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WHAT IS SALAFISM? AND WHAT DOES IT CALL TO? By Abu Khadeejah Abdul-Wāhid Alam All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of all creation; may Al- lah extol the mention of our noble Prophet Muhammad in the highest company of Angels and give him peace and se- curity―and his family, his Companions and all those who follow him correctly until the establishment of the Hour. Some important clarifications Islam is the Religion of all the Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad. A Muslim is anyone who embraces this Religion and acts upon it. Muslims worship none except the one true God (Arabic, Al-Ilāh), and He is Allāh. Muslims shun all forms of polytheism and they follow the teachings of final Messenger sent to mankind. This is the basis )صــ# % عل(ه وســلم( of Salafism. صـ# % عل(ه ( The Sunnah is the Path of the Prophet and his Companions. Whoever follows this )وســــــــــــــــلــم path exactly is referred to as a Sunni and he is from Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamā’ah. Sometimes the term Sunni is used more generally to refer to anyone who is not from the Shi’ite sect. However merely being a non-Shi’ite is not sufficient to save a person from falling into deviation. 2 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) As-Salaf As-Sālih (The Pious Predecessors): The Salaf are the people of the early virtuous genera- tions. Whoever follows their path and proceeds upon their methodology is a Salafi. So the Salaf are Companions of Muhammad (صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم) and the three generations that came after them. They are also called Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamā’ah, As-hābul- Hadīth and Ahlul-Hadīth. Whoever accepts them and follows their path precisely in belief, methodology and religion is upon true guidance. Salafism (or Salafiyyah) is the true Path in following Islam and the Sunnah. A Salafi is one who follows the path of the Salaf As-Sālih exactly without altera- tion. The terms Salafi, Sunni, Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamā’ah, As- hābul-Hadeeth and Ahlul-Hadeeth are interchangea- ble. All these titles refer to the same body of people who all follow the same path. However, not every- one who uses these titles is a true adherent of what they represent. In fact, the majority of people who ascribe themselves to these labels have beliefs and methodologies in opposition to the path of the Salaf As-Sālih. To distinguish between a mere claimant and a true adherent is one the main purposes of this article. To be a Salafi means adhering to the Creed, Method- ology and the way of life of the Salaf As-Sālih (the 3 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) Pious Predecessors). The earliest of the Salaf was the generation of our Prophet (ص# % عل(ه وسلم) and his Companions. Then after them came the virtuous three generations of believers who held fast to the Sunnah (Path) of the Prophet and his Companions. The person who understands this path correctly, follows it exactly, without introducing anything into it and nor deviating from it is a Salafi. To be a Salafi is not merely to imagine that one is upon the true path of the Salaf, but Salafism is to study the religion of the Companions and follow it — it was they who understood best the meanings and intent صــــــــــ# % ( of the speech and actions of the Prophet .)عل(ه وسلم 4 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) So, if someone asks: “What is the Call (Da’wah) and Methodology (Manhaj) of the Salafis in learning, prac- tising and teaching the Religion?” We can answer by saying: Here is our Da’wah explained in the follow- ing 89 points: OUR DA’WAH (OUR CALL) 1. We call, first and foremost, to the worship of Allah alone without associating partners with Him. This was the starting point of the call of the Prophets (عليهم الســــــلام), just as Allah has stated: “We sent a messenger to every nation proclaiming: Worship Al- lah alone and abandon the worship of the false dei- ties.” So, this call to the worship of Allah alone must be coupled with the negation of the worship of eve- rything besides Him. 2. We acknowledge that the Religion calls to many essentials, therefore, we begin by inviting to the most essential affair, followed by that which is next in importance according to the Quranic and صـــــــــــــــ# % عـلـ(ـــــــه ( Prophetic texts. Allah’s Messenger -In“ :)ر 56 % عنه( commanded Mu’ādh ibn Jabal )وسلم 7 vite them firstly to the worship Allāh alone and if they af- firm that, then inform them that Allāh has obligated upon them five prayers during the night and day. If they affirm that, then inform them that Allāh has obligated upon them the Zakāt...” 5 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) 3. We hold that the Sunnah is Revelation just as the Qur’ān is Revelation. Allāh, the Most High, said: “He (the Prophet) does not speak from his desires, rather it is not except Revelation that is sent to him.” 4. We believe that the Sunnah is whatever )صـــــــــــــــ# % عل(ـه وســـــــــــــــلم( was conveyed to the Prophet صـــــــــــــــ# % عل(ـه ( other than the Qur’ān. The Prophet Indeed I have been given the Qur’ān and that“ :)وســـــــــــــــلـم which is like it along with it.” 5. We believe that the Sunnah is whatever the Prophet (صــــــــــــــــــ# % عـــلـــ(ـــــــه وســــــــــــــــــلـــم) stated or did and whatever was done in his presence which he did not object to. The Sunnah also includes his outward de- scription and inward character. 6. We hold that the best of mankind after the Prophets and Messengers (Q) are the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad (صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم) due to his saying: “The best of mankind is my generation, then those who come after them, then those who come after them.” 7. We hold that the most excellent of these Companions is Abu Bakr As-Siddeeq, then `Umar ibn Al-Khattāb, then `U6thmān ibn `Affān, then `Alī ibn AbīTālib(ر5%عنهم),thentherestofthetenCom- 7 panions who were promised Paradise. Then those 6 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) that fought at Badr, then those who took the oath of allegiance of Ar-Ridwān at Al-Hudaibiyah under the tree, then the rest of the Muhājiroon, then the An- sār, then those who embraced Islam before the con- quest of Makkah, then those who embraced after the conquest. 8. We dissociate ourselves from the Shī’ah and we warn against them due to their nu- merous heresies such as their hatred, reviling and cursing the wives and Companions of Allāh’s Mes- senger (صــــــــ# % عل(ه وســــــــلم). The Messenger of Allāh ,said: “Do not abuse my Companions )صــ# % عل(ه وســلم( for by the One in Whose Hand is my soul, if one of you were to spend the like of the Mount of Uhud in gold, it would not equate to even a handful of one of them, and not even half.” And he (صـــــــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــــــلم) said: “The curse of Allāh is upon the one who curses my Companions.” 9. We believe that rectification of theUm- mah lies in holding fast to the Book of Allāh and the ص# % عل(ه ( authentic Sunnah of Allāh’s Messenger .upon the understanding of the Companions )وســــــــلم The Prophet (صـــــــــــــــ# % عل(ـــــه وســـــــــــــــلم) said: “I have left among you that which if you cling to it, you will never go astray: The Book of Allāh and my Sunnah.” He also said: “Hold on to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the Rightly Guided Caliphs after me.” 7 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) 10. We believe that the attainment of unity of the Muslims and the avoidance of splitting is a fun- damental commanded by Allāh and His Messenger Allāh, the Most High, stated: “And .)ص# % عل(ه وسلم( hold fast all of you together to the Rope of Allāh, and be not divided.” and He said: “Do not be like those who di- vided and differed after there had come to them the clear proofs.” 11. We believe that the legislated unity can only be achieved when all disputation and differing between Muslims is referred back to the Book and the Sunnah upon the understanding of the Compan- ions. This is due to the saying of the Most High: “If you differ in any affair between yourselves, then refer it back to Allāh and His Messenger if you truly believe in Allāh and the Last Day.” And the saying of the Messen- ger (صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم): “Whoever among you lives for long will see much differing and controversy, so upon you is to cling to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the Rightly Guided Caliphs after me. Hold on to that with your molar teeth.” 12. We believe that inviting (da’wah) to Allāh begins with the rectification of the Belief (`Aqeedah). This was the starting point of the call of all the Mes- sengers (عليهم الســـــــــــلام). And the Messenger Muham- mad (صـــــــــــــــ# % عل(ـه وســـــــــــــــلم) commanded Mu’ādh ibn Jabal (ر 56 % عنه) to begin with the belief (Tawheed) 7 8 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) when calling the people of Yemen to Islam. 13. We reject and forbid all innovations that are introduced into the Religion, whether it be in matters of belief, speech or action due to the saying of Allāh, the Most High: “This day I have perfected for you your Religion, completed my favour upon you and I am pleased with Islam as your Religion.” And the saying of the Most High: “Or have they set up partners along- side Allāh who legislate for them in the Religion that for which Allāh has given no authority.” 14. All innovations introduced into the Reli- gion are forbidden, misguided and lead to the Fire. There is no allowance in Islam for what is referred to as a good innovation (bid`ah hasanah). This is due to the saying of the Prophet (صـــ# % عل(ه وســـلم): “In- deed the worst of all affairs in Islam are the newly intro- duced matters, every newly introduced matter is bid`ah, and every bid`ah is misguidance, and every misguidance is in the Fire.” And he said: “Whoever introduces into this affair of ours that which is not from it, then it is re- jected.” 15. We believe the Qur’ān is the Speech of Allāh, not created. And whoever states that the Qur’ān is created is a disbeliever. Imām Ahmad ibn Hanbal said: “It is not created. And one should not show weakness in declaring that it is not created. Rather, the speech of Allāh is not distinct and separate from Him, and 9 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) not a single thing from it is created.” We believe that Allāh, the Most High, speaks with words, letters and a voice that is heard. And He speaks when He Wills to whom He Wills. 16. We affirm the Names and Attributes of Allāh mentioned in the Qur’ān and authentic Sun- nah. We believe that they are taken upon their ap- parent meanings and not metaphorically. We do not discuss ‘how’ (kayf) the Attributes are. We hold that to question ‘how’ the Attributes of Allāh are is an in- novation that leads to making resemblances with Allāh. And the early Salaf, such as Mālik ibn Anas .sternly forbade that )رحمه %( 17. We free our Lord, the Most High, from any likeness (tamtheel) to the Creation whilst affirming that His Attributes are real and true, just as He has stated: “There is nothing like unto Him, and He is the All- Hearing, the All-Seeing.” So, He, the Most High, ne- gated resemblance whilst affirming His Attributes of Hearing and Seeing. 18. We affirm for Allāh what He has affirmed for Himself of Names and Attributes without negat- ing (ta’teel) them or distorting (tahreef) them. He, the Most High, has said regarding His Names: “And to Al- lah belong the best names, so invoke Him by them. And leave those who practice deviation con- cerning His names. They will be recompensed for what 10 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) they have been doing.” 19. We believe in the punishment of the grave and its reward as has been reported in the authentic narrations. We believe in the questioning of the servant in the grave by the two Angels. They will question the servant regarding his Lord, his Religion and his Prophet as is reported in the authentic nar- rations. 20. We believe that there is a Bridge (As-Sirāt) erected over Hell, thinner than a strand of hair and sharper than a sword as has been reported in the au- thentic narrations and that every person will cross over it in accordance to his deeds. The righteous will cross it swiftly like lightning or a charging horse, whilst the sinners will crawl, and others will be snatched and cast into the Hellfire due to their evil deeds. Allāh, the Most High, said: “There is none of you, except that he will come to it. This is upon your Lord an inevitability decreed.” 21. We believe that Allāh, the Mighty and Ma- jestic, is above the Seven Heavens, over His Throne, separate and distinct from His Creationand He knows everything and Controls the affairs. There are over one thousand proofs from the Qur’ān and Sunnah proving the Highness (Al-`Uluw) of Allāh, as well as the Ijmā` (consensus) of the Sahābah and the Imāms of Ahlus-Sunnah from the early Salaf. 11 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018)

Whoever states that Allāh, the Most High, is in- dwelling in His creation has disbelieved. The Mes- senger (صــــــ# % عل(ه وســــــلم) said: “When you ask Allāh, ask for Al-Firdaws which is the middle of Paradise and highest part of Paradise. Above it is the Throne of the Most Merciful, and from it originate the rivers of Para- dise.” Allāh, the Most High, said: “The Most Merciful has ascended over the Throne.” And we do not delve into ‘how’. 22. We believe in the intercession (Ash- صـــــــــــ# % عل(ه ( Shafā`ah) of the Prophet Muhammad on Day of Resurrection, and for other than )وســــــــــــــلم him, for those whom Allāh has permitted from amongst the Angels, the Prophets and the believers. This is due to the saying of Allāh, the Most High:“None shall have the power of intercessionex- cept one who has received permission from the Most Mer- صـ# % ( ciful.” And due to the saying of the Prophet I am the master of the children of Adam on“ :)عل(ه وســـــــلم the Day of Resurrection. I am the first for whom the grave will be split open, the first to intercede and the first whose intercession will be accepted.” 23. We believe that seeking intercession from the Prophets and the Awliyā (pious people who have died) by supplicating to them is major shirk (poly- theism) because that is considered as worship of )صـــــــــــــــــــــــ# % عـــــــــلـــــــــ(ـــــــــه وســـــــــــــــــــــــلـــــــــم( them. The Messenger 12 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) said: “Supplication (du`ā) is worship.” And Allāh, the Most High, stated: “And invoke not beside Allāh that which will neither benefit you nor harm you, but if you do, then you will be from the wrongdoers. And if Allāh af- flictsyou with harm, none can remove it except He.” And His statement concerning those who supplicate to the deceased: “Who is more astray than the one who calls upon other than Allāh; one who will not answer him till the Day of Resurrec- tion.” And His saying: “Your Lord has said: Call upon Me and supplicate to Me and I will answer you. And those who disdain My worship, then they will be entered into the Hellfire in disgrace.” . 24. We believe in the Qadā and Qadr of Allāh, meaning that the affairs are Pre-Decreed. This en- tails belief in four matters: 1) Allāh’s knowledge over everything that has occurred, that which is to occur; and nothing escapes His knowledge. 2) Allāh commanded the Pen to write everything that was to take place until the Day of Judgement in Al-Lawh Al- Mahfoodh(The Preserved Tablet), fifty thousand years before the creation of the Heavens and the Earth. 3) Allāh Wills whatever takes place, and noth- ing takes place except by His Will. 4) Allāh created everything, good and evil, from His perfect Wisdom. 25. We hold that seeking blessings (tabarruk) from the graves, or from particular trees, or stones, 13 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018)

or rocks and so on, is shirk (polytheism). The Prophet (صـــــــــــــــــ# % عــلــ(ـــــــه وســـــــــــــــــلــم) said to those who requested that they be allotted a tree for seeking blessings: “By Him in whose Hand is my soul, you have عـــــــلـــــــ(ـــــــه ( said just as the Children of Israel said to Mūsā Make for us a god just like their gods.’ So Mūsā‘ :)الســـــــــلام said, ‘Indeed, you are a people who are ignorant.’ (Al- A’rāf: 138) You shall certainly follow the ways of those who came before you.” 26. We hold that People of Innovation (Ahlul- Bid’ah) should be boycotted and shunned because they seek to corrupt the pure Religion. Fudayl ibn Iyād (died 187H) said: “I met the best of people, all of them people of Sunnah and they used to forbid from keep- ing company with the People of Bid`ah.” 27. We hold that the one who defends, accom- modates or promotes the People of Innovation is to be counted amongst them due to the saying of the Prophet (صـــــــــــــــ# % عل(ـــه وســـــــــــــــلم): “A person is upon the Religion of his companion, so let each of you look to whom رحمه ( he takes as his companion.” And Fudayl ibn Iyād %) said: “Whoever sits with a person of Innovation, then beware of him.” 28. We hold that it is not permitted to sit and acquire knowledge from Ahlul-Bid`ah. And upon this, there is the ijmā’ (consensus) of Ahlus-Sunnah. Qādi 14 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) Abu Ya’lā (d. 333H) said: “There is a consensus amongst the Sahābah and the Tābi’een regarding dissociating and cutting-off from the Innovators.” 29. We hold it to be forbidden to look into the books, writings, websites and teachings of Ahlul- Bid’ah or listen to their lectures and classes. To delve into their teachings and writings opposes the Manhaj (Methodology) of the Salaf. Rather, it is for the Scholars and those grounded in knowledge to uncover their mistakes and to refute them. 30. We hold that the general Muslims who have been deceived by the callers to innovation should be invited to the Sunnah in a goodly manner in accordance to the saying of Allāh, the Most High: “Invite to the Path of your Lord with wisdom, good admonition and argue with them in a manner that is best.” 31. We hold that inviting to Allāh’s Reli- gion (proselytizing) is governed by Revelation (tawqīfiyyah) and its methodology is not open to opinions and personal deduction. So, we repudiate those who utilise nasheeds (songs) and music as a means to attract people to Islam. The same applies to those who make fictitious films and movies or use magic tricks and comedy as a means of da’wah (pros- elytizing). They are considered to be misguided and in opposition to the Sunnah and the way of the 15 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018)

