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Revision as of 19:51, 18 September 2021 editAlbertatiran (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users8,097 edits Renamed the Criticism section to Analysis instead, so that it'd contain all discussions about the event and not just the criticism. Added 2 new paragraphs to the new Analysis section. I'll next organize this section and shorten it hopefully. As it stands, it has some repetitions.Tag: Visual edit← Previous edit Revision as of 08:41, 19 September 2021 edit undoAlbertatiran (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users8,097 edits →Analysis: Polishsed the analysis section + removed repetitions + added new sourcesTag: Visual editNext edit →
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== Analysis == == Analysis ==
The outburst of violence at Saqifah, according to ], indicates that a substantial number of the Ansar must have initially refused to follow Omar's lead. Otherwise, Madelung argues, there would have been no need to beat up their chief, ibn Ubadah.<ref>{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|page=33}}</ref> Even after Omar's pledge to Abu Bakr, some of the Ansar reportedly insisted that, "We will not pay allegiance to anyone except Ali."<ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=35}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|p=37}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Abbas|2021|p=93}}</ref> The outburst of violence at Saqifah, according to the author ], indicates that a substantial number of the Ansar must have initially refused to follow Omar's lead. Otherwise, Madelung argues, there would have been no need to beat up ], who was the chief of the ], the majority tribe of the Ansar.<ref>{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|page=33}}</ref> Even after Omar's pledge to Abu Bakr, some of the ] reportedly insisted that, "We will not pay allegiance to anyone except ]."<ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=35}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|p=37}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Abbas|2021|p=93}}</ref> Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law was, however, holding vigil over Muhammad's body, alongside other close relatives and was likely unaware of the ongoing Saqifah meeting.<ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|p=39}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Momen|1985|p=18}}</ref>


It has been suggested that two factors allowed the handful of Muhajirun at Saqifah to impose their will upon the Ansar:<ref name=":14">{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|pp=33, 34}}</ref> The first factor was that ], a leader of the rival tribe of ], broke rank with the Ansar and backed Abu Bakr.<ref name=":14" /><ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|p=37}}</ref> The second factor was the timely arrival of the ] tribe in great numbers, who filled the streets of Medina. The Aslam tribe, residing outside of Medina, were the enemies of the Ansar and readily supported Abu Bakr. Omar would often point out that, "It was only when I saw the ] that I became certain of victory."<ref name=":14" /> It has been suggested that two factors allowed the handful of ] at Saqifah to impose their will upon the ]:<ref name=":14">{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|pp=33, 34}}</ref> The first factor was that two key figures broke rank with the rest of the Ansar and backed Abu Bakr: ], a leader of the rival tribe of ], and ], an internal rival of ] among the ].<ref name=":14" /><ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|p=37}}</ref> The second factor was the timely arrival of the ] tribe in great numbers, who filled the streets of Medina. The Aslam tribe, residing outside of Medina, were the enemies of the Ansar and readily supported Abu Bakr. Omar would often point out that, "It was only when I saw the ] that I became certain of victory."<ref name=":14" />


While Omar defended its outcome, he later considered Saqifah to be a hasty decision or ''falta''.<ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=30}}</ref> In particular, "We feared if we left the people without a pledge of allegiance they might after our departure suddenly make a pledge ."<ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=31}}</ref> ] suggests that that other person was ], Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, and that the rushed nature of Saqifah was out of the fear that the Ansar might put forward the case of Ali among themselves.<ref name=":15">{{harvnb|Madelung|1997|p=37}}</ref> While Omar defended its outcome, he considered Saqifah to be a hasty decision or ''falta''.<ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=30}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Momen|1985|p=19}}</ref> In particular, by his own admission, "We feared if we left the people without a pledge of allegiance they might after our departure suddenly make a pledge ."<ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=31}}</ref> ] suggests that that other person was ], Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, and that the rushed nature of Saqifah was out of the fear that the Ansar might put forward the case of Ali among themselves.<ref name=":15">{{harvnb|Madelung|1997|p=37}}</ref>


