties:''' <br /> 4,000,000+ | casualties2 = '''Total military casualties:'''<br />4,500,000
{{Collapsible list {{Collapsible list
|title = Breakdown |title = Breakdown
|'''Casualties of 1941:''' |'''Casualties of 1941:'''
---- ----
(based on Soviet archives) Based on Soviet archives:{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=95–98}}
* 566,852 killed in action{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=95–98}} * 566,852 killed in action (101,471 of whom died in hospital of wounds)
* 235,339 died of non-combat causes{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=95–98}} * 235,339 died from non-combat causes
* 1,336,147 sick or wounded via combat and non-combat causes{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=95–98}} * 1,336,147 sick or wounded via combat and non-combat causes
* 2,335,482 missing in action{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=95–98}} * 2,335,482 missing in action or captured
:*~500,000 Soviet ]s captured while still mobilizing{{sfn|Krivosheev|1997|pp=95–98}}
:* 3,355,499 captured by the Germans (according to ] ] reports){{sfn|"AOK POW Reports"}}
---- ----
* 21,200 aircraft lost{{sfn|Bergstrom|2007|p=117}} * 21,200 aircraft, of which 10,600 were lost to combat{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=117}}
* 20,500 tanks destroyed * 20,500 tanks destroyed{{sfn|Sharp|2010|p=89}}
}} }}
| notes =
|notes={{note|aaa|a}} Finland was a ] that launched ] on 25 June; it was not a member of the Axis powers, and the Finnish offensive was coordinated with, but distinct from Operation Barbarossa.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} However, Soviet losses resulting from the Finnish offensive are included in the totals.
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Barbarossa}}
{{Campaignbox Axis–Soviet War}}
}} }}


'''Operation Barbarossa'''{{efn|{{langx|de|link=no|Unternehmen Barbarossa}}; {{Langx|ru|link=no|Операция Барбаросса|Operatsiya Barbarossa}}}} was the ] of the ] by ] and many of its ], starting on Sunday, 22 June 1941, during ]. It was the largest and costliest land offensive in human history, with around 10 million combatants taking part,{{sfn|Citino|2021}} and over 8 million casualties by the end of the operation.{{sfn|Anderson|Clark|Walsh|2018|pp=67}}{{sfn|Dimbleby|2021|p=xxxvii–xxxviii}}
'''Operation Barbarossa''' (]: ''Unternehmen Barbarossa'') was the ] for ]'s invasion of the ] during ], commencing on 22 June 1941. Over the course of the operation, about four million soldiers of the ] invaded Soviet Russia along a {{convert|2900|km|mi|abbr=on}} front, making it the largest invasion in the history of warfare. In addition to troops, the Germans employed some 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000 horses. The operation was driven by ]'s ideological desire to conquer the Soviet territories as outlined in '']''. It marked the beginning of the rapid escalation of the war, both geographically and in the formation of the ].


The operation, ]d after ] ("red beard"), a 12th-century ] and ], put into action Nazi Germany's ideological goals of eradicating ] and conquering the western Soviet Union to ] it with ]. The German {{lang|de|]}} aimed to use some of the conquered people as ] for the Axis war effort while acquiring the oil reserves of the ] as well as the agricultural resources of various Soviet territories, including ] and ]. Their ultimate goal was to create more {{lang|de|]}} (living space) for Germany, and the eventual extermination of the native ] by mass deportation to ], ], enslavement, and ].{{sfn|Rich|1973|pp=204–221}}{{sfn|Snyder|2010|p=416}}
Prior to the invasion, the two countries had signed political and economical pacts to strengthen their relations. An invasion of Russia was authorized by Hitler on 18 December 1940 for a start date of 15 May 1941, but this would not be met, and instead the invasion began on 22 June 1941. Operationally, the Germans won resounding victories and occupied some of the most important economic areas of the Soviet Union, mainly in ], while sustaining heavy casualties. Despite these successes, the German offensive ] and was then pushed back by a Soviet counter offensive without taking the city. The Germans would never again mount a simultaneous offensive along the entire strategic ]. The ] repelled the ]'s strongest blow and forced Germany into a war of attrition, which it was unprepared for.


In the two years leading up to the invasion, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union ] and ] for strategic purposes. Following the ], the ] began planning an invasion of the Soviet Union in July 1940 (under the code-name ]). Over the course of the operation, over 3.8 million personnel of the Axis powers—the largest invasion force in the ]—invaded the western Soviet Union, along a {{convert|2900|km|mi|sp=us|adj=on}} front, with 600,000 motor vehicles and over 600,000 horses for non-combat operations. The offensive marked a major escalation of World War II, both geographically and with the ], which brought the USSR into the ].
Operation Barbarossa's failure led to Hitler's demands for further operations inside the ], all of which eventually failed, such as continuing the ] (]) and ], among other battles on occupied Soviet territory.


Barbarossa was the largest military operation in world history in both manpower and casualties. Its failure was a turning point in the ]'s fortunes. Most importantly, the operation opened up the ], to which more forces were committed than in any other theater of war in world history. Regions covered by the operation became the site of some of the largest battles, deadliest atrocities, highest casualties, and most horrific conditions for Soviets and Germans alike, all of which influenced the course of both World War II and the subsequent history of the ]. The German forces captured millions of Soviet prisoners who were not granted the protection stipulated in the ]. Most of them ]. Germany deliberately starved the prisoners to death as part of its "]", aiming to reduce the population of Eastern Europe and then repopulate it with ethnic Germans. The operation opened up the ], in which more forces were committed than in any other ] in human history. The area saw some of history's largest battles, most horrific ], and highest ] (for Soviet and Axis forces alike), all of which influenced the course of World War II and the subsequent ]. The German armies eventually captured five million Soviet ] troops{{sfn|Chapoutot|2018|p=272}} and deliberately ] 3.3&nbsp;million Soviet prisoners of war, and millions of civilians, as the "]" worked to solve German food shortages and exterminate the Slavic population through starvation.{{sfn|Snyder|2010|pp=175–186}} ] and ], carried out by German death squads or willing collaborators,{{Efn|See for instance the involvement of Latvian and Ukrainian forces in killing Jews cited by historian Raul Hilberg.{{sfn|Hilberg|1992|pp=58–61, 199–202}}}} murdered over a million ] as part of ].{{sfn|United States Holocaust Memorial Museum|1996|pp=50–51}}

The failure of Operation Barbarossa reversed the fortunes of Nazi Germany.{{sfn|Rees|2010}} Operationally, German forces achieved significant victories and occupied some of the most important economic areas of the Soviet Union (mainly in Ukraine) and inflicted, as well as sustained, heavy casualties. The German offensive came to an end during the ] near the end of 1941,{{sfn|Mawdsley|2015|p=54}}{{sfn|Anderson|Clark|Walsh|2018|pp=48–49, 51}} and the subsequent ] pushed the Germans about {{convert|250|km|abbr=on}} back. German high command anticipated a quick collapse of Soviet resistance as in the ], analogous to the reaction Russia had during World War I,{{sfn|Clairmont|2003|pp=2818–2823}} but instead the Red Army absorbed the German '']''{{'}}s strongest blows and bogged it down in a ] for which the Germans were unprepared. Following the heavy losses and logistical strain of Barbarossa, the ''Wehrmacht''{{'}}s diminished forces could no longer attack along the entire Eastern Front, and subsequent operations to retake the initiative and drive deep into Soviet territory—such as ] in 1942 and ] in 1943—were weaker and eventually failed, which resulted in the ''Wehrmacht''{{'}}s defeat. These Soviet victories ended Germany's territorial expansion and presaged the eventual defeat and collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945.

{{TOC limit}}


==Background== ==Background==
===Naming===
The theme of Barbarossa had long been used by the ] as part of their political imagery, though this was really a continuation of the glorification of the famous Crusader king by German nationalists since the 19th century. According to a Germanic medieval legend, revived in the 19th century by the nationalistic tropes of ], the ] ]—who drowned in Asia Minor while leading the ]—was not dead but ] in ], and would awaken in the hour of Germany's greatest need and restore the nation to its former glory.{{sfn|Childers|2017|pp=470–471}} Originally, the invasion of the Soviet Union was codenamed '']'' (alluding to Holy Roman Emperor ]'s expansive campaigns in Eastern Europe),{{sfn|Riché|1993|pp=267–269}} but Hitler had the name changed to ''Operation Barbarossa'' in December 1940.{{sfn|Kershaw|2001|p=335}} Hitler had in July 1937 praised Barbarossa as the emperor who first expressed Germanic cultural ideas and carried them to the outside world through his imperial mission.{{sfn|Mayer|1989|p=340}} For Hitler, the name Barbarossa signified his belief that the conquest of the Soviet Union would usher in the Nazi "]".{{sfn|Mayer|1989|p=340}}


===Racial policies of Nazi Germany=== ===Racial policies of Nazi Germany===
{{Main| Racial policy of Nazi Germany}} {{Main|Racial policy of Nazi Germany}}
As early as 1925, ] vaguely declared in his political manifesto and autobiography '']'' that he would invade the ], asserting that the German people needed to secure {{lang|de|]}} ('living space') to ensure the survival of Germany for generations to come.{{sfn|Stackelberg|2002|p=188}} On 10 February 1939, Hitler told his army commanders that the next war would be "purely a war of {{lang|de|]en}} ... totally a people's war, a ]". On 23 November, once World War II had already started, Hitler declared that "racial war has broken out and this war shall determine who shall govern Europe, and with it, the world".{{sfn|Förster|1988|p=21}} The ] portrayed the Soviet Union (and all of Eastern Europe) as populated by non-Aryan {{lang|de|]}} ('sub-humans'), ruled by ] conspirators.{{sfn|Hillgruber|1972|p=140}} Hitler claimed in ''Mein Kampf'' that Germany's destiny was to follow the {{lang|de|]}} ('turn to the East') as it did "600 years ago" (see {{lang|de|]}}).{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=716}} Accordingly, it was a partially secret but well-documented Nazi policy to kill, deport, or enslave the majority of Russian and other Slavic populations and repopulate the land west of the Urals with Germanic peoples, under {{lang|de|]}} (General Plan for the East).{{sfn|Stackelberg|2007|p=271}} The Nazis' belief in their ethnic superiority pervades official records and ] articles in German periodicals, on topics such as "how to deal with alien populations."{{sfn|Fahlbusch|1999|pp=241–264}}
]
As early as 1925, ] suggested in his political manifesto and autobiography '']'' that he would invade the ], asserting that the German people needed to secure '']'' ("living space") to ensure the survival of Germany for generations to come.{{sfn||''The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler'', 1989}} ] viewed the Soviet Union (and all of Eastern Europe) as populated by '']'' ("sub-humans"), ruled by "] conspirators".{{sfn||''The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler'', 1989}} ''Mein Kampf'' said Germany's destiny was to "turn to the East" as it did "six hundred years ago".{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=716}} Accordingly, it was stated Nazi policy to kill, deport, or enslave the majority of Russian and other Slavic populations and ].{{sfn||''The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler'', 1989}} Verification of the belief in German ethnic predominance is discernible in official German records and by pseudo-scientifically validated articles in German periodicals at the time, works which covered matters like "how to deal with alien populations".{{sfn|Fahlbusch|1999|pp=241–264}}


] Institute of Agriculture in Berlin, 1942]]
Before and during the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were heavily indoctrinated with anti-Bolshevik, anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic ideology via movies, radio, lectures, books and leaflets. Following the invasion, Wehrmacht officers told their soldiers to target people who were described as "Jewish Bolshevik subhumans", the "Mongol hordes", the "Asiatic flood" and the "red beast". Nazi propaganda portrayed the war against the Soviet Union as both an ideological war between German National Socialism and Jewish Bolshevism and a racial war between the Germans and the Bolshevik, Jewish, Gypsies and Slavic ''Untermenschen''.{{sfn|Burleigh|2001|p=512}} Most German soldiers viewed the war in Nazi terms and viewed their Soviet enemy as sub-human.{{sfn|Förster|2005|p=127}}
While older histories tended to emphasize the ] upholding its honor in the face of Hitler's fanaticism, the historian ] notes that "In fact, the military commanders were caught up in the ideological character of the conflict, and involved in its implementation as willing participants".{{sfn|Förster|1988|p=21}} Before and during the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were indoctrinated with ], ] and ] ideology via movies, radio, lectures, books, and leaflets.{{sfn|Evans|1989|p=59}} Likening the Soviets to the forces of ], Hitler told the ]n military leader ] that the "Mongolian race" threatened Europe.{{sfn|Breitman|1990|pp=340–341}} Following the invasion, many ''Wehrmacht'' officers told their soldiers to target people who were described as "Jewish Bolshevik subhumans," the "Mongol hordes," the "Asiatic flood" and the "Red beast."{{sfn|Evans|1989|pp=59–60}} Nazi propaganda portrayed the war against the Soviet Union as an ideological war between German National Socialism and Jewish Bolshevism and a racial war between the disciplined Germans and the Jewish, Romani and Slavic {{lang|de|Untermenschen}}.{{sfn|Burleigh|2000|p=512}} An 'order from the Führer' stated that the paramilitary SS {{lang|de|]}}, which closely followed the ''Wehrmacht''{{'}}s advance, were to execute all Soviet functionaries who were "less valuable Asiatics, Gypsies and Jews."{{sfn|Burleigh|Wippermann|1991|p=100}} Six months into the invasion of the Soviet Union, the {{lang|de|Einsatzgruppen}} had murdered more than 500,000 Soviet Jews, a figure greater than the number of Red Army soldiers killed in battle by then.{{sfn|Lewy|2017|p=24}} German army commanders cast Jews as the major cause behind the "] struggle."{{sfn|Kershaw|2001|p=466}} The main guideline for German troops was "Where there's a partisan, there's a Jew, and where there's a Jew, there's a partisan" or "The partisan is where the Jew is."{{sfn|Kershaw|2001|p=467}}{{sfn|Förster|1988|p=28}} Many German troops viewed the war in Nazi terms and regarded their Soviet enemies as sub-human.{{sfn|Förster|2005|p=127}}


After the war began, the Nazis issued a ban on sexual relations between Germans and foreign ].{{sfn|Majer|2003|p=180}} There were regulations enacted against the {{lang|de|]}} ('Eastern workers') that included the death penalty for sexual relations with a German.{{sfn|Gellately|1990|p=224}} ], in his secret memorandum, ''Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East'' (dated 25 May 1940), outlined the Nazi plans for the non-German populations in the East.{{sfn|Himmler|1940|pp=147–150}} Himmler believed the ] process in Eastern Europe would be complete when "in the East dwell only men with truly German, Germanic blood."{{sfn|Mazower|2009|p=181}}
Influenced by the guidelines, in a directive sent out to the troops under his command, General ] of the Panzer Group 4 stated:


The Nazi secret plan {{lang|de|Generalplan Ost}}, prepared in 1941 and confirmed in 1942, called for a "new order of ethnographical relations" in the territories occupied by Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. It envisaged ], executions and enslavement of the populations of conquered countries, with very small percentages undergoing Germanisation, expulsion into the depths of Russia or other fates, while the conquered territories would be Germanised. The plan had two parts, the {{lang|de|]}} ('small plan'), which covered actions to be taken during the war and the {{lang|de|]}} ('large plan'), which covered policies after the war was won, to be implemented gradually over 25 to 30 years.{{sfn|Rössler|Schleiermacher|1996|pp=270–274}}
{{quote|The war against Russia is an important chapter in the German nation's struggle for existence. It is the old battle of the Germanic against the Slavic people, of the defence of European culture against Muscovite-Asiatic inundation and of the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism. The objective of this battle must be the demolition of present-day Russia and must therefore be conducted with unprecedented severity. Every military action must be guided in planning and execution by an iron resolution to exterminate the enemy remorselessly and totally. In particular, no adherents of the contemporary Russian Bolshevik system are to be spared.{{sfn|Burleigh|2001|p=521}}}}


A speech given by General ] demonstrates the dissemination of the Nazi racial plan, as he informed the ] that the war against the Soviet Union was "an essential part of the German people's struggle for existence" ({{lang|de|Daseinskampf}}), also referring to the imminent battle as the "old struggle of Germans against Slavs" and even stated, "the struggle must aim at the annihilation of today's Russia and must, therefore, be waged with unparalleled harshness."{{sfn|Ingrao|2013|p=140}} Hoepner also added that the Germans were fighting for "the defence of European culture against Moscovite–Asiatic inundation, and the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism&nbsp;... No adherents of the present Russian-Bolshevik system are to be spared." ] also told his subordinates that troops should view the war as a "struggle between two different races and act with the necessary severity."{{sfn|Förster|1988|p=23}} Racial motivations were central to Nazi ideology and played a key role in planning for Operation Barbarossa since both Jews and communists were considered equivalent enemies of the Nazi state. Nazi imperialist ambitions rejected the common humanity of both groups, declaring the supreme struggle for {{lang|de|Lebensraum}} to be a {{lang|de|]}} ('war of annihilation').{{sfn|Ingrao|2013|pp=138–142}}{{sfn|Förster|1988|p=21}}
The Nazi secret plan '']'' (GPO) which was prepared in 1941 and confirmed in 1942 called for a "new order of ethnographical relations" in the territories occupied by Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. The plan envisaged removal of majority of the population of conquered counties with very small differing percentages of the various conquered nations undergoing Germanisation, expulsion into the depths of Russia, and other fates, the net effect of which would be to ensure that the conquered territories would be Germanized. It was divided into two parts; the "Small Plan" (Kleine Planung), which covered actions which were to be taken during the war, and the "Big Plan" (Grosse Planung), which covered actions to be undertaken after the war was won, and to be implemented gradually over a period of 25 to 30 years.{{sfn|Rössler|Schleiermacher|1996|pp=270–274}}


===German-Soviet relations of 1939–40===
Heinrich Himmler in his secret memorandum "Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East" dated 25 May 1940 expressed his own thoughts and the future plans for the populations in the East.{{sfn|Himmler|1940|pp=147-150}} The basic principles outlined were: find and split up as many different ethnic groups in the East, selecting "racially valuable" people and assimilating them in Germany and to restrict non-Germans education to four-grade elementary school.{{sfn|Himmler|1940|pp=147-150}} Himmler believed the Germanization process in Eastern Europe would be complete when "in the East dwell only men with truly German, Germanic blood".{{sfn|Mazower|2009|p=181}}
{{Main|Germany–Soviet Union relations, 1918–1941}}
]


On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow known as the ].{{sfn|Dimbleby|2021|pp=73–74}} A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union on the division of the eastern European ] between their respective "]," Soviet Union and Germany would partition Poland in the event of an invasion by Germany, and the Soviets would be allowed to overrun ], ], ] and the region of ].{{sfn|Kirby|1980|p=120}} On 23 August 1939 the rest of the world learned of this pact but were unaware of the provisions to partition Poland.{{sfn|Hildebrand|1973|p=89}} The pact stunned the world because of the parties' earlier mutual hostility and their conflicting ].{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=30}} The conclusion of this pact was followed by the ] on 1 September that triggered the outbreak of ], then the ] that led to the annexation of the eastern part of the country.{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|pp=56–59}} As a result of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union maintained reasonably strong diplomatic relations for two years and fostered ]. The countries entered a ] by which the Soviets received German military equipment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, such as oil and wheat, to help the German ] by circumventing the British ].{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=668–669}}
Before World War II, observers believed that in a war with the Soviet Union, Germany would attack through the ] while the '']'' (Navy) would seize ] from the ]. They assumed that possessing the entire Baltic basin would satisfy Hitler, who would not repeat ]'s mistake of concentrating all his forces and energy on taking ].{{sfn|"Adolf Hitler's Navy"}} Some historians also believe that a decision to invade the Soviet Union was premeditated, based on Hitler being afraid of having to fight a war both against the Western allies and against the Soviets in the East. This preventative war would allow the Germans to avoid making the same mistake they had made in ].{{sfn|Weeks|2002|p=98}}


Despite the parties' ostensibly cordial relations, each side was highly suspicious of the other's intentions. For instance, the Soviet invasion of ] in June 1940 went beyond their sphere of influence as agreed with Germany.{{sfn|Brackman|2001|p=341}} After Germany entered the ] with Japan and Italy, it began ].{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=57}} After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12 to 14 November 1940, Ribbentrop presented a draft treaty for a Soviet entry into the Axis.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=199}} However, Hitler had no intention of allowing the Soviet Union into the Axis and in an order stated, "Political conversations designed to clarify the attitude of Russia in the immediate future have been started. Regardless of the outcome of these conversations, all preparations for the East previously ordered orally are to be continued. directives on that will follow as soon as the basic elements of the army's plan for the operation have been submitted to me and approved by me."{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=199}} There would be no "long-term agreement with Russia" given that the Nazis intended to go to war with them; but the Soviets approached the negotiations differently and were willing to make huge economic concessions to secure a relationship under general terms acceptable to the Germans just a year before.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=199}} On 25 November 1940, the Soviet Union offered a written counter-proposal to join the Axis if Germany would agree to refrain from interference in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, but Germany did not respond.{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=57}} As both sides began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, although they did sign a ] addressing several open issues in January 1941. According to historian ], ] was convinced that the overall military strength of the Soviet Union was such that he had nothing to fear and anticipated an easy victory should Germany attack; moreover, Stalin believed that since the Germans were still fighting the British in the west, Hitler would be unlikely to open up a two-front war and subsequently delayed the reconstruction of defensive fortifications in the border regions.{{sfn|Service|2005|p=259}} When German soldiers swam across the ] to warn the ] of an impending attack, they were shot as enemy agents.{{sfn|Service|2005|pp=259–260}} Some historians believe that Stalin, despite providing an amicable front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Germany. Rather, Stalin might have had intentions to break off from Germany and proceed with his own campaign against Germany to be followed by one against the rest of Europe.{{sfn|Weeks|2002|p=98}} Other historians contend that Stalin did not plan for such an attack in June 1941, given the parlous state of the Red Army at the time of the invasion.{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|p=629}}
===German-Soviet relations of 1939–40===
{{further|Germany–Soviet Union relations before 1941}}
The Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow in August 1939, known as the ], shortly before the ] that triggered the outbreak of ], which was followed by the ] of the Eastern part of the country.{{sfn||''The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler'', 1989}} A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union on the division of the ] between their respective "]"; the Soviet Union and Germany would split Poland if an invasion were to occur, and Russia would be allowed to swallow the Baltic states and ].{{sfn|Kirby|1980|p=120}}{{sfn|Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939}} The pact stunned the world because of the parties' mutual hostility and their conflicting ].{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=30}} As a result of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union had reasonably strong diplomatic relations and ]. The countries entered a ], in which the Soviets received German military equipment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, such as oil and wheat, to help Germany circumvent a British blockade.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=668–669}}


]
Despite the parties' ongoing relations, each side was highly suspicious of the other's intentions. After Germany entered the ] with Japan and Italy, it began ].{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=57}} After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12 to 14 November, Germany presented a proposed written agreement for a Soviet entry into the Axis. On 25 November 1940, the Soviet Union offered a written counterproposal agreement to join the Axis if Germany foreclosed acting in the Soviet's sphere of influence, to which Germany did not respond.{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=57}} As both sides began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, although they signed a ] addressing several open issues in January 1941. Some Historians also believe that Soviet leader ], despite providing an amicable front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Germany. Rather, Stalin might have had intentions to break off from Germany and proceed with his own campaign against Germany as well as the rest of Europe.{{sfn|Weeks|2002|p=98}}


===German invasion plans=== ===Axis invasion plans===
{{See also|A-A line|The Ural mountains in Nazi planning}} {{See also|A-A line|Ural Mountains in Nazi planning|Lossberg study}}
] ] was the original German plan of attack for Operation Barbarossa, as depicted in a US Government study (March 1955).]]


Stalin's reputation as a brutal dictator contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and their faith in success, as many competent and experienced military officers were killed in the ] of the 1930s, leaving the Red Army with a relatively inexperienced leadership compared to that of their German counterparts. The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda, also claiming that the Red Army was preparing to attack them, and their own invasion was thus presented as a ] strike.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} Stalin's reputation as a brutal dictator contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and to their expectations of success, as Stalin's ] of the 1930s had executed many competent and experienced military officers, leaving Red Army leadership weaker than their German adversary. The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} They also claimed that the Red Army was ], and their own invasion was thus presented as a ] strike.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}}


In the summer of 1940, following the rising tension between the Soviet Union and Germany over territories in the Balkans, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union increasingly looked like Hitler's only solution.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=127}} While no concrete plans were made yet, Hitler told one of his generals in June that the victories in Western Europe "finally freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism".{{sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=129–130}} Although German generals warned Hitler that occupying ] would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation", the ] anticipated additional benefits, like the ] of many soldiers to elevate the ] in German industry, ] becoming a reliable source of immense agricultural products, ] under German rule vastly stimulating Germany's overall economy, and the expansion of territory to improve Germany's geostrategic position which would further isolate ].{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} Hitler was convinced Britain would sue for peace, once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} Hitler also utilised the rising tension between the Soviet Union and Germany over territories in the Balkans as one of the pretexts for the invasion.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=127}} While no concrete plans had yet been made, Hitler told one of his generals in June 1940 that the victories in Western Europe finally freed his hands for a "final showdown" with Bolshevism.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|pp=129–130}} With the successful end to the ], General ] was assigned the task of drawing up the initial invasion plans of the Soviet Union. The first battle plans were entitled ''Operation Draft East'' (colloquially known as the ''Marcks Plan'').{{sfn|Kay|2006|p=31}} His report advocated the ] as the operational objective of any invasion of the Soviet Union. This assault would extend from the northern city of ] on the ] through ] and ] to the port city of ] at the mouth of the ] on the ]. The report concluded that—once established—this military border would reduce the threat to Germany from attacks by enemy ].{{sfn|Kay|2006|p=31}}


Although Hitler was warned by many high-ranking military officers, such as ], that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation," he anticipated compensatory benefits such as the ] of entire divisions to relieve the acute ] in German industry, the exploitation of ] as a reliable and immense source of agricultural products, the use of ] to stimulate Germany's overall economy and the expansion of territory to improve Germany's efforts to isolate the United Kingdom.{{sfn|Roberts|2011|pp=147–148}} Hitler was further convinced that Britain would sue for peace once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union,{{sfn|Hildebrand|1973|p=105}} and if they did not, he would use the resources gained in the East to defeat the ].{{sfn|Overy|1996|p=60}}
On 5 December 1940, Hitler received the final military plans for the invasion which the ] had been working on since July 1940 under the codename "Operation Otto". Hitler, however, was dissatisfied with the Otto version and on 18 December issued ] which called for a new battle plan, now codenamed "Operation Barbarossa".{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} The operation was named after medieval Emperor ] of the ], a leader of the ] in the 12th century. The invasion was set for 15 May 1941, but this would not be met.{{sfn|Brackman|2001|p=344}}


{{quote
According to a 1978 essay by German historian ], the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were coloured by hubris stemming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the "invincible" Wehrmacht and by ignorance tempered by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic" country. Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the officer corps was held in contempt. The leadership of the Wehrmacht paid little attention to politics, the economy or culture and the considerable industrial capacity of the Soviet Union was ignored as a factor, in favour of a very narrow military view.{{sfn|Wolfram|2007|pp=21–22}} Hillgruber argued that because these assumptions were shared by the entire military elite, Hitler was able to push through with a "war of annihilation" that would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible with the complicity of "several military leaders", even though it was quite clear that this would be a violation of all accepted norms of warfare.{{sfn|Wolfram|2007|pp=21–22}}
| quote = We only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=6}}
| source = —Adolf Hitler
}}
Hitler received the final military plans for the invasion on 5 December 1940, which the ] had been working on since July 1940, under the codename "Operation Otto." Upon reviewing the plans, Hitler formally committed Germany to the invasion when he issued ] on 18 December 1940, where he outlined the precise manner in which the operation was to be carried out.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|p=51}} Hitler also renamed the operation to ''Barbarossa'' in honor of medieval Emperor Friedrich I of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century.{{sfn|Stackelberg|2007|p=258}} The ], issued by Hitler on 30 March 1941, supplemented the Directive by decreeing that the war against the Soviet Union would be one of annihilation and legally sanctioned the eradication of all ] and intellectual elites in Eastern Europe.{{sfn|Beck|2005|pp=328–330}} The invasion was tentatively set for May 1941, but it was ] to allow for further preparations and possibly better weather.{{sfn|Bradley|Buell|2002|p=101}}
{{quote|the purpose of the Russian campaign the decimation of the ] population by thirty million.
| source = — ]'s statement to ] officers at ], June 1941{{sfn|Rees|2017|pp=197–198}}{{sfn|Aly|Heim|2002|p=227}} }}
According to a 1978 essay by German historian ], the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were substantially coloured by hubris, stemming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the "invincible" ''Wehrmacht'' and by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic" country.{{Efn|It is additionally important that considerable portions of the German General Staff thought of Russia as a "colossus of clay" which was "politically unstable, filled with discontented minorities, ineffectively ruled, and militarily weak."{{sfn|Megargee|2000|p=110}} }} Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the officer corps was held in contempt. The leadership of the ''Wehrmacht'' paid little attention to politics, culture, and the considerable industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, in favour of a very narrow military view.{{sfn|Wette|2007|pp=21–22}} Hillgruber argued that because these assumptions were shared by the entire military elite, Hitler was able to push through with a "war of annihilation" that would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible with the complicity of "several military leaders," even though it was quite clear that this would be in violation of all accepted norms of warfare.{{sfn|Wette|2007|pp=21–22}}


In autumn 1940, high-ranking German officials drafted a memorandum on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They said Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States would end up as only a further economic burden for Germany.{{sfn|Gorodetsky|2001|pp=69–70}} Another German official{{who|date=March 2015}} argued that the Soviets in their current bureaucratic form were harmless and that the occupation would not produce a gain for Germany.{{sfn|Gorodetsky|2001|pp=69–70}} Hitler disagreed with economists about the risks, and told his right-hand man ], the chief of the ], that everyone on all sides were always raising economic misgivings against a war with Russia and that he would no more listen to that kind of talk.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=162}} It is speculated that this was passed on to General ] – who had produced reports that predicted a net economic drain for Germany in the event of an invasion of the Soviet Union unless its economy was captured intact and the Caucasus oilfields seized in the first blow – and he consequently revised his future report to fit Hitler's wishes.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=162}} The ]'s ineptitude in the ] against Finland in 1939–40 convinced Hitler of a quick victory within a few months, and did not anticipate a long campaign lasting into the winter, and therefore adequate preparations, like warm clothings, were not made.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} Even so, in autumn 1940, some high-ranking German military officials drafted a memorandum to Hitler on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They argued that the eastern territories (], the ], the ], the ], and the ]) would only end up as a further economic burden for Germany.{{sfn|Gorodetsky|2001|pp=69–70}} It was further argued that the Soviets, in their current bureaucratic form, were harmless and that the occupation would not benefit Germany politically either.{{sfn|Gorodetsky|2001|pp=69–70}} Hitler, solely focused on his ultimate ideological goal of eliminating the Soviet Union and Communism, disagreed with economists about the risks and told his right-hand man ], the chief of the ''Luftwaffe'', that he would no longer listen to misgivings about the economic dangers of a war with the USSR.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=162}} It is speculated that this was passed on to General ], who had produced reports that predicted a net economic drain for Germany in the event of an invasion of the Soviet Union unless its economy was captured intact and the Caucasus oilfields seized in the first blow; Thomas revised his future report to fit Hitler's wishes.{{sfn|Ericson|1999|p=162}} The Red Army's ineptitude in the ] against Finland in 1939–40 also convinced Hitler of a quick victory within a few months. Neither Hitler nor the General Staff anticipated a long campaign lasting into the winter and therefore, adequate preparations such as the distribution of warm clothing and ] of important military equipment like tanks and artillery, were not made.{{sfn|Palmer|2010|pp=187–188}}