Companions. 32. We affirm that the Believers will truly see ص# ( their Lord in the Hereafter, just as the Prophet said: “Indeed you shall see your Lord just )% عل(ه وســــــلم as you see the full moon on a cloudless night.” And it is not permitted to falsely interpret this or to set up metaphors. Rather, it is taken upon the apparent meaning in accordance to the consensus of Ahlus- Sunnah wal-Jamā’ah. Imām Al-Ājurri (d. 360H) said: “And whoever denies all of what we have mentioned and claims that Allāh will not be seen in the Hereafter has disbelieved.” 33. We hold that a person is not considered to be fromAhlus-Sunnah wal-Jamā`ahuntil he gives precedence to the Revelation over and above his in- tellect and that he abandons theological and philo- sophical rhetoric (kalām) and submits to the Pro- phetic narrations and to the understanding of the early Salaf. 34. We hold that the ruler is to be obeyed, whether he is righteous or sinful. And rebellion against the tyrannical Muslim ruler is forbidden, even if his character is like that of a devil, even if he does not practice the Sunnah, and he beats the backs of the people, imprisons them and takes their wealth. This agrees with the statement of the Prophet (صــــ# % عل(ه وســــلم): “You will have rulers over 16 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) you, and they will not follow my Sunnah, nor follow my guidance. There will be amongst them people who will have the hearts of devils in the bodies of men.” Hudhai- fah (ر 56 % عـنـــــــه) asked: “O Messenger of Allāh! What should I do if I 7reach that time?” He replied: “Hear and obey the ruler, even if he beats your back and takes your wealth. Hear and obey him!” (Muslim) 35. We hold that one is obligated to be patient صـــــ# ( with the tyrannical ruler, just as the Prophet said: “If one of you sees something from )% عل(ه وســــــــــــلم your ruler that displeases you, then be patient.” (Bu- khāri) 36. We believe that it is forbidden to pub- licly rebuke the Rulers as that is the way of the mis- )صـــــــــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــــــــلم( guided Khawārij. The Prophet said: “Whoever desires to advise the Ruler, then he is not do so publicly! Rather, he should take him by his hand and take him into seclusion. So, if he accepts the advice, that is good, and if not, then he has fulfilled his duty” (Ahmad 15369, Ibn Abī ‘Āsim 1098) 37. We hold that those who rebel against the tyrannical rulers are from the Khawārij and Ahlul- Bid’ah, and they are not Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamā’ah. The Prophet (صـــــــــــــــ# % عـلـ(ـــــــه وســـــــــــــــلـم) said regarding them: “There will appear a people, and they will recite the Qur’ān, but it will not go beyond their collar bones. They 17 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) will exit the Religion, just as an arrow goes through its tar- get.” The Sahābah agreed that this narration refers to the Khawārij. 38. We do not declare a Muslim to be an unbe- liever or an apostate due to a major sin so long as his sin does not reach the level of shirk or kufr. Allāh, the Most High, stated: “Indeed Allāh does not forgive that partners be associated with Him in worship, but He for- gives lesser than that to whomever He pleases.” Those who declare Muslims to be unbelievers based upon major sins are the Khawārij. 39. We hold that a fornicator, a thief, a mur- derer, a drunkard, a gambler, etc. is under the threat of Allāh’s punishment and under His Will. He is not considered to be an unbeliever, even if he commits all of these sins unless he considers them to be per- missible (istihlāl). This is just as Ibn Taymiyyah (died 728H), Ibn Abdul-Wahhāb (died 1207H) and Ibn Bāz (may Allah’s mercy be upon them all) have stated as the consensus of Ahlus-Sunnah. The Khawārij oppose this and declare the major sinners from Muslims to be unbelievers, focusing particularly upon the sinful Rulers. 40. We hold that Kufr can be minor (asghar), which does not exit a person from Islam - and it can be major (akbar), which exits a person from Islam. Likewise, shirk can be minor (asghar), which does not 18 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018)

exit a person from Islam - and it can be major (ak- bar), which exits a person from Islam. 41. We hold to the statement of Ibn Taymiyyah (Al-Fatāwa 7/312): “It was from the saying of the Salaf that ‘a person can possess both imān and hy- pocrisy (nifāq).’ Likewise, their saying that ‘a person can possessbothimānandkufr.’And that is not thekufrthat exits6 from the Religion, just as Ibn regarding the saying of Allāh, the Most High, ‘And whoever does not judge by what Allāh has revealed, then they are the unbelievers.’ So, they would say: “They disbelieved with a kufr that did not exit them from the Religion.” And they were followed in that under- standing by Imām Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and other than him from the imāms of the Sunnah.” 42. We do not declare the Muslim rulers to be unbelievers if they judge by other than what Allāh has revealed unless they proclaim that to be halāl, )رحــــــــــــمــــــــــــه %( just as Imām Abdul-Azeez Ibn Bāz stated: “If he judges by other than what Allah has re- vealed making that permissible (halāl), then he has disbe- lieved . But when he does so to please his people, or other than that, then it is kufr lesser than [ma- ‘Abbās (ر5 % عنهما) and his companions have said 7 jor] kufr, that does not exit him from Islam.” This agrees with the saying of Ibn ‘Abbās (ر 56 % عنهمــــــا) men- tioned in the previous point. 19 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) 7 43. We believe that this Ummah, the Muslims, will divide into numerous sects, just as the Prophet said: “This Ummah will divide into )صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم( seventy-three sects. All of them will end up in the Hellfire except for one.” The Companions asked him: “Which is that one sect, O Messenger of Allah?” He replied: “That which I and my Companions are upon to- day.”Thesectwhich holds fast to the wayof the Messenger6 (صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم) and his Companions and they are called: Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamā’ah; Ahlul- Hadeeth; the Salafis; al-Jamā’ah; at-Tā’ifat al-Mansoorah (The Aided Group); al-Firqat an-Nājiyah (The Saved Sect); as-Suwād al-A’dham (The Main Body); and they are the Ghurabā (The Strangers). All of these titles refer to one group of people. 44. We hold that not every claimant to the Sun- nah is truly upon the Sunnah - and a person is judged upon that which is apparent from him, de- spite his claim. There are many who claim to be upon the Sunnah, yet they flagrantly oppose the fundamentals of the Sunnah. So no attention is paid to such claims. 45. We hold that the sinners ofAhlus-Sun- nah are better than the worshippers of Ahlul-Bid’ah because innovations are worse than sin. Imām Ah- mad ibn Hanbal (died 241H) said: “The graves of the will be saved, and that is only one sect )ر5 % عنهم( 7 20 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) major sinners of ahlus-Sunnah are gardens . And the graves of the abstemious (zuhād) of ahlul-Bidah are pits . The sinners (fussāq) of ahlus-Sunnah are the friends of Allāh and the abstemious (zuhād) of ahlul- Bid’ah are the enemies of Allāh.” So, their outward dis- plays of piety and abstinence do not benefit them whilst they follow innovated beliefs. 46. We hold that Imān (Faith) is speech and ac- tion, it increases and decreases. This means: Imān is speech of the heart which is knowledge and affir- mation in the heart of the ‘aqeedah and other aspects of the religion. Imān is actions of the heart such as love, hope and fear. Imān is speech of the tongue such as the utterance of the testimony (shahādatain), recital of the Qur’ān, mentioning the praise of Allah, and glorifying Him with Dhikr. Imān is the action of the limbs such as the Prayer, Fasting, Zakāh, Hajj, Ji- hād and obedience to parents. Ahlus-Sunnah be- lieve that Imān increases with obedience to Allāh and it decreases with disobedience to Allāh. Imām Al-Barbahāri (% رحمه) said, “Whoever says, ‘Imān is speech and action, it increases and decreases.’ He has exited from irjā’, its beginning and its end.” 47. In the understanding and definition of Imān, both the Murji’ah and the Khawārij went astray. The Murji’ah hold that Imān does not include 21 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) actions and it does not increase or decrease. The Khawārij hold that major sins and the abandonment of the obligations do not decrease one’s imān, ra- ther, major sins invalidate one’s imān altogether. Both of these sects are astray. 48. We hold that demonstrations, street pro- tests and ‘sit-ins’ anywhere in the world are against the guidelines of the Islamic Sharī’ah. They are not from the Sunnah and are not from the legislated means for the rectification of the Ummah. Rather, they lead to chaos and disorder in society; and are considered as Khurooj (rebellion) against those in authority. There is not from Sahābah any proof that allows demonstrations, sit-ins and protests (even if they are peaceful). 49. We hold that there is no obedience to any of the creation in disobedience to Allāh, as has .)ص# % عل(ه وسلم( been reported from the Prophet 50. We hold that if the Ruler commands the subjects to disobey Allāh, then the ruler is not to be obeyed in that, just as the father who commands his children to disobey Allāh, then, he must not be obeyed in that. However, the duty of overall obedi- ence and allegiance to the Ruler must not be re- moved; he is obeyed in that which is good and diso- beyed when he commands with sin. But he is not re- belled against due to his sin. 22 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) 51. We hold that the Muslim ruler is not to be rebelled against if he commits an act of Kufr or Shirk unless the scholars of Salafiyyah declare him to be an unbeliever using the principles of the Sharī’ah; and they see that the people have the ability to re- move and replace him with one who is better than him — and that they know that his removal will not involve bloodshed and killing that will lead to a greater evil than leaving him power. So, if the out- come of rising up against an unbelieving ruler will lead to greater harm, then rebellion against him is prohibited. This is an affair well-known from the mighty principles of the Sharī’ah as explained by Ibn Taymiyyah and others. 52. We hold that the blood of Muslim is forbid- den to spill. His blood, wealth, property and honour are inviolable. The one who violates these rights is sinful and threatened with the severe punishment of Allāh. 53. We hold that a non-Muslim isnotto be killed just as a Muslim is not to be killed unjustly. The non-Muslims in the Muslim lands are protected by covenants and agreements by the Muslim gov- ernments. The Prophet (صـ# % عل(ه وسـلم): “Whoever kills a non-Muslim under a covenant will not smell the scent of Paradise.” 54. We hold that modern-day insurgencies are 23 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) an innovation of the wicked Khawārij and Shī’ah who wish to create anarchy in the Muslim lands out of which they hope to gain authority. 55. We hold that acts of terrorism are com- pletely contrary to the teachings of Islam, whether they are perpetrated in the Muslim lands or in non- Muslim lands. There is no evidence from the Qur’ān and Sunnah and nor from the Salaf As-Sālih that permits such mindless and indiscriminate acts of vi- olence. 56. We hold that offensive Jihād is to be per- formed only behind a Muslim ruler who holds the reins of power and governance over his country and commands his army. It is not from Jihād to set up terrorist cells and detonate explosives amongst the people, whether that be in Muslim or non-Muslim societies. Such people are not considered to be Mu- jāhideen in Islam, rather, they are major sinners upon the wicked beliefs and innovations of the Khawārij and Shī’ah. 57. We hold that it is a form of Jihād for a Mus- lim to defend his life, family and property from en- emy attack and in this situation, it is not necessary to seek the permission of the ruler. That is because the nature of such acts of aggression do not afford a person time to send a message to the authorities. However, if the ruler of the country or those 24 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018)

appointed by him command him to cease fighting, he must cease. 58. We hold that in times of crisis when calam- ities strike the Muslims and when the question of Ji- hād arises, the Muslims must refer back to the sen- ior scholars of Salafiyyah for answers and Fatāwa and not to the inexperienced sheikhs or students of knowledge. And the Fatāwa of the of Ahlul-Bid’ah are not given consideration. 59. We believe that suicide attacks carried out by the terrorists have no basis in the Sharī'ah. There )صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم( is no evidence that the Prophet sanctioned such acts of killing oneself with one's own hands. 60. We hold it to be impermissible to target and attack civilians (non-combatants), especially women and children during any conflict. 61. We hold that it is correct that the Khawārij insurgents be fought and routed if they wreak havoc in the land, and the authorities should be aided in )صــــــــــ# % عل(ه وســــــــــلم( combatting them. The Prophet said regarding them, “I would slaughter them with the slaughtering of the people of Aad.” Ibn Taymiyyah cited the consensus of Ahlus-Sunnah proving the permis- sibility of fighting the insurgents (Khawārij). 62. We hold that the People of the Book, the 25 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) Jews and Christians, have a special station in Islam due to what has been revealed to them of scripture ص# ( before the sending of the Prophet Muhammad Allāh has permitted the Muslims to .)% عل(ه وســـــــــــــلم eat their slaughtered meat and to marry their chaste women. However, alongside this, they are still con- sidered to be unbelievers in Allāh, His Book and His Messenger. So, they should be invited to Islam, and to worship the One True Lord, the Lord of all the Prophets, and He is Allāh, the sole God (al-Ilāh) wor- thy of worship, to the exclusion of all else. 63. We hold that it is forbidden to transgress against the rights of the non-Muslims, or to be un- just towards them, for indeed Allāh has forbidden injustice in every situation. 64. We believethat the sinful Muslims who worshipped Allāh alone will be removed from the Hellfire after they are punished in it. And no Muwah- hid (Monotheist) Muslim will remain in Hell forever, even if he committed many major sins. 65. We believe that mankind will stand before their Lord on the Day of Resurrection. They will be barefoot, naked, uncircumcised and the Sun will be drawn close to the distance of a mile. Then the Mes- senger (صـ# % عل(ه وسـلم) will intercede on behalf of the creation with his Lord for the Judgement to begin. This intercession is specific for the Messenger 26 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) .)ص# % عل(ه وسلم( Muhammad 66. We believe in the Balance of Scales (Mizān) that will set up on the Day of Resurrection, wherein the good and evil deeds will be weighed, just as Allāh stated: “So those whose scales are heavy, it is they who will be successful.” and He, the Most High, said: “And those whose scales are light, those are the ones who have lost their souls...” 67. We believe in the Lake (Hawd) of the Prophet (صـــــ# % عل(ه وســـــلم) on the Day of Resurrec- tion. Its water is whiter than milk and sweeter than honey. Its vessels are more numerous than the stars in the sky. Whoever drinks from it will never be thirsty again. This is for the Ummah of Muhammad and every Prophet will have his ,)صـــــ# % عل(ه وســـــلم( Hawd. This Ummah will race towards the Hawd of the Messenger (صــــــ# % عل(ه وســــــلم) and ahlul-Bid’ah will be pushed back due to what they innovated into the Religion such as the Khawārij, the Shī’ah, the Jahmiyyah, the Mu’tazilah, the Sufis and the Ashā’irah. 68. We believe that Hellfire and Paradise have already been created and in existence, and they will never cease to be in existence. This belief is opposed by the Mu’tazilah sect. 69. We believe in the appearance of the Mahdi 27 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) from the progeny of the Messenger Muhammad He will rule over the Muslims .)صـــــــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــــــلم( before the appearance of the Dajjāl (the Anti-Christ) عــــــــلــــــــ(ــــــــه ,and the descent of ‘Īsā ibn Maryam (Jesus .)السلام 70. We believe in the appearance of the Dajjāl (the Anti-Christ) after the Muslims conquer Con- stantinople. He is a human, the one-eyed liar, who will call the people to worship him. He will be given powers with which he will deceive the people and call them to obey and worship him. He is a great tribulation upon mankind and will wreak havoc for forty days: the first day will last a year, the second will last a month, the third will last a week, and the remaining thirty-seven days will be normal. He is from the signs of the Hour. All the Prophets of Allah warned against him and the Prophet Muham- mad (صـ# % عل(ه وسـلم) commanded the believers to seek refuge from him and not to approach him when he appears. 71. We believe in the descent of ‘Īsā ibn Mar- yam (عل(ـه الســـــــــــــــلام). He will descend, with his hands placed on the wings of two Angels, to the white min- aret in the east of Damascus whilst the Mahdi is leading the Muslims in prayer. He will kill the Dajjāl and rule the earth with justice and peace. When he dies, the Muslims will pray the funeral (Janāzah) 28 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) )عل(ه السلام( prayer for him. It is during the life of ‘Īsā that Gog and Magog will emerge and wreak havoc. ‘Īsā (عل(ه السلام) and believers will supplicate to Allāh and He will destroy them and cleanse the Earth. 72. We believe that the doors of repentance are open for a person so long as the soul is not removed from his body and the Sun has not risen from the West (as that is from the Major Signs of the Last Hour). صــــــــــ# % عل(ه ( We believe that Muhammad .73 is the final Messenger, after whom there is no )وسـلم new Messenger and no new revelation. ‘Īsā Ibn Mar- yam (عل(ه السلام) will judge by the Qur’ān and Sunnah upon his return. 74. We reject the false interpretations and dis- tortions of the Attributes of Allāh by the Ash’aris and Mātureedis who falsely claim that they are from ahlus-Sunnah. Rather, they are ahlul-Bid`ah, from the misguided sects. They are from the subsects of the Jahmiyyah who negate the Attributes of Allāh through rejection and false interpretation. 75. We reject the hizbiyyah (partisanship) of the modern-day sects who have created further seg- regation within the ranks of the Muslims, each party seeks allegiance to itself in contradiction to the Book and Sunnah. So, we warn against these 29 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) groupings such as Jamā’at At-Tableegh (founded in India in the 1920’s), Al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimoon (founded in Egypt in the 1920’s),Hizbut-Tahreer and the other sects of recent times. These sects are no different in their deviations from the sects of old. They are Ahlul-Bid’ah and it is forbidden to join them or to aid them in their proselytising. 76. We reject the fanaticism which is labelled deceptively as taqleed by the blind-followers of the four well-known Madhhabs. The noble Imāms, Abu Haneefah, Mālik, Ash-Shāfi’ee and Ahmad ibn Han- bal (% رحمهم) did not intend or command that the Sunnah be abandoned in favour of their opinions or Madhhabs. Furthermore, the Madhhabs are used as a means to conceal numerous deviations that the founding Imāms were never upon. Many adherents oftheseMadhhabs engage in grave worship and seeking aid from the inhabitants of the graves and they follow the Ash’ari or Mātureedi creed. All of this opposes the Book and Sunnah and the Madh- hab of the Salaf. 77. We call to honouring and respecting the scholars of Ahlus-Sunnah. Love of them is a distin- guishing sign of Ahlus-Sunnah, and hatred of them is a distinguishing sign of Ahlul-Bid’ah. If a Scholar of Sunnah errs in his ijtihād, he attains one reward, and if he is correct, he attains two rewards. 30 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) 78. We do not venerate or praise the scholars of the innovators. Rather, we warn against them and we do not mention their good deeds. To mention their good along with their innovations with the claim of establishing justice for them is an innova- ص# % عل(ه ( tion (called al-mawāzanah). The Prophet said: “What I fear for you most are the leaders of )وســـــــلم misguidance.” And he (صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم) said about the 72 sects of misguidance, “They are all in Hell.” And he (صـــــــــــــــــ# % عــلـــ(ـــــــه وســـــــــــــــــلـــم) said about the paths of divergence of Ahlul-Bid’ah, “At the head of each path is a devil that calls to it.” So, he (صـــ# % عل(ه وســـلم) did not praise their good deeds nor did he mention them. 79. We hold that if a Scholar ofahlus-Sun- nah errs, then his error is corrected, and his honour is preserved. If his error opposes the foundational principles of the Religion and the `aqeedah, then the Scholars correct his errors and advise him. If he persists stubbornly in his inno- vation, then the Scholars will declare him to be an innovator and warn against him. 80. We believe as Imām al-Barbahāri stated: “One does not bear witness for anyone due to a good or bad deed, for you do not know what his final deed will be before his death. So, hope for him the mercy of Allāh and fear for 31 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) him . You do not know what has been des- tined for him at the time of death from feelings of regret before Allāh, and what Allāh has ordained for him at that time if he was to die upon Islam. So, hope for him Allāh’s Mercy and fear for him due to his sins. And there is no sin except that there is for the servant repentance from it.” 81. We believe that the pious believers(the ‘Awliyā of Allāh) are not deserving of anything from the rights of worship. One may not seek from the deceased anything, for they themselves are in need of the supplications of the living and in need of the Mercy of Allāh. 82. Anyone who requests from the deceased pious believers help, intercession, assistance, res- cue, increase in sustenance, repelling of harm and so on has committed shirk (polytheism). 83. To request from a pious believer who is alive that he supplicate to Allāh for one who is in need is permissible and legislated. The Companions would ask the Prophet (صـــــــــــــــــــ# % عــــلــــ(ـــــــه وســـــــــــــــــــلــــم) to supplicate for them whilst he was alive, but they did not ever seek his supplication after his death. 84. We believe that the wives of the Prophet (peace be upon him) are the mothers of the believ- ers, they are pure and pious, and every Muslim is ob- ligated to love them as our mothers. 32 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018) 85. We remain silent concerning whatever tribulation occurred between the Companions after )صــــــــــ# % عل(ه وســــــــــلم( the death of Allāh’s Messenger since they were Mujtahidoon (people of knowledge who strived to attain the truth). Whoever was cor- rect amongst them is rewarded with two rewards and whoever was mistaken is rewarded with one re- ward. And Allāh has already stated: “Allāh is pleased with them and they are pleased with him.” 86. We hold it that it is not permitted to ascribe to the Companions that they are innovators or sin- ners. Whoever does so has opposed the Messenger of Allāh (صـــــــ# % عل(ه وســـــــلم) in his saying: “When my Companions are mentioned, withhold.” Those who as- cribe deviation to the Companions are astray and among Ahlul-Bid’ah. 87. We hold that it is permitted to warn against the innovators by name, and that is not considered blameworthy backbiting by the consensus of ahlus- Sunnah and ahlul-Hadeeth. We see that the books of the Scholars of theSalaf of thisUmmahcontain plentiful rebuke against the people of misguidance, the weak narrators and the fabricators of hadeeth by name. 88. We hold that it is forbidden to revile and rebuke the tyrannical ruler, but it is permitted to re- buke and warn against the callers to innovation and 33 |abukhadeejah.com(Copyright2018) misguidance.Zā’idah ibn Qudāmah said: I asked Mansoor ibn Mu’tamir, “Can I revile the ruler whilst I am fasting?” He replied, “No.” I then asked, “Then can I revile the People of Desires and Innovation?” He re- plied, “Yes.” 89. We believe that this Ummah will be recti- fied by way of purification (Tasfiyah) and cultivation (Tarbiyah). Purification from false and alien beliefs and practices that have crept into the Religion over the centuries. Cultivation of the next generation upon the sound Belief, Methodology and practice of the Religion based upon the Qur’ān, the authentic Sunnah and the understanding of the early Salaf. The rectification of the Ummah is not possible ex- cept upon this basis, just as Imām Mālik ibn Anas (died 179H) said: “The latter part of the Ummah will not be rectified except by that which rectified its first part.” And all praise is due to Allāh, Lord of the worlds. May the peace, blessings and salutations of Allāh be upon our noble Messenger, Muhammad, and upon his family, his Companions and his true followers. Written by Abu Khadeejah ‘Abdul-Wāhid 34 |abukhadeejah.com(copyright2018)