] points out that Abu Bakr did everything in his speech to avoid raising the case of Ali for the caliphate.<ref name=":15" /> According to Madelung, Abu Bakr was well aware that a broad '']'', in which Ali was to be on option, would have almost inevitably led to the election of Ali:<ref name=":16">{{harvnb|Madelung|1997|pages=36, 40}}</ref> The Ansar would have likely supported Ali because of his family ties with them, and the same arguments that favored Abu Bakr over the Ansar (kinship, service to Islam, etc.) would have arguably favored Ali over Abu Bakr.<ref name=":16" /><ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|p=38}}</ref> Madelung argues that the straightforward logic of dynastic succession would have almost certainly prevailed in a general ''shura.''<ref>{{harvnb|Madelung|1997|pages=41, 42}}</ref> ] points out that Abu Bakr did everything in his speech to avoid raising the case of Ali for the caliphate.<ref name=":15" /> According to Madelung, Abu Bakr was well aware that a broad '']'', in which Ali was to be on option, would have almost inevitably led to the election of Ali:<ref name=":16">{{harvnb|Madelung|1997|pages=36, 40}}</ref> The Ansar would have likely supported Ali because of his family ties with them, and the same arguments that favored Abu Bakr over the Ansar (kinship, service to Islam, etc.) would have arguably favored Ali over Abu Bakr.<ref name=":16" /><ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|p=38}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Momen|1985|p=19}}</ref> Madelung adds that the straightforward logic of dynastic succession would have almost certainly prevailed in a general ''shura'' in favor of Ali''.''<ref>{{harvnb|Madelung|1997|pages=41, 42}}</ref>


The election has been viewed as controversial for a number of reasons.<ref name="FitzpatrickWalkerP3" /> It is notable that aside from the Ansar who initiated the meeting, the only prominent Muslims who attended the meeting were Abu Bakr, Omar and Abu Ubaidah.{{NoteTag|It is likely the three were also accompanied by personal attendants, family members and clients.<ref name=MandelungP32/>}} Later accounts suggest that ] was also involved, though this cannot be confirmed by standard sources. Nevertheless, the absence of so many of the Muhajirun (including Muhammad's own family, whose attendance would have been vital for any legitimate consultation) has been viewed as problematic. Omar himself described Saqifah as a ''falta'' (hasty affair),<ref name="MavaniP2">{{citation|last=Mavani|first=Hamid|title=Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi'ism: From Ali to Post-Khomeini|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gJChf3qXGUkC&pg=PA2|page=2|year=2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-04473-2}}</ref> though he defended their actions on account of the urgency of the situation.<ref name="MadelungP32-33">{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|pages=32–33}}</ref> Due to its questionable legal authority, following Omar's own ascension to the Caliphate, he warned the Muslims against using the example of Saqifah as a precedent for appointing his successor.<ref name="MavaniP2" /> As a result, the Saqifah event has been criticized as a "backroom deal" which was heavily influenced by pre-Islamic tribal politics.<ref name="FitzpatrickWalkerP3" /><ref>{{Cite book|last=Gross|first=Max|title=The Routledge handbook of religion and security|publisher=Routledge|year=2012|isbn=9781136239328|editor-last=Seiple|editor-first=Chris|pages=58|chapter=Shi’a Muslims and Security: the Centrality of Iran|editor-last2=Hoover|editor-first2=Dennis|editor-last3=Otis|editor-first3=Pauletta}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Hazleton|2009|p=58}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Abbas|2021|p=94}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Jafri|1979|pp=37, 38}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Momen|1985|pp=18, 19}}</ref> In particular, aside from the Ansar who initiated the meeting, the only prominent Muslims who participated were Abu Bakr, Omar and Abu Ubaidah.{{NoteTag|It is likely the three were also accompanied by personal attendants, family members and clients.<ref name=MandelungP32/>}} Later accounts suggest that ] was also involved, though this cannot be confirmed by standard sources.<ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=32}}</ref> Nevertheless, the meeting could not reach a concensus in the absence of so many of the Muhajirun and, in particular, Muhammad's own family, whose attendance would have been vital for a legitimate outcome.<ref>{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|pp=32}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Abbas|2021|p=93}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Momen|1985|p=19}}</ref> Due to its questionable legal authority, Omar later warned Muslims against following the example of Saqifah again.<ref name="MavaniP2">{{citation|last=Mavani|first=Hamid|title=Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi'ism: From Ali to Post-Khomeini|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gJChf3qXGUkC&pg=PA2|page=2|year=2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-135-04473-2}}</ref><ref>{{Harvtxt|Madelung|1997|p=30}}</ref>


