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{{Short description|Period of aerial battle of the First World War}}
⚫ ]
{{Use British English|date=November 2017}}
The '''Fokker Scourge''' (or '''Fokker Scare''') lasted from August 1915 to early 1916 during the ]. The '']'' ] was the first service aircraft to be fitted with machine guns ] to fire past the propeller blades. The introduction of the Fokker into service with the ] (''Die Fliegertruppen'') came as a surprise to Allied aviators and gained a measure of ] over the ].<ref name="Franks p. 1">Franks 2001, p. 1.</ref><ref name="Kennett 1991, p. 110">Kennett 1991, p. 110.</ref>
⚫ ]


The '''Fokker Scourge''' ('''Fokker Scare''') occurred during the ] from ] to early 1916.<ref name="Franks p. 1">Franks 2001, p. 1.</ref> Imperial German Flying Corps ({{lang|de|]}}) units, equipped with {{lang|de|]}} (Fokker monoplane) ], gained an advantage over the ] (RFC) and the French {{lang|fr|]}}.
⚫ This period of German air superiority ended with the arrival in numbers of the French ] and British ] fighters, which were capable of challenging the Fokkers, although some sources describe the "scourge" as the period from the arrival of the first two '']'' fighters at ] in June 1915 to August–September 1916, when the last ''Eindeckers'' were replaced.<ref>Bruce 1968, v.2, p. 20.</ref><ref name="Franks p. 1"/>


The Fokker was the first service aircraft to be fitted with a machine gun ] to fire through the arc of the propeller without striking the blades. The tactical advantage of aiming the gun by aiming the aircraft and the surprise of its introduction were factors in its success.<ref name="Kennett 1991, p. 110">Kennett 1991, p. 110.</ref>
⚫ The term "Fokker Scourge" was coined by the British press in mid-1916, after the ''Eindeckers'' had been outclassed by the new Allied types.<ref>Robertson 2003, p. 103.</ref> Use of the term coincided with a political campaign to end a perceived dominance of the ] in the supply of aircraft to the ], a campaign that was begun by the pioneering aviation journalist ] and ] M.P., founder of the aviation company ] (Supermarine from 1916) and a great enthusiast for aerial warfare.<ref>Hare 1990, pp. 91–102.</ref>

⚫ This period of German ] ended with the arrival in numbers of the French ] and British ] fighters, which were capable of challenging the Fokkers, although the last Fokkers were not finally replaced until August–September 1916.<ref>Bruce 1968, v.2, p. 20.</ref><ref name="Franks p. 1"/>

⚫ The term "Fokker Scourge" was coined by the British press in mid-1916, after the {{lang|de|Eindeckers}} had been outclassed by the new Allied types.<ref>Robertson 2003, p. 103.</ref> Use of the term coincided with a political campaign to end a perceived dominance of the ] in the supply of aircraft to the Royal Flying Corps, a campaign that was begun by the pioneering aviation journalist ] and ] M.P., founder of ] (Supermarine from 1916) and a great enthusiast for aerial warfare.<ref>Hare 1990, pp. 91–102.</ref>


==Background== ==Background==


===Early air warfare=== ===Early air warfare===
⚫ ]
⚫ In early 1915, as ] developed, the Allies (especially the French) were ahead of the Germans in the fitting of machine-guns to aircraft.<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 177.</ref> The first aircraft used with some success as ] included the British ] (Vickers Gunbus) and the French ].<ref>Bruce 1989, pp. 2–4.</ref> The number of aircraft operating over the Western Front in 1914 and 1915 was small compared to later in the war and air warfare was in its infancy, but the German '']'' (''OHL'', army high command) had already ordered the development of machine-gun-armed aircraft to counter those of the Allies. The new ] class armed two-seaters and twin-engined "K" (later "G") class aircraft such as the ] were attached in ones and twos to ''Feldflieger-Abteilungen'' (artillery-observation and reconnaissance detachments) to escort unarmed aircraft.<ref name="Franks p. 1"/><ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 18">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 18.</ref><ref>Jones, 2002, p. 469</ref>


]
⚫ On 18 April 1915, the Morane-Saulnier L of ] was captured after he was shot down behind the German lines.<ref name="Bruce p. 3">Bruce 1989, p. 3.</ref> From 1{{nbsp}}April, Garros had destroyed three German aircraft in the Morane, which carried a machine-gun firing past the propeller blades. Bullets that hit the blades were deflected by small metal wedges.<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 178.</ref> Garros tried to burn his aircraft after the forced landing but this failed to conceal the nature of the device. The significance of the deflector blades was immediately apparent and the German authorities requested several aircraft manufacturers, including ], to produce a copy.<ref name="Bruce p. 3"/>
⚫ As ] developed, the Allies gained a lead over the Germans by introducing machine-gun armed types such as the ] fighter and the ].<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 177.</ref><ref>Bruce 1989, pp. 2–4.</ref> By early 1915, the German {{lang|de|]}} (OHL, Supreme Army Command) had ordered the development of machine-gun-armed aircraft to counter those of the Allies. The new ], armed two-seaters and twin-engined "K" (later "G") class aircraft such as the ] were attached in ones and twos to {{lang|de|]en}} (FFA) artillery-observation and reconnaissance detachments for "fighter" sorties, mostly the escort of unarmed aircraft.<ref name="Franks p. 1"/><ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 18">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 18.</ref><ref>Jones, 2002, p. 469</ref>

⚫ On 18 April 1915, the Morane-Saulnier L of ] was captured, after he was forced to land behind the German lines.<ref name="Bruce p. 3">Bruce 1989, p. 3.</ref> From 1{{nbsp}}April, Garros had destroyed three German aircraft in the Morane, which carried a machine-gun firing through the propeller arc. Saulnier had failed to develop a synchroniser and with Garros, as an interim solution, fitted metal wedges to the propeller; bullets that hit the blades were deflected by them.<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 178.</ref><ref name="Bruce p. 3"/> Garros burned his aircraft but this failed to conceal the nature of the device and the significance of the deflector blades. The German authorities requested several aircraft manufacturers, including that of ], to produce a copy.<ref name="Bruce p. 3"/>


===Synchronisation gear=== ===Synchronisation gear===
{{main|Synchronization gear}} {{main|Synchronization gear}}
⚫ ]
⚫ <!-- ]-->
⚫ The Fokker company produced the {{lang|de|Stangensteuerung}} (push rod controller), a genuine ]. Impulses from a cam driven by the engine controlled the timing of the machine-gun for its fire to be limited to the intervals between the propeller blades' travel past the barrel.<ref name="Grosz p.2">Grosz 1989, p. 2.</ref> Unlike earlier proposed gears, the {{lang|de|Stangensteuerung}} was fitted to an aircraft and proved effective. In a postwar biography, Fokker claimed that he produced the gear in 48{{nbsp}}hours but it was probably designed by ], a {{lang|de|Fokker Flugzeugbau}} engineer.<ref name=Weyl1>Weyl 1965, p. 96.</ref> Among several pre-war patents for similar devices was that of ], a Swiss engineer who had worked for ] and the German ] company.<ref name="Grosz p.2"/><ref>Woodman 1989, pp. 180–183.</ref>


⚫ The device was fitted to the most suitable Fokker type, the ] (military type name "Fokker A.III"), of which A.16/15, assigned to ], became the prototype of the ] series of fighter designs.<ref>{{cite book |last=Grosz |first=Peter M. |year=2002 |title=Fokker E I/II |series=Windsock Datafile No. 91 |url=https://www.windsockdatafilespecials.co.uk/91-fokker-eiii-210-p.asp |location=Berkhamsted |publisher=Albatros |pages=6–9 |isbn=1-902207-46-7}}</ref><ref name="Gray and Thetford p. 83">Gray and Thetford 1961, p. 83.</ref> Fokker demonstrated A.16/15 in May and June 1915 to German fighter pilots, including ], ] and ].<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 9.</ref> The Fokker, with its typical {{lang|fr|Morane}} controls, an over-sensitive balanced elevator and dubious lateral control, was difficult to fly; Parschau, who was experienced on Fokker{{nbsp}}A types, converted pilots to the new fighter.<ref>Immelmann 2009, p. 77.</ref><ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 10">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 10.</ref> The early {{lang|de|Eindeckers}} were attached to FFAs, in ones and twos, to protect reconnaissance machines from Allied machine-gun-armed aircraft.<ref name="Gray and Thetford p. 83"/>
⚫ ]
⚫ Fokker designed the {{lang|de|''Stangensteuerung''}} (push rod controller), a genuine ]. The gear used impulses from a cam on the aircraft engine to control the firing of the machine-gun to prevent bullets from hitting the propeller.<ref name="Grosz p.2">Grosz 1989, p. 2.</ref> Other gears had been proposed but the {{lang|de|''Stangensteuerung''}} was the first to be fitted to an aircraft and proved in flight. In a postwar biography, Fokker claimed that he designed and built the gear in 48{{nbsp}}hours but this has been largely discounted. It is believed that the gear may have been based on a pre-war patent by ], a Swiss engineer who had worked for ] and the German ] company; the gear had probably been built by ], a Fokker Flugzeugbau engineer.<ref name="Grosz p.2"/><ref>Woodman 1989, pp. 180–183.</ref>