Etymology

Salafis consider the hadith that quotes Muhammad saying, "The best of my community are my generation, the ones who follow them and the ones who follow them." as a call to Muslims to follow the example of those first three generations, known collectively as the salaf, or "pious Predecessors" (Template:Lang-ar). The salaf are believed to include Muhammad himself, the "Companions" (Sahabah), the "Followers" (Tabi'un), and the "Followers of the Followers" (Tabi' al-Tabi'in). Historically, the term Salafi as a proper noun and adjective had been used during the classical era to refer to the theological school of the early Ahl al-Hadith movement. The treatises of the medieval proto-Salafist theologian Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328 C.E/ 728 A.H), which played the most significant role in formalizing the creedal, social and political positions of Ahl al-Hadith; constitute the most widely referred classical works in Salafi seminaries.

Tenets

According to Bernard Haykel, "temporal proximity to the Prophet Muhammad is associated with the truest form of Islam" among many Sunni Muslims. Salafis are first and foremost religious and social reformers engaged in creating and reproducing particular forms of authority and identity, both personal and communal. They define reformist project first and foremost through creedal tenets (i.e., a theology). Also important in its manhaj (Arabic: منهج i.e. Methodology) are certain legal teachings as well as forms of sociability and politics.

The Salafi da'wa is a methodology, but it is not a madhhab (school) in fiqh (jurisprudence) as is commonly misunderstood. Salafis can come from the Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali, Hanafi or Zahirite law schools of Sunni Fiqh. In theology, Salafis are highly influenced by Hanbali doctrines. The followers of Salafi school identify themselves as Ahlul Sunna wal Jama'ah and are also known as Ahl al-Hadith. The Salafiyya movement champions this early Sunni school of thought, also known as traditionalist theology.

Salafis place great emphasis on practicing actions in accordance with the known sunnah, not only in prayer but in every activity in daily life. For instance, many are careful always to use three fingers when eating, to drink water in three pauses, and to hold it with the right hand while sitting. The main doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya's school, also referred by various academics as "al-Salafiyyah al-Tarikhiyah" (trans: "Historical Salafism") consist of:

• revival of "the authentic beliefs and practices" of Salaf al-Salih
• "upholding tawhid (oneness of God)"
• rejection of partisanship towards madh'habs
• literalist adherence to religious scriptures
• loyalty to Islamic rulers who ruled by Sharia (Islamic law)
• objection to bid'ah and heresies

Views on Taqlid (adherence to legal precedent)

The Salafi thought seeks the re-orientation of Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) away from Taqlid (adherence to the legal precedent of a particular Madhhab) and directly back to the Prophet, his Companions and the Salaf. This preferred return to the pure way of the Prophet is termed "Ittiba" (following the Prophet by directly referring to the Scriptures). In legal approach, Salafis are divided between those who, in the name of independent legal judgement (ijtihad), reject strict adherence (taqlid) to the four schools of law (madhahib) and others who remain faithful to these.

Although Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792 C.E/ 1206 A.H) had personally rejected the practice of Taqlid, Wahhabi scholars favoured following the Hanbali madhhab and generally permit Taqlid in following Fatwas (juristic legal opinions) and encourages following the madhhabs. While they doctrinally condemned Taqlid and advocated Ijtihad, historically the Wahhabi legal practice was grounded mostly within the confines of Hanbali school, until recently. The doctrinal rejection of Taqlid by Wahhabis would lead to subsequent emergence of prominent Wahhabi ulema such as Sa'd ibn 'Atiq, Abd Ar-rahman Ibn Nasar As Sa'adi, Ibn 'Uthaymin, Ibn Baz, etc.; who would depart significantly from Hanbali law.

Other Salafi movements, however, believe that taqlid is unlawful and challenge the authority of the legal schools. In their perspective, since the madhhabs emerged after the era of Salaf al-Salih (pious predecessors); those Muslims who follow a madhhab without directly searching for Scriptural evidences would get deviated. These include the scholars of Ahl-i Hadith movement, Muhammad Nasir Al-Din al-Albani (d. 2000), Muḥammad Ḥayāt al-Sindhī (d. 1163), Ibn 'Amir al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 1182), al-Shawkānī (d. 1250), etc.; who completely condemn taqlid (imitation), rejecting the authority of the legal schools, and oblige Muslims to seek religious rulings (fatwa) issued by scholars exclusively based on the Qur’an and Hadith; with no intermediary involved. The Ahl-i Hadith ulema would distinguish themselves from the Wahhabis who followed the Hanbali school while they considered themselves as following no particular school. In contemporary era, Albani and his disciples, in particular, would directly criticise Wahhabis on the issue of Taqlid due to their affinity towards the Hanbali school and called for a re-generated Wahhabism purified of elements contrary to doctrines of the Salaf.

Other Salafi scholars like Sayyid Rashid Rida (d. 1935) follow a middle course, allowing the layperson to do Taqlid only when necessary, obliging him to do Ittiba when the Scriptural evidences become known to him. Their legal methodology rejects partisanship to the treatises of any particular schools of law, and refer to the books of all madhhabs. Following Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim, these scholars accept the rich literary heritage of Sunni Fiqh and consider the literature of the four Sunni law-schools as beneficial resources to issue rulings for the contemporary era. At the far end of the spectrum, some Salafis hold that adhering to taqlid is an act of shirk (polytheism).

Contemporary Salafis generally discard the practice of adhering to the established rulings of any particular Madhhab, condemning the principle of Taqlid (blind imitation) as a bid'ah (innovation) and are significantly influenced by the legal principles of the Zahirite school, historically associated with anti-madhhab doctrines that opposed the canonization of legal schools. Early Zahirite scholar Ibn Hazm's condemnation of Taqlid and calls to break free from the interpretive system of the canonized schools by espousing a Fiqh directly grounded on Qura'n and Hadith; have conferred a major impact on the Salafiyya movement. Salafi legalism is most often marked by its departure from the established rulings (mu'tamad) of the four Sunni madhahib, as well as frequently aligning with Zahirite views mentioned by Ibn Hazm in his legal compendium Al-Muhalla.

Scholarly hierarchy

Bernard Haykel notes that due to the peculiarity of its methodology, Salafis enjoy a relatively less rigid scholarly hierarchy of authorities (ulema). Most Salafis unlike other traditional and pre-modern Muslims do not subscribe to a hierarchy that rigorously "constrains and regulates... the output of opinions". As an interpretive community, Salafi tradition, "in contrast to other Muslim traditions of learning", is "relatively open, even democratic".

Differences from Kalam theology

Methodology and hermeneutics

Contemporary proponents of the Athari school of theology largely come from the Salafi movement; they uphold the Athari works of Ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taimiyya himself, a disputed and partly rejected scholar during his lifetime, became a major scholar among followers of the Salafi movement credited with the title Shaikh al-Islam. Other important figures include major scholars important in Islamic history, such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal. While proponents of Kalam revere early generations of Salaf al-Salih, viewing Muhammad and the Sahaba as exemplar role models in religious life, they emulate them through the lens of the classical traditions of the madhahib and its religious clergy. On the other hand, Salafis attempt to follow the Salaf al-Salih through recorded scriptural evidences, often bypassing the classical manuals of madhahib. Nonetheless, both Salafis and Mutakallimun empasize the significance of the Salaf in the Sunni tradition.

Salafi Muslims consider Qur'an and Sunnah (which they equate with the Kutub al-Sittah) as the only valid authoritative source for Islam. While Salafis believe that investigation of novel issues should be understood from the Scriptures in consideration of the context of modern era, they oppose rationalist interpretations of Scriptures. In addition to limiting the usage of logic with regards to textual interpretations, Salafi scholars also reduce the importance given to medieval legal manuals and texts, giving more priority to the texts from the early generations of the Salaf. Salafis favor practical implementation as opposed to disputes with regards to meanings, meaning may be considered either clear or something beyond human understanding. As adherents of Athari theology, Salafis believe that engagement in speculative theology (kalam) is absolutely forbidden. Atharis engage in strictly literal and amodal reading of the Qur'an and hadith (prophetic traditions) and only their clear or apparent meanings have the sole authority in creedal affairs. As opposed to one engaged in Ta'wil (metaphorical interpretation), they do not attempt to conceptualize the meanings of the Qur'an rationally; and believe that the real meanings should be consigned to God alone (tafwid). Following the Salafi hermeneutic approach, Salafis differ from that of non-Salafis in some regards of permissibility.

Ibn Taymiyya was known for making scholarly refutations of religious groups such as the Sufis, Jahmites, Asha'rites, Shias, Falsafa etc., through his numerous treatises. Explaining the theological approach of "Salafiyya", Ibn Taymiyya states in a fatwa:

"The way of the Salaf is to interpret literally the Koranic verses and hadiths that relate to the Divine attributes , and without attributing to Him anthropomorphic qualities ."

— Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyah, Al-Fatawa al-Kubra (Great Religious Edicts), vol. 5, p. 152,

Metaphysics

Tawhid is a central tenet of Islam. However, Salafism differs with Kalam - and Sufi metaphysics in regard to its doctrines. The stances of these schools on tawhid and shirk could be starkly different, to such an extent that some of its respective followers may consider each other as falling into shirk. An extremist minority of Ash'arite and Maturidite theologians pronounce Takfir on Salafi Muslims, accusing them of committing shirk and of deifying "an object at the sky". For most traditional scholars tawhid is sufficiently affirmed by passing the questions of Munkar and Nakir; which is accepting Allah as the only Lord, Muhammad as his messenger, and that one follows islam.

Like all Muslims, Salafis believe that tawhid includes the shahada (Islamic testimony of faith). In addition to this, Salafi theologians classify Tawhid into tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya ("Unity of Divinity": "belief that only God may be worshipped") and tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya ("Unity of Lordship": "belief that there is only one Lord and Creator"). Salafis believe that Allah is the only deity worthy of worship, and condemn objects deified through religious veneration as false idols. Certain beliefs and practices related to the seeking of intercession and solicitation from prophets, saints, dead ancestors, etc. are thus considered by Salafis as idolatry. With regards to religious matters, Salafis only accept religious evidence from sacred scriptures. This methodology is also used for arbitrating differences with other Muslim sects.

Salafis believe that Allah is the sole legislator and regard the man-made principles of secular systems as an additional violation of tawhid. Proto-Salafist theologian Ibn Taymiyya stressed throughout his numerous treatises that Muslim rulers are obliged to rule by Sharia (Islamic law), in consultation with the ulema (Islamic scholars). Ibn Taymiyya asserted that only Allah was worthy of worship, and that Muslims have to worship Allah by strictly abiding by the Sharia. He further emphasized that Muslims had no obedience towards those rulers who abandoned Sharia and ruled by man-made legal systems.

Sufi theologicans like ibn Arabi advocated the doctrine that tawhid means to realize nothing exists except God, by conjecturing that everything must have been in the mind of God when creating the world, if God is the creator of everything. Other Sufis claimed that various saints acquired "divine consciousness" and hidden knowledge of the universe. In Western thought systems, this is rather known as monism than monotheism.

Angels, spirits, jinn, and devil(s)

Certain beliefs and folk practices in various regional localities are condemned as idolatry by followers of Salafism. Followers of the Salafi movement regard a number of practises related to beseeching help from the spirits of Awliya (saints) as bid'ah and shirk. Additionally, there are variations between established local beliefs concerning spirits and jinn and interpretations of such entities by Salafis. A range of beliefs about spirits and angels present in tales from various classical Muslim texts are rejected by Salafi reformists, who refer to quotes from the Qur'an and hadith, to bolster their creedal arguments.