Most notable in his absence was Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was at the time performing the ] of Muhammad's body alongside the latter's immediate family. Muhammad's relatives were disgruntled by the haste with which the election took place, denying them a voice in the proceedings.<ref name="FitzpatrickWalkerP3" /> Ali himself may have been reasonably expected to assume leadership, being both cousin and son-in-law to Muhammad.<ref>{{cite book|last=Hoffman|first=Valerie J.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JNxvMRJM3EAC&pg=PA6|title=The Essentials of Ibadi Islam|publisher=Syracuse University Press|year=2012|isbn=978-0-8156-5084-3|page=6|authorlink=Valerie Hoffman (academic)}}</ref> The theologian ] stated that Ali also had support among the Ansar for his succession, explained by the genealogical links he shared with them.{{NoteTag|Ali's paternal great-grandmother, ], had been a member of the ].<ref>{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|page=36}}</ref>}} Whether his candidacy for the succession was actually raised during Saqifah is unknown, though it is not unlikely.<ref name="MadelungP32-33" /> The fact that first-hand accounts of the meeting are restricted to solely Omar's testimony contributes to the general uncertainty of the proceedings.<ref name="MandelungP32">{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|page=32}}</ref>{{NoteTag|The Ansar present were probably unwilling to give accounts of their defeat in a cause that was later commonly derided as un-Islamic. This, combined with the early deaths of Abu Bakr, Abu Ubaidah and Salim, left only Umar to provide a report on the meeting.<ref name=MandelungP32/>}} Most notable in his absence was Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was at the time performing the ] of Muhammad's body alongside the latter's immediate family. Muhammad's relatives were disgruntled by the haste with which the election took place, denying them a voice in the proceedings.<ref name="FitzpatrickWalkerP3" /> Ali himself may have been reasonably expected to assume leadership, being both cousin and son-in-law to Muhammad.<ref>{{cite book|last=Hoffman|first=Valerie J.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JNxvMRJM3EAC&pg=PA6|title=The Essentials of Ibadi Islam|publisher=Syracuse University Press|year=2012|isbn=978-0-8156-5084-3|page=6|authorlink=Valerie Hoffman (academic)}}</ref> The theologian ] stated that Ali also had support among the Ansar for his succession, explained by the genealogical links he shared with them.{{NoteTag|Ali's paternal great-grandmother, ], had been a member of the ].<ref>{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|page=36}}</ref>}} Whether his candidacy for the succession was actually raised during Saqifah is unknown, though it is not unlikely.<ref name="MadelungP32-33">{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|pages=32–33}}</ref> The fact that first-hand accounts of the meeting are restricted to solely Omar's testimony contributes to the general uncertainty of the proceedings.<ref name="MandelungP32">{{harvtxt|Madelung|1997|page=32}}</ref>{{NoteTag|The Ansar present were probably unwilling to give accounts of their defeat in a cause that was later commonly derided as un-Islamic. This, combined with the early deaths of Abu Bakr, Abu Ubaidah and Salim, left only Umar to provide a report on the meeting.<ref name=MandelungP32/>}}


==Aftermath== ==Aftermath==

Revision as of 08:41, 19 September 2021

Roofed building in Medina, Arabia involved in the succession of Muhammad
Saqifah
A modern view of the approximate area where the gathering at Saqifah occurred
Observed byMuslims
TypeIslam
SignificanceAbu Bakr being elected as the first caliph of Islam
ObservancesPrayers, naat, nasheed

Saqifah (Template:Lang-ar) refers to the event in which, some of the Sahabah (Template:Lang-ar) gathered and pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr, electing him as the first caliph of Islam. The event is one of the most important events in Sunni Islam.

