Misplaced Pages

Latest revision as of 13:39, 8 January 2025

Indo-Pakistani war of 1971
Part of the Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts, Cold War, and Bangladesh Liberation War
First row: Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, the Cdr. of Pakistani Eastern Comnd., signing the documented Instrument of Surrender in Dacca in the presence of Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora (GOC-in-C of Indian Eastern Comnd.). Surojit Sen of All India Radio is seen holding a microphone on the right. Second row (left to right): Vice Adm. N. Krishnan (FOC-in-C Eastern Naval Comnd.), Air Mshl. H.C. Dewan, (AOC-in-C Eastern Air Comnd.), Lt Gen. Sagat Singh (Cdr. IV Corps), Maj Gen. JFR Jacob (COS Eastern Comnd.) and Flt Lt Krishnamurthy (peering over Jacob's shoulder).
Date 3–16 December 1971 (1 week and 6 days) Location * India–East Pakistan border India–West Pakistan border Line of Control Indian Ocean Arabian Sea Bay of Bengal Result Indian victory Eastern front: Surrender of East Pakistan military command Western front: Unilateral ceasefire Territorial changes Eastern Front: East Pakistan secedes from Pakistan as Bangladesh Western Front: Indian forces captured around 15,010 km (5,795 sq mi) of land in the West but returned it in the 1972 Simla Agreement as a gesture of goodwill. India retained 883 km (341.1 sq mi) of the gained territory in Jammu and Kashmir while Pakistan retained 53 km (20.4 sq mi) territory
Belligerents
India  Provisional Government of Bangladesh	Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Indira Gandhi Swaran Singh Sam Manekshaw J.S. Aurora S. N. Kohli Nilakanta Krishnan Sheikh Mujibur Rahman M. A. G. Osmani	Yahya Khan A.A.K. Niazi  Rao Farman Tikka Khan Iftikhar Janjua  † Md Shariff   Leslie Mungavin Inamul Haq  Abdul Motaleb Malik
Strength
Indian Armed Forces: 825,000 – 860,000 Mukti Bahini: 180,000	Pakistan Armed Forces: 350,000 – 365,000 Razakars: 35,000
Casualties and losses
India 2,500–3,843 killed 9,851–12,000 injured 1 naval aircraft 1 frigate Okha harbour damaged/fuel tanks destroyed Neutral claims 45 IAF aircraft 80 tanks Indian claims 45 IAF aircraft Pakistani claims 130 IAF aircraft	Pakistan 9,000 killed 25,000 wounded 93,000 captured 2 destroyers 1 Minesweeper 1 Submarine 3 Patrol vessels 7 gunboats Pakistani main port Karachi facilities damaged/fuel tanks destroyed Pakistani airfields damaged and cratered Neutral claims 75 PAF aircraft 200 tanks Indian claims 94 PAF aircraft Pakistani claims 42 PAF aircraft

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, also known as the third India-Pakistan war, was a military confrontation between India and Pakistan that occurred during the Bangladesh Liberation War in East Pakistan from 3 December 1971 until the Pakistani capitulation in Dhaka on 16 December 1971. The war began with Pakistan's Operation Chengiz Khan, consisting of preemptive aerial strikes on eight Indian air stations. The strikes led to India declaring war on Pakistan, marking their entry into the war for East Pakistan's independence, on the side of Bengali nationalist forces. India's entry expanded the existing conflict with Indian and Pakistani forces engaging on both the eastern and western fronts. Thirteen days after the war started, India achieved a clear upper hand, and the Eastern Command of the Pakistan military signed the instrument of surrender on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka, marking the formation of East Pakistan as the new nation of Bangladesh. Approximately 93,000 Pakistani servicemen were taken prisoner by the Indian Army, which included 79,676 to 81,000 uniformed personnel of the Pakistan Armed Forces, including some Bengali soldiers who had remained loyal to Pakistan. The remaining 10,324 to 12,500 prisoners were civilians, either family members of the military personnel or collaborators (Razakars).

It is estimated that members of the Pakistani military and supporting pro-Pakistani Islamist militias killed between 300,000 and 3,000,000 civilians in Bangladesh. As a result of the conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled the country to seek refuge in India.

During the 1971 Bangladesh war for independence, members of the Pakistani military and supporting pro-Pakistani Islamist militias called the Razakars raped between 200,000 and 400,000 Bangladeshi women and girls in a systematic campaign of genocidal rape.

Background

The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation War, which was a result of the violation of the rights of East Pakistan by the Pakistan Army. The political tensions in East Pakistan had its origin in the creation of Pakistan as a result of the partition of India by the United Kingdom in 1947; the popular language movement in 1950; mass riots in East Bengal in 1964; and the mass protests in 1969. These led to the resignation of President Ayub Khan, who invited army chief General Yahya Khan to take over the central government. The geographical distance between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan was vast; East Pakistan lay over 1,600 kilometres (1,000 mi) away, which greatly hampered any attempt to integrate the Bengali and the Pakistani cultures.

To overcome the Bengali domination and prevent formation of the central government in Islamabad, the controversial One Unit programme established the two wings of East and West Pakistan. West Pakistanis' opposition to these efforts made it difficult to effectively govern both wings. In 1969, President Yahya Khan announced the first general elections and disestablished the status of West Pakistan as a single province in 1970, in order to restore it to its original heterogeneous status comprising four provinces, as defined at the time of establishment of Pakistan in 1947. In addition, there were religious and racial tensions between Bengalis and the multi-ethnic West Pakistanis, as Bengalis looked different from the dominant West Pakistanis.

The East Pakistan's Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stressed his political position by presenting his Six Points and endorsing the Bengalis' right to govern. The 1970 Pakistani general election, resulted in Awami League gaining 167 out of 169 seats for the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly, and a near-absolute majority in the 313-seat National Assembly, while the vote in West Pakistan was mostly won by the socialist Pakistan Peoples Party. The League's election success caused many West Pakistanis to fear that it would allow the Bengalis to draft the constitution based on the six-points and liberalism.

To resolve the crisis, the Admiral Ahsan Mission was formed to provide recommendations. Its findings were met with favourable reviews from the political leaders of West Pakistan, with the exception of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party.

However, the military top brass vetoed the mission's proposal. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto endorsed the veto, and subsequently refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Awami League called for general strikes in the country. President Yahya Khan postponed the inauguration of the National Assembly, causing disillusionment with the Awami League and their supporters throughout East Pakistan. In reaction, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for general strikes that eventually shut down the government, and dissidents in the East began targeting the ethnic Bihari community, which largely supported West Pakistan.

In early March 1971, approximately 300 Biharis were slaughtered in riots by Bengali mobs in Chittagong alone. The Government of Pakistan used the "Bihari massacre" to justify its deployment of the military in East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated its military crackdown. President Yahya Khan called on the military – which was overwhelmingly led by West Pakistanis – to suppress dissent in the East, after accepting the resignation of Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, the chief of staff of the East-Pakistani military.

Mass arrests of dissidents began and, after several days of strikes and non-cooperation, the Pakistani military, led by Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March 1971. The government outlawed the Awami League, which forced many of its members and sympathisers into refuge in Eastern India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25/26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. Operation Searchlight, followed by Operation Barisal, attempted to kill the intellectual elite of the east.

On 26 March 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman of the Pakistan Army declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

In April, the exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles and Bengali officers in Pakistan's army, navy, and marines, defected to the rebellion after taking refuge in different parts of India. The Bangladesh Force, namely the Mukti Bahini, consisting of a conventional force and a guerilla force, was formed under the retired colonel Mohammad Ataul Gani Osmani. There was also a meeting between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Nixon in November 1971, where she rejected the US advice against intervening in the conflict.

India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War

After the resignations of Admiral S.M. Ahsan and Lieutenant-General Yaqub Ali Khan, the media correspondents began airing reports of the Pakistani military's widespread genocide against their Bengali citizens, particularly aimed at the minority Bengali Hindu population, which led to approximately 10 million people seeking refuge in the neighbouring states of Eastern India. The Indian government opened the East Pakistan–India border to allow the Bengali refugees to find safe shelter; the governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees strained India's already overburdened economy.

The Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community for assistance, but failed to elicit any response, despite the External Affairs minister Swaran Singh meeting foreign ministers of other countries. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 concluded that instead of taking in millions of refugees, it was economical to go to war against Pakistan, and expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of East Pakistan. On 28 April 1971, the Union cabinet ordered the Chief of the Army Staff General Sam Manekshaw to "Go into East Pakistan". Defected East Pakistan military officers and the elements of Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) immediately started using the Indian refugee camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas that were to be trained against Pakistan.

By November 1971, the Indian military was providing direct fire against Pakistani troops and even made several incursions into Pakistani territory.

Indian authorities also attempted to carry on psychological warfare and keep up the morale of comrades in East Pakistan. The Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (Free Bangladesh Radio Centre), which had broadcast Major Rahman's independence declaration, was relocated from Kalurghat in East Pakistan to India after the transmission building was shelled by Pakistani Sabre jets on 30 March 1971. It resumed broadcasts on 3 April from Tripura, aided by the Indian Border Security Force. The clandestine station was finally shifted to Kolkata, where it was joined by a large number of Bangladeshi radio programmers, newscasters, poets, singers and journalists. Its jurisdiction was transferred to the provisional Bangladesh government-in-exile, and made its first broadcast on 25 May, the birth anniversary of poet Kazi Nazrul Islam (who would later be named Bangladesh's national poet). Among the Indian contributors to the radio station's nationalistic programmes was Salil Chowdhury. Akashvani Kolkata also actively took part in this effort.

Objective

By the end of April 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had asked the Indian Chief of Army Staff Gen Sam Manekshaw if he was ready to go to war with Pakistan. According to Manekshaw's own personal account, he refused, citing the onset of monsoon season in East Pakistan and also the fact that the army tanks were being refitted. He offered his resignation, which Gandhi declined. He then said he could guarantee victory if she would allow him to prepare for the conflict on his terms, and set a date for it; Gandhi accepted his conditions. In reality, Gandhi was well aware of the difficulties of a hasty military action, but she needed to get the military's views to satisfy her hawkish colleagues and the public opinion, which were critical of India's restraint.

By mid July, India had settled on a plan of attack. The ground in the East would be drier by mid November, which would make a rapid offensive easier. By early to mid December, the Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, limiting China's ability to intervene.

The news media's mood in Pakistan had turned increasingly jingoistic and militaristic against East Pakistan and India when the Pakistani news media reported the complexity of the situation in the East, though the reactions from Pakistan's news media pundits were mixed. By the end of September 1971, a propaganda campaign, possibly orchestrated by elements within the government of Pakistan, resulted in stickers endorsing "Crush India" becoming a standard feature on the rear windows of vehicles in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore; this soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan. By October, other stickers proclaimed Hang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

From mid October to 20 November, the Indian army conducted multiple incursions into East Pakistani territory, generally withdrawing to India after completing their mission. From 21 November, however, Indian forces with Mukti Bahini support entered East Pakistan and remained there in preparation for a formal war that India expected to launch on 6 December.

An Indian-Pakistani war seemed inevitable. The Soviet Union reportedly warned Pakistan against the war, which they termed as "suicidal course for Pakistan's unity." Despite this warning, in November 1971, thousands of people led by conservative Pakistani politicians marched in Lahore and across Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to "crush India". On 23 November, President Yahya Khan declared a national state of emergency and told the country to prepare for war. By the first week of December, the conservative print media outlets in the country had published jihad related materials to boost the recruitment in the military.

Overview

Initiation

On the evening of 3 December, at about 17:35, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched surprise pre-emptive strikes on eight Indian airfields, including Agra, which was 480 kilometres (300 mi) from the border. At the time of the attack, the Taj Mahal had been camouflaged with lots of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap, because its marble glowed prominently in the moonlight. These pre-emptive strikes, known as Operation Chengiz Khan, were inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab–Israeli Six-Day War. Unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967, which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew too few planes to inflict significant damage.

In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Gandhi held that the air strikes were a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force (IAF) responded with initial air strikes the same night. These expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning.

This air action marked the start of all-out war; Gandhi ordered the mobilisation of troops and launched a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan. This involved Indian forces in coordinated air, sea and land assaults. The main Indian objective on the eastern front was to capture Dacca, and on the western front to contain Pakistani forces.

Ground operations

The Indian army was better equipped than the Pakistanis and enjoyed significant numerical superiority over them.

