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			{{Short description\|Concept in religion, ethics, and philosophy}}
	'''Theories of Value''' ask 'What sorts of things are ]?' Or: 'What does "good" mean?'
			{{Other uses}}
			{{globalize\|article\|date=May 2019}}
			], ]s are considered to be good beings and are contrasted with ]s, who are their evil counterparts.]]
			In most contexts, the concept of '''good''' denotes the conduct that should be preferred when posed with a choice between possible actions. Good is generally considered to be the opposite of ] and is of ], ], ], and ]. The specific meaning and etymology of the term and its associated translations among ancient and contemporary languages show substantial variation in its inflection and meaning, depending on circumstances of place and history, or of philosophical or religious context.

			== History of Western ideas ==
	"If we had to give the most general, catch-all description of good things, then what would that description be?"
			{{Further\|Form of the good\|Origins of morality\|Morality}}

			Every language has a word expressing ''good'' in the sense of "having the right or desirable quality" (]) and ''bad'' in the sense "undesirable". A sense of ] and a distinction "right and wrong, good and bad" are ].<ref>] (1991) ''Human Universals''. Philadelphia, ] ().</ref>
	When that question is answered with "]", this is called "]".

			=== Plato and Aristotle ===
	Many people believe that value theory is the most important area of ]. All ] and most ]s have been concerned with it to some degree. It can define "good" and "]" for a community or society. It affects ] - maybe ].
			]]]
			Although the history of the origin of the use of the concept and meaning of "good" are diverse, the notable discussions of ] and ] on this subject have been of significant historical effect. The first references that are seen in Plato's ''The Republic'' to the ] are within the conversation between ] and ] (454c–d). When trying to answer such difficult questions pertaining to the definition of ], Plato identifies that we should not "introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature" instead we must focus on "the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves”, which is the form of the Good. This form is the basis for understanding all other forms, it is what allows us to understand everything else. Through the conversation between Socrates and Glaucon (508a–c) Plato analogizes the form of the Good with the sun as it is what allows us to see things. Here, Plato describes how the sun allows for sight. But he makes a very important distinction, "sun is not sight", but it is "the cause of sight itself". As the sun is in the visible realm, the form of Good is in the ] realm. It is "what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower". It is not only the "cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge".

			Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain that "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e).<ref name=Reeve>{{cite book\|last=Plato\|translator=C.D.C. Reeve\|title=Republic\|date=1992\|publisher=Hackett Publ. Co\|location=Indianapolis, Ind.\|isbn=978-0-87220-136-1\|edition=2nd}}</ref>

			In contrast to Plato, Aristotle discusses the Forms of Good in critical terms several times in both of his major surviving ethical works, the '']'' and '']''. Aristotle argues that Plato's Form of the Good does not apply to the physical world, for Plato does not assign "goodness" to anything in the existing world. Because Plato's Form of the Good does not explain events in the physical world, humans have no reason to believe that the Form of the Good exists and the Form of the Good thereby, is irrelevant to human ethics.<ref name=plat>{{cite book\|last=Fine\|first=Gail\|title=Plato on Knowledge and Forms\|url=https://archive.org/details/platoonknowledge00fine_595\|url-access=limited\|date=2003\|publisher=Oxford University Press\|location=New York\|isbn=0-19-924559-2\|pages=}}</ref>
	Goodness and ] affects ], which sets relative valuations on ]. When governments decide what is good and to be encouraged, they cut taxes on those activities, remove regulations or laws, and provide subsidies. However, when they decide what is bad and to be discouraged, they pass laws to make it illegal and enforce them with violence, monopolize it to limit or control it, and make stern speeches on television.

			Plato and Aristotle were not the first contributors in ancient Greece to the study of the "good" and discussion preceding them can be found among the pre-Socratic philosophers. In Western civilisation, the basic meanings of κακός and ἀγαθός are "bad, cowardly" and "good, brave, capable", and their absolute sense emerges only around 400 BC, with ], in particular ].<ref>], ''Democritus and the Origins of Moral Psychology'', The American Journal of Philology (1985)</ref> Morality in this absolute sense solidifies in the dialogues of ], together with the emergence of ] thought (notably in '']'', which ponders the concept of piety (]) as a moral absolute). The idea is further developed in ] by ], ], and ].
	==Moral vs. other goods==
	An ]'s and ]'s usage of the term "good" differ.

			=== Ancient western religions ===
	First, the word "good" has a different meaning when applied to persons and actions or things. For example, to say that "Mary's a morally good person and her honesty is good." might have a different sense of good in the sentence "A banana split is good."
			] (or Ferohar), one of the primary symbols of Zoroastrianism, believed to be the depiction of a ''Fravashi'' (a guardian spirit)]]
			{{Further\|Zoroastrianism\|Gnosticism}}
			Aside from ancient Greek studies of the "good", more than twenty-five hundred years ago in the eastern part of ancient ] a religious philosopher called ] simplified the ] of early Iranian deities <ref name="Boyce_1979_6-12">{{harvnb\|Boyce\|1979\|pp=6–12}}</ref> into ]: ] (] ]) and ] (]) that were in conflict.

			For the western world, this idea developed into a religion that spawned many ]s, some of which embraced an extreme ] belief that the ] should be shunned and the ] should be embraced. Gnostic ideas influenced many ] religions,<ref>{{cite book \|title=The Penguin Dictionary of Religion\| year=1997\|publisher=Penguin Books UK\|author=John Hinnel}}</ref> which teach that '']'' (variously interpreted as ], ], ], or "oneness with God") may be reached by practising philanthropy to the point of personal poverty, ] (as far as possible for '']'' and totally for '']''), and diligently searching for ] by helping others.<ref name=gph>{{cite book \|title=Gnostic Philosophy: From Ancient Persia to Modern Times\|first=Tobias \|last=Churton\|publisher=Inner Traditions – Bear & Company \|date=2005\|isbn=978-159477-035-7}}</ref>
	Economic "good" is challenged by such issues as ]. Some claim that ]s are a "good" in the economic sense, as their production can bring ] for ] growers and doctors who treat ]. Many people would agree that is not ''morally'' "good"; some dispute even the economic claim, pointing out an analogy to the ].