Beginning in March 1941, ] laid out details for the disposal of Soviet economic after conquest. The entire urban population of the conquered territory was to be starved to death, thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and urban space for German upper class.{{sfn|Patterson|2003|p=562}} Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the ] ''Lebensraum'' ideals, for the benefit of future generations of the "] ]".{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} In 1941, Nazi-ideologue ], later appointed Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories, suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be administered in the following '']iate'' (Reich Commissionerships):{{sfn|Klemann|Kudryashov|2013|p=33}} Further to Hitler's Directive, ], issued in March 1941, laid out the agenda for the next step after the anticipated quick conquest of the Soviet Union. The ] outlined how entire urban populations of conquered territories were to be starved to death, thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and urban space for the German upper class.{{sfn|Patterson|2003|p=562}} Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the ] {{lang|de|Lebensraum}} ideals for the benefit of future generations of the "] ]".{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} In 1941, Nazi ideologue ]—later appointed Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories—suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be administered in the following {{lang|de|]iate}} ('Reich Commissionerships'):


{| width="50%" class="wikitable collapsible collapsed" {|class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan="3" | Administration of conquered Soviet territory by Alfred Rosenberg{{sfn|Handrack|1981|p=40}}{{sfn|Klemann|Kudryashov|2013|p=33}}
|+Administrative subdivisions of conquered Soviet territory as envisaged, and then partially realised, by Alfred Rosenberg{{sfn|Handrack|1981|p=40}}{{sfn|Klemann|Kudryashov|2012|p=33}}
|- |-
! Name
!scope="col" style="width:10em;"| Name
!scope="col" style="width:13em;" class="unsortable"| Notes ! style=width:500px | Note
! Map
!scope="col" style="width:8em;" class="unsortable"| Map
|- |-
! scope="row" | ] ! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|]}}}}
| The ] and ] |] and ]
| {{center|]}} |{{center|]}}
|- |-
! scope="row" | ] ! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|]}}}}
| ], enlarged eastwards to the ] |], enlarged eastwards to the ]
| {{center|]}} |{{center|]}}
|- |-
! scope="row" | ] ! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|]}}}}
| ] and the ] region |] and the ] region
| {{center|Unrealized}} |{{center|Unrealised}}
|- |-
! scope="row" | ] ! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|]}}}}
| ] and the rest of ] |] and remaining ]; originally called '''Reichskommissariat Russland''', later renamed
| {{center|Unrealized}} |{{center|Unrealised}}
|- |-
! scope="row" | ] ! scope="row" |{{left|{{lang|de|]}}}}
| ] and territories |] and territories
| {{center|Unrealized}} |{{center|Unrealised}}
|- |-
|} |}


While planning Barbarossa, Hitler and his generals disagreed on where Germany should focus its energy.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} Hitler, in many discussions with his generals, repeated his order of "Leningrad first, the ] second, Moscow third".{{sfn|Higgins|1966|pp=11–59}} Hitler believed Moscow to be of "no great importance" in the defeat of the Soviet Union and instead believed victory would come with the destruction of the Red Army west of the capital, especially west of the ] and ] Rivers, and this pervaded the plan for Barbarossa.{{sfn|Glantz|2010b|pp=19, 60}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=72}} This belief later led to disputes between Hitler and several German senior officers including ], ], ] and ], who believed the decisive victory could only be delivered at Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|2010b|pp=55–60}} Hitler had grown overconfident in his own military judgement from the rapid successes in Western Europe.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} German military planners also researched ]. In their calculations, they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat of the Red Army into the Russian interior, as it could not afford to give up the Baltic countries, Ukraine, or the Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thus, have to be defended.{{sfn|Rich|1973|p=212}} Hitler and his generals disagreed on where Germany should focus its energy.{{sfn|Megargee|2000|pp=131–134}}{{sfn|Seaton|1972|pp=59–63}} Hitler, in many discussions with his generals, repeated his order of "Leningrad first, the ] second, Moscow third;"{{sfn|Higgins|1966|pp=11–59}} but he consistently emphasized the destruction of the Red Army over the achievement of specific terrain objectives.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=18}} Hitler believed Moscow to be of "no great importance" in the defeat of the Soviet Union{{Efn|Concerning this strategic mistake, historian David Stone asserts that, "If Hitler's decision to invade Russia in 1941 was his greatest single error of judgement, then his subsequent decision not to strike hard and fast against Moscow was surely a close second."{{sfn|Stone|2011|p=195}} }} and instead believed victory would come with the destruction of the Red Army west of the capital, especially west of the ] and ] rivers, and this pervaded the plan for Barbarossa.{{sfn|Glantz|2010b|pp=19, 60}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=72}} This belief later led to disputes between Hitler and several German senior officers, including ], ], ] and ], who believed the decisive victory could only be delivered at Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|2010b|pp=55–60}} They were unable to sway Hitler, who had grown overconfident in his own military judgment as a result of the rapid successes in Western Europe.{{sfn|Seaton|1972|pp=32–36}}


==German preparations== ==German preparations==
] on the road near ], June 1941]]
{{Further|Lossberg study}}
]
The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the ] had finished. By the third week in February 1941, 680,000 German soldiers were stationed on the Romanian-Soviet border.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=822}} In preparation for the attack, Hitler moved more than 3.2 million German and about 500,000 Axis soldiers to the Soviet border, launched many ] missions over Soviet territory, and stockpiled ] in the East. Although the Soviet High Command was alarmed by this, Stalin's belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to attack only two years after signing the ] resulted in a slow Soviet preparation.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} Since April 1941, the Germans had begun setting up ] to add substance to their claims that Britain was the real target. These simulated preparations in Norway and the English Channel coast with activities such as ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}}


The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the ] had finished. By the third week of February 1941, 680,000 German soldiers were gathered in assembly areas on the Romanian-Soviet border.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=822}} In preparation for the attack, Hitler had secretly moved upwards of 3 million German troops and approximately 690,000 Axis soldiers to the Soviet border regions.{{sfn|Müller|2016|p=175}} Additional ''Luftwaffe'' operations included numerous ] missions over Soviet territory many months before the attack.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=12}}
{{quote box | width = 22em | quote = We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.{{sfn||''The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler'', 1989}}| source = —Adolf Hitler}}
German military planners also researched ]. In their calculations they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat of the Soviet Army into the Russian interior, as it could not afford to give up the Baltic states, Ukraine, or the Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thus had to be defended.{{sfn|Rich|1973|p=212}}


Although the Soviet High Command was alarmed by this, Stalin's belief that Nazi Germany was unlikely to attack only two years after signing the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact resulted in slow Soviet preparation.{{sfn|Hastings|2012|p=141}} This fact aside, the Soviets did not entirely overlook the threat of their German neighbor. Well before the German invasion, Marshal ] referred to the Germans as the Soviet Union's "most important and strongest enemy," and as early as July 1940, the Red Army Chief of Staff, ], produced a preliminary three-pronged plan of attack for what a German invasion might look like, remarkably similar to the actual attack.{{sfn|Overy|2006|pp=490–491}} Since April 1941, the Germans had begun setting up ] and ] to substantiate their claims that Britain was the real target. These simulated preparations in ] and the ] coast included activities such as ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises.{{sfn|Ziemke|1959|p=138}}
The postponement of Barbarossa from the initially planned date of 15 May to the actual invasion date of 22 June 1941 (a 38-day delay) occurred due to a combination of reasons. Namely, the ] required a diversion of troops and resources which hampered preparations and an unusually wet winter that kept rivers at full flood until late spring. The full floods could have discouraged an earlier attack, even if it was unlikely to have happened before the end of the Balkans Campaign. The importance of the delay is still debated.{{sfn|Bradley|Buell|2002|pp=35–40}}


{{anchor|Reasons for delay}}The reasons for the postponement of Barbarossa from the initially planned date of 15 May to the actual invasion date of 22 June 1941 (a 38-day delay) are debated. The reason most commonly cited is the unforeseen contingency of ] and ] on 6 April 1941 until June 1941.{{sfn|Middleton|1981}} Historian Thomas B. Buell indicates that Finland and Romania, which weren't involved in initial German planning, needed additional time to prepare to participate in the invasion. Buell adds that an unusually wet winter kept rivers at full flood until late spring.{{sfn|Bradley|Buell|2002|p=page 101}}{{Efn|Flooding was so bad that Guderian wrote: "The Balkans Campaign had been concluded with all the speed desired, and the troops there engaged which were now needed for Russia were withdrawn according to plan and very fast. But all the same there was a definite delay in the opening of our Russian Campaign. Furthermore we had had a very wet spring; the Bug and its tributaries were at flood level until well into May and the nearby ground was swampy and almost impassable."{{sfn|Guderian|2002|p=145}} }} The floods may have discouraged an earlier attack, even if they occurred before the end of the Balkans Campaign.<ref>{{harvnb|Bradley|Buell|2002|pp=35–40}}; {{harvnb|Hillgruber|1965|pp=506–507}}; {{harvnb|Vogel|1995|p=483}}; {{harvnb|Stahel|2009|p=140}}</ref>{{Efn|Guderian wrote: "A delay was almost certainly inevitable given that the late spring thaw had swelled and in some cases flooded the major waterways, impeding mobile operations over the sodden ground."{{sfn|Guderian|2002|p=145}} Blumentritt: "...&nbsp;the ground was soft and boggy and the roads were covered with mud. Normally May brought a change of conditions; the water receded and movement was less hampered. But 1941 was an exceptional year, and at the end of June the Bug, a Polish river near Brest-Litovsk, was still overflowing its banks."{{sfn|Blumentritt|1952|p=101}}}}
The Germans deployed one independent regiment, one separate motorized training brigade and 153 divisions for Barbarossa, which included 138 divisions (104 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorized infantry divisions) in three army groups, 9 security divisions to operate in conquered territories, 4 divisions in Finland and 2 divisions as reserve under the direct control of ].{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=20, 34}} These were equipped with about 3,350 tanks, 7,200 artillery pieces, 2,770 aircraft that amounted to 65 percent of the Luftwaffe, about 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000 horses.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=20, 25}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=73–74}} Finland slated 14 divisions for the invasion, and Romania offered 13 divisions and 8 brigades over the course of Barbarossa.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}} The entire Axis forces, deployed across a front extending from the ] southward to the ],{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=18}} were organized into ], ], ] and ], alongside three ] (air fleets – air force equivalent of army groups) that supported the army groups – ] for North, ] for Center and ] for South.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}


] commander, Field Marshal ], and Hitler study maps during the early days of Hitler's Soviet Campaign.]]
Army Norway was to operate in far northern Scandinavia and bordering Soviet territories.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}} Army Group North was to march through the ] into northern Russia, and either take or destroy the city of ] (now ]). Army Group Center would advance to ] and then Moscow, marching through what is now ] and the West-central regions of Russia proper. Army Group South was to strike the heavily populated and agricultural heartland of ], taking ] before continuing Eastward over the ]s of southern USSR to the ] with the aim of controlling the oil-rich ].{{sfn|Baker|2013|pp=26–27}}{{sfn|Higgins|1966|pp=11–59}} The German forces in the rear (mostly '']'' and '']'' units) were to operate in conquered territories to counter any ] activity in areas they controlled, as well as to ].{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} The official plan for Barbarossa assumed that the army groups would be able to advance freely to their primary objectives simultaneously without spreading thin, once they have won the border battles and destroyed Red Army's forces in the forward area.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=21}}

The importance of the delay is still debated. ] argued that Hitler's Balkan Campaign had delayed the commencement of Barbarossa by several weeks and thereby jeopardised it.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=829–830}} Many later historians argue that the 22 June start date was sufficient for the German offensive to reach Moscow by September.{{sfn|Bradley|Buell|2002|pp=35–40}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2006|p=44}}{{sfn|Stockings|Hancock|2013|pp=581–84}}{{sfn|Hooker|1999}} ] wrote in 2012 about the delay caused by German attacks in the Balkans that "most accept that it made little difference" to the eventual outcome of Barbarossa.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=158}}

The Germans deployed one independent regiment, one separate motorised training brigade and 153 divisions for Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 ] and 15 ] divisions in three army groups, nine ] to operate in conquered territories, four divisions in Finland{{Efn|For the Finnish President, ], the attack against the Soviet Union was part of the struggle against Bolshevism and one of Finland's "traditional enemies". {{sfn|Menger|1997|p=532}} }} and two divisions as reserve under the direct control of ].{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=20, 34}} These were equipped with 6,867 armoured vehicles, of which 3,350–3,795 were tanks, 2,770–4,389 aircraft (that amounted to 65 percent of the ''Luftwaffe''), 7,200–23,435 artillery pieces, 17,081 mortars, about 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000–700,000 horses.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=20, 25}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|pp=73–74}}{{sfn|Liedtke|2016|p=220}}{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=129}}{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=80}} Finland slated 14 divisions for the invasion, and Romania offered 13 divisions and eight brigades over the course of Barbarossa.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}} The entire Axis forces, 3.8&nbsp;million personnel,{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9}} deployed across a front extending from the Arctic Ocean southward to the ],{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=18}} were all controlled by the OKH and organised into ], ], ] and ], alongside three ] (air fleets, the air force equivalent of army groups) that supported the army groups: ] for North, ] for Centre and ] for South.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}}

Army Norway was to operate in far northern ] and ].{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}} Army Group North was to march through Latvia and Estonia into northern Russia, then either take or destroy the city of ], and link up with Finnish forces.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=36}}{{sfn|Higgins|1966|pp=11–59}} Army Group Centre, the army group equipped with the most armour and air power,{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=14}} was to strike from Poland into ] and the west-central regions of Russia proper, and advance to ] and then Moscow.{{sfn|Higgins|1966|pp=11–59}} Army Group South was to strike the heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking ] before continuing eastward over the ]s of southern USSR to the Volga with the aim of controlling the oil-rich ].{{sfn|Higgins|1966|pp=11–59}} Army Group South was deployed in two sections separated by a {{convert|198|mi|km|adj=on}} gap. The northern section, which contained the army group's only panzer group, was in southern Poland right next to Army Group Centre, and the southern section was in Romania.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=40}}

The German forces in the rear (mostly {{lang|de|]}} and {{lang|de|Einsatzgruppen}} units) were to operate in conquered territories to counter any ] activity in areas they controlled, as well as to ] and Jews.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=9–24}} On 17 June, ] (RSHA) chief ] briefed around thirty to fifty {{lang|de|Einsatzgruppen}} commanders on "the policy of eliminating Jews in Soviet territories, at least in general terms".{{sfn|Breitman|1991|p=434}} While the {{lang|de|Einsatzgruppen}} were assigned to the ''Wehrmacht''{{'}}s units, which provided them with supplies such as gasoline and food, they were controlled by the RSHA.{{sfn|Hilberg|1961|pp=177–183}} The official plan for Barbarossa assumed that the army groups would be able to advance freely to their primary objectives simultaneously, without spreading thin, once they had won the border battles and destroyed the Red Army's forces in the border area.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=21}}


==Soviet preparations== ==Soviet preparations==
{{see also|Soviet offensive plans controversy|2006 Soviet war documents declassification}}
In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December 1940, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack on the Soviet Union in ''Mein Kampf'', and that Hitler believes the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Stalin declared "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two years".{{sfn|Berthon|Potts|2007|p=47}}
] and ] in 1940]]
]


Despite the estimations held by Hitler and others in the German High Command, the Soviet Union was by no means weak. ], a prominent military theorists in ] in the interwar period, lobbied the ] for colossal investment in the resources required for the production of weapons in mass quantities. In 1930 he forwarded a memo to the Kremlin, pressing the case for "40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks".{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=56}} In the early 1930s, a very modern operational ] for the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulations, in the form of the ]. Defense expenditure also grew rapidly: in 1933 it had reached 12 percent of ], from just 5 percent in 1913, and by 1940 it stood at 18 percent.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=55}} In 1930, ], a prominent military theorist in ] in the ] and later ], forwarded a memo to the Kremlin that lobbied for colossal investment in the resources required for the mass production of weapons, pressing the case for "40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks."{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=56}} In the early 1930s, a modern operational ] for the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 Field Regulations in the form of the ]. Defence expenditure also grew rapidly from just 12 percent of the ] in 1933 to 18 percent by 1940.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=55}}


During Stalin's Great Purge in the 1930s, the officer corps of the Red Army was decimated and their replacements, appointed by Stalin for political reasons, often lacked military competence. Of the five marshals appointed in 1935, only two survived Stalin's purge. 50 out of the 57 corps commanders, 154 out of the 186 divisional commanders and 401 out of 456 colonels were killed; and many other officers were dismissed.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=57}} In total, about 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed.{{sfn|Rayfield|2004|p=315}} Stalin further underscored his control by reasserting the role of political commissars at the divisional level and below to oversee and ensure the political loyalty of the Army to the regime. The commissars held a position equal to that of the commander of the unit they were overseeing.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=57}} However, by 1941 about 80 percent of the officers dismissed during the Great Purge had been reinstated. Also, between January 1939 and May 1941, 161 new divisions were activated. Therefore, although about 75 percent of all the officers had been in their position for less than one year by 1941,{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=58}} that was also because of the rapid increase in creation of military units, and not just because of the purge.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=58}} During Joseph Stalin's Great Purge in the late 1930s, which had not ended by the time of the German invasion on 22 June 1941, much of the officer corps of the Red Army was executed or imprisoned. Many of their replacements, appointed by Stalin for political reasons, lacked military competence.{{sfn|Glantz|1998|p=26}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=55}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=57}} Of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union appointed in 1935, only ] and ] survived Stalin's purge. Tukhachevsky was killed in 1937. Fifteen of 16 army commanders, 50 of the 57 corps commanders, 154 of the 186 divisional commanders, and 401 of 456 colonels were killed, and many other officers were dismissed.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=57}} In total, about 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed.{{sfn|Rayfield|2004|p=315}} Stalin further underscored his control by reasserting the role of ]s at the divisional level and below to oversee the political loyalty of the army to the regime. The commissars held a position equal to that of the commander of the unit they were overseeing.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=57}} But in spite of efforts to ensure the political subservience of the armed forces, in the wake of Red Army's poor performance in Poland and in the Winter War, about 80 percent of the officers dismissed during the Great Purge were reinstated by 1941. Also, between January 1939 and May 1941, 161 new divisions were activated.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=22}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=58}} Therefore, although about 75 percent of all the officers had been in their position for less than one year at the start of the German invasion of 1941, many of the short tenures can be attributed not only to the purge but also to the rapid increase in the creation of military units.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=58}}


Beginning in July 1940, the Red Army General Staff developed war plans that identified the ''Wehrmacht'' as the most dangerous threat to the Soviet Union, and that in the case of a war with Germany, the ''Wehrmacht''{{'}}s main attack would come through the region north of the ] into Belorussia,{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=15}}{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=21}} which later proved to be correct.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=15}} Stalin disagreed, and in October, he authorised the development of new plans that assumed a German attack would focus on the region south of Pripyat Marshes towards the economically vital regions in Ukraine. This became the basis for all subsequent Soviet war plans and the deployment of their armed forces in preparation for the German invasion.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=15}}{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=21–22}}
The Soviets held a clear numerical advantage in tanks that numbered more than 20,000,{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} of which about 11,000{{sfn|Mercatante|2012|p=64}} were in the western ] that faced the German invasion forces, which had about 3,350 tanks.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=73}}{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=20}} Hitler later declared to some of his generals, "If I had known about the Russian tank's strength in 1941 I would not have attacked".{{sfn|Macksey|1989|p=456}} However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many armoured units lacked the trucks for supplies.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} The most advanced Soviet tank models, the ] and ], were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7 percent of the total Soviet tank force.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} Furthermore, during the late 1930s, the Soviets had partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions, but after their experiences in the ] and their observation of the German campaign against France, they had begun to emulate the Germans and organize most of their armored assets into large armored divisions and corps. This reorganization was still only in progress and incomplete when Barbarossa commenced.{{sfn|Dunnigan|1978|p=82}} The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was thoroughly offset by the superior training and readiness of the Wehrmacht.{{sfn|Rayfield|2004|p=315}}


In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December 1940, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack on the Soviet Union in ''Mein Kampf'' and Hitler's belief that the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Stalin declared "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two years".{{sfn|Berthon|Potts|2007|p=47}} As early as August 1940, British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets a week after Hitler informally approved the plans for ''Barbarossa'' and warned the Soviet Union accordingly.{{sfn|Waller|1996|p=192}} Some of this intelligence was based on ] information obtained from broken ] traffic.{{sfn|Budiansky|2001|loc=Chapter 6}} But Stalin's distrust of the British led him to ignore their warnings in the belief that they were a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war on their side.{{sfn|Waller|1996|p=192}}{{sfn|Roberts|1995|p=1293}} Soviet intelligence also received word of an invasion around 20 June from ] whose spy, Yan Baohang, had overheard talk of the plans at a dinner with a German ] and sent word to ].{{sfn|Faligot|2019|p=38}} The Chinese maintain the tipoff helped Stalin make preparations, though little exists to confirm the Soviets made any real changes upon receiving the intelligence.{{sfn|Faligot|2019|p=38}} In early 1941, Stalin's own ]s and American intelligence gave regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack.{{sfn|Waller|1996|pp=196–198}} Soviet spy ] also gave Stalin the exact German launch date, but Sorge and other informers had previously given different invasion dates that passed peacefully before the actual invasion.{{sfn|Roberts|2011|p=155}}{{sfn|Hastings|2016|pp=110–113}} Stalin acknowledged the possibility of an attack in general and therefore made significant preparations, but decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler.{{sfn|Waller|1996|p=202}}
The Soviet Armed Forces in the western Soviet Union was outnumbered at the start of the invasion,{{sfn|Taylor|1974|p=98}} with about 3.8 million of the Axis in the Eastern Front in June 1941 facing about 2.6–2.7 million Soviets in the western Soviet Union, and an overall Soviet force of 5.3–5.5 million.{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9}}{{sfn|Glantz|1998|p=293}}{{sfn|Taylor|1974|p=98}} The Red Army was dispersed and thoroughly unprepared when invasion commenced.{{sfn|Sakwa|2005|pp=225–227}} Their units were often separated and lacked adequate transportation. Tank units were rarely well equipped, and also lacked training and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. {{sfn|Sakwa|2005|pp=225–227}}


]
{| class="wikitable" style="float:right; margin:1em auto 1.5em 2.5em; text-align:right;"

|+'''Development of the Soviet Armed Forces — Compiled by Russian military historian ]{{sfn|Russian Military Library}}
In early 1941, Stalin authorised the State Defence Plan 1941 (DP-41), which along with the Mobilisation Plan 1941 (MP-41), called for the deployment of 186 divisions, as the first strategic echelon, in the four ]{{efn|name=western military districts Soviet Union}} of the western Soviet Union that faced the Axis territories; and the deployment of another 51 divisions along the Dvina and Dnieper Rivers as the second strategic echelon under ] control, which in the case of a German invasion was tasked to spearhead a Soviet counteroffensive along with the remaining forces of the first echelon.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=21–22}} But on 22 June 1941 the first echelon contained 171 divisions,{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=16, 219}} numbering 2.6–2.9&nbsp;million;{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9}}{{sfn|Glantz|1998|pp=10–11, 101, 293}} and the second strategic echelon contained 57 divisions that were still mobilising, most of which were still understrength.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=22–23, 51}} The second echelon was undetected by German intelligence until days after the invasion commenced, in most cases only when German ground forces encountered them.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=22–23, 51}}

At the start of the invasion, the manpower of the Soviet military force that had been mobilised was 5.3–5.5&nbsp;million,{{sfn|Glantz|2001|p=9}}{{sfn|Glantz|1998|p=293}} and it was still increasing as the Soviet ] of 14 million, with at least basic military training, continued to mobilise.{{sfn|Glantz|1998|p=107}}{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=68}} The Red Army was dispersed and still preparing when the invasion commenced.{{sfn|Sakwa|2005|pp=225–227}} Their units were often separated and lacked adequate transportation. While transportation remained insufficient for Red Army forces, when Operation Barbarossa kicked off, they possessed some 33,000 pieces of artillery, a number far greater than the Germans had at their disposal.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|p=386}}{{efn|Historian ] reports that before the war came to its conclusion, the Soviets had an artillery advantage over the Germans of seven-to-one and that artillery production was the only area where they doubled U.S. and British manufacturing output.{{sfn|Hanson|2017|pp=386–387}} }}

The Soviet Union had around 23,000 tanks available of which 14,700 were combat-ready.{{sfn|Kirshin|1997|p=385}} Around 11,000 tanks were in the western military districts that faced the German invasion force.{{sfn|Mercatante|2012|p=64}} Hitler later declared to some of his generals, "If I had known about the Russian tank strength in 1941 I would not have attacked".{{sfn|Macksey|1989|p=456}} However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many armoured units lacked the trucks for supplies.{{sfn|Seaton|1972|pp=91–93}}{{sfn|Hastings|2012|p=140}} The most advanced Soviet tank models—the ] and ]—which were superior to all current German tanks, as well as all designs still in development as of the summer 1941,{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=23}} were not available in large numbers at the time the invasion commenced.{{sfn|Seaton|1972|p=93}} Furthermore, in the autumn of 1939, the Soviets disbanded their ] and partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions;{{sfn|Glantz|1998|p=109}} but following their observation of the German campaign in France, in late 1940 they began to reorganise most of their armoured assets back into mechanised corps with a target strength of 1,031 tanks each.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=22}} But these large armoured formations were unwieldy, and moreover they were spread out in scattered garrisons, with their subordinate divisions up to {{convert|100|km|abbr=off}} apart.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=22}} The reorganisation was still in progress and incomplete when Barbarossa commenced.{{sfn|Dunnigan|1978|p=82}}{{sfn|Glantz|1998|p=109}} Soviet tank units were rarely well equipped, and they lacked training and logistical support. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements in place for refuelling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective.{{sfn|Sakwa|2005|pp=225–227}} The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was thoroughly offset by the superior training and organisation of the ''Wehrmacht''.{{sfn|Rayfield|2004|p=315}}

The Soviet Air Force (]) held the numerical advantage with a total of approximately 19,533 aircraft, which made it the largest air force in the world in the summer of 1941.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=28}} About 7,133–9,100 of these were deployed in the five western military districts,{{efn|name=western military districts Soviet Union}}{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=28}}{{sfn|Mercatante|2012|p=64}}{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=76}} and an additional 1,445 were under naval control.{{sfn|Glantz|1998|p=13}}

{|class="wikitable floatright" style="text-align:right;"
|-
|+Development of the Soviet Armed Forces{{sfn|Meltyukhov|2000}}
|-
! !
!1 January 1939 !1 January 1939
Line 250: Line 321:
!Increase !Increase
|- |-
|Divisions calculated || 131.5 || 316.5 || 140.7% |Divisions calculated ||131.5 ||316.5 ||140.7%
|- |-
|Personnel || 2,485,000 || 5,774,000 || 132.4% |Personnel ||2,485,000 ||5,774,000 ||132.4%
|- |-
|Guns and mortars || 55,800 || 117,600 || 110.7% |Guns and mortars ||55,800 ||117,600 ||110.7%
|- |-
|Tanks || 21,100 || 25,700 || 21.8% |Tanks ||21,100 ||25,700 ||21.8%
|- |-
|Aircraft || 7,700 || 18,700 || 142.8% |Aircraft ||7,700 ||18,700 ||142.8%
|} |}


Historians have debated whether Stalin was planning an invasion of German territory in the summer of 1941. The debate began in the late 1980s when ] published a journal article and later the book '']'' in which he claimed that Stalin had seen the outbreak of war in Western Europe as an opportunity to spread communist revolutions throughout the continent, and that the Soviet military was being deployed for an imminent attack at the time of the German invasion.{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|pp=626–627}} This view had also been advanced by former German generals following the war.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=243}} Suvorov's thesis was fully or partially accepted by a limited number of historians, including ], ], ], and ], and attracted public attention in Germany, Israel, and Russia.{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|pp=631, 633, 636}}{{sfn|Bar-Joseph|Levy|2009|p=476}} It has been strongly rejected by most historians,{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|p=630}}{{sfn|Humpert|2005|p=72}} and ''Icebreaker'' is generally considered to be an "anti-Soviet tract" in Western countries.{{sfn|Roberts|1995|p=1326}} ] and ] wrote books to rebut Suvorov's arguments.{{sfn|Mawdsley|2003|pp=819–820}} The majority of historians believe that Stalin was seeking to avoid war in 1941, as he believed that his military was not ready to fight the German forces.{{sfn|Bar-Joseph|Levy|2009|p=477}} The debate on whether Stalin intended to launch an offensive against Germany in 1941 remains inconclusive but has produced an abundance of scholarly literature and helped to expand the understanding of larger themes in Soviet and world history during the interwar period.{{sfn|Kshyk|2015}}
Prior to the invasion, the Soviet Air Force (]) was forbidden to shoot down Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, despite hundreds of prewar incursions into Soviet airspace.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} The Soviet Air Force held the numerical advantage with a total of approximately 19,533 aircraft, which made it the largest air force in the world in the summer of 1941.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=28}} About 7,133 of these were deployed in the western military districts.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=28}} However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and Soviet ] lacked modern fire-control techniques.{{sfn|Dunnigan|1978|pp=93–94}}

In August 1940, British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets only a week after Hitler informally approved the plans for ''Barbarossa'', and warned the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Waller|1996|p=192}} But Stalin's distrust of the British led him to ignore their warnings, believing it to be a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war on their side.{{sfn|Waller|1996|p=192}} In early 1941, Stalin's own ]s and American intelligence gave regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack.{{sfn|Waller|1996|pp=196–198}} Stalin acknowledged the possibility of an attack in general and therefore made significant preparations, but decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler.{{sfn|Waller|1996|p=202}} He had an ill-founded confidence in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and suspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR.{{sfn|Roberts|1995|p=1293}} Russian spy ] also gave Stalin the exact German launch date, but Sorge and other informers had previously given different invasion dates which passed peacefully before the actual invasion.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}}