Pakistan launched a ground offensive on the western front. Major ground attacks were concentrated on the western border by the Pakistan Army but the Indian Army was successful in penetrating into Pakistani soil. It eventually made some quick and initial gains, including the capture of around 15,010 km (5,795 sq mi) of Pakistani territory; this land gained by India in Azad Kashmir, Punjab and Sindh sectors was later ceded in the Simla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill

Casualties inflicted to Pakistan Army's I Corps, II Corps, and Pakistan Marines' Punjab detachment were very high, and many soldiers and marines perished due to lack of operational planning and lack of coordination within the marine-army formations against Indian Army's Southern and Western Commands. By the time the war came to end, the army soldiers and marines were highly demoralised– both emotionally and psychologically– on the western front and had no will to put up a defensive fight against the approaching Indian Army soldiers.

Western Front

On 3 December, after the air strike carried out by the PAF, the 106 Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani forces under the command of Brig Mohammad Mumtaz Khan advanced towards the village of Hussainiwala with 2000 troops and artillery support. The Indian side had deployed one battalion, 15 Punjab, under the command of Lt Col Shastry comprising 900 soldiers with support from the IAF. The 15 Punjab could not hold the village and had to retreat on 4 December towards the fortress called Kaiser-i-Hind outside Hussainiwala. The Indian forces were eventually pushed from the fortress a well. The Indian side suffered 125 casualties while the Pakistani forces lost 67 men.

Simultaneously, Pakistani forces began an offensive on Chhamb, similar to the offensive carried out during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965. The Pakistani 23 Armoured Division under Maj Gen Iftikhar Janjua pushed through the region held by the Indian 10 Division with superior equipment commanded by Maj Gen Jaswant Singh. Till 9 December, the Pakistani commander Maj Gen Janjua perished but the Pakistani forces were able to force the Indian units to retreat by 11 December. Pakistan retained the territory won in this battle after the Simla Agreement.

On 4 December, a Pakistani unit from the 18 Infantry Division commanded by Maj Gen B. M. Mustafa headed by Brig. Tariq Mir and Brig Jahanzeb Abab advanced towards the Rajasthan town of Longewala. The town was held by an outnumbered Infantry Company under Major K. S. Chandapuri and few border guards but had heavy IAF support. This company held several anti-tank guns, cannons and howitzers. The initial Pakistani armored advance was stalled by the Indian Anti-tank and Anti-Mech defenses from high ground and the Pakistani sappers were also pushed back by Indian small arm and artillery cannon fire. The IAF 122 squadron under the command of Wing Cdr D. M. Conquest equipped with Hawker Hunter and HAL HF-24 Marut also bombed the Pakistani units. By 7 December the Battle of Longewala was decisively won by India.

Pakistani I Corps attempted to cut Indian transport lines between Punjab and Jammu by advancing on the Shakargarh sector on 6 December. Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan commanded two infantry and one armored division into battle. The region was heavily reinforced by the Indian I Corps commanded by Lt Gen Khem Karan Singh holding three infantry divisions, two independent armored brigades and two artillery brigades. The resultant battle raged till the end of the war on 16 December and recorded heavy losses on both sides. Despite being numerically superior than the Indian side, Pakistan failed at capturing the region and the Indian units pushed back and threatened Sialkot. The Battle of Basantar was deemed an Indian victory.

Between 8 and 14 December, India captured an 800 km stretch of the Karakoram range in the Northern region of Ladakh in the Battle of Turtuk under the command of Col Udai Singh.

Eastern Front

When the conflict started, the war immediately took a decisive turn in favour of India and their Bengali rebel allies militarily and diplomatically.

Before the formal beginning of hostilities on 3 December, on 23 November, the Indian Army conventionally penetrated the eastern fronts and crossed East Pakistan's borders to join their Bengali nationalist allies. Contrary to the 1965 war, which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan. Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Indian Army's Eastern Command, led the full Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As the Indian Eastern Command attacked the Pakistan Eastern Command, IAF rapidly destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dacca airfield out of commission. In the meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.

The Indian campaign's "blitzkrieg" techniques exploited weaknesses in the Pakistani positions and bypassed opposition; this resulted in a swift victory. Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight and psychological panic spread in the Eastern Command's military leadership. Subsequently, the Indian Army encircled Dacca and issued an ultimatum to surrender in "30-minutes" time window on 16 December 1971. Upon hearing the ultimatum, the East-Pakistan government collapsed when the Lt-Gen. A.A.K. Niazi (Cdr. of Eastern Command) and his deputy, V-Adm. M.S. Khan, surrendered without offering any resistance. On 16 December 1971, Pakistan ultimately called for unilateral ceasefire and surrendered its entire four-tier military to the Indian Army – hence ending the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.

On the ground, Pakistan suffered the most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded, while India had 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The loss of armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced and this finally represented a major defeat for Pakistan.

The Indian Army's improved performance following its defeat in the Sino-Indian War in 1962 boosted its morale and prestige.

Naval operations

Navy NHQ staffers and commanders of the Pakistan Navy knew very well that unlike the 1965 war, the Navy was ill-prepared for the naval conflict with India. The Pakistan Navy was in no condition to fight an offensive war in deep water against the Indian Navy, and neither was it in a condition to mount a serious defence against Indian Navy's seaborne encroachment.

In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy's Western Naval Command, under Vice admiral S.N. Kohli, successfully launched a surprise attack on the port of Karachi on the night of 4/5 December 1971 under the codename Trident. The naval attack involving the Soviet-built Osa-class missile boats sank the Pakistan Navy's destroyer PNS Khaibar and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz while PNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged. Pakistani naval sources reported that about 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. Seeking to retaliate, the Pakistan Navy submarines hunted for the major Indian warships. On 9 December 1971, Hangor sank INS Khukri, inflicting 194 Indian casualties, and this attack was the first submarine kill since World War II.

The sinking of INS Khukri was followed by another Indian attack on the port of Karachi on the night of 8/9 December 1971 under the codename Python. A squadron of Indian Navy's Osa missile boats approached the Karachi port and launched a series of Soviet-acquired Styx missiles, that resulted in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships, as well as foreign ships docked in Karachi. The PAF did not attack the Indian Navy ships, and confusion remained the next day when the civilian pilots of Pakistan International, acting as reconnaissance war pilots, misidentified PNS Zulfiqar and the air force attacked its own warship, inflicting major damages and killing several officers on board.

In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Nilakanta Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed, and its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan, including Chittagong and Cox's Bazar. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank off the coast of Visakhapatnam, due to an internal explosion, though whether this was triggered by Indian depth charges, diving to avoid them or some other reason has never been established.

Due to a high number of defections, the Navy relied on deploying the Pakistan Marines, led by Rear Admiral Leslie Mungavin, where they had to conduct riverine operations against the Indian Army, but they too suffered major losses, mainly due to their lack of understanding of expeditionary warfare and the wet terrain of East Pakistan.

The damage inflicted on the Pakistan Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the Pakistan Coast Guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels; and large-scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships – Anwarbaksh, Pasni and Madhumathi – and ten smaller vessels were captured. Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dacca. According to one Pakistani scholar, Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.

Air operations

After the attempted pre-emptive attack, the PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war progressed, the IAF continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number of sorties flown by the PAF decreased day–by–day. The IAF flew 4,000 sorties while the PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.

This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF's AHQ to cut its losses, as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict in the liberation war in the East. The PAF avoided making contacts with the Indian Navy after the latter raided the port of Karachi twice, but the PAF did retaliate by bombing Okha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that had attacked.

In the east, No. 14 Squadron "Tail Choppers" was destroyed and its CO, Squadron Leader PQ Mehdi, was taken POW, putting Pakistan's air command in Dhaka out of commission. India thereby achieved total air superiority on the eastern front.

At the end of the war, PAF pilots made successful escapes from East Pakistan to neighbouring Burma; many PAF personnel had already left the East for Burma on their own before Dacca was overrun by the Indian military in December 1971.

Indian attacks on Pakistan

As the Indian Army tightened its grip in East Pakistan, the IAF continued with its attacks against Pakistan as the campaign developed into a series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar, and close-support attacks by fighter jets, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by Canberras and An-12s, while Pakistan responded with similar night attacks with its B-57s and C-130s.

The PAF deployed its F-6s mainly on defensive combat air patrol missions over their own bases, leaving the PAF unable to conduct effective offensive operations. The IAF's raids damaged one USAF and one UN aircraft in Dacca, while a RCAF DHC-4 Caribou was destroyed in Islamabad, along with the USAF's Beech U-8 owned by the US military's liaison chief Brigadier-General Chuck Yeager. Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against PAF forward air bases in Pakistan until the end of the war, and interdiction and close-support operations were maintained.

One of the most successful air raids by India into West Pakistan happened on 8 December 1971, when Indian Hunter aircraft from the Pathankot-based 20 Squadron, attacked the Pakistani base in Murid and destroyed 5 F-86 aircraft on the ground. This was confirmed by Pakistan's military historian, Air Commodore M Kaiser Tufail, in his book In The Ring and on Its Feet: Pakistan Air Force in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.

The PAF played a more limited role in the operations. They were reinforced by Mirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally (whose identity remains unknown). According to author Martin Bowman, "Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha AFB, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia." The IAF was able to conduct a wide range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines; feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing and reconnaissance. The PAF, which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent's skies within the first week of the war. Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge at Iranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing to offer a fight.

India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in Pakistan, while the PAF flew about 30 and 2,840 at the respective fronts. By the end of the war, India had lost 45 aircraft while Pakistan lost 75.

Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command

Officially, the Instrument of Surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command stationed in East Pakistan, was signed between the Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the GOC-in-C of Indian Eastern Command and Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi, the Commander of the Pakistan Eastern Command, at the Ramna Race Course in Dacca at 16:31Hrs IST on 16 December 1971. There was a problem over who would represent the Bangladesh government, as the three Bangladeshi battalion commanders - Lt Cols Shafiullah, Khaled Musharraf and Ziaur Rahman - were located too far away to be airlifted on time. The responsibility fell on the only armed forces officer available, Gp Capt AK Khondkar, chief of the newly formed BAF. As the surrender was accepted silently by Lieutenant-General Aurora, the surrounding crowds on the race course started shouting anti-Pakistan slogans, and there were reports of abuses aimed at the surrendering commanders of Pakistani military. Indian officers and an Indian diplomat, MEA joint secretary for Pakistan AK Ray, had to form a human chain around Lt Gen Niazi to protect him from being lynched.

Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the surrender on 16 December, and India claimed large gains of territory in Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war). The war confirmed the independence of Bangladesh.

Following the surrender, the Indian Army took approximately 90,000 Pakistani servicemen and their Bengali supporters as POWs, making it the largest surrender since World War II. Initial counts recorded that approximately 79,676 war prisoners were uniformed personnel, and the overwhelming majority of the war prisoners were officers – most of them from the army and navy, while relatively small numbers were from the air force and marines; others in larger number were serving in paramilitary units.

The remaining prisoners were civilians who were either family members of the military personnel or volunteers (razakars). The Hamoodur Rahman Commission and the POW Investigation Commission reports instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as given in the table below. Apart from soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war.

Inter-service branch	Number of captured Pakistani POWs	Officer commanding
Pakistan Army	54,154	Lieutenant-General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi
Pakistan Navy/Pakistan Marines	1,381	Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff
Pakistan Air Force	833	Air Commodore Inamul Haq
Paramilitary (East Pakistan Rifles/Police)	22,000	Major-General Rao Farman Ali
Civil government personnel	12,000	Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik
Total:	90,368	~

Foreign reaction and involvement

United States and Soviet Union

The Soviet Union sympathised with the East Pakistanis, and supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini's incursion against Pakistan during the war, in a broader view of recognising that the secession of East Pakistan as Independent Bangladesh would weaken the position of its rivals— the United States and China. The Soviet Union gave assurances to India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, it would take counter-measures. This assurance was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in August 1971.

The Soviet Union accepted the Indian position that any resolution to the crisis in East Pakistan would have to be on terms acceptable to India and the Awami League, but the Indo-Soviet treaty did not mean a total commitment to the Indian stance, according to author Robert Jackson. The Soviet Union continued economic aid to Pakistan and made sympathetic gestures to Pakistan until mid-October 1971. By November 1971, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan Alexei Rodionov directed a secretive message (Rodionov message) that ultimately warned Pakistan that "it will be embarking on a suicidal course if it escalates tensions in the subcontinent".