			This development from the relative or habitual to the absolute is evident in the terms ''ethics'' and '']'' as well, both being derived from terms for "regional custom", Greek ἦθος and Latin ''mores'', respectively (see also '']'').
	Philosophers and politicians have usually focussed on the sense of "morally good", as applied to persons and actions.

			=== Medieval period in western cultures ===
	==Academic use vs. everyday life==
			{{Further\|Christian philosophy}}
	Virtue plays an important part in everyday life; everyone has their own set of beliefs on what is "good", and what is not. This article however, focusses on the philosophical and academic approach.
			])]]
	Although people do all have there own set of beliefs and morals on what is "good", people do try to inflict there own views on others. This is called emotivism, im sure theres another actual word for it but its late, and i cant remember it... i believe its prescriptionism, but im not sure. Anyways, you pass your morals onto other people and persuade them to think as you do. Usually it is something everyone does, and as you grow older it works less and less because you are less easily influenced. When you are younger an adult telling you that smoking is bad, is as good as the word coming from "God", but as you grow older, other peoples opinions seem to mean less. It also depends on the ranking the person you are talking. If you are talking to the president, his opinions seem far more important, compared with someone like a child or a local bin man saying it.
			Medieval ] was founded on the work of Bishop ] and theologian ], who understood evil in terms of ] and ], as well as the influences of Plato and Aristotle, in their appreciation of the concept of the ]. Silent contemplation was the route to appreciation of the Idea of the Good.<ref>A. Kojeve, ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel'' (1980) p. 108</ref>

			Many medieval Christian theologians both broadened and narrowed the basic concept of ''Good and Evil'' until it came to have several, sometimes complex definitions such as:<ref>{{cite book \|title=Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition\|author=Farley, E\|publisher=Fortress Press / Vanderbilt University\|year=1990\|isbn=978-0800624477}}</ref>
	==Religion==
			* a personal preference or subjective judgment regarding any issue that might earn ] or ] from the ]
	===Judaism, Christianity and Islam===
			* religious obligation arising from ] leading to ] or ]
	In the monotheist religions ], ], and ], the infallibility of God is the basis for their respective values.
			* a generally accepted ] of behaviour that might enhance group ] or wealth
			* ] or behaviour that induces strong emotional reaction
			* ] imposing a legal ]

	===~~Buddhism~~ ~~and~~ ~~Hinduism~~===		=== Modern concepts ===
			==== Kant ====
	In these religions the basic goal is for a human soul to become more perfected until it can reach or merge with ] or achieve ]. ]s attempt to perfect their lives toward this end. ]s, as reformed Hindus, attempt to perfect their detachment from a world that they believe is illusory.
			{{main\|Kant\|Critique of Practical Reason}}
			A significant enlightenment context for studying the "good" has been its significance in the study of "]" as found in ] and other Enlightenment philosophers and religious thinkers. These discussions were undertaken by Kant, particularly in the context of his '']''.

	===~~Animism~~===		==== Rawls ====
			]'s book '']'' prioritized social arrangements and goods, based on their contribution to ]. Rawls defined justice as ''fairness'', especially in distributing social goods, defined fairness in terms of procedures, and attempted to prove that just institutions and lives are good, if every rational individual's goods are considered fairly. Rawls's crucial invention was the ], a procedure in which one tries to make objective moral decisions by refusing to let personal facts about oneself enter one's moral calculations.
	Many animist religions are driven by personal prudence. Good and bad luck is caused by good and bad spirits. Both can be propitiated by the correct rituals, and these form a necessary traditional system to get through life.

			== Opposition to evil ==
	===Radical values environmentalism===
			{{main\|Good and evil}}
	Radical values environmentalists say that the only intrinsically good thing is a flourishing ecosystem. Individuals and societies are merely means to this end. The ] is the most detailed expression of this overall thought but it strongly influenced ] and the modern ].
			In religion, ethics, and philosophy, "]" is a very common ]. In cultures with ] and ] religious influence, evil is usually perceived as the antagonistic ]. Good is that which should prevail and evil should be defeated.<ref name="Paul O. Ingram 1986. P. 148-149">Paul O. Ingram, ]. ''Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Mutual Renewal and Transformation''. University of Hawaii Press, 1986. P. 148-149.</ref>

			As a religious concept, basic ideas of a ] between good and evil has developed in western cultures so that today:
	==Academic theories==
			* '']'' is a broad concept, but it typically deals with an association with life, ], continuity, happiness, love, and ]
	Philosophers say that a correct definition of '''goodness''' would be valuable because it might allow one to construct a good life or society by reliable processes of deduction, elaboration or prioritisation. One could answer the ancient question, "How then should we live?"
			* '']'' typically is associated with conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, discrimination designed to harm others, humiliation of people designed to diminish their psychological needs and dignity, destructiveness, and acts of unnecessary and/or indiscriminate violence <ref>Ervin Staub. ''Overcoming evil: genocide, violent conflict, and terrorism''. New York, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Pp. 32.</ref>
			* the dilemma of the ] and their capacity to perform both good and evil activities <ref>{{cite book \|chapter-url=http://www.worldtransformation.com/human-condition/ \|chapter=The Human Condition \|title=The Book of Real Answers to Everything! \|first=Jeremy \|last=Griffith \|year=2011 \|isbn= 9781741290073}}</ref>

			]'' portrays one of the eight guardians of ], Sendan Kendatsuba, banishing evil.]]
	To consider the roots of the modern conceptions of value, we must return to ]'s origins:

			== In Buddhism ==
	===Kant: hypothetical and categorical imperatives.===
			In cultures with ] spiritual influence, this antagonistic duality itself must be overcome through achieving '']'', or emptiness. This is the recognition of good and evil not being unrelated, but two parts of a greater whole; unity, oneness, a ].<ref name="Paul O. Ingram 1986. P. 148-149"/>
	]'s (]-]) thinking influenced ]. He thought of moral value as a unique and universally identifiable property. He showed that many practical goods are good only in states-of-affairs described by a sentence containing an "if" clause. Further, the "if" clause often described the category in which the judgment was made (Art, science, etc.). Kant described these as "hypothetical goods," and tried to find a "categorical" good that would operate across all categories of judgment.