⚫ The device was fitted to the most suitable Fokker type, the ] (military designation A.III), of which ''A.16/15'', assigned to ], became the prototype of the E.I.<ref name="Gray and Thetford p. 83">Gray and Thetford 1961, p. 83.</ref> Fokker demonstrated ''A.16/15'' to the first few German fighter pilots, including ], ] and ], in May and June 1915.<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 9.</ref> The Fokker, with its "Morane" controls, including the over-sensitive balanced elevator and dubious lateral control, was difficult to fly; Parschau, who was experienced on Fokker{{nbsp}}A types, converted pilots to the new fighter.<ref>Immelmann 1934 (2009), p. 77.</ref><ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 10">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 10.</ref> The early ''Eindeckers'' were attached the normal '']en'' (''FFA'', Field Flying Detachments) in ones and twos, to protect reconnaissance machines from Allied machine-gun-armed aircraft.<ref name="Gray and Thetford p. 83"/>


==Operational service== ==Operational service==


===''Eindecker'' operations=== ===Service début===


] ]
Fokker ''Eindecker'' E.5/15, the last of the pre-production series, is believed to have been first flown in action by Kurt Wintgens of ''FFA''{{nbsp}}6.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 11–12">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 11–12.</ref> On 1{{nbsp}}and 4{{nbsp}}July 1915, he reported combats with French Morane{{nbsp}}L (Parasols), each time well over the French lines.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 10"/> Wintgens' accounts of the fights were modestly equivocal about the destruction of the Moranes and the victories were never confirmed but the first matches French records of a Morane forced down on 1{{nbsp}}July near ] with a wounded crew and a damaged engine, followed by one more three days later.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 10-12">Van Wyngarden 2006, pp. 10–12.</ref> By 15{{nbsp}}July, Wintgens had moved to ''FFA''{{nbsp}}48 and scored his first recognised victory, another Morane{{nbsp}}L.<ref name="Franks 2001, pp. 10–11">Franks 2001, pp. 10–11.</ref> To replace the older machine, Otto Parschau had received E.1/15, which became the prototype for the Fokker ''Eindecker'' line of aircraft when it was returned to the Fokker Flugzeugbau factory in ]–Gorries for further development of the design.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 12">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 12.</ref> Fokker {{lang|de|Eindecker}} E.5/15, the last of the pre-production series, is believed to have been first flown in action by Kurt Wintgens of FFA{{nbsp}}6.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 11–12">Van Wyngarden 2006, pp. 11–12.</ref> On 1{{nbsp}}and 4{{nbsp}}July 1915, he reported combats with French Morane-Saulnier{{nbsp}}L (Parasols), well over the French lines.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 10"/> The claims were not ] but research has shown that the first claim matches French records of a Morane forced down on 1{{nbsp}}July near ], with a wounded crew and a damaged engine, followed three days later by another.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 10-12">Van Wyngarden 2006, pp. 10–12.</ref> By 15{{nbsp}}July, Wintgens had moved to FFA{{nbsp}}48 and scored his first confirmed victory, another Morane{{nbsp}}L.<ref name="Franks 2001, pp. 10–11">Franks 2001, pp. 10–11.</ref> Parschau had received the new E.1/15 (Fokker factory serial 191), the initial example of the five Fokker '''M.5K/MG''' service test examples for the {{lang|de|Eindecker}} line of aircraft, when the A.16/15 (green machine), he had flown since the beginning of the war, was returned to the Fokker Flugzeugbau factory in ]–Gorries for development.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 12">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 12.</ref>


By the end of July 1915, about fifteen ''Eindeckers'' were operational with various units, including the five M.5K/MGs and about ten early production E.I airframes.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 12"/> At first, the pilots flew the new aircraft as a sideline, when not flying normal operations in two-seater reconnaissance aircraft.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 12"/> Oswald Boelcke, in ''FFA''{{nbsp}}62, scored his first victory in an ] on 4{{nbsp}}July.<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 13.</ref> M.5K/MG prototype airframe E.3/15, the first ''Eindecker'' delivered to ''FFA''{{nbsp}}62, was armed with a ] gun, synchronised by the troublesome first version of the Fokker gear. At first, E.3/15 was jointly allocated to him and Immelmann when their "official" duties permitted, allowing them to master the type's difficult handling characteristics and to practice shooting at ground targets.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 14">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 14.</ref> Immelmann was soon allocated a very early production Fokker E.I, ''E.13/15'', one of the first armed with an ] machine gun, using the more reliable production version of the Fokker gear.<ref>Woodman 1989, pp. 180–183.</ref> By the end of July 1915, about fifteen {{lang|de|Eindeckers}} were operational with various units, including the five M.5K/MGs and about ten early production E.I airframes.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 12"/> The pilots flew the new aircraft as a sideline, when not flying normal operations in two-seater reconnaissance aircraft.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 12"/> Boelcke, in FFA{{nbsp}}62, scored his first victory in an ] on 4{{nbsp}}July.<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 13.</ref> M.5K/MG prototype airframe E.3/15, the first {{lang|de|Eindecker}} delivered to FFA{{nbsp}}62, was armed with a ] gun, synchronised by the unreliable first version of the Fokker gear. At first, E.3/15 was jointly allocated to him and Immelmann when their "official" duties permitted, allowing them to master the type's difficult handling characteristics and to practice shooting at ground targets.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 14">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 14.</ref> Immelmann was soon allocated a very early production Fokker E.I, E.13/15, one of the first armed with the ] (a lightened version of the MG08 ''Spandau'') machine-gun, using the more reliable production version of the Fokker gear.<ref>Woodman 1989, pp. 180–183.</ref>


===RFC=== ===The Scourge begins===


]
The first RFC sightings of the new Fokker aircraft were recorded at the end of July 1915 and continued until the end of September. Large numbers of Fokkers were not encountered until October, towards the end of the ] {{nowrap|(25 September – 14 October).}}<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 144</ref> These aircraft included the similar Pfalz E-type fighters (derived like the Fokker ''Eindeckers'' from the Morane-Saulier{{nbsp}}H), which were also called "Fokkers" by French and British airmen.<ref>Franks 2001, p. 59.</ref>
⚫ The Fokker Scourge is usually considered by the British to have begun on 1{{nbsp}}August, when ]s of ] ] (RFC) bombed the base of FFA{{nbsp}}62 at {{nowrap|5:00 a. m.,}} waking the German pilots, including Boelcke (most likely, still with E 3/15) and Immelmann (flying E 13/15), who were quickly into the air after the raiders.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 14"/> Boelcke suffered a ] but Immelmann caught up with a B.E.2c and shot it down. This aircraft was flown as a bomber, without an observer or Lewis gun, the pilot armed only with an automatic pistol.<ref name="Franks 2001, pp. 10–11"/> After about ten minutes of manoeuvring (giving the lie to exaggerated accounts of the stability of B.E.2 aircraft) Immelmann had fired 450{{nbsp}}rounds, which riddled the B.E. and wounded the pilot in the arm.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 15">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 15.</ref> By late October, towards the end of the ], more Fokkers (including the similar Pfalz E-type fighters, which were also called Fokkers by Allied airmen) were encountered by RFC pilots and by December, forty Fokkers were in service.<ref>Franks 2001, p. 59.</ref><ref>Jones, 2002, p. 144</ref><ref>Wise, 1981, p. 355</ref>


RFC pilots reported that the new fighter could make long, steep dives and that the fixed, synchronised machine gun was aimed by aiming the aircraft. The machine gun was belt-fed, unlike the drum-fed Lewis guns of their opponents. The Fokker pilots took to flying high and diving on their quarry, usually out of the sun: firing a long burst and continuing the dive until well out of range. If the British aircraft had not been shot down, the German pilot could climb again and repeat the process. Immelmann developed the ], a ] after the dive, followed by a roll when vertical to face the opposite way, then a turn to attack again.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 150</ref> In the new fighters, pilots could make long, steep dives, aiming the fixed, synchronised machine-gun by aiming the aircraft. The machine gun was belt-fed, unlike the drum-fed ]s of their opponents, who had to change drums when in action. The Fokker pilots took to flying high and diving on their quarry, usually out of the sun, firing a long burst and continuing the dive until well out of range. If the British aircraft had not been shot down, the German pilot could climb again and repeat the process. Immelmann invented the ], a ] after the dive, followed by a roll when vertical to face the opposite way, after which he could turn to attack again.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 150</ref>
{|class="wikitable" align=right style="margin:0 0 1em 1em"
|+RFC aircraft losses<br /><small>(July 1915<br />to January 1916)</small><ref>Wise, 1981, p. 355</ref>
|-
! Month
! Total
|-
| June ||align="right"|6
|-
| July ||align="right"|15
|-
| August ||align="right"|10
|-
| September ||align="right"|14
|-
| October ||align="right"|12
|-
| November ||align="right"|16
|-
| December ||align="right"|17
|-
| January ||align="right"|30
|-
| '''Total''' ||align="right"|'''120'''
|}
⚫ The mystique acquired by the Fokker was greater than its material effect and in October, RFC HQ expressed concern at the willingness of pilots to avoid combat. RFC losses were exacerbated by the increase in the number of aircraft at the front, from 85 to 161 between March and September, the hard winter of 1915–1916 and some aggressive flying by the new German "C" type two-seaters.<ref>Wise, 1981, p. 355</ref><ref>Hoeppner 1994, p. 38</ref> Boelcke and Immelmann continued to score, as did ], ] and ] from FFA{{nbsp}}23 and Kurt von{{nbsp}}Crailshein of FFA{{nbsp}}53. The "official" list of claims by Fokker pilots for the second half of 1915 was no more than 28, many of them over French aircraft. Thirteen aeroplanes had been shot down by Immelmann or Boelcke and the rest by seven other Fokker pilots.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 18"/><ref>Franks 2001, p. 41.</ref> January 1916 brought thirteen claims, most of them against the French, followed by twenty more in February, the last month of the "scourge" proper. Most of the victories were scored by ] rather than the newer pilots flying the greater number of Fokkers. Allied casualties had been light by later standards but the loss of air superiority to the Germans, flying a new and supposedly invincible aircraft, caused dismay among the Allied commanders and lowered the morale of Allied airmen. In his memoir ''Sagittarius Rising'' (1936), ] wrote,