Sunni Hadith literature espouses belief in the existence of various supernatural beings, such as jinn, demons, etc. which are affirmed by all Muslims, including Salafis. Various non-Salafi Muslims believe that various devils ("shayatin") and jinns are capable of entering the private spaces and bodies of humans; and affect the ritual purity of Muslims. While Salafis assert that devils are capable of possessing human beings, certain Salafi scholars downplay the role of Shayatin in the context of ritual purification; and emphasize that it is Iblis itself who plays a harmful role by inflicting "waswas" (evil whisperings) on human minds. According to various Sufi perspectives, a set of devils (shayatin) are linked to sinful activities performing psychological functions, and in various desacralized places. Salafi scholars assert that Iblis is constantly attempting to endanger human beings at all times through waswas and various forms of temptations. Various dhikr prescribed in religious scriptures, including the Basmala, are recommended by Salafi scholars to Muslim laymen for recital, to ward off dangers from Satanic temptations.

While the degree and possibility of fallen angels is debated in Islam, many Salafis largely reject such debates and tend to reject the concept of fallen angels altogether. While rejection of fallen angels can be traced back since Hasan al-Basri, it is not universally accepted and other scholars, such as Tabari, have accepted that Iblis was originally an angel, The latter opinion is shared by early modernist Salafis (Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida) who argued that the term jinn includes angels as well, and that Iblis was one of them. Contrary, most traditionalist Salafis believe that Iblis was originally a Jinn. This was also the stance of Ibn Taymiyya and his pupil Ibn Kathir. As evident from Turkish Sufi texts, Iblis is alternatively portrayed as neither from Jinn nor from the Angels, describing it as a created being originally known as "Azāzīl".

Teachings of Ibn Taymiyya

The followers of the Salafiyya school look to the medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah as the most significant classical scholarly authority in theology and spirituality. Ibn Taymiyya's theological treatises form the core doctrinal texts of Wahhabi, Ahl-i Hadith and various other Salafi movements. According to the monotheistic doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya, Tawhid is categorised into three types: At-tawḥīd ar-rubūbiyya (Oneness in Lordship), At-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya (Oneness in Worship) and At-tawhid al-assmaa was-sifaat (Oneness in names and attributes). Ibn Taymiyya's interpretation of the Shahada (Islamic testimony) as the testimony to worship God alone "only by means of what He has legislated", without partners, is adopted by the Salafis as the foundation of their faith. In the contemporary era, Ibn Taymiyya's writings on theology and innovated practices have inspired Salafi movements of diverse kinds. The increased prominence of these movements in the twentieth century has led to a resurgence in interest of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya far beyond traditional Salafi circles. Salafis commonly refer to Ibn Taymiyya by the title Shaykh al-Islām. Alongside Ibn Taymiyya, his disciples Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ibn Kathir, Al-Dhahabi, etc. constitute the most referenced classical scholarship in Salafi circles.

The scholarly works of Ibn Taymiyya, which advocate Traditionalist Creedal positions and intensely critique other theological schools, embody the theology of the Salafiyya school. Ibn Taymiyya also cited a scholarly consensus (Ijma), on the permissibility of ascribing ones self to the beliefs of the Salaf, stating:

"There is no shame in declaring oneself to be a follower of the salaf, belonging to it and feeling proud of it; rather that must be accepted from him, according to scholarly consensus. The madhhab of the salaf cannot be anything but true. If a person adheres to it inwardly and outwardly, then he is like the believer who is following truth inwardly and outwardly."

History

Historians and academics date the emergence of Salafiyya movement to the late 19th-century Arab world, an era when European colonial powers were dominant. Notable leaders of the movement included Jamal al-Din Qasimi (1866–1914), 'Abd al-Razzaq al Bitar (1837–1917), Tahir al-Jazai'iri (1852–1920) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935). Until the First World War, religious missions of the Salafi call in the Arab East had operated secretively. Following the First World War, the Salafi ideas were spread and established among the intelligentsia. Politically oriented scholars like Rashid Rida had also emphasized the necessity to establish an Islamic state that implements Sharia (Islamic law) and thus laid the intellectual foundations for a more conservative strand of Salafiyya, which would also influence the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The usage of the term "Salafiyya" to denote a theological reform movement based on the teachings of the Salaf al-Salih; was popularised by the Syrian disciples of Tahir al-Jaza'iri who were active in Egypt during the 1900s. They opened the famous "al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya" ("The Salafi Bookshop") in Cairo in 1909. Rashid Rida co-operated with the owners of the library starting from 1912 and together published classical works, Hanbali treatises, pro-Wahhabi pamphlets, etc. as well as numerous articles through their official journal "Al-Majalla al-Salafiyya". The immense popularity of the term at the time caused the Catholic Orientalist scholar Louis Massignon to mistakenly associate the label with Jamal al-Din Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, which became the standard practice for Western scholars for much of the 20th century, at the expense of conceptual veracity.

Salafis believe that the label "Salafiyya" existed from the first few generations of Islam and that it is not a modern movement. To justify this view, Salafis rely on a handful of quotes from medieval times where the term "Salafi" is used. One of the quotes used as evidence and widely posted on Salafi websites is from the genealogical dictionary of al-Sam'ani (d. 1166), who wrote a short entry about the surname "al-Salafi" (the Salafi): "According to what I heard, this ascription to the pious ancestors and adoption of their doctrine ." In his biographical dictionary Siyar a`lam al-nubala, Athari theologian Al-Dhahabi described his teacher Ibn Taymiyya as a person who "supported the pure Sunna and al-Tariqa al-Salafiyah (Salafiyah way or methodology)"; referring to his non-conformist juristic approach that was based on direct understanding of Scriptures and his practice of issuing fatwas that contradicted the madhabs.

At least one scholar, Henri Lauzière, casts doubt on al-Sam'ani, claiming he "could only list two individuals—a father and his son—who were known" as al-Salafi. "Plus, the entry contains blank spaces in lieu of their full names, presumably because al-Sam'ani had forgotten them or did not know them." In addition, Lauzière claims "al-Sam'ani's dictionary suggests that the surname was marginal at best, and the lone quotation taken from Al-Dhahabi, who wrote 200 years later, does little to prove Salafi claims."

Origins

The Salafi movement emphasizes looking up to the era of the Salaf al-Salih; who were the early three generations of Muslims that succeeded Prophet Muhammad. They consider the faith and practices of salaf al-salih as virtuous and exemplary. By seeking to capture values of the Salaf in their own lives, Salafis attempt to recreate a ‘golden age’, and revive a pristine version of Islam, stripped of all later accretions, including the four schools of law as well as popular Sufism. The emergence of Salafism coincided with the rise of Western colonialism across many parts of the Islamic world. Between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, these reformist movements called for a direct return to the Scriptures, institutional standardisations and jihad against colonial powers.

The movement developed across various regions of the Islamic World in the late 19th century as an Islamic response against the rising European imperialism. The Salafi revivalists were inspired by the creedal doctrines of the medieval Syrian Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who had strongly condemned philosophy and various features of Sufism as heretical. Ibn Taymiyya's radical reform programme called for Muslims to return to the pristine Islam of the Salaf al-Salih (pious ancestors); through a direct understanding of Scriptures. Further influences of the early Salafiyya movement included various 18th-century Islamic reform movements such as the Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula, subcontinental reform movements spearheaded by Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, Shah Ismail Dehlawi and Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed as well as the Yemeni islah movement led by Al-San'aani and Al-Shawkani.

These movements had advocated the belief that the Qur'an and Sunnah are the primary sources of sharia and the legal status quo should be scrutinized based on Qur'an and Hadith. Far from being novel, this idea was a traditionist thesis kept alive within the Hanbali school of law. The Wahhabi movement, under the leadership of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, forcefully revived Hanbali traditionism in 18th century Arabia. Influenced by the Hanbali scholars Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350); the teachings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab were also closely linked to the formulation of proto-Hanbalism expounded by early Hanbali writers 'Abd Allah ibn Ahmad (d. 290/903), Abu Bakr al-Khallal (d. 311/923) as well as non-Hanbali scholars like Ibn Hazm, whom he cited frequently. Indian Hadith specialist Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, while rejecting Taqlid, also emphasised on involving the Fuqaha (jurisconsultants) in the study of hadith, their interpretations and rationalisation. Thus, he was accommodative towards classical structures of Fiqh. In Yemen, influential scholar Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Shawkani (1759–1834) condemned Taqlid far more fiercely, and his movement advocated radical rejection of classical Fiqh structures. The promotion of Ijtihad of these movements was also accompanied by an emphasis on strict adherence to Qur'an and Hadith.

Evolution

During the mid-nineteenth century British India, the Ahl-i Hadith movement revived the teachings of Shah Waliullah and Al-Shawkani; advocating rejection of Taqlid and study of hadith. They departed from Shah Waliullah's school with a literalist approach to hadith, and rejected classical legal structures; inclining towards the Zahirite school. In the 19th century, Hanbali traditionism would be revived in Iraq by the influential Alusi family. Three generations of Alusis, Mahmud al-Alusi (d. 1853), Nu'man al-Alusi (d. 1899) and Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi (1857–1924); were instrumental in spreading the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhabi movement in the Arab world. Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi, a defender and historian of the Wahhabi movement, was also a leader of the Salafiyya movement. All these reformist tendencies merged into the early Salafiyya movement, a theological faction prevalent across the Arab world during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, which was closely associated with the works of Sayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935).

Late nineteenth-century

The first phase of the Salafiyya movement emerged amidst the reform-minded ulema of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth century. The movement relied primarily upon the works of Hanbali theologian Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, whose call to follow the path of Salaf, inspired their name. The early phase of this tradition sought a middle-way that synthesised between 'ilm and Tasawwuf. Damascus, a major centre of Hanbali scholarship in the Muslim World, played a major role in the emergence and dissemination of the ideas of this early trend of the Salafiyya. Some scholars in this phase like Amir 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, re-interpreted Ibn 'Arabi's mystical beliefs and reconciled them with the opposing theological doctrines of Ibn Taymiyya to address new challenges. Other major figures in the movement included 'Abd al-Razzaq Al-Bitar, Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Tahir al-Jazairi, etc. 'Abd al-Razzaq Al-Bitar (the grandfather of Muhammad Bahjat al Bitar, a disciple of Rashid Rida) was the leader of the more traditional branch of the reform trend, which would become the Salafiyya of Damascus. Years later, Rashid Rida would describe him as the "mujaddid madhhab al-salaf fil-Sham" (the reviver of the ancestral doctrine in Syria). While these reformers were critical of various aspects of popular Sufism, they didn't deny Sufism completely. The Cairene school of Muhammad Abduh emerged as a separate trend in 1880s, and would be influenced by the Damascene Salafiyya, as well as Mu'tazilite philosophy. Abduh's movement sought a rationalist approach to adapt to the increasing pace of modernisation. While 'Abduh was critical of certain Sufi practices, his writings had Sufi inclinations and he retained love for "true Sufism" as formulated by Al-Ghazali.

The Damascene Salafiyya was also influenced by their reformist counterparts in Baghdad, especially the scholars of the Alusi family. Abu Thana' Shihab al-Din al-Alusi (1802–1854) was the first of the Alusi family of ulama to promote reformist ideas, influenced by Wahhabism through his teacher 'Ali al-Suwaydi. He also combined the theological ideas of Sufis and Mutakallimun (dialecticians) like Razi in his reformist works. Shihab al-Din's son, Nu'man Khayr al-Din al-Alusi, was also heavily influenced by the treatises of Siddiq Hasan Khan, an early leader of the Ah-i Hadith movement. He regularly corresponded with him and received an Ijazat (license to teach) from Siddiq Hasan Khan, and became the leader of the Salafi trend in Iraq. Later he would also send his son 'Ala' al-Din (1860–1921) to study under Hasan Khan. Khayr al-Din Alusi would write lengthy polemics and treatises advocating the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya. The Iraqi reformers rejected the validity of Taqlid in jurisprudence, calling for Ijtihad and condemned ritual innovations like tomb-visitations for the purpose of worship.

Salafiyya tradition had become dominant in Syria by the 1880s, due to its popularity amongst the reformist ulema in Damascus. Furthermore; most of the medieval treatises of the classical Syrian theologian Ibn Taymiyya were preserved in various Damascene mosques. Salafi scholars gathered these works and indexed them in the archives of the Zahiriyya Library (Maktabat Zahiriyya), one of the most prominent Islamic libraries of the 19th century. Most influential Salafi scholars during this period were Tahir al-Jazai'ri, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar and Jamal al-Din Qasimi. These scholars took precedent from the 18th-century reformers influenced by Ibn Taymiyya, such as Al-Shawkani, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Shah Waliullah etc. and called for a return to the purity of the early era of the Salaf al-Salih (righteous forebears). Like Ibn Taymiyya during the 13th century; they viewed themselves as determined preachers calling to defend Tawhid (Islamic monotheism), attacking bid'ah (religious innovations), criticising the Ottoman monarchy and its clerical establishment as well as relentlessly condemning Western ideas such as nationalism. According to historian Itzchak Weismann:

"The Salafi trend of Damascus constituted a religious response to the political alliance forged between the Ottoman State under the modernizing autocracy of Sultan Abdül Hamid II and orthodox sufi shaykhs and ulama who were willing to mobilize the masses in his support."

Post-WW1 Era

By the 1900s, the reformers had already become commonly known as "Salafis", which in-part was also used to deflect accusations from their opponents; to emphasize that they were different from the Wahhabis of Najd. The Salafi turn against Ibn 'Arabi and Sufism would materialize a decade later, after the First World War, under the leadership of Rashid Rida. This second-stage of Salafiyya was championed by Rashid Rida and his disciples across the Islamic World, advocating a literalist understanding of the Scriptures. They were also characterised by a militant hostility to Western imperialism and culture. In addition to condemnations of tomb visits, popular Sufi practices, brotherhoods, miracles and mystical orders; Rida's criticism of Sufism extended to all of it and beyond the critiques of his fellow Salafi comrades. He questioned the murid-murshid relationship in mysticism, as well as the Silsilas (chains of transmission) upon which Tariqah structures were built. In particular, Rida fiercely rebuked political quietism and pacifist doctrines of various Sufi orders. The Salafiyya of Rida and his disciples held onto an ideal of the complete return to the religious and political ways of the salaf. In calling for a return to the Salaf, Rashid Rida emphasised the path of the first four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (Khulafa Rashidin) and the revival of their principles. Rida's revivalist efforts contributed to the construction of a collective imagined Salafi community operating globally, transcending national borders. For this reason, he is regarded as one of the founding pioneers of the Salafiyya movement and his ideas inspired many Islamic revivalist movements.

Rashid Rida's religious approach was rooted in reviving Ibn Taymiyya's theology as the solution to rectify the decline and disintegration of the Islamic World. Salafiyya movement took a much more conservative turn under Rida's mantle and became vehemently critical of the clerical establishment. Rida's doctrines deeply impacted Islamist ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949) and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) who advocated a holistic conception of Islamic state and society; similar to the Wahhabi movement. Muslim Brotherhood’s Syrian leaders like Mustapha al-Siba‘i and ‘Isam al-‘Attar were also influential in the movement and their ideas influenced numerous Jordanian students. The Damascene Salafiyya consisted of major scholarly figures like Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar al-Athari, ‘Ali al-Tantawi, Nasir al-Din al-Albani, ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Imam, Mazhar al-‘Azma, al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi, Taqiy al-Din al-Hilali, Muhiy al-Din al-Qulaybi, ‘Abd Allah al-Qalqayli, etc. Numerous books of the movement were printed and published through the Islamic Bookstore in Lebanon owned by Zuhayr Shawish.

The early leaders of Salafiyya like Sayyid Rashid Rida (d. 1935), Jamal al-Din Qasimi (d. 1914), etc. had considered traditionalist theology as central to their comprehensive socio-political reform programme. Rashid Rida, for instance, argued that Athari theology represented Sunni orthodoxy, was less divisive and provided a more reliable basis of faith than Ash'arism. According to Rida, Salafi creed was easier to understand than Kalam (speculative theology) and hence granted a stronger bulwark against the dangers posed by atheism and other heresies. Salafi reformers also hailed the medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyyah as a paragon of Sunni orthodoxy and emphasized that his strict conception of Tawhid was an important part of the doctrine of the forefathers (madhhab al-salaf). Despite this, the Salafi reformers during this era were more concerned with pan-Islamic unity and hence refrained from accusing the majority of their co-religionists of being heretics; professing their creedal arguments with moderation. Jamal al-Din Qasimi decried sectarianism and bitter polemics between Atharis and followers of other creedal schools, despite considering them unorthodox. For Rashid Rida, intra-Sunni divisions between Atharis and Ash'arites, were an evil that weakened the strength of the Ummah (Muslim community) and enabled foreigners to gain control over Muslim lands. Hence, Rida held back from adopting an exclusivist attitude against Asharis during the first two decades of the 20th century.