Historians ] whether Stalin was planning an invasion of German territory in the summer of 1941. The debate began in the late 1980s when ] published a journal article and later the book '']'' in which he stated that Stalin had seen the outbreak of war in western Europe as an opportunity to spread communist revolutions throughout the continent, and that the Soviet military was being deployed for an imminent attack at the time of the German invasion.{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|pp=626–627}} This view had also been advanced by former German generals following the war.{{sfn|Smelser|Davies|2008|p=243}} Suvorov's thesis was fully or partially accepted by some historians, including ], ], ] and ], and attracted public attention in Germany, Israel and Russia.{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|pp=631, 633, 636}}{{sfn|Bar-Joseph|Levy|2009|p=476}} However, it has been strongly rejected by most historians of this period,{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|p=630}} and ''Icebreaker'' is generally considered to be an "anti-Soviet tract" in western countries.{{sfn|Roberts|1995|p=1326}} ] and ] wrote books to rebut Suvorov's argument,{{sfn|Mawdsley|2003|pp=819–820}} and most historians believe that Stalin was seeking to avoid war in 1941 as he believed that his military was not ready to fight the German forces.{{sfn|Bar-Joseph|Levy|2009|p=477}}


==Order of battle== ==Order of battle==
{{main|Order of battle for Operation Barbarossa}} {{main|Order of battle for Operation Barbarossa}}


{| class="wikitable" style="font-size:95%; width:40%" {|class="wikitable" style="font-size:95%;"
|+'''Order of battle – June 1941
|- |-
|+Order of battle – June 1941{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=26,29}}{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
! scope="col" | Axis forces
! scope="col" | Soviet Forces
|- |-
! scope="col" style=width:50% |Axis forces
| valign="top" |
! scope="col" style=width:50% |Soviet forces{{efn|name=western military districts Soviet Union}}
''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=30}}
|-
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=30}}
|valign="top" |
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=30}}
{{Tree list}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=30}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=30}} *'''Northern Theatre'''{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=26}}
** ]
** ]


''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}} *''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=26}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}} ** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}} ** ]
** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}}
** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}}


''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} *''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=31}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
** ]
** ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
** ]
** ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} ** ]
** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
** ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
** ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
** ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
| width="50%" |
''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=29}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=29}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=29}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=29}}


''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} *''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} ** ]
** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}} ** ]
*** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}}
*** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}}
** ]
*** ]
** ]
** ]
** ]
{{Tree list/end}}
|width="55%" |
{{tree list}}
*''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=29}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
** ]
** ]
** ]
*** ]
** ]
** Northern ]


''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=31}} *''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|p=30}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=31}} ** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=31}} ** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=31}} *** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=31}} ** ]
*** ]
** 5th Airborne Corps
** Baltic ]
** ]
** ]


''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} *''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2005|p=31}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} ** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} *** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} ** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} *** ]
*** ]
** ]
*** ]
** ]
** ] and ] Mechanised Corps
** ], 21st Rifle, 44th Rifle, 47th Rifle, 50th Rifle and ] Corps
** Western ]


''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} *''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} ** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} *** ]
*** 22nd Mechanised Corps
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}} ** ]
*** ]
* ]{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}
*** 15th Mechanised Corps
** ]
*** ]
** ]
*** 16th Mechanised Corps
** 31 Rifle, 36th Rifle, 49th Rifle, 55th Rifle and 1st Airborne Corps
** Kiev ]

*''']'''{{sfn|Kirchubel|2003|p=31}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=290–303}}
** ]
*** ]
*** 18th Mechanised Corps
** 7th Rifle, 9th Rifle and 3rd Airborne Corps
** Odessa ]
** ]
----
*'''] Armies (second strategic echelon)'''{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=302–303}}
** ]
*** ]
** ]
*** ]
** ]
*** ]
** ]
*** ]
** ]
** ]
** 20th Rifle, 45th Rifle, 67th Rifle and 21st Mechanised Corps.
{{tree list/end}}
|-
! colspan=2 | '''Total number of divisions (22 June)'''
|-
|{{center|German : 152{{Sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=365}}}}
{{center|Romanian : 14{{Sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=367}}}}
|{{center|Soviet : 220{{Sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=365}}}}
|} |}


==Invasion== ==Invasion==
] tank in Ukraine, June 1941]] ], 22 June 1941]]


At around 01:00 on 22 June 1941, the Soviet military districts in the border area{{efn|name=western military districts Soviet Union}} were alerted by NKO Directive No. 1, issued late on the night of 21 June.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=81}} It called on them to "bring all forces to combat readiness", but to "avoid provocative actions of any kind".{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=287}} It took up to two hours for several of the units subordinate to the Fronts to receive the order of the directive,{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=287}} and the majority did not receive it before the invasion commenced.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=81}} A German communist deserter, ], had crossed the lines at 21:00 on 21 June{{efn|The ] learned about Liskow only at 03:00 on 22 June.{{sfn|Czak|2014|pp=1, 120}}}} and informed the Soviets that an attack was coming at 04:00. Stalin was informed, but apparently regarded it as disinformation. Liskow was still being interrogated when the attack began.{{sfn|Erickson|1972|pp=526–527}}
At around 3:15 am on 22 June 1941, the Axis Powers commenced the invasion with the bombing of major cities in Soviet-occupied Poland,{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|pp=33–34}} and an artillery barrage on Red Army defences on the entire front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=81}} Roughly three million soldiers of the Wehrmacht went into action and faced slightly fewer Soviet troops at the border.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|pp=33–34}} At around noon, the news of the invasion was broadcast to the population by Soviet foreign minister ]:


On 21 June, at 13:00 Army Group North received the codeword "Düsseldorf", indicating Barbarossa would commence the next morning, and passed down its own codeword, "Dortmund".{{sfn|Kirchubel|2013|p=136}} At around 03:15 on 22 June 1941, the Axis Powers commenced the invasion of the Soviet Union with the bombing of major cities in Soviet-occupied Poland{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|pp=33–34}} and an artillery barrage on Red Army defences on the entire front.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=81}} Air-raids were conducted as far as ] near Leningrad and ] in the Crimea. At the same time the ] was presented by Foreign Minister ]. Meanwhile, ground troops crossed the border, accompanied in some locales by Lithuanian and Ukrainian partisans.{{sfn|Seaton|1972|p=98}} Roughly three million soldiers of the ''Wehrmacht'' went into action and faced slightly fewer Soviet troops at the border.{{sfn|Kirchubel|2007|pp=33–34}} Accompanying the German forces during the initial invasion were Finnish and Romanian units as well.{{sfn|Pohl|2018|p=246}}
{{quotation|Today at 4 o'clock in the morning, without addressing any grievances to the Soviet Union, without a declaration of war, German forces fell on our country, attacked our frontiers in many places, and bombed our cities – Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kuanas and others... an act of treachery unprecedented in the history of civilized nations... Our people's answer to Napoleon's invasion was a Patriotic War...The Red Army and the whole nation will wage a victorious Patriotic War for our beloved country, for honour, for liberty ... Our cause is just. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be ours!{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=70}}{{sfn|Braithwaite|2010|p=74}}|Vyacheslav Molotov}}
]
At around noon, the news of the invasion was broadcast to the population by Soviet foreign minister ]: "...&nbsp;Without a declaration of war, German forces fell on our country, attacked our frontiers in many places&nbsp;... The Red Army and the whole nation will wage a victorious Patriotic War for our beloved country, for honour, for liberty&nbsp;... Our cause is just. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be ours!"{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=70}}{{sfn|Braithwaite|2010|p=74}} By calling upon the population's devotion to their nation rather than the Party, Molotov struck a patriotic chord that helped a stunned people absorb the shattering news.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=70}} Within the first few days of the invasion, the Soviet High Command and Red Army were extensively reorganised so as to place them on the necessary war footing.{{sfn|Seaton|1972|p=99}} Stalin did not address the nation about the German invasion until 3 July, when he also called for a "Patriotic War... of the entire Soviet people".{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=92}}


In Germany, on the morning of 22 June, Nazi propaganda minister ] announced the invasion to the waking nation in a radio broadcast with Hitler's words: "At this moment a march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided today to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially in this fight!"{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=82}} Later the same morning, Hitler proclaimed to his colleagues, "Before three months have passed, we shall witness a collapse of Russia, the like of which has never been seen in history".{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=82}} Hitler also addressed the German people via the radio, presenting himself as a man of peace, who reluctantly had to attack the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Hitler|1941}} Following the invasion, Goebbels instructed that Nazi propaganda use the slogan "European crusade against Bolshevism" to describe the war; subsequently thousands of ] joined the ''Waffen-SS''.{{sfn|Ueberschär|Müller|2008|p=244}}
By calling upon the population's devotion to their nation rather than the Party, Molotov struck a patriotic chord while allowing a stunned people to absorb the shattering news.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=70}} Stalin addressed the nation for the first time since the start of the German invasion on 3 July, and just like Molotov's announcement, he called for a "Patriotic War ... of the entire Soviet people".{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=92}}


==Initial attacks==
In Germany, on the morning of 22 June, ] minister ] announced the invasion to the waking nation in a radio broadcast:
]


The initial momentum of the German ground and air attack completely destroyed the Soviet organisational ] within the first few hours, paralyzing every level of command from the infantry platoon to the Soviet High Command in Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=31–33}} Moscow failed to grasp the magnitude of the catastrophe that confronted the Soviet forces in the border area, and Stalin's first reaction was disbelief.{{sfn|Roberts|2011|p=156}} At around 07:15, Stalin issued NKO Directive No. 2, which announced the invasion to the Soviet Armed Forces, and called on them to attack Axis forces wherever they had violated the borders and launch air strikes into the border regions of German territory.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=83}} At around 09:15, Stalin issued NKO Directive No. 3, signed by Timoshenko, which now called for a general counteroffensive on the entire front "without any regards for borders" that both men hoped would sweep the enemy from Soviet territory.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=31}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=287}} Stalin's order, which Timoshenko authorised, was not based on a realistic appraisal of the military situation at hand, but commanders passed it along for fear of retribution if they failed to obey; several days passed before the Soviet leadership became aware of the enormity of the opening defeat.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=31}}
{{quotation|At this moment a march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided today to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially in this fight!{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=82}}|Joseph Goebbels}}


===Air war===
Later the same morning, Hitler proclaimed to colleagues, "before three months have passed, we shall witness a collapse of Russia, the like of which has never been seen in history".{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=82}}
{{Main|Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa|German-Soviet air war 22 June 1941}}
''Luftwaffe'' reconnaissance units plotted Soviet troop concentrations, supply dumps and airfields, and marked them down for destruction.{{sfn|Askey|2014|p=253}} Additional ''Luftwaffe'' attacks were carried out against Soviet command and control centres to disrupt the mobilisation and organisation of Soviet forces.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|p=85}}{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p= 51}} In contrast, Soviet artillery observers based at the border area had been under the strictest instructions not to open fire on German aircraft prior to the invasion.{{sfn|Hastings|2012|p=141}} One plausible reason given for the Soviet hesitation to return fire was Stalin's initial belief that the assault was launched without Hitler's authorisation. Significant amounts of Soviet territory were lost along with Red Army forces as a result; it took several days before Stalin comprehended the magnitude of the calamity.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|pp=85–86}} The ''Luftwaffe'' reportedly destroyed 1,489 aircraft on the first day of the invasion{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=20}} and over 3,100 during the first three days.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=23}} Hermann Göring, ] and ], distrusted the reports and ordered the figure checked. ''Luftwaffe'' staffs surveyed the wreckage on Soviet airfields, and their original figure proved conservative, as over 2,000 Soviet aircraft were estimated to have been destroyed on the first day of the invasion.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=20}} In reality, Soviet losses were likely higher; a Soviet archival document recorded the loss of 3,922 Soviet aircraft in the first three days against an estimated loss of 78 German aircraft.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=23}}{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=9}} The ''Luftwaffe'' reported the loss of only 35 aircraft on the first day of combat.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|p=23}} A document from the ] puts the ''Luftwaffe''{{'}}s loss at 63 aircraft for the first day.{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|pp=8, 390}}


By the end of the first week, the ''Luftwaffe'' had achieved ] over the battlefields of all the army groups,{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=9}} but was unable to extend this air dominance over the vast expanse of the western Soviet Union.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p= 19}}{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=54}} According to the ] of the ], the ''Luftwaffe'' by 5 July had lost 491 aircraft with 316 more damaged, leaving it with only about 70 percent of the strength it had at the start of the invasion.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=54}}
===Phase one===
{{See also|Battle of Białystok–Minsk|Battle of Raseiniai|Battle of Brody (1941)|Operation München}}
]


===Baltic countries===
The contribution of Germany's allies would generally not make itself felt until later. Though the Stavka was alarmed by reports about German troops approaching the border and had, at 00:30 am, warned the ] that war was imminent, only a small number of units were alerted in time.{{sfn|Ridder|2007|p=292}}{{citation needed|date=March 2015}} At around 7:15 am, Stalin issued NKO Directive No.2, which announced the invasion to the Soviet Armed Forces, calling them to attack Axis forces wherever they had violated the borders and launch air strikes into the border regions of German territory.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=83}} But the Kremlin effectively had no accurate information on the real scope of the German invasion nor the scale of the disaster that was befalling the Soviet forces in the border area. At around 9:15 pm, Stalin issued NKO Directive No.3, which now called for a general counteroffensive without any regards for borders.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=31}}
{{Main|Baltic Operation}}
], summer 1941]]
On 22 June, Army Group North attacked the Soviet Northwestern Front and broke through its 8th and 11th Armies.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=37}} The Soviets immediately launched a ] against the German 4th Panzer Group with the Soviet 3rd and 12th Mechanised Corps, but the Soviet attack was defeated.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=37}} On 25 June, the 8th and 11th Armies were ordered to withdraw to the Western Dvina River, where it was planned to meet up with the 21st Mechanised Corps and the 22nd and 27th Armies. However, on 26 June, ]'s LVI Panzer Corps reached the river first and secured a bridgehead across it.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=38}} The Northwestern Front was forced to abandon the river defences, and on 29 June Stavka ordered the Front to withdraw to the ] on the approaches to Leningrad.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=38}} On 2 July, Army Group North began its attack on the Stalin Line with its 4th Panzer Group, and on 8 July captured ], devastating the defences of the Stalin Line and reaching ].{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=38}} The 4th Panzer Group had advanced about {{convert|450|km|mi}} since the start of the invasion and was now only about {{convert|250|km|mi}} from its primary objective Leningrad. On 9 July it began its attack towards the Soviet defences along the ] in Leningrad oblast.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=93}}


===Ukraine and Moldavia===
Luftwaffe reconnaissance units worked frantically to plot troop concentration, supply dumps, and airfields, and mark them down for destruction. The ''Luftwaffe'' reported to have destroyed 1,489 aircraft on the first day of the invasion.{{sfn|Bergstrom|2007|p=20}} Hermann Göring, ] and ], distrusted the reports and ordered the figure checked. ''Luftwaffe'' staffs surveyed the wreckage on Soviet airfields, and their original figure proved conservative, as over 2,000 Soviet aircraft were estimated to have been destroyed.{{sfn|Bergstrom|2007|p=20}} The Luftwaffe reported the loss of 35 aircraft on the first day of combat. For the first three days, the Germans reported to have destroyed over 3,100 Soviet aircraft. In reality, Soviet losses were likely higher, as according to Russian historian ] some 3,922 Soviet aircraft were lost in that time period.{{sfn|Bergstrom|2007|p=23}} According to archival reports in the ] of the German High Command, by 5 July the Luftwaffe had lost 491 aircraft with 316 more damaged, leaving it with only about 70 percent of the strength it had at the start of the invasion.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=54}} The Luftwaffe achieved air superiority in all sectors facing their army groups, and they would maintain it throughout the course of Barbarossa.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=49}}
{{See also|Operation München|Battle of Brody (1941)}}
] (left), commander of the ], inspects a large iron works facility in Ukraine, 1941.]]


The northern section of Army Group South faced the Southwestern Front, which had the largest concentration of Soviet forces, and the southern section faced the Southern Front. In addition, the Pripyat Marshes and the ] posed a serious challenge to the army group's northern and southern sections respectively.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|pp=89, 140}} On 22 June, only the northern section of Army Group South attacked, but the terrain impeded their assault, giving the Soviet defenders ample time to react.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|pp=89, 140}} The German ] and 6th Army attacked and broke through the Soviet 5th Army.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=41}} Starting on the night of 23 June, the Soviet 22nd and 15th Mechanised Corps attacked the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group from north and south respectively. Although intended to be concerted, Soviet tank units were sent in piecemeal due to poor coordination. The 22nd Mechanised Corps ran into the 1st Panzer Army's III Motorised Corps and was decimated, and its commander killed. The 1st Panzer Group bypassed much of the 15th Mechanised Corps, which engaged the German 6th Army's 297th Infantry Division, where it was defeated by antitank fire and ''Luftwaffe'' attacks.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=42}} On 26 June, the Soviets launched another counterattack on the 1st Panzer Group from north and south simultaneously with the 9th, 19th and 8th Mechanised Corps, which altogether fielded 1649 tanks, and supported by the remnants of the 15th Mechanised Corps. The battle lasted for four days, ending in the defeat of the Soviet tank units.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=43–44, 225}} On 30 June Stavka ordered the remaining forces of the Southwestern Front to withdraw to the Stalin Line, where it would defend the approaches to Kiev.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=21, 43–44}}
In the opening hours, the Luftwaffe destroyed the Western Front’s air force on the ground, and with the aid of ] troops operating in the Soviet rear paralyzed its communication lines, which particularly cut off the Soviet 4th Army headquarters from headquarters above and below it.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} On the same day, 2nd Panzer Group crossed the ], broke through the 4th Army, bypassed ], and pressed on towards Minsk, while the 3rd Panzer Group bypassed most of the 3rd Army and pressed on towards Vilnius.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} Simultaneously, the German 4th and 9th Armies engaged the Western Front forces in the environs of Białystok.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} On Pavlov's order, on 24–25 June the 6th and 11th Mechanized, and the 6th Cavalry Corps launched a strong counterstrike towards Grodno in hopes of destroying the 3rd Panzer Group. However, the 3rd Panzer Group had moved on, with its forward units reaching Vilnius on the evening of 23 June, and the Western Front’s armoured counteroffensive instead ran into infantry and antitank fire from the V Army Corps of the German 9th Army supported by Luftwaffe air attacks.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} By the night of 25 June the Soviet counteroffensive was defeated and the 6th Cavalry Corps' commander captured. The same night, Pavlov ordered all the remnants of the Western Front to withdraw to Slonim towards Minsk.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} Subsequent smaller counteroffensives to buy time for the withdraw were launched against the German forces, which all failed,{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} and on 27 June the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups met near Minsk and captured the city the next day, effecting the encirclement of almost all of the Western Front in two pockets – one around Białystok and another west of Minsk.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33, 56}}


On 2 July, the southern section of Army Group South—the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, alongside the German 11th Army—invaded ], which was defended by the Southern Front.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=45}} Counterattacks by the Front's 2nd Mechanised Corps and 9th Army were defeated, but on 9 July the Axis advance stalled along the defences of the Soviet 18th Army between the ] and ] Rivers.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=45, 112}}
===Phase two===
{{Main|Battle of Smolensk (1941)}}
]


===Belorussia===
On 3 July, Hitler finally gave the go-ahead for the Panzers to resume their drive East after the infantry divisions had caught up.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} However, a rainstorm typical of Russian summers slowed their progress and Russian defenses stiffened.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} The delays gave the Soviets time to organize a massive counterattack against Army Group Center. Its ultimate objective was ], which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing the Germans was an old Soviet defensive line held by six armies. On 6 July, the Soviets attacked the 3rd Panzer Army with 700 tanks. The Germans defeated this counterattack with overwhelming air superiority.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} The 2nd Panzer Army crossed the Dnieper River and closed on Smolensk from the South while the 3rd Panzer Army, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closed on Smolensk from the North.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} Trapped between their pincers were three Soviet armies. On 18 July, the Panzer Groups came to within sixteen kilometres of closing the gap but the trap would not snap shut until 26 July.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} When the Panzer Groups finally closed the gap, 300,000 Red Army soldiers were captured.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} Even so, liquidating the pocket took another ten days in which time 100,000 Red Army soldiers escaped to stand between the Germans and Moscow.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}}
{{Main|Battle of Białystok–Minsk}}
In the opening hours of the invasion, the ''Luftwaffe'' destroyed the Western Front's air force on the ground, and with the aid of ] and their supporting anti-communist fifth columns operating in the Soviet rear paralyzed the Front's communication lines, which particularly cut off the Soviet 4th Army headquarters from headquarters above and below it.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} On the same day, the ] crossed the Bug River, broke through the 4th Army, bypassed ], and pressed on towards ], while the ] bypassed most of the 3rd Army and pressed on towards ].{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} Simultaneously, the German 4th and 9th Armies engaged the Western Front forces in the environs of ].{{sfn|Seaton|1972|pp=119–125}} On the order of the Western Front commander, ], the 6th and 11th Mechanised Corps and the 6th Cavalry Corps launched a strong counterstrike towards ] on 24–25 June in hopes of destroying the 3rd Panzer Group. However, the 3rd Panzer Group had already moved on, with its forward units reaching Vilnius on the evening of 23 June, and the Western Front's armoured counterattack instead ran into infantry and antitank fire from the V Army Corps of the German 9th Army, supported by ''Luftwaffe'' air attacks.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} By the night of 25 June, the Soviet counterattack was defeated, and the commander of the 6th Cavalry Corps was captured. The same night, Pavlov ordered all the remnants of the Western Front to withdraw to Slonim towards Minsk.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} Subsequent counterattacks to buy time for the withdrawal were launched against the German forces, but all of them failed.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33}} On 27 June, the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups met near Minsk and captured the city the next day, completing the encirclement of almost all of the Western Front in two ]: one around Białystok and another west of Minsk.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=29–33, 56}} The Germans destroyed the Soviet 3rd and 10th Armies while inflicting serious losses on the 4th, 11th and 13th Armies, and reported to have captured 324,000 Soviet troops, 3,300 tanks, 1,800 artillery pieces.{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|pp=122–123}}{{sfn|Fritz|2011|pp=88, 509}}


] in present-day Belarus]]
Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength. The German troops had used their initial supplies without attaining the expected strategic freedom of movement. Operations were now slowed down to allow for resupply; the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} Hitler had by now lost faith in battles of encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers. He now believed he could defeat the Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant seizing the industrial center of ], the ] and the oil fields of the ] in the South and the speedy capture of Leningrad, a major center of military production, in the North.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}}{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}}


A Soviet directive was issued on 29 June to combat the mass panic rampant among the civilians and the armed forces personnel. The order stipulated swift, severe measures against anyone inciting panic or displaying cowardice. The ] worked with commissars and military commanders to scour possible withdrawal routes of soldiers retreating without military authorisation. Field expedient general courts were established to deal with civilians spreading rumours and military deserters.{{sfn|Seaton|1972|p=111}} On 30 June, Stalin relieved Pavlov of his command, and on 22 July tried and executed him along with many members of his staff on charges of "cowardice" and "criminal incompetence".{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=56–57}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2014|p=253}}
], in overall charge of Army Group Center, and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa, vehemently argued in favor of continuing the all-out drive towards Moscow. Besides the psychological importance of capturing the enemy's capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms production and the center of the Soviet communications as well as transportation system. More importantly, intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the Red Army was deployed near Moscow under ] for an all-out defense of the capital.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} But Hitler was adamant, and issued a direct order to the talented panzer ace ], bypassing his commanding officer von Bock, to send Army Group Center's tanks to the North and South, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}}


On 29 June, Hitler, through Brauchitsch, instructed Bock to halt the advance of the panzers of Army Group Centre until the infantry formations liquidating the pockets caught up.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=54–56}} But Guderian, with the tacit support of Bock and Halder, ignored the instruction and attacked on eastward towards Bobruisk, albeit reporting the advance as a ]. He also personally conducted an aerial inspection of the Minsk-Białystok pocket on 30 June and concluded that his panzer group was not needed to contain it, since ]'s 3rd Panzer Group was already involved in the Minsk pocket.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=60–62}} On the same day, some of the infantry corps of the 9th and 4th Armies, having sufficiently liquidated the Białystok pocket, resumed their march eastward to catch up with the panzer groups.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=60–62}} On 1 July, Bock ordered the panzer groups to resume their full offensive eastward on the morning of 3 July. But Brauchitsch, upholding Hitler's instruction, and Halder, unwillingly going along with it, opposed Bock's order. However, Bock insisted on the order by stating that it would be irresponsible to reverse orders already issued. The panzer groups resumed their offensive on 2 July before the infantry formations had sufficiently caught up.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|pp=60–62}}
===Phase three===
{{Main|Battle of Uman|Battle of Kiev (1941)}}
]
By mid-July, below the ], the Germans had come within a few kilometers of ]. The 1st Panzer Army then went South while the 17th Army struck East and trapped three Soviet armies near ].{{sfn|Thomas|2012|p=13}} As the Germans eliminated the pocket, the tanks turned North and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Army, diverted from Army Group Center, had crossed the Desna River with 2nd Army on its right flank. The two Panzer armies now trapped four Soviet armies and parts of two others.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}}


===Northeast Finland===
For its final attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Army was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Center. On 8 August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses. By the end of August, 4th Panzer Army had penetrated to within {{convert|30|mi|km|abbr=on}} of Leningrad. The Finns had pushed Southeast on both sides of ], reaching the old Finnish-Soviet frontier.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}}
{{Main|Continuation War}}
]
During German-Finnish negotiations, Finland had demanded to remain neutral unless the Soviet Union attacked them first. Germany therefore sought to provoke the Soviet Union into an attack on Finland. After Germany launched Barbarossa on 22 June, German aircraft used Finnish air bases to attack Soviet positions. The same day the Germans launched ] and occupied the ] at the Finnish-Soviet border. Simultaneously Finland proceeded to ]. Despite these actions the Finnish government insisted via diplomatic channels that they remained a neutral party, but the Soviet leadership already viewed Finland as an ally of Germany. Subsequently, the Soviets proceeded to launch a massive bombing attack on 25 June against all major Finnish cities and industrial centres, including Helsinki, Turku and Lahti. During a night session on the same day the Finnish parliament decided to go to war against the Soviet Union.{{sfnp|Nenye|Munter|Wirtanen|Birks|2016|pp=36, 39–41}}{{sfnp|Mann|Jörgensen|2002|pp=74–76}}


Finland was divided into two operational zones. Northern Finland was the staging area for Army Norway. Its goal was to execute a two-pronged pincer movement on the strategic port of ], named ]. Southern Finland was still under the responsibility of the Finnish Army. The goal of the Finnish forces was, at first, to recapture Finnish Karelia at ] as well as the Karelian Isthmus, which included Finland's second largest city ].{{sfnp|Ueberschär|1998|pp=941–944; 974–980}}{{sfnp|Nenye|Munter|Wirtanen|Birks|2016|pp=38–41}}
At this stage, Hitler ordered the final destruction of Leningrad with no prisoners taken, and on 9 September, Army Group North began the final push which within ten days had brought it within {{convert|7|mi|km|abbr=on}} of the city.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} However, the advance over the last {{convert|10|km|mi|abbr=on}} proved very slow and casualties mounted. Hitler, now out of patience, ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed, but starved into submission.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} Deprived of its Panzer forces, Army Group Center had remained static and was subjected to numerous Soviet counterattacks, in particular the ] in which the Germans suffered their first major tactical defeat since their invasion began. These attacks drew Hitler's attention back to Army Group Center and its drive on Moscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies to break off their ] and support Army Group Center on its attack on Moscow.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}}


==Further German advances==
Before it could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be finished. Half of Army Group Center had swung to the South in the back of the Kiev position, while Army Group South moved to the North from its Dniepr ].{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=77}} The encirclement of Soviet Forces in Kiev was achieved on 16 September. A savage battle ensued in which the Soviets were hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerial bombardment.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=77}} After ten days of vicious fighting, the Germans claimed over 600,000 Soviet soldiers captured. Actual losses were 452,720 men, 3,867 artillery pieces and mortars from 43 Divisions of the 5th, 21st, 26th, and 37th Soviet Armies.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=77}}
{{Further|Battle of Smolensk (1941)|Leningrad Operation (1941)}}
]


On 2 July and through the next six days, a rainstorm typical of Belarusian summers slowed the progress of the panzers of Army Group Centre, and Soviet defences stiffened.{{sfn|Glantz|2010a|p=63}} The delays gave the Soviets time to organise a massive counterattack against Army Group Centre. The army group's ultimate objective was Smolensk, which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing the Germans was an ] held by six armies. On 6 July, the Soviets launched a massive counter-attack using the V and VII Mechanised Corps of the 20th Army,{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=70}} which collided with the German 39th and 47th Panzer Corps in a battle where the Red Army lost 832 tanks of the 2,000 employed during five days of ferocious fighting.{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|p=240}} The Germans defeated this counterattack thanks largely to the coincidental presence of the ''Luftwaffe''{{'}}s only squadron of tank-busting aircraft.{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|p=240}} The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper River and closed in on Smolensk from the south while the 3rd Panzer Group, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closed on Smolensk from the north. Trapped between their pincers were three Soviet armies. The 29th Motorised Division captured Smolensk on 16 July yet a gap remained between Army Group Centre. On 18 July, the panzer groups came to within {{convert|10|km|mi|spell=in}} of closing the gap but the trap did not finally close until 5 August, when upwards of 300,000 Red Army soldiers had been captured and 3,205 Soviet tanks were destroyed. Large numbers of Red Army soldiers escaped to stand between the Germans and Moscow as resistance continued.{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|pp=123–124}}
===Phase four===
{{Main|Battle of Moscow}}
]
After Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and there were no more directly available trained reserves. To defend Moscow, Stalin could field 800,000 men in 83 divisions, but no more than 25 divisions were fully effective. ], the drive to Moscow, began on 2 October.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} In front of Army Group Center was a series of elaborate defense lines, the first centered on ] and the second on ].{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}}


]
The first blow took the Soviets completely by surprise as the 2nd Panzer Army, returning from the South, took ] which was {{convert|75|mi|km|abbr=on}} South of the Soviet first main defense line.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} Three days later, the Panzers pushed on to ] while 2nd Army attacked from the West.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} The Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies were now encircled. To the North, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked ], trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} Moscow's first line of defense had been shattered. The pocket eventually yielded 673,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the start of the invasion to three million. The Soviets had only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for the defense of Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=343}}
Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realised they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength.{{sfn|Dear|Foot|1995|p=88}} The German troops had used their initial supplies, and General Bock quickly came to the conclusion that not only had the Red Army offered stiff opposition, but German difficulties were also due to the logistical problems with reinforcements and provisions.{{sfn|Keegan|1989|p=189}} Operations were now slowed down to allow for resupply; the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia''|1996}} In addition to strained logistics, poor roads made it difficult for wheeled vehicles and foot infantry to keep up with the faster armoured spearheads, and shortages in boots and winter uniforms were becoming apparent. Furthermore, all three army groups had suffered 179,500 casualties by 2 August, and had only received 47,000 replacements.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=86}}