⚫ {{quote|Hearsay and a few lucky encounters had made the machine respected, not to say dreaded by the slow, unwieldy machines then used by us for Artillery Observation and Offensive Patrols.<ref>Lewis 1977, p. 51.</ref>}}
⚫ In retrospect, the Fokker Scourge is usually considered to have begun on 1{{nbsp}}August, when the ] aircraft of ] bombed the base of ''FFA''{{nbsp}}62 at 5:00{{nbsp}}am, waking the German pilots.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 14"/> Boelcke was quickly into the air after the raiders, in Fokker M.5K/MG ''Eindecker'' ''E.3/15'', and Immelmann followed in ''E.13/15''. Boelcke suffered a gun ], but Immelmann caught one of the raiders and shot it down.<ref name="Franks 2001, pp. 10–11"/> His victory was over a B.E.2c, flown as a bomber, without an observer or Lewis gun, the pilot armed only with an automatic pistol. After about ten minutes of manoeuvring (giving the lie to exaggerated accounts of the stability of B.E.2 aircraft), Immelmann had fired 450{{nbsp}}rounds, which riddled the B.E. and wounded the pilot in the arm.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 15">Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 15.</ref>


⚫ On 14 January, RFC HQ issued orders that until better aircraft arrived, long and short-range reconnaissance aircraft must have three escorts flying in close formation. If contact with the escorts was lost, the reconnaissance must be cancelled, as would photographic reconnaissance to any great distance beyond the front line. Sending the B.E.2c into action without an observer armed with a Lewis gun also became less prevalent.<ref name="Terraine p. 199">Terraine 1982, p. 199.</ref> The new tactic of concentrating aircraft in time and space had the effect of reducing the number of reconnaissance sorties the RFC could fly.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 156–157</ref>
⚫ The mystique acquired by the Fokker was greater than its material effect, exacerbated as it was by the hard winter of 1915–1916, and some aggressive flying by the new "C" type German two-seaters, which added to Allied losses.<ref>Hoeppner, 1994, p. 38</ref> Boelcke and Immelmann continued to score as did ], ] and ] from ''FFA''{{nbsp}}23 and Kurt von{{nbsp}}Crailshein of ''FFA''{{nbsp}}53; the "official" list of claims by Fokker pilots for the second half of 1915 was no more than 28 and many of these were over French rather than British aircraft. Thirteen aircraft had been shot down by Immelmann or Boelcke and the other fifteen by seven other Fokker pilots.<ref name="Van Wyngarden p. 18"/><ref>Franks 2001, p. 41.</ref> January 1916 brought a further thirteen claims, most of them against the French and there were twenty more in February, the last month of the "scourge" proper. Most of the victories had been scored by aces rather than the newer pilots flying the increased number of Fokkers. Allied losses were paltry by later standards but the loss of air superiority to the Germans, flying a new and supposedly invincible aircraft, caused dismay among the Allied commanders and lowered the morale of Allied airmen. In ''Sagittarius Rising'' (1936) the author wrote,


⚫ ]
⚫ {{quote|Hearsay and a few lucky encounters had made the machine respected, not to say dreaded by the slow, unwieldy machines then used by us for Artillery Observation and Offensive Patrols.|]<ref>Lewis 1977, p. 51.</ref>}}
⚫ New defensive formations were devised; a ] method was for the reconnaissance aircraft to lead, escorted on each side {{convert|500|ft|m|abbr=on}} higher, with another escort {{convert|1000|ft|m|abbr=on}} behind and above.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 147–148</ref> On 7 February, on a II{{nbsp}}Wing long-range reconnaissance, the observation pilot flew at {{convert|7500|ft|m|abbr=on}}; a German aircraft appeared over ] (Roeselare) and seven more closed in behind the formation. West of ] (Thourout) two Fokkers arrived and attacked at once, one diving on the reconnaissance machine and the other on an escort. Six more German aircraft appeared over ] (Kortemark) and formed a procession of fourteen aeroplanes stalking the British formation. None of the German pilots attacked and all the British aircraft returned, only to meet two German aircraft coming back from a bombing raid, which opened fire and mortally wounded the pilot of one of the escorts. The British ascribed their immunity to attack during the 55-minute flight to the rigid formation which the two Fokkers were unable to disrupt.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 157–158</ref>


On 7 February, a ] B.E.2c., was to be escorted by three B.E.2cs, two F.E.2s and a ] from 12 Squadron and two more F.Es. and four R.E. aeroplanes from ]. The flight was cancelled due to bad weather but twelve escorts for one reconnaissance aircraft demonstrated the effect of the Fokkers in reducing the efficiency of RFC operations.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 158</ref> British and French reconnaissance flights to get ] for intelligence and artillery ranging data had become riskier, in spite of German fighters being forbidden to fly over Allied lines (to keep the synchronisation gear secret).<ref>Franks 2001, pp. 11–12.</ref> This policy, for various reasons, prevailed for most of the war; the rarity of German fighters appearing behind the Allied lines limited the degree of air superiority they were able to attain.<ref>Hoeppner, 1994, p. 41</ref><ref>Franks 2001, p. 6.</ref>
⚫ ]
⚫ The RFC changed tactics for the sedate ] and the newer ] ] fighters. On 14{{nbsp}}January RFC{{nbsp}}HQ issued orders that until better aircraft were delivered, long- and short-range reconnaissance aircraft must have three escorts flying in close formation. If contact with the escorts was lost, the reconnaissance must be cancelled as would photographic reconnaissance to any great distance beyond the front line. Sending the B.E.2c into action without an observer armed with a machine gun also became less prevalent.<ref name="Terraine p. 199">Terraine 1982, p. 199.</ref> The new tactic of concentrating aircraft in time and space had the effect of reducing the size of the RFC, when the demand for information by the army remained the same.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 156–157</ref>

⚫ Much effort went into devising formations; a II{{nbsp}}Wing RFC method was for the reconnaissance aircraft to lead, escorted on each side {{convert|500|ft|m}} higher, with another escort behind and {{convert|1000|ft|m}} above.{{refn|From 30 January 1916, each British army had a Royal Flying Corps ] attached, which was divided into ], the corps wing with squadrons responsible for close reconnaissance, photography and artillery observation on the front of each army corps, and an army wing which by 1917 conducted long-range reconnaissance and bombing, using the aircraft types with the highest performance.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 147–148</ref>|group="Note"}} On 7{{nbsp}}February, on a II{{nbsp}}Wing long-range reconnaissance, the observation pilot flew at {{convert|7500|ft|m}}; a German aircraft appeared over Roulers and seven more closed in behind the formation. West of Thourout, two Fokkers arrived and attacked at once, one diving on the reconnaissance machine and the other on an escort. Six more German aircraft appeared over Courtemarck and formed a procession of 14{{nbsp}}aeroplanes stalking the British formation. None of the German pilots attacked and all the British aircraft returned, only to meet two German aircraft coming back from a bombing raid, which opened fire and mortally wounded the pilot of one the British escort aircraft. The British ascribed their immunity to attack during the 55-minute flight to the rigid formation, which the two Fokkers were unable to disrupt.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 157–158</ref> On 7{{nbsp}}February, a ] B.E.2c. was to be escorted by three B.E.2c, two F.E.2 aircraft and a ] from 12 Squadron and two more F.E. and four R.E. aeroplanes from ]. The flight was cancelled due to bad weather but twelve escorts for one reconnaissance aircraft demonstrated the effect of the Fokkers in drastically reducing the efficiency of RFC operations.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 158</ref>

The British and French had to accept that it had become much more hazardous to get ] for intelligence and ranging data for Allied artillery, in conditions of the new German air superiority.<ref>Franks 2001, pp. 11–12.</ref> The German command was concerned that the interrupter gear would be discovered and German fighters were forbidden to fly over Allied lines, a policy that for various reasons persisted for most of the war. While there were a number of tactical advantages in this approach, the effect of German air superiority was limited by the rarity of German fighters appearing behind the Allied lines.<ref>Hoeppner, 1994, p. 41</ref><ref>Franks 2001, p. 6.</ref>