			== In the field of biology ==
	An influential result of Kant's search was the idea of a good will as being the only good in itself.
			] is regarded by some biologists (notably ], ], ], and ]) as an important question to be addressed by the field of biology.<ref>{{cite book \|first=Edward Osborne \|last=Wilson \|author-link= E. O. Wilson \|year= 2012 \|title=The Social Conquest of Earth \|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company \|url=https://archive.org/details/socialconquestof0000wils \|url-access=registration \|isbn= 9780871404138}}</ref><ref>{{cite book \|last= Griffith \|first=Jeremy \|author-link=Jeremy Griffith \|year=2011 \|chapter=Good vs Evil \|title=The Book of Real Answers to Everything! \|isbn= 9781741290073 \|chapter-url= http://www.worldtransformation.com/good-vs-evil/}}</ref><ref>{{cite book \|first=Edward Osborne \|last=Wilson \|author-link= E. O. Wilson \|year= 2007 \|title=Evolution for Everyone: How Darwin's Theory Can Change the Way We Think About Our Lives \|publisher=Random House Publishing \|isbn= 9780385340922}}</ref><ref>{{cite book \|last= de Waal \|first= Frans \|author-link= Frans De Waal \|year= 2012 \|title= Moral behavior in animals \|url= http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html \|access-date= 2012-11-20 \|archive-date= 2012-04-17 \|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20120417212015/http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html \|url-status= dead }}</ref>

			== See also ==
	He saw a good will as acting in accordance with a moral command, the "]": "Act according to those maxims that you could will to be universal law." From this, and a few other axioms, Kant developed a moral system that would apply to any "praiseworthy person." (See ''],'' third section, -.)
			{{div col\|colwidth=30em}}
			* ]
			* ]
			* ] (ethics)
			* ] (Nietzsche)
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* Ethics
			* ]
			* ] (Plato)
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ] (Nietzsche)
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			* ]
			{{div col end}}

			== References ==
	Many philosophers believe that any general definition of goodness must define goods that are categorical in the sense that Kant intended.
			{{Reflist}}

			== Further reading ==
	===Goodness as a property===
			{{refbegin}}
	One problem is that 'goodness' seems not to be definable, and therefore it is sometimes thought not to be a real property of the world.
			* Aristotle. "Nicomachean Ethics". 1998. USA: ]. (1177a15)
			* Bentham, Jeremy. ''The Principles of Morals and Legislation''. 1988. Prometheus Books.
			* {{cite book \|last=Boyce \|first=Mary \|title=Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices \|location=London \|publisher=Routledge/Kegan Paul \|date=1979}} Corrected repr. 1984; repr. with new foreword 2001.
			* Dewey, John. ''Theory of Valuation''. 1948. University of Chicago Press.
			* Griffin, James. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. 1986. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
			* Hume, David. ''A Treatise of Human Nature''. 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
			* Hurka, Thomas. ''Perfectionism''. 1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
			* Kant, Immanuel. ''Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals''. 1996. Cambridge University Press. Third section, -.
			* Kierkegaard, Søren. ''Either/Or''. 1992. ].
			* Rawls, John. ''A Theory of Justice''. 1999. Belknap Press.
			* Ross, W. D. ''The Right and the Good''. 1930. Oxford University Press.
			{{refend}}

			== External links ==
	Attempted definitions of goodness fail in known ways. Definitions generally either describe traits or properties of a real object or set of objects, or divide the concept into other, subsidiary concepts. Both approaches have failed to define goodness. The two usual failures are that either the definition is circular, or the definition has no meaning in the real world.
			*{{Commons category-inline}}
			*{{wikiquote-inline}}

			{{Good and evil}}
	Because the project has failed for thousands of years, philosophers have tried desperate expedients to get some of the value of such a definition. Usually these definitions involved simplifications, or additional assumptions.
			{{Ethics}}
			{{Authority control}}

			]
	===Problems with definitions using traits or properties===
			]
	Most philosophers find that the traits or properties that would justify calling a thing good are different for different categories of judgment.
			]
	For example, the criteria by which we judge art to be good are different from those by which we judge people to be good.
			]
	A famous early discussion of this problem is by ], in his '']'' (at 1096a5).
			]

	Many judgments of goodness translate to prices, but this appears to be a summary or effect of judgment, not a cause. For example, a piece of art found in an attic may be sold for the price of a meal. A collector may then recognise it as a lost work of a famous artist, and sell it for more than the price of a house. The price changed because the collector had better judgment than the owner who kept it in an attic.

	If goodness were a common trait or property, we should be able to abstract it, but no one has succeeded. Thus goodness is widely believed not to be a property of any natural thing or state of affairs.

	Of course, this belief is open to trivial skepticism: Perhaps philosophers just haven't stumbled across the right definition. One philosopher named ] claims he has. He maintains that "good" is a second-order property, a quantifier of qualities: to call a thing good is to contend that it is '''all''' there under its concept. See ].

	One wonders where such an immaterial trait as goodness
	could reside. An obvious answer is "Inside people."
	Some philosophers go so far as to say that if some state of affairs does not tend to arouse a desirable subjective state in self-aware beings, then it cannot be good.

	Although the elusive definition of external "objective" goodness could be used to construct rational morals and legislation, a subjective definition of goodness could be useful to help one live a good life.