The United States stood with Pakistan by supporting it morally, politically, economically and materially when U.S. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger refused to use rhetoric in a hopeless attempt to intervene in a large civil war. The U.S. establishment had the impression that the Soviets were in an informal alliance with India, and the US therefore needed Pakistan to help to limit Soviet influence in South Asia. During the Cold War, Pakistan was a close formal ally of the United States and also had close relations with the People's Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and the regional position of America's new tactical ally, China. Nixon encouraged Iran to send military supplies to Pakistan. The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal" activities of the Pakistani military in East Pakistan, most notably the Blood telegram, and this prompted widespread criticism and condemnation – both by the United States Congress and in the international press.

Then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, George H. W. Bush, introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. However, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and the following days witnessed the use of great pressure on the Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail.

When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon deployed Task Force 74, led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal. Enterprise and its escort ships arrived on station on 11 December 1971. According to a Russian documentary, the United Kingdom also deployed a carrier battle group led by the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay, on her final deployment.

On 6 and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers from Vladivostok; they trailed US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by the USS Enterprise task force in the Indian Ocean.

As the war progressed, it became apparent to the United States that India was going to invade and disintegrate Pakistan in a matter of weeks, therefore President Nixon spoke with the USSR General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on a hotline on 10 December, where Nixon reportedly urged Brezhnev to restrain India as he quoted: "in the strongest possible terms to restrain India with which ... you have great influence and for whose actions you must share responsibility."

After the war, the United States accepted the new balance of power and recognised India as a dominant player in South Asia; the US immediately engaged in strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries in the successive years. In June 1972, Soviet Ambassador Rodionov said, "the Soviet Union had always stood and would stand for the unity and territorial integrity of Pakistan". The USSR aided Pakistan economically on several technical and industrial projects.

A 2019 study argues "that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory" in the war, and that they overestimated "the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger's own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon's policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors."

China

During the course of the war, China harshly criticised India for its involvement in the East Pakistan crises, and accused India of having imperialistic designs in South Asia. Before the war started, Chinese leaders and officials had long been philosophically advising the Pakistan government to make peaceful political settlements with the East Pakistani leaders, as China feared that India was secretly supporting, infiltrating, and arming the Bengali rebels against the East Pakistani government. China was also critical of the Government of East Pakistan, led by its governor Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, which used ruthless measures to deal with the Bengali opposition, and did not endorse the Pakistani position on that issue.

When the war started, China reproached India for its direct involvement and infiltration in East Pakistan. It disagreed with Pakistani President Yahya Khan's consideration of military options, and criticised East Pakistan Awami League politicians' ties with India. China reacted with great alarm when the prospects of Indian invasion of Pakistan and integration of Pakistan-administered Kashmir into their side of Kashmir, became imminent. US President Nixon encouraged China to mobilise its armed forces along its border with India to discourage the Indian assault, but the Chinese did not respond to this encouragement since the Indian Army's Northern Command was well prepared to guard the Line of Actual Control, and was already engaging and making advances against the Pakistan Army's X Corps in the Line of Control.

China did not welcome the break-up of Pakistan's unity by the East Pakistani politicians, and effectively vetoed the membership of Bangladesh when it applied to the United Nations in 1972. China objected to admitting Bangladesh on the grounds that two UN resolutions concerning Bangladesh, requiring the repatriation of Pakistani POWs and civilians, had not yet been implemented. Furthermore, China was also among the last countries to recognise the independence of Bangladesh, refusing to do so until 31 August 1975. To this date, its relations with Bangladesh are determined by the Pakistan factor.

Ceylon

Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) saw the partition of Pakistan as an example for themselves and feared India might use its enhanced power against them in the future. The left-wing government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike following a neutral non-aligned foreign policy. As Pakistani aircraft could not fly over Indian territory, they would have to take a longer route around India and so they stopped at Bandaranaike Airport in Sri Lanka where they were refuelled before flying to East Pakistan. This decision did not strain relations between Ceylon and India.

Arab World

As many Arab countries were allied with both the United States and Pakistan, it was easy for Kissinger to encourage them to participate. He sent letters to both, the King of Jordan and the King of Saudi Arabia. President Nixon gave permission for Jordan to send ten F-104s and promised to provide replacements. F-86s from Saudi Arabia helped camouflage the extent of PAF losses, and some Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha AFB, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia. In addition to these three countries, an unidentified Middle Eastern ally also supplied Pakistan with Mirage IIIs.

Israel

Despite not having diplomatic relations at the time, Israel supplied India with armaments, ammunition, intelligence and training ahead of its intervention in East Pakistan, which has been described as a "surprising minor success" of India's efforts to garner international support. In July 1971 Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister, got Israeli arms manufacturer Shlomo Zabludowicz to provide India and the Mukti Bahini with mortars, ammunition and instructors. Meir reportedly sought diplomatic ties with India in exchange, which were finally established in 1992 under P. V. Narasimha Rao.

Aftermath

Territorial changes

In the western front (present-day India-Pakistan border), both countries sparred indecisively. By the end of the war, India had captured a larger quantity of territory than Pakistan. After the ceasefire on 17 December, both sides attempted to take back lost territory. On 17 December, India's 51 Para brigade launched a successful but costly attack on a sand dune occupied by an intruding Pakistani platoon, which cost the Indian unit 21 killed and 60 wounded. In May 1972, as the snow melted, Pakistan attacked the Lipa Valley, where the heavily outnumbered Indian forces fell back, with both sides suffering heavy casualties as well as Pakistani forces losing their senior commander. Pakistan would launch similar attacks to attempt to regain lost territory at Minimarg Lake and Turtuk.

Subsequently, in 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement, after which both sides would retain territory they captured in Kashmir and demarcate the Line of Control, while the international border would return to its pre-war limits.

Since the end of the war, India continues to retain control over the regions such as Chalunka, Thang, Turtuk, Takshi and Pachtang.

India

The war and subsequent independence of Bangladesh stripped Pakistan of more than half of its population, and with nearly one-third of its army in captivity, clearly established India's military and political dominance of the subcontinent. India successfully led a diplomatic campaign to isolate Pakistan. On state visits to the United Kingdom and France, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi convinced them to break with their ally the United States and block any pro-Pakistan resolution in the United Nations.

The victory also defined India's much broader role in foreign politics, as many countries in the world had come to realise – including the United States – that the balance of power had shifted to India as a major player in the region. In the wake of changing geopolitical realities, India sought to establish closer relations with regional countries such as Iran, which was a traditional ally of Pakistan. The United States itself accepted a new balance of power, and when India conducted a surprise nuclear test in 1974, the US notified India that it had no "interest in actions designed to achieve new balance of power."

In spite of the magnitude of the victory, India was surprisingly restrained in its reaction. Mostly, Indian leaders seemed pleased by the relative ease with which they had accomplished their goals—the establishment of Bangladesh and the prospect of an early return to their homeland of the 10 million Bengali refugees who were the cause of the war. In announcing the Pakistani surrender, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared in the Indian Parliament:

Dacca is now the free capital of a free country. We hail the people of Bangladesh in their hour of triumph. All nations who value the human spirit will recognise it as a significant milestone in man's quest for liberty.

Colonel John Gill of National Defense University, US, remarks that, while India achieved a military victory, it was not able to reap the political fruits it might have hoped for in Bangladesh. After a brief 'honeymoon' phase between India and Bangladesh, their relationship began to sour. The perceived Indian overstay revived Bangladeshi anxieties of Hindu control. Many were concerned that Mujib was permitting Indian interference in the country's internal matters and many in the Bangladeshi army resented his attachment with India. Whilst India enjoyed excellent relations with Bangladesh during the Awami League tenures, relations deteriorated when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party assumed power. A 2014 Pew Research Center opinion poll found that 27% of Bangladeshis were wary of India. However, 70% of Bangladeshis held a positive view of India: while 50% of Bangladeshis held a positive view of Pakistan.

Pakistan

For Pakistan, the war was a complete and humiliating defeat, a psychological setback that came from a defeat at the hands of rival India. Pakistan lost half its population and a significant portion of its economy, and suffered setbacks to its geopolitical role in South Asia. In the post-war era, Pakistan struggled to absorb the lessons learned from the military interventions in the democratic system and the impact of the Pakistani military's failure was grave and long-lasting.

From the geopolitical point of view, the war ended in the breaking-up of the unity of Pakistan from being the largest Muslim country in the world to its politico-economic and military collapse that resulted from a direct foreign intervention by India in 1971. Pakistani policy-makers further feared that the two-nation theory had been disproved by the war, that Muslim nationalism had proved insufficient to keep Bengalis a part of Pakistan.

The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept the magnitude of this kind of defeat, as the state media had been projecting imaginary victories. When the ceasefire that came from the surrender of East Pakistan was finally announced, the people could not come to terms with the magnitude of defeat; spontaneous demonstrations and massive protests erupted on the streets of major metropolitan cities in Pakistan. According to Pakistani historians, the trauma was extremely severe, and the cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary terms and in human resources was very high. Demoralized and finding itself unable to control the situation, the Yahya administration fell when President Yahya Khan turned over his presidency to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was sworn in on 20 December 1971 as President with the control of the military. The loss of East Pakistan shattered the prestige of the Pakistani military. Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force, and a third of its army. The war also exposed the shortcomings of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan". Hussain Haqqani, in his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military notes,

Moreover, the army had failed to fulfill its promises of fighting until the last man. The eastern command had laid down arms after losing only thirteen hundred men in battle. In West Pakistan, too, twelve hundred military deaths had accompanied lackluster military performance.

In his book The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative, Pakistan Army's Major General Hakeem Arshad Qureshi, a veteran of this conflict, noted:

We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who alone were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system and a flawed social order that our own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years. At the most critical moment in our history we failed to check the limitless ambitions of individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart their selfish and irresponsible behaviour. It was our collective 'conduct' that had provided the enemy an opportunity to dismember us.

— Qureshi, p. 288

After the war, the Pakistan Army's generals in the East held each other responsible for the atrocities committed, but most of the burden was laid on Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan, who earned notoriety from his actions as governor of the East; he was called the "Butcher of Bengal" because of the widespread atrocities committed within the areas of his responsibility. Tikka was a "soldier known for his eager use of force".

Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi commented on Tikka's actions: "On the night between 25/26 March 1971, General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Chengiz Khan and Halaku Khan ... General Tikka ... resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: 'I want the land and not the people'". Major-General Rao Farman wrote in his table diary: "Green land of East Pakistan will be painted red," which has been interpreted to mean that he planned to massacre Bengalis. Farman said the entry was not expressing a thirst for blood, but concern that East Pakistan's future could be the red flag of Communism.

Major reforms were carried out by successive governments in Pakistan after the war. To address the economic disparity, the National Finance Commission system was established to equally distribute the taxation revenue among the four provinces, the large-scale nationalisation of industries and nationwide census were carried out in 1972. The Constitution was promulgated in 1973 that reflected this equal balance and a compromise between Islamism and Humanism, and provided guaranteed equal human rights to all. The military was heavily reconstructed and heavily reorganised, with President Bhutto appointing chiefs of staff in each inter-service, contrary to C-in-Cs, and making instruction on human rights compulsory in the military syllabus in each branch of inter-services. Major investments were directed towards modernising the navy. The military's chain of command was centralized in Joint Staff Headquarters (JS HQ) led by an appointed Chairman Joint Chiefs Committee to coordinate military efforts to safeguard the nation's defence and unity. In addition, Pakistan sought to have a diversified foreign policy, as Pakistani geostrategists had been shocked that both China and the United States provided limited support to Pakistan during the course of the war, with the US displaying an inability to supply weapons that Pakistan needed the most.

In January 1972, Pakistan under Bhutto launched the clandestine development of nuclear weapons with a view to "never to allow another foreign invasion of Pakistan."

Bangladesh

As a result of the war, East Pakistan became an independent country, Bangladesh, as the world's fourth most populous Muslim state on 16 December 1971. West Pakistan, now just Pakistan, secured the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from the Headquarter Prison and allowed him to return to Dacca. On 19 January 1972, Mujib was inaugurated as the first President of Bangladesh, later becoming the Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 1974.