===End of the Scourge=== ===End of the Scourge===
⚫ ], ''Guardian of Verdun'']]
The scourge waned during the ] (21{{nbsp}}February{{snd}}20{{nbsp}}December 1916). The Germans tried to impose an air barrage ({{lang|de|Luftsperre}}) which concealed much of the German preparation for the offensive from French aerial reconnaissance. During March and April increasing numbers of the new French ] fighters were sent to Verdun. Organised in specialist fighter squadrons ({{lang|fr|escadrilles de chasse}}) the Nieuports could operate in formations larger than the singletons or pairs normally flown by the Fokkers, quickly regaining air superiority for the {{lang|fr|]}}.<ref>Herris and Pearson 2010, p. 29.</ref>


British F.E.2b pusher aircraft had been arriving in France from late 1915 and in the New Year began to replace the older F.B.5s. The pilot and observer had a good view forwards from their cockpits and the observer could also fire backwards over the tail. ], the first squadron equipped with the F.E., arrived in France on 23{{nbsp}}January 1916, for long-range reconnaissance and escort flying. The new aircraft lacked the speed to pursue the Fokkers and had limited manoeuvrability but the F.E.s became formidable opponents, particularly when flying in formation.<ref>Hare 1990, p. 87.</ref>
⚫ ]
The beginning of the end of the scourge came at the ] (21{{nbsp}}February{{snd}}20{{nbsp}}December). When the battle began, air superiority created by the Fokkers meant that German preparations had mostly been concealed from French aerial reconnaissance. The German aircraft established a {{lang|de|''Luftsperre''}} (air barrage), a systematic blockade on the French air squadrons, relying as much on chasing their opponents away as actually shooting them down. During the battle, the new French ] fighter arrived in increasing numbers. The Nieuports were superior to the ''Eindeckers'' in almost every respect and were organised in {{lang|fr|''escadrilles de chasse''}}, specialist fighter squadrons that could operate in formations larger than the singletons or pairs normally flown by the Fokkers, quickly regaining air superiority.<ref>Herris and Pearson 2010, p. 29.</ref>


⚫ ]
The British pressed for more fighters and better designs from England, the first of which was the F.E.2b a ] with the engine at the back. Early examples arrived in France in late 1915 and in the new year, F.E.s began to replace Vickers F.B.5 Gunbus fighters. The F.E. was relatively fast and had a reliable engine and a good view from the pilot and observer cockpits, from which the observer could also fire over the tail. ], the first full F.E. unit, arrived in France on 23{{nbsp}}January 1916, for long-range reconnaissance and escort flying. The Fokker pilots attacked the F.E.s without hesitation but soon found that the new aircraft was a formidable opponent, particularly in formation. The second "counter-Fokker" fighter was the ] single-seat pusher. Although its performance was modest, once its single forward-firing Lewis gun was fixed to fire forwards, its superior manoeuvrability gave it an advantage over the ''Eindecker''. ] (Major ]) arrived with D.H.2s on 8{{nbsp}}February and began patrols north of the Somme; another six D.H.2 squadrons followed. On 25{{nbsp}}April, two of the D.H. pilots were attacked and found that they could out-manoeuvre the Fokkers; a few days later, without opening fire ,a D.H. pilot caused a Fokker to crash onto a roof at Bapaume.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 158–159</ref> The Nieuport{{nbsp}}11 proved even more effective and the first similar Nieuport 16s in British service were issued to ] and ] in April.<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 92.</ref>
The ], a single-seat fighter, began to arrive at the front in February 1916. This aircraft had a modest performance but its superior manoeuvrability gave it an advantage over the {{lang|de|Eindecker}}, especially once the Lewis gun was fixed to point in the direction of flight. On 8 February, ] (Major ]) arrived with D.H.2s and began patrols north of the Somme; another six D.H.2 squadrons followed. On 25 April, two of the D.H. pilots were attacked and found that they could out-manoeuvre the Fokkers; a few days later, without opening fire, a D.H. pilot caused a Fokker to crash onto a roof at Bapaume.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 158–159</ref> The Nieuports proved even more effective when the first Nieuport 16s in British service were issued to ] and ] in April.<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 92.</ref>


⚫ By March 1916, despite frequent encounters with Fokkers and the success of {{lang|de|Eindecker}} aces, the scourge was almost over.<ref>Franks 2001, pp. 59–60.</ref> The bogey of the Fokker {{lang|de|Eindecker}} as a fighter was finally laid in April, when an E.III landed by mistake at a British aerodrome. The captured aircraft was found not to have the superior performance it had been credited with.<ref>Lewis, 1977, p. 52</ref> The first British aircraft with a synchronisation gear was a Bristol Scout, which arrived on 25 March 1916 and on 24 May the first ] aircraft were flown to France by a flight of ].<ref>Bruce, 1968, v.2, p.119</ref>
⚫ ], ''Guardian of Verdun'']]
⚫ By March 1916, despite frequent encounters with Fokkers and the success of the German ''Eindecker'' aces, the scourge was over.<ref>Franks 2001, pp. 59–60.</ref> The bogey of the Fokker ''Eindecker'' as a fighter was finally laid to rest in April, when an E.III landed by mistake on a British aerodrome and its performance was found to be much inferior than had been thought.<ref>Lewis, 1977, p. 52</ref> The first British aircraft with a synchroniser gear was a Bristol Scout, which arrived on 25{{nbsp}}March 1916, and on 24{{nbsp}}May the first ] aircraft were flown to France by a flight of ].


===End of the ''Eindecker''=== ===End of the {{lang|de|Eindecker}}===


⚫ ]
The impact of the new Allied types, especially the Nieuport, was of considerable concern to the Fokker pilots.<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 51.</ref> Some pilots even took to flying captured Nieuports and ''OHL'' was sufficiently desperate to order the building of Nieuport copies by German firms, such as ], with the ].<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 64.</ref><ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 166.</ref> New ] single-seat biplane fighters, particularly the ] and ], had been under test since late 1915 and the replacement of the monoplanes with these types had begun by mid-1916.<ref name="Grosz 1996, p. 5">Grosz 1996, p. 5.</ref> The effect of the new Allied types, especially the Nieuport, was of considerable concern to the Fokker pilots; some even took to flying captured examples.<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 51.</ref> {{lang|de|Idflieg}} was sufficiently desperate to order German firms to build Nieuport copies, of which the ] and the ] were built in small numbers.<ref>Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 64.</ref><ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 166.</ref> New D type single-seat, biplane fighters, particularly the ] and ], had been under test since late 1915 and the replacement of the monoplanes with these types began by mid-1916.<ref name="Grosz 1996, p. 5">Grosz 1996, p. 5.</ref>


⚫ In February 1916, {{lang|de|Inspektor-Major}} Friedrich Stempel began to assemble {{lang|de|Kampfeinsitzer Kommando}} (KEK, single-seat battle units). The KEK were units mostly of two to four fighters, equipped with {{lang|de|Eindeckers}} and other types which had served with FFA units during the winter of 1915–1916. By July 1916, KEK had been formed at ], ], ] and ] near Verdun as well as other places on the Western Front, as {{lang|de|Luftwachtdienst}} (aerial guard service) units, consisting only of fighters.<ref>Guttman, 2009, p. 9</ref> In late May, German air activity on the British front decreased markedly, while the commander of the new {{lang|de|Luftstreitkräfte}}, {{lang|de|Oberst}} (Colonel) ], reorganised the German air service.<ref>Gray & Thetford 1962 p. xxix</ref> The fighters of the KEK were concentrated into fighter squadrons ({{lang|de|]}}) the first of which, ] ({{lang|de|Jasta 2}}) went into action on the Somme on 17 September. By this time, the last of the {{lang|de|Eindeckers}}, long outmoded as front line fighters, had been retired.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 281</ref>
⚫ ]
⚫ As early as February 1916, Inspektor-Major Friedrich Stempel began to assemble {{lang|de|''Kampfeinsitzer Kommando''}} (''KEK'', single-seat battle units). The ''KEK'' were small units, mostly of two to four fighters, equipped with ''Eindeckers'' and other types which had served with ''FFA'' units during the winter of 1915–1916. ''KEK'' were formed at ], ], ], and ] near Verdun and other places on the Western Front, as {{lang|de|''Luftwachtdienst''}} (aerial guard force) units consisting only of fighters.<ref>Guttman, 2009, p. 9</ref> In the second half of May, German air activity on the British front decreased markedly, while the commander of the new {{lang|de|''Luftstreitkräfte''}} ''Oberst'' ] reorganised the German air service.<ref>Jones, 2002, pp. 161–162, 160</ref> The fighters of the ''KEK'' were concentrated into the first '']'', true fighter squadrons and replacement of ''Eindeckers'' with better aircraft had begun. By September, the last of the ''Eindeckers'', by now long outmoded as front line fighters, had been retired.<ref>Jones, 2002, p. 281</ref>


==Aftermath== ==Aftermath==
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===Analysis=== ===Analysis===