Hitler by now had lost faith in battles of encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia''|1996}} He now believed he could defeat the Soviet state by economic means, depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant seizing the industrial centre of ], the Donbas and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the south and the speedy capture of Leningrad, a major centre of military production, in the north.{{sfn|Keegan|1989|p=195}}
The German government now publicly predicted the imminent capture of Moscow, convincing foreign correspondents of a pending Soviet collapse.{{sfn|Smith|2000|pp=83–91}} On 13 October, the 3rd Panzer Army penetrated to within {{convert|90|mi|km|abbr=on}} of the capital.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} ] was declared in Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon, however, the weather had deteriorated. Temperatures fell while there was a continued rainfall, turning the unpaved road network ] and steadily slowing the German advance on Moscow to as little as {{convert|2|mi|km|abbr=on}} a day.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} The supply situation rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the German Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were reorganized. The pause gave the Soviets, who were in a far better supply situation, time to consolidate their positions and organize formations of newly activated reservists.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} In little over a month the Soviets organized eleven new armies which included 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet far east as ] had assured Stalin there was no longer a threat from the Japanese.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} With the Siberian forces came over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}}


]
The Germans were nearing exhaustion, while they also began to recall ]. General ] noted in his diary:


Halder, Bock, and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa argued vehemently in favour of continuing the all-out drive toward Moscow.{{sfn|Keegan|1989|pp=192–194}}{{sfn|Wright|1968|p=38}} Besides the psychological importance of capturing the Soviet capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major centre of arms production, the centre of the Soviet communications system and an important transport hub. Intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the remaining Red Army was deployed near Moscow under Timoshenko for the defence of the capital.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia''|1996}} Guderian was sent to Hitler by Bock and Halder to argue their case for continuing the assault against Moscow, but Hitler issued an order through Guderian (bypassing Bock and Halder) to send Army Group Centre's tanks to the north and south, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow.{{sfn|Seaton|1982|pp=177–178}} Convinced by Hitler's argument, Guderian returned to his commanding officers as a convert to the Führer's plan, which earned him their disdain.{{sfn|Seaton|1982|p=178}}
{{quotation|They remembered what happened to Napoleon's Army. Most of them began to re-read ] grim account of 1812. That had a weighty influence at this critical time in 1941. I can still see ] trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office and standing before the map with Caulaincourt's book in his hand.{{sfn|Clark|2012|p=165}}|Günther Blumentritt}}


===Northern Finland===
On 15 November, with the ground hardening due to the cold weather, the Germans once again began the attack on Moscow.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}} Although the troops themselves were now able to advance again, there had been no delay allowed to improve the supply situation. Facing the Germans were the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet armies. The Germans intended to let 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies cross the ] and envelop Moscow from the Northeast. 2nd Panzer Army would attack ] and then close in on Moscow from the South.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} As the Soviets reacted to the flanks, 4th Army would attack the center. In two weeks of desperate fighting, lacking sufficient fuel and ammunition, the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} However, in the South, 2nd Panzer Army was being blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units, augmented with the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies, attacked the 2nd Panzer Army and inflicted a shocking defeat on the Germans. However, 4th Panzer Army pushed the Soviet 16th Army back and succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal and began the encirclement.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}}
{{Main|Operation Silver Fox|Operation Platinum Fox}}
]


On 29 June, Germany launched its effort to capture Murmansk in a pincer attack. The northern pincer, conducted by ], approached Murmansk directly by crossing the border at Petsamo. However, in mid-July after securing the neck of the ] and advancing to the ] the German advance was stopped by heavy resistance from the Soviet ]. Renewed attacks led to nothing, and this front became a stalemate for the remainder of Barbarossa.{{sfnp|Mann|Jörgensen|2002|pp=81–87}}{{sfnp|Ueberschär|1998|pp=941–944}}
On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within {{convert|15|mi|km|abbr=on}} of Moscow, and could see the spires of the ], but by then the first blizzards of the ] had begun.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=1032}}{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} A reconnaissance battalion also managed to reach the town of ], only about {{convert|8|km|mi|abbr=on}} away from the Soviet capital, and captured its bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as its railway station, which marked the farthest advance of German forces.{{sfn|Commager|1991|p=144}} The Wehrmacht had not been equipped for winter warfare. The bitter cold also caused severe problems for their guns and equipment. Furthermore, weather conditions grounded the Luftwaffe from conducting any large scale operations.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} Newly created Soviet units near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, and on 5 December, they launched a ] which pushed the Germans back over {{convert|200|mi|km|abbr=on}}. By late December 1941, the Germans had lost the battle for Moscow and the invasion had cost the Army over 830,000 casualties in killed, wounded, captured or gone missing in action.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} Operation Barbarossa was over, marking the start of over three more years of costly, large-scale warfare on the newly formed ].


The second pincer attack began on 1 July with the German ] and ] slated to recapture the ] region for Finland and then proceed eastwards to cut the ] near ]. The German units had great difficulty dealing with the Arctic conditions. After heavy fighting, Salla was taken on 8 July. To keep the momentum the German-Finnish forces advanced eastwards until they were stopped at the town of ] by Soviet resistance. Further south the Finnish III Corps made an independent effort to reach the Murmansk railway through the Arctic terrain. Facing only one division of the Soviet ] it was able to make rapid headway. On 7 August it captured Kestenga while reaching the outskirts of ]. Large Red Army reinforcements then prevented further gains on both fronts, and the German-Finnish force had to go onto the defensive.{{sfnp|Ueberschär|1998|pp=941–951}}{{sfnp|Mann|Jörgensen|2002|pp=87–93}}
==War crimes==
The Soviet Union had not participated in the ] and therefore their troops could not rely on the protection the Conventions guaranteed soldiers during times of war.{{sfn|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}} Hitler called for the battle against Russia to be a "struggle for existence" and accordingly authorized ]. He orchestrated the notorious ], which called for all political representatives taken prisoner at the front to be shot immediately without trial.{{sfn|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}} German soldiers both willingly and unwillingly participated in these mass killings.{{sfn|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}} An estimated two million died of starvation during Barbarossa alone; nothing was done for their survival.{{sfn|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}}


===Karelia===
{{quotation|In the camps there were no army huts. They lived in foxholes. Everyone had to dig their own. Each morning a special squad collected the corpses ... 30 to 40 of them, that was normal.{{sfn|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}}|Boris Kostinski, Soviet prisoner of war}}
{{Main|Finnish reconquest of Ladoga Karelia (1941)|Finnish reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus (1941)}}
]
The Finnish plan in the south in Karelia was to advance as swiftly as possible to Lake Ladoga, cutting the Soviet forces in half. Then the Finnish territories east of Lake Ladoga were to be recaptured before the advance along the Karelian Isthmus, including the recapture of Viipuri, commenced. The Finnish attack was launched on 10 July. The Army of Karelia held a numerical advantage versus the Soviet defenders of the 7th Army and ], so it could advance swiftly. The important road junction at Loimola was captured on 14 July. By 16 July, the first Finnish units reached Lake Ladoga at Koirinoja, achieving the goal of splitting the Soviet forces. During the rest of July, the Army of Karelia advanced further southeast into Karelia, coming to a halt at the former Finnish-Soviet border at Mansila.{{sfnp|Nenye|Munter|Wirtanen|Birks|2016|pp=67–86}}{{sfnp|Ueberschär|1998|pp=970–974}}


With the Soviet forces cut in half, the attack on the Karelian Isthmus could commence. The Finnish army attempted to encircle large Soviet formations at ] and ] by advancing to the western shores of Lake Ladoga. By mid-August the encirclement had succeeded and both towns were taken, but many Soviet formations were able to evacuate by sea. Further west, the attack on Viipuri was launched. With Soviet resistance breaking down, the Finns were able to encircle Viipuri by advancing to the ]. The city itself was taken on 29 August,{{sfn|Enkenberg|2021|p=70}} along with a broad advance on the rest of the Karelian Isthmus. By the beginning of September, Finland had restored its pre-Winter War borders.{{sfnp|Nenye|Munter|Wirtanen|Birks|2016|pp=87–109}}{{sfnp|Ueberschär|1998|pp=970–974}}
Organized crimes, pre-planned before Barbarossa, against civilians, including women and children, were also carried out on an industrial scale by the Germans and local supporters.{{sfn|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}} Special ] killing squads, like the '']'' and '']'', murdered tens of thousands of people, especially ] and ], in conquered Soviet territories. Several other thousands were shipped to Germany to be used as ].{{sfn|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}} By the end of the war, approximately 60 percent of all Soviet POW's were killed in German captivity.{{sfn|"Nazi Persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War"}}


===Offensive towards central Russia===
==Historical significance==
{{Main|Battle of Uman}}
Operation Barbarossa was the biggest and one of the fastest military operations in human history. More men, tanks, guns and aircraft were committed than had ever been deployed in a single offensive.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}} The invasion opened up the ], the largest theater of World War II, which saw titanic clashes of unprecedented violence and destruction, and more than 26 million deaths.{{sfn|Moskoff|2002|p=236}} More people died fighting on the Eastern Front than in all other fighting across the globe during World War II.{{sfn|Weinberg|2005|p=243}} A total of 75 percent of the entire ] participated in Barbarossa.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}}
By mid-July, the German forces had advanced within a few kilometers of Kiev below the Pripyat Marshes. The 1st Panzer Group then went south, while the 17th Army struck east and trapped three Soviet armies near ].{{sfn|Thomas|2012|p=13}} As the Germans eliminated the pocket, the tanks turned north and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Group, diverted from Army Group Centre, had crossed the river Desna with 2nd Army on its right flank. The two panzer armies now trapped four Soviet armies and parts of two others.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}}

By August, as the serviceability and the quantity of the ''Luftwaffe''{{'}}s inventory steadily diminished due to combat, demand for air support only increased as the VVS recovered. The ''Luftwaffe'' found itself struggling to maintain local air superiority.{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=84}} With the onset of bad weather in October, the ''Luftwaffe'' was on several occasions forced to halt nearly all aerial operations. The VVS, although faced with the same weather difficulties, had a clear advantage thanks to the prewar experience with cold-weather flying, and the fact that they were operating from intact airbases and airports.{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=83–85}} By December, the VVS had matched the ''Luftwaffe'' and was even pressing to achieve air superiority over the battlefields.{{sfn|Hardesty|2012|p=103}}

===Leningrad===
{{Main|Siege of Leningrad}}
For its final attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Group was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Centre. On 8 August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defences. By the end of August, 4th Panzer Group had penetrated to within {{convert|48|km|abbr=off}} of Leningrad. The Finns{{Efn|Significant planning for Finnish participation in the campaign against the Soviet Union was conducted well-before the plan's actual implementation.{{sfn|Ueberschär|1998|pp=455–470}} }} had pushed southeast on both sides of Lake Ladoga to reach the old Finnish-Soviet frontier.{{sfn|Klink|1998|pp=631–641}}

] (centre), commander of ], on 20 August 1941]]

The Germans attacked Leningrad in August 1941; in the following three "black months" of 1941, 400,000 residents of the city worked to build the city's fortifications as fighting continued, while 160,000 others joined the ranks of the Red Army. Nowhere was the Soviet {{lang|fr|]}} spirit stronger in resisting the Germans than at Leningrad where reserve troops and freshly improvised {{transliteration|ru|]}} units, consisting of worker battalions and even schoolboy formations, joined in digging trenches as they prepared to defend the city.{{sfn|Werth|1964|p=199}} On 7 September, the German ] seized ], cutting off all land routes to Leningrad. The Germans severed the railroads to Moscow and captured the railroad to Murmansk with Finnish assistance to inaugurate the start of a siege that would last for over two years.{{sfn|Miller|Commager|2001|pp=68–69}}{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=204}}

At this stage, Hitler ordered the final destruction of Leningrad with no prisoners taken, and on 9 September, Army Group North began the final push. Within ten days it had advanced within {{convert|11|km|abbr=off}} of the city.{{sfn|''Hitler Strikes East''|2009}} However, the push over the last {{convert|10|km|mi|abbr=on}} proved very slow. and casualties mounted. Hitler, now out of patience, ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed, but rather starved into submission. Along these lines, the OKH issued Directive No. la {{not a typo|1601/41}} on 22 September 1941, which accorded Hitler's plans.{{sfn|Forczyk|2009|p=11}} Deprived of its Panzer forces, Army Group Centre remained static and was subjected to numerous Soviet counterattacks, in particular the ], in which the Germans suffered their first major tactical defeat since their invasion began; this Red Army victory also provided an important boost to Soviet morale.{{sfn|Werth|1964|pp=189–190, 195–197}} These attacks prompted Hitler to concentrate his attention back to Army Group Centre and its drive on Moscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies to break off their ] and support Army Group Centre in its attack on Moscow.{{sfn|Müller|2016|p=180}}{{sfn|Cooper|1984|pp=328–330}}

===Kiev===
{{Main|Battle of Kiev (1941)}}
Before an attack on Moscow could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be finished. Half of Army Group Centre had swung to the south in the back of the Kiev position, while Army Group South moved to the north from its Dnieper ].{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=77}} The encirclement of Soviet forces in Kiev was achieved on 16 September. A battle ensued in which the Soviets were hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerial bombardment. After ten days of vicious fighting, the Germans claimed 665,000 Soviet soldiers captured, although the real figure is probably around 220,000.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=94}} Soviet losses were 452,720 men, 3,867 artillery pieces and mortars from 43 divisions of the 5th, 21st, 26th, and 37th Soviet Armies.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=77}} Despite the exhaustion and losses facing some German units (upwards of 75 percent of their men) from the intense fighting, the massive defeat of the Soviets at Kiev and the Red Army losses during the first three months of the assault contributed to the German assumption that ] (the attack on Moscow) could still succeed.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|p=145}}

===Sea of Azov===
{{Main|Battle of the Sea of Azov}}
], 25 October 1941.]]
After operations at Kiev were successfully concluded, Army Group South advanced east and south to capture the industrial Donbas region and the ]. The Soviet Southern Front launched an attack on 26 September with two armies on the northern shores of the ] against elements of the German ], which was simultaneously advancing into the Crimea. On 1 October, the ] under ] swept south to ] the two attacking Soviet armies. By 7 October, the Soviet ] and ] were isolated and four days later they had been annihilated. The Soviet defeat was total; 106,332 men captured, 212 ]s destroyed or captured in the pocket alone as well as 766 ] pieces of all types.{{sfn|Liedtke|2016|p=149}} The death or capture of two-thirds of all Southern Front troops in four days unhinged the Front's left flank, allowing the Germans to ] Kharkov on 24 October. Kleist's 1st Panzer Army took the Donbas region that same month.{{sfn|Liedtke|2016|p=149}}

===Central and northern Finland===
]

In central Finland, the German-Finnish advance on the Murmansk railway had been resumed at Kayraly. A large encirclement from the north and the south trapped the defending Soviet corps and allowed XXXVI Corps to advance further to the east.{{sfn|Ziemke|1959|pp=170–172}} In early September it reached the old 1939 Soviet border fortifications. On 6 September the first defence line at the Voyta River was breached, but further attacks against the main line at the ] failed.{{sfn|Ziemke|1959|pp=174–178}} With Army Norway switching its main effort further south, the front stalemated in this sector. Further south, the Finnish III Corps launched a new offensive towards the Murmansk railway on 30 October, bolstered by fresh reinforcements from Army Norway. Against Soviet resistance, it was able to come within {{cvt|30|km|mi}} of the railway, when the Finnish High Command ordered a stop to all offensive operations in the sector on 17 November. The United States of America applied diplomatic pressure on Finland not to disrupt Allied aid shipments to the Soviet Union, which caused the Finnish government to halt the advance on the Murmansk railway. With the Finnish refusal to conduct further offensive operations and German inability to do so alone, the German-Finnish effort in central and northern Finland came to an end.{{sfnp|Ueberschär|1998|pp=941–953}}{{sfnp|Mann|Jörgensen|2002|pp=93–97}}

===Karelia===
{{Main|Finnish invasion of East Karelia (1941)}}

Germany had pressured Finland to enlarge its offensive activities in Karelia to aid the Germans in their Leningrad operation. Finnish attacks on Leningrad itself remained limited. Finland stopped its advance just short of Leningrad and had no intentions to attack the city. The situation was different in eastern Karelia. The Finnish government agreed to restart its offensive into Soviet Karelia to reach ] and the ]. On 4 September, this new drive was launched on a broad front. Albeit reinforced by fresh reserve troops, heavy losses elsewhere on the front meant that the Soviet defenders of the 7th Army were not able to resist the Finnish advance. ] was taken on 5 September. On 7 September, Finnish forward units reached the Svir River.{{sfn|Menger|1997|p=533}} ], the capital city of the ], fell on 1 October. From there the Army of Karelia moved north along the shores of Lake Onega to secure the remaining area west of Lake Onega, while simultaneously establishing a defensive position along the Svir River. Slowed by winter's onset they nevertheless continued to advance slowly during the following weeks. ] was captured on 5 December and ] fell the next day. On 7 December, Finland halted all offensive operations and went onto the defensive.{{sfnp|Ueberschär|1998|pp=974–980}}{{sfnp|Nenye|Munter|Wirtanen|Birks|2016|pp=109–132}}

==Battle of Moscow==
{{Main|Battle of Moscow}}
]s flying over German positions near Moscow]]
]'' 24, 1941]]
After Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and there were no more trained reserves directly available. To defend Moscow, Stalin could field 800,000 men in 83 divisions, but no more than 25 divisions were fully effective. Operation Typhoon, the drive to Moscow, began on 30 September 1941.{{sfn|Stone|2011|p=215}}{{sfn|Stahel|2009|p=440}} In front of Army Group Centre was a series of elaborate defence lines, the first centred on ] and the second on ].{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} Russian peasants began fleeing ahead of the advancing German units, burning their harvested crops, driving their cattle away, and destroying buildings in their villages as part of a ] designed to deny to the Nazi war machine needed supplies and foodstuffs.{{sfn|Gilbert|1989|pp=241–242}}

The first blow took the Soviets completely by surprise when the 2nd Panzer Group, returning from the south, took ], just {{convert|121|km|mi|abbr=on}} south of the Soviet first main defence line.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} Three days later, the Panzers pushed on to ], while the 2nd Army attacked from the west.{{sfn|Gilbert|1989|p=242}} The Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies were now encircled. To the north, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} Moscow's first line of defence had been shattered. The pocket eventually yielded over 500,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the start of the invasion to three million. The Soviets now had only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for the defence of Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=343}}

The German government now publicly predicted the imminent capture of Moscow and convinced foreign correspondents of an impending Soviet collapse.{{sfn|Smith|2000|pp=83–91}} On 13 October, the 3rd Panzer Group penetrated to within {{convert|140|km|mi|abbr=on}} of the capital.{{sfn|Thomas|2012|pp=12–14}} ] was declared in Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon, however, the weather worsened. Temperatures fell while there was continued rainfall. This turned the unpaved road network ] and slowed the German advance on Moscow.{{sfn|Hill|2016|pp=250, 255}} Additional snows fell which were followed by more rain, creating a glutinous mud that German tanks had difficulty traversing, which the Soviet T-34, with its wider tread, was better suited to navigate.{{sfn|Gilbert|1989|p=244}} At the same time, the supply situation for the Germans rapidly deteriorated.{{sfn|Shepherd|2016|pp=178–179}} On 31 October, the German Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were reorganised. The pause gave the Soviets, far better supplied, time to consolidate their positions and organise formations of newly activated reservists.{{sfn|Gilbert|1989|pp=245–246}}{{sfn|Hill|2016|pp=255, 265}} In little over a month, the Soviets organised eleven new armies that included 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet Far East after Soviet intelligence assured Stalin that there was no longer a threat from the Japanese.{{sfn|Gilbert|1989|p=245}} During October and November 1941, over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft arrived along with the Siberian forces to assist in defending the city.{{sfn|Keegan|1989|p=203}}

With the ground hardening due to the cold weather,{{Efn|On 12 November 1941 the temperature around Moscow was {{convert|-12|C}}.{{sfn|Gilbert|1989|p=255}} }} the Germans resumed the attack on Moscow on 15 November.{{sfn|Roberts|2011|pp=174–175}} Although the troops themselves were now able to advance again, there had been no improvement in the supply situation; only 135,000 of the 600,000 trucks that had been available on 22 June 1941 were available by 15 November 1941. Ammunition and fuel supplies were prioritised over food and winter clothing, so many German troops looted supplies from local populations, but could not fill their needs.{{sfn|Lopez|Aubin|Bernard|Guillerat|2019|p=98}}

Facing the Germans were the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet Armies. The Germans intended to move the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies across the ] and envelop Moscow from the northeast. The 2nd Panzer Group would attack ] and then close on Moscow from the south.{{sfn|Roberts|2011|pp=175–176}} As the Soviets reacted to their flanks, the 4th Army would attack the centre. In two weeks of fighting, lacking sufficient fuel and ammunition, the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow. In the south, the 2nd Panzer Group was being blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units, augmented by the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies, attacked the 2nd Panzer Group and inflicted a defeat on the Germans. The 4th Panzer Group pushed the Soviet 16th Army back, however, and succeeded in crossing the Moscow Canal in an attempt to encircle Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|pp=104–108}}

]

On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within {{convert|24|km|mi|abbr=on}} of Moscow. They were so close that German officers claimed they could see the spires of the ],{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=106}} but by then the first blizzards had begun.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=1032}} A reconnaissance battalion managed to reach the town of ], only about {{convert|8|km|mi|abbr=on}} from the Soviet capital. It captured the bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as the railway station, which marked the easternmost advance of German forces.{{sfn|Commager|1991|p=144}} In spite of the progress made, the ''Wehrmacht'' was not equipped for such severe winter warfare.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|pp=85, 87}} The Soviet army was better adapted to fighting in winter conditions, but faced production shortages of winter clothing. The German forces fared worse, with deep snow further hindering equipment and mobility.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=87}}{{sfn|Hill|2016|pp=301, 305}} Weather conditions had largely grounded the ''Luftwaffe'', preventing large-scale air operations.{{sfn|Mosier|2006|p=184}} Newly created Soviet units near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, who despite their inexperience, were able to halt the German offensive by 5 December due to ], the presence of skilled and experienced leadership like ], and the poor German situation.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=86}} On 5 December, the Soviet defenders launched a massive counterattack as part of the ]. The offensive halted on 7 January 1942, after having pushed the German armies back {{cvt|100|-|250|km|mi}} from Moscow.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|pp=91–97}} The ''Wehrmacht'' had lost the Battle for Moscow, and the invasion had cost the German Army over 830,000 men.{{sfn|Fritz|2011|p=209}}


==Aftermath== ==Aftermath==
With the failure of the ], all German plans for a quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be revised. The Soviet counter-offensives in December 1941 caused heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately eliminated the German threat to Moscow.{{sfn|Müller|2016|pp=181–182}}{{sfn|Baker|2009|pp=50–56}} Attempting to explain matters, Hitler issued ''Führer Directive No. 39'', which cited the early onset of winter and the severe cold as the primary reasons for the failed campaign,{{sfn|Baker|2009|p=54}} whereas the main reasons were German military unpreparedness, poor intelligence of actual Soviet strength, extensive logistical difficulties, high levels of attrition and heavy casualties, and overextension of German forces within the vast Soviet territories.{{sfn|Shepherd|2016|p=536}} On 22 June 1941, the ''Heer'' as a whole had 209 divisions at its disposal, 163 of which were offensively capable. On 31 March 1942, less than one year after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the army was reduced to fielding 58 offensively capable divisions.{{sfn|Wegner|1990|p=792}} The Red Army's tenacity and ability to counter-attack effectively took the Germans as much by surprise as their own initial attack had the Soviets. Spurred on by the successful defence and in an effort to imitate the Germans, Stalin wanted to begin his own counteroffensive, not just against the German forces around Moscow, but against their armies in the north and south.{{sfn|Müller|2016|p=181}} Anger over the failed German offensives caused Hitler to relieve Brauchitsch of command and in his place, Hitler assumed personal control of the German Army on 19 December 1941, a decision that would progressively prove fatal to Germany's war effort and contribute to its eventual defeat.{{sfn|Baudot|Bernard|Foot|Jacobsen|1989|p=482}}
With the failure of the ], all German plans of a quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be revised. The Soviet counteroffensives in December 1941 caused heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately eliminated the German threat to Moscow.{{sfn|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}}

The Soviet Union had suffered heavily from the conflict, losing huge tracts of territory, and vast losses in men and ]. Nonetheless, the Red Army proved capable of countering the German offensives, particularly as the Germans began experiencing irreplaceable shortages in manpower, armaments, provisions, and fuel.{{sfn|Baudot|Bernard|Foot|Jacobsen|1989|pp=482–483}}

=== Subsequent German offensives ===
Despite the rapid relocation of Red Army armaments production east of the Urals and a dramatic increase of production in 1942, especially of armour, new aircraft types and artillery, the '']'' (German army) was able to mount another large-scale offensive in June 1942, although on a much reduced front than the previous summer. Hitler, having realised that Germany's oil supply was severely depleted,{{sfn|Hayward|2000|p=769}} attempted to utilise Army Group South to capture the ] in the new offensive, codenamed ].{{sfn|Symonds|2014|p=70}} Again, the Germans quickly overran great expanses of Soviet territory, but they failed to achieve their ultimate goal of the ]s of ], culminating in their disastrous defeat at the ] in February 1943 and withdrawal from the Caucasus.{{sfn|Baker|2009|pp=57–68}}

By 1943, Soviet armaments production was fully operational and increasingly outproducing the German war economy.{{sfn|Dunn|1995|pp=44–45}} The final major German offensive in the Eastern theatre of World War II took place during July–August 1943 with the launch of ], an assault on the ] ].{{sfn|Baudot|Bernard|Foot|Jacobsen|1989|p=483}} Approximately one million German troops confronted a Soviet force over 2.5&nbsp;million strong. The Soviets, well aware of the attack in advance and fully prepared for it, prevailed in the ]. Following the German defeat, the Soviets launched ], a counter-offensive employing six million men along a {{convert|1500|mi|order=flip|adj=on}} front towards the Dnieper River as they drove the Germans westwards.{{sfn|Glantz|2002|pp=36–41}}

Employing increasingly ambitious and tactically sophisticated offensives, along with making operational improvements in secrecy and deception, by the summer of 1944, the Red Army was eventually able to regain much of the area previously conquered by the Germans.{{sfn|Shepherd|2016|pp=444–450, 463–467}} The destruction of Army Group Centre, the outcome of ] in 1944, proved to be a decisive success and additional Soviet offensives against the German Army Groups North and South in the autumn of 1944 put the German war machine into further retreat.{{sfn|Baker|2009|pp=87–97}} By January 1945, what had been the Eastern Front was now controlled by the Soviets, whose military might was aimed at the German capital of Berlin.{{sfn|Baker|2009|p=98}} Hitler ] on 30 April 1945 in order to avoid capture by the Soviets, and the war in Europe finally ended with the total defeat and capitulation of Nazi Germany in May 1945.{{sfn|Burleigh|2000|pp=794–812}}

===War crimes===
{{Main|Einsatzgruppen|German atrocities committed against Soviet prisoners of war|The Holocaust in Russia|War crimes of the Wehrmacht}}
], a nurse with the ], before her execution by hanging. The placard reads: ''We are the partisans who shot German troops'', ], 26 October 1941.]]
While the Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva Convention, Germany had signed the treaty and was thus obligated to offer Soviet POWs humane treatment according to its provisions (as they generally did with other Allied POWs).{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|pp=16, 20–23}} According to the Soviets, they had not signed the Geneva Conventions in 1929 due to Article 9 which, by imposing ] of POWs into different camps, contravened the Soviet constitution.{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|p=20}} Article 82 of the convention specified that "In case, in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall nevertheless remain in force as between the belligerents who are parties thereto."{{sfn|Geneva Convention, Article 82}} Despite such mandates, Hitler called for the battle against the Soviet Union to be a "struggle for existence" and emphasized that the Soviet armies were to be "]", a mindset that contributed to ].{{sfn|Kershaw|2001|pp=355–389}} A memorandum from 16 July 1941, recorded by ], quotes Hitler saying, "The giant area must naturally be pacified as quickly as possible; this will happen at best if anyone who just looks funny should be shot".{{sfn|Browning|1998|p=10}}{{sfn|Förster|1988|p=31}} Conveniently for Germany, the fact that the Soviets failed to sign the convention played into their hands as they justified their behavior accordingly. Even if the Soviets had signed, it is highly unlikely that this would have stopped the Nazis' ] policies towards combatants, civilians, and prisoners of war.{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|pp=20–21}}

]

Before the war, Hitler had issued the notorious Commissar Order, which called for all Soviet political commissars taken prisoner at the front to be ].{{sfn|Kershaw|2001|pp=357–359}} German soldiers participated in these mass killings along with members of the {{lang|de|SS-Einsatzgruppen}}, sometimes reluctantly, claiming "military necessity".{{sfn|Wette|2007|pp=198–199}}{{sfn|Förster|1998|pp=507–513}} On the eve of the invasion, German soldiers were informed that their battle "demands ruthless and vigorous measures against Bolshevik inciters, guerrillas, saboteurs, Jews and the complete elimination of all active and passive resistance". Collective punishment was authorised against partisan attacks; if a perpetrator could not be quickly identified, burning villages and mass executions were considered acceptable reprisals.{{sfn|Förster|1988|p=26}} Although the majority of German soldiers accepted these crimes as justified due to Nazi propaganda, which depicted the Red Army as {{lang|de|Untermenschen}}, a few prominent German officers openly protested against them.{{sfn|Ueberschär|Müller|2008|p=246}} An estimated two million Soviet ] died of starvation during Barbarossa alone.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=89–94}} By the end of the war, 58 percent of all Soviet prisoners of war had died in German captivity.{{sfn|Glantz|2011|p=48}}