	===Shortcomings of subjectivism===
	It is useful to discuss ], or ], about intrinsic good. Subjectivists may say that to answer the question, "What things are intrinsically good?" we need only answer "What do I, or my group want not merely as a means to something else, but for itself?"

	There are, however, problems with this approach. We can be wrong about what is good for us.

	For this and other reasons, ] theories argue against both subjective and ] conceptions of value and meaning, and focus on the relationships between body and other essential elements of human life. In effect, conceptual metaphor theories treat ethics as an ] problem and the issue of how to work-out values as a negotiation of these metaphors, not the application of some ]ion or a strict standoff between parties who have no way to understand each other's view.

	===Intrinsic versus instrumental goodness===
	May people find it useful to distinguish instrumental and intrinsic goods. This was discussed by Aristotle: an intrinsically good thing is worth having for itself, even if it doesn't help you get anything else that's good.

	Hammers and radios are instrumental goods, used to build and get music (say).

	Many people find intrinsic goods in the pleasure we get from listening to a great piece of music, or understanding philosophy or science.

	It's not always an either-or proposition. Some things are both good in themselves, and good for getting other things that are good. Understanding Science is such a good.

	Since instrumental goods are always to get other goods, the values by which one lives must ultimately be intrinsic. For example, most people pursue money merely so that they can afford what they call "the finer things in life," And the question is: What are they? Which things are intrinsically good?

	===Pragmatism and intrinsic goodness===
	] (]-]) in his book '']'' saw goodness as the outcome of "valuation," a continuous balancing of "ends in view." An end in view was said to be an objective which we adopt or not, which we refine or reject based on its consistency with other objectives or means to objectives held by ourselves or others.

	His empirical approach did not accept intrinsic value as an inherent or enduring property of things. He saw it as an illusory product of our continuous valuing activity as purposive beings. In his view, all goodness is best understood as instrumental, with no contrasting intrinsic goodness.

	===Hedonism===
	] made the first known attempt to define goodness as subjective pleasure, and its opposite as pain. This is called ].
	(See '']'' by ])

	However, simple hedonism is rejected even by most hedonists because there seem to be pleasures that are bad (e.g. eating too much) and pains that are good (e.g. going to the dentist).

	There are other problems with identifying goodness as pleasure. It's strange to say that carrying out one's duty (which is obviously good) has anything to do with pleasure. Also, the sense of achievement following completion of one's work is rarely considered pleasure, although it is clearly good.

	Aristotle even distinguished genuine happiness from amusement, and virtuous from base pleasures. This makes some sense because useful work is seen as better than mere amusement (such as a chat room).

	The usual fix of Hedonism is to consider consequences, as well as pleasure and pain. For example. going to a dentist has a small amount of pain now, but avoids more later. However, even ] is strained when considering duty.

	Happiness or pleasure can often be recognized, which solves many problems for Hedonism. But no known definitions of happiness or pleasure have met objections similar to those of a definition of goodness: The situations producing the happiness or pleasure are different in different categories of action.

	Furthermore, the conditions and consequences of pleasure, or pain, can seem to be either good or bad, and thus undermine our judgement about that pleasure or pain.

	Neither happiness nor pleasure has been conceptually divided (analyzed) in a way that permits deductive choices of real-world alternatives.

	So imagine that the only intrinsically good things in the world are good pleasures. But then aren't we giving a circular account of "good" -- if we say that good things are good pleasures, then we're using the word "good" to define itself.

	Alternatively, we might try to find out which pleasures will result in the most other pleasures. Then we could call those pleasures "intrinsically good," and only then say: "the only instrinsically good things in the world are good pleasures." That could avoid the circularity problem.

	But this is flawed. Imagine a nation of sadists. The public torture of one person in such a nation may produce more pleasure than any other event, since everyone's basic (not to say base) urges would be satisfied vicariously. But many people would say that such an action would be bad.

	So pleasure seems a poor candidate as a criteria of goodness.

	===Non-cognitivism===
	Some philosophers, faced with intractable circularity, considered that goodness was a special property that is not empirically verifiable, like 'redness' or 'circular.'

	For example, ] blamed this circularity on what he called the "]". He believed that people had a nonphysical intuition that could sense goodness, which was then falsely projected onto things and fallaciously treated as a natural property. Few people believe in this intuitionism, but the term has stuck because goodness is so widely thought nonphysical, or no physical basis can be found for it.

	Others described a theory called ], simplified to the 'Boo-Hurray' theory of morality. It was thought by emotivists that to call something wrong, or good, was either to express disapproval or approval.

	Emotivism has problems as an explanation of goodness. For example, people's emotions vary according to situation, person or circumstance. But goodness is usually conceived as constant across all situations. Torture, for example, does not become good because it is approved. Public disapproval does not always mean that an action is wrong. Therefore emotions are an inconsistent and inaccurate guide to goodness.

	===Circularity in the analysis of 'goodness'===
	The other form of definitions of goodness is to try to divide the concept of goodness into smaller, more understandable concepts.

	It has been thought that if some conception of goodness were divided, or causally regressed far enough, the process would eventually come to a logical stopping place, an "ultimate good." However all known forms of such regressions appear to be either circular, or open to skepticism.

	Attempts to translate, divide or causally regress the concept of goodness usually fail in a particular way. Every such attempt seems to end up with one or more subconcepts prefixed with the word "good" or related words like "pleasure," "dutiful," "praiseworthy", or "virtuous." Such definitions appear to be circular, and therefore are believed invalid.

	The circularity of causal regression hits scientific definitions of goodness especially hard, because it seems to indicate that science cannot study goodness. Some philosophers have gone so far as to say that science can only study "what is", not "what should be." They claim that there is an unsurmountable gap between facts and values, the "fact -value distinction"

	The clearest proponent of this viewpoint was ] in ''],'' who famously questioned the move from statements about facts to statements about what ought to be.