The event took place at a courtyard of the Banu Sa'ida tribe, shortly after the death of Muhammad in the year 632. During the event, many prominent Sahabah including Omar and Abu Ubaidah gathered at the event, although some Sahabah, including Ali, were not present at the event.

Event

During Muhammad's lifetime, the Muslims in Medina were divided into two groups; the Muhajirun, who had converted to Islam in Mecca and migrated to Medina with Muhammad, and the Ansar, who were originally from Medina and had invited Muhammad to govern their city.

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In the immediate aftermath of Muhammad's death in 11 AH (632 CE), a gathering of the Ansar took place in the a courtyard of the Banu Saida clan. The conventional wisdom of historians was that the purpose of the meeting was for the Ansar to decide on a new leader of the Muslim community among themselves, with the intentional exclusion of the Muhajirun. However, it is more likely that the Ansar, with a similar thinking that precipitated the later Ridda wars, considered that their allegiance to Muhammad had elapsed with his death and expected that his community would disintegrate. For this reason, they may have simply been seeking to re-establish control over Medina under the belief that the majority of the Muhajirun would return to Mecca anyway.

Nevertheless, Abu Bakr and Omar, both companions of Muhammad, upon learning of the meeting, hastened to the gathering and reportedly forced their way into Saqifah. Abu Bakr and Omar and another companion, Abu Ubaidah, were likely the only members of Muhajirun who attended the Saqifah gathering.

When they arrived, Abu Bakr warned the Ansar that Arabs will not recognize the rule of anyone outside of Muhammad's tribe, the Quraysh. Muhajirun, Abu Bakr argued, had the most noble lineage, had accepted Islam earlier, and were nearer to Muhammad in relation. He then took Omar and Abu Ubaidah by the hand and offered them to the Ansar as potential choices. Habab ibn Mundhir, a veteran from the Battle of Badr, countered with his own suggestion that the Quraysh and the Ansar choose separate rulers from among themselves. The group grew heated upon hearing this proposal and began to argue amongst themselves. The author W. Muir gives the following observation of the situation:

The moment was critical. The unity of the Faith was at stake. A divided power would fall to pieces, and all might be lost. The mantle of the Prophet must fall upon one Successor, and on one alone. The sovereignty of Islam demanded an undivided Caliphate; and Arabia would acknowledge no master but from amongst Koreish.

The stalemate reportedly continued through the night and into the next day. As evident from the early accounts, eloquent speeches gave way to a shouting match, with different groups competing for power. Sa'd ibn Ubadah, the chief of the Khazraj tribe of the Ansar, reportedly accused the attending Muhajirin of colluding together. In a decisive move, Omar took Abu Bakr's hand and swore his allegiance to him, an example eventually followed by the Ansar after ibn Ubadah was beaten into compliance.

Analysis

The outburst of violence at Saqifah, according to the author W. Madelung, indicates that a substantial number of the Ansar must have initially refused to follow Omar's lead. Otherwise, Madelung argues, there would have been no need to beat up Sa'd ibn Ubadah, who was the chief of the Khazraj, the majority tribe of the Ansar. Even after Omar's pledge to Abu Bakr, some of the Ansar reportedly insisted that, "We will not pay allegiance to anyone except Ali." Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law was, however, holding vigil over Muhammad's body, alongside other close relatives and was likely unaware of the ongoing Saqifah meeting.

It has been suggested that two factors allowed the handful of Muhajirun at Saqifah to impose their will upon the Ansar: The first factor was that two key figures broke rank with the rest of the Ansar and backed Abu Bakr: Usaid ibn Hudair, a leader of the rival tribe of Aws, and Bashir bin Sa'ad, an internal rival of Sa'd ibn Ubadah among the Khazraj. The second factor was the timely arrival of the Aslam tribe in great numbers, who filled the streets of Medina. The Aslam tribe, residing outside of Medina, were the enemies of the Ansar and readily supported Abu Bakr. Omar would often point out that, "It was only when I saw the Aslam that I became certain of victory."