Organised crimes against civilians, including women and children, were carried out on a huge scale by the German police and military forces, as well as the ].{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|pp=56–57}}{{sfn|Browning|1998|pp=10–12}} Under the command of the Reich Security Main Office, the {{lang|de|Einsatzgruppen}} killing squads conducted large-scale ]s of Jews and ] in conquered Soviet territories. ] historian ] puts the number of Jews murdered by "mobile killing operations" at 1,400,000.{{sfn|Hilberg|1961|p=767}} The original instructions to kill "Jews in party and state positions" were broadened to include "all male Jews of ]" and then expanded once more to "all male Jews regardless of age". By the end of July, the Germans were regularly killing women and children.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=213}} On 18 December 1941, Himmler and Hitler discussed the "Jewish question", and Himmler noted the meeting's result in his appointment book: "To be annihilated as partisans". According to ], "annihilating Jews and solving the so-called 'Jewish question' under the cover of killing partisans was the agreed-upon convention between Hitler and Himmler".{{sfn|Browning|2000}} In accordance with Nazi policies against "inferior" Asian peoples, ] were also persecuted. According to a post-war report by Prince Veli Kajum Khan, they were imprisoned in concentration camps in terrible conditions, where those deemed to have "Mongolian" features were murdered daily. Asians were also targeted by the {{lang|de|Einsatzgruppen}} and were the subjects of lethal medical experiments and murder at a "pathological institute" in Kiev.{{sfn|Breitman|1990|pp=341–343}} Hitler received reports of the mass killings conducted by the {{lang|de|Einsatzgruppen}} which were first conveyed to the RSHA, where they were aggregated into a summary report by ] Chief ].{{sfn|Langerbein|2003|pp=33–34}}
] (right) with commander of ], ], in October 1941]]

Burning houses suspected of being partisan meeting places and poisoning water wells became common practice for soldiers of the German ]. At Kharkov, the fourth largest city in the Soviet Union, food was provided only to the small number of civilians who worked for the Germans, with the rest designated to slowly starve.{{sfn|Moskoff|2002|pp=54–57}} Thousands of Soviets were deported to Germany for use as slave labour beginning in 1942.{{sfn|Glantz|House|1995|p=57}}

The citizens of Leningrad were subjected to heavy bombardment and a siege that would last 872 days and starve more than a million people to death, of whom approximately 400,000 were children below the age of 14.{{sfn|''Siege of Leningrad''|2011}}{{sfn|Miller|Commager|2001|p=69}}{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=289}} The German-Finnish blockade cut off access to food, fuel and raw materials, and rations reached a low, for the non-working population, of {{convert|4|oz}} (five thin slices) of bread and a little watery soup per day.{{sfn|Miller|Commager|2001|p=68}} Starving Soviet civilians began to eat their domestic animals, along with hair tonic and ]. Some desperate citizens resorted to cannibalism; Soviet records list 2,000 people arrested for "the use of human meat as food" during the siege, 886 of them during the first winter of 1941–42.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=289}} The ''Wehrmacht'' planned to seal off Leningrad, starve out the population, and then demolish the city entirely.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=204}}

====Sexual violence====
{{see also|Wartime sexual violence#World War II|War crimes of the Wehrmacht}}
Rape was a widespread phenomenon in the East as German soldiers regularly committed violent sexual acts against Soviet women.{{sfn|Mühlhäuser|2010|p=74}} Whole units were occasionally involved in the crime with upwards of one-third of the instances being ].{{sfn|Shepherd|2016|p=285}} Historian ] relates that in the world of the eastern front, where the German army equated Russia with Communism, everything was "fair game"; thus, rape went unreported unless entire units were involved.{{sfn|Heer|2000|p=110}} Frequently in the case of Jewish women, they were murdered immediately after acts of sexual violence.{{sfn|Mühlhäuser|2010|p=134}} Historian Birgit Beck emphasizes that military decrees, which served to authorise wholesale brutality on many levels, essentially destroyed the basis for any prosecution of sexual offenses committed by German soldiers in the East.{{sfn|Beck|2004|p=327}} She also contends that detection of such instances was limited by the fact that sexual violence was often inflicted in the context of ]s in civilian housing.{{sfn|Beck|2004|p=328}}

=== Nazi plunder of Eastern Europe ===
{{Main|Nazi plunder}}
After the initiation of Operation Barbarossa, Eastern Europe was relentlessly plundered by Nazi German forces. In 1943 alone, 9,000,000 tons of cereals, {{cvt|2000000|t|LT ST}} of fodder, {{cvt|3000000|t|LT ST}} of potatoes, and {{cvt|662000|t|LT ST}} of meats were sent back to Germany. During the course of the German occupation, some 12&nbsp;million pigs and 13&nbsp;million sheep were seized by Nazi forces.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|p=944}} The value of this plunder is estimated at 4&nbsp;billion Reichsmarks. This relatively low number in comparison to the occupied nations of Western Europe can be attributed to the indiscriminate ] pursued by Nazi Germany in the Eastern Front.{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=943–944}}

==Historical significance==
Barbarossa was the largest military operation in history—more men, tanks, guns and aircraft were deployed than in any other offensive.{{sfn|Overy|1996|p=68}}{{sfn|Anderson|Clark|Walsh|2018|p=7}} The invasion opened the ], the war's largest theatre, which saw clashes of unprecedented violence and destruction for four years and killed over 26 million Soviet people, including about 8.6&nbsp;million ].{{sfn|Moskoff|2002|p=236}} More died fighting on the Eastern Front than in all other fighting across the globe during World War II.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=264}} Damage to both the economy and landscape was enormous, as approximately 1,710 Soviet towns and 70,000 villages were razed.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|p=160}}


Barbarossa and the subsequent German defeat changed the political landscape of Europe, dividing it into Eastern and Western blocs.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=152–153}} The political vacuum left in the eastern half of the continent was filled by the USSR when Stalin secured his territorial prizes of 1944–1945 and firmly placed the Red Army in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the eastern half of Germany.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|p=153}} Stalin's fear of resurgent German power and his distrust of his erstwhile allies contributed to Soviet pan-Slavic initiatives and a subsequent alliance of Slavic states.{{sfn|Roberts|2014|pp=258–260}} The historians David Glantz and ] assert that Barbarossa influenced not only Stalin but subsequent Soviet leaders, claiming it "colored" their strategic mindsets for the "next four decades".{{efn|Glantz and House use the expression "The Great Patriotic War", the Soviet name for World War II—but this term represents by and large, the contest between the U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany.}} As a result, the Soviets instigated the creation of "an elaborate system of ] and ] states, designed to insulate the Soviet Union from any possible future attack".{{sfn|Glantz|House|2015|p=364}} In the ensuing ], Eastern Europe became a ], and Western Europe aligned itself with the United States.{{sfn|Hartmann|2013|pp=154–155}}
Nevertheless, despite this setback, the Soviet Union had suffered heavily from the loss of large parts of its army and industry, allowing the Germans to mount another large-scale offensive in the July 1942, codenamed ], now directed towards the ]s of ].{{sfn|Symonds|2014|p=70}} This offensive failed just as Barbarossa had; the Germans again conquered vast amounts of land, but failed to achieve their ultimate goals when they were ]. By then, the Soviet war economy was fully operational and was able to simply outproduce Germany, which was not prepared for a long war of attrition.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}} It ended with the total destruction and occupation of Nazi Germany in May 1945.{{sfn|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}}


==See also== ==See also==
* ]
{{Portal|World War II|Nazi Germany|Soviet Union}}
* ]
** ]
* ]
* ]
* ] * ]
* ]
* ] * ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
{{Portal bar|Germany|Soviet Union}}


==References== ==References==
===Notes===
{{Reflist|30em}}
{{notelist |refs=
{{efn|name=western military districts Soviet Union |The four Soviet military districts facing the Axis, the ], the ], the ] and the ], at the outbreak of the war were renamed the ], the ], the ] and the ], respectively. A fifth military district, the ], became the ].{{sfn|Glantz|2011|pp=11, 16, 208}}
}}
}}


==Sources== ===Citations===
{{Reflist|20em}}


===Printed=== ===Bibliography===
{{refbegin|30em}} {{Refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}
* {{cite book | last1=Aly | first1=Götz | last2=Heim | first2=Susanne | year=2002 | title=Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction | location=Princeton and Oxford | publisher=Princeton University Press | isbn=978-0-691-08938-6}}
* {{cite news | title = Adolf Hitler's Navy | newspaper = ] | url = http://books.google.dk/books?id=NkEEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=PA26&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=true | accessdate = 19 March 2015 | ref = {{sfnRef|"Adolf Hitler's Navy"}} | pages =26–27 | date= 7 December 1936 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Andaházi Szeghy |first1=Viktor |title=A Magyar Királyi Honvédség részvétele a Szovjetunió elleni támadásban, 1941. június-december |trans-title=Participation of the Royal Hungarian Armed Forces in the attack against the Soviet Union, June–December, 1941 |date=2016 |publisher=Belvedere Meridionale |location=Szeged |isbn=978-615-5372-53-7 |url=http://www.belvedere.meridionale.hu/letolt/ASZV_A%20magyar%20kiralyi%20honvedseg.pdf |language=hu }}
* {{cite book | last = Baker | first = Lee | title = The Second World War on the Eastern Front | publisher = Routledge | year = 2013 | isbn = 978-1317865049| ref = harv }}
* {{cite book |last1=Anderson |first1=Duncan |title=The Eastern Front: Barbarossa, Stalingrad, Kursk, Leningrad, Bagration, Berlin |last2=Clark |first2=Lloyd |last3=Walsh |first3=Stephen |publisher=Amber Books |year=2018 |isbn=978-1-78274-619-5}}
*{{cite journal|last1=Bar-Joseph|first1=Uri|last2=Levy|first2=Jack S.|title=Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure|journal=Political Science Quarterly|date=Fall 2009|volume=124|issue=3|pages=461–488| doi = 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00656.x | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Bellamy | first = Chris | title = Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War | publisher = Vintage Books | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-0-375-72471-8 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last= Axworthy |first= Mark |date= 1995 |title= Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–1945 |publisher= Arms and Armour Press |location= London |isbn= 1-85409-267-7}}
* {{cite AV media|ref={{sfnRef|''Battle for Russia''|1996}}|people=Aitken, Andy, Dave Flitton & James Wignall (directors), Dave Flitton (series producer); Dave Flitton, Andy Aitken & James Wignall (writers)|date=1996|title=The Battle for Russia|medium=television documentary|url=//www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAfcOYKMPP4|series=]|publisher=]|access-date=19 March 2015}}
* {{cite book|last=Bergstrom| first= Christer| title= Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December 1941| publisher = Classic Publications| year= 2007|ISBN = 978-1-85780-270-2|ref=harv}}
* {{cite book |last=Askey |first=Nigel |title= Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation |volume=(II B) |year=2014 |location= U.S. |publisher= Lulu Publishing |isbn=978-1-312-41326-9}}
* {{cite book | author1-last = Berthon | author1-first = Simon | author2-last = Potts | author2-first = Joanna | title = Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin | publisher = Da Capo Press | year = 2007 | isbn = 0-306-81538-9 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last=Baker | first=Lee | title= The Second World War on the Eastern Front | location=London | publisher=Pearson Longman | year = 2009 | isbn = 978-1-4058-4063-7}}
* {{cite book | last1 = Boog | first1 = Horst | last2 = Förster | first2 = Jürgen | last3 = Hoffmann | first3 = Joachim | last4 = Klink | first4 = Ernst | last5 = Müller | first5 = Rolf-Dieter | last6 = Ueberschär | first6= Gerd R. |authorlink3=Joachim Hoffmann |authorlink5=Rolf-Dieter Müller| editor-link=Military History Research Office (Germany) | others= Translated by Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers, Louise Willmot | series = ] | title= Attack on the Soviet Union | volume=IV | publisher = Clarendon Press | year = 1998 | isbn = 0-19-822886-4 | ref = harv}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Bar-Joseph |first1=Uri |last2=Levy |first2=Jack S. |title=Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure |journal=Political Science Quarterly |date=Fall 2009 |volume=124 |issue=3 |pages=461–488 |doi=10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00656.x | issn=0032-3195}}
* {{cite book | last = Brackman | first = Roman | title = The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life | publisher = Frank Cass Publishing | year = 2001 | isbn = 0-7146-5050-1 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | author1-last = Bradley | author1-first = John | author2-last = Buell | author2-first = Thomas | title = Why Was Barbarossa Delayed? The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean | publisher = Square One Publishing | year = 2002 | isbn = 0-7570-0160-2 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book | editor-last1=Baudot | editor-first1=Marcel | editor-last2=Bernard |editor-first2=Henri |editor-last3=Foot|editor-first3=Michael R.D.|editor-last4=Jacobsen|editor-first4=Hans-Adolf | year=1989 | title= The Historical Encyclopedia of World War II | location=New York and Oxford | publisher=Facts on File | isbn=978-0-671-24277-0 }}
* {{cite book | last = Braithwaite | first = Rodric |authorlink=Rodric Braithwaite | title = Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War| publisher = Profile Books | year = 2010 | isbn = 978-1-86197774-8 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book| last= Beck | first=Birgit | year=2004 | title=Wehrmacht und sexuelle Gewalt. Sexualverbrechen vor deutschen Militärgerichten, 1939–1945 | language=de | location=Paderborn | publisher=Schöningh Verlag | isbn=978-3-506-71726-9}}
* {{cite book| last=Beck | first=Birgit | year=2005 | chapter=Sexual Violence and Its Prosecution by Courts Martial of the Wehrmacht | title=A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945 | editor1=Roger Chickering | editor2=Stig Förster | editor3=Bernd Greiner | pages=317–332 | location=Cambridge and New York | publisher=Cambridge University Press | isbn=978-0-521-83432-2}}
* {{cite book| last = Burleigh | first = Michael | title = The Third Reich: A New History | year = 2001 | publisher = Pan Macmillan | isbn = 978-0-330-47550-1 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Clark | first = Lloyd | title = Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943 | publisher = Headline Review | year = 2012 | isbn = 978-0755336395 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Beevor |first=Antony |author-link=Antony Beevor |title=The Second World War |location=New York |publisher=Back Bay Books |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-316-02374-0 |url=https://archive.org/details/secondworldwar00beev }}
* {{cite book | last = Commager |authorlink=Henry Steele Commager | first = Henry | title = The Story of the Second World War | publisher = Brassey's Publishing | year = 1991 | isbn = 978-0080410661 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Bellamy |first=Chris |date=2007 |title=Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War |publisher=Vintage Books |isbn=978-0-375-72471-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/absolutewarsovie0000bell/ |url-access=registration }}
* {{cite book | last = Dunnigan | first = James |authorlink=Jim Dunnigan | title = The Russian Front | publisher = Arms & Armour Press | year = 1978 | isbn = -0-85368-152-X | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Bergström |first=Christer |title=Barbarossa – The Air Battle: July–December 1941 |publisher=Classic Publications |year=2007 |isbn=978-1-85780-270-2 }}
* {{cite book |author1-last = Berthon |author1-first = Simon |author2-last = Potts |author2-first = Joanna |title=Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin |publisher=Da Capo Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-306-81538-6 }}
* {{cite book | last = Ericson | first = Edward | title = Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941 | publisher = Praeger Publishing | year = 1999 | isbn = 978-0275963378 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Fahlbusch | first = Michael | title = Die Südostdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft | publisher = German Historical Institute | language = German | year = 1999 | isbn = 978-0-375-41086-4 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last= Blumentritt |first= Günther |date= 1952 |title= Von Rundstedt: The Soldier and the Man |publisher= Odhams Press |location= London |url= https://archive.org/details/vonrundstedtsold0000blum/ |url-access= registration |access-date= 12 August 2021 }}
* {{cite book |ref= {{sfnRef|Boog et al.|1998}} |editor-last1= Boog |editor-first1= Horst |editor-last2= Förster |editor-first2= Jürgen |editor-last3= Hoffmann |editor-first3= Joachim |editor-last4= Klink |editor-first4= Ernst |editor-last5= Müller |editor-first5= Rolf-Dieter |editor-last6= Ueberschär |editor-first6= Gerd R. |translator1-first=Dean S. |translator1-last= McMurry |translator2-first= Ewald |translator2-last= Osers |translator3-first= Louise |translator3-last= Willmot |date= 1998 |editor-link1= Horst Boog |editor-link2= Jürgen Förster |editor-link3= Joachim Hoffmann |editor-link4= Ernst Klink |editor-link5= Rolf-Dieter Müller |editor-link6= Gerd R. Ueberschär |series= ] |volume= IV |title= The Attack on the Soviet Union | location= Oxford and New York |publisher= Clarendon Press |isbn= 978-0-19-822886-8 }}
* {{cite book| last = Förster| first = Jürgen | contribution = The German Military's Image of Russia | title = Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy | publisher = Weidenfeld & Nicolson | location = London | year = 2005 | isbn = | ref = harv }}
** {{harvc |last= Förster |first1= Jürgen |year= 1998 |chapter= Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation |in= Boog et al. |author-link= Jürgen Förster |nb= yes}}
* {{cite book | last = Gorodetsky | first = Gabriel |authorlink=Gabriel Gorodetsky | title = Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia | publisher = Yale University Press | year = 2001 | isbn = 978-0300084597 | ref = harv }}
** {{harvc |last1= Klink |first1= Ernst |year= 1998 |chapter= The Conduct of Operations |in= Boog et al. |author-link= Ernst Klink |nb= yes}}
* {{Cite conference| last = Glantz | first = David |authorlink=David Glantz | title = The Soviet-German War 1941–1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay |url=http://sti.clemson.edu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=189&Itemid=310 |publisher=Clemson University |conference=A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture at the Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs| year = 2001 | ref = harv }}
** {{harvc |last1= Ueberschär |first1= Gerd R. |year= 1998 |chapter= The Involvement of Scandinavia in the Plans for Barbarossa |in= Boog et al. |author-link= Gerd R. Ueberschär |nb= yes}}
* {{cite book | last = Glantz | first = David | title = Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War | publisher = University Press of Kansas | year = 1998 | isbn = 978-0700617890 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Glantz | first = David | title = Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk, Volume 1 | publisher = Helion & Company | year = 2010a | isbn = 978-1906033729 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Brackman |first=Roman |title=The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life |place=Portland and London| publisher=Frank Cass Publishing |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-7146-5050-0 }}
* {{cite book | last = Glantz | first = David | title = Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk, Volume 2 | publisher = Helion & Company | year = 2010b | isbn = 978-1906033903 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |author1-last = Bradley |author1-first = John |author2-last = Buell |author2-first = Thomas |title=Why Was Barbarossa Delayed? The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean |publisher=Square One Publishing |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-7570-0160-4 }}
* {{cite book | author1-last = Glantz | author1-first = David | author2-last = House | author2-first = Jonathan | title = When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler | publisher = Michigan University | year = 1995 | isbn = 978-1906033729 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Braithwaite |first=Rodric |author-link=Rodric Braithwaite |title=Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War |publisher=Profile Books |year=2010 |isbn=978-1-86197-774-8 }}
* {{cite web | author=BRD | year=2021 | title=Kanzlerin Merkel: Jahrestag des Überfalls von Nazi-Deutschland auf die damalige Sowjetunion ist Tag der Scham (19 June 2021) | trans-title=Chancellor Angela Merkel: The Anniversary of Nazi Germany's Attack against the Former Soviet Union is a Day of Shame | url=https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kanzlerin-merkel-jahrestag-des-ueberfalls-von-nazi-deutschland-auf-die-damalige-sowjetunion-ist-tag-der-scham-1933782 }}
* {{cite book | last = Handrack | first = Hans-Dieter | title = Das Reichskommissariat Ostland: Die Kulturpolitik Der Deutschen Verwaltung Zwischen Autonomie Und Gleichschaltung 1941–1944 | publisher = Michigan University | language = German | year = 1981 | isbn = 978-3879980383 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite journal | jstor=260654 | title=Himmler and the 'Terrible Secret' among the Executioners | last=Breitman |first=Richard | journal=Journal of Contemporary History | year=1991 | volume=26 | issue=3/4 | pages=431–451 | doi=10.1177/002200949102600305 | s2cid=159733077 }}
* {{cite book | last = Hartmann | first = Christian |title = Operation Barbarossa: Nazi Germany's War in the East, 1941–1945| publisher = Oxford University Press |year = 2013 | isbn = 978-0-19-966078-0 |ref=harv}}
* {{cite book | last = Higgins | first = Trumbull | title = Hitler and Russia: The Third Reich in a Two-Front War, 1937-1943 | publisher = Macmillan Publishing | year = 1966 | asin = B0000CNOQU | ref = harv }} * {{cite journal | jstor=260736 | title=Hitler and Genghis Khan | last=Breitman |first=Richard | journal=Journal of Contemporary History | year=1990 | volume=25 | issue=2/3 | pages=337–351 | doi=10.1177/002200949002500209 | s2cid=159541260 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Browning |first1=Christopher R. |author-link=Christopher Browning |title=Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland |year=1998 |publisher=HarperCollins |location=New York |isbn=978-0-06-099506-5 |edition=1 }}
*{{cite book | last = Himmler | first = Heinrich | chapter = Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East | year = 1940 | title = Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10|pages=147-150|volume= 13 | publisher=US Government Printing Office|location= District of Columbia | ref = harv }}
* {{cite web|last=Browning|first=Christopher|year=2000|title=Evidence for the Implementation of the Final Solution|url=https://www.phdn.org/archives/www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/browning1.htm|website=Web Genocide Documentation Center – Resources on Genocide, War Crimes and Mass Killing|publisher=University of the West of England|access-date=1 October 2016}}
* {{cite book | author1-last = Klemann| author1-first = Hein | author2-last = Kudryashov| author2-first = Sergei |title = Occupied Economies: An Economic History of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 1939-1945 | publisher = Business & Economics | year = 2013| ISBN= 978-0-857850607| ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Kirby | first = D.G. | title = Finland in the Twentieth Century: A History and an Interpretation | publisher = University of Minnesota Press | year = 1980 | isbn = 0-8166-5802-1 | ref = harv }} * {{Cite book | last = Budiansky | first = Stephen | title = Battle of wits: the complete story of codebreaking in World War II | publisher = Penguin| isbn = 978-0-14-028105-7| location = London| date = 2001}}
* {{cite book |last1=Burleigh |first1=Michael |last2=Wippermann |first2=Wolfgang |title=The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945 |url=https://archive.org/details/racialstate00mich |url-access=registration |year=1991 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-39802-2 }}
* {{cite book | last = Kirchubel | first = Robert | title = Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North | publisher = Osprey Publishing | year = 2005 | isbn = 978-1-84176-857-1 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Kirchubel | first = Robert | title = Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group Center | publisher = Osprey Publishing | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-1-84603-107-6 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Burleigh |first=Michael |title=The Third Reich: A New History |year=2000 |publisher=Pan Macmillan |isbn=978-0-330-47550-1 }}
* {{cite book | last = Kirchubel | first = Robert | title = Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group South | publisher = Osprey Publishing | year = 2003 | isbn = 978-1782004257 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book | last=Chapoutot | first=Johann | year=2018 | title=The Law of Blood: Thinking and Acting as a Nazi | place=Cambridge and London | publisher=The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press | isbn= 978-0-674-66043-4}}
* {{cite book | last = Krivosheev | first = G. F. | title = Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century | publisher = Greenhill Books | year = 1997 | isbn = 978-1853672804 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book | last=Childers | first=Thomas | year=2017 | title=The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany | place=New York | publisher=Simon & Schuster | isbn=978-1-4516-5113-3}}
* {{Cite web | last=Citino | first=Robert | title=Operation Barbarossa: The Biggest of All Time (June 18, 2021) | year=2021 | url=https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/operation-barbarossa | access-date=2022-12-29 | website=The National WWII Museum}}
* {{cite book | last = Macksey | first = Kenneth |authorlink=Kenneth Macksey | title = Hitler's Generals |chapter=Guderian |editor-last = Barnett | editor-first = Correlli |editor-link=Correlli Barnett | publisher = Weidenfeld & Nicolson | year = 1989 | isbn = 0-297-79462-0 | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book |last=Clark |first=Lloyd |title=Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front 1943 |publisher=Headline Review |year=2012 |isbn=978-0-7553-3639-5 }}
* {{cite journal|last1=Mawdsley|first1=Evan|title=Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 1940-1941|journal=The International History Review|date=2003|volume=25|issue=4|pages=818–865 | issn = 1618-4866 |ref = harv }}
* {{cite book| last = Mazower | first = Mark | title = Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe | publisher = Penguin | year = 2009 | isbn = 0141011920 | ref = harv }} * {{Cite journal |last=Clairmont |first=Frederic F. |date=2003 |title=Stalingrad: Hitler's Nemesis |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4413752 |journal=Economic and Political Weekly |volume=38 |issue=27 |pages=2819–2823 |jstor=4413752 |issn=0012-9976 }}
* {{cite book |last = Mercatante | first = Steven | title = Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe | publisher = Praeger | year = 2012 | isbn = 978-0313395925 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Commager |author-link=Henry Steele Commager |first=Henry |title=The Story of the Second World War |publisher=Brassey's Publishing |year=1991 |isbn=978-0-08-041066-1 |url=https://archive.org/details/henrysteelecomma00henr }}
* {{cite book | last = Meltyukhov | first = Mikhail | title = Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939–1941 | language = Russian | publisher = Вече | year = 2000 | isbn = 5-7838-0590-4 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book | last=Cooper | first=Matthew | year=1984 | title=The German Army, 1933–1945: Its Political and Military Failure | location=New York | publisher=Bonanza Books | isbn=978-0-517-43610-3 | url=https://archive.org/details/germanarmy1933190000coop }}
* {{cite book | last = Moskoff | first = William | title = The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War II | publisher = Cambridge University Press | year = 2002 | isbn = 978-0521522830 | ref = harv }} * {{cite thesis |last=Czak |first=Steven |year=2014 |title=Soviet Intelligence on the Eve of War, 1939–1941 |institution=University of Calgary |doi=10.11575/PRISM/27837 |type=PhD diss.}}
* {{cite AV media |ref={{sfnRef|''Hitler Strikes East''|2009}} |people=Davidson, Nick (producer) |year=2009 |title=Hitler Strikes East |series=] |medium=television documentary |url=http://www.worldmediarights.com/index.php?hidAction=episode&eid=553&page=Hitler_Strikes_East |publisher=NM Productions (for ]) |access-date=19 March 2015 |archive-date=8 March 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200308184216/http://www.worldmediarights.com/index.php?hidAction=episode&eid=553&page=Hitler_Strikes_East |url-status=dead }}
* {{cite book | last = Patterson | first = David | title = The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry | publisher = Transaction | year = 2003 | isbn = 978-1412820073| ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Rayfield | first = Donald | title = Stalin and his Hangmen | publisher = Penguin Books | year = 2004 | isbn = 0-14-100375-8 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |editor1-last= Dear |editor1-first= Ian |editor2-last= Foot |editor2-first= M. R. D. |editor2-link= M. R. D. Foot |year= 1995 |title= The Oxford Guide to World War II |publisher= Oxford University Press |place= Oxford; New York |isbn= 978-0-19-534096-9}}
* {{cite book | last = Rich | first = Norman | title = Hitler's War Aims Ideology: The Nazi State and the Course of Expansion | year = 1973 | publisher = W.W. Norton | isbn = 978-0233964768 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Dimbleby |first=Jonathan |author-link=Jonathan Dimbleby |title=Operation Barbarossa: The History of a Cataclysm |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2021 |isbn=978-0-19-754721-2}}
* {{cite journal | last = Roberts | first = Cynthia | title = Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941 | journal = Europe-Asia Studies | year = 1995 |volume=47 |issue=8 | doi = 10.1080/09668139508412322 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Dunn |first=Walter S. Jr. |title=The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930–1945 |place=Westport, CT | publisher=Praeger |year=1995 |isbn= 978-0-275-94893-1 }}
* {{cite book | last = Roberts | first = Geoffrey |authorlink=Geoffrey Roberts | title = Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 | publisher = Yale University Press | year = 2006 | isbn = 0-300-11204-1 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Dunnigan |first=James |author-link=Jim Dunnigan |title=The Russian Front |publisher=Arms & Armour Press |year=1978 |isbn=0-85368-152-X }}
* {{cite book | last=Enkenberg | first=Ilkka | title=Jatkosota Päivä Päivältä | year=2021 | publisher=Readme.fi | isbn=978-952-373-249-0 | language=fi}}
* {{cite book| last1 = Rössler | first1 = Mechtild | last2 = Schleiermacher | first2 = Sabine | title = Der "Generalplan Ost." Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik | year = 1996 | language = German | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Sakwa | first = Richard |authorlink=Richard Sakwa | title = The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union | publisher = Routledge Publishing | year = 2005 | isbn = 978-1134806027 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Ericson |first=Edward |title=Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941 |publisher=Praeger Publishing |year=1999 |isbn=978-0-275-96337-8 }}
* {{cite journal |last=Erickson |first=J. |year=1972 |title=The Soviet Response to Surprise Attack: Three Directives, 22 June 1941 |journal=Soviet Studies |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=519–553 |doi=10.1080/09668137208410829}}
* {{cite book | last = Shirer | first = William |authorlink=William L. Shirer | title = ] | publisher = Simon & Schuster | year = 1990 | isbn = 0-671-72868-7 | ref = harv }}
* {{Cite book |last=Evans |first=Richard J. |author-link=Richard J. Evans |year=1989 |title=In Hitler's Shadow |url=https://archive.org/details/inhitlersshadow00rich |url-access=registration |location=New York |publisher=Pantheon }}
*{{cite book|last1=Smelser|first1=Ronald|last2=Davies|first2=Edward J. II|title=The myth of the Eastern Front : The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture|date=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York|isbn=9780521712316|edition=Paperback | ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Smith | first = Howard |authorlink=Howard K. Smith | title = Last Train from Berlin | publisher = Phoenix Press | year = 2000 | isbn = 978-1842122143 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Fahlbusch |first=Michael |title=Die Südostdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft |publisher=German Historical Institute |language=de |year=1999 |isbn=978-0-375-41086-4 }}
* {{cite book | last = Symonds | first = Craig |authorlink=Craig Symonds | title = Neptune: The Allied Invasion of Europe and the D-Day Landings | publisher = Oxford University Press | year = 2014 | isbn = 978-0199986118 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Faligot |first=Roger | title=Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping | publisher=C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd. | year=2019 |isbn=978-1-78738-604-4 |location=London | translator-last=Lehrer |translator-first=Natasha | author-link=Roger Faligot}}
* {{cite book | last = Taylor | first = Alan | title = History of World War II | publisher = Octopus Books | year = 1974 | isbn = 978-0706403992 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book | last=Forczyk | first=Robert |title=Moscow 1941: Hitler's first defeat | publisher=Osprey |year=2006 |isbn=978-1-84603-017-8 }}
* {{cite book | last = Thomas | first = Nigel | title = The German Army 1939–45: Eastern Front 1941–43 | publisher = Osprey Publishing | year = 2012 | isbn = 978-1782002192 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book | last=Forczyk | first=Robert | year=2009 | title= Leningrad 1941–44: The Epic Siege | location=Oxford, UK | publisher=Osprey | isbn=978-1-84908-107-8 }}
* {{cite journal | last = Uldricks | first = Teddy | title = The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler? | journal = Slavic Review | year = 1999 |date=Autumn 1999 | doi = 10.2307/2697571 |volume=58 |number= 3 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book | last=Forczyk | first=Robert |title=Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941–1942 |publisher=Pen and Sword |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-78159-008-9 }}
* {{cite journal|last1=Förster|first1=Jürgen|title=Barbarossa Revisited: Strategy and Ideology in the East|journal=Jewish Social Studies|date=Winter 1988|volume=50|issue=1/2|pages=21–36|url=http://www.mconway.net/page1/page5/files/Barbarossa%20Strategy.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160330004056/http://www.mconway.net/page1/page5/files/Barbarossa%20Strategy.pdf|archive-date=30 March 2016}}
* {{cite book | last = Waller | first = John | title = The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War | publisher = Tauris & Company | year = 1996 | isbn = 978-1-86064-092-6| ref = harv }}
* {{cite book | last = Ward | first = John | title = Hitler's Stuka Squadrons: The Ju 87 at War, 1936–1945 | publisher = MBI Publishing | year = 2004 | isbn = 978-0760319918 | ref = harv }} * {{cite book |last=Förster |first=Jürgen |chapter=The German Military's Image of Russia|title=Russia: War, Peace and Diplomacy |publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicolson |location=London |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-297-84913-1 }}
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* {{cite book |last=Glantz |first=David |title=Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War |publisher=University Press of Kansas |year=1998 |isbn=978-0-7006-1789-0 }}
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* {{cite book |last = Glantz |first = David |title=Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 |publisher=The History Press |year=2011 |orig-date=2001 |isbn=978-0-7524-6070-3 }}
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* {{cite book |last=Gorodetsky |first=Gabriel |author-link=Gabriel Gorodetsky |title=Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia |publisher=Yale University Press |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-300-08459-7 }}
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* {{cite book |last1=Smelser |first1=Ronald|author-link1 = Ronald Smelser |last2=Davies |first2=Edward J. | author-link2 = Edward J. Davies |title=The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture |date=2008 |publisher=] |location=New York |isbn=978-0-521-71231-6 |edition=Paperback |title-link=The Myth of the Eastern Front}}
* {{cite book |last=Smith |first=Howard |author-link=Howard K. Smith |title=Last Train from Berlin |publisher=Phoenix Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-1-84212-214-3 }}
* {{cite book | last=Snyder| first=Timothy | year=2010 | title= Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin | location= New York | publisher= Basic Books | isbn=978-0-465-03147-4 }}
* {{cite book | last = Stackelberg | first = Roderick | title = Hitler's Germany: Origins, Interpretations, Legacies | publisher = Taylor & Francis | location = London; New York | year = 2002 | isbn = 978-0-203-00541-5 }}
* {{cite book| last=Stackelberg | first=Roderick | year=2007 | title= The Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany | place= New York | publisher= Routledge | isbn= 978-0-415-30861-8 }}
* {{cite book| last=Stahel | first=David | author-link=David Stahel | year=2009 | title=Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East | location=Cambridge, UK | publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-76847-4}}
* {{cite book| last1=Stockings | first1=Craig | last2=Hancock |first2=Eleanor | year=2013 | title=Swastika over the Acropolis: Re-interpreting the Nazi Invasion of Greece in World War II | publisher=Brill |isbn=978-90-04-25457-2 }}
* {{cite book | last = Stone | first = David | title = Shattered Genius: The Decline and Fall of the German General Staff in World War II | year = 2011 | publisher = Casemate | location = Philadelphia | isbn = 978-1-61200-098-5 }}
* {{cite news |author= Süddeutsche Zeitung |date= 19 June 2021 |title= Überfall auf Sowjetunion 1941: Merkel nennt Jahrestag Anlass für Scham |trans-title= Merkel calls the 1941 attack against the Soviet Union an occasion for shame |language= de |newspaper= Süddeutsche Zeitung |url= https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/angela-merkel-zweiter-weltkrieg-sowjetunion-1.5327042 }}
* {{cite book |last=Symonds |first=Craig |author-link=Craig Symonds |title=] |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2014 |isbn=978-0-19-998611-8 }}
* {{cite book |last=Thomas |first=Nigel |title=The German Army 1939–45: Eastern Front 1941–43 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |year=2012 |isbn=978-1-78200-219-2 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Ueberschär |first1=Gerd R. |last2=Müller |first2=Rolf-Dieter |title=Hitler's War in the East, 1941–1945: A Critical Assessment |publisher=Berghahn Books |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-84545-501-9 }}
* {{cite journal |last=Uldricks |first=Teddy |title=The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler? |journal=Slavic Review |date=Autumn 1999 |doi=10.2307/2697571 |volume=58 |issue=3 |pages= 626–643 |jstor=2697571|s2cid=153701270 }}
* {{cite book | author = United States Holocaust Memorial Museum | title = Historical Atlas of the Holocaust | year = 1996 | location = New York | publisher = Macmillan Publishing | isbn = 978-0-02-897451-4 | url = https://archive.org/details/historicalatlaso00unit }}
* {{cite book|last=Vehviläinen|first=Olli|year=2002|title=Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia|publisher=Palgrave|location=New York|isbn=978-0-333-80149-9}}
* {{cite book |last= Vogel |first= Detlef |date= 1995 |chapter= The German Attack on Yugoslavia and Greece |editor-last1= Schreiber |editor-first1= Gerhard |editor-last2= Stegemann |editor-first2= Bernd |editor-last3= Vogel |editor-first3= Detlef |series= ] |title= The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa 1939–1941 |volume= III |publisher= Clarendon Press |location= Oxford |translator1-last= McMurry |translator1-first= Dean S. |translator2-last= Osers |translator2-first= Ewald |translator3-last= Willmot |translator3-first= Louise |translator4-last= Falla |translator4-first= P. S. |isbn=978-0-19-822884-4}}
* {{cite book |last=Waller |first=John |title=The Unseen War in Europe: Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War |publisher=Tauris & Company |year=1996 |isbn=978-1-86064-092-6 }}
* {{cite book |last=Weeks |first=Albert |title=Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=2002 |isbn=978-0-7425-2191-9 }}
* {{cite book | last1=Wegner | first1=Bernd | chapter=Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1942/43 | editor1=Boog, Horst | editor2=Rahn, Werner | editor3=Stumpf, Reinhard | editor4=Wegner, Bernd | year=1990 | editor-link=Military History Research Office (Germany) | title=Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg | volume=VI | language=de | location=Stuttgart | publisher=Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt|isbn=978-3-421-06233-8 }}
* {{cite book |last=Weinberg |first=Gerhard |author-link=Gerhard Weinberg |title=A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1994 |isbn=0-521-44317-2}}
* {{cite book |last=Werth |first=Alexander |title=Russia at War, 1941–1945 |year=1964 |location=New York |publisher=E.P. Dutton |asin=B0000CMAU7}}
* {{cite book |last=Wette |first=Wolfram |author-link = Wolfram Wette |title=The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality |publisher=Harvard University Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-674-02577-6 |title-link=The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality }}
* {{cite book | last = Wright | first = Gordon | year = 1968 | title = The Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945 | location = New York | publisher = Harper & Row | isbn = 978-0-06-131408-7 | url = https://archive.org/details/ordealoftotalwa00wrig }}
* {{cite book | last = Ziemke | first = Earl F. | year = 1959 | title = The German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940–1945 | url = http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-23/CMH_Pub_104-23.pdf | location = Washington D.C. | publisher = U.S. Government Printing Office | asin = B0007ETEOM | access-date = 5 November 2016 | archive-date = 21 October 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201021045809/https://history.army.mil/html/books/104/104-23/CMH_Pub_104-23.pdf | url-status = dead }}
{{refend}} {{refend}}