	==The evasiveness of a definition of 'goodness'.==
	Many philosophers tried to end the regressions by applying an auxiliary evaluation that helps the general regression to a stopping place.
	This auxiliary evaluation is often open to skepticism.

	For example, ] considered "The supreme element of happiness" to be theoretical study, because it "ruled all others."
	(''Nicomachean Ethics'', 1177a15) In this case, supremity was the auxiliary evaluation that could be doubted.

	He also supported the ancient Greek view which said that it was not happiness , which is a mental state over time, which is intrinsically good -- it is, instead, something like happiness, but ], for which there is no word in English, except perhaps the word "flourishing" or "well-being." Eudaimonia is more than simply happiness; it is a happy life that is well -lived .

	Happiness is a subjective state. Eudaimonia is an objective state; literally, it means something like "having a good spirit." Thus this line of argument ends in circularity also.

	] (]-]) appproached the problem by asserting that everything sensed was an effect, with an earlier cause. Each immediate (proximal) cause was less diluted in goodness, and therefore, the first cause would have to be perfectly good. In this case, the concept of dilution might be doubted as an inaccurate metaphor, or that the dilution necessarily scales back to perfection (maybe the first cause was very good, instead of perfect). One might also doubt that the causal regression ends: It might be circular, for instance.

	Another improvement is to distinguish contributory goods. These have the same qualities as the good thing, but need some emergent property of a whole state-of-affairs in order to be good. For example salt is food, but is usually good only as part of a prepared meal. Other exampless come from music and language.

	Most philosophers that think goods have to create desirable mental states also say that goods are experiences of self-aware beings. These philosophers often distinguish the experience, which thay call an intrinsic good, from the things that seem to cause the experience, which they call "inherent" goods.

	===Collectivism versus individualism: contributory goods===
	We may want to go beyond eudamonia by saying that an individual person's flourishing is valuable only as a means to the flourishing of society as a whole. In other words, a single person's life is, ultimately, not important or worthwhile in itself, but is good only as a means to the success of society as a whole.

	Some elements of ] are an example of this, encouraging the view that people ought to conform as individuals to the demands of a peaceful and ordered society.

	So the question at issue now is: Is an individual's life intrinsically good, or is it merely instrumentally good? Is an individual's life, well-lived, something that is desirable for its own sake, or is it desirable, ultimately, only as a means to having a happy society?

	We can use the terms "values individualism" and "values collectivism" to mark the dispute. Here are some definitions:

	Values individualism is the view that only individual lives (or their eudaimonia ) are intrinsically valuable; and so they are valuable not merely as a means to the flourishing of society.

	Values collectivism is the view that individual lives (or their eudaimonia) are only instrumentally valuable, i.e., good only as a means to, or as an outcome of the flourishing of society; the flourishing of society (whatever this might be) is the only intrinsically good thing.

	We are then faced with the problem of how to choose, and on what basis, between values collectivism and values individualism.

	Returning to the ecology question, which its advocates see as beyond the collective/individualist duality, one can now view radical values environmentalism as the view that the ] and ] must constantly be increasing - ] for instance is concerned with ensuring that values are quantified and prices set by means which respect the actual trades that ordinary people would make. ] and ] and even ] all proceed directly from the desire to make the economic and social relation accurately reflect values decisions made by at least the wiser individuals. This is a very concrete and material view, that bears little relationship to Animism or the Gaia philosophy.

	===Transcendental value===
	The more spiritual view, however, that all life has intrinsic value, is more reminiscent of the philosophy of ](]-]). Hegel rejected individualism as expressed for example in both the American and the French revolutions. Individualism, he felt, runs directly contrary to the nature of humanity and reality, since the individual has value and reality only as a part of a greater and unified whole. Humans, for instance, live only as part of a living planet Earth.

	Another similar viewpoint is that of ], the ancient Chinese philosophy which advocated quietism and conformity to the Way, or Tao: "The Tao is the natural order of things. It is a force that flows through every living or sentient object, as well as through the entire universe".

	=== Ecological transcendence ===
	This sort of holism seems an odd point of view: in our experience goodness, or value exists within an ecosystem, Earth. What kind of being could validly apply the word to an ecosystem as a whole? Who would have the power to assess and judge an ecosystem as good or bad? By what criteria? In effect, it could only judge ''us'' sentient beings within it, and dispose of us as it required.

	Perhaps this view could be grounded in a ], or in the concept of ], but these concepts are not accepted as providing an elucidation of everyday examples of goodness. The economic view tends to be more satisfactory since it can be directly related to the Categorical Imperative or people's documented choices to select one thing over another.

	Nevertheless, it should be noted that many people get support in accepting the fact that God created the world or "the universe", and therefore that it has a purpose and value which lies beyond our understanding. This is of course true of many of those who accept the economic or material view of the human body or its similarity to other ] bodies.

	=== Empathy ===
	One way to resolve the issue is to focus on empathy and the ability of beings to feel each others' pain. We care more about a gorilla than a mosquito, and would protect one and kill the other, then, not because of some abstract similarity genetically measured, but, because the gorilla lives and feels just like we do. This idea is carried forward in the ] view and has given rise to the ] movement and ].

	This is compatible with ] views, expressed e.g. in David Hume's views that the idea of a self with unique identity is illusory, and that morality ultimately comes down to sympathy and fellow feeling for others, or the exercise of approval underlying moral judgements.

	The question of ] comes up also in early Enlightenment theory:

	===Utilitarianism===
	]'s book '']'' prioritized goods by considering pleasure, pain and consequences. This theory had a wide effect on public affairs, up to and including the present day. A similar system was later named ] by ].

	Utilitarianism succeeds in many cases. However Utilitarianism has some questionable implications.

	For example, it considers all goods as interchangeable. If feeding a starving child would cause the child to feel sick, and not permanently improve his situation, a Utilitarian would prefer to spend the money on a watch for a rich man.