On the brink of defeat in around 14 December 1971, the media reports indicated that the Pakistan Army soldiers, the local East Pakistan Police they controlled, razakars and the Shanti Committee carried out systematic killings of professionals such as physicians, teachers, and other intellectuals, as part of a pogrom against the Bengali Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban educated intellectuals. This massacre of Hindus was confirmed by the Pakistani military brass in a postwar judicial inquiry.

Young men, especially students, who were seen as possible rebels and recruiters were also targeted by the stationed military, but the extent of casualties in East Pakistan is not known, and the issue is itself controversial and contradictory among the authors who wrote books on the pogrom; the Pakistani government denied the charges of involvement in 2015. R.J. Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three million people killed. Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000. Bangladesh government figures state that Pakistani forces aided by collaborators killed three million people, raped 200,000 women and displaced millions of others.

According to authors Kenton Worcester, Sally Bermanzohn and Mark Ungar, Bengalis themselves killed about 150,000 non-Bengalis living in the East. There had been reports of Bengali insurgents indiscriminately killing non-Bengalis throughout the East; however, neither side provided substantial proofs for their claims and both Bangladeshi and Pakistani figures contradict each other over this issue. Bihari representatives in June 1971 claimed a higher figure of 500,000 killed by Bengalis.

In 2010, the Awami League's government decided to set up a tribunal to prosecute the people involved in alleged war crimes and those who collaborated with Pakistan. According to the government, the defendants would be charged with crimes against humanity, genocide, murder, rape and arson.

According to John H. Gill, there was widespread polarisation between pro-Pakistan Bengalis and pro-liberation Bengalis during the war, and those internal battles are still playing out in the domestic politics of modern-day Bangladesh. To this day, the issue of committed atrocities and pogroms is an influential factor in the Bangladesh–Pakistan relations.

Impact

Pakistan: War Enquiry Commission and War prisoners

In the aftermath of the war, the Pakistani Government constituted the War Enquiry Commission, to be headed by Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman, who was an ethnic Bengali, and composed of the senior justices of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The War Enquiry Commission was mandated with carrying out thorough investigations into the intelligence, strategic, political and military failures that causes the defeat in the war.

The War Commission also looked into Pakistan's political and military involvement in the history of East Pakistan that encompasses 1947–71. The First War Report was submitted in July 1972, but it was very critically opined and penned on political misconducts of politicians and the military interference in national politics. Written in moral and philosophical perspective, the First Report was lengthy and provided accounts that were unpalatable to be released to the public. Initially, there were 12 copies that were all destroyed, except for the one that was kept and marked as "Top Secret" to prevent the backlash effects on the demoralised military. In 1976, the Supplementary Report was submitted, which was the comprehensive report compiled together with the First Report; this report was also marked as classified.

In 2000, the excerpts of the Supplementary Report were leaked to a political correspondent of Pakistan's Dawn, which the Dawn published together with India Today. The First Report is still marked as classified, while the Supplementary Report's excerpts were suppressed by the news correspondents. The War Report's supplementary section was published by the Pakistan Government, but it did not officially hand over the report to Bangladesh despite its requests.

The War Report exposed many military failures, from the strategic to the tactical–intelligence levels, while it confirmed the looting, rapes and the unnecessary killings by the Pakistan military and their local agents. It laid the blame squarely on Pakistan Army generals, accusing them of debauchery, smuggling, war crimes and neglect of duty. The War Commission had recommended public trial of Pakistan Army generals on the charges that they had been responsible for the situation in the first place and that they had succumbed without a fight, but no actions were ever taken against those responsible, except the dismissal of chiefs of the Pakistan Army, Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan Navy, and decommissioning of the Pakistan Marines.

The War Commission, however, rejected the charge that 200,000 Bengali girls were raped by the Pakistan Army, remarking, "It is clear that the figures mentioned by the Dacca authorities are altogether fantastic and fanciful," and cited the evidence of a British abortion team that had carried out the termination of "only a hundred or more pregnancies". The commission also claimed that "approximately 26,000 persons (were) killed during the action by the Pakistan military" Bina D'Costa states that the War Commission was aware of the military's brutality in East Pakistan, but "chose to downplay the scale of the atrocities committed."

The second commission was known as Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Prisoners of War Investigation, conducted solely by the Pakistani government, that was to determine the numbers of Pakistani military personnel who surrendered, including the number of civilian POWs. The official number of the surrendered military personnel was soon released by the Government of Pakistan after the war was over.

India: Indo-Pakistani summits

On 2 July 1972, the Indo-Pakistani summit was held in Simla, Himachal Pradesh, India where the Simla Agreement was reached and signed between President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The treaty provided insurance to Bangladesh that Pakistan recognised Bangladesh's sovereignty, in exchange for the return of the Pakistani POWs. Over the next five months, India released more than 90,000 war prisoners, with Lieutenant-General A.A.K. Niazi being the last war prisoner to be handed over to Pakistan.

The treaty also gave back more than 13,000 km of land that the Indian Army had seized in Pakistan during the war, though India retained a few strategic areas, including Turtuk, Dhothang, Tyakshi (earlier called Tiaqsi) and Chalunka of Chorbat Valley, which was more than 883 km. The Indian hardliners, however, felt that the treaty had been too lenient to President Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile stability in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis and that he would be accused of losing Kashmir in addition to the loss of East Pakistan. As a result, Prime Minister Gandhi was criticised by a section in India for believing Bhutto's "sweet talk and false vows", while the other section claimed the agreement to be successful, for not letting it to fall into "Versailles Syndrome" trap.

In 1973, India and Pakistan reached another compromise when both countries signed a trilateral agreement with Bangladesh that actually brought the war prisoners, non-Bengali and Pakistan-loyal Bengali bureaucrats and civilian servants to Pakistan. The Delhi Agreement witnessed the largest mass population transfer since the Partition of India in 1947.

Bangladesh: International Crimes Tribunal

In 2009, the issue of establishing the International Crimes Tribunal began to take public support. The tribunal was formally established in 2010 to investigate and prosecute suspects for the genocide committed in 1971 by the Pakistan Army and their local collaborators, Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams during the Bangladesh Liberation War.

Long-term consequences

• Steve Coll, in his book Ghost Wars, argues that the Pakistan military's experience with India, including Pervez Musharraf's experience in 1971, influenced the Pakistani government to support jihadist groups in Afghanistan even after the Soviets left, because the jihadists were a tool to use against India, including bogging down the Indian Army in Kashmir.
• Writing about the war in Foreign Affairs magazine, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stated "There is no parallel in contemporary history to the cataclysm which engulfed Pakistan in 1971. A tragic civil war, which rent asunder the people of the two parts of Pakistan, was seized by India as an opportunity for armed intervention. The country was dismembered, its economy shattered and the nation's self-confidence totally undermined." This statement of Bhutto has given rise to the myth of betrayal prevalent in modern Pakistan. This view was contradicted by the post-War Hamoodur Rahman Commission, ordered by Bhutto himself, which in its 1974 report indicted generals of the Pakistan Army for creating conditions which led to the eventual loss of East Pakistan and for inept handling of military operations in the East.

Military awards

Battle honours

After the war, 41 battle honours and 4 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army; notable among them are:

• East Pakistan 1971 (theatre honour)
• Sindh 1971 (theatre honour)
• Jammu and Kashmir 1971 (theatre honour)
• Punjab 1971 (theatre honour)
• Basantar River
• Bogra
• Chachro
• Chhamb
• Defence of Punch
• Dera Baba Nanak
• Gadra City
• Harar Kalan
• Hilli
• Longewala
• Parbat Ali
• Poongli Bridge
• Shehjra
• Shingo River Valley
• Sylhet

Gallantry awards

For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers on both sides were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries. Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award Param Vir Chakra, Bangladeshi award Bir Sreshtho and the Pakistani award Nishan-E-Haider:

India

Recipients of the Param Vir Chakra:

Bangladesh

Recipients of the Bir Sreshtho:

• Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir (Posthumously)
• Lance Naik Munshi Abdur Rouf (Posthumously)
• Sepoy Hamidur Rahman (Posthumously)
• Sepoy Mostafa Kamal (Posthumously)
• ERA Mohammad Ruhul Amin (Posthumously)
• Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahman (Posthumously)
• Lance Naik Nur Mohammad Sheikh (Posthumously)

Pakistan

Recipients of the Nishan-E-Haider:

Civilian awards

On 25 July 2011, Bangladesh Swadhinata Sammanona, the Bangladesh Freedom Honour, was posthumously conferred on former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

R. M. Muzumdar - IOFS officer. Second Indian Director General of the Indian Ordnance Factories. He was awarded the Padma Bhushan by the Government of India, in 1973, in the Civil service category, for his contributions during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.

O. P. Bahl, an IOFS officer. Former Additional Director General Ordnance Factories and Member of the Ordnance Factory Board. Received Padma Shri, in 1972 in the civil-service category for his efforts during the war.

On 28 March 2012, President of Bangladesh Zillur Rahman and the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina conferred Bangladesh Liberation War Honour and Friends of Liberation War Honour to 75 people, six organisations, Mitra Bahini and the people of India at a special ceremony at the Bangabandhu International Conference Centre, Dhaka. This included eight heads of states: former Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav, the third King of Bhutan Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, former Soviet General Secretary Leonid IIyich Brezhnev, former Soviet head of state Nikolai Viktorovich Podgorny, former Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, former Yugoslav President Marshal Josip Broz Tito, former UK Prime Minister Sir Edward Richard George Heath and former Nepalese Prime Minister Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala. The organisations include the BBC, Akashbani (All India Radio), International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Oxfam and Kolkata University Shahayak Samiti.

The list of foreign friends of Bangladesh has since been extended to 568 people. It includes 257 Indians, 88 Americans, 41 Pakistanis, 39 Britons, 9 Russians, 18 Nepalese, 16 French and 18 Japanese.

In media

Films

• Ora Egaro Jon (The Magnificent Eleven), a 1972 Dhallywood war film directed by Chashi Nazrul Islam, featuring real Indian Army and Pakistani Army personnel. This was the first ever feature film about Bangladesh Liberation War.
• Hindustan Ki Kasam, a 1973 Bollywood war film directed by Chetan Anand about Operation Cactus Lilly.
• Aakraman, a 1975 Bollywood film set during this war featuring a romantic love triangle.
• Border, a 1997 Bollywood war film directed by J.P.Dutta. This movie is an adaptation from real life events that happened at the Battle of Longewala fought in Rajasthan (Western Theatre).
• 16 December, a 2002 film directed by Mani Shankar.
• 1971 – Prisoners of War, a 2007 Bollywood war film directed by Amrit Sagar. Set against the backdrop of a prisoner-of-war camp in Pakistan, it follows six Indian prisoners awaiting release after their capture during the war.
• Midnight's Children, a 2012 film was adapted from Salman Rushdie's novel, is fictional story of two twins born on the midnight of 15 August 1947. It also has references to 1971 war.
• Children of War, a 2014 Hindi drama film, revolves around the events of 1971 Bangladesh genocide and the liberation war.
• The Ghazi Attack, a 2017 war film directed by Sankalp Reddy. It is based on the sinking of PNS Ghazi during the war.
• 1971: Beyond Borders, a 2017 Indian war drama film written and directed by Major Ravi.
• Raazi, a 2017 fictional spy film, based on the novel "Calling Sehmat", was set before the events of war about the detection of plans to deploy PNS Ghazi
• Romeo Akbar Walter, a 2019 spy thriller film was set against the backdrop of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, which tells the story of Rehmatullah Ali, a young Indian bank clerk, who is recruited by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), for a covert operation in Pakistan.
• Bhuj: The Pride of India, 2021 action film set during the war tells the story of rebuilding the Bhuj airbase in India, which was damaged by the Pakistan air attacks.
• Pippa, a 2023 action film based on the life of Brigadier Balram Singh Mehta who fought in the Battle of Garibpur on the eastern front in November 1971.
• Sam Bahadur, a 2023 film, is based on the life of India's first Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw and his contribution to the 1971 Indo-Pak war.

Short films

• Mukti: Birth of a Nation, a 2017 short film directed by Manu Chobe depictsalso focuses on hs contribution to 1971 war. the negotiations between Major General J. F. R. Jacob and Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi over the Pakistani Instrument of Surrender.