Beginning from the mid-1920s, this leniency gradually disappeared from Salafi activists and scholars to give way to a more partisan stance. Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, for example, was more uncompromising in his defense of Salafi theology than Rida and Qasimi. The hardening of Salafi stance was best represented by Rashid Rida's disciple Muhammad Bahjat al Bitar (1894–1976) who made robust criticisms of speculative theology, by compiling treatises that revived the creedal polemics of Ibn Taymiyya. One such treatise titled "Al-Kawthari wa-ta'liqatuhu" published in 1938 strongly admonishes the Ottoman Maturidite scholar Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari (1879–1952); accusing him of heresy. In the treatise, Bitar vigorously advocates Ibn Taymiyya's literalist approach to the theological question of the Divine attributes (Al- Asma wa-l-Sifat) and seemingly anthropomorphic expressions in the Qur'an. At the height of his career, Bitar enjoyed the respect of Syrian ulema and laypersons of all groups. For his student Nasir al-Din Albani (1914–1999) and his purist Salafi followers, Bitar was a master of theology and hadith. For the Islamist Muslim Brothers, Bitar's studies of Islam and the Arabic language were an asset for Islamic Renaissance.

Contemporary era

Syrian Salafiyya tradition that emerged in late nineteenth century consisted of two divergent tendencies: an apolitical Quietist trend and a "Salafi-Islamist hybrid". The early Salafiyya led by Rashid Rida was dominated by revolutionary Pan-Islamists who had socio-political goals and advocated for the restoration of an Islamic Caliphate through military struggle against European colonial powers. However, contemporary Salafiyya are dominated by Purists who eschew politics and advocate Islamic Political Quietism. Contemporary Purist Salafism, widely known as "the Salafi Manhaj" emerged from the 1960s as an intellectual hybrid of three similar, yet distinct, religious reform traditions: the Wahhabi movement in Arabia, Ahl-i Hadith movement in India and Salafiyya movement in the Arab world of the late-19th and early 20th centuries. The person most responsible for this transformation was the Albanian Islamic hadith scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a protege of Rashid Rida, who is generally considered as the "spiritual father" of the Purist Salafi current and respected by all contemporary Salafis as "the greatest hadith scholar of his generation".

As of 2017, journalist Graeme Wood estimated that Salafi "probably" make up "fewer than 10%" of Muslims globally, but by the 21st century, Salafi teachings and ideas had become so mainstreamised that many modern Muslims, even those who do not self-identify as Salafi, have adopted various aspects of Salafism.

At times, Salafism has also been deemed a hybrid of Wahhabism and other post-1960s movements. Academics and historians have used the term "Salafism" to denote "a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas" across the Islamic World and "sought to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization". Starting from the French scholar Louis Massignon, Western scholarship for much of the 20th-century considered the Islamic Modernist movement of 19th-century figures Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (who were Ash'ari rationalists) to be part of the wider Salafiyya movement. However, contemporary Salafis follow a literalist approach with a "heavy reliance on hadith", looking up to Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciples like Ibn Kathir, Ibn Qayyim, etc. whom they regard as important classical religious authorities. Major contemporary figures in the movement include Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, ibn 'Uthaymin, Ibn Baz, Ehsan Elahi Zahir, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, Rashid Rida, Thanā Allāh Amritsari, Abd al-Hamid Bin Badis, Zubair Ali Zaee, Ahmad Shakir, Saleh Al-Fawzan, Zakir Naik, Abdul-Ghaffar Hasan, Sayyid Sabiq, Salih al-Munajjid, Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, Muhammad al-Gondalwi, etc.

In the modern era, some Salafis tend to take the surname "Al-Salafi" and refer to the label "Salafiyya" in various circumstances to evoke a specific understanding of Islam that is supposed to differ from that of other Sunnis in terms of 'Aqidah (creed) and approach to Fiqh (legal tradition).

Political trends within Salafism

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Some Western analysts, most prominently Quintan Wiktorowicz in an article published in 2006, have classified Salafis into three groups – purists, activists, and Jihadis – based on their approach to politics. Purists focus on education and missionary work to solidify the Tawhid; activists focus on political reform and re-establishing a Caliphate through the means of political activities, but not violence (sometimes called Salafist activism); and jihadists share similar political goals as the politicians, but engage in violent Jihad (sometimes called Salafi jihadism and/or Qutbism).

Following the Arab Spring, Salafis across the Arab World have formed various political parties that actively advocate for Islamic social and political causes in the region.

Purists

"Purists" are Salafists who focus on non-violent da'wah (preaching of Islam), education, and "purification of religious beliefs and practices", who follow the Salafi 'aqida (creed). They dismiss politics as "a diversion or even innovation that leads people away from Islam". Also known as conservative Salafism, its adherents seek to distance themselves from politics. This strand focuses its attention on the study of Islamic sharia, educating the masses and preaching to the society. This methodology is seen as attracting a significant section of pious Muslims who seek to be driven solely by religious objectives but not political objectives. Conservative Salafis are disinterested in getting entangled in the problems and consequences that accompany political activism. According to them, a prolonged movement of "purification and education" of Muslims is essential for Islamic revival through reaping a "pure, uncontaminated Islamic society" and thereby establish an Islamic state.

Some of them never oppose rulers. Madkhalism, as an example, is a strain of Salafists viewed as supportive of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Taking its name from the controversial Saudi Arabian cleric Rabee al-Madkhali, the movement lost its support in Saudi Arabia proper when several members of the Permanent Committee (the country's clerical body) denounced Madkhali personally. Influence of both the movement and its figureheads have waned so much within the Muslim world that analysts have declared it to be a largely European phenomenon.

Salafi activists

Further along the spectrum are the Salafi-Activists (or haraki) who advocate the transformation of societies through political action. They include Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Hizb al-Nour (Party of Light), the Al Islah Party of Yemen, the Al Asalah of Bahrain, and the ulema affiliated to the movement known as Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening). Committed to advancing "the Islamic solution" for all socio-political problems; Salafi-Activists are vehemently hostile to secularism, Israel, and the West. Their strategy involves working within the established order, to achieve the ultimate objective of replacing that order with an Islamic state.

Activists are different from the Salafi-jihadists in that they eschew violence and differ from Salafi purists in that they engage in modern political processes. Salafi-Activists have a long tradition of political activism in major Arab Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and its various branches and affiliates. Salafi activism originated in the 1950s to 60s Saudi Arabia, where many Muslim Brothers took refuge from the prosecution by the Nasser regime. There, they synthesized their Muslim Brotherhood beliefs with Salafism, which led to the creation of the Salafi activist trend exemplified by the Sahwa movement in the 80s, promulgated by Safar Al-Hawali and Salman al-Ouda.

In addition to being strong advocates of Sunni empowerment in the post-Arab Spring context, Salafi parties regularly warn against Iran's interventionist and expansionist ambitions in the Arab World. Salafi activist scholars have attacked the Khomeinist Shia Crescent project and attempts to Shi'itization through demographic shifts in countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, etc. As early as the 1980s Syrian Salafi Islamist clerics like Muhammad Surur had launched staunch critiques of Khomeini, denouncing him as a proponent of Iranian domination over the Arab World.

Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e Islami, etc. are heavily influenced by the Activist Salafi thought. The movement is very popular amongst the followers of the Salafiyya school, and is often referred to as "mainstream Salafism". The activist Salafis condemn violence, yet engage actively in the political processes of their societies to advocate for shari'a. As of 2013, this school makes up the majority of Salafism.

The movement is fiercely attacked by the followers of the Madkhalist strand of Quietist Salafism; who totally withdraw themselves from politics. Many Salafi activists are critical of the policies of Gulf kingdoms and have attacked Madkhalis for blindly toeing the political line of the Gulf monarchs. The Activist trend, who some call "politicos", see politics as "yet another field in which the Salafi creed has to be applied" in order to safeguard justice and "guarantee that the political rule is based upon the Shari'a". Al–Sahwa Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening), as example, has been involved in peaceful political reform. Safar Al-Hawali, Salman al-Ouda, Abu Qatada, Zakir Naik, etc. are representatives of this trend. Because of being active on social media, they have earned some support among youth.

It's very simple. We want sharia. Sharia in economy, in politics, in judiciary, in our borders and our foreign relations.

— Mohammed Abdel-Rahman, the son of Omar Abdel-Rahman, Time magazine. October 8, 2012

After the eruption of Arab Spring, Salafi Muslims have been becoming increasingly active in the political sphere, championing various Islamic causes. Salafi activists are highly critical of the foreign policies of Western countries as well as Iran's aggressive activities in the region, such as its military intervention in Syrian that backed the Alawite-dominated regime of Bashar al-Assad against Sunnis. Some Quietist Salafis have also began organizing political parties, in response to threats posed by wars and external interference in Arab countries. These include the Al-Nour Party in Egypt and Ansar al-Sunna in Sudan.

Salafi jihadists

"Salafi Jihadism" was a term invented by Gilles Kepel to describe those self-claiming Salafi groups who began developing an interest in (armed) jihad during the mid-1990s. Practitioners are often referred to as "Salafi jihadis", "Salafi jihadists", "Revolutionary Salafis" or "armed Salafis". Journalist Bruce Livesey estimates that Salafi jihadists constitute less than 1.0 percent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims (i.e., less than 10 million).

Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shia rule". Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such as Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah ibn Baaz and Abdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh), but also from the sahwa movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali. Dr. Joas Wagemakers defines Salafi-Jihadists as those Salafis who advocate Jihad against secular rulers through armed, revolutionary methods. Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Usama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abubakr al-Baghdadi, Sayf al-Adel, etc. are the major contemporary figures in this movement. Jihadi Salafi groups include Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and the Al-Shabaab.

All Salafi-Jihadists agree on the revolutionary overthrow of existing ruling order through armed Jihad; and its replacement with a Global Caliphate. They believe that Jihad is essential to Islamic piety and belief, an individual obligation (fard 'al-Ayn) on all Muslims; which the Palestinian Jihadist scholar 'Abdallah ‘Azzam (1941–89) asserted as "the most excellent form of worship". Salafi-Jihadists regard themselves as the heirs of Sayyid Qutb, an influential Islamist scholar who led the radical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1960s. Inspired by their reading of Ibn Taymiyya, they are strong advocates of takfir (excommunication) and the principles of Al-Wala' wa'l- Bara'. Like Qutb, they also made the belief in the exclusive sovereignty (Hakimiyya) of Allah central to Tawhid, and condemn all other political doctrines as Jahiliyya. Sayyid Qutb's Al-Ma‘alim Fi'l-tariq (The Milestones), a short tract which outlined his militant strategy of destroying Jahiliyya and replacing it with Islam, would become an influential treatise in the Salafi-Jihadi intellectual circles.

An analysis of the Caucasus Emirate, a Salafi jihadist group, was made in 2014 by Darion Rhodes. It analyzes the group's strict observance of tawhid and its rejection of shirk, taqlid and bid‘ah, while believing that Jihad ( holy war) is the only way to advance the cause of Allah on the Earth. The purist and Activist Salafis often strongly disapprove of the Jihadists and rejects its Islamic character. Although rooted in certain fringe interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith, scholars point out that Salafi-Jihadi views are not representative of the broader Islamic tradition. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals from across the Islamic spectrum – Sunni, Shi‘a, Salafi, Sufi, Wahhabi, modernists and Islamic neo-traditionalists – have come out strongly against various Salafi-jihadi groups and their doctrines; regarding them as "a perversion" of Islamic teachings.

Academic Review

Wiktorowicz's typology has largely been discarded by recent scholarship due to its simplistic assumptions regarding religion, in addition to other limitations, such as its neglect of the changing social, political and cultural realities occurring across the Muslim World. Several researchers have criticised the classification for being unobservant regarding the dynamism of the Salafiyya, such it's evolving relations with Islamic politics; as well as for its rigid compartmentalisation of Salafi Muslims. According to Samir Amghar and Francesco Cavatorta:

"studies question fundamentally the theoretical and scientific relevance of the typology between quietists, politicians and revolutionaries and argue that it is crucial to refine this typology by affirming that it is no longer apt in explaining Salafism in the contemporary age... If Wiktorowicz’s categorisation has the merit of shedding light on the plural and contradictory character of a movement that is too often caricatured, it prevents us from thinking about its dynamic and evolving character. The changing reality on the ground across the Arab world and beyond demands that traditional categories be revisited."

By making a case study of Egyptian Salafis and the "quietist" Al-Nour party, one scholar Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, demonstrates that Wiktorowicz's "non-dynamic typology" merely denotes "time-bounded pragmatic political strategies" rather than any solid identity. Laurence proposes re-defining the triple classification of "Quietist, Activist and Jihadist" into "proselytizing, politico and revolutionary"; and re-conceptualise these categories as "temporal strategies" instead of a solid spiritual identity. She further calls for a holistic approach that accounts for the "fluidity, diversity, and evolution of Salafi groups" and focus more on the strategic adaptation of Salafi Muslims in their respective environments rather than creedal issues. Based on his study of European Salafi movements, Samir Amghar asserts that Jihadism no longer can be classified as part of proper Salafism since, according to Amghar, both movements have diverged significantly over the course of decades and have no "shared doctrinal background".

Wiktorowicz's proposition that all self-professed Salafi groups have the same "Aqidah" (creed) has also been challenged. According to scholar Massimo Ramaioli:

"Salafis do not vary, as Wiktorowicz claimed, only at the level of reading social reality and its attendant socio-political manifestations (their manhaj), while retaining sameness and coherence at the theoretical level. From a philosophy of praxis perspective, we can account for the variations of ‘aqīdah that we witness. On issues such as imān (faith), kufr (unbelief) and takfīr (excommunication), al-wala’ wa al-bara’, and of course violence and jihād, Salafis clearly do not hold the same views precisely because they read social reality, and consequently behave, so differently... Negotiating the constraints and opportunities of the political prods Salafis to engage in thorough and at times painful ideological (re)positioning... the political affects Salafism on both levels: ideational and methodological/practical."

Regional groups and movements

Saudi Arabia

Modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholar Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis. He started a reform movement in the remote, sparsely populated region of Najd. He invited people to Tawhid (monotheism) and advocated purging of practices such as shrine and tomb visitation, which were widespread among Muslims. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered such practices as aspects of idolatry, representative of impurities and inappropriate innovations in Islam which contradicted Tawhid. While Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab stressed on the importance of obedience to sharia, he also obliged Muslims to uphold sharia by reading and following the Scriptures. Like their paragon scholar Ibn Taymiyya, Wahhabis did not believe in blind-adherence (Taqlid) and advocated engaging with the Qur'an and Hadith through Ijtihad (legal reasoning), emphasizing simplicity in religious rituals and practices. Thus, classical-era legal works by Fuqaha were not considered as authoritative as the Scriptures themselves, since the former were human interpretations while the Qur'an is the Universal, Eternal Word of God.

The Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia is the result of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's reform movement. Unlike other reform movements, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his disciples were also able to secure a religio-political pact with Muhammad Ibn Saud and his House; which enabled them to engage in military expansionism and establish an Islamic state in the Arabian Peninsula. While the mainstream constituency believed in Islamic revival through education and welfare reforms, the militant elements of the movement advocated armed campaigns to eradicate local practices considered as innovation and demolished numerous shrines and tombs of saints (awliya). It is believed that the Wahhabism is a more strict, Saudi form of Salafism, according to Mark Durie, who states that Saudi leaders "are active and diligent" using their considerable financial resources "in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world". Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree with the view that Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis".

However, many scholars and critics distinguish between the old form of Saudi Salafism (termed as Wahhabism) and the new Salafism in Saudi Arabia. Stéphane Lacroix, a fellow and lecturer at Sciences Po in Paris, also affirmed a distinction between the two: "As opposed to Wahhabism, Salafism refers to all the hybridations that have taken place since the 1960s between the teachings of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and other Islamic schools of thought". Hamid Algar and Khaled Abou El Fadl believe, during the 1960s and 70s, Wahhabism rebranded itself as Salafism knowing it could not "spread in the modern Muslim world" as Wahhabism.

Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian. It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high-level scholarship. "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for. It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university. Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools" at a cost of around $2–3bn annually since 1975. To put the number into perspective, the propaganda budget of the Soviet Union was about $1bn per annum.

This spending has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew, and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam") to be perceived as the correct interpretation – or the "gold standard" of Islam – in many Muslims' minds.

Salafis are sometimes labelled "Wahhabis", often in a derogatory manner by their sectarian opponents. Some Western critics often conflate Wahhabis and Salafis, although numerous Western academics have challenged such depictions. While Wahhabism is viewed as a Salafist movement in Arabian Peninsula that took inspiration from Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and his successors in the Aal al-Shaykh, the broader Salafist movement have deeper roots across the Muslim World. Often times, other Salafis oppose the stance of Gulf-based Wahhabis on various issues and engage in a variety of political activities.

