| Revision as of 19:41, 6 February 2007 editBill Clark (talk | contribs)529 edits ←Replaced page with ''''Michael Devitt''' is an Australian philosopher currently teaching at the City University of New York in New York City. [[Category:...'← Previous edit | Revision as of 19:44, 6 February 2007 edit undoWill Beback (talk | contribs)112,162 editsm Reverted edits by Bill Clark (talk) to last version by SdorranceNext edit → | ||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| {{Infobox_Philosopher | | |||
| '''Michael Devitt''' is an ] ] currently teaching at the ] in ]. | |||
| <!-- Scroll down to edit this page --> | |||
| <!-- Philosopher Category --> | |||
| region = Western Philosophy | | |||
| era = ] | | |||
| color = #B0C4DE | | |||
| <!-- Image and Caption --> | |||
| image_name = | | |||
| image_caption = | | |||
| <!-- Information --> | |||
| name = Michael Devitt| | |||
| birth = | | |||
| death = | | |||
| school_tradition = ]| | |||
| main_interests = ], ], ]| | |||
| influences = ] | | |||
| influenced = | | |||
| notable_ideas = |}} | |||
| '''Michael Devitt''' is an ] ] currently teaching at the ] in ]. His primary interests include ], ], ] and ]. His current work involves the philosophy of ], foundational issues in ], the semantics of ] and ], ], and ]. | |||
| He is a noted proponent of the ]. He claims that repeated groundings in an object can account for reference change. However, such a response leaves open the problem of cognitive significance that originally intrigued ] and ]. | |||
| Michael Devitt is also a defender of ], and along with ], defends this position against claims that it is self-refuting by invoking ] that avoid analysing ] like "x is true" as expressing a real property. They are construed, instead, as logical devices so that asserting that a sentence is true is just a quoted way of asserting the sentence itself. To say, "'God exists' is true" is just to say, "God exists". This way, Rey and Devitt argue, in so far as dispositional replacements of "claims" and deflationary accounts of "true" are coherent, eliminativism is not self-refuting.<ref>Devitt, M. & Rey, G. (1991). ''Transcending Transcendentalism'' in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 87-100.</ref> | |||
| Devitt is a known critic of ]. | |||
| === Education === | |||
| Devitt's ] (]–]) was at ] in ], where he completed 3 “A” Levels and 9 “O” Levels. He then studied at the ] in ] between ]–], taking his qualifying exam at the end of that time. | |||
| His ] began at the ] in ], where he studied philosophy and ]. He graduated in ] with First Class Honours and a University Medal in philosophy. He continued on as a post-graduate research student until ], when he moved to ] and studied under ]. He received his MA in ] and his PhD in ]. | |||
| === Academic Positions === | |||
| Following the completion of his coursework at Harvard, Michael Devitt returned to ] in ] and began his teaching career as a lecturer in the Philosophy department. He was made a senior lecturer in ] and Associate Professor in ], and by ] was named as Head of Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy. He continued teaching at the University of Sydney until ], after which he returned to the ] and accepted an appointment of Professor of Philosophy at the ] in ]. He remained in ] until ], when he became a Professor (later Distinguished Professor) as well as acting as the Executive Officer of the Philosophy Program from ]–]. | |||
| In addition to his tenured or tenure-track positions, Michael Devitt has held numerous non-tenured positions at the ], ], ], ], ], ], ], ], and ]. | |||
| === Publications === | |||
| * Designation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, xiii, 311 pp. | |||
| * Realism and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, ix, 250 pp. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 2nd edn revised, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, xii, 327pp. Reprinted "with a new afterword," Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, xii, 371pp. | |||
| * Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, x, 338pp. | |||
| * "Meanings Just Ain't in the Head." Method, Reason and Language: Essays in honour of Hilary Putnam, George Boolos, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990), pp. 79-104. Reprinted in Croatian in Filozofskim Istrazivanjima 45 (1992), pp. 425-45. | |||
| * "A Shocking Idea about Meaning." Revue Internationale de Philosophie, a special issue devoted to Hilary Putnam, in press. | |||
| * "The Metaphysics of Truth." In The Nature of Truth, Michael Lynch, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2001). | |||
| === External Links === | |||
| * | |||
| * | |||
| === References === | |||
| <references/> | |||
| ] | ] | ||
Revision as of 19:44, 6 February 2007
| Michael Devitt | |
|---|---|
| Era | 20th-century philosophy |
| Region | Western Philosophy |
| School | analytic philosophy |
| Main interests | philosophy of language, cognitive science, scientific realism |
Michael Devitt is an Australian philosopher currently teaching at the City University of New York in New York City. His primary interests include philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics and epistemology. His current work involves the philosophy of linguistics, foundational issues in semantics, the semantics of definite descriptions and demonstratives, semantic externalism, and scientific realism.