. Flightglobal. Retrieved 13 September 2014.</ref>]] ]
Among British politicians and journalists who grossly exaggerated the material effects of the "Scourge" were the eminent pioneering aviation journalist C.{{nbsp}}G. Grey, founder of '']'', one of the first aviation magazines and Noel Pemberton Billing M.P., a notably unsuccessful aircraft designer and manufacturer.<ref name="Kennett 1991, p. 110"/> Their supposed object was the replacement of the B.E.2c with better aircraft but it took the form of an attack on the ] command and the ].<ref name="Franks p. 1"/> C.{{nbsp}}G. Grey had orchestrated a campaign against the Royal Aircraft Factory in the pages of ''The Aeroplane'', going back to its period as the Balloon Factory, well before it had produced any heavier-than-air aircraft.<ref>Hare 1990, in numerous entries</ref><!--this needs to be specific--> Among British politicians and journalists who grossly exaggerated the material effects of the "Scourge" were the eminent pioneering aviation journalist C.{{nbsp}}G. Grey, founder of '']'', one of the first aviation magazines and Noel Pemberton Billing, a ] (RNAS) pilot, notably unsuccessful aircraft designer and manufacturer and a Member of Parliament from March 1916.<ref name="Kennett 1991, p. 110"/> Their supposed object was the replacement of the B.E.2c with better aircraft but it took the form of an attack on the RFC command and the Royal Aircraft Factory.<ref name="Franks p. 1"/> C.{{nbsp}}G. Grey had orchestrated a campaign against the Royal Aircraft Factory in the pages of ''The Aeroplane'', going back to its period as the Balloon Factory, well before it had produced any heavier-than-air aircraft.<ref>Hare 1990, P. 29</ref>


Before the unsuitability of the B.E.2c for air combat was exposed by the first Fokker aces, criticism was not primarily aimed at the technical quality of Factory aircraft but because a government body was competing with private industry. When the news of the Fokker monoplane fighters reached him in late 1915, Grey was quick to blame the problem on past orders for equipment that the latest developments had rendered obsolete. Grey did not suggest what aircraft might have been ordered instead, even supposing that the rapid development of aviation technology during the war could have been foreseen. Pemberton Billing also blamed the initially poor performance of British aircraft manufacturers on what he saw as the favouritism shown by the RFC, an arm of the British army, towards the Royal Aircraft Factory, which, while nominally civilian, was also part of the army. Pemberton Billing claimed that, Before the unsuitability of the B.E.2c for aerial combat was exposed by the first Fokker aces, criticism was not primarily aimed at the technical quality of Royal Aircraft Factory aircraft but because a government body was competing with private industry. When the news of the Fokker monoplane fighters reached him in late 1915, Grey was quick to blame the problem on orders for equipment that the latest developments had rendered obsolete. Grey did not suggest alternative aircraft, even supposing that the rapid development of aviation technology during the war could have been foreseen. Pemberton Billing also blamed the initially poor performance of British aircraft manufacturers on what he saw as the favouritism shown by the RFC, an arm of the British Army, towards the Royal Aircraft Factory, which, while nominally civilian, was also part of the army. Pemberton Billing claimed that,


{{quote| ... hundreds, nay thousands of machines have been ordered which have been referred to by our pilots as "Fokker Fodder" ... I would suggest that quite a number of our gallant officers in the Royal Flying Corps have been rather murdered than killed.|Pemberton Billing<ref>Hare 1990, p. 91.</ref>}} {{bquote| ... hundreds, nay thousands of machines have been ordered which have been referred to by our pilots as "Fokker Fodder" ... I would suggest that quite a number of our gallant officers in the Royal Flying Corps have been rather murdered than killed.<ref>Hare 1990, p. 91.</ref>}}


Even among writers who recognised the hysteria of this version of events, this picture of the Fokker scourge gained considerable currency during the war and afterwards. In 1996 Grosz wrote, Even among writers who recognised the hysteria of this version of events, this picture of the Fokker Scourge gained considerable currency during the war and afterwards. In 1996 Peter Grosz wrote,


{{quote|The epithet ''Fokker Fodder'' was coined by the British to describe the fate of their aircraft under the guns of the Fokker monoplanes, but given acknowledged mediocrity, it comes as something of a shock to realise how abysmal the level of British aircraft performance, pilot training and aerial tactics must have been....|P. M. Grosz<ref name="Grosz 1996, p. 5"/>}} {{quote|The epithet ''Fokker Fodder'' was coined by the British to describe the fate of their aircraft under the guns of the Fokker monoplanes, but given acknowledged mediocrity, it comes as something of a shock to realise how abysmal the level of British aircraft performance, pilot training and aerial tactics must have been....<ref name="Grosz 1996, p. 5"/>}}


===Subsequent operations=== ===Subsequent operations===


The period of Allied air superiority that followed the Fokker Scourge was brief. By mid-September 1916, the first ] fighters were coming into service. The new aircraft were again able to challenge Allied air superiority, culminating in "]" during the ] {{nowrap|(9 April – 16 May 1917).}}<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 108.</ref> In the next two years, the Allied air forces gradually overwhelmed the {{lang|de|''Luftstreitkräfte''}} in quality and quantity, until the Germans were only able to gain temporary control over small areas of the Western Front. When this tactic became untenable, development of new aircraft began, which led to the ]. The new aircraft created another "Fokker Scourge" in the summer of 1918 and as a condition of the ], Germany was required to surrender all Fokker D.VII aircraft to the Allies.<ref> firstworldwar.com</ref> The period of Allied air superiority that followed the Fokker Scourge was brief; by mid-September 1916, the first twin-''Spandau'' armed ] fighters were coming into service. The new aircraft were again able to challenge Allied aircraft, culminating in "]" during the ] {{nowrap|(9 April – 16 May 1917).}}<ref>Cheesman 1960, p. 108.</ref> In the next two years, the Allied air forces gradually overwhelmed the {{lang|de|Luftstreitkräfte}} in quality and quantity, until the Germans were only able to gain temporary control over small areas of the Western Front. When this tactic became untenable, development of new aircraft began, which led to the ]. The new aircraft created another Fokker Scourge in the summer of 1918 and as a condition of the ], Germany was required to surrender all of its ] to the Allies.<ref> firstworldwar.com</ref>