===Online=== ===Further reading===
{{Refbegin|30em|indent=yes}}
* {{cite web
* {{cite book |last= Bartov |first= Omer |author-link= Omer Bartov |date= 2001 |title= The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare |location= London |publisher= Palgrave Macmillan |isbn= 978-0-333-94944-3 |ref=none}}
| title = Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941
* {{cite book |last1=Browning |first1= Christopher R. |date= 2007 |title= The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942 |at= Generalplan Ost: The Search for a Final Solution through Expulsion |author-link1= Christopher Browning |publisher= University of Nebraska Press |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=d9Wg4gjtP3cC&q=Generalplan+Ost |isbn= 978-0-8032-0392-1 |ref=none}}
| publisher = World War II Stats
* {{cite book |last=Erickson |first=John |title=The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany | origyear=1975 |year=2003 |publisher=Cassell |location=London |isbn=0-304-36541-6}}
| url = http://ww2stats.com/cas_ger_okh_tow41.html
* {{cite book |last= Evans |first= Richard J. |date= 2008 |title= The Third Reich at War |location= London |publisher= Allen Lane |isbn= 978-0-7139-9742-2 |ref=none}}
| accessdate = 10 May 2013
* {{cite web |editor-last= Halsall |editor-first= Paul |title= Modern History Sourcebook: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939 |website= ] |publisher= ] |url= https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1939pact.asp |access-date= 20 April 2021 |ref=none}}
| ref = {{sfnRef|"Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater of War, 1941"}}
* {{cite journal | last=Hayward | first=Joel| title=Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941–42 | journal=Journal of Strategic Studies | date=1995 | volume=18 | issue=4 | pages=94–135 | url=https://archive.org/stream/JoelHaywardhitlersQuestForOilTheImpactOfEconomicConsiderationsOn/JoelHaywardGermanStrategy_djvu.txt | doi=10.1080/01402399508437621 |ref=none}}
}}
* {{cite book | last=Kay | first=Alex | chapter=The Purpose of the Russian Campaign Is the Decimation of the Slavic Population by Thirty Million | title=Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization |editor-last1=Kay | editor-first1=Alex J. | editor-last2=Rutherford | editor-first2=Jeff | editor-last3=Stahel | editor-first3=David | publisher=University of Rochester Press |year=2012 |isbn=978-1-58046-407-9 |location=Rochester, NY}}
*{{cite web
* {{cite book |last= Kershaw |first= Ian |date= 2000 |title= Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris |publisher= Penguin |isbn= 978-0-14-013363-9 |ref=none}}
| title = AOK/Ic POW Summary Reports
* {{Cite book |last= Price-Smith |first= Andrew T. |year= 2015 |title= Oil, Illiberalism, and War: An Analysis of Energy and US Foreign Policy |publisher= MIT Press |isbn= 978-0-262-02906-3 |ref=none}}
| publisher = World War II Stats
* {{cite book | last=Trigg | first=Jonathan | title= Barbarossa Through German Eyes |year= 2023 |publisher= Amberley Publishing |location= Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK |isbn= 978-1-3981-1551-4}}
| url = http://ww2stats.com/pow_ger_okh_aok.html
* {{cite web |author= United States Holocaust Memorial Museum |title= Nazi Persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War |url= http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007178 |access-date=24 March 2015 |date=20 June 2014 |ref=none }}
| accessdate = 3 April 2015
* {{cite book |last= Ward |first= John |year= 2004 |title= Hitler's Stuka Squadrons: The Ju 87 at War, 1936–1945 |publisher= MBI Publishing |isbn= 978-0-7603-1991-8 |ref=none}}
| ref = {{sfnRef|"AOK POW Reports"}}
{{refend}}
}}
*{{cite web
|title = Army vs. NKVD figures
| publisher = World War II Stats
| url = http://ww2stats.com/pow_sow_tot.html
| accessdate = 3 April 2015
| ref = {{sfnRef|"Red Army and NKVD figures, 1941-1945"}}
}}
*{{cite AV media
| people = Davidson, Nick (producer)
| date =2009
| title = Hitler Strikes East
| series = ]
| medium = television documentary
| url = http://www.worldmediarights.com/index.php?hidAction=episode&eid=553&page=Hitler_Strikes_East
| time =
| publisher =NM Productions (for ])
| accessdate = 19 March 2015
| ref = {{sfnRef|''Hitler Strikes East'', 2009}}
}}
*{{cite AV media
| people =]; Müllner, Jörg (directors); Renate Bardong (producer)
| date = 1998
| title = General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey
| series = ]
| medium = television documentary
| url = http://www.hulu.com/hitlers-warriors
| time =
| publisher =ZDF
| accessdate = 24 March 2015
| ref = {{sfnRef|''General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey'', 1998}}
}}
* {{cite web
| title = Modern History Sourcebook: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939
| publisher = ]
| url = http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1939pact.html
| accessdate = 19 March 2015
| ref = {{sfnRef|Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939}}
}}
*{{cite encyclopedia
|editor-first=
|editor-last=
|encyclopedia=]
|title= Nazi Persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War
|url=http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007178
|access-date= 24 March 2015
|date=20 June 2014
|publisher= ]
|ref= {{sfnRef|"Nazi Persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War"}}
}}
*{{cite AV media
| people = Grazhdan, Anna (director); Artem Drabkin & Aleksey Isaev (writers); Valeriy Babich, Vlad Ryashin, ''et. al'' (producers)
| date = 2011
| title = Operation Barbarossa
| series = Soviet Storm: World War II in the East
| medium = television documentary
| url = http://www.starmediafilm.com/en/historical/velikaya_vojna
| time =
| publisher =Star Media
| accessdate = 19 March 2015
| ref = {{sfnRef|''Operation Barbarossa'' 2011}}
}}
* {{cite web
| title = Оценка советским руководством событий Второй мировой войны в 1939-1941
| author= Meltyukhov, Mikhail Ivanovich
| language = Russian
| url = http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/11.html
| accessdate = 19 March 2015
| ref = {{sfnRef|Russian Military Library}}
}}
*{{cite AV media
| people = Aitken, Andy, Dave Flitton & James Wignall (directors), Dave Flitton (series producer); Dave Flitton, Andy Aitken & James Wignall (writers)
| date = 1996
| title = The Battle for Russia
| medium = television documentary
| url =https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hAfcOYKMPP4
| time =
| series=]
| publisher =]
| accessdate = 19 March 2015
| ref = {{sfnRef|''Battle for Russia'', 1996}}
}}
*{{cite AV media
| people = Jones, Bill Treharne (producer); ] (presenter and co-producer)
| date = 1989
| title = The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler
| medium = television documentary
| url =
| time =
| publisher =BBC
| ref = {{sfnRef|''The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler'', 1989}}
}}


==External links== ==External links==
{{Spoken Misplaced Pages|En-OperationBarbarossa-article.ogg|date=10 December 2017}}
{{Commons category|Operation Barbarossa}}
* {{Commons category-inline|Operation Barbarossa}}
{{Wikisource|Führer Directive 21}}
* {{Wikisource-inline|Führer Directive 21}}
* on the ] website
* {{Wikisource-inline|Adolf Hitler's Letter to Benito Mussolini Explaining the Invasion of the Soviet Union}}
* original reports and pictures from '']''
* {{Wikisource-inline|The Führer to the German People: 22 June 1941}}
* over Operation Barbarossa
* {{Wikisource-inline|Adolf Hitler's Order of the Day to the German Troops on the Eastern Front (2 October 1941)}}
* {{Wikisource-inline|Adolf Hitler Explains His Reasons for Invading the Soviet Union}}
* on the ] website
* original reports and pictures from '']''
* "Operation Barbarossa": {{YouTube|KxsdfcgfSS8}}, lecture by ], author of ''Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East'' (2009); via the official channel of ]


{{World War II}} {{World War II}}
{{Army Group Rear Area (Wehrmacht)}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2013}}
{{Authority control}}


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Latest revision as of 11:26, 5 January 2025

1941–1942 invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and its allies

Operation Barbarossa
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II

Clockwise from top-left:
  • German soldiers advance through northern Russia
  • German flamethrower crew burns down a house in the background
  • German Panzer IV stuck in the snow with white camouflage paint
  • Soviet Ilyushin Il-2s over German positions near Moscow
  • Soviet POWs on the way to prison camps
  • Soviet soldiers fire artillery
Date22 June 1941 – 8 December 1941
(5 months, 1 week and 6 days)
Location
Result See § Aftermath
Territorial
changes		 Axis captured approximately 600,000 sq mi (1,600,000 km) of Soviet territory but failed to reach the A-A line
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Units involved
Axis armies: Soviet armies:
Strength

Frontline strength (22 June 1941)

  • 3.8 million personnel
  • 3,350–3,795 tanks
  • 3,030–3,072 other AFVs
  • 2,770–5,369 aircraft
  • 7,200–23,435 artillery pieces
  • 17,081 mortars
  • 600,000 horses
  • 600,000 vehicles

Frontline strength (22 June 1941)

  • 2.6–2.9 million personnel
  • 11,000 tanks
  • 7,133–9,100 military aircraft
Casualties and losses

Total military casualties:
1,000,000+

Breakdown
  • Casualties of 1941:

    According to German Army medical reports (including Army Norway):

    • 186,452 killed
    • 40,157 missing
    • 655,179 wounded in action
    • 8,000 evacuated sick
    • 2,827 aircraft destroyed
    • 2,735 tanks destroyed
    • 104 assault guns destroyed

    Other involved country losses

    • Kingdom of Romania 114,000+ casualties (at least 39,000 dead or missing)
    • Finland 75,000 casualties
      (26,355 dead) in Karelia
      5,000+ casualties during Operation Silver Fox.
    • Fascist Italy 8,700 casualties
    • Kingdom of Hungary (1920–1946) 4,420 casualties

Total military casualties:
4,500,000

Breakdown
  • Casualties of 1941:

    Based on Soviet archives:

    • 566,852 killed in action (101,471 of whom died in hospital of wounds)
    • 235,339 died from non-combat causes
    • 1,336,147 sick or wounded via combat and non-combat causes
    • 2,335,482 missing in action or captured
    • 21,200 aircraft, of which 10,600 were lost to combat
    • 20,500 tanks destroyed
Operation Barbarossa
German declaration of war

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Phase 4

Air war

Eastern Front
Naval warfare
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

Operation Barbarossa was the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and many of its Axis allies, starting on Sunday, 22 June 1941, during World War II. It was the largest and costliest land offensive in human history, with around 10 million combatants taking part, and over 8 million casualties by the end of the operation.

The operation, code-named after Frederick I "Barbarossa" ("red beard"), a 12th-century Holy Roman Emperor and Crusader, put into action Nazi Germany's ideological goals of eradicating communism and conquering the western Soviet Union to repopulate it with Germans. The German Generalplan Ost aimed to use some of the conquered people as forced labour for the Axis war effort while acquiring the oil reserves of the Caucasus as well as the agricultural resources of various Soviet territories, including Ukraine and Byelorussia. Their ultimate goal was to create more Lebensraum (living space) for Germany, and the eventual extermination of the native Slavic peoples by mass deportation to Siberia, Germanisation, enslavement, and genocide.

In the two years leading up to the invasion, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed political and economic pacts for strategic purposes. Following the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the German High Command began planning an invasion of the Soviet Union in July 1940 (under the code-name Operation Otto). Over the course of the operation, over 3.8 million personnel of the Axis powers—the largest invasion force in the history of warfare—invaded the western Soviet Union, along a 2,900-kilometer (1,800 mi) front, with 600,000 motor vehicles and over 600,000 horses for non-combat operations. The offensive marked a major escalation of World War II, both geographically and with the Anglo-Soviet Agreement, which brought the USSR into the Allied coalition.

The operation opened up the Eastern Front, in which more forces were committed than in any other theatre of war in human history. The area saw some of history's largest battles, most horrific atrocities, and highest casualties (for Soviet and Axis forces alike), all of which influenced the course of World War II and the subsequent history of the 20th century. The German armies eventually captured five million Soviet Red Army troops and deliberately starved to death or otherwise killed 3.3 million Soviet prisoners of war, and millions of civilians, as the "Hunger Plan" worked to solve German food shortages and exterminate the Slavic population through starvation. Mass shootings and gassing operations, carried out by German death squads or willing collaborators, murdered over a million Soviet Jews as part of the Holocaust.

The failure of Operation Barbarossa reversed the fortunes of Nazi Germany. Operationally, German forces achieved significant victories and occupied some of the most important economic areas of the Soviet Union (mainly in Ukraine) and inflicted, as well as sustained, heavy casualties. The German offensive came to an end during the Battle of Moscow near the end of 1941, and the subsequent Soviet winter counteroffensive pushed the Germans about 250 km (160 mi) back. German high command anticipated a quick collapse of Soviet resistance as in the invasion of Poland, analogous to the reaction Russia had during World War I, but instead the Red Army absorbed the German Wehrmacht's strongest blows and bogged it down in a war of attrition for which the Germans were unprepared. Following the heavy losses and logistical strain of Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht's diminished forces could no longer attack along the entire Eastern Front, and subsequent operations to retake the initiative and drive deep into Soviet territory—such as Case Blue in 1942 and Operation Citadel in 1943—were weaker and eventually failed, which resulted in the Wehrmacht's defeat. These Soviet victories ended Germany's territorial expansion and presaged the eventual defeat and collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945.

Background

Naming

The theme of Barbarossa had long been used by the Nazi Party as part of their political imagery, though this was really a continuation of the glorification of the famous Crusader king by German nationalists since the 19th century. According to a Germanic medieval legend, revived in the 19th century by the nationalistic tropes of German Romanticism, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa—who drowned in Asia Minor while leading the Third Crusade—was not dead but asleep, along with his knights, in a cave in the Kyffhäuser mountains in Thuringia, and would awaken in the hour of Germany's greatest need and restore the nation to its former glory. Originally, the invasion of the Soviet Union was codenamed Operation Otto (alluding to Holy Roman Emperor Otto the Great's expansive campaigns in Eastern Europe), but Hitler had the name changed to Operation Barbarossa in December 1940. Hitler had in July 1937 praised Barbarossa as the emperor who first expressed Germanic cultural ideas and carried them to the outside world through his imperial mission. For Hitler, the name Barbarossa signified his belief that the conquest of the Soviet Union would usher in the Nazi "Thousand-Year Reich".

Racial policies of Nazi Germany

Main article: Racial policy of Nazi Germany

As early as 1925, Adolf Hitler vaguely declared in his political manifesto and autobiography Mein Kampf that he would invade the Soviet Union, asserting that the German people needed to secure Lebensraum ('living space') to ensure the survival of Germany for generations to come. On 10 February 1939, Hitler told his army commanders that the next war would be "purely a war of Weltanschauungen ... totally a people's war, a racial war". On 23 November, once World War II had already started, Hitler declared that "racial war has broken out and this war shall determine who shall govern Europe, and with it, the world". The racial policy of Nazi Germany portrayed the Soviet Union (and all of Eastern Europe) as populated by non-Aryan Untermenschen ('sub-humans'), ruled by Jewish Bolshevik conspirators. Hitler claimed in Mein Kampf that Germany's destiny was to follow the Drang nach Osten ('turn to the East') as it did "600 years ago" (see Ostsiedlung). Accordingly, it was a partially secret but well-documented Nazi policy to kill, deport, or enslave the majority of Russian and other Slavic populations and repopulate the land west of the Urals with Germanic peoples, under Generalplan Ost (General Plan for the East). The Nazis' belief in their ethnic superiority pervades official records and pseudoscientific articles in German periodicals, on topics such as "how to deal with alien populations."

Plan of new German settlement colonies (marked with dots and diamonds), drawn up by the Friedrich Wilhelm University Institute of Agriculture in Berlin, 1942

While older histories tended to emphasize the myth of the "clean Wehrmacht," upholding its honor in the face of Hitler's fanaticism, the historian Jürgen Förster notes that "In fact, the military commanders were caught up in the ideological character of the conflict, and involved in its implementation as willing participants". Before and during the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were indoctrinated with anti-Bolshevik, anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic ideology via movies, radio, lectures, books, and leaflets. Likening the Soviets to the forces of Genghis Khan, Hitler told the Croatian military leader Slavko Kvaternik that the "Mongolian race" threatened Europe. Following the invasion, many Wehrmacht officers told their soldiers to target people who were described as "Jewish Bolshevik subhumans," the "Mongol hordes," the "Asiatic flood" and the "Red beast." Nazi propaganda portrayed the war against the Soviet Union as an ideological war between German National Socialism and Jewish Bolshevism and a racial war between the disciplined Germans and the Jewish, Romani and Slavic Untermenschen. An 'order from the Führer' stated that the paramilitary SS Einsatzgruppen, which closely followed the Wehrmacht's advance, were to execute all Soviet functionaries who were "less valuable Asiatics, Gypsies and Jews." Six months into the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Einsatzgruppen had murdered more than 500,000 Soviet Jews, a figure greater than the number of Red Army soldiers killed in battle by then. German army commanders cast Jews as the major cause behind the "partisan struggle." The main guideline for German troops was "Where there's a partisan, there's a Jew, and where there's a Jew, there's a partisan" or "The partisan is where the Jew is." Many German troops viewed the war in Nazi terms and regarded their Soviet enemies as sub-human.

After the war began, the Nazis issued a ban on sexual relations between Germans and foreign slaves. There were regulations enacted against the Ost-Arbeiter ('Eastern workers') that included the death penalty for sexual relations with a German. Heinrich Himmler, in his secret memorandum, Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East (dated 25 May 1940), outlined the Nazi plans for the non-German populations in the East. Himmler believed the Germanisation process in Eastern Europe would be complete when "in the East dwell only men with truly German, Germanic blood."

The Nazi secret plan Generalplan Ost, prepared in 1941 and confirmed in 1942, called for a "new order of ethnographical relations" in the territories occupied by Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe. It envisaged ethnic cleansing, executions and enslavement of the populations of conquered countries, with very small percentages undergoing Germanisation, expulsion into the depths of Russia or other fates, while the conquered territories would be Germanised. The plan had two parts, the Kleine Planung ('small plan'), which covered actions to be taken during the war and the Große Planung ('large plan'), which covered policies after the war was won, to be implemented gradually over 25 to 30 years.

A speech given by General Erich Hoepner demonstrates the dissemination of the Nazi racial plan, as he informed the 4th Panzer Group that the war against the Soviet Union was "an essential part of the German people's struggle for existence" (Daseinskampf), also referring to the imminent battle as the "old struggle of Germans against Slavs" and even stated, "the struggle must aim at the annihilation of today's Russia and must, therefore, be waged with unparalleled harshness." Hoepner also added that the Germans were fighting for "the defence of European culture against Moscovite–Asiatic inundation, and the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism ... No adherents of the present Russian-Bolshevik system are to be spared." Walther von Brauchitsch also told his subordinates that troops should view the war as a "struggle between two different races and act with the necessary severity." Racial motivations were central to Nazi ideology and played a key role in planning for Operation Barbarossa since both Jews and communists were considered equivalent enemies of the Nazi state. Nazi imperialist ambitions rejected the common humanity of both groups, declaring the supreme struggle for Lebensraum to be a Vernichtungskrieg ('war of annihilation').

German-Soviet relations of 1939–40

Main article: Germany–Soviet Union relations, 1918–1941
The geopolitical disposition of Europe in 1941, immediately before the start of Operation Barbarossa. The grey area represents Nazi Germany, its allies, and countries under its control.

On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union on the division of the eastern European border states between their respective "spheres of influence," Soviet Union and Germany would partition Poland in the event of an invasion by Germany, and the Soviets would be allowed to overrun Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the region of Bessarabia. On 23 August 1939 the rest of the world learned of this pact but were unaware of the provisions to partition Poland. The pact stunned the world because of the parties' earlier mutual hostility and their conflicting ideologies. The conclusion of this pact was followed by the German invasion of Poland on 1 September that triggered the outbreak of World War II in Europe, then the Soviet invasion of Poland that led to the annexation of the eastern part of the country. As a result of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union maintained reasonably strong diplomatic relations for two years and fostered an important economic relationship. The countries entered a trade pact in 1940 by which the Soviets received German military equipment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, such as oil and wheat, to help the German war effort by circumventing the British blockade of Germany.

Despite the parties' ostensibly cordial relations, each side was highly suspicious of the other's intentions. For instance, the Soviet invasion of Bukovina in June 1940 went beyond their sphere of influence as agreed with Germany. After Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, it began negotiations about a potential Soviet entry into the pact. After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12 to 14 November 1940, Ribbentrop presented a draft treaty for a Soviet entry into the Axis. However, Hitler had no intention of allowing the Soviet Union into the Axis and in an order stated, "Political conversations designed to clarify the attitude of Russia in the immediate future have been started. Regardless of the outcome of these conversations, all preparations for the East previously ordered orally are to be continued. directives on that will follow as soon as the basic elements of the army's plan for the operation have been submitted to me and approved by me." There would be no "long-term agreement with Russia" given that the Nazis intended to go to war with them; but the Soviets approached the negotiations differently and were willing to make huge economic concessions to secure a relationship under general terms acceptable to the Germans just a year before. On 25 November 1940, the Soviet Union offered a written counter-proposal to join the Axis if Germany would agree to refrain from interference in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, but Germany did not respond. As both sides began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, although they did sign a border and commercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941. According to historian Robert Service, Joseph Stalin was convinced that the overall military strength of the Soviet Union was such that he had nothing to fear and anticipated an easy victory should Germany attack; moreover, Stalin believed that since the Germans were still fighting the British in the west, Hitler would be unlikely to open up a two-front war and subsequently delayed the reconstruction of defensive fortifications in the border regions. When German soldiers swam across the Bug River to warn the Red Army of an impending attack, they were shot as enemy agents. Some historians believe that Stalin, despite providing an amicable front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Germany. Rather, Stalin might have had intentions to break off from Germany and proceed with his own campaign against Germany to be followed by one against the rest of Europe. Other historians contend that Stalin did not plan for such an attack in June 1941, given the parlous state of the Red Army at the time of the invasion.

1939 German Diplomatic passport with its holder returning after the outbreak of war 2 years later and being evacuated on a special train out of the USSR.

Axis invasion plans

See also: A-A line, Ural Mountains in Nazi planning, and Lossberg study
The Marcks Plan was the original German plan of attack for Operation Barbarossa, as depicted in a US Government study (March 1955).

Stalin's reputation as a brutal dictator contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and to their expectations of success, as Stalin's Great Purge of the 1930s had executed many competent and experienced military officers, leaving Red Army leadership weaker than their German adversary. The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda. They also claimed that the Red Army was preparing to attack the Germans, and their own invasion was thus presented as a pre-emptive strike.

Hitler also utilised the rising tension between the Soviet Union and Germany over territories in the Balkans as one of the pretexts for the invasion. While no concrete plans had yet been made, Hitler told one of his generals in June 1940 that the victories in Western Europe finally freed his hands for a "final showdown" with Bolshevism. With the successful end to the campaign in France, General Erich Marcks was assigned the task of drawing up the initial invasion plans of the Soviet Union. The first battle plans were entitled Operation Draft East (colloquially known as the Marcks Plan). His report advocated the A-A line as the operational objective of any invasion of the Soviet Union. This assault would extend from the northern city of Arkhangelsk on the Arctic Sea through Gorky and Rostov to the port city of Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga on the Caspian Sea. The report concluded that—once established—this military border would reduce the threat to Germany from attacks by enemy bombers.