Indian subcontinent

In Indian subcontinent, a number of Salafi streams exist including Ahl i Hadith and Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen. Ahl-i Hadith is a religious movement that emerged in Northern India in the mid-nineteenth century. Adherents of Ahl-i-Hadith regard the Quran, sunnah, and hadith as the sole sources of religious authority and oppose everything introduced in Islam after the earliest times. In particular, they reject taqlid (following legal precedent) and favor ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) based on the scriptures. The movement's followers call themselves Salafi, while others refer to them as Wahhabi, or consider them a variation on the Wahhabi movement. In recent decades the movement has expanded its presence in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.

Shah Waliullah Dehlawi (1703-1762) is considered as the intellectual forefather of the movement and its followers regard him as Shaykh al-Islam. Waliullah 's rejection of Taqlid would be emphasized by his son Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824) and later successors like Shah Ismail (1779-1831) in a puritanical manner; stripping it of their eclectic and rational aspects. This tendency culminated in the Jihad movement of Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786-1831). This iconoclastic movement expanded Shah Waliullah's rejection of Taqlid as a fundamental creedal doctrine. They focused on waging physical Jihad against non-Muslims and banishing syncretic rituals prevalent amongst Muslims. Although the Indian Mujahidin movement led by Sayyid Ahmad shared close parallels with the Arabian Wahhabi movement and hence labelled as "Wahhabi" by the British; both movements mostly evolved independently. After the death of Sayyid Ahmad in 1831; his successors Wilayat ali, Inayat Ali, Muhammad Hussain, and Farhat Hussain continued Jihad activities of the "Wahhabi" movement throughout British India; spreading across Chittagong to Peshawar and from Madras to Kashmir. They played an important role in the Rebellion of 1857 and their anti-British Jihad has been described as "the most strident challenge" faced by the British during the 1850s. After the defeat of the revolt, the British would fully crush the Mujahidin through a series of expeditions, "Wahhabi" trials and sedition laws. By 1883, the movement was fully suppressed and no longer posed any political threat. Many adherents of the movement abandoned physical Jihad and opted for political quietism. The Ahl-i-Hadith movement emerged from these circles of religious activists.

In 19th century British India, the revivalist Ahl-i Hadith movement had descended as a direct outgrowth and quietist manifestation of the Indian Mujahidin. The early leaders of the movement were the influential hadith scholars Sayyid Nazir Hussein Dehlawi (1805-1902) and Siddiq Hasan Khan of Bhopal (1832-1890) who had direct tutelage under the lineage of Shah Waliullah and the Indian Mujahidin movement. Syed Nazeer Hussein was a student of Shah Muhammad Ishaq, the grandson of Shah Waliullah, and held the title ''Miyan Sahib'', which was strongly associated with the spiritual heirs of Shah Waliullah. Siddiq Hasan Khan was a student of Sadar al-Din Khan (1789-1868) who inturn, had studied under Shah 'Abd al-Azeez and Shah 'Abd al-Qadir, the sons of Shah Waliullah. His father was also a direct disciple of Shah 'Abd al Aziz. Yemeni scholars were also active in the Bhopal court of Siddiq Hasan Khan and he became a student of Muhaddith 'Abd al-Haqq of Benarus, who was a disciple of Shawkani in Yemen. He became profoundly influenced by the works Al-Shawkani; claiming frequent contacts with him via visions and in this way, an ijaza (permission) to transmit his works. Thus, the Ahl-i Hadith movement drew directly from the teachings of Shah Waliullah and Al-Shawkani; advocating rejection of Taqlid and revival of hadith. However, they departed from Shah Waliullah's conciliatory approach to classical legal theory; aligning themselves with Zahirite (literalist) school and adopted a literalist hadith approach. They also rejected the authority of the four legal schools and restrict Ijma (consensus) to the companions. Their ideal was to lead a pious and ethical life in conformity to the Prophetic example in every aspect of life.

Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen (KNM) was founded in 1950 in Kerala as a popular reform movement by the Kerala Jamiyat al Ulama (KJU). It traces its root to Kerala Aikya Sangam established in 1922 by Vakkom Moulavi. KNM witnessed a number of splits since 2002 and all existing fractions maintain a good connection with Arab Salafi groups especially in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Folk Islam and Sufism, popular amongst the poor and working classes in the region, are anathema to Ahl-i Hadith beliefs and practices. This attitude towards Sufism has brought the movement into conflict with the rival Barelvi movement even more so than the Barelvis' rivals, the Deobandis. Ahl-i Hadith followers identify with the Zahiri madhhab. The movement draws both inspiration and financial support from Saudi Arabia. Jamia Salafia is their largest institution in India.

Egypt

The Egyptian Salafi movement is one of the most influential branches of the Salafi movement which profoundly impacted religious currents across the Arab world, including the scholars of Saudi Arabia. Salafis in Egypt are not united under a single banner or unified leadership. The main Salafi trends in Egypt are Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, The Salafist Calling, al-Madkhaliyya Salafism, Activist Salafism, and al-Gam’eyya Al-Shar’eyya. Salafi-Wahhabi doctrines were introduced in Egypt by the Syrian scholar Rashid Rida starting from the 1920s. Rashid Rida opposed the Westernising cultural trends adopted by Egyptian liberal elite and denounced nationalist ideas as a plot to undermine Islamic unity. Rida and his disciples campaigned for the establishment of an Islamic state based on Salafi principles; thus becoming the biggest adversary of the Egyptian secularists and nationalists.

Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society

Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, also known as Ansar Al-Sunna, was founded in 1926 by Sheikh Mohamed Hamed El-Fiqi, a 1916 graduate of Al-Azhar and a student of the famed Muslim reformer Muhammed Abduh. It is considered the main Salafi group in Egypt. El-Fiqi's ideas were resentful of Sufism. But unlike Muhammed Abduh, Ansar Al-Sunna follows the Tawhid as preached by Ibn Taymiyyah. Many Saudi scholars became disciples of prominent ulema of Ansar al Sunna like ʿAbd al-Razzaq ʿAfifi and Muhammad Khalil Harras.

Majority of Egyptian Salafis are affiliated to Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya. Established by Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi (a student of Salafi scholar Rashid Rida) to defend traditionalist Salafism, the movement shares a warm relationship with Arabian Wahhabi scholars and was a major benefactor of Salafi resurgence since the 1970s. The movement traces its initial Wahhabi contacts to Rashid Rida. Al-Azhar shares a close relation with Ansar al-Sunna. Most of the early leaders of Ansar al-Sunna were Azhari graduates and many of its contemporary scholars studied under Al-Azhar. Prominent scholars in the movement include Rashid Rida, Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqqi, Abd al-Razzaq ‘Afifi, Sayyid Sabiq, Muhammad Khalil Harass, etc.

Salafist Call (al-daʿwa al-salafiyya)

Salafist Call (al-daʿwa al-salafiyya) is another influential Salafist organisation. It is the outcome of student activism during the 1970s. While many of the activists joined the Muslim Brotherhood, a faction led by Mohammad Ismail al-Muqaddim, influenced by Salafists of Saudi Arabia established the Salafist Calling between 1972 and 1977. Salafist call is the most popular and localised of the Salafi organisations in Egypt. Due to it being an indigenous mass movement with strong political stances on various issues, it doesn't enjoy good relationship with Saudi Arabia. Emphasising its Egyptian heritage more robustly than Ansar al-Sunna, Da'wa Salafiyya traces its history through the persecution and imprisonment of Ibn Taymiyya in Egypt, to the trials faced by the Muwahhidun movement in Arabia and then finally to scholars like Sayyid Rashid Rida, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, etc. who popularised Ibn Taymiyya's thought during the early twentieth century Egypt. Unlike Ansar al-Sunna which preaches political quietism, Salafist call is a politically activist movement.

The Al-Nour Party

The Al-Nour Party was created by Salafist Call after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. It has an ultra-conservative Islamist ideology, which believes in implementing strict Sharia law. In the 2011–12 Egypt parliamentary elections, the Islamist Bloc led by Al‑Nour party received 7,534,266 votes out of a total 27,065,135 correct votes (28%). The Islamist Bloc gained 127 of the 498 parliamentary seats contested, second-place after the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. Al‑Nour Party itself won 111 of the 127 seats. From January 2013 onward, the party gradually distanced itself from Mohamed Morsi's Brotherhood regime, and was involved in the large-scale protests in late June against Morsi's rule that subsequently led to a military coup removing him from office in July that year. A lawsuit against the party was dismissed on 22 September 2014 because the court indicated it had no jurisdiction. A case on the dissolution of the party was adjourned until 17 January 2015. Another court case that was brought forth to dissolve the party was dismissed after the Alexandria Urgent Matters Court ruled on 26 November 2014 that it lacked jurisdiction.

According to Ammar Ali Hassan of Al-Ahram, while Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood agree on many issues such as the need to "Islamize" society and legally requiring all Muslims to give alms, the former has nevertheless rejected the flexibility of the latter on the issue of whether women and Christians should be entitled to serve in high office, as well as its relatively tolerant attitude towards Iran.

Malaysia

In 1980, Prince Mohammed bin Faisal Al Saud of Saudi Arabia offered Malaysia $100 million for an interest-free finance corporation, and two years later the Saudis helped finance the government-sponsored Bank Islam Malaysia. In 2017 it was reported that Salafi doctrines are spreading among Malaysia's elite, and the traditional Islamic theology currently taught in Government schools is shifted to a Salafi view of theology derived from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-backed Salafist wave in Malaysia has particularly manifested itself in the growing trends of anti-Shi’a Muslim rhetoric and the encroaching Arabization of Malay culture.

Yemen

Islamic scholar Muhammad Ibn 'Ali ash-Shawkani (1759 - 1839 C.E) is regarded as their intellectual precursor by the Salafis in Yemen, upholding his works to promote Salafi revivalist ideas. Beyond Yemen, his works are widely used in Salafi schools. He also profoundly influenced other Salafi movements across the world such as the Ahl-i Hadith in the Indian subcontinent.

Tunisia

Salafism has been dismissively labeled as "ultra-conservative", in the context of Tunisia after the 2011 revolution.

Turkey

Turkey has been largely absent from the growing literature on the phenomenon of transnational Salafism. Salafism is a minority strand of Turkish Islam that evolved in the context of the state's effort in the 1980s to recalibrate religion as a complement to Turkish nationalism. Although Salafism became a topic of discussion in media and scholarly writing in Turkish religious studies faculties, a continued lack of orthographic stability (variously, Selfye, Selefiyye, Selfyyecilik, Selefizm)" gives an indication both of the denial of its relevance to Turkey and the success of republican secularism in clearing religion from public discourse. Yet since the 1980s Salafi preachers trained in Saudi Arabia have been able to find a niche through publishing houses that have endeavoured to translate Arabic texts from the Saudi Salafi scene in an attempt to change the discursive landscape of Turkish Islam. In 1999, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs Diyanet, recognized Salafism as a Sunni school of thought. Salafist preachers then started to make inroads into the Turkish society. With the implication of Turkish citizens and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Syrian civil war, public discussion began to question the narrative of Salafism as a phenomenon alien to Turkey. Salafism becomes an observable element of religious discourse in Turkey in the context of the military regime's attempt to outmanoeuvre movements emerging as a challenge to the Kemalist secular order, namely the left, Necmettin Erbakan's Islamism, Kurdish nationalism, and Iran. Through the Turkish—Islamic Synthesis (Turk islam Sentezi), the scientific positivism that had been the guiding principle of the republic since 1923 was modified to make room for Islam as a central element of Turkish national culture. The military authorities oversaw an increase of more than 50 percent in the budget of the religious affairs administration (known as Diyanet), expanding it from 50,000 employees in 1979 to 85,000 in 1989. Pursuing closer ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey involved itself in a more meaningful manner in the pan-Islamic institutions under Saudi tutelage, and Diyanet received Muslim World League funding to send officials to Europe to develop outreach activities in Turkish immigrant communities." A network of commercial and cultural links was established with Saudi businesses and institutions in banking and financial services, publishing houses, newspapers, magazines, and children's books.

Preachers who had studied at the Islamic University of Madinah, and applied the Salafi designation, also established publishing houses and charity organizations (dernek), the most prominent example is Iraqi-Turkish decent Salafi scholar and preacher Abdullah Yolcu, who preaches under the banner of Guraba publishing house. Subject to periodic harassment and arrest by security forces, they adopted markedly more public profiles with AKP ascendancy over the military following a resounding electoral victory in 2002. The Turkish Salafis became active on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, complementing websites for their publishing enterprises. Saudi-based scholars such as Bin Baz, al-Albani, Saleh Al-Fawzan (b. 1933), and Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen (1925-2001) form the core of their references, while they avoid contemporary 'ulama' associated with the Muslim Brotherhood such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), an Egyptian scholar based in Qatar. Turkish is their prime language of communication, but Arabic is prominent in special sections on websites, Arabic-language Salafi texts in their bookshops, and heavy use of Arabic terminology in their Turkish texts. The most well-established among them is Ablullah Yolcu, who is said to do "production of Turkish Salafism from Arabic texts". While Turkey has been outside the discussion on transnational Salafism, Meijer's observation that Salafism may succeed `when its quietist current can find a niche or the nationalist movement has failed' seems to speak surprisingly well to the Turkish case."

China

Salafism is opposed by a number of Hui Muslims Sects in China such as by the Gedimu, Sufi Khafiya and Jahriyya, to the extent that even the fundamentalist Yihewani (Ikhwan) Chinese sect, founded by Ma Wanfu after Salafi inspiration, condemned Ma Debao and Ma Zhengqing as heretics when they attempted to introduce Salafism as the main form of Islam. Ma Debao established a Salafi school, called the Sailaifengye (Salafi), in Lanzhou and Linxia. It is completely separate from other Muslim sects in China. Muslim Hui avoid Salafis, even if they are family members. The number of Salafis in China are not included on percentage lists of Muslim sects in China. The Kuomintang Sufi Muslim General Ma Bufang, who backed the Yihewani (Ikhwan) Muslims, persecuted the Salafis and forced them into hiding. They were not allowed to move or worship openly. The Yihewani had become secular and Chinese nationalists; they considered the Salafiyya to be "heterodox" (xie jiao) and people who followed foreigners' teachings (waidao). After the Communists took power, Salafis were allowed to worship openly again.

Vietnam

An attempt at Salafist expansion among the Muslim Chams in Vietnam has been halted by Vietnamese government controls, however, the loss of the Salafis among Chams has been to be benefit of Tablighi Jamaat.

Qatar

Similar to Saudi Arabia, most citizens of Qatar adhere to a strict sect of Salafism referred to as Wahhabism. The national mosque of Qatar is the Imam Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab Mosque named after the founder of Wahhabism. Similar to Saudi Arabian sponsorship of Salafism, Qatar has also funded the construction of mosques that promote the Wahhabi Salafism.

Unlike the strict practice of Wahhabi Salafism in Saudi Arabia, Qatar has demonstrated an alternative view of Wahhabism. In Qatar, women are allowed by law to drive, non-Muslims have access to pork and liquor through a state-owned distribution center, and religious police do not force businesses to close during prayer times. Also, Qatar hosts branches of several American universities and a "Church City" in which migrant workers may practice their religion. The adoption of a more liberal interpretation of Wahhabism is largely credited to Qatar's young Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.

Yet, Qatar's more tolerant interpretation of Wahhabism compared to Saudi Arabia has drawn backlash from Qatari citizens and foreigners. The Economist reported that a Qatari cleric criticized the state's acceptance of un-Islamic practices away from the public sphere and complained that Qatari citizens are oppressed. Although Qatari gender separation is less strict than that found in Saudi Arabia, plans to offer co-ed lectures were put aside after threats to boycott Qatar's segregated public university. Meanwhile, there have been reports of local discontent with the sale of alcohol in Qatar.

Qatar has also drawn widespread criticism for attempting to spread its fundamental religious interpretation both through military and non-military channels. Militarily, Qatar has been criticized for funding rebel Islamist extremist fighters in the Libyan Crisis and the Syrian Civil War. In Libya, Qatar funded allies of Ansar al-Sharia, the jihadist group thought to be behind the killing of former U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens, while channeling weapons and money to the Islamist Ahrar al-Sham group in Syria. In addition, Qatar-based charities and online campaigns, such as Eid Charity and Madid Ahl al-Sham, have a history of financing terrorist groups in Syria. Qatar has also repeatedly provided financial support to the Gaza government led by the militant Hamas organisation while senior Hamas officials have visited Doha and hosted Qatari leaders in Gaza. Qatar also gave approximately $10 billion to the government of Egypt during Mohamed Morsi's time in office.