	Unhappily, the utilitarian argument to permit abortions is of the same form as this questionable type, though with changed quantities. To see this, substitute "unconscious fetus, destined for loveless poverty" for "starving child" and "improved woman's income" for "rich man's watch."

	To a humanist, who values human life above all else, the form of the judgment remains invalid, while a utilitarian might agree with the statement, based on the changed magnitudes of value.

	In another widely questioned set of judgments, Utilitarians weigh the pleasures and pains of men and animals in the same scale.
	(See ], an animal rights organization based firmly on Utilitarian ideals.)

	]' book '']'' prioritized social arrangements and goods based on their contribution to ]. Rawls defined justice as fairness, especially in distributing social goods, defined fairness in terms of procedures, and attempted to prove that just institutions and lives are good, if rational individuals' goods are considered fairly.

	]' crucial invention was "]," a procedure in which one tries to make objective moral decisions by refusing to let personal facts about oneself enter one's moral calculations.

	A problem with both Kant's and Rawls' approach is that goodness appears to be both prior to and essential to fairness, and different for different beings. Procedurally fair processes of the type used by Kant and Rawls may reduce the totality of goodness, and thereby be unfair.

	For example, if two people are found to own an orange, the standard fair procedure is to cut it in two, and give half to each. However, if one wants to eat it, while the other wants the rind to flavor a cake, cutting it in two is clearly less good than giving the peel to the baker, and feeding the meat to the eater.

	Many people judge that if both procedures are known, using the first procedurally-fair procedure to mediate between a baker and an eater is unfair because it is not as good.

	Applying procedural fairness to an entire society therefore seems certain to create recognizable inefficiencies, and therefore be unfair, and (by the equivalence of justice with fairness) unjust.

	This strikes at the very foundation of Kantian ethics, because it shows that hypothetical goods can be better than categorical goods, and therefore be more desirable, and even more just.

	==Summary: Values pluralism and the grading of values==
	Notice that there is a succession of things which can be considered as the kind of thing which is intrinsically good: from particular events of pleasure, to an individual's happiness, to an individual's ], to the flourishing of a society, to the flourishing of an entire ecosystem. So it can be seen that there is a rather difficult problem about the ''scope'' of the theory of value. Where do you stop, in this succession of items, in your account of what is valuable for its own sake?

	If you say that an individual pleasure is valuable for its own sake, then why don't you say that an individual's entire happiness is valuable for its own sake? And so forth: and on reaching the end of this sequence, we find ourselves valuing ecosystems which is itself an activity which seems metaphysical, inexplicable.

	As a values pluralist, you might say: every item in this succession of items is intrinsically good. The goodness of a particular experience, of an individual's whole life, of society, and of an ecosystem, are all worth having for their own sake, and not merely as a means to something else. So as a values pluralist you would say: I don't have to decide which of these things is intrinsically good, because they are all intrinsically good.

	That position does not seem to hold up to careful scrutiny. Sometimes we have a choice , for example, to sacrifice our own pleasure, or happiness, or even our own lives, for the sake of many other people. In these cases two things are weighed: your own individual happiness, and the more general happiness of a lot of other people. And if you conclude that you should sacrifice your own happiness, in one of these ways, what does that amount to?

	It could say that your own life is worthwhile in and of itself, and that it is also worthwhile as a means to the happiness of others. Remember, the same thing can be both instrumentally and intrinsically good: understanding, or knowledge, is one possible example. It is clear that a human life might be another, and in that way some people would defend values pluralism. Two different things, a life and the good of society, can both be intrinsically good, even though one could be sacrificed for the second. This does not involve a contradiction.

	Indeed, ] faces this dilemma in an egregious way: since being precedes essence, then our choices are paramount in setting our values. It makes little sense to evaluate one action over another: if they are real choices then they are expressions of our being, and of our ultimate freedom. ] faced the famous difficulty of being unable to decide whether it was better to stay at home to care for his elderly mother, or to go to war in the defence of his country.

	We are left with an unresolved issue: the issue of the relative importance of intrinsic values. If these things are to be ranked in order of importance, how would the ranking go? So a person could be a values pluralist and still be an individualist, or a collectivist, or a radical environmentalist. It would just have to be said that the most important thing, the most valuable thing, is my own flourishing; or, instead, the flourishing of society; or, perhaps, the flourishing of the environment.

	But this leaves us back at the start of the argument: on what basis do we, should we, choose in cases of conflict? Why is one thing better than another? Why is anything good?

	==Conclusion==
	After all this, we can see why the notion or thing called 'goodness' has a claim on being the most important, yet the most puzzling area of philosophy.

	We can also see why there would be temptation to reduce values to prices, and why the ] or ] might be ultimately understood by economic methods, not ethical ones. To a degree, economics and ethics compete to explain people's choices. ''See also ] on this.''

	So much in our day to day life involves apparent value judgements: crucial life decisions we make, the habits we develop and transmit to our children, our deepest political convictions.

	Academic philosophy seems to provide no objective criteria or decision process to help us in our decision making or reflections on these matters.

	Hypothetical imperatives can outweigh Categorical imperatives, as we have seen, and intrinsic goods can be outweighed by instrumental goods. For each proposed ideal candidate for being called good, we seem able to envisage a situation where that candidate is judged bad.

	Further, the prospect of the quest being successful, that goodness could finally be analysed, satisfactorily defined and universally agreed is unsettling for some people. They feel that perhaps the definition could be used in a totalitarian way, perhaps the world would lose some of its ambiguity, there may be a loss of diversity in society and in ways of life. So the fact that some existing choices may be threatened, produces the paradoxical situation that ultimate, incontrovertible knowledge of what is good may to some people not seem good or desirable.

	Perhaps the only certainty we can have from looking at the investigations of philosopers over the centuries is that:

	*What is good cannot be defined in abstraction from situations and our experience of them, academic approaches have so far proved infertile.