He is a noted proponent of the Causal theory of reference. He claims that repeated groundings in an object can account for reference change. However, such a response leaves open the problem of cognitive significance that originally intrigued Bertrand Russell and Frege.
Michael Devitt is also a defender of Eliminativism, and along with Georges Rey, defends this position against claims that it is self-refuting by invoking deflationary semantic theories that avoid analysing predicates like "x is true" as expressing a real property. They are construed, instead, as logical devices so that asserting that a sentence is true is just a quoted way of asserting the sentence itself. To say, "'God exists' is true" is just to say, "God exists". This way, Rey and Devitt argue, in so far as dispositional replacements of "claims" and deflationary accounts of "true" are coherent, eliminativism is not self-refuting.
Devitt is a known critic of Constructivist epistemology.
Education
Devitt's secondary education (1952–1957) was at Bradfield College in Berkshire, England, where he completed 3 “A” Levels and 9 “O” Levels. He then studied at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia between 1958–1961, taking his qualifying exam at the end of that time.
His higher education began at the University of Sydney in 1962, where he studied philosophy and psychology. He graduated in 1966 with First Class Honours and a University Medal in philosophy. He continued on as a post-graduate research student until 1967, when he moved to Harvard University and studied under Quine. He received his MA in 1970 and his PhD in 1972.
Academic Positions
Following the completion of his coursework at Harvard, Michael Devitt returned to Sydney in 1971 and began his teaching career as a lecturer in the Philosophy department. He was made a senior lecturer in 1977 and Associate Professor in 1982, and by 1985 was named as Head of Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy. He continued teaching at the University of Sydney until 1987, after which he returned to the United States and accepted an appointment of Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland in 1988. He remained in Maryland until 1999, when he became a Professor (later Distinguished Professor) as well as acting as the Executive Officer of the Philosophy Program from 1999–2002.
In addition to his tenured or tenure-track positions, Michael Devitt has held numerous non-tenured positions at the University of Nottingham, Macquarie University, Australian National University, Victoria University of Wellington, University of Michigan, University of Southern California, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Harvard University, and Sydney University’s Women’s College.
Publications
- Designation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, xiii, 311 pp.
- Realism and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984, ix, 250 pp. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 2nd edn revised, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991, xii, 327pp. Reprinted "with a new afterword," Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, xii, 371pp.
- Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, x, 338pp.
- "Meanings Just Ain't in the Head." Method, Reason and Language: Essays in honour of Hilary Putnam, George Boolos, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990), pp. 79-104. Reprinted in Croatian in Filozofskim Istrazivanjima 45 (1992), pp. 425-45.
- "A Shocking Idea about Meaning." Revue Internationale de Philosophie, a special issue devoted to Hilary Putnam, in press.
- "The Metaphysics of Truth." In The Nature of Truth, Michael Lynch, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2001).
External Links
References
- Devitt, M. & Rey, G. (1991). Transcending Transcendentalism in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 87-100.