Non-militarily, Qatar state-funded broadcaster Al Jazeera has come under criticism for selective reporting in coordination with Qatar's foreign policy objectives. In addition, reports have condemned Qatar's financing of the construction of mosques and Islamic centers in Europe as attempts to exert the state's Salafist interpretation of Islam. Reports of Qatar attempting to impact the curriculum of U.S. schools and buy influence in universities have also spread. The nearby Persian Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have been among the countries that have condemned Qatar's actions. In 2014, the three Persian Gulf countries withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar referencing Qatar's failure to commit to non-interference in the affairs of other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Saudi Arabia has also threatened to block land and sea borders with Qatar. This blockade came to an end on 5 January 2021, when authorities from both Saudi and Qatar came on common grounds, with the midmanship of Kuwait.

Statistics

It is often reported from various sources, including the German domestic intelligence service (Bundesnachrichtendienst), that Salafism is the fastest-growing Islamic movement in the world. The Salafiyya movement has also gained popular acceptance as a "respected Sunni tradition" in Turkey starting from the 1980s, when the Turkish government forged closer ties to Saudi Arabia. This paved the way for cooperation between the Salafi Muslim World League and the Turkish Diyanet, which recognised Salafism as a traditional Sunni theological school, thus introducing Salafi teachings to Turkish society. Globally, Salafisation of Islamic religious discourse occurred simultaneously alongside the rise of pan-Islamist Movements, with an emphasis on the concept of Tawhid.

Other usage

Al-Salafiyya Al-Tanwiriyya (Enlightened Salafism)

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As opposed to the traditionalist Salafism discussed throughout this article, some Western academics and historians have used the term "Salafism" to denote modernists, "a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas" and "sought to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization". They are also known as Modernist Salafis. This trend, which was also known as Al-Salafiyya Al-Tanwiriyya (Enlightened Salafism) was represented by the Islamic scholars Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839-1897 C.E/ 1255-1314 A.H) and Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905 C.E/ 1265-1323 A.H ); whose writings had distinct Mu'tazilite and Sufi mystical inclinations opposed by Salafism.

The origins of contemporary Salafism in the modernist "Salafi Movement" of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh is noted by some, while others say Islamic Modernism only influenced contemporary Salafism. However, the former notion has been rejected by majority. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz:

There has been some confusion in recent years because both the Islamic modernists and the contemporary Salafis refer (referred) to themselves as al-salafiyya, leading some observers to erroneously conclude a common ideological lineage. The earlier salafiyya (modernists), however, were predominantly rationalist Asharis.

The second stage of Arab Salafiyya movement emerged after the First World War and was championed by the Syrian-Egyptian Islamic scholar Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935), who called for a purist return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. These Salafis favoured a literalist understanding of scriptures rather than the allegorical readings of Afghani and ʿAbduh, and were characterised by a deep resistance and hostility to Western imperialism and Western ideologies. Rida's Salafiyya also championed pan-Islamist fraternity encompassing Ahl-i Hadith in South Asia to the Arabian Wahhabis; and clashed with nationalist and secular trends throughout the Islamic World. These themes would be re-inforced and popularised by a number of similar-minded Islamic revivalists like Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949 C.E/1324-1368 A.H) in Egypt and other Islamic fundamentalists like Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979 C.E/1321-1399 A.H) in India.

Groups like Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami etc. are inspired by Salafism as well as the modernist movement. Muslim Brotherhood include the term salafi in the "About Us" section of its website.

Influence on contemporary Salafism

In terms of their respective formation, Wahhabism and Salafism are quite distinct. Wahhabism was a pared-down Islam that rejected modern influences, while Salafism sought to reconcile Islam with modernism. What they had in common is that both rejected traditional teachings on Islam in favor of direct, ‘fundamentalist’ reinterpretation. Although Salafism and Wahhabism began as two distinct movements, Faisal's embrace of Salafi (Muslim Brotherhood) pan-Islamism resulted in cross-pollination between ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings on Tawhid, Shirk and bid‘ah and Salafi interpretations of ahadith (the sayings of Muhammad). Some Salafis nominated ibn Abd al-Wahhab as one of the Salaf (retrospectively bringing Wahhabism into the fold of Salafism), and the Muwahidun began calling themselves Salafis.

In the broadest sense

In a broad sense, Salafism is similar to Non-denominational Islam (NDM), in the sense some of its adherents do not follow a particular creed. Salafi (follower of Salaf) means any reform movement that calls for resurrection of Islam by going back to its origin. In line with Wahhabism they promote a literal understanding of the sacred texts of Islam and reject other more liberal reformist movements such as those inspired for example by Muhammad Abduh or by Muhammad Iqbal.

Criticisms

Criticism

Due to its approach of rejecting taqlid, Salafiyya school is considered as deviant by certain ulema (clerics) of the Ash'arite and Maturidite schools, who champion themselves as the Sunni Islamic orthodoxy and believe Taqlid of the four madhabs to be wajib (obligatory) for the matter of Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Some of these Sunni scholars also accuse Salafis of falling into certain forms of unapparent tajsim and tashbih in 'Aqidah which they consider as deviation from orthodox Sunni doctrines, while clarifying that this deviancy does not expel them from the fold of Islam.

Some scholars of the Al-Azhar University of Cairo produced a work of religious opinions entitled al-Radd (The Response) to refute various views of the Salafi movement. Al-Radd singles out numerous Salafi aberrations – in terms of ritual prayer alone it targets for criticism the following Salafi claims:

• The claim that it is prohibited to recite God's name during the minor ablution ;
• The claim that it is obligatory for men and women to perform the major ablution on Friday ;
• The claim that it is prohibited to own a dog for reasons other than hunting ;
• The claim that it is prohibited to use alcohol for perfumes .

One of the authors of al-Radd, the Professor of Law Anas Abu Shady states that, "they want to be everything to everyone. They're interested not only in the evident (al-zahir), although most of their law goes back to the Muhalla , but they also are convinced that they alone understand the hidden (al-batin)!"

Sunni critics of Salafism accuse Salafis of altering the actual teachings of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and that of the other eponyms of the four Sunni legal schools. The Syrian Ash'arite scholar Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti wrote a number of works refuting Salafism including Al-La Madhhabiyya (Abandoning the Madhhabs) is the most dangerous Bid‘ah Threatening the Islamic Shari'a (Damascus: Dar al-Farabi 2010) and Al-Salafiyya was a blessed epoch, not a school of thought (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1990). The latter is perhaps the most widespread refutation of Salafism in the twentieth century.

Numerous academic rebuttals of Salafism have been produced in the English language by modernists such as Khaled Abou El Fadl of the UCLA School of Law, and by Sufi intellectuals like Timothy Winter of Cambridge University and G.F. Haddad. According to El Fadl, Islamist militant groups such as Al-Qaeda "derive their theological premises from the intolerant Puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds". He claimed that the intolerance and alleged endorsement of terrorism manifest in the fringe elements of Wahhabism and Salafism was due to a deviation from Muslim historical traditions. El-Fadl also argued that the Salafi methodology "drifted into stifling apologetics" by the 1960s, marked by "anxiety" to "render Islam compatible with modernity". These apologetic efforts sought the defense of Islamic traditions from the onslaught of Westernization; while simultaneously maintaining the supremacy of Islam and its compatibility with modernity. However, according to El Fadl, such efforts were being increasingly tainted by political opportunism and an unwillingness for critical engagement with the Islamic traditions.

The Saudi government has been criticised by the British tabloid The Independent, for its role in the destruction of early Islamic heritage sites in Arabia. There has been controversies over the recent expansionist projects in Mecca and Medina that destroyed historically important Islamic heritage sites to make way for "skyscrapers, shopping malls and luxury hotels". The actions of the Saudi government stirred controversy across the Muslim world and Islamic activists across all sects, including Salafis, Sufis, Shias, etc. ;condemned the actions of the Saudi government.

Abu Ammaar Yasir Qadhi, an American Islamic cleric and former Salafi, has critiqued what he perceived as the hostility of the movement against non-Salafi Muslims, as well as its lack of intellectualism. While noting his own belief that the of following the generations of the Salaf is "a fundamental part" of Islamic faith, he has stated his disagreement with the methodological approach of Salafism.

Western criticism

In 2012, German government officials alleged that Salafi Muslims in Germany had links to various Islamist militant groups but later clarified that not all Salafis are terrorists. The statements by German government officials criticizing Salafism were televised by Deutsche Welle during April 2012. According to the German political scientist Thorsten Gerald Schneiders, despite the Salafi claims to re-establish Islamic values and defend Islamic culture, some members of the movement interpret it in a manner which does not match with Islamic traditions and regard certain elements of Muslim culture such as poetry, literature, singing, philosophy, etc. as works of the devil. According to the French political scientist Olivier Roy, most of the third generation Western Muslim immigrants tend to adopt Salafism and some of them may break off from their family heritage, marrying other converts, rather than a bride from their country of origin, chosen by their parents. According to ex-CIA officer Marc Sageman, sections of the Salafi movement are linked to some Jihadist groups around the world, like Al-Qaeda.

However, according to other analysts, Salafis are not inherently political. Salafis may exhibit all sorts of diverse relations with the state depending on the environment, like the general populations to which they belong. They exhibit no demonstrable proclivity toward violence as a monolithic group. Those Salafis who engage in political participation or armed insurgencies, do so as part of a wider umbrella of political projects. Historian Roel Meijer has asserted that attempts to associate Salafi Muslims with violence by certain Western critics stem from the literature related to the state-sponsored "security studies" conducted by various Western governments during the early 2000s, as well as from Orientalist depictions that attempted to link Islamic revivalists with violence during the colonial era.

Prominent Salafis

• Abdur-Rahman al-Mu'allimee al-Yamani, Yemeni Scholar and the Librarian of the Grand Mosque's Library in Mecca (d.1966)
• Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, Saudi Grand Mufti (d. 1999)
• 'Abd al-Hamid ibn Baadis, an Algerian scholar (d. 1940)
• 'Abd al-Rahim Green
• Abdullah al-Ghudayyan, Saudi Arabian Salafi scholar (d. 2010)
• Abu Qatada, Palestinian-Jordanian cleric
• Ali al-Tamimi, contemporary American Islamic leader
• Bilal Philips, Canadian Salafi imam
• Ehsan Elahi Zaheer, Pakistani scholar (d. 1987)
• Feiz Mohammad
• Haitham al-Haddad, British Salafi cleric
• Ibn Taymiyyah, influential early Islamic scholar.
• Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti, a Mauritanian scholar (d. 1973)
• Muhammad Asadullah Al-Ghalib, a Bangladeshi reformist Islamic scholar and leader of the Salafi organisation Ahlehadith Movement Bangladesh
• Muhammad ibn Salih al-Munajjid, founder of IslamQA website
• Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, religious leader and scholar.
• Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani prominent Yemeni Islamic theologian, hadith scholar and jurist
• Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen, Saudi Arabian scholar (d. 1999)
• Muhammad Nasir al-Din Al-Albani, Syrian-Albanian hadith scholar and theologian (d. 1999)
• Muhammad Rashid Rida, a Syrian-Egyptian scholar (d. 1935)
• Rabee al-Madkhali, leader of the Madkhalist movement
• Saleh Al-Fawzan, a Saudi Arabian Islamic scholar
• Umar Sulaiman Ashqar, author of the Islamic Creed-series
• Zakir Naik, Salafi ideologue in India
• Zubair Alizai (1957–2013); Pakistani hadith scholar and Hafiz
• Othman al-Khamees, Salafi ideologue in Kuwait
• Abdur Razzaque Bin Yusuf, a Bangladeshi reformist Islamic scholar, Ahle Hadith leader and Founder of Al Jamiah As Salafiah

See also

• Deobandi movement
• International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism
• Islam in Saudi Arabia
• Islamic fundamentalism
• Islamic schools and branches
• Glossary of Islam#Manhaj
• Sufi–Salafi relations