While Omar defended its outcome, he considered Saqifah to be a hasty decision or falta. In particular, by his own admission, "We feared if we left the people without a pledge of allegiance they might after our departure suddenly make a pledge ." Madelung suggests that that other person was Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, and that the rushed nature of Saqifah was out of the fear that the Ansar might put forward the case of Ali among themselves.

Madelung points out that Abu Bakr did everything in his speech to avoid raising the case of Ali for the caliphate. According to Madelung, Abu Bakr was well aware that a broad shura, in which Ali was to be on option, would have almost inevitably led to the election of Ali: The Ansar would have likely supported Ali because of his family ties with them, and the same arguments that favored Abu Bakr over the Ansar (kinship, service to Islam, etc.) would have arguably favored Ali over Abu Bakr. Madelung adds that the straightforward logic of dynastic succession would have almost certainly prevailed in a general shura in favor of Ali.

As a result, the Saqifah event has been criticized as a "backroom deal" which was heavily influenced by pre-Islamic tribal politics. In particular, aside from the Ansar who initiated the meeting, the only prominent Muslims who participated were Abu Bakr, Omar and Abu Ubaidah. Later accounts suggest that ibn Abu Hudhayfa was also involved, though this cannot be confirmed by standard sources. Nevertheless, the meeting could not reach a concensus in the absence of so many of the Muhajirun and, in particular, Muhammad's own family, whose attendance would have been vital for a legitimate outcome. Due to its questionable legal authority, Omar later warned Muslims against following the example of Saqifah again.

Most notable in his absence was Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was at the time performing the ritual bathing of Muhammad's body alongside the latter's immediate family. Muhammad's relatives were disgruntled by the haste with which the election took place, denying them a voice in the proceedings. Ali himself may have been reasonably expected to assume leadership, being both cousin and son-in-law to Muhammad. The theologian Ibrahim al-Nakhai stated that Ali also had support among the Ansar for his succession, explained by the genealogical links he shared with them. Whether his candidacy for the succession was actually raised during Saqifah is unknown, though it is not unlikely. The fact that first-hand accounts of the meeting are restricted to solely Omar's testimony contributes to the general uncertainty of the proceedings.

Aftermath

Muhammad had been buried before the participants of the Saqifah gathering scattered. With the help of the Aslam and Aws tribes, Omar then dominated the streets to secure pledge of allegiance of Medinans. Several companions, most notably, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali, initially refused to acknowledge Abu Bakr's authority.

To cement his new authority, Abu Bakr ordered his aides, among them Omar, to confront Ali, resulting in an altercation which may have involved violence. In an act of passive resistance, however, Ali continued to hold out against Abu Bakr's pressure until his wife, Fatimah, died a few months later. According to the Shia, Fatimah died from the injuries that she suffered in a raid on her house, ordered by Abu Bakr. This claim is rejected by the Sunni.

At the time, Abu Bakr was almost universally accepted as successor to Muhammad. However, the conflicts after Muhammad's death are considered as the roots of the current division among Muslims. Those who had accepted Abu Bakr's caliphate later became the Sunni, while the supporters of Ali's right to caliphate eventually became the Shia.

Notes

  1. It is likely the three were also accompanied by personal attendants, family members and clients.
  2. It is likely the three were also accompanied by personal attendants, family members and clients.
  3. Ali's paternal great-grandmother, Salma bint Amr, had been a member of the Banu Khazraj.
  4. The Ansar present were probably unwilling to give accounts of their defeat in a cause that was later commonly derided as un-Islamic. This, combined with the early deaths of Abu Bakr, Abu Ubaidah and Salim, left only Umar to provide a report on the meeting.