	*There seems to be no enduring thing which can be said to be absolutely good in itself.

	*Perhaps an inductive, empirical based investigation of goodness as the outcome of situations of valuation activity would be a more productive approach.

	These conclusions may in the long run be more likely to give us some practical guidance in a world of multiple choice and of bewildering pluralism.

	See also: ], ], ], ], ]

	]
	]
	]
	]

Latest revision as of 12:51, 13 January 2025

Concept in religion, ethics, and philosophy For other uses, see Good (disambiguation).

The examples and perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. You may improve this article, discuss the issue on the talk page, or create a new article, as appropriate. (May 2019) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

In most contexts, the concept of good denotes the conduct that should be preferred when posed with a choice between possible actions. Good is generally considered to be the opposite of evil and is of ethics, morality, philosophy, and religion. The specific meaning and etymology of the term and its associated translations among ancient and contemporary languages show substantial variation in its inflection and meaning, depending on circumstances of place and history, or of philosophical or religious context.

History of Western ideas

Further information: Form of the good, Origins of morality, and Morality

Every language has a word expressing good in the sense of "having the right or desirable quality" (ἀρετή) and bad in the sense "undesirable". A sense of moral judgment and a distinction "right and wrong, good and bad" are cultural universals.

Plato and Aristotle

Although the history of the origin of the use of the concept and meaning of "good" are diverse, the notable discussions of Plato and Aristotle on this subject have been of significant historical effect. The first references that are seen in Plato's The Republic to the Form of the Good are within the conversation between Glaucon and Socrates (454c–d). When trying to answer such difficult questions pertaining to the definition of justice, Plato identifies that we should not "introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature" instead we must focus on "the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves”, which is the form of the Good. This form is the basis for understanding all other forms, it is what allows us to understand everything else. Through the conversation between Socrates and Glaucon (508a–c) Plato analogizes the form of the Good with the sun as it is what allows us to see things. Here, Plato describes how the sun allows for sight. But he makes a very important distinction, "sun is not sight", but it is "the cause of sight itself". As the sun is in the visible realm, the form of Good is in the intelligible realm. It is "what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower". It is not only the "cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge".

Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain that "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e).

In contrast to Plato, Aristotle discusses the Forms of Good in critical terms several times in both of his major surviving ethical works, the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that Plato's Form of the Good does not apply to the physical world, for Plato does not assign "goodness" to anything in the existing world. Because Plato's Form of the Good does not explain events in the physical world, humans have no reason to believe that the Form of the Good exists and the Form of the Good thereby, is irrelevant to human ethics.

Plato and Aristotle were not the first contributors in ancient Greece to the study of the "good" and discussion preceding them can be found among the pre-Socratic philosophers. In Western civilisation, the basic meanings of κακός and ἀγαθός are "bad, cowardly" and "good, brave, capable", and their absolute sense emerges only around 400 BC, with Pre-Socratic philosophy, in particular Democritus. Morality in this absolute sense solidifies in the dialogues of Plato, together with the emergence of monotheistic thought (notably in Euthyphro, which ponders the concept of piety (τὸ ὅσιον) as a moral absolute). The idea is further developed in Late Antiquity by Neoplatonists, Gnostics, and Church Fathers.

Ancient western religions

Faravahar (or Ferohar), one of the primary symbols of Zoroastrianism, believed to be the depiction of a *Fravashi* (a guardian spirit)

Further information: Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism

Aside from ancient Greek studies of the "good", more than twenty-five hundred years ago in the eastern part of ancient Persia a religious philosopher called Zoroaster simplified the pantheon of early Iranian deities into two opposing forces: Ahura Mazda (Illuminating Wisdom) and Angra Mainyu (Destructive Spirit) that were in conflict.

For the western world, this idea developed into a religion that spawned many sects, some of which embraced an extreme dualistic belief that the material world should be shunned and the spiritual world should be embraced. Gnostic ideas influenced many ancient religions, which teach that gnosis (variously interpreted as enlightenment, salvation, liberation, or "oneness with God") may be reached by practising philanthropy to the point of personal poverty, sexual abstinence (as far as possible for hearers and totally for initiates), and diligently searching for wisdom by helping others.

This development from the relative or habitual to the absolute is evident in the terms ethics and morality as well, both being derived from terms for "regional custom", Greek ἦθος and Latin mores, respectively (see also siðr).

Medieval period in western cultures

Further information: Christian philosophy

Medieval Christian philosophy was founded on the work of Bishop Augustine of Hippo and theologian Thomas Aquinas, who understood evil in terms of Biblical infallibility and Biblical inerrancy, as well as the influences of Plato and Aristotle, in their appreciation of the concept of the Summum bonum. Silent contemplation was the route to appreciation of the Idea of the Good.

Many medieval Christian theologians both broadened and narrowed the basic concept of Good and Evil until it came to have several, sometimes complex definitions such as:

a personal preference or subjective judgment regarding any issue that might earn praise or punishment from the religious authorities
religious obligation arising from Divine law leading to sainthood or damnation
a generally accepted cultural standard of behaviour that might enhance group survival or wealth
natural law or behaviour that induces strong emotional reaction
statute law imposing a legal duty

Modern concepts

Kant

Main articles: Kant and Critique of Practical Reason

A significant enlightenment context for studying the "good" has been its significance in the study of "the good, the true, and the beautiful" as found in Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment philosophers and religious thinkers. These discussions were undertaken by Kant, particularly in the context of his Critique of Practical Reason.

Rawls

John Rawls's book A Theory of Justice prioritized social arrangements and goods, based on their contribution to justice. Rawls defined justice as fairness, especially in distributing social goods, defined fairness in terms of procedures, and attempted to prove that just institutions and lives are good, if every rational individual's goods are considered fairly. Rawls's crucial invention was the original position, a procedure in which one tries to make objective moral decisions by refusing to let personal facts about oneself enter one's moral calculations.