Miniseries/Dramas

• PNS Ghazi, an Urdu (Pakistani) drama based on sinking of PNS Ghazi, ISPR

See also

• Bangladesh Liberation War
• Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses
• List of aerial victories during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
• Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
• Separatist nationalism in Pakistan
  • Muslim nationalism in South Asia
    • Pakistani nationalism
    • Conservatism in Pakistan
    • Socialism in Pakistan
• Bangladesh Forces
• Timeline of the Bangladesh War
• Radcliffe Line
• Pakistan and state-sponsored terrorism
• India and state-sponsored terrorism
• United States–Pakistan relations before 1990
• Soviet Union-Pakistan relations before 1990
• Tridev Roy
• Operation Searchlight\Barisal
• Riverine Warfare
• Protest of 1969 in Pakistan
• Pakistan Air Force in East Pakistan
• Pakistan news media in Indo-Pakistani war of 1971
• International Crimes Tribunal (Bangladesh)
• Indian Army in East Pakistan
• Pakistan-Afghanistan relations
• 1971 Winter POWs/MIA Investigations, Pakistan
• Pakistan military deployments in other countries
• Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction

General

• History of Bangladesh
• History of Myanmar
• List of conflicts in Asia

References

1. Lyon, Peter (2008). Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 166. ISBN 978-1-57607-712-2. India's decisive victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war and emergence of independent Bangladesh dramatically transformed the power balance of South Asia
2. Kemp, Geoffrey (2010). The East Moves West India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East. Brookings Institution Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-0-8157-0388-4. However, India's decisive victory over Pakistan in 1971 led the Shah to pursue closer relations with India
3. Byman, Daniel (2005). Deadly connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge University Press. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-521-83973-0. India's decisive victory in 1971 led to the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972
4. Faruki, Kemal A. "THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR, 1971, AND THE UNITED NATIONS." Pakistan Horizon, vol. 25, no. 1, 1972, pp. 10–20. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393109. Accessed 21 Jan. 2024. "On the next day, Dacca surrendered, President Yahya Khan talked of 'war until victory', India made a unilateral declaration of ceasefire in the West and the Security Council chose to adjourn having accumulated in its possession, by that time, six draft resolutions from various member States of the Security Council."
5. Burke, S. M. "The Postwar Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971." Asian Survey, vol. 13, no. 11, 1973, pp. 1036–49. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2642858. Accessed 21 Jan. 2024. "In Kashmir they agreed to respect 'the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971...without prejudice to the recognized position of either side.'"
6. Siniver A. The India-Pakistan War, December 1971. In: Nixon, Kissinger, and US Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2008:148-184. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511511660.008 "The fall of Dacca and the unconditional surrender of the outnumbered Pakistani forces in the East were followed the next day by a mutual declaration of cease-fire along the Western border."
7. ^ Nawaz, Shuja (2008). Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. Oxford University Press. p. 329. ISBN 978-0-19-547697-2.
8. ^ Chitkara, M. G (1996). Benazir, a Profile. APH. p. 81. ISBN 9788170247524. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
9. ^ Schofield, Victoria (2003). Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending Ward. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 117. ISBN 9781860648984. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
10. ^ Warikoo, K. (2009). Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives. Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series. Taylor & Francis. p. 71. ISBN 978-1-134-03294-5.
11. Palit, Maj Gen DK (1998). The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War, 1971. Lancer Publishers. p. 44. ISBN 978-1-897829-37-0. Archived from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
12. ^ Cloughley, Brian (5 January 2016). A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-1-63144-039-7. Archived from the original on 14 April 2021. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
13. Rashiduzzaman, M. (March 1972). "Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement". Asian Survey. 12 (3): 191. doi:10.2307/2642872. JSTOR 2642872. The Pakistan Government, however, claimed that the combined fighting strength of the 'secessionists' amounted to about 180,000 armed personnel.
14. Dixit, J.N. (2 September 2003). India-Pakistan in War and Peace. Routledge. ISBN 1134407572. while the size of the Indian armed forces remained static at one million men and Pakistan's at around 350,000.
15. ^ Boewe, Charles (2006). "Indian-Pakistani Wars". In Leonard, Thomas M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of the Developing World. Vol. 2. Routledge. p. 806. ISBN 978-0-415-97663-3. Retrieved 8 December 2023.
16. ^ "This Vijay Diwas, remember the sacrifices and do good by our disabled soldiers". The Times of India. 16 December 2018. Archived from the original on 17 December 2018. About 3,843 Indian soldiers died in this war that resulted in the unilateral surrender of the Pakistan Army and led to the creation of Bangladesh. Among the soldiers who returned home triumphant were also 9,851 injured; many of them disabled.
17. Kapur, Anu (11 March 2010). Vulnerable India: A Geographical Study of Disasters. SAGE Publications India. ISBN 9788132105428. Archived from the original on 14 April 2021. Retrieved 12 November 2020 – via Google Books.
18. ^ The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare, edited by Chris Bishop (Amber publishing 1997, republished 2004 pages 384–387 ISBN 1-904687-26-1)
19. "Chapter 10: Naval Operations in the Western Naval Command". Indian Navy. Archived from the original on 23 February 2012.
20. "Damage Assessment– 1971 Indo Pak Naval War". Orbat.com. Archived from the original on 19 March 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
21. Dr. He Hemant Kumar Pandey & Manish Raj Singh (1 August 2017). INDIA'S MAJOR MILITARY & RESCUE OPERATIONS. Horizon Books ( A Division of Ignited Minds Edutech P Ltd), 2017. p. 117.
22. ^ "IAF Combat Kills – 1971 Indo-Pak Air War" (PDF). orbat.com. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 January 2014. Retrieved 20 December 2011.
23. "Pakistan Air Force – Official website". Paf.gov.pk. Archived from the original on 15 December 2011. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
24. "Chapter-10". Indiannavy.nic.in. Archived from the original on 23 February 2012. Retrieved 25 April 2012.
25. "AMS-138". Navsource.org. Archived from the original on 30 October 2013. Retrieved 24 April 2012.
26. "Minesweepers MSO MSC MSI MHC MCM Post-War". Shipbuildinghistory.com. 23 December 2011. Archived from the original on 28 February 2012. Retrieved 24 April 2012.
27. "The Sinking of the Ghazi". Bharat Rakshak Monitor, 4(2). Archived from the original on 28 November 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
28. "How west was won...on the waterfront". The Tribune. Archived from the original on 30 June 2017. Retrieved 24 December 2011.
29. "India – Pakistan War, 1971; Western Front, Part I". acig.com. Archived from the original on 10 September 2012. Retrieved 22 December 2011.
30. "Aircraft Losses in Pakistan – 1971 War". Archived from the original on 1 May 2009. Retrieved 24 April 2010.
31. ^ "India: Easy Victory, Uneasy Peace". Time. 27 December 1971. Archived from the original on 13 June 2017. Retrieved 24 April 2016.
32. "1971 War: 'I will give you 30 minutes'". Sify. Archived from the original on 6 December 2010. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
33. ^ Burke, S. M (1974). Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies – S. M. Burke. University of Minnesota Press. p. 216. ISBN 9780816607204. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
34. Bose, Sarmila (November 2011). "The question of genocide and the quest for justice in the 1971 war" (PDF). Journal of Genocide Research. 13 (4): 398. doi:10.1080/14623528.2011.625750. S2CID 38668401. Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 27 March 2016.
35. "Jamaat claims denied by evidence". THE DAILY STAR. 28 February 2008. Archived from the original on 11 August 2017. Retrieved 10 March 2016.
36. ^ Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 87. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1.
37. Alston, Margaret (2015). Women and Climate Change in Bangladesh. Routledge. p. 40. ISBN 9781317684862. Archived from the original on 13 October 2020. Retrieved 8 March 2016.
38. Debnath, Angela (2012) . "The Bangladesh Genocide: The Plight of Women". In Totten, Samuel (ed.). Plight and Fate of Women During and Following Genocide. Transaction Publishers. p. 55. ISBN 978-1-4128-4759-9. Archived from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 8 March 2016.
39. ^ U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere Archived 21 December 2011 at the Wayback Machine, 31 March 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.
40. Kennedy, Senator Edward, "Crisis in South Asia – A report to the Subcommittee investigating the Problem of Refugees and Their Settlement, Submitted to U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee", 1 November 1971, U.S. Govt. Press, page 66. Sen. Kennedy wrote, "Field reports to the U.S. Government, countless eye-witness journalistic accounts, reports of International agencies such as World Bank and additional information available to the subcommittee document the reign of terror which grips East Bengal (East Pakistan). Hardest hit have been members of the Hindu community who have been robbed of their lands and shops, systematically slaughtered, and in some places, painted with yellow patches marked 'H'. All of this has been officially sanctioned, ordered and implemented under martial law from Islamabad."
41. Rummel, Rudolph J., "Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900" Archived 21 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine, ISBN 3-8258-4010-7, Chapter 8, Table 8.2 Pakistan Genocide in Bangladesh Estimates, Sources, and Calculations Archived 4 February 2012 at the Wayback Machine: lowest estimate 2 million claimed by Pakistan (reported by Aziz, Qutubuddin. Blood and tears Karachi: United Press of Pakistan, 1974. pp. 74, 226), some other sources used by Rummel suggest a figure of between 8 and 10 million with one (Johnson, B. L. C. Bangladesh. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975. pp. 73, 75) that "could have been" 12 million.
42. Sharlach, Lisa (2000). "Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda". New Political Science. 22 (1): 92–93. doi:10.1080/713687893. S2CID 144966485.
43. Sharlach, Lisa (2002). "State Rape: Sexual Violence as Genocide". In Kent Worcester; Sally A. Bermanzohn; Mark Ungar (eds.). Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox. Routledge. p. 111. ISBN 978-0-415-93111-3.
44. Sajjad, Tazreena (2012) . "The Post-Genocidal Period and its Impact on Women". In Tottne, Samuel (ed.). Plight and Fate of Women During and Following Genocide. Transaction Publishers. p. 225. ISBN 978-1-4128-4759-9.
45. Mookherjee, Nayanika (2012). "Mass rape and the inscription of gendered and racial domination during the Bangladesh War of 1971". In Raphaëlle Branche; Fabrice Virgili (eds.). Rape in Wartime. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 68. ISBN 978-0-230-36399-1.
46. ^ Lieven, Anatol (2012). Pakistan: A Hard Country. PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1610391627. Archived from the original on 11 October 2020. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
47. Abbott, David (2015). Changing World: Pakistan. Minnesota, U.S.: Encyclopaedia Britannica. ISBN 9781625133212. Archived from the original on 29 October 2020. Retrieved 8 January 2017.
48. "1971 war: The story of India's victory, Pak's surrender, Bangladesh freedom". Business Standard India. 16 December 2018. Archived from the original on 12 July 2020. Retrieved 6 July 2020.
49. "Legal Framework Order 1970". Story of Pakistan. Nazaria-e-Pakistan Trust, 2003. 1 June 2003. Archived from the original on 3 December 2016. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
50. Chatterjee, Pranab (2010). A Story of Ambivalent Modernization in Bangladesh and West Bengal: The Rise and Fall of Bengali Elitism in South Asia. Peter Lang. p. 24. ISBN 978-1-4331-0820-4. Archived from the original on 19 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020. Muslims in West Pakistan had developed a culture which bordered on ethnocentrism, since the ideas entertained in West Pakistan were that they, the ethnic "Sindhi," "Punjabi," "Beluchi," "Afghani," and others were "real" Muslims whereas "Bengali" Muslims from East Pakistan were "distant" Muslims.
51. Nohlen, Dieter (2004). Elections in Asia and the Pacific (Reprint ed.). Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. ISBN 978-0-19-924958-9.
52. Guha, Ramachandra (2011). India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy. Pan Macmillan. ISBN 9780330540209. Archived from the original on 14 October 2020. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
53. ^ Ehtisham, S. Akhtar (1998). A Medical Doctor Examines Life on Three Continents: A Pakistani View. Algora Publishing. ISBN 978-0-87586-634-5. Archived from the original on 14 October 2020. Retrieved 9 December 2016.
54. ^ Ghazali, Abdus Sattar. "The Second Martial Law". Islamic Pakistan: Illusions and Reality. National Book Club. Archived from the original on 30 May 2014. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
55. ^ D'Costa, Bina (2011). Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia. Routledge. p. 103. ISBN 978-0-415-56566-0.
56. Bose, Sarmila (8 October 2005). "Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971". Economic and Political Weekly. Archived from the original on 1 March 2007.