==References== ==References==

===Notes===
{{reflist|group="Note"}}


===Citations=== ===Citations===
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* Bruce, J. M. ''Morane Saulnier Type L''. Berkhamstead, UK: Albatros Productions, 1989. {{ISBN|978-0-948414-20-6}}. * Bruce, J. M. ''Morane Saulnier Type L''. Berkhamstead, UK: Albatros Productions, 1989. {{ISBN|978-0-948414-20-6}}.
* Bruce, J. M. ''War Planes of the First World War''. London: MacDonald, 1968. {{ISBN|978-0-356-01473-9}}. * Bruce, J. M. ''War Planes of the First World War''. London: MacDonald, 1968. {{ISBN|978-0-356-01473-9}}.
* Cheesman, E. F. (ed.) ''Fighter Aircraft of the 1914–1918 War''. Letchworth, UK: Harleyford, 1960. OCLC 771602378 * Cheesman, E. F. (ed.) ''Fighter Aircraft of the 1914–1918 War''. Letchworth, UK: Harleyford, 1960. OCLC 771602378.
* Franks, Norman. ''Sharks Among Minnows: Germany's First Fighter Pilots and the Fokker Eindecker Period, July 1915 to September 1916''. London: Grub Street, 2001. {{ISBN|978-1-90230-492-2}}. * Franks, Norman. ''Sharks among Minnows: Germany's First Fighter Pilots and the Fokker Eindecker Period, July 1915 to September 1916''. London: Grub Street, 2001. {{ISBN|978-1-90230-492-2}}.
* Gray, Peter and Owen Thetford. ''German Aircraft of the First World War''. London: Putman, 1990, First edition 1962. {{ISBN|978-0-93385-271-6}}. * Gray, Peter and Owen Thetford. ''German Aircraft of the First World War''. London: Putman, 1990, First edition 1962. {{ISBN|978-0-93385-271-6}}.
* Grosz, P. M. ''Fokker E.III''. Berkhamstead, UK: Albatros Productions, 1989. {{ISBN|978-0-948414-19-0}}. * Grosz, P. M. ''Fokker E.III''. Berkhamstead, UK: Albatros Productions, 1989. {{ISBN|978-0-948414-19-0}}.
* Grosz, P. M. ''Halberstadt Fighters''. Berkhamstead, UK: Albatros Productions, 1996. {{ISBN|978-0-948414-86-2}}. * Grosz, P. M. ''Halberstadt Fighters''. Berkhamstead, UK: Albatros Productions, 1996. {{ISBN|978-0-948414-86-2}}.
* {{cite web |url=http://www.worldwar1.com/relevance/Relevance_Summer09.pdf |title=Verdun: The First Air Battle for the Fighter: Prelude and Opening |others=Part 1 |last=Guttman |first=Jon |date=Summer 2009 |website=World War I.com |publisher=The Great War Society |accessdate=26 May 2014}} * {{cite web |url=http://www.worldwar1.com/relevance/Relevance_Summer09.pdf |title=Verdun: The First Air Battle for the Fighter: Prelude and Opening |others=Part 1 |last=Guttman |first=Jon |date=Summer 2009 |website=World War I.com |publisher=The Great War Society |access-date=26 May 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603222631/http://www.worldwar1.com/relevance/Relevance_Summer09.pdf |archive-date=3 June 2016 |url-status=dead }}
* Hare, Paul R. ''The Royal Aircraft Factory''. London: Putnam, 1990. {{ISBN|978-0-85177-843-3}}. * Hare, Paul R. ''The Royal Aircraft Factory''. London: Putnam, 1990. {{ISBN|978-0-85177-843-3}}.
* Herris, Jack and Bob Pearson. ''Aircraft of World War I: 1914–1918''. London: Amber, 2010. {{ISBN|978-1-90662-666-2}}. * Herris, Jack and Bob Pearson. ''Aircraft of World War I: 1914–1918''. London: Amber, 2010. {{ISBN|978-1-90662-666-2}}.
* ] ''Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft: ein Rückblick auf die Entwicklung und die Leistungen unserer Heeres-Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege'' (in German) translation ''Germany's War in the Air''. Battery Press, 1994. original publication: Leipzig: 1921, K. F. Koehle. {{ISBN|978-0-89839-195-4}}. * ] ''Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft: ein Rückblick auf die Entwicklung und die Leistungen unserer Heeres-Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege'' (in German) translation ''Germany's War in the Air''. Battery Press, 1994. original publication: Leipzig: 1921, K. F. Koehle. {{ISBN|978-0-89839-195-4}}.
* Immelmann, Franz (with an appendix by Norman Franks). ''Immelmann: The Eagle of Lille''. Drexel Hill, UK: Casemate, 2009 (originally published in Germany, 1934). {{ISBN|978-1-932033-98-4}}. * Immelmann, Franz (appendix by Norman Franks). ''Immelmann: The Eagle of Lille''. Drexel Hill, UK: Casemate, 2009 (originally published in Germany, 1934). {{ISBN|978-1-932033-98-4}}.
* Jones, H. A. ''The War in the Air, Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force'', (volume II). original publication, London: Clarendon Press 1928. London: Imperial War Museum and N & M Press edition, 2002. , access date 12 April 2015 {{ISBN|978-1-84342-413-0}}. * Jones, H. A. ''The War in the Air, Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force'', (volume II). original publication, London: Clarendon Press 1928. London: Imperial War Museum and N & M Press facs. edition, 2002. , access date 12 April 2015 {{ISBN|978-1-84342-413-0}}.
* ]. ''Sagittarius Rising''. London: Penguin, 1977 (first published 1936). {{ISBN|978-0-14-004367-9}}. * ]. ''Sagittarius Rising''. London: Penguin, 1977 (first published 1936). {{ISBN|978-0-14-004367-9}}.
* Kennett, Lee ''The First Air War: 1914–1918'' New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991. {{ISBN|978-0-02-917301-5}}. * Kennett, Lee ''The First Air War: 1914–1918'' New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991. {{ISBN|978-0-02-917301-5}}.
* Robertson, Linda R. ''The Dream of Civilized Warfare: World War I Flying Aces and the American Imagination'' Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2003. {{ISBN|978-0-8166-4270-0}}. * Robertson, Linda R. ''The Dream of Civilized Warfare: World War I Flying Aces and the American Imagination'' Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2003. {{ISBN|978-0-8166-4270-0}}.
* Terraine, John. ''White Heat: The New Warfare 1914–1918''. London: Book Club Associates, 1982. {{ISBN|978-0-85052-331-7}}. * Terraine, John. ''White Heat: The New Warfare 1914–1918''. London: Book Club Associates, 1982. {{ISBN|978-0-85052-331-7}}.
* Weyl, A. J., ''Fokker: The Creative Years.'' London: Putnam, 1965.
* Wyngarden, Greg van. ''Early German Aces of World War I''. Botley, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2006. {{ISBN|978-1-84176-997-4}}. * Wyngarden, Greg van. ''Early German Aces of World War I''. Botley, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2006. {{ISBN|978-1-84176-997-4}}.
* Woodman, Harry. ''Early Aircraft Armament: The Aeroplane and the Gun up to 1918''. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989. {{ISBN|978-0-85368-990-4}}. * Woodman, Harry. ''Early Aircraft Armament: The Aeroplane and the Gun up to 1918''. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989. {{ISBN|978-0-85368-990-4}}.
* Wise, S. F. ''Canadian Airmen and the First World War. The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force vol. I''. (repr. ed.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1981 . {{ISBN|978-0-8020-2379-7}}.
{{Refend}} {{Refend}}


==Further reading== ==Further reading==
{{Refbegin}} {{Refbegin}}
* {{cite thesis |last=Bradbeer |first=T. G. |title=The Battle for Air Supremacy over the Somme 1 June – 30 November 1916 |type=PhD |url=http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/180/rec/1 |year=2004 |publisher=US Army Command and General Staff College |location=Fort Leavenworth, KS |accessdate=26 March 2016 |docket=ADA428847 |oclc=939481536}} * {{cite thesis |last=Bradbeer |first=T. G. |title=The Battle for Air Supremacy over the Somme 1 June – 30 November 1916 |type=PhD |url=http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/180/rec/1 |year=2004 |publisher=US Army Command and General Staff College |location=Fort Leavenworth, KS |access-date=26 March 2016 |docket=ADA428847 |oclc=939481536 |archive-date=6 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160406185615/http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/180/rec/1 |url-status=dead }}
* {{cite book |last=Duffy |first=C. |title=Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme 1916 |publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicholson |year=2007 |orig-year=2006 |location=London |edition=Phoenix |isbn=978-0-7538-2202-9}} * {{cite book |last=Duffy |first=C. |title=Through German Eyes: The British and the Somme 1916 |publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicolson |year=2007 |orig-year=2006 |location=London |edition=Phoenix |isbn=978-0-7538-2202-9}}
* {{cite book |title=Die deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege: Aus den Aufzeichnungen und mit Hilfe 29 Offiziere und Beamten der Marine- und Militärische- Flugzicherung |trans-title=The German Air Force in the Great War: Its History, Development, Organisation, Aircraft, Weapons and Equipment, 1914–1918 |last=Neumann |first=G. P. |authorlink= |year=1920 |publisher=Mittler & Sohn |location=Berlin |edition=abr. trans. Hodder & Stoughton |url=https://ia600500.us.archive.org/2/items/germanairforcein00gurduoft/germanairforcein00gurduoft.pdf |accessdate=18 August 2014 |oclc=773250508}} * {{cite book |title=Die deutschen Luftstreitkräfte im Weltkriege: Aus den Aufzeichnungen und mit Hilfe 29 Offiziere und Beamten der Marine- und Militärische- Flugzicherung |trans-title=The German Air Force in the Great War: Its History, Development, Organisation, Aircraft, Weapons and Equipment, 1914–1918 |last=Neumann |first=G. P. |year=1920 |publisher=Mittler & Sohn |location=Berlin |edition=abr. trans. Hodder & Stoughton |url=https://archive.org/details/germanairforcein00gurduoft |access-date=18 August 2014 |oclc=773250508 }}
{{Refend}} {{Refend}}


==External links== ==External links==
* *
* * {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150228111530/http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/airplane%20at%20war/FOKKER.htm |date=2015-02-28 }}
* *
* *
* *


⚫ {{Aviation in World War I}}
{{wwi-air}}
⚫ {{World War I}}


] ]

Latest revision as of 11:19, 26 September 2024

Period of aerial battle of the First World War

Kurt Wintgens' Fokker M.5K/MG "E.5/15" Eindecker, flown by him on 1 July 1915, in the first successful aerial engagement in an aircraft fitted with a synchronised machine gun

The Fokker Scourge (Fokker Scare) occurred during the First World War from July 1915 to early 1916. Imperial German Flying Corps (Die Fliegertruppen) units, equipped with Fokker Eindecker (Fokker monoplane) fighters, gained an advantage over the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) and the French Aéronautique Militaire.

The Fokker was the first service aircraft to be fitted with a machine gun synchronised to fire through the arc of the propeller without striking the blades. The tactical advantage of aiming the gun by aiming the aircraft and the surprise of its introduction were factors in its success.

This period of German air superiority ended with the arrival in numbers of the French Nieuport 11 and British Airco DH.2 fighters, which were capable of challenging the Fokkers, although the last Fokkers were not finally replaced until August–September 1916.

The term "Fokker Scourge" was coined by the British press in mid-1916, after the Eindeckers had been outclassed by the new Allied types. Use of the term coincided with a political campaign to end a perceived dominance of the Royal Aircraft Factory in the supply of aircraft to the Royal Flying Corps, a campaign that was begun by the pioneering aviation journalist C. G. Grey and Noel Pemberton Billing M.P., founder of Pemberton-Billing Ltd (Supermarine from 1916) and a great enthusiast for aerial warfare.

Background

Early air warfare

Vickers "gunbus" biplanes had the engine behind the pilot which gave an unobstructed field of fire for the machine gun

As aerial warfare developed, the Allies gained a lead over the Germans by introducing machine-gun armed types such as the Vickers F.B.5 Gunbus fighter and the Morane-Saulnier L. By early 1915, the German Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, Supreme Army Command) had ordered the development of machine-gun-armed aircraft to counter those of the Allies. The new "C" class, armed two-seaters and twin-engined "K" (later "G") class aircraft such as the AEG G.I were attached in ones and twos to Feldflieger Abteilungen (FFA) artillery-observation and reconnaissance detachments for "fighter" sorties, mostly the escort of unarmed aircraft.