Opposition to evil

Main article: Good and evil

In religion, ethics, and philosophy, "good and evil" is a very common dichotomy. In cultures with Manichaean and Abrahamic religious influence, evil is usually perceived as the antagonistic opposite of good. Good is that which should prevail and evil should be defeated.

As a religious concept, basic ideas of a dichotomy between good and evil has developed in western cultures so that today:

Good is a broad concept, but it typically deals with an association with life, charity, continuity, happiness, love, and justice
Evil typically is associated with conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, discrimination designed to harm others, humiliation of people designed to diminish their psychological needs and dignity, destructiveness, and acts of unnecessary and/or indiscriminate violence
the dilemma of the human condition and their capacity to perform both good and evil activities

In Buddhism

In cultures with Buddhist spiritual influence, this antagonistic duality itself must be overcome through achieving Śūnyatā, or emptiness. This is the recognition of good and evil not being unrelated, but two parts of a greater whole; unity, oneness, a Monism.

In the field of biology

Morality is regarded by some biologists (notably Edward O. Wilson, Jeremy Griffith, David Sloan Wilson, and Frans de Waal) as an important question to be addressed by the field of biology.

References

Donald Brown (1991) Human Universals. Philadelphia, Temple University Press (online summary).
Plato (1992). Republic. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publ. Co. ISBN 978-0-87220-136-1.
Fine, Gail (2003). Plato on Knowledge and Forms. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 350. ISBN 0-19-924559-2.
Charles H. Kahn, Democritus and the Origins of Moral Psychology, The American Journal of Philology (1985)
Boyce 1979, pp. 6–12
John Hinnel (1997). The Penguin Dictionary of Religion. Penguin Books UK.
Churton, Tobias (2005). Gnostic Philosophy: From Ancient Persia to Modern Times. Inner Traditions – Bear & Company. ISBN 978-159477-035-7.
A. Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1980) p. 108
Farley, E (1990). Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition. Fortress Press / Vanderbilt University. ISBN 978-0800624477.
^ Paul O. Ingram, Frederick John Streng. Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Mutual Renewal and Transformation. University of Hawaii Press, 1986. P. 148-149.
Ervin Staub. Overcoming evil: genocide, violent conflict, and terrorism. New York, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, Pp. 32.
Griffith, Jeremy (2011). "The Human Condition". The Book of Real Answers to Everything!. ISBN 9781741290073.
Wilson, Edward Osborne (2012). The Social Conquest of Earth. W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 9780871404138.
Griffith, Jeremy (2011). "Good vs Evil". The Book of Real Answers to Everything!. ISBN 9781741290073.
Wilson, Edward Osborne (2007). Evolution for Everyone: How Darwin's Theory Can Change the Way We Think About Our Lives. Random House Publishing. ISBN 9780385340922.
de Waal, Frans (2012). Moral behavior in animals. Archived from the original on 2012-04-17. Retrieved 2012-11-20.

External links

Media related to Good at Wikimedia Commons
Quotations related to Good at Wikiquote

v t e Good and evil
Good	Form of the Good Higher good Omnibenevolence Summum bonum
Evil	Absence of good Lesser of two evils Moral evil Radical evil Natural evil Necessary evil Wickedness
Study	Ponerology Problem of evil Value theory

v t e Ethics
Normative	Consequentialism Deontology Care Particularism Pragmatic Role Suffering-focused Utilitarianism Virtue
Applied	Animal Artificial intelligence Bio Business Computer Discourse Engineering Environmental Land Legal Machine Meat eating Media Medical Nursing Professional Programming Research Sexual Technology Terraforming Uncertain sentience
Meta	Absolutism Axiology Cognitivism Realism Naturalism Non-naturalism Subjectivism Ideal observer theory Divine command theory Constructivism Euthyphro dilemma Intuitionism Nihilism Non-cognitivism Emotivism Expressivism Quasi-realism Universal prescriptivism Rationalism Relativism Skepticism Universalism Value monism – Value pluralism
Schools	Buddhist Christian Confucian Epicurean Existentialist Feminist Islamic Jewish Kantian Rousseauian Stoic Tao
Concepts	Authority Autonomy Common sense Compassion Conscience Consent Culture of life Dignity Double standard Duty Equality Etiquette Eudaimonia Family values Fidelity Free will Good and evil Good Evil Problem of evil Happiness Honour Ideal Immorality Justice Liberty Loyalty Moral agency Moral courage Moral hierarchy Moral imperative Morality Norm Pacifism Political freedom Precept Rights Self-discipline Suffering Stewardship Sympathy Theodicy Torture Trust Value Intrinsic Japan Western Vice Virtue Vow Wrong
Ethicists	Laozi Socrates Plato Aristotle Diogenes Valluvar Cicero Confucius Augustine Mencius Mozi Xunzi Aquinas Spinoza Butler Hume Smith Kant Hegel Schopenhauer Bentham Mill Kierkegaard Sidgwick Nietzsche Moore Barth Tillich Bonhoeffer Foot Rawls Dewey Williams Mackie Anscombe Frankena MacIntyre Hare Singer Parfit Nagel Adams Taylor Azurmendi Korsgaard Nussbaum
Works	Nicomachean Ethics (c. 322 BC) Ethics (Spinoza) (1677) Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1726) A Treatise of Human Nature (1740) The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820) Either/Or (1843) Utilitarianism (1861) The Methods of Ethics (1874) On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) Principia Ethica (1903) A Theory of Justice (1971) Practical Ethics (1979) After Virtue (1981) Reasons and Persons (1984)
Related	Axiology Casuistry Descriptive ethics Ethics in religion Evolutionary ethics History of ethics Human rights Ideology Moral psychology Philosophy of law Political philosophy Population ethics Rehabilitation Secular ethics Social philosophy Index
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