57. Salik, Siddiq (1977). Witness To Surrender. Oxford University Press. pp. 63, 228–9. ISBN 978-984-05-1373-4.
58. Riedel, Bruce O. (2011). Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad. Brookings Institution. p. 10. ISBN 978-0-8157-0557-4.
59. Matinuddin, Kamal (1994). Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis, 1968–1971. Wajidalis. ISBN 978-969-8031-19-0. Archived from the original on 18 May 2016. Retrieved 15 November 2015.
60. Khan, Fazal Muqueem (1973). Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership. National Book Foundation. ISBN 978-0-88386-302-2. Archived from the original on 11 June 2016. Retrieved 15 November 2015.
61. Qureshi, Hakeem Arshad (2003). Through the 1971 Crisis: An Eyewitness Account by a Soldier. Oxford University Press. p. 33. ISBN 978-0-19-579778-7.
62. Raja, Dewan Mohammad Tasawwar (2010). O General My General. Osmany Memorial Trust. pp. 68, 70. ISBN 978-984-8866-18-4.
63. ^ Shafqat, Sahar (2007). "Pakistan (1971)". In DeRouen, Karl Jr.; Heo, Uk (eds.). Civil wars of the world : major conflicts since World War II. Vol. II. ABC-CLIO. p. 596. ISBN 978-1-85109-919-1. Archived from the original on 19 August 2020. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
64. ^ "The U.S.: A Policy in Shambles". Time. 20 December 1971. Archived from the original on 30 September 2013. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
65. ^ "East Pakistan: Even the Skies Weep". Time. 25 October 1971. Archived from the original on 4 November 2007. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
66. ^ "Indo-Pakistani Wars". MSN Encarta. Archived from the original on 1 November 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
67. International, Rotary (1971). The Rotarian. Rotary International. Archived from the original on 13 October 2020. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
68. "The four Indo-Pak wars". Kashmirlive, 14 September 2006. Archived from the original on 17 October 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
69. Praval, K. C. (2009) . Indian Army After Independence. India: Lancer Publishers. p. 415. ISBN 978-1-935501-61-9. Retrieved 18 July 2017.
70. Bass, Gary J. (2013). The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide. Alfred A. Knopf. p. 94. ISBN 978-0-307-70020-9.
71. ^ Raghavan, Srinath (2012), "Soldiers, Statesmen, and India's Security Policy", India Review, 11 (2): 116–133, doi:10.1080/14736489.2012.674829, S2CID 154213504
72. "I had to find troops for Dhaka". Rediff News. 14 December 2006. Archived from the original on 25 August 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
73. Gill, John H. (2003). An Atlas of the 1971 India - Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh. National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. p. 12. Archived from the original on 22 March 2023. Retrieved 21 March 2023. By November, the Indian Army and paramilitary troops were regularly providing artillery support to the Mukti Bahini and, toward the end of the month, the army had even made small incursions into East Pakistan in several locations.
74. "50 years on, B'desh remembers Kolkata radio station that gave them hope during liberation war". The New Indian Express. PTI. 25 May 2021. Archived from the original on 4 December 2021. Retrieved 4 December 2021.
75. Dasgupta, Priyanka (29 November 2021). "How a secret radio station broadcast hope in 1971". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 4 December 2021. Retrieved 4 December 2021.
76. Dikshit, Sandeep (28 June 2008). "How he and his men won those wars". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
77. ^ "Sam Manekshaw: Sam Manekshaw, soldier, died on 27 June, aged 94". The Economist. 3 July 2008. p. 107. Archived from the original on 12 April 2017. Retrieved 7 July 2008.
78. Manekshaw, SHFJ. (11 November 1998). "Lecture at Defence Services Staff College on Leadership and Discipline" (Appendix V) in Singh (2002)Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, M.C. – Soldiering with Dignity.
79. Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. (1990). War and secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh. University of California Press. p. 208. ISBN 0-520-07665-6.
80. Ahmad, Dawood (16 December 2011). "Rethinking the big lies from 1971". The Express Tribune. Archived from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
81. Ahmed, Khalid (26 December 2013). "Pakistan,1971". The Indian Express. Archived from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
82. ^ "1971 'Jihad': Print ads from West Pakistan". Dawn (Editorial). 16 December 2014. Archived from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 23 December 2016.
83. "New Twist In 'Crush India' Propaganda Campaign". US Department of State Telegram. 26 October 1971. Archived from the original on 2 November 2011. Retrieved 29 September 2011.
84. Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. (1990). War and secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh. University of California Press. p. 212. ISBN 0-520-07665-6.
85. Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. (1990). War and secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh. University of California Press. p. 213. ISBN 0-520-07665-6.
86. ^ Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East. London, UK: Monitoring Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation. 1971. Archived from the original on 16 October 2020. Retrieved 22 December 2016.
87. "Anti-India Demonstration and Procession". US Department of State Telegram. 9 November 1971. Archived from the original on 2 April 2012. Retrieved 29 September 2011.
88. "Crush India" (PDF). Pakistan Observer. 30 November 1971. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 May 2012. Retrieved 29 September 2011.
89. "Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Archived from the original on 23 August 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
90. ^ Davies, Peter E. (2014). F-104 Starfighter Units in Combat. Osprey Publishing. p. 83. ISBN 978-1-78096-314-3. Retrieved 4 December 2023.
91. ^ "Bangladesh: Out of War, a Nation Is Born". Time. 20 December 1971. Archived from the original on 28 September 2013. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
92. "Trying to catch the Indian Air Force napping, Yahya Khan, launched a Pakistani version of Israel's 1967 air blitz in hopes that one rapid attack would cripple India's far superior air power. But India was alert, Pakistani pilots were inept, and Yahya's strategy of scattering his thin air force over a dozen air fields was a bust!", p. 34, Newsweek, 20 December 1971
93. ^ "India and Pakistan: Over the Edge". Time. 13 December 1971. Archived from the original on 8 October 2013. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
94. "1971: Pakistan intensifies air raids on India". BBC News. 3 December 1971. Archived from the original on 30 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
95. Makeig, Douglas C. (1989). "National Security". In Heitzman, James; Worden, Robert (eds.). Bangladesh: A Country Study. Library of Congress Country Studies. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. p. 210. OCLC 49223313. Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 17 April 2023. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
96. Palit, DK (10 October 2012). The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War, 1971. Lancer Publishers. ISBN 9781897829370. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
97. Hasnat, Syed Farooq (2011). Pakistan. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9780313346972. Archived from the original on 16 October 2020. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
98. Ahmad, Nadeem (7 August 2022). "The Battle of Hussainiwala". Bol News. Retrieved 25 November 2023.
99. "1971 War: The Battle of Hussainiwala". Indian Defence Review. 9 December 2020. Retrieved 25 November 2023.
100. ^ Saikia, Yasmin (3 July 2017). "The Battle of Hussainiwala and Qaiser-i-Hind: The 1971 War". Journal of Military History. 81 (3): 932–934.
101. Lt. Col. Muhammad Usman Hassan. "Battle Lore – On Breakthrough in Chamb". Soldiers Speak, Selected Articles from Pakistan Army Journal 1956–1981. Army Education Press, GHQ, Rawalpindi.
102. "Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Bilateral Relations (Simla Agreement) | UN Peacemaker". peacemaker.un.org. Retrieved 12 December 2023.
103. "The Tribune – Windows – Featured story". The Tribune. Retrieved 2 August 2016.
104. p. 42, Sharma
105. "Service Record for Group Captain Donald Melvyn Conquest 4692 GD(P) at Bharat Rakshak.com". Bharat Rakshak. Retrieved 28 May 2024.
106. Higgins, David R. (20 January 2016). M48 Patton vs Centurion: Indo-Pakistani War 1965. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781472810946.
107. National Defense University, Indian I Corps Archived 2008-10-29 at the Wayback Machine
108. "Rinchen's second victory of the day". Rediff News. 22 December 2011.
109. ^ Nair, Sreekumar (1 March 2010). Interpretation. Pustak Mahal. ISBN 9788122311112. Archived from the original on 14 April 2021. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
110. ^ Paret, Peter; Gordon A. Craig; Felix Gilbert (1986). Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820097-0. Archived from the original on 17 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020., pp802
111. Sengupta, Ramananda. "1971 War: 'I will give you 30 minutes'". Sify. Archived from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
112. Singh, Dipender (27 June 2008). "Sam gave dignity to Army in 1971, after 1962 debacle". Hindustan Times. Archived from the original on 26 December 2016. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
113. Goldrick, James (1997). No Easy Answers. New Delhi: Lancer's Publications and Distributors. ISBN 978-1-897829-02-8. Archived from the original on 18 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
114. ^ Goldrick, James (1997). No Easy Answers (PDF). New Delhi, India: Sona Printers, India. ISBN 1-897829-02-7. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
115. Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century. Frank Cass. p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-5542-2.
116. Branfill-Cook, Roger (2014). Torpedo: The Complete History of the World's Most Revolutionary Naval Weapon. Seaforth Publishing. ISBN 9781848322158. Archived from the original on 22 October 2020. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
117. "Trident, Grandslam and Python: Attacks on Karachi". Bharat Rakshak. Archived from the original on 26 September 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
118. Shabir, Usman. "The Second Missile Attack " PakDef Military Consortium". pakdef.org. Pakistan Defence, Usman. Archived from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
119. "Defence Notes". defencejournal.com. Archived from the original on 1 January 2012. Retrieved 25 April 2012.
120. Olsen, John Andreas (2011). Global Air Power. Potomac Books. p. 237. ISBN 978-1-59797-680-0.
121. "Remembering our war heroes". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 2 December 2006. Archived from the original on 7 November 2012.
122. "Does the US want war with India?". Rediff.com. 31 December 2004. Archived from the original on 25 October 2010. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
123. "Utilisation of Pakistan merchant ships seized during the 1971 war". Irfc-nausena.nic.in. Archived from the original on 1 March 2012. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
124. "Damage Assesment [sic] – 1971 Indo-Pak Naval War" (PDF). B. Harry. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 May 2010. Retrieved 20 June 2010.
125. "Military Losses in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War". Venik. Archived from the original on 25 February 2002. Retrieved 30 May 2005.
126. ^ Tariq Ali (1983). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. Penguin Books. p. 95. ISBN 978-0-14-022401-6. In a two-week war, Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army.
127. Jon Lake, "Air Power Analysis: Indian Airpower", World Air Power Journal, Volume 12
128. Group Captain M. Kaiser Tufail, "Great Battles of the Pakistan Airforce" and "Pakistan Air Force Combat Heritage" (pafcombat) et al., Feroze sons, ISBN 969-0-01892-2
129. "Indo-Pakistani conflict". Library of Congress Country Studies. Archived from the original on 19 October 2015. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
130. "Picture Gallery – Aviation Art by Group Captain Syed Masood Akhtar Hussaini". PAF Falcons. Archived from the original on 30 August 2011. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
131. Khan, Sher. "Last Flight from East Pakistan". defencejournal.com. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
132. ^ Bowman, Martin (2016). Cold War Jet Combat: Air-to-Air Jet Fighter Operations 1950–1972. Pen and Sword. ISBN 9781473874633. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
133. Simha, Rakesh Krishnan (17 January 2012). "How India brought down the US' supersonic man". Russia & India Report. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
134. Vishnu Som. "Exclusive Details of How Air Force Raided A Pak Air Base". NDTV. Archived from the original on 25 January 2018. Retrieved 25 January 2018.
135. Simha, Rakesh Krishnan (4 June 2015). "Why the Indian Air Force has a high crash rate". Russia Beyond. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
136. ^ "1971 war: When Indian officers rescued Pakistan general from a lynch mob". The Times of India. 15 December 1971. Archived from the original on 22 December 2021. Retrieved 22 December 2021.
137. Nayar, Kuldip (3 February 1998). "Of betrayal and bungling". The Indian Express. Archived from the original on 23 August 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
138. "Vijay Diwas: All you need to know about 1971 war with Pakistan | India News". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 26 November 2021. Retrieved 26 November 2021.
139. Cloughley, Brian (2016). A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections. Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. ISBN 9781631440397. Archived from the original on 28 October 2020. Retrieved 8 August 2017.