On 18 April 1915, the Morane-Saulnier L of Roland Garros was captured, after he was forced to land behind the German lines. From 1 April, Garros had destroyed three German aircraft in the Morane, which carried a machine-gun firing through the propeller arc. Saulnier had failed to develop a synchroniser and with Garros, as an interim solution, fitted metal wedges to the propeller; bullets that hit the blades were deflected by them. Garros burned his aircraft but this failed to conceal the nature of the device and the significance of the deflector blades. The German authorities requested several aircraft manufacturers, including that of Anthony Fokker, to produce a copy.

Synchronisation gear

Main article: Synchronization gear
Diagram of Fokker's "Stangensteuerung" synchronisation mechanism

The Fokker company produced the Stangensteuerung (push rod controller), a genuine synchronisation gear. Impulses from a cam driven by the engine controlled the timing of the machine-gun for its fire to be limited to the intervals between the propeller blades' travel past the barrel. Unlike earlier proposed gears, the Stangensteuerung was fitted to an aircraft and proved effective. In a postwar biography, Fokker claimed that he produced the gear in 48 hours but it was probably designed by Heinrich Lübbe, a Fokker Flugzeugbau engineer. Among several pre-war patents for similar devices was that of Franz Schneider, a Swiss engineer who had worked for Nieuport and the German LVG company.

The device was fitted to the most suitable Fokker type, the Fokker M.5K (military type name "Fokker A.III"), of which A.16/15, assigned to Otto Parschau, became the prototype of the Fokker Eindecker series of fighter designs. Fokker demonstrated A.16/15 in May and June 1915 to German fighter pilots, including Kurt Wintgens, Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann. The Fokker, with its typical Morane controls, an over-sensitive balanced elevator and dubious lateral control, was difficult to fly; Parschau, who was experienced on Fokker A types, converted pilots to the new fighter. The early Eindeckers were attached to FFAs, in ones and twos, to protect reconnaissance machines from Allied machine-gun-armed aircraft.

Operational service

Service début

Otto Parschau's "green machine" (A.16/15, factory s/n 216) with a Stangensteuerung synchroniser; the "prototype" Fokker Eindecker.

Fokker Eindecker E.5/15, the last of the pre-production series, is believed to have been first flown in action by Kurt Wintgens of FFA 6. On 1 and 4 July 1915, he reported combats with French Morane-Saulnier L (Parasols), well over the French lines. The claims were not confirmed but research has shown that the first claim matches French records of a Morane forced down on 1 July near Lunéville, with a wounded crew and a damaged engine, followed three days later by another. By 15 July, Wintgens had moved to FFA 48 and scored his first confirmed victory, another Morane L. Parschau had received the new E.1/15 (Fokker factory serial 191), the initial example of the five Fokker M.5K/MG service test examples for the Eindecker line of aircraft, when the A.16/15 (green machine), he had flown since the beginning of the war, was returned to the Fokker Flugzeugbau factory in Schwerin–Gorries for development.

By the end of July 1915, about fifteen Eindeckers were operational with various units, including the five M.5K/MGs and about ten early production E.I airframes. The pilots flew the new aircraft as a sideline, when not flying normal operations in two-seater reconnaissance aircraft. Boelcke, in FFA 62, scored his first victory in an Albatros C.I on 4 July. M.5K/MG prototype airframe E.3/15, the first Eindecker delivered to FFA 62, was armed with a Parabellum MG14 gun, synchronised by the unreliable first version of the Fokker gear. At first, E.3/15 was jointly allocated to him and Immelmann when their "official" duties permitted, allowing them to master the type's difficult handling characteristics and to practice shooting at ground targets. Immelmann was soon allocated a very early production Fokker E.I, E.13/15, one of the first armed with the lMG 08 (a lightened version of the MG08 Spandau) machine-gun, using the more reliable production version of the Fokker gear.

The Scourge begins

Otto Parschau's second Eindecker, E.1/15, with experimental "mid-wing" modification which became standard on production E.Is

The Fokker Scourge is usually considered by the British to have begun on 1 August, when B.E.2cs of 2 Squadron Royal Flying Corps (RFC) bombed the base of FFA 62 at 5:00 a. m., waking the German pilots, including Boelcke (most likely, still with E 3/15) and Immelmann (flying E 13/15), who were quickly into the air after the raiders. Boelcke suffered a jammed gun but Immelmann caught up with a B.E.2c and shot it down. This aircraft was flown as a bomber, without an observer or Lewis gun, the pilot armed only with an automatic pistol. After about ten minutes of manoeuvring (giving the lie to exaggerated accounts of the stability of B.E.2 aircraft) Immelmann had fired 450 rounds, which riddled the B.E. and wounded the pilot in the arm. By late October, towards the end of the Battle of Loos, more Fokkers (including the similar Pfalz E-type fighters, which were also called Fokkers by Allied airmen) were encountered by RFC pilots and by December, forty Fokkers were in service.

In the new fighters, pilots could make long, steep dives, aiming the fixed, synchronised machine-gun by aiming the aircraft. The machine gun was belt-fed, unlike the drum-fed Lewis guns of their opponents, who had to change drums when in action. The Fokker pilots took to flying high and diving on their quarry, usually out of the sun, firing a long burst and continuing the dive until well out of range. If the British aircraft had not been shot down, the German pilot could climb again and repeat the process. Immelmann invented the Immelmann turn, a zoom after the dive, followed by a roll when vertical to face the opposite way, after which he could turn to attack again.

RFC aircraft losses
(July 1915
to January 1916)
Month Total
June 6
July 15
August 10
September 14
October 12
November 16
December 17
January 30
Total 120

The mystique acquired by the Fokker was greater than its material effect and in October, RFC HQ expressed concern at the willingness of pilots to avoid combat. RFC losses were exacerbated by the increase in the number of aircraft at the front, from 85 to 161 between March and September, the hard winter of 1915–1916 and some aggressive flying by the new German "C" type two-seaters. Boelcke and Immelmann continued to score, as did Hans Joachim Buddecke, Ernst von Althaus and Rudolph Berthold from FFA 23 and Kurt von Crailshein of FFA 53. The "official" list of claims by Fokker pilots for the second half of 1915 was no more than 28, many of them over French aircraft. Thirteen aeroplanes had been shot down by Immelmann or Boelcke and the rest by seven other Fokker pilots. January 1916 brought thirteen claims, most of them against the French, followed by twenty more in February, the last month of the "scourge" proper. Most of the victories were scored by aces rather than the newer pilots flying the greater number of Fokkers. Allied casualties had been light by later standards but the loss of air superiority to the Germans, flying a new and supposedly invincible aircraft, caused dismay among the Allied commanders and lowered the morale of Allied airmen. In his memoir Sagittarius Rising (1936), Cecil Lewis wrote,

Hearsay and a few lucky encounters had made the machine respected, not to say dreaded by the slow, unwieldy machines then used by us for Artillery Observation and Offensive Patrols.

On 14 January, RFC HQ issued orders that until better aircraft arrived, long and short-range reconnaissance aircraft must have three escorts flying in close formation. If contact with the escorts was lost, the reconnaissance must be cancelled, as would photographic reconnaissance to any great distance beyond the front line. Sending the B.E.2c into action without an observer armed with a Lewis gun also became less prevalent. The new tactic of concentrating aircraft in time and space had the effect of reducing the number of reconnaissance sorties the RFC could fly.

Reproduction FE2b, Masterton, New Zealand, 2009

New defensive formations were devised; a II Wing RFC method was for the reconnaissance aircraft to lead, escorted on each side 500 ft (150 m) higher, with another escort 1,000 ft (300 m) behind and above. On 7 February, on a II Wing long-range reconnaissance, the observation pilot flew at 7,500 ft (2,300 m); a German aircraft appeared over Roulers (Roeselare) and seven more closed in behind the formation. West of Torhout (Thourout) two Fokkers arrived and attacked at once, one diving on the reconnaissance machine and the other on an escort. Six more German aircraft appeared over Cortemarck (Kortemark) and formed a procession of fourteen aeroplanes stalking the British formation. None of the German pilots attacked and all the British aircraft returned, only to meet two German aircraft coming back from a bombing raid, which opened fire and mortally wounded the pilot of one of the escorts. The British ascribed their immunity to attack during the 55-minute flight to the rigid formation which the two Fokkers were unable to disrupt.

On 7 February, a 12 Squadron B.E.2c., was to be escorted by three B.E.2cs, two F.E.2s and a Bristol Scout from 12 Squadron and two more F.Es. and four R.E. aeroplanes from 21 Squadron. The flight was cancelled due to bad weather but twelve escorts for one reconnaissance aircraft demonstrated the effect of the Fokkers in reducing the efficiency of RFC operations. British and French reconnaissance flights to get aerial photographs for intelligence and artillery ranging data had become riskier, in spite of German fighters being forbidden to fly over Allied lines (to keep the synchronisation gear secret). This policy, for various reasons, prevailed for most of the war; the rarity of German fighters appearing behind the Allied lines limited the degree of air superiority they were able to attain.

End of the Scourge

The red Nieuport 11 of Jean Navarre, Guardian of Verdun

The scourge waned during the Battle of Verdun (21 February – 20 December 1916). The Germans tried to impose an air barrage (Luftsperre) which concealed much of the German preparation for the offensive from French aerial reconnaissance. During March and April increasing numbers of the new French Nieuport 11 fighters were sent to Verdun. Organised in specialist fighter squadrons (escadrilles de chasse) the Nieuports could operate in formations larger than the singletons or pairs normally flown by the Fokkers, quickly regaining air superiority for the Aéronautique Militaire.