See also

References

  1. ^ Fitzpatrick, Coeli; Walker, Adam Hani (2014). Muhammad in History, Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 3. ISBN 978-1-61069-178-9.
  2. Hawa, Salam (2017), The Erasure of Arab Political Identity: Colonialism and Violence, Taylor & Francis, p. 47, ISBN 978-1-317-39006-0
  3. Madelung, Wilferd (1997). The Succession to Muhammad. Cambridge University Press. p. 31. ISBN 0-521-64696-0.
  4. Abbas (2021, p. 92) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  5. Hazleton (2009, p. 60) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFHazleton2009 (help)
  6. Madelung 1997, p. 32
  7. ^ Madelung (1997, p. 32)
  8. Abbas (2021, p. 92) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  9. Hazleton (2009, p. 62) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFHazleton2009 (help)
  10. Jafri (1979, p. 36)
  11. Madelung (1997, pp. 30–31)
  12. Muir, William (1892), The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall : from Original Sources (2nd ed.), London: The Religious Tract Society, p. 2
  13. Hazleton (2009, p. 62) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFHazleton2009 (help)
  14. Abbas (2021, p. 93) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  15. Hazleton (2009, p. 64) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFHazleton2009 (help)
  16. ^ Hazleton (2009, p. 65) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFHazleton2009 (help)
  17. Madelung (1997, p. 31)
  18. Madelung (1997, p. 33)
  19. Madelung (1997, p. 35)
  20. Jafri (1979, p. 37)
  21. Abbas (2021, p. 93) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  22. Jafri (1979, p. 39)
  23. Momen (1985, p. 18) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFMomen1985 (help)
  24. ^ Madelung (1997, pp. 33, 34)
  25. Jafri (1979, p. 37)
  26. Madelung (1997, p. 30)
  27. Momen (1985, p. 19) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFMomen1985 (help)
  28. Madelung (1997, p. 31)
  29. ^ Madelung 1997, p. 37
  30. ^ Madelung 1997, pp. 36, 40
  31. Jafri (1979, p. 38)
  32. Momen (1985, p. 19) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFMomen1985 (help)
  33. Madelung 1997, pp. 41, 42
  34. Gross, Max (2012). "Shi'a Muslims and Security: the Centrality of Iran". In Seiple, Chris; Hoover, Dennis; Otis, Pauletta (eds.). The Routledge handbook of religion and security. Routledge. p. 58. ISBN 9781136239328.
  35. Hazleton (2009, p. 58) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFHazleton2009 (help)
  36. Abbas (2021, p. 94) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  37. Jafri (1979, pp. 37, 38)
  38. Momen (1985, pp. 18, 19) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFMomen1985 (help)
  39. Madelung (1997, p. 32)
  40. Madelung (1997, pp. 32)
  41. Abbas (2021, p. 93) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  42. Momen (1985, p. 19) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFMomen1985 (help)
  43. Mavani, Hamid (2013), Religious Authority and Political Thought in Twelver Shi'ism: From Ali to Post-Khomeini, Routledge, p. 2, ISBN 978-1-135-04473-2
  44. Madelung (1997, p. 30)
  45. Hoffman, Valerie J. (2012). The Essentials of Ibadi Islam. Syracuse University Press. p. 6. ISBN 978-0-8156-5084-3.
  46. Madelung (1997, p. 36)
  47. Madelung (1997, pp. 32–33)
  48. Abbas (2021, p. 94) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  49. Hazleton (2009, p. 65) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFHazleton2009 (help)
  50. Madelung (1997, p. 43)
  51. Fitzpatrick & Walker (2014, p. 3)
  52. Jafri (1979, pp. 40, 41)
  53. Madelung (1997, p. 32)
  54. Fitzpatrick & Walker (2014, p. 186)
  55. Fitzpatrick & Walker (2014, p. 4)
  56. Abbas (2021, pp. 97–99) harvtxt error: no target: CITEREFAbbas2021 (help)
  57. Jafri, S.H.M. (1979). The Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam. London: Longman. p. 23.
  58. Badie, Dina (2017). After Saddam: American Foreign Policy and the Destruction of Secularism in the Middle East. Lexington Books. p. 3. ISBN 978-1-4985-3900-5.

Further reading

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