140. Burke, S. M. (1974). Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies. University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 9780816607204. Archived from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
141. Jackson, Robert (1975). South Asian Crisis: India — Pakistan — Bangla Desh. Chatto & Windus. pp. 72–73. ISBN 978-1-349-04163-3. Archived from the original on 1 October 2021. Retrieved 2 October 2021.
142. ^ Cheema, Amar (2014). The Crimson Chinar: The Kashmir Conflict: A Politico Military Perspective. Lancer Publishers. ISBN 978-81-7062-301-4. Archived from the original on 7 February 2023. Retrieved 27 December 2016.
143. Saunders, Harold H. (July–August 2014). "What Really Happened in Bangladesh". Foreign Affairs.
144. Alvandi, Roham (2016). Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War. Oxford University Press. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-19-061068-5.
145. Hanhimäki, Jussi (2004). The flawed architect: Henry Kissinger and American foreign policy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-517221-8. Archived from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
146. Lewis, John P. (9 December 1971). "Mr. Nixon and South Asia". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 July 2018. Retrieved 23 July 2018. The Nixon Administration's South Asia policy... is beyond redemption
147. "President Richard Nixon and the Presidents". nixontapes.org. Archived from the original on 9 April 2022. Retrieved 30 March 2020. WHT 016-048 12/08/1971 11:06 – 11:14 am P, GHWB Archived 9 April 2022 at the Wayback Machine
148. "1971 War: How the US tried to corner India". Rediff.com. 26 December 2006. Archived from the original on 28 August 2013. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
149. Rajagopalan, Rajesh; Mishra, Atul (2015). Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-32475-1. Archived from the original on 7 February 2023. Retrieved 18 September 2018.
150. "British aircraft carrier 'HMS Eagle' tried to intervene in 1971 India – Pakistan war". Frontier India. 18 December 2010. Archived from the original on 10 January 2016. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
151. "Cold war games". Bharat Rakshak. Archived from the original on 9 June 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
152. "Birth of a nation". The Indian Express. 11 December 2009. Archived from the original on 5 June 2020. Retrieved 14 April 2011.
153. "Nixon/Kissinger Saw India as "Soviet Stooge" in 1971 South Asia Crisis". nsarchive.gwu.edu. George Washington University press. Archived from the original on 24 December 2016. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
154. ^ Wetering, Carina (2016). Changing US Foreign Policy toward India. Springer. p. 69. ISBN 9781137548627. Archived from the original on 9 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
155. "Soviet aid for Pak projects". News Review on South Asia. June 1972. pp. 15–16.
156. Clary, Christopher (2019). "Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war". Journal of Strategic Studies. 42 (5): 677–700. doi:10.1080/01402390.2019.1570143. S2CID 159267611.
157. Jayapalan, N. (2000). India and Her Neighbours. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. ISBN 9788171569120. Archived from the original on 16 October 2020. Retrieved 25 December 2016.
158. Singh, Swaran, ed. (2007). China-Pakistan strategic cooperation : Indian perspectives. New Delhi: Manohar. p. 61. ISBN 978-8173047619.
159. ^ Jaffrelot, Christophe (2016). Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures. Columbia University Press. p. 285. ISBN 9780231540254. Archived from the original on 11 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
160. ^ "China Recognizes Bangladesh". Oxnard, California, USA. Associated Press. 1 September 1975. Archived from the original on 28 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
161. "China Veto Downs Bangladesh UN Entry". Montreal, Quebec, Canada. United Press International. 26 August 1972. Archived from the original on 14 April 2021. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
162. Chau, Donovan C.; Kane, Thomas M. (2014). China and International Security: History, Strategy, and 21st-Century Policy [3 volumes]: History, Strategy, and 21st-Century Policy. ABC-CLIO. pp. 226–227. ISBN 9781440800023. Archived from the original on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
163. "The Recognition Story". Bangladesh Strategic and Development Forum. Archived from the original on 25 July 2011. Retrieved 17 August 2011.
164. Raghavan, V. R. (2013). Internal Conflicts- A Four State Analysis: India-Nepal-Sri Lanka-Myanmar. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. p. 69. ISBN 9789382573418. Archived from the original on 11 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
165. "India and Its Neighbors: Cooperation or Confrontation?" (PDF). CIA. p. 7. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 April 2021. Retrieved 13 April 2021.
166. "The Foreign Policy of Sirimavo Bandaranaike". The Island. Archived from the original on 13 December 2010. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
167. "Brief Overview of Sri Lanka's Foreign Relations to Post-Independence". Foreign Ministry – Sri Lanka. Archived from the original on 8 April 2019. Retrieved 8 April 2019.
168. "Pak thanks Lanka for help in 1971 war". Hindustan Times. 11 June 2011. Archived from the original on 21 March 2021. Retrieved 14 February 2019.
169. The Diplomatic Ideas and Practices of Asian States. BRILL. 22 November 2021. ISBN 978-90-04-47803-9. Archived from the original on 2 October 2023. Retrieved 17 August 2023.
170. "Documents reveal US tilt to Pak in 1971 - India News". The Times of India. 20 December 2002. Archived from the original on 20 August 2022. Retrieved 20 August 2022.
171. Bass, Gary (2013). The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide. Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 978-0-307-70020-9. Archived from the original on 27 June 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2023.
172. Raghavan, Srinath (2013). 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh. Harvard University Press. pp. 182–183. ISBN 9780674731295.
173. Gill, John H. (2003). An Atlas of the 1971 India - Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh. National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Archived from the original on 22 March 2023. Retrieved 21 March 2023. In the west, the two armies sparred indecisively, each side's small advances being balanced by the other side's gains. The only exception was the dramatic drive by India's 11th Division into the sandy wastes of Pakistan's Sindh Province which netted India approximately 4,500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory, albeit barren desert.18
174. Gill, John H. An Atlas of the 1971 war. p. 55. There was no significant action south of Fazilka, although Indian 4 Para of 51 Para Brigade conducted a costly assault to evict an intruding Pakistani platoon from a nameless sand dune near the village of Nagi several days after the cease-fire (26/27 December). This action cost 4 Para 21 killed and 60 wounded
175. ^ Singh, Sukhwant (1981). India's Wars Since Independence The Liberation Of Bangladesh. Lancer Publishers LLC. ISBN 978-1-935501-60-2. Archived from the original on 22 May 2023. Retrieved 10 July 2023. As the snows melted, Pakistan tried constantly to reclaim its lost territories in Jammu and Kashmir and improve its defensive posture along the ceasefire line in the process. In May 1972, Pakistan made a surprise brigade attack on the Indian forward posts in the Kayan area of the Lipa valley. The Indian posts fell back, suffering heavy casualties. Similarly, the Minimarg Lake area in Gurais was becoming active and large tracts of snow earlier claimed to be in Indian hands were gradually shrinking. The same was the case in the Tartok area of the Partapur sector of Ladakh. These ceasefire violations were prompted by Indian tactical and administrative difficulties in the newly acquired territory.
176. International Living. International Living, Incorporated. 2002. p. 22.
177. Mudiam, Prithvi Ram (1994). India and the Middle East. British Academic Press. p. 79. ISBN 9781850437031.
178. ^ Kemp, Geoffrey (2012). The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0815724070. Archived from the original on 14 October 2020. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
179. Gill, John H. (2003). An Atlas of the 1971 India – Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh. Washington DC: National Defense University. Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. p. 66. Archived from the original on 18 April 2016. Retrieved 9 April 2016.
180. Higham, Robin D. S. (April 2005), "An Atlas of the 1971 India – Pakistan war : the creation of Bangladesh (review)", The Journal of Military History, 69 (2), doi:10.1353/jmh.2005.0101, S2CID 162129844, archived from the original on 19 November 2015, retrieved 9 April 2016
181. Baxter, Craig (2002). Government and politics in South Asia (5th ed.). Westview Press. p. 269.
182. Lewis, David (2011). Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society. Cambridge University Press. p. 81. ISBN 978-1-139-50257-3. Archived from the original on 6 January 2017. Retrieved 18 February 2019. There were high levels of corruption and cronyism within the administration and widespread concerns that he was allowing India to interfere in Bangladesh's domestic affairs existed.
183. van Schendel, Willem (12 February 2009). A History of Bangladesh. Cambridge University Press. p. 182. ISBN 978-1-316-26497-3. Archived from the original on 26 May 2019. Retrieved 18 February 2019. Another, far more dangerous group felt deeply affronted: the army ... Their resentment originated in the final days of the war of 1971. According to them, the Indian army had robbed the Bangladeshi fighters of the glory of liberating Bangladesh, walking in when the freedom fighters had already finished the job, and had taken away to India all sophisticated weaponry and vehicles captured from the Pakistanis ... they also felt bitter about Mujib's closeness to India, which, they thought, undermined the sovereignty of Bangladesh. By 1973, many in the army were both anti-Indian and anti-Mujib; in the elections that year the garrisons voted solidly for opposition candidates.
184. "Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other". Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. 14 July 2014. Archived from the original on 15 October 2015. Retrieved 9 April 2016.
185. "Pakistan's leaders should heed the lesson of Bangladesh". The Guardian. 15 August 2010. Archived from the original on 26 December 2016. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
186. "No lessons learnt in forty years". The Express Tribune. 15 December 2011. Archived from the original on 24 October 2016. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
187. Malik, Anas (22 October 2010). Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology. Routledge. ISBN 9781136904196. Archived from the original on 19 October 2020. Retrieved 7 November 2016.
188. Waines, David (6 November 2003). An Introduction to Islam. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521539067. Archived from the original on 13 October 2020. Retrieved 7 November 2016.
189. Dogra, C. Deepak (9 December 2015). Pakistan: Caught in the Whirlwind. Lancer Publishers LLC. ISBN 9781940988221. Archived from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 7 November 2016.
190. Further information relates in Hamoodur Rahman Commission.
191. ^ Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 88. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1.
192. Siddique, Abubakar (2014). The Pashtun question: the unresolved key to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hurst & Co. p. 39. ISBN 978-1-84904-292-5.
193. Langewiesche, William (November 2005). "The Wrath of Khan". The Atlantic. Retrieved 31 July 2016.
194. "Prince, Soldier, Statesman – Sahabzada Yaqub Khan". Defence Journal. Archived from the original on 12 March 2009. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
195. Qureshi, Hakeem Arshad (2002). The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative. Oxford University Press. p. 288. ISBN 978-0-19-579778-7.
196. "Gen. Tikka Khan, 87; 'Butcher of Bengal' Led Pakistani Army". Los Angeles Times. 30 March 2002. Archived from the original on 19 June 2021. Retrieved 11 April 2010.
197. Bhutto, Fatima (2010). Songs of Blood and Sword: A Daughter's Memoir. Nation Books. p. 100. ISBN 978-1-56858-632-8. Retrieved 1 December 2023.
198. Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1. Archived from the original on 12 January 2016. Retrieved 11 April 2010.
199. Khan, M. H. (2016). Memoir of M H Khan: Turbulence in the Indian Subcontinent. Mereo Books. p. 144. ISBN 978-1-86151-569-8. Archived from the original on 1 May 2022. Retrieved 1 May 2022.
200. Mamoon, Muntassir (2000). The Vanquished Generals and the Liberation War of Bangladesh. Translated by Ibrahim, Kushal. Somoy Prokashan. pp. 88, 148–149. ISBN 984-458-210-5.
201. "Population of Pakistan in 1972" (PDF). Bureau of Statistics. Archived (PDF) from the original on 20 September 2018. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
202. "Constitution of Pakistan". Story of Pakistan. Nazaria-e-Pakistan, Part IV. June 2003. Archived from the original on 2 October 2013. Retrieved 2 June 2014.
203. ^ Singh, Ravi Shekhar Narain Singh (2008). The Military Factor in Pakistan. Lancer Publishers. ISBN 9780981537894. Archived from the original on 9 October 2020. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
204. Kapur, Ashok (14 December 2010). India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle. Routledge. ISBN 9781136902611. Archived from the original on 13 October 2020. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
205. Paul, T. V. (2000). Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. McGill-Queen's Press. p. 133. ISBN 978-0-7735-2087-5. Archived from the original on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 24 December 2016.