Although Hitler was warned by many high-ranking military officers, such as Friedrich Paulus, that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation," he anticipated compensatory benefits such as the demobilisation of entire divisions to relieve the acute labour shortage in German industry, the exploitation of Ukraine as a reliable and immense source of agricultural products, the use of forced labour to stimulate Germany's overall economy and the expansion of territory to improve Germany's efforts to isolate the United Kingdom. Hitler was further convinced that Britain would sue for peace once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union, and if they did not, he would use the resources gained in the East to defeat the British Empire.

We only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.

— —Adolf Hitler

Hitler received the final military plans for the invasion on 5 December 1940, which the German High Command had been working on since July 1940, under the codename "Operation Otto." Upon reviewing the plans, Hitler formally committed Germany to the invasion when he issued Führer Directive 21 on 18 December 1940, where he outlined the precise manner in which the operation was to be carried out. Hitler also renamed the operation to Barbarossa in honor of medieval Emperor Friedrich I of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century. The Barbarossa Decree, issued by Hitler on 30 March 1941, supplemented the Directive by decreeing that the war against the Soviet Union would be one of annihilation and legally sanctioned the eradication of all Communist political leaders and intellectual elites in Eastern Europe. The invasion was tentatively set for May 1941, but it was delayed for over a month to allow for further preparations and possibly better weather.

the purpose of the Russian campaign the decimation of the Slavic population by thirty million.

— — Heinrich Himmler's statement to SS officers at Wewelsburg castle, June 1941

According to a 1978 essay by German historian Andreas Hillgruber, the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were substantially coloured by hubris, stemming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the "invincible" Wehrmacht and by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic" country. Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the officer corps was held in contempt. The leadership of the Wehrmacht paid little attention to politics, culture, and the considerable industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, in favour of a very narrow military view. Hillgruber argued that because these assumptions were shared by the entire military elite, Hitler was able to push through with a "war of annihilation" that would be waged in the most inhumane fashion possible with the complicity of "several military leaders," even though it was quite clear that this would be in violation of all accepted norms of warfare.

Even so, in autumn 1940, some high-ranking German military officials drafted a memorandum to Hitler on the dangers of an invasion of the Soviet Union. They argued that the eastern territories (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic) would only end up as a further economic burden for Germany. It was further argued that the Soviets, in their current bureaucratic form, were harmless and that the occupation would not benefit Germany politically either. Hitler, solely focused on his ultimate ideological goal of eliminating the Soviet Union and Communism, disagreed with economists about the risks and told his right-hand man Hermann Göring, the chief of the Luftwaffe, that he would no longer listen to misgivings about the economic dangers of a war with the USSR. It is speculated that this was passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had produced reports that predicted a net economic drain for Germany in the event of an invasion of the Soviet Union unless its economy was captured intact and the Caucasus oilfields seized in the first blow; Thomas revised his future report to fit Hitler's wishes. The Red Army's ineptitude in the Winter War against Finland in 1939–40 also convinced Hitler of a quick victory within a few months. Neither Hitler nor the General Staff anticipated a long campaign lasting into the winter and therefore, adequate preparations such as the distribution of warm clothing and winterisation of important military equipment like tanks and artillery, were not made.

Further to Hitler's Directive, Göring's Green Folder, issued in March 1941, laid out the agenda for the next step after the anticipated quick conquest of the Soviet Union. The Hunger Plan outlined how entire urban populations of conquered territories were to be starved to death, thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and urban space for the German upper class. Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the geopolitical Lebensraum ideals for the benefit of future generations of the "Nordic master race". In 1941, Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg—later appointed Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories—suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be administered in the following Reichskommissariate ('Reich Commissionerships'):

Administrative subdivisions of conquered Soviet territory as envisaged, and then partially realised, by Alfred Rosenberg
Name Note Map
Reichskommissariat Ostland Baltic countries and Belarus
Reichskommissariat Ukraine Ukraine, enlarged eastwards to the Volga
Reichskommissariat Kaukasien Southern Russia and the Caucasus region Unrealised
Reichskommissariat Moskowien Moscow metropolitan area and remaining European Russia; originally called Reichskommissariat Russland, later renamed Unrealised
Reichskommissariat Turkestan Central Asian republics and territories Unrealised

German military planners also researched Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia. In their calculations, they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat of the Red Army into the Russian interior, as it could not afford to give up the Baltic countries, Ukraine, or the Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thus, have to be defended. Hitler and his generals disagreed on where Germany should focus its energy. Hitler, in many discussions with his generals, repeated his order of "Leningrad first, the Donbas second, Moscow third;" but he consistently emphasized the destruction of the Red Army over the achievement of specific terrain objectives. Hitler believed Moscow to be of "no great importance" in the defeat of the Soviet Union and instead believed victory would come with the destruction of the Red Army west of the capital, especially west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, and this pervaded the plan for Barbarossa. This belief later led to disputes between Hitler and several German senior officers, including Heinz Guderian, Gerhard Engel, Fedor von Bock and Franz Halder, who believed the decisive victory could only be delivered at Moscow. They were unable to sway Hitler, who had grown overconfident in his own military judgment as a result of the rapid successes in Western Europe.

German preparations

Elements of the German 3rd Panzer Army on the road near Pruzhany, June 1941

The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the campaign in the Balkans had finished. By the third week of February 1941, 680,000 German soldiers were gathered in assembly areas on the Romanian-Soviet border. In preparation for the attack, Hitler had secretly moved upwards of 3 million German troops and approximately 690,000 Axis soldiers to the Soviet border regions. Additional Luftwaffe operations included numerous aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory many months before the attack.

Although the Soviet High Command was alarmed by this, Stalin's belief that Nazi Germany was unlikely to attack only two years after signing the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact resulted in slow Soviet preparation. This fact aside, the Soviets did not entirely overlook the threat of their German neighbor. Well before the German invasion, Marshal Semyon Timoshenko referred to the Germans as the Soviet Union's "most important and strongest enemy," and as early as July 1940, the Red Army Chief of Staff, Boris Shaposhnikov, produced a preliminary three-pronged plan of attack for what a German invasion might look like, remarkably similar to the actual attack. Since April 1941, the Germans had begun setting up Operation Haifisch and Operation Harpune to substantiate their claims that Britain was the real target. These simulated preparations in Norway and the English Channel coast included activities such as ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises.

The reasons for the postponement of Barbarossa from the initially planned date of 15 May to the actual invasion date of 22 June 1941 (a 38-day delay) are debated. The reason most commonly cited is the unforeseen contingency of invading Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April 1941 until June 1941. Historian Thomas B. Buell indicates that Finland and Romania, which weren't involved in initial German planning, needed additional time to prepare to participate in the invasion. Buell adds that an unusually wet winter kept rivers at full flood until late spring. The floods may have discouraged an earlier attack, even if they occurred before the end of the Balkans Campaign.

OKH commander, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, and Hitler study maps during the early days of Hitler's Soviet Campaign.

The importance of the delay is still debated. William Shirer argued that Hitler's Balkan Campaign had delayed the commencement of Barbarossa by several weeks and thereby jeopardised it. Many later historians argue that the 22 June start date was sufficient for the German offensive to reach Moscow by September. Antony Beevor wrote in 2012 about the delay caused by German attacks in the Balkans that "most accept that it made little difference" to the eventual outcome of Barbarossa.

The Germans deployed one independent regiment, one separate motorised training brigade and 153 divisions for Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorised infantry divisions in three army groups, nine security divisions to operate in conquered territories, four divisions in Finland and two divisions as reserve under the direct control of OKH. These were equipped with 6,867 armoured vehicles, of which 3,350–3,795 were tanks, 2,770–4,389 aircraft (that amounted to 65 percent of the Luftwaffe), 7,200–23,435 artillery pieces, 17,081 mortars, about 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000–700,000 horses. Finland slated 14 divisions for the invasion, and Romania offered 13 divisions and eight brigades over the course of Barbarossa. The entire Axis forces, 3.8 million personnel, deployed across a front extending from the Arctic Ocean southward to the Black Sea, were all controlled by the OKH and organised into Army Norway, Army Group North, Army Group Centre and Army Group South, alongside three Luftflotten (air fleets, the air force equivalent of army groups) that supported the army groups: Luftflotte 1 for North, Luftflotte 2 for Centre and Luftflotte 4 for South.

Army Norway was to operate in far northern Scandinavia and bordering Soviet territories. Army Group North was to march through Latvia and Estonia into northern Russia, then either take or destroy the city of Leningrad, and link up with Finnish forces. Army Group Centre, the army group equipped with the most armour and air power, was to strike from Poland into Belorussia and the west-central regions of Russia proper, and advance to Smolensk and then Moscow. Army Group South was to strike the heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking Kiev before continuing eastward over the steppes of southern USSR to the Volga with the aim of controlling the oil-rich Caucasus. Army Group South was deployed in two sections separated by a 198-mile (319 km) gap. The northern section, which contained the army group's only panzer group, was in southern Poland right next to Army Group Centre, and the southern section was in Romania.

The German forces in the rear (mostly Waffen-SS and Einsatzgruppen units) were to operate in conquered territories to counter any partisan activity in areas they controlled, as well as to execute captured Soviet political commissars and Jews. On 17 June, Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) chief Reinhard Heydrich briefed around thirty to fifty Einsatzgruppen commanders on "the policy of eliminating Jews in Soviet territories, at least in general terms". While the Einsatzgruppen were assigned to the Wehrmacht's units, which provided them with supplies such as gasoline and food, they were controlled by the RSHA. The official plan for Barbarossa assumed that the army groups would be able to advance freely to their primary objectives simultaneously, without spreading thin, once they had won the border battles and destroyed the Red Army's forces in the border area.

Soviet preparations

See also: Soviet offensive plans controversy and 2006 Soviet war documents declassification
Semyon Timoshenko and Georgy Zhukov in 1940

In 1930, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a prominent military theorist in tank warfare in the interwar period and later Marshal of the Soviet Union, forwarded a memo to the Kremlin that lobbied for colossal investment in the resources required for the mass production of weapons, pressing the case for "40,000 aircraft and 50,000 tanks." In the early 1930s, a modern operational doctrine for the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 Field Regulations in the form of the Deep Battle Concept. Defence expenditure also grew rapidly from just 12 percent of the gross national product in 1933 to 18 percent by 1940.

During Joseph Stalin's Great Purge in the late 1930s, which had not ended by the time of the German invasion on 22 June 1941, much of the officer corps of the Red Army was executed or imprisoned. Many of their replacements, appointed by Stalin for political reasons, lacked military competence. Of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union appointed in 1935, only Kliment Voroshilov and Semyon Budyonny survived Stalin's purge. Tukhachevsky was killed in 1937. Fifteen of 16 army commanders, 50 of the 57 corps commanders, 154 of the 186 divisional commanders, and 401 of 456 colonels were killed, and many other officers were dismissed. In total, about 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed. Stalin further underscored his control by reasserting the role of political commissars at the divisional level and below to oversee the political loyalty of the army to the regime. The commissars held a position equal to that of the commander of the unit they were overseeing. But in spite of efforts to ensure the political subservience of the armed forces, in the wake of Red Army's poor performance in Poland and in the Winter War, about 80 percent of the officers dismissed during the Great Purge were reinstated by 1941. Also, between January 1939 and May 1941, 161 new divisions were activated. Therefore, although about 75 percent of all the officers had been in their position for less than one year at the start of the German invasion of 1941, many of the short tenures can be attributed not only to the purge but also to the rapid increase in the creation of military units.

Beginning in July 1940, the Red Army General Staff developed war plans that identified the Wehrmacht as the most dangerous threat to the Soviet Union, and that in the case of a war with Germany, the Wehrmacht's main attack would come through the region north of the Pripyat Marshes into Belorussia, which later proved to be correct. Stalin disagreed, and in October, he authorised the development of new plans that assumed a German attack would focus on the region south of Pripyat Marshes towards the economically vital regions in Ukraine. This became the basis for all subsequent Soviet war plans and the deployment of their armed forces in preparation for the German invasion.

In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December 1940, Stalin mentioned Hitler's references to an attack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf and Hitler's belief that the Red Army would need four years to ready itself. Stalin declared "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another two years". As early as August 1940, British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets a week after Hitler informally approved the plans for Barbarossa and warned the Soviet Union accordingly. Some of this intelligence was based on Ultra information obtained from broken Enigma traffic. But Stalin's distrust of the British led him to ignore their warnings in the belief that they were a trick designed to bring the Soviet Union into the war on their side. Soviet intelligence also received word of an invasion around 20 June from Mao Zedong whose spy, Yan Baohang, had overheard talk of the plans at a dinner with a German military attaché and sent word to Zhou Enlai. The Chinese maintain the tipoff helped Stalin make preparations, though little exists to confirm the Soviets made any real changes upon receiving the intelligence. In early 1941, Stalin's own intelligence services and American intelligence gave regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack. Soviet spy Richard Sorge also gave Stalin the exact German launch date, but Sorge and other informers had previously given different invasion dates that passed peacefully before the actual invasion. Stalin acknowledged the possibility of an attack in general and therefore made significant preparations, but decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler.

Army general (later Marshal) Zhukov speaking at a military conference in Moscow, September 1941

In early 1941, Stalin authorised the State Defence Plan 1941 (DP-41), which along with the Mobilisation Plan 1941 (MP-41), called for the deployment of 186 divisions, as the first strategic echelon, in the four military districts of the western Soviet Union that faced the Axis territories; and the deployment of another 51 divisions along the Dvina and Dnieper Rivers as the second strategic echelon under Stavka control, which in the case of a German invasion was tasked to spearhead a Soviet counteroffensive along with the remaining forces of the first echelon. But on 22 June 1941 the first echelon contained 171 divisions, numbering 2.6–2.9 million; and the second strategic echelon contained 57 divisions that were still mobilising, most of which were still understrength. The second echelon was undetected by German intelligence until days after the invasion commenced, in most cases only when German ground forces encountered them.

At the start of the invasion, the manpower of the Soviet military force that had been mobilised was 5.3–5.5 million, and it was still increasing as the Soviet reserve force of 14 million, with at least basic military training, continued to mobilise. The Red Army was dispersed and still preparing when the invasion commenced. Their units were often separated and lacked adequate transportation. While transportation remained insufficient for Red Army forces, when Operation Barbarossa kicked off, they possessed some 33,000 pieces of artillery, a number far greater than the Germans had at their disposal.

The Soviet Union had around 23,000 tanks available of which 14,700 were combat-ready. Around 11,000 tanks were in the western military districts that faced the German invasion force. Hitler later declared to some of his generals, "If I had known about the Russian tank strength in 1941 I would not have attacked". However, maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many armoured units lacked the trucks for supplies. The most advanced Soviet tank models—the KV-1 and T-34—which were superior to all current German tanks, as well as all designs still in development as of the summer 1941, were not available in large numbers at the time the invasion commenced. Furthermore, in the autumn of 1939, the Soviets disbanded their mechanised corps and partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions; but following their observation of the German campaign in France, in late 1940 they began to reorganise most of their armoured assets back into mechanised corps with a target strength of 1,031 tanks each. But these large armoured formations were unwieldy, and moreover they were spread out in scattered garrisons, with their subordinate divisions up to 100 kilometres (62 miles) apart. The reorganisation was still in progress and incomplete when Barbarossa commenced. Soviet tank units were rarely well equipped, and they lacked training and logistical support. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements in place for refuelling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was thoroughly offset by the superior training and organisation of the Wehrmacht.

The Soviet Air Force (VVS) held the numerical advantage with a total of approximately 19,533 aircraft, which made it the largest air force in the world in the summer of 1941. About 7,133–9,100 of these were deployed in the five western military districts, and an additional 1,445 were under naval control.

Development of the Soviet Armed Forces
1 January 1939 22 June 1941 Increase
Divisions calculated 131.5 316.5 140.7%
Personnel 2,485,000 5,774,000 132.4%
Guns and mortars 55,800 117,600 110.7%
Tanks 21,100 25,700 21.8%
Aircraft 7,700 18,700 142.8%

Historians have debated whether Stalin was planning an invasion of German territory in the summer of 1941. The debate began in the late 1980s when Viktor Suvorov published a journal article and later the book Icebreaker in which he claimed that Stalin had seen the outbreak of war in Western Europe as an opportunity to spread communist revolutions throughout the continent, and that the Soviet military was being deployed for an imminent attack at the time of the German invasion. This view had also been advanced by former German generals following the war. Suvorov's thesis was fully or partially accepted by a limited number of historians, including Valeri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann, Mikhail Meltyukhov, and Vladimir Nevezhin, and attracted public attention in Germany, Israel, and Russia. It has been strongly rejected by most historians, and Icebreaker is generally considered to be an "anti-Soviet tract" in Western countries. David Glantz and Gabriel Gorodetsky wrote books to rebut Suvorov's arguments. The majority of historians believe that Stalin was seeking to avoid war in 1941, as he believed that his military was not ready to fight the German forces. The debate on whether Stalin intended to launch an offensive against Germany in 1941 remains inconclusive but has produced an abundance of scholarly literature and helped to expand the understanding of larger themes in Soviet and world history during the interwar period.

Order of battle

Main article: Order of battle for Operation Barbarossa
Order of battle – June 1941
Axis forces Soviet forces
Total number of divisions (22 June)
German : 152 Romanian : 14 Soviet : 220

Invasion

German troops at the Soviet state border marker, 22 June 1941

At around 01:00 on 22 June 1941, the Soviet military districts in the border area were alerted by NKO Directive No. 1, issued late on the night of 21 June. It called on them to "bring all forces to combat readiness", but to "avoid provocative actions of any kind". It took up to two hours for several of the units subordinate to the Fronts to receive the order of the directive, and the majority did not receive it before the invasion commenced. A German communist deserter, Alfred Liskow, had crossed the lines at 21:00 on 21 June and informed the Soviets that an attack was coming at 04:00. Stalin was informed, but apparently regarded it as disinformation. Liskow was still being interrogated when the attack began.

On 21 June, at 13:00 Army Group North received the codeword "Düsseldorf", indicating Barbarossa would commence the next morning, and passed down its own codeword, "Dortmund". At around 03:15 on 22 June 1941, the Axis Powers commenced the invasion of the Soviet Union with the bombing of major cities in Soviet-occupied Poland and an artillery barrage on Red Army defences on the entire front. Air-raids were conducted as far as Kronstadt near Leningrad and Sevastopol in the Crimea. At the same time the German declaration of war was presented by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Meanwhile, ground troops crossed the border, accompanied in some locales by Lithuanian and Ukrainian partisans. Roughly three million soldiers of the Wehrmacht went into action and faced slightly fewer Soviet troops at the border. Accompanying the German forces during the initial invasion were Finnish and Romanian units as well.

Moscovites gather by a loudspeaker to listen to Molotov's speech, 22 June 1941

At around noon, the news of the invasion was broadcast to the population by Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov: "... Without a declaration of war, German forces fell on our country, attacked our frontiers in many places ... The Red Army and the whole nation will wage a victorious Patriotic War for our beloved country, for honour, for liberty ... Our cause is just. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be ours!" By calling upon the population's devotion to their nation rather than the Party, Molotov struck a patriotic chord that helped a stunned people absorb the shattering news. Within the first few days of the invasion, the Soviet High Command and Red Army were extensively reorganised so as to place them on the necessary war footing. Stalin did not address the nation about the German invasion until 3 July, when he also called for a "Patriotic War... of the entire Soviet people".

In Germany, on the morning of 22 June, Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels announced the invasion to the waking nation in a radio broadcast with Hitler's words: "At this moment a march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided today to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially in this fight!" Later the same morning, Hitler proclaimed to his colleagues, "Before three months have passed, we shall witness a collapse of Russia, the like of which has never been seen in history". Hitler also addressed the German people via the radio, presenting himself as a man of peace, who reluctantly had to attack the Soviet Union. Following the invasion, Goebbels instructed that Nazi propaganda use the slogan "European crusade against Bolshevism" to describe the war; subsequently thousands of volunteers and conscripts joined the Waffen-SS.

Initial attacks

German advances from June to August 1941

The initial momentum of the German ground and air attack completely destroyed the Soviet organisational command and control within the first few hours, paralyzing every level of command from the infantry platoon to the Soviet High Command in Moscow. Moscow failed to grasp the magnitude of the catastrophe that confronted the Soviet forces in the border area, and Stalin's first reaction was disbelief. At around 07:15, Stalin issued NKO Directive No. 2, which announced the invasion to the Soviet Armed Forces, and called on them to attack Axis forces wherever they had violated the borders and launch air strikes into the border regions of German territory. At around 09:15, Stalin issued NKO Directive No. 3, signed by Timoshenko, which now called for a general counteroffensive on the entire front "without any regards for borders" that both men hoped would sweep the enemy from Soviet territory. Stalin's order, which Timoshenko authorised, was not based on a realistic appraisal of the military situation at hand, but commanders passed it along for fear of retribution if they failed to obey; several days passed before the Soviet leadership became aware of the enormity of the opening defeat.

Air war

Main articles: Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa and German-Soviet air war 22 June 1941

Luftwaffe reconnaissance units plotted Soviet troop concentrations, supply dumps and airfields, and marked them down for destruction. Additional Luftwaffe attacks were carried out against Soviet command and control centres to disrupt the mobilisation and organisation of Soviet forces. In contrast, Soviet artillery observers based at the border area had been under the strictest instructions not to open fire on German aircraft prior to the invasion. One plausible reason given for the Soviet hesitation to return fire was Stalin's initial belief that the assault was launched without Hitler's authorisation. Significant amounts of Soviet territory were lost along with Red Army forces as a result; it took several days before Stalin comprehended the magnitude of the calamity. The Luftwaffe reportedly destroyed 1,489 aircraft on the first day of the invasion and over 3,100 during the first three days. Hermann Göring, Minister of Aviation and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, distrusted the reports and ordered the figure checked. Luftwaffe staffs surveyed the wreckage on Soviet airfields, and their original figure proved conservative, as over 2,000 Soviet aircraft were estimated to have been destroyed on the first day of the invasion. In reality, Soviet losses were likely higher; a Soviet archival document recorded the loss of 3,922 Soviet aircraft in the first three days against an estimated loss of 78 German aircraft. The Luftwaffe reported the loss of only 35 aircraft on the first day of combat. A document from the German Federal Archives puts the Luftwaffe's loss at 63 aircraft for the first day.

By the end of the first week, the Luftwaffe had achieved air supremacy over the battlefields of all the army groups, but was unable to extend this air dominance over the vast expanse of the western Soviet Union. According to the war diaries of the German High Command, the Luftwaffe by 5 July had lost 491 aircraft with 316 more damaged, leaving it with only about 70 percent of the strength it had at the start of the invasion.

Baltic countries

Main article: Baltic Operation
German forces pushing through Latvia, summer 1941

On 22 June, Army Group North attacked the Soviet Northwestern Front and broke through its 8th and 11th Armies. The Soviets immediately launched a powerful counterattack against the German 4th Panzer Group with the Soviet 3rd and 12th Mechanised Corps, but the Soviet attack was defeated. On 25 June, the 8th and 11th Armies were ordered to withdraw to the Western Dvina River, where it was planned to meet up with the 21st Mechanised Corps and the 22nd and 27th Armies. However, on 26 June, Erich von Manstein's LVI Panzer Corps reached the river first and secured a bridgehead across it. The Northwestern Front was forced to abandon the river defences, and on 29 June Stavka ordered the Front to withdraw to the Stalin Line on the approaches to Leningrad. On 2 July, Army Group North began its attack on the Stalin Line with its 4th Panzer Group, and on 8 July captured Pskov, devastating the defences of the Stalin Line and reaching Leningrad oblast. The 4th Panzer Group had advanced about 450 kilometres (280 mi) since the start of the invasion and was now only about 250 kilometres (160 mi) from its primary objective Leningrad. On 9 July it began its attack towards the Soviet defences along the Luga River in Leningrad oblast.

Ukraine and Moldavia

See also: Operation München and Battle of Brody (1941)
General Ewald von Kleist (left), commander of the 1st Panzer Group, inspects a large iron works facility in Ukraine, 1941.

The northern section of Army Group South faced the Southwestern Front, which had the largest concentration of Soviet forces, and the southern section faced the Southern Front. In addition, the Pripyat Marshes and the Carpathian Mountains posed a serious challenge to the army group's northern and southern sections respectively. On 22 June, only the northern section of Army Group South attacked, but the terrain impeded their assault, giving the Soviet defenders ample time to react. The German 1st Panzer Group and 6th Army attacked and broke through the Soviet 5th Army. Starting on the night of 23 June, the Soviet 22nd and 15th Mechanised Corps attacked the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group from north and south respectively. Although intended to be concerted, Soviet tank units were sent in piecemeal due to poor coordination. The 22nd Mechanised Corps ran into the 1st Panzer Army's III Motorised Corps and was decimated, and its commander killed. The 1st Panzer Group bypassed much of the 15th Mechanised Corps, which engaged the German 6th Army's 297th Infantry Division, where it was defeated by antitank fire and Luftwaffe attacks. On 26 June, the Soviets launched another counterattack on the 1st Panzer Group from north and south simultaneously with the 9th, 19th and 8th Mechanised Corps, which altogether fielded 1649 tanks, and supported by the remnants of the 15th Mechanised Corps. The battle lasted for four days, ending in the defeat of the Soviet tank units. On 30 June Stavka ordered the remaining forces of the Southwestern Front to withdraw to the Stalin Line, where it would defend the approaches to Kiev.

On 2 July, the southern section of Army Group South—the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, alongside the German 11th Army—invaded Soviet Moldavia, which was defended by the Southern Front. Counterattacks by the Front's 2nd Mechanised Corps and 9th Army were defeated, but on 9 July the Axis advance stalled along the defences of the Soviet 18th Army between the Prut and Dniester Rivers.

Belorussia

Main article: Battle of Białystok–Minsk

In the opening hours of the invasion, the Luftwaffe destroyed the Western Front's air force on the ground, and with the aid of Abwehr and their supporting anti-communist fifth columns operating in the Soviet rear paralyzed the Front's communication lines, which particularly cut off the Soviet 4th Army headquarters from headquarters above and below it. On the same day, the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Bug River, broke through the 4th Army, bypassed Brest Fortress, and pressed on towards Minsk, while the 3rd Panzer Group bypassed most of the 3rd Army and pressed on towards Vilnius. Simultaneously, the German 4th and 9th Armies engaged the Western Front forces in the environs of Białystok. On the order of the Western Front commander, Dmitry Pavlov, the 6th and 11th Mechanised Corps and the 6th Cavalry Corps launched a strong counterstrike towards Grodno on 24–25 June in hopes of destroying the 3rd Panzer Group. However, the 3rd Panzer Group had already moved on, with its forward units reaching Vilnius on the evening of 23 June, and the Western Front's armoured counterattack instead ran into infantry and antitank fire from the V Army Corps of the German 9th Army, supported by Luftwaffe air attacks. By the night of 25 June, the Soviet counterattack was defeated, and the commander of the 6th Cavalry Corps was captured. The same night, Pavlov ordered all the remnants of the Western Front to withdraw to Slonim towards Minsk. Subsequent counterattacks to buy time for the withdrawal were launched against the German forces, but all of them failed. On 27 June, the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups met near Minsk and captured the city the next day, completing the encirclement of almost all of the Western Front in two pockets: one around Białystok and another west of Minsk. The Germans destroyed the Soviet 3rd and 10th Armies while inflicting serious losses on the 4th, 11th and 13th Armies, and reported to have captured 324,000 Soviet troops, 3,300 tanks, 1,800 artillery pieces.

German mechanised forces staging in preparation to attack Slutsk in present-day Belarus

A Soviet directive was issued on 29 June to combat the mass panic rampant among the civilians and the armed forces personnel. The order stipulated swift, severe measures against anyone inciting panic or displaying cowardice. The NKVD worked with commissars and military commanders to scour possible withdrawal routes of soldiers retreating without military authorisation. Field expedient general courts were established to deal with civilians spreading rumours and military deserters. On 30 June, Stalin relieved Pavlov of his command, and on 22 July tried and executed him along with many members of his staff on charges of "cowardice" and "criminal incompetence".

On 29 June, Hitler, through Brauchitsch, instructed Bock to halt the advance of the panzers of Army Group Centre until the infantry formations liquidating the pockets caught up. But Guderian, with the tacit support of Bock and Halder, ignored the instruction and attacked on eastward towards Bobruisk, albeit reporting the advance as a reconnaissance-in-force. He also personally conducted an aerial inspection of the Minsk-Białystok pocket on 30 June and concluded that his panzer group was not needed to contain it, since Hermann Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group was already involved in the Minsk pocket. On the same day, some of the infantry corps of the 9th and 4th Armies, having sufficiently liquidated the Białystok pocket, resumed their march eastward to catch up with the panzer groups. On 1 July, Bock ordered the panzer groups to resume their full offensive eastward on the morning of 3 July. But Brauchitsch, upholding Hitler's instruction, and Halder, unwillingly going along with it, opposed Bock's order. However, Bock insisted on the order by stating that it would be irresponsible to reverse orders already issued. The panzer groups resumed their offensive on 2 July before the infantry formations had sufficiently caught up.

Northeast Finland

Main article: Continuation War
Finnish soldiers crossing the Murmansk Railway, 1941

During German-Finnish negotiations, Finland had demanded to remain neutral unless the Soviet Union attacked them first. Germany therefore sought to provoke the Soviet Union into an attack on Finland. After Germany launched Barbarossa on 22 June, German aircraft used Finnish air bases to attack Soviet positions. The same day the Germans launched Operation Rentier and occupied the Petsamo Province at the Finnish-Soviet border. Simultaneously Finland proceeded to remilitarise the neutral Åland Islands. Despite these actions the Finnish government insisted via diplomatic channels that they remained a neutral party, but the Soviet leadership already viewed Finland as an ally of Germany. Subsequently, the Soviets proceeded to launch a massive bombing attack on 25 June against all major Finnish cities and industrial centres, including Helsinki, Turku and Lahti. During a night session on the same day the Finnish parliament decided to go to war against the Soviet Union.

Finland was divided into two operational zones. Northern Finland was the staging area for Army Norway. Its goal was to execute a two-pronged pincer movement on the strategic port of Murmansk, named Operation Silver Fox. Southern Finland was still under the responsibility of the Finnish Army. The goal of the Finnish forces was, at first, to recapture Finnish Karelia at Lake Ladoga as well as the Karelian Isthmus, which included Finland's second largest city Viipuri.