British F.E.2b pusher aircraft had been arriving in France from late 1915 and in the New Year began to replace the older F.B.5s. The pilot and observer had a good view forwards from their cockpits and the observer could also fire backwards over the tail. 20 Squadron, the first squadron equipped with the F.E., arrived in France on 23 January 1916, for long-range reconnaissance and escort flying. The new aircraft lacked the speed to pursue the Fokkers and had limited manoeuvrability but the F.E.s became formidable opponents, particularly when flying in formation.

D.H.2 taking off from airfield at Beauval, France

The Airco DH.2, a single-seat fighter, began to arrive at the front in February 1916. This aircraft had a modest performance but its superior manoeuvrability gave it an advantage over the Eindecker, especially once the Lewis gun was fixed to point in the direction of flight. On 8 February, 24 Squadron (Major Lanoe Hawker) arrived with D.H.2s and began patrols north of the Somme; another six D.H.2 squadrons followed. On 25 April, two of the D.H. pilots were attacked and found that they could out-manoeuvre the Fokkers; a few days later, without opening fire, a D.H. pilot caused a Fokker to crash onto a roof at Bapaume. The Nieuports proved even more effective when the first Nieuport 16s in British service were issued to 1 and 11 Squadrons in April.

By March 1916, despite frequent encounters with Fokkers and the success of Eindecker aces, the scourge was almost over. The bogey of the Fokker Eindecker as a fighter was finally laid in April, when an E.III landed by mistake at a British aerodrome. The captured aircraft was found not to have the superior performance it had been credited with. The first British aircraft with a synchronisation gear was a Bristol Scout, which arrived on 25 March 1916 and on 24 May the first Sopwith 1½ Strutter aircraft were flown to France by a flight of 70 Squadron.

End of the Eindecker

Halberstadt D.II, said to be one of Boelcke's aircraft

The effect of the new Allied types, especially the Nieuport, was of considerable concern to the Fokker pilots; some even took to flying captured examples. Idflieg was sufficiently desperate to order German firms to build Nieuport copies, of which the Euler D.I and the Siemens-Schuckert D.I were built in small numbers. New D type single-seat, biplane fighters, particularly the Fokker D.II and Halberstadt D.II, had been under test since late 1915 and the replacement of the monoplanes with these types began by mid-1916.

In February 1916, Inspektor-Major Friedrich Stempel began to assemble Kampfeinsitzer Kommando (KEK, single-seat battle units). The KEK were units mostly of two to four fighters, equipped with Eindeckers and other types which had served with FFA units during the winter of 1915–1916. By July 1916, KEK had been formed at Vaux, Avillers, Jametz and Cunel near Verdun as well as other places on the Western Front, as Luftwachtdienst (aerial guard service) units, consisting only of fighters. In late May, German air activity on the British front decreased markedly, while the commander of the new Luftstreitkräfte, Oberst (Colonel) Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen, reorganised the German air service. The fighters of the KEK were concentrated into fighter squadrons (Jagdstaffeln) the first of which, Jagdstaffel 2 (Jasta 2) went into action on the Somme on 17 September. By this time, the last of the Eindeckers, long outmoded as front line fighters, had been retired.

Aftermath

Analysis

Caricature of Fokker Eindecker published in Flight for 3 February 1916, satirising exaggerated accounts of its capabilities in other publications.

Among British politicians and journalists who grossly exaggerated the material effects of the "Scourge" were the eminent pioneering aviation journalist C. G. Grey, founder of The Aeroplane, one of the first aviation magazines and Noel Pemberton Billing, a Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) pilot, notably unsuccessful aircraft designer and manufacturer and a Member of Parliament from March 1916. Their supposed object was the replacement of the B.E.2c with better aircraft but it took the form of an attack on the RFC command and the Royal Aircraft Factory. C. G. Grey had orchestrated a campaign against the Royal Aircraft Factory in the pages of The Aeroplane, going back to its period as the Balloon Factory, well before it had produced any heavier-than-air aircraft.

Before the unsuitability of the B.E.2c for aerial combat was exposed by the first Fokker aces, criticism was not primarily aimed at the technical quality of Royal Aircraft Factory aircraft but because a government body was competing with private industry. When the news of the Fokker monoplane fighters reached him in late 1915, Grey was quick to blame the problem on orders for equipment that the latest developments had rendered obsolete. Grey did not suggest alternative aircraft, even supposing that the rapid development of aviation technology during the war could have been foreseen. Pemberton Billing also blamed the initially poor performance of British aircraft manufacturers on what he saw as the favouritism shown by the RFC, an arm of the British Army, towards the Royal Aircraft Factory, which, while nominally civilian, was also part of the army. Pemberton Billing claimed that,

... hundreds, nay thousands of machines have been ordered which have been referred to by our pilots as "Fokker Fodder" ... I would suggest that quite a number of our gallant officers in the Royal Flying Corps have been rather murdered than killed.

Even among writers who recognised the hysteria of this version of events, this picture of the Fokker Scourge gained considerable currency during the war and afterwards. In 1996 Peter Grosz wrote,

The epithet Fokker Fodder was coined by the British to describe the fate of their aircraft under the guns of the Fokker monoplanes, but given acknowledged mediocrity, it comes as something of a shock to realise how abysmal the level of British aircraft performance, pilot training and aerial tactics must have been....

Subsequent operations

The period of Allied air superiority that followed the Fokker Scourge was brief; by mid-September 1916, the first twin-Spandau armed Albatros D.I fighters were coming into service. The new aircraft were again able to challenge Allied aircraft, culminating in "Bloody April" during the Battle of Arras (9 April – 16 May 1917). In the next two years, the Allied air forces gradually overwhelmed the Luftstreitkräfte in quality and quantity, until the Germans were only able to gain temporary control over small areas of the Western Front. When this tactic became untenable, development of new aircraft began, which led to the Fokker D.VII. The new aircraft created another Fokker Scourge in the summer of 1918 and as a condition of the Armistice, Germany was required to surrender all of its Fokker D.VIIs to the Allies.

References

Citations

  1. ^ Franks 2001, p. 1.
  2. ^ Kennett 1991, p. 110.
  3. Bruce 1968, v.2, p. 20.
  4. Robertson 2003, p. 103.
  5. Hare 1990, pp. 91–102.
  6. Cheesman 1960, p. 177.
  7. Bruce 1989, pp. 2–4.
  8. ^ Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 18.
  9. Jones, 2002, p. 469
  10. ^ Bruce 1989, p. 3.
  11. Cheesman 1960, p. 178.
  12. ^ Grosz 1989, p. 2.
  13. Weyl 1965, p. 96.
  14. Woodman 1989, pp. 180–183.
  15. Grosz, Peter M. (2002). Fokker E I/II. Windsock Datafile No. 91. Berkhamsted: Albatros. pp. 6–9. ISBN 1-902207-46-7.
  16. ^ Gray and Thetford 1961, p. 83.
  17. Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 9.
  18. Immelmann 2009, p. 77.
  19. ^ Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 10.
  20. Van Wyngarden 2006, pp. 11–12.
  21. Van Wyngarden 2006, pp. 10–12.
  22. ^ Franks 2001, pp. 10–11.
  23. ^ Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 12.
  24. Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 13.
  25. ^ Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 14.
  26. Woodman 1989, pp. 180–183.
  27. Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 15.
  28. Franks 2001, p. 59.
  29. Jones, 2002, p. 144
  30. Wise, 1981, p. 355
  31. Jones, 2002, p. 150
  32. Wise, 1981, p. 355
  33. Wise, 1981, p. 355
  34. Hoeppner 1994, p. 38
  35. Franks 2001, p. 41.
  36. Lewis 1977, p. 51.
  37. Terraine 1982, p. 199.
  38. Jones, 2002, pp. 156–157
  39. Jones, 2002, pp. 147–148
  40. Jones, 2002, pp. 157–158
  41. Jones, 2002, p. 158
  42. Franks 2001, pp. 11–12.
  43. Hoeppner, 1994, p. 41
  44. Franks 2001, p. 6.
  45. Herris and Pearson 2010, p. 29.
  46. Hare 1990, p. 87.
  47. Jones, 2002, pp. 158–159
  48. Cheesman 1960, p. 92.
  49. Franks 2001, pp. 59–60.
  50. Lewis, 1977, p. 52
  51. Bruce, 1968, v.2, p.119
  52. Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 51.
  53. Van Wyngarden 2006, p. 64.
  54. Cheesman 1960, p. 166.
  55. ^ Grosz 1996, p. 5.
  56. Guttman, 2009, p. 9
  57. Gray & Thetford 1962 p. xxix
  58. Jones, 2002, p. 281
  59. "Deadly Fokker", Flight, vol. VIII, no. 371, p. 103, 3 February 1916, retrieved 13 September 2014 – via Flightglobal Archive
  60. Hare 1990, P. 29
  61. Hare 1990, p. 91.
  62. Cheesman 1960, p. 108.
  63. "Armistice terms" firstworldwar.com

Bibliography

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