206. "125 Slain in Dacca Area, Believed Elite of Bengal". The New York Times. New York. 19 December 1971. p. 1. Archived from the original on 28 March 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2008. At least 125 persons, believed to be physicians, professors, writers and teachers, were found murdered today in a field outside Dacca. All the victims' hands were tied behind their backs and they had been bayoneted, garroted or shot. These victims were among an estimated 300 Bengali intellectuals who had been seized by West Pakistani soldiers and locally recruited supporters.
207. Murshid, Tazeen M. (1997). "State, Nation, Identity: The Quest for Legitimacy in Bangladesh". South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. 20 (2): 1–34. doi:10.1080/00856409708723294. ISSN 1479-0270.
208. Khan, Muazzam Hussain (2012). "Killing of Intellectuals". In Islam, Sirajul; Jamal, Ahmed A. (eds.). Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Second ed.). Asiatic Society of Bangladesh. Archived from the original on 26 May 2019. Retrieved 4 July 2015.
209. Shaiduzzaman. "Martyred intellectuals: martyred history". The New Age. South Africa. Archived from the original on 1 December 2010. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
210. "1971 Bengali Hindu Genocide". Hindu American Foundation. Retrieved 26 November 2023.
211. Bose, Sarmila (2010). Dead reckoning : memories of the 1971 Bangladesh war. London: C. Hurst. pp. 164–165, 176–181. ISBN 978-1-84904-049-5.
212. Mikaberidze, Alexander (2013). Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes: An Encyclopedia [2 Volumes]: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. pp. 511–512. ISBN 978-1-59884-926-4. Archived from the original on 20 April 2020. Retrieved 7 February 2019.
213. "Pakistan denies committing war crimes in 1971". The Daily Star. 1 December 2015. Archived from the original on 5 December 2015. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
214. Rummel, Rudolph J., "Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900" Archived 21 February 2016 at the Wayback Machine, ISBN 978-3-8258-4010-5, Chapter 8, table 8.1
215. "Birth of Bangladesh: When raped women and war babies paid the price of a new nation". The Indian Express. 19 December 2016. Archived from the original on 6 April 2019. Retrieved 17 December 2016.
216. "Bangladesh sets up war crimes court". Al Jazeera. 26 March 2010. Archived from the original on 5 June 2011. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
217. Worcester, Kenton; Bermanzohn, Sally Avery; Ungar, Mark (2013). Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox. Routledge. p. 111. ISBN 978-1-136-70125-2. Archived from the original on 20 April 2020. Retrieved 18 September 2018.
218. Tripathi, Salil (2016). The Colonel Who Would Not Repent: The Bangladesh War and Its Unquiet Legacy. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-21818-3. Archived from the original on 20 April 2020. Retrieved 18 September 2018.
219. Hossain, Mokerrom (2010). From Protest to Freedom: A Book for the New Generation: the Birth of Bangladesh. Mokerrom. p. 133. ISBN 978-0-615-48695-6. Archived from the original on 20 April 2020. Retrieved 18 September 2018.
220. Gerlach, Christian (2010). Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World. Cambridge University Press. p. 148. ISBN 978-1-139-49351-2. Archived from the original on 26 May 2019. Retrieved 18 September 2018.
221. "Bangladesh sets up 1971 war crimes tribunal". BBC News. 25 March 2010. Archived from the original on 28 March 2010. Retrieved 26 March 2010.
222. "Bangladesh to Hold Trials for 1971 War Crimes". Voice of America. 26 March 2010. Archived from the original on 29 March 2010. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
223. Gill, John H (1994). An Atlas of 1971 Indian-Pakistan war-the Creation of Bangladesh. NESA. p. 66.
224. "Dhaka demonstrators protest Pakistan's reaction to Molla's execution". The Express Tribune. 18 December 2013. Archived from the original on 26 December 2016. Retrieved 18 December 2013.
225. ^ Bose, Sarmila (22 September 2007). "Losing the Victims: Problems of Using Women as Weapons in Recounting the Bangladesh War" (PDF). Economic and Political Weekly: 3865. Archived (PDF) from the original on 9 October 2016. Retrieved 30 March 2016.
226. Kharal, Rāʼe Asad K̲h̲ān (2000). Pākistān kaise ṭūṭā?. Intelligence Publishers. Archived from the original on 9 October 2020. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
227. Shah, Aqil (2014). The Army and Democracy. Harvard University Press. p. 127. ISBN 9780674419773. Archived from the original on 11 October 2020. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
228. "The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report | Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan". Story of Pakistan. 1 June 2003. Archived from the original on 28 December 2020. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
229. ^ Halarnkar, Sameer (21 August 2000). "The Untold Story of 1971 – Behind Pakistan's Defeat". India Today. Archived from the original on 13 January 2016. Retrieved 17 December 2011.
230. ^ "Bangladesh requests war report". BBC News. 30 August 2000. Archived from the original on 28 October 2009. Retrieved 24 April 2011.
231. Bhatt, Arunkumar (2015). Psychological Warfare and India. Lancer Publishers. pp. 288–289. ISBN 9788170621331. Archived from the original on 23 October 2020. Retrieved 22 August 2016.
232. Halarnkar, Sameer (21 August 2000). "The Genesis of Defeat – How many Hindus have you killed?". India Today. Archived from the original on 25 October 2013. Retrieved 17 December 2011.
233. Halarnkar, Sameer (21 August 2000). "The Loss of Character – "Lust for wine, greed for houses"". India Today. Archived from the original on 2 June 2016. Retrieved 17 December 2011.
234. ^ Halarnkar, Sameer (21 August 2000). "Bravado And Capitulation – "Further resistance is not humanly possible"". India Today. Archived from the original on 2 June 2016. Retrieved 17 December 2011.
235. ^ D'Costa, Bina (2011). Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia. Routledge. p. 76. ISBN 978-0-415-56566-0. Archived from the original on 20 April 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2016.
236. Hamoodur Rehman Commission (HRC) Report of Inquiry into the 1971 War (Vanguard Books Lahore, 513)
237. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report Archived 16 August 2016 at the Wayback Machine, chapter 2 Archived 12 October 2014 at the Wayback Machine, paragraph 33
238. D'Costa, Bina (2011). Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia. Routledge. p. 78. ISBN 978-0-415-56566-0. Archived from the original on 20 April 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2016.
239. ^ "India Pakistan | Timeline". BBC News. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 27 November 2015.
240. "Simla Agreement". Bilateral/Multilateral Documents. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Archived from the original on 28 September 2021. Retrieved 27 September 2013.
241. "Turtuk, a Promised Land Between Two Hostile Neighbours". The Wire. Archived from the original on 30 October 2020. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
242. Rajrishi Singhal, qz com. "An encounter with the 'king' of Turtuk, a border village near Gilgit-Baltistan". Scroll.in. Archived from the original on 24 October 2020. Retrieved 27 October 2020.
243. "A portrait of a village on the border". 10 August 2017. Archived from the original on 26 August 2017. Retrieved 26 August 2017.
244. "Have you heard about this Indian Hero?". Rediff.com. 22 December 2011. Archived from the original on 14 June 2017. Retrieved 28 May 2015.
245. "The Simla Agreement 1972". Story of Pakistan. Archived from the original on 14 June 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2009.
246. Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 99. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1.
247. "The collapse of the Shimla Accord". 9 June 2014. Archived from the original on 23 April 2016. Retrieved 9 April 2016.
248. "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees". UNCHR. Archived from the original on 14 May 2013. Retrieved 16 February 2013.
249. Wolpert, Stanley (1993). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan:his life and times. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195076615.
250. Wierda, Marieke; Anthony Triolo (31 May 2012). Luc Reydams; Jan Wouters; Cedric Ryngaert, eds. International Prosecutors. Oxford University Press. p. 169. ISBN 978-0199554294.
251. Coll, Steve (2005). Ghost Wars. The Penguin Press. ISBN 978-1-59420-007-6. Archived from the original on 8 January 2016. Retrieved 15 September 2020. pg 221, 475.
252. Kreisler interview with Coll "Conversations with history", 25 March 2005 Archived 18 January 2009 at the Wayback Machine, UC Berkeley Institute of International Studies
253. Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali (April 1973). "Pakistan Builds Anew". Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 16 January 2011. Retrieved 8 July 2011.
254. Singh, Sarbans (1993). Battle Honours of the Indian Army 1757 – 1971. New Delhi: Vision Books. pp. 257–278. ISBN 978-81-7094-115-6. Archived from the original on 25 February 2012. Retrieved 3 November 2011.
255. "Martyrs". National Defense Academy, Pune. Archived from the original on 29 September 2011.
256. "Param Vir Chakra". Government of India. Archived from the original on 22 December 2011. Retrieved 14 November 2011.
257. "Gallantry Awards | Ministry of Defence, Government of India". www.gallantryawards.gov.in. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
258. "Gallantry Awards | Ministry of Defence, Government of India". www.gallantryawards.gov.in. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
259. "Gallantry Awards | Ministry of Defence, Government of India". www.gallantryawards.gov.in. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
260. "Gallantry Awards | Ministry of Defence, Government of India". www.gallantryawards.gov.in. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
261. Khan, Sanjida. "National Awards". Banglapedia. Archived from the original on 24 December 2021. Retrieved 8 July 2018. Through a gazette notification of the government issued on 15 December 1973, the insignia of Bir Srestha was conferred upon seven martyr freedom fighters (posthumously)
262. Rahman, Rifaat (4 December 2015). "Swadhinata Chattar built as memorial to seven Liberation War heroes ruined by encroachers". bdnews24.com. Archived from the original on 9 July 2018. Retrieved 8 July 2018. Inside, there are separate plaques for Bir Shrestha Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir, Bir Shrestha Flight Lt Motiur Rahman, Bir Shrestha Sepoy Mostofa Kamal, Bir Shrestha Sepoy Hamidur Rahman, Bir Shrestha Lance Naik Munshi Abdur Rouf, Bir Shrestha Ruhul Amin, and Bir Shrestha Lance Naik Nur Mohammad Sheikh.
263. "Nishan-e-Haider holders of Pakistan Army". Archived from the original on 24 April 2013. Retrieved 19 February 2013.
264. "Nishan-e-Haider". Archived from the original on 12 August 2014.
265. "Major Muhammad Akram". 24 August 2010. Archived from the original on 24 August 2010. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
266. "PAKISTAN AIR FORCE - Official website". 14 March 2010. Archived from the original on 14 March 2010. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
267. "Major Shabbir Sharif's 51st martyrdom anniversary observed". The Express Tribune. 6 December 2022. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
268. "Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan". 9 August 2019. Archived from the original on 9 August 2019. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
269. "Lance Naik Muhammad Mahfuz". 30 January 2018. Archived from the original on 30 January 2018. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
270. Habib, Haroon (25 July 2011). "Bangladesh honours Indira Gandhi with highest award". The Hindu. Archived from the original on 10 October 2017. Retrieved 18 May 2013.
271. "Govt offers to form committee, OF unions to think over | Nagpur News". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 24 December 2021. Retrieved 24 December 2021.
272. "Padma Shri Awardees". Government of India. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
273. "At India's 200-year-old ordnance factories, anxiety and anticipation | India News". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 24 December 2021. Retrieved 24 December 2021.
274. "Friends of freedom honoured". The Daily Star. 28 March 2012. Archived from the original on 29 March 2012. Retrieved 28 March 2012.
275. "B'desh honours foreign friends". The Financial Express. Dhaka. 28 March 2012. Archived from the original on 24 February 2015. Retrieved 28 March 2012.
276. Haq, Fahmidul (2022). "Cinema of Bangladesh: Absence of 1947 and abundance of 1971". India Review. 21 (3): 429. doi:10.1080/14736489.2022.2086409.
277. ^ "Top 10 films on Indo-Pak conflict". The Times of India. 30 March 2011. Archived from the original on 11 May 2012. Retrieved 28 July 2012.
278. "'Border' director JP Dutta pays tribute to Brig Chandpuri | Chandigarh News". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 15 December 2020. Retrieved 16 October 2020.
279. "1971: Beyond Borders Review {3.5/5}: The film puts across the message that fighting wars for "borders and orders" robs away so many lives needlessly". The Times of India. Retrieved 20 June 2017.
280. "The thrill lies in being the first person to do something that has not been done before: Mohanlal". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 24 November 2020. Retrieved 16 October 2020.
281. "That spy princess!". The Hindu. 3 May 2008. ISSN 0971-751X. Archived from the original on 9 November 2020. Retrieved 10 May 2018.
282. "Bhuj The Pride of India: Sanjay Dutt, Sharad Kelkar and Sonakshi Sinha join Ajay Devgn's film". The Indian Express. 20 March 2019. Archived from the original on 21 March 2019. Retrieved 25 June 2019.
283. "Mukti – Birth of a Nation Showcases History of Indian Military During 1971". News18. 18 August 2017. Archived from the original on 30 October 2020. Retrieved 27 October 2020.