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24. ^ "From there he learned to oppose taqlid in a madhab." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 174. "Al-Albani had denounced Wahhabi attachment to the Hanbali school." Stephane Lacroix, George Holoch, Awakening Islam, p. 85
25. Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism". Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62–63. ISBN 978-0-19-933343-1.
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27. Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism". Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 43. ISBN 978-0-19-933343-1.
28. Lacroix, Stéphane (2011). "Chapter 3: Resistance to Sahwa Ascendancy". Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press. pp. 84–85, 220. ISBN 978-0-674-04964-2.
29. Shaham, Ron (2018). Rethinking Islamic Legal Modernism. Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Publishers. p. 37. ISBN 978-90-04-36954-2. In setting forth these premises, Rida appears to prepare the ground to steer a middle course.. Rida did not ignore the rich heritage of Islamic law, as did a number of his strict Salafi contemporaries. Instead, following Ibn Taymiyya and especially his student Ibn al-Qayyim, he viewed the literature of the four Sunni law-schools (without committing himself to the teachings of one school in particular) as a resource from which to draw guidance and inspiration for adapting the law to changing circumstances
30. "For many Salafis, both modernist and conservative, "worship" of created beings includes practicing taqlid within a madhab of fiqh." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 165
31. Khan, Rehan (5 February 2020). "Salafi Islam and its Reincarnations- Analysis". Eurasia Review. Archived from the original on 5 Feb 2020.
32. Gauvain, Richard (2013). Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God. New York: Routledge. pp. 8, 11, 229–230, 328, 347. ISBN 978-0-7103-1356-0. the identity of many modern Salafis is dependent upon their departure from the established rulings of the four Sunni law schools (madhahib), including that of Ibn Hanbal. Modern Salafis generally dislike the practice of following the established rulings of any particular law school and view the principle of legal "imitation" (taqlid) as a significant factor in the overall decline of the Muslim Umma... Zahiri influence on modern Salafi legal thought occurs almost entirely through the Muhalla of Ibn Hazm, .... more important than Ibn Hazm's individual opinions to the Salafi scholars and ritual practitioners mentioned here is the unyielding Zahiri-style logic that underscores them... modern Salafis are endeavouring to shift Zahiri legal from the margins of orthodoxy into its centre
33. Haykel, Bernard (2009). "Chapter 1: On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action". In Meijer, Roel (ed.). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. pp. 35–36. ISBN 978-0-231-15420-8. And because of their adherence to a particular form of textual interpretation-one that emphasises a direct interfaçe with the texts of revelation.Salafis enjoy a relatively shallow and limited hierarchy of scholarly authoritics. Most Salafis -though not all- are unlike traditional, and pre-modern, Muslinms in that they do not subscribe to a developed and layered scholastic tradition of religious interpretation, which otherwise constrains and regulates, in rigorous tashion, the output of opinions. As such, it is striking how relatively easy it is to become an authority figure among the Salafis. In fact, as an interpretive community Salafıs are, in contrast to other Muslim traditions of learning, relatively open, even democratic
34. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 38–48
35. ^ Michael Cook, On the Origins of Wahhābism, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July, 1992), p. 198
36. Wagemakers, Joas (5 August 2016). "Salafism". Religion. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.255. ISBN 978-0-19-934037-8 – via Oxford Research Encyclopedias.
37. Evstatiev, Simeon. "Salafism as a contested concept." Knowledge, Authority and Change in Islamic Societies. Brill, 2021. p. 187
38. Bin Ali Mohamed Roots Of Religious Extremism, The: Understanding The Salafi Doctrine Of Al-wala Wal Bara World Scientific, 14.09.2015 9781783263943 p. 61
39. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36 "For the Atharis, the “clear” (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur’an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden. A strictly literal, or perhaps amodal, reading of the Qur’an, as opposed to one engaged in ta’wil (metaphorical interpretation), or an attempt to rationally conceptualize its meanings, cannot be questioned and the “real” meanings should be consigned to God."
40. Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, 2010: 36–7 "For the Atharis, the “clear” (i.e., zahir, apparent, or literal) meaning of the Qur’an and especially the prophetic traditions (ahadith) have sole authority in matters of belief, as well as law, and to engage in rational disputation (jadal), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden. A strictly literal, or perhaps amodal, reading of the Qur’an, as opposed to one engaged in ta’wil (metaphorical interpretation), or an attempt to rationally conceptualize its meanings, cannot be questioned and the “real” meanings should be consigned to God."
41. Bin Ali Mohamed Roots Of Religious Extremism, The: Understanding The Salafi Doctrine Of Al-wala Wal Bara World Scientific, 14.09.2015 9781783263943 pp. 62-63
42. ^ G. Rabil, Robert (2014). "1: The Creed, Ideology, and Manhaj (Methodology) of Salafism: A Historical and Contemporaneous Framework". Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism. Washington, DC, USA: Georgetown University Press. p. 26. ISBN 978-1-62616-116-0.
43. Shagaviev, Damir A., and Venera N. Khisamova. "Islamic theological literature of the Salafi sect in the modern Tatarstan." Journal of Sustainable Development 8.7 (2015): 84.
44. Umar, Muhammad Sani, and Mark Woodward. "The Izala effect: unintended consequences of Salafi radicalism in Indonesia and Nigeria." Contemporary Islam 14.1 (2020): 49-73.
45. Wagemakers, Joas (2016). "Salafism". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.255. ISBN 978-0-19-934037-8.
46. Umar, Muhammad Sani, and Mark Woodward. "The Izala effect: unintended consequences of Salafi radicalism in Indonesia and Nigeria." Contemporary Islam 14.1 (2020): 49-73.
47. Pall, Zoltan. Salafism in Lebanon: Local and transnational movements. Vol. 49. Cambridge Middle East Studies, 2018.
48. Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi movement." Studies in conflict & terrorism 29.3 (2006): 207-239.
49. G. Rabil, Robert (2014). "1: The Creed, Ideology, and Manhaj (Methodology) of Salafism: A Historical and Contemporaneous Framework". Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism. Washington, DC, USA: Georgetown University Press. pp. 27, 28. ISBN 978-1-62616-116-0.
50. Hanif, N. Biographical Encyclopaedia of Sufis: Central Asia and Middle East. Vol. 2. Sarup & Sons, 2002. p. 45
51. Umar, Muhammad Sani, and Mark Woodward. "The Izala effect: unintended consequences of Salafi radicalism in Indonesia and Nigeria." Contemporary Islam 14.1 (2020): 49-73.
52. Rothenberg, Celia E. "Islam on the Internet: the jinn and the objectification of Islam." The Journal of Religion and Popular Culture 23.3 (2011): 358-371.
53. TY - Jour Au - Østebø, Terje PY - 2014 DA - 2014/01/01 TI - The revenge of the Jinns: spirits, Salafi reform, and the continuity in change in contemporary Ethiopia JO - Contemporary Islam SP - 17 EP - 36 VL - 8 IS - 1 AB - The point of departure for this article is a story about jinns taking revenge upon people who have abandoned earlier religious practices. It is a powerful account of their attempt to free themselves from a past viewed as inhabited by evil forces and about the encounter between contemporary Salafi reformism and a presumed disappearing religious universe. It serves to prove how a novel version of Islam has superseded former practices; delegitimized and categorized as belonging to the past. The story is, however, also an important source and an interesting entry-point to examine the continued relevance of past practices within processes of reform. Analyzing the story about the jinns and the trajectory of Salafi reform in Bale, this contribution demonstrates how the past remains intersected with present reformism, and how both former practices and novel impetuses are reconfigured through this process. The article pays attention to the dialectics of negotiations inherent to processes of reform and points to the manner in which the involvement of a range of different actors produces idiosyncratic results. It challenges notions of contemporary Islamic reform as something linear and fixed and argues that such processes are multifaceted and open-ended. SN - 1872-0226 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-013-0282-7 DO - 10.1007/s11562-013-0282-7 ID - Østebø2014 ER -
54. Stephen Burge Angels in Islam: Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti's al-Haba'ik fi Akhbar al-malik Routledge 2015 ISBN 978-1-136-50473-0 p. 13-14
55. Gauvain, Richard (2013). "3: Pure bodies, purer hearts". Salafi Ritual Purity. 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge. pp. 68, 69. ISBN 978-0-7103-1356-0. In Sunni Islam's classical hadith texts, there exists a firm connection between Muslim notions of impurity and supernatural forces. Numerous hadiths describe the children of Shaytan (al-shayatin) and jinn as lurking in bathrooms and bedrooms, waiting for the physical defenses of Muslims to be lowered, so that they can enter the bodies of the latter. Although never a pressing concern, such ideas inform the tahara legal material in a handful of places. The conviction that mankind shares his planet with these creatures is accepted by virtually all Muslims in Shubra, and its Salafi groups are no exception. Here, no one doubts that demons are capable of entering our bodies and, on occasion, of possessing them outright. Be this as it may, in the Salafis' classes on tahara and the discussions afterwards, there is virtually no mention of supernatural creatures..For the Shubra Salafi shaykhs, by contrast, it is only Shaytan who is capable of negatively affecting our ritual relationship to God, through his "whispers" (wasawisu).{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
56. Friedl, E. (2020). Religion and Daily Life in the Mountains of Iran: Theology, Saints, People. Vereinigtes Königreich: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 86
57. SHIGERU KAMADA* A STUDY OF THE TERM SIRR (SECRET) IN SUFI LATA'IF THEORIES p. 18
58. Marion Holmes Katz Body of Text: The Emergence of the Sunni Law of Ritual Purity SUNY Press, 2012 ISBN 978-0-7914-8857-7 p. 13
59. Gauvain, Richard (2013). "3: Pure bodies, purer hearts". Salafi Ritual Purity. 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017: Routledge. pp. 68, 69. ISBN 978-0-7103-1356-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
60. Welch, Alford T. (2008) Studies in Qur'an and Tafsir. Riga, Latvia: Scholars Press. p. 756.
61. Gauvain, Richard (2013). Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God. Abingdon, England, the U.K.: Routledge. pp. 69–74. ISBN 978-0-7103-1356-0.
62. Omar Hamdan Studien zur Kanonisierung des Korantextes: al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrīs Beiträge zur Geschichte des Korans Otto Harrassowitz Verlag 2006 ISBN 978-3447053495 pp. 291–292 (German)
63. Wheeler, Brannon M. (2002). Prophets in the Quran: An Introduction to the Quran and Muslim Exegesis. London, England: A&C Black. p. 16. ISBN 978-0-826-44957-3.
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65. Kefeli, A. (2022). "The Return of Jinn and Angels: Repairing Access to Prophetic Authority in Tatarstan". In Muslim Religious Authority in Central Eurasia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004527096_004
66. Hoover, Jon (2019). Ibn Taymiyya (Makers of the Muslim World). 10 Bloomsbury Street, London WC1B 3SR, England: Oneworld Academic. pp. 11, 19, 46–47, 88, 140. ISBN 978-1-78607-689-2.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
67. Schmidtke, Sabine (2016). The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 635. ISBN 978-0-19-969670-3. Ibn Taymiyya also speaks of the priority of worship and ethics over metaphysics in theological terms that later became widespread among Wahhābīs and modern Salafīs. He distinguishes two tawḥīds, or two ways of confessing God's unity. Ibn Taymiyya's first tawḥīd is that of God's divinity (ulūhiyya). Al-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya signifies God's sole worthiness to be a god, that is, God's sole right to be an object of worship (ʿibāda). Al-tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya is exclusive worship of God that refuses to give devotion and love to anything or anyone else. Then flowing out from this is the second tawḥīd, the tawḥīd of God's lordship (rubūbiyya). God's lordship refers to His creative power, and al-tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya means confessing that God is the only source of created beings
68. Schmidtke, Sabine (2016). The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 427, 626, 641–642. ISBN 978-0-19-969670-3.
69. C. Martin, Richard (2004). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. New York: Macmillan Reference USA. p. 468. ISBN 0-02-865603-2.
70. Bosworth, Donzel, Heinrichs, Lecomte, C. E. , E. Van , W. P. , G. (1997). The Encyclopedia of Islam:New Edition Vol. IX. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. p. 400. ISBN 90-04-10422-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
71. Leaman, Oliver (2006). The Qur'an: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis. pp. 631–633. ISBN 0-415-32639-7.
72. Lauziere, Henri (2010). "The Construction Ofsalafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 42 (3): 369–389. doi:10.1017/S0020743810000401.
73. Leaman, Oliver (2006). The Qur'an: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge: Taylor & Francis. p. 282. ISBN 0-415-32639-7. Ibn Taymiyya's works extend to almost every area of contemporary intellectual life... Nearly all of his works are in the style of a refutation or a critique,... He embodies the theology of the Salafi (Traditionalist) movement and all his works are intense, focused and well-argued.
74. "Is it permissible for people to call themselves "Ahl al-Hadeeth"". Islam Helpline.
75. Ibn Taymiyya, Ahmad. Majmu al-Fatawa Vol.1. Cairo, Egypt: Dar al-Hadith. p. 141.
76. S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999). Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. pp. 258–259. ISBN 0-8108-3609-2.
77. ^ Cite error: The named reference Harvard Divinity was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
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79. ^ Esposito, John L.; Shahin, Emad El-Din (1 November 2013). The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics. OUP USA. p. 38. ISBN 9780195395891.
80. ^ Dubler, Joshua (2010). "Salafi Muslims". In Edward E. Curtis (ed.). Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History. Infobase Publishing. p. 499. ISBN 9781438130408.
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82. S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999). Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. pp. 258, 259. ISBN 0-8108-3609-2. AL-SALAFIYYA. .. Among the movement's notables were Shaykh Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Shaykh 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar, and Shaykh Tahir Bin al-Tazairy.
83. Mattar, Philip (2004). Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa Second Edition Volume IV. Macmillan Reference USA, 27500 Drake Rd. Farmington Hills, MI 48331-3535: Macmillan Reference USA. p. 1923. ISBN 0-02-865773-X. Rida made the Islamic umma (community) his central concern, asking why it had declined relative to the modern West and blaming the decline on medieval additions to Islam—such as the reverence for Sufi saints—which had obscured the pure religion of the ancestors (salaf, from which comes the name for the Salafiyya movement){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
84. S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999). Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. p. 259. ISBN 0-8108-3609-2. AL-SALAFIYYA. .. The Salafi call in Arab East was secretive until the end of World War I. After that, the Salafi ideas spread and were established among the intelligentsia.
85. ^ C. Martin, Richard (2016). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World Second Edition. 27500 Drake Rd., Farmington Hills, MI, 48331-3535: Gale. p. 955. ISBN 978-0-02-866269-5. He was also much more politically oriented... seeing the institution of an Islamic state as the precursor to the application of Islamic law and the promotion of Islamic social mores. Rida thus laid the intellectual foundations for a more conservative strand of Salafi reformism, one that is associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The reformism of Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), the principal ideologues of the Brotherhood, reflects Rida's influence in its advocacy of a holistic conception of Islamic state and society, in which sharia regulates all spheres of life.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
86. Bennett, Clinton; Shepard, William (2013). "6: Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements". The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies. 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK: Bloomsbury. p. 171. ISBN 978-1-4411-2788-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
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88. ^ Lauzière, Henri (24 July 2008). The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the life and thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. Phd Dissertation Georgetown University. p. 63.
89. ^ Lauzière, Henri (24 July 2008). The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the life and thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. Phd Dissertation Georgetown University. p. 65.
90. ^ Ridgeon, Lloyd (2015). Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age. 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 3, 15. ISBN 978-1-4725-2387-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
91. Ágoston, Masters, Gábor, Bruce (2009). "Salafiyya". Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. Facts On File, Inc., An imprint of Infobase Publishing, 132 West 31st Street, New York NY 10001: Facts on File. pp. 500–501. ISBN 978-0-8160-6259-1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
92. Tucker, Spencer C.; Roberts, Priscilla (12 May 2008). The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History [4 volumes]: A Political, Social, and Military History. ABC-CLIO. p. 975. ISBN 9781851098422.
93. Sinan Siyech, Mohammed (4 February 2020). "What Makes a Movement Violent: Comparing the Ahle Hadith (Salafists) in India and Pakistan". MEI. Archived from the original on 18 April 2021.
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97. W. Brown, Daniel (1999). "Chapter 2: The emergence of modern Challenges to tradition". Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 22–26. ISBN 9780521653947.
98. Ahsan, Sayyid (1987). "IV Foundations of the Saudi State- ll : Reforms of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab". Trends in Islam in Saudi Arabia. Department of Islamic Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University. pp. 141–142.
99. W. Brown, Daniel (1999). "Chapter 2: The emergence of modern Challenges to tradition". Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27–30. ISBN 9780521653947.
100. Weismann, Itzchak (2001). "Between Ṣūfī Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya from the Damascene Angle". Die Welt des Islams. 41 (2). Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden: Brill Publishers: 206–237. doi:10.1163/1570060011201286. JSTOR 1571353 – via JSTOR.
101. Dean Commins, David (1990). Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 24–26. ISBN 0-19-506103-9.
102. Weismann, Itzchak (2001). Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. pp. 263–271, 273–276. ISBN 90-04-11908-6.
103. Mubarak, Hadia (2022). "1: Ruptures and Continuities in Modern Islamic Thought". Rebellious Wives, Neglectful Husbands: Controversies in Modern Qurʾanic Commentaries. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 39–41. ISBN 978-0-19-755330-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
104. Weismann, Itzchak (2001). Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. pp. 273–274. ISBN 90-04-11908-6.
105. Weismann, Itzchak (2001). "Between Ṣūfī Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya from the Damascene Angle". Die Welt des Islams. 41 (2). Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden: Brill Publishers: 206–237. doi:10.1163/1570060011201286. JSTOR 1571353 – via JSTOR.
106. Ridgeon, Lloyd (2015). Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age. 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 3, 16. ISBN 978-1-4725-2387-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
107. Frampton, Martyn (2018). The Muslim Brotherhood and the West: A History of Enmity and Engagement. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 22–23. ISBN 9780674970700.
108. Ismail, Raihan (2021). "Transnational Networks". Rethinking Salafism: The Transnational Networks of Salafi ʿUlama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 180. ISBN 9780190948955.
109. Mubarak, Hadia (2022). "1: Ruptures and Continuities in Modern Islamic Thought". Rebellious Wives, Neglectful Husbands: Controversies in Modern Qurʾanic Commentaries. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 39–40. ISBN 978-0-19-755330-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
110. Weismann, Itzchak (2001). "Introduction". Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus. Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. p. 7. ISBN 90-04-11908-6.
111. S. Moussalli, Ahmad (1999). Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey. Folkestone, Kent: The Scarecrow Press. p. 259. ISBN 0-8108-3609-2. AL-SALAFIYYA. .. In Damascus, many Jordanian students were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's Shaykh Mustapha al-Siba'i and 'Isam al-'Attar, both with a long history in al-Salafiyya. In Damascus, the movement had a large following, including Allama Shaykh Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, 'Ali al-Tantawi, Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Shaykh 'Abd al-Fattah al-Imam, Mazhar al-'Azma, Shaykh al-Bashir al Ibrahimi, Dr. Taqiy al-Din al-Hilal, Shaykh Muhiy al Din al-Qulaybi and Shaykh 'Abd Allah al-Qalqayli. The Islamic Bookstore in Lebanon owned by Zuhayr Shawish printed many of the movement's books.
112. Lauziere, Henri (2016). The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 46–49. ISBN 978-0-231-17550-0.
113. Lauziere, Henri (2016). The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 49. ISBN 978-0-231-17550-0.
114. Weismann, Adawi, Itzchak, Rokaya (17 March 2021). "Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar and the Decline of Modernist Salafism in Twentieth-century Syria". Journal of Islamic Studies. 32 (2): 237–256. doi:10.1093/jis/etab017 – via Academia.edu.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
115. Meijer, Roel (2014). "Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism". Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 47, 59–60, 63–64, 73. ISBN 978-0-19-933343-1.
116. Olidort, Jacob (2015). "A New Curriculum: Rashīd Riḍā and Traditionalist Salafism". In Defense of Tradition: Muhammad Naşir Al-Dīn Al-Albānī and the Salafī Method. Princeton, NJ, U.S.A: Princeton University. pp. 49, 52–54.
117. Mubarak, Hadia (2022). "1: Ruptures and Continuities in Modern Islamic Thought". Rebellious Wives, Neglectful Husbands: Controversies in Modern Qurʾanic Commentaries. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 40–41. ISBN 978-0-19-755330-5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
118. Murray-Miller, Gavin (2022). "3: Pan-Islamism and Ottoman Imperialism". Empire Unbound: France and the Muslim Mediterranean, 1880–1918 (1st ed.). 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America: Oxford University Press. p. 74. ISBN 978-0-19-286311-9.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
119. Wood, Graeme (2017). The Way of the Strangers. Random House. p. 22.
120. Haykel, Bernard (2009). Meijer, Roel (ed.). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. p. 35. ISBN 978-0-231-15420-8. Salafi teachings and ideas have become pervasive in recent decades so that many modern Muslims -even ones who do not identify formally as being Salafi- are attracted to certain aspects of Salafism, namely its exclusive emphasis on textual forms of authority, its theology that attacks Ashari voluntarism, its pared down version of legal interpretation and its call for reform of Muslim belief and practice by, among other things, returning to the model of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions
121. ^ Stephane Lacroix, "Al-Albani's Revolutionary Approach to Hadith" Archived 10 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine. Leiden University's ISIM Review, Spring 2008, #21.
122. ^ Kepel, Gilles (2006). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 9781845112578. Retrieved 28 January 2014.
123. ^ For example: "Salafism originated in the mid to late 19th-century as an intellectual movement at al-Azhar University, led by Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935)." from Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism Archived 3 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine, by Trevor Stanley. Terrorism Monitor Volume 3, Issue 14. 15 July 2005
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Further reading

• Muhammad in History, Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God (2 vols.), Edited by C. Fitzpatrick and A. Walker, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2014. ISBN 1610691776.
• Botobekov, Uran (2021). "How Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Groups are Exploiting the Covid-19 Pandemic: New Opportunities and Challenges". In Käsehage, Nina (ed.). Religious Fundamentalism in the Age of Pandemic. Religionswissenschaft. Vol. 21. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. pp. 107–148. doi:10.14361/9783839454855-005. ISBN 978-3-8376-5485-1.

• Salafi movement
• Islamic fundamentalism
• Sunni Islamic branches
• 19th-century Islam