Further German advances

Further information: Battle of Smolensk (1941) and Leningrad Operation (1941)
German advances during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa, August 1941

On 2 July and through the next six days, a rainstorm typical of Belarusian summers slowed the progress of the panzers of Army Group Centre, and Soviet defences stiffened. The delays gave the Soviets time to organise a massive counterattack against Army Group Centre. The army group's ultimate objective was Smolensk, which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing the Germans was an old Soviet defensive line held by six armies. On 6 July, the Soviets launched a massive counter-attack using the V and VII Mechanised Corps of the 20th Army, which collided with the German 39th and 47th Panzer Corps in a battle where the Red Army lost 832 tanks of the 2,000 employed during five days of ferocious fighting. The Germans defeated this counterattack thanks largely to the coincidental presence of the Luftwaffe's only squadron of tank-busting aircraft. The 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper River and closed in on Smolensk from the south while the 3rd Panzer Group, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closed on Smolensk from the north. Trapped between their pincers were three Soviet armies. The 29th Motorised Division captured Smolensk on 16 July yet a gap remained between Army Group Centre. On 18 July, the panzer groups came to within ten kilometres (6.2 mi) of closing the gap but the trap did not finally close until 5 August, when upwards of 300,000 Red Army soldiers had been captured and 3,205 Soviet tanks were destroyed. Large numbers of Red Army soldiers escaped to stand between the Germans and Moscow as resistance continued.

German mechanized forces pushing east through a rapeseed field, August 1941.

Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realised they had grossly underestimated Soviet strength. The German troops had used their initial supplies, and General Bock quickly came to the conclusion that not only had the Red Army offered stiff opposition, but German difficulties were also due to the logistical problems with reinforcements and provisions. Operations were now slowed down to allow for resupply; the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation. In addition to strained logistics, poor roads made it difficult for wheeled vehicles and foot infantry to keep up with the faster armoured spearheads, and shortages in boots and winter uniforms were becoming apparent. Furthermore, all three army groups had suffered 179,500 casualties by 2 August, and had only received 47,000 replacements.

Hitler by now had lost faith in battles of encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pincers. He now believed he could defeat the Soviet state by economic means, depriving them of the industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant seizing the industrial centre of Kharkov, the Donbas and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the south and the speedy capture of Leningrad, a major centre of military production, in the north.

German armoured forces cross the Dnieper, September 1941.

Halder, Bock, and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa argued vehemently in favour of continuing the all-out drive toward Moscow. Besides the psychological importance of capturing the Soviet capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was a major centre of arms production, the centre of the Soviet communications system and an important transport hub. Intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the remaining Red Army was deployed near Moscow under Timoshenko for the defence of the capital. Guderian was sent to Hitler by Bock and Halder to argue their case for continuing the assault against Moscow, but Hitler issued an order through Guderian (bypassing Bock and Halder) to send Army Group Centre's tanks to the north and south, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow. Convinced by Hitler's argument, Guderian returned to his commanding officers as a convert to the Führer's plan, which earned him their disdain.

Northern Finland

Main articles: Operation Silver Fox and Operation Platinum Fox

On 29 June, Germany launched its effort to capture Murmansk in a pincer attack. The northern pincer, conducted by Mountain Corps Norway, approached Murmansk directly by crossing the border at Petsamo. However, in mid-July after securing the neck of the Rybachy Peninsula and advancing to the Litsa River the German advance was stopped by heavy resistance from the Soviet 14th Army. Renewed attacks led to nothing, and this front became a stalemate for the remainder of Barbarossa.

The second pincer attack began on 1 July with the German XXXVI Corps and Finnish III Corps slated to recapture the Salla region for Finland and then proceed eastwards to cut the Murmansk railway near Kandalaksha. The German units had great difficulty dealing with the Arctic conditions. After heavy fighting, Salla was taken on 8 July. To keep the momentum the German-Finnish forces advanced eastwards until they were stopped at the town of Kayraly by Soviet resistance. Further south the Finnish III Corps made an independent effort to reach the Murmansk railway through the Arctic terrain. Facing only one division of the Soviet 7th Army it was able to make rapid headway. On 7 August it captured Kestenga while reaching the outskirts of Ukhta. Large Red Army reinforcements then prevented further gains on both fronts, and the German-Finnish force had to go onto the defensive.

Karelia

Main articles: Finnish reconquest of Ladoga Karelia (1941) and Finnish reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus (1941)
Finnish troops advancing in Karelia in August 1941

The Finnish plan in the south in Karelia was to advance as swiftly as possible to Lake Ladoga, cutting the Soviet forces in half. Then the Finnish territories east of Lake Ladoga were to be recaptured before the advance along the Karelian Isthmus, including the recapture of Viipuri, commenced. The Finnish attack was launched on 10 July. The Army of Karelia held a numerical advantage versus the Soviet defenders of the 7th Army and 23rd Army, so it could advance swiftly. The important road junction at Loimola was captured on 14 July. By 16 July, the first Finnish units reached Lake Ladoga at Koirinoja, achieving the goal of splitting the Soviet forces. During the rest of July, the Army of Karelia advanced further southeast into Karelia, coming to a halt at the former Finnish-Soviet border at Mansila.

With the Soviet forces cut in half, the attack on the Karelian Isthmus could commence. The Finnish army attempted to encircle large Soviet formations at Sortavala and Hiitola by advancing to the western shores of Lake Ladoga. By mid-August the encirclement had succeeded and both towns were taken, but many Soviet formations were able to evacuate by sea. Further west, the attack on Viipuri was launched. With Soviet resistance breaking down, the Finns were able to encircle Viipuri by advancing to the Vuoksi River. The city itself was taken on 29 August, along with a broad advance on the rest of the Karelian Isthmus. By the beginning of September, Finland had restored its pre-Winter War borders.

Offensive towards central Russia

Main article: Battle of Uman

By mid-July, the German forces had advanced within a few kilometers of Kiev below the Pripyat Marshes. The 1st Panzer Group then went south, while the 17th Army struck east and trapped three Soviet armies near Uman. As the Germans eliminated the pocket, the tanks turned north and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Group, diverted from Army Group Centre, had crossed the river Desna with 2nd Army on its right flank. The two panzer armies now trapped four Soviet armies and parts of two others.

By August, as the serviceability and the quantity of the Luftwaffe's inventory steadily diminished due to combat, demand for air support only increased as the VVS recovered. The Luftwaffe found itself struggling to maintain local air superiority. With the onset of bad weather in October, the Luftwaffe was on several occasions forced to halt nearly all aerial operations. The VVS, although faced with the same weather difficulties, had a clear advantage thanks to the prewar experience with cold-weather flying, and the fact that they were operating from intact airbases and airports. By December, the VVS had matched the Luftwaffe and was even pressing to achieve air superiority over the battlefields.

Leningrad

Main article: Siege of Leningrad

For its final attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Group was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Centre. On 8 August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defences. By the end of August, 4th Panzer Group had penetrated to within 48 kilometres (30 miles) of Leningrad. The Finns had pushed southeast on both sides of Lake Ladoga to reach the old Finnish-Soviet frontier.

German general Heinz Guderian (centre), commander of Panzer Group 2, on 20 August 1941

The Germans attacked Leningrad in August 1941; in the following three "black months" of 1941, 400,000 residents of the city worked to build the city's fortifications as fighting continued, while 160,000 others joined the ranks of the Red Army. Nowhere was the Soviet levée en masse spirit stronger in resisting the Germans than at Leningrad where reserve troops and freshly improvised Narodnoe Opolcheniye units, consisting of worker battalions and even schoolboy formations, joined in digging trenches as they prepared to defend the city. On 7 September, the German 20th Motorised Division seized Shlisselburg, cutting off all land routes to Leningrad. The Germans severed the railroads to Moscow and captured the railroad to Murmansk with Finnish assistance to inaugurate the start of a siege that would last for over two years.

At this stage, Hitler ordered the final destruction of Leningrad with no prisoners taken, and on 9 September, Army Group North began the final push. Within ten days it had advanced within 11 kilometres (6.8 miles) of the city. However, the push over the last 10 km (6.2 mi) proved very slow. and casualties mounted. Hitler, now out of patience, ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed, but rather starved into submission. Along these lines, the OKH issued Directive No. la 1601/41 on 22 September 1941, which accorded Hitler's plans. Deprived of its Panzer forces, Army Group Centre remained static and was subjected to numerous Soviet counterattacks, in particular the Yelnya Offensive, in which the Germans suffered their first major tactical defeat since their invasion began; this Red Army victory also provided an important boost to Soviet morale. These attacks prompted Hitler to concentrate his attention back to Army Group Centre and its drive on Moscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies to break off their Siege of Leningrad and support Army Group Centre in its attack on Moscow.

Kiev

Main article: Battle of Kiev (1941)

Before an attack on Moscow could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be finished. Half of Army Group Centre had swung to the south in the back of the Kiev position, while Army Group South moved to the north from its Dnieper bridgehead. The encirclement of Soviet forces in Kiev was achieved on 16 September. A battle ensued in which the Soviets were hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerial bombardment. After ten days of vicious fighting, the Germans claimed 665,000 Soviet soldiers captured, although the real figure is probably around 220,000. Soviet losses were 452,720 men, 3,867 artillery pieces and mortars from 43 divisions of the 5th, 21st, 26th, and 37th Soviet Armies. Despite the exhaustion and losses facing some German units (upwards of 75 percent of their men) from the intense fighting, the massive defeat of the Soviets at Kiev and the Red Army losses during the first three months of the assault contributed to the German assumption that Operation Typhoon (the attack on Moscow) could still succeed.

Sea of Azov

Main article: Battle of the Sea of Azov
Germans battle Soviet defenders on the streets of Kharkov, 25 October 1941.

After operations at Kiev were successfully concluded, Army Group South advanced east and south to capture the industrial Donbas region and the Crimea. The Soviet Southern Front launched an attack on 26 September with two armies on the northern shores of the Sea of Azov against elements of the German 11th Army, which was simultaneously advancing into the Crimea. On 1 October, the 1st Panzer Army under Ewald von Kleist swept south to encircle the two attacking Soviet armies. By 7 October, the Soviet 9th and 18th Armies were isolated and four days later they had been annihilated. The Soviet defeat was total; 106,332 men captured, 212 tanks destroyed or captured in the pocket alone as well as 766 artillery pieces of all types. The death or capture of two-thirds of all Southern Front troops in four days unhinged the Front's left flank, allowing the Germans to capture Kharkov on 24 October. Kleist's 1st Panzer Army took the Donbas region that same month.

Central and northern Finland

The front in Finland, December 1941

In central Finland, the German-Finnish advance on the Murmansk railway had been resumed at Kayraly. A large encirclement from the north and the south trapped the defending Soviet corps and allowed XXXVI Corps to advance further to the east. In early September it reached the old 1939 Soviet border fortifications. On 6 September the first defence line at the Voyta River was breached, but further attacks against the main line at the Verman River failed. With Army Norway switching its main effort further south, the front stalemated in this sector. Further south, the Finnish III Corps launched a new offensive towards the Murmansk railway on 30 October, bolstered by fresh reinforcements from Army Norway. Against Soviet resistance, it was able to come within 30 km (19 mi) of the railway, when the Finnish High Command ordered a stop to all offensive operations in the sector on 17 November. The United States of America applied diplomatic pressure on Finland not to disrupt Allied aid shipments to the Soviet Union, which caused the Finnish government to halt the advance on the Murmansk railway. With the Finnish refusal to conduct further offensive operations and German inability to do so alone, the German-Finnish effort in central and northern Finland came to an end.

Karelia

Main article: Finnish invasion of East Karelia (1941)

Germany had pressured Finland to enlarge its offensive activities in Karelia to aid the Germans in their Leningrad operation. Finnish attacks on Leningrad itself remained limited. Finland stopped its advance just short of Leningrad and had no intentions to attack the city. The situation was different in eastern Karelia. The Finnish government agreed to restart its offensive into Soviet Karelia to reach Lake Onega and the Svir River. On 4 September, this new drive was launched on a broad front. Albeit reinforced by fresh reserve troops, heavy losses elsewhere on the front meant that the Soviet defenders of the 7th Army were not able to resist the Finnish advance. Olonets was taken on 5 September. On 7 September, Finnish forward units reached the Svir River. Petrozavodsk, the capital city of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, fell on 1 October. From there the Army of Karelia moved north along the shores of Lake Onega to secure the remaining area west of Lake Onega, while simultaneously establishing a defensive position along the Svir River. Slowed by winter's onset they nevertheless continued to advance slowly during the following weeks. Medvezhyegorsk was captured on 5 December and Povenets fell the next day. On 7 December, Finland halted all offensive operations and went onto the defensive.

Battle of Moscow

Main article: Battle of Moscow
Soviet Ilyushin Il-2s flying over German positions near Moscow
German soldier ready to throw a Stielhandgranate 24, 1941

After Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and there were no more trained reserves directly available. To defend Moscow, Stalin could field 800,000 men in 83 divisions, but no more than 25 divisions were fully effective. Operation Typhoon, the drive to Moscow, began on 30 September 1941. In front of Army Group Centre was a series of elaborate defence lines, the first centred on Vyazma and the second on Mozhaysk. Russian peasants began fleeing ahead of the advancing German units, burning their harvested crops, driving their cattle away, and destroying buildings in their villages as part of a scorched-earth policy designed to deny to the Nazi war machine needed supplies and foodstuffs.

The first blow took the Soviets completely by surprise when the 2nd Panzer Group, returning from the south, took Oryol, just 121 km (75 mi) south of the Soviet first main defence line. Three days later, the Panzers pushed on to Bryansk, while the 2nd Army attacked from the west. The Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies were now encircled. To the north, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies. Moscow's first line of defence had been shattered. The pocket eventually yielded over 500,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the start of the invasion to three million. The Soviets now had only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for the defence of Moscow.

The German government now publicly predicted the imminent capture of Moscow and convinced foreign correspondents of an impending Soviet collapse. On 13 October, the 3rd Panzer Group penetrated to within 140 km (87 mi) of the capital. Martial law was declared in Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon, however, the weather worsened. Temperatures fell while there was continued rainfall. This turned the unpaved road network into mud and slowed the German advance on Moscow. Additional snows fell which were followed by more rain, creating a glutinous mud that German tanks had difficulty traversing, which the Soviet T-34, with its wider tread, was better suited to navigate. At the same time, the supply situation for the Germans rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the German Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were reorganised. The pause gave the Soviets, far better supplied, time to consolidate their positions and organise formations of newly activated reservists. In little over a month, the Soviets organised eleven new armies that included 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet Far East after Soviet intelligence assured Stalin that there was no longer a threat from the Japanese. During October and November 1941, over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft arrived along with the Siberian forces to assist in defending the city.

With the ground hardening due to the cold weather, the Germans resumed the attack on Moscow on 15 November. Although the troops themselves were now able to advance again, there had been no improvement in the supply situation; only 135,000 of the 600,000 trucks that had been available on 22 June 1941 were available by 15 November 1941. Ammunition and fuel supplies were prioritised over food and winter clothing, so many German troops looted supplies from local populations, but could not fill their needs.

Facing the Germans were the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet Armies. The Germans intended to move the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies across the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow from the northeast. The 2nd Panzer Group would attack Tula and then close on Moscow from the south. As the Soviets reacted to their flanks, the 4th Army would attack the centre. In two weeks of fighting, lacking sufficient fuel and ammunition, the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow. In the south, the 2nd Panzer Group was being blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units, augmented by the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies, attacked the 2nd Panzer Group and inflicted a defeat on the Germans. The 4th Panzer Group pushed the Soviet 16th Army back, however, and succeeded in crossing the Moscow Canal in an attempt to encircle Moscow.

The German position of advances up to the end of Operation Typhoon, 5 December 1941

On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within 24 km (15 mi) of Moscow. They were so close that German officers claimed they could see the spires of the Kremlin, but by then the first blizzards had begun. A reconnaissance battalion managed to reach the town of Khimki, only about 8 km (5.0 mi) from the Soviet capital. It captured the bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as the railway station, which marked the easternmost advance of German forces. In spite of the progress made, the Wehrmacht was not equipped for such severe winter warfare. The Soviet army was better adapted to fighting in winter conditions, but faced production shortages of winter clothing. The German forces fared worse, with deep snow further hindering equipment and mobility. Weather conditions had largely grounded the Luftwaffe, preventing large-scale air operations. Newly created Soviet units near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, who despite their inexperience, were able to halt the German offensive by 5 December due to superior defensive fortifications, the presence of skilled and experienced leadership like Zhukov, and the poor German situation. On 5 December, the Soviet defenders launched a massive counterattack as part of the Soviet winter counteroffensive. The offensive halted on 7 January 1942, after having pushed the German armies back 100–250 km (62–155 mi) from Moscow. The Wehrmacht had lost the Battle for Moscow, and the invasion had cost the German Army over 830,000 men.

Aftermath

With the failure of the Battle of Moscow, all German plans for a quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be revised. The Soviet counter-offensives in December 1941 caused heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately eliminated the German threat to Moscow. Attempting to explain matters, Hitler issued Führer Directive No. 39, which cited the early onset of winter and the severe cold as the primary reasons for the failed campaign, whereas the main reasons were German military unpreparedness, poor intelligence of actual Soviet strength, extensive logistical difficulties, high levels of attrition and heavy casualties, and overextension of German forces within the vast Soviet territories. On 22 June 1941, the Heer as a whole had 209 divisions at its disposal, 163 of which were offensively capable. On 31 March 1942, less than one year after the invasion of the Soviet Union, the army was reduced to fielding 58 offensively capable divisions. The Red Army's tenacity and ability to counter-attack effectively took the Germans as much by surprise as their own initial attack had the Soviets. Spurred on by the successful defence and in an effort to imitate the Germans, Stalin wanted to begin his own counteroffensive, not just against the German forces around Moscow, but against their armies in the north and south. Anger over the failed German offensives caused Hitler to relieve Brauchitsch of command and in his place, Hitler assumed personal control of the German Army on 19 December 1941, a decision that would progressively prove fatal to Germany's war effort and contribute to its eventual defeat.

The Soviet Union had suffered heavily from the conflict, losing huge tracts of territory, and vast losses in men and materiel. Nonetheless, the Red Army proved capable of countering the German offensives, particularly as the Germans began experiencing irreplaceable shortages in manpower, armaments, provisions, and fuel.

Subsequent German offensives

Despite the rapid relocation of Red Army armaments production east of the Urals and a dramatic increase of production in 1942, especially of armour, new aircraft types and artillery, the Heer (German army) was able to mount another large-scale offensive in June 1942, although on a much reduced front than the previous summer. Hitler, having realised that Germany's oil supply was severely depleted, attempted to utilise Army Group South to capture the oil fields of Baku in the new offensive, codenamed Case Blue. Again, the Germans quickly overran great expanses of Soviet territory, but they failed to achieve their ultimate goal of the oil fields of Baku, culminating in their disastrous defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943 and withdrawal from the Caucasus.

By 1943, Soviet armaments production was fully operational and increasingly outproducing the German war economy. The final major German offensive in the Eastern theatre of World War II took place during July–August 1943 with the launch of Operation Citadel, an assault on the Kursk salient. Approximately one million German troops confronted a Soviet force over 2.5 million strong. The Soviets, well aware of the attack in advance and fully prepared for it, prevailed in the Battle of Kursk. Following the German defeat, the Soviets launched Operation Kutuzov, a counter-offensive employing six million men along a 2,400-kilometre (1,500 mi) front towards the Dnieper River as they drove the Germans westwards.

Employing increasingly ambitious and tactically sophisticated offensives, along with making operational improvements in secrecy and deception, by the summer of 1944, the Red Army was eventually able to regain much of the area previously conquered by the Germans. The destruction of Army Group Centre, the outcome of Operation Bagration in 1944, proved to be a decisive success and additional Soviet offensives against the German Army Groups North and South in the autumn of 1944 put the German war machine into further retreat. By January 1945, what had been the Eastern Front was now controlled by the Soviets, whose military might was aimed at the German capital of Berlin. Hitler committed suicide on 30 April 1945 in order to avoid capture by the Soviets, and the war in Europe finally ended with the total defeat and capitulation of Nazi Germany in May 1945.

War crimes

Main articles: Einsatzgruppen, German atrocities committed against Soviet prisoners of war, The Holocaust in Russia, and War crimes of the Wehrmacht
Masha Bruskina, a nurse with the Soviet resistance, before her execution by hanging. The placard reads: We are the partisans who shot German troops, Minsk, 26 October 1941.

While the Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva Convention, Germany had signed the treaty and was thus obligated to offer Soviet POWs humane treatment according to its provisions (as they generally did with other Allied POWs). According to the Soviets, they had not signed the Geneva Conventions in 1929 due to Article 9 which, by imposing racial segregation of POWs into different camps, contravened the Soviet constitution. Article 82 of the convention specified that "In case, in time of war, one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall nevertheless remain in force as between the belligerents who are parties thereto." Despite such mandates, Hitler called for the battle against the Soviet Union to be a "struggle for existence" and emphasized that the Soviet armies were to be "annihilated", a mindset that contributed to war crimes against Soviet prisoners of war. A memorandum from 16 July 1941, recorded by Martin Bormann, quotes Hitler saying, "The giant area must naturally be pacified as quickly as possible; this will happen at best if anyone who just looks funny should be shot". Conveniently for Germany, the fact that the Soviets failed to sign the convention played into their hands as they justified their behavior accordingly. Even if the Soviets had signed, it is highly unlikely that this would have stopped the Nazis' genocidal policies towards combatants, civilians, and prisoners of war.

Himmler inspecting a prisoner of war camp

Before the war, Hitler had issued the notorious Commissar Order, which called for all Soviet political commissars taken prisoner at the front to be shot immediately without trial. German soldiers participated in these mass killings along with members of the SS-Einsatzgruppen, sometimes reluctantly, claiming "military necessity". On the eve of the invasion, German soldiers were informed that their battle "demands ruthless and vigorous measures against Bolshevik inciters, guerrillas, saboteurs, Jews and the complete elimination of all active and passive resistance". Collective punishment was authorised against partisan attacks; if a perpetrator could not be quickly identified, burning villages and mass executions were considered acceptable reprisals. Although the majority of German soldiers accepted these crimes as justified due to Nazi propaganda, which depicted the Red Army as Untermenschen, a few prominent German officers openly protested against them. An estimated two million Soviet prisoners of war died of starvation during Barbarossa alone. By the end of the war, 58 percent of all Soviet prisoners of war had died in German captivity.

Organised crimes against civilians, including women and children, were carried out on a huge scale by the German police and military forces, as well as the local collaborators. Under the command of the Reich Security Main Office, the Einsatzgruppen killing squads conducted large-scale massacres of Jews and communists in conquered Soviet territories. Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg puts the number of Jews murdered by "mobile killing operations" at 1,400,000. The original instructions to kill "Jews in party and state positions" were broadened to include "all male Jews of military age" and then expanded once more to "all male Jews regardless of age". By the end of July, the Germans were regularly killing women and children. On 18 December 1941, Himmler and Hitler discussed the "Jewish question", and Himmler noted the meeting's result in his appointment book: "To be annihilated as partisans". According to Christopher Browning, "annihilating Jews and solving the so-called 'Jewish question' under the cover of killing partisans was the agreed-upon convention between Hitler and Himmler". In accordance with Nazi policies against "inferior" Asian peoples, Turkmens were also persecuted. According to a post-war report by Prince Veli Kajum Khan, they were imprisoned in concentration camps in terrible conditions, where those deemed to have "Mongolian" features were murdered daily. Asians were also targeted by the Einsatzgruppen and were the subjects of lethal medical experiments and murder at a "pathological institute" in Kiev. Hitler received reports of the mass killings conducted by the Einsatzgruppen which were first conveyed to the RSHA, where they were aggregated into a summary report by Gestapo Chief Heinrich Müller.

General Erich Hoepner (right) with commander of SS Polizei Division, Walter Krüger, in October 1941

Burning houses suspected of being partisan meeting places and poisoning water wells became common practice for soldiers of the German 9th Army. At Kharkov, the fourth largest city in the Soviet Union, food was provided only to the small number of civilians who worked for the Germans, with the rest designated to slowly starve. Thousands of Soviets were deported to Germany for use as slave labour beginning in 1942.

The citizens of Leningrad were subjected to heavy bombardment and a siege that would last 872 days and starve more than a million people to death, of whom approximately 400,000 were children below the age of 14. The German-Finnish blockade cut off access to food, fuel and raw materials, and rations reached a low, for the non-working population, of 4 ounces (110 g) (five thin slices) of bread and a little watery soup per day. Starving Soviet civilians began to eat their domestic animals, along with hair tonic and Vaseline. Some desperate citizens resorted to cannibalism; Soviet records list 2,000 people arrested for "the use of human meat as food" during the siege, 886 of them during the first winter of 1941–42. The Wehrmacht planned to seal off Leningrad, starve out the population, and then demolish the city entirely.

Sexual violence

See also: Wartime sexual violence § World War II, and War crimes of the Wehrmacht

Rape was a widespread phenomenon in the East as German soldiers regularly committed violent sexual acts against Soviet women. Whole units were occasionally involved in the crime with upwards of one-third of the instances being gang rape. Historian Hannes Heer relates that in the world of the eastern front, where the German army equated Russia with Communism, everything was "fair game"; thus, rape went unreported unless entire units were involved. Frequently in the case of Jewish women, they were murdered immediately after acts of sexual violence. Historian Birgit Beck emphasizes that military decrees, which served to authorise wholesale brutality on many levels, essentially destroyed the basis for any prosecution of sexual offenses committed by German soldiers in the East. She also contends that detection of such instances was limited by the fact that sexual violence was often inflicted in the context of billets in civilian housing.

Nazi plunder of Eastern Europe

Main article: Nazi plunder

After the initiation of Operation Barbarossa, Eastern Europe was relentlessly plundered by Nazi German forces. In 1943 alone, 9,000,000 tons of cereals, 2,000,000 t (2,000,000 long tons; 2,200,000 short tons) of fodder, 3,000,000 t (3,000,000 long tons; 3,300,000 short tons) of potatoes, and 662,000 t (652,000 long tons; 730,000 short tons) of meats were sent back to Germany. During the course of the German occupation, some 12 million pigs and 13 million sheep were seized by Nazi forces. The value of this plunder is estimated at 4 billion Reichsmarks. This relatively low number in comparison to the occupied nations of Western Europe can be attributed to the indiscriminate scorched-earth policy pursued by Nazi Germany in the Eastern Front.

Historical significance

Barbarossa was the largest military operation in history—more men, tanks, guns and aircraft were deployed than in any other offensive. The invasion opened the Eastern Front, the war's largest theatre, which saw clashes of unprecedented violence and destruction for four years and killed over 26 million Soviet people, including about 8.6 million Red Army soldiers. More died fighting on the Eastern Front than in all other fighting across the globe during World War II. Damage to both the economy and landscape was enormous, as approximately 1,710 Soviet towns and 70,000 villages were razed.

Barbarossa and the subsequent German defeat changed the political landscape of Europe, dividing it into Eastern and Western blocs. The political vacuum left in the eastern half of the continent was filled by the USSR when Stalin secured his territorial prizes of 1944–1945 and firmly placed the Red Army in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the eastern half of Germany. Stalin's fear of resurgent German power and his distrust of his erstwhile allies contributed to Soviet pan-Slavic initiatives and a subsequent alliance of Slavic states. The historians David Glantz and Jonathan House assert that Barbarossa influenced not only Stalin but subsequent Soviet leaders, claiming it "colored" their strategic mindsets for the "next four decades". As a result, the Soviets instigated the creation of "an elaborate system of buffer and client states, designed to insulate the Soviet Union from any possible future attack". In the ensuing Cold War, Eastern Europe became a Soviet sphere of influence, and Western Europe aligned itself with the United States.

See also

Portals:

References

Notes

  1. Germany's allies, in total, provided a significant number of troops and material to the front. There were also numerous units under German command recruited in German-occupied Europe and sympathetic puppet or neutral states, including the Spanish Blue Division, the Legion of French Volunteers Against Bolshevism, the 369th Croatian Infantry Regiment, the Croatian Air Force Legion, and the Croatian Naval Legion.
  2. The Light Transport Brigade from Croatia was attached to the 3rd Cavalry Division "Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta"
  3. Of the AFVs, Askey reports there were 301 assault guns, 257 tank destroyers and self-propelled guns, 1,055 armoured half-tracks, 1,367 armoured cars, 92 combat engineer and ammunition transport vehicles.
  4. 881,788 of which are German
  5. Excludes an additional 395,799 who were deemed unfit for service due to non-combat causes, transported out of their Army Group sectors for treatment, and treated in divisional/local medical facilities. 98% of those 395,799 eventually returned to active duty service, usually after relatively short treatment, meaning about 8,000 became permanent losses. Askey 2014, p. 178.
  6. 855 killed, 2,288 wounded in action, 277 missing and captured, 1,000 sick and injured
  7. German: Unternehmen Barbarossa; Russian: Операция Барбаросса, romanized: Operatsiya Barbarossa
  8. See for instance the involvement of Latvian and Ukrainian forces in killing Jews cited by historian Raul Hilberg.
  9. It is additionally important that considerable portions of the German General Staff thought of Russia as a "colossus of clay" which was "politically unstable, filled with discontented minorities, ineffectively ruled, and militarily weak."
  10. Concerning this strategic mistake, historian David Stone asserts that, "If Hitler's decision to invade Russia in 1941 was his greatest single error of judgement, then his subsequent decision not to strike hard and fast against Moscow was surely a close second."
  11. Flooding was so bad that Guderian wrote: "The Balkans Campaign had been concluded with all the speed desired, and the troops there engaged which were now needed for Russia were withdrawn according to plan and very fast. But all the same there was a definite delay in the opening of our Russian Campaign. Furthermore we had had a very wet spring; the Bug and its tributaries were at flood level until well into May and the nearby ground was swampy and almost impassable."
  12. Guderian wrote: "A delay was almost certainly inevitable given that the late spring thaw had swelled and in some cases flooded the major waterways, impeding mobile operations over the sodden ground." Blumentritt: "... the ground was soft and boggy and the roads were covered with mud. Normally May brought a change of conditions; the water receded and movement was less hampered. But 1941 was an exceptional year, and at the end of June the Bug, a Polish river near Brest-Litovsk, was still overflowing its banks."
  13. For the Finnish President, Risto Ryti, the attack against the Soviet Union was part of the struggle against Bolshevism and one of Finland's "traditional enemies".
  14. ^ The four Soviet military districts facing the Axis, the Baltic Military District, the Western Special Military District, the Kiev Special Military District and the Odessa Military District, at the outbreak of the war were renamed the Northwestern Front, the Western Front, the Southwestern Front and the Southern Front, respectively. A fifth military district, the Leningrad military district, became the Northern Front.
  15. Historian Victor Davis Hanson reports that before the war came to its conclusion, the Soviets had an artillery advantage over the Germans of seven-to-one and that artillery production was the only area where they doubled U.S. and British manufacturing output.
  16. The NKGB learned about Liskow only at 03:00 on 22 June.
  17. Significant planning for Finnish participation in the campaign against the Soviet Union was conducted well-before the plan's actual implementation.
  18. On 12 November 1941 the temperature around Moscow was −12 °C (10 °F).
  19. Glantz and House use the expression "The Great Patriotic War", the Soviet name for World War II—but this term represents by and large, the contest between the U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany.

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