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* Reanalyze the extent to which this conflict was, in fact, a victory for Egypt. (By forcing peace through a position of power Egypt achieved its primary objective of regaining control of the Sinai (this is a backwards read of the reality. egypt lost its bargaining position by its loss of its patron the soviet union, and was instead forced to negotiate for the sinai and recognize Israel. this meant a major loss of prestige and it's ejection from the arab league)).
* (Try to find reliable sources that detail the war specifically on the Golan Heights from the Syrian and/or Iraqi retrospective) - This may be difficult to accomplish given the open nature of Israeli society which tolerates internal discussion as opposed to the regimes in Syria / Iraq which do not.

* Point to peace initiatives: * Point to peace initiatives:
** From Sadat <s>in 1971</s> and in February 1973 - They both where rejected by Golda Meir government <s> leaving no choice to the Egyptians to get in the war</s>. ** From Sadat <s>in 1971</s> and in February 1973 - They both were rejected by Golda Meir's government <s> leaving no choice to the Egyptians to get in the war</s>.
** From Golda: On 28 February 1973, during a visit in ], Golda agreed with ]'s peace proposal based on "security versus sovereignty" : ] would accept Egyptian sovereignty over all ], while ] would accept Israeli presence in some of Sinai strategic positions.; The Rabin Memoirs <ref name="Rabin1996p215">{{cite book|author=Yitzhak Rabin|title=The Rabin Memoirs|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Gb8sjKSTvFwC|year=1996|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-20766-0|page=215|quote="security versus sovereignty"...Israel would have to accept Egyptian sovereignty over all the Sinai, while Egypt ,in turn, would have to accept Israeli military presence in certain strategic positions."}}</ref> Sadat refused this proposal.<ref name="Kumaraswamy2013p105">{{cite book|author=P.R. Kumaraswamy|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=g1TkFQgzp5cC&pg=PA105|date=11 January 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-32895-4|pages=105–}}</ref> ** From Golda: On 28 February 1973, during a visit in ], Golda agreed with ]'s peace proposal based on "security versus sovereignty" : ] would accept Egyptian sovereignty over all ], while ] would accept Israeli presence in some of Sinai strategic positions.; The Rabin Memoirs <ref name="Rabin1996p215">{{cite book|author=Yitzhak Rabin|title=The Rabin Memoirs|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Gb8sjKSTvFwC|year=1996|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-20766-0|page=215|quote="security versus sovereignty"...Israel would have to accept Egyptian sovereignty over all the Sinai, while Egypt ,in turn, would have to accept Israeli military presence in certain strategic positions."}}</ref> Sadat refused this proposal.<ref name="Kumaraswamy2013p105">{{cite book|author=P.R. Kumaraswamy|title=Revisiting the Yom Kippur War|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=g1TkFQgzp5cC&pg=PA105|date=11 January 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-32895-4|pages=105–}}</ref>
<p> {{reflist}} <p> {{reflist}}
*This article discusses atrocities committed by the Syrians, and the Egyptians, but does not discuss any of the atrocities committed by the Israelis. This Article should include a more information on atrocities committed on all sides, rather than only pointing out Syrian and Egyptian actions. By leaving out Israeli atrocities, the article appears to imply that Israel did not commit any atrocities. There is a pervasive tone of moral superiority attributed to Israel throughout the article, which needs to be remedied. This has nothing to do with Syrians, or Egyptians being prohibited from discussing such things by their government, as is suggested above. Stating that Israel is an "Open Society", while Syria and Iraq obviously must not be is horribly biased.
*Binyamin Telem should be added to the list of Commanders and leaders, as he was commander of the Israeli navy during the Yom Kippur war. (http://en.wikipedia.org/Benjamin_Telem)
*Typo in 1.2.1: In the quotation from El Gamasy, the article states that "it was a feast day in Israel". It was not a ''feast'' day, it was a ''fast'' day.
*Barely any references can be sourced independently.
*Numerous minor grammatical errors. For instance, the first paragraph should have a comma between "Golan Heights" and "respectively".

Latest revision as of 09:21, 6 June 2024

  • Reanalyze the extent to which this conflict was, in fact, a victory for Egypt. (By forcing peace through a position of power Egypt achieved its primary objective of regaining control of the Sinai (this is a backwards read of the reality. egypt lost its bargaining position by its loss of its patron the soviet union, and was instead forced to negotiate for the sinai and recognize Israel. this meant a major loss of prestige and it's ejection from the arab league)).
  • Point to peace initiatives:
    • From Sadat in 1971 and in February 1973 - They both were rejected by Golda Meir's government leaving no choice to the Egyptians to get in the war.
    • From Golda: On 28 February 1973, during a visit in Washington, Golda agreed with Henry Kissinger's peace proposal based on "security versus sovereignty" : Israel would accept Egyptian sovereignty over all Sinai, while Egypt would accept Israeli presence in some of Sinai strategic positions.; The Rabin Memoirs Sadat refused this proposal.

  1. Yitzhak Rabin (1996). The Rabin Memoirs. University of California Press. p. 215. ISBN 978-0-520-20766-0. security versus sovereignty"...Israel would have to accept Egyptian sovereignty over all the Sinai, while Egypt ,in turn, would have to accept Israeli military presence in certain strategic positions.
  2. P.R. Kumaraswamy (11 January 2013). Revisiting the Yom Kippur War. Routledge. pp. 105–. ISBN 978-1-136-32895-4.