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=== Temperature and Weather Changes === | === Temperature and Weather Changes === | ||
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There is regional and seasonal variability of droughts in Syria. Autumn seasons have experienced slight increases in rainfall, where critical agricultural seasons such as winter and spring have steadily declined. Additionally, the Southwestern portion of the country, near to the Mediterranean, has experienced minor increases in rainfall, while the Northwestern portion has steadily declined.<ref name=":0" /> Drought risks have been found to be greatest in areas such as Al Qadmus.<ref name=":3" /> he Syrian Drought, from 2006-2011, is one of the worst in the region’s history, and led to widespread agricultural failures, especially in the northeastern portion of the country. Farming and herding communities were deeply affected. The crisis compelled many rural Syrians to migrate to cities<ref name=":5" /> |
There is regional and seasonal variability of droughts in Syria. Autumn seasons have experienced slight increases in rainfall, where critical agricultural seasons such as winter and spring have steadily declined. Additionally, the Southwestern portion of the country, near to the Mediterranean, has experienced minor increases in rainfall, while the Northwestern portion has steadily declined.<ref name=":0" /> Drought risks have been found to be greatest in areas such as Al Qadmus.<ref name=":3" /> he Syrian Drought, from 2006-2011, is one of the worst in the region’s history, and led to widespread agricultural failures, especially in the northeastern portion of the country. Farming and herding communities were deeply affected. The crisis compelled many rural Syrians to migrate to cities.<ref name=":5" /> While the period of time is consistent with decreasing rainfall data, some studies argue that the Syrian Drought was not a part of long term drying trends attributed to climate change.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last=Selby |first=Jan |last2=Dahi |first2=Omar |last3=Fröhlich |first3=Christiane |last4=Hulme |first4=Mike |date=September 2017 |title=Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629816301822 |journal=Political Geography |volume=60 |pages=232-244 |via=Science Direct}}</ref> | ||
There are persistent heatwaves in Syria, particularly since the 2010s. Compound events, which are hot and dry conditions simultaneously, have grown in frequency. These heatwaves have an annual frequency increase of 6.3%. Such extremes are particularly pronounced in northeastern and southwestern Syria.<ref>Mathbout , S., & Martin Vide, J. (n.d.). (working paper). ''Climate extremes: Characteristics of dry and compound hot - dry events in Syria over the last 120 years''. Barcelona.</ref> Both frequency and severity of extreme heat events are expected to rise significantly, which is especially true for densely populated areas. The number of people exposed to extreme heat is also projected to increase, as urban populations in Syria are expected to become more vulnerable.<ref>Hamed, M. M., Al-Hasani, A. A. J., Nashwan, M. S., Sa’adi, Z., & Shahid, S. (2024). Assessing the growing threat of heat stress in the North Africa and Arabian Peninsula region connected to climate change. ''Journal of Cleaner Production'', ''447'', 141639. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141639</nowiki></ref> | There are persistent heatwaves in Syria, particularly since the 2010s. Compound events, which are hot and dry conditions simultaneously, have grown in frequency. These heatwaves have an annual frequency increase of 6.3%. Such extremes are particularly pronounced in northeastern and southwestern Syria.<ref>Mathbout , S., & Martin Vide, J. (n.d.). (working paper). ''Climate extremes: Characteristics of dry and compound hot - dry events in Syria over the last 120 years''. Barcelona.</ref> Both frequency and severity of extreme heat events are expected to rise significantly, which is especially true for densely populated areas. The number of people exposed to extreme heat is also projected to increase, as urban populations in Syria are expected to become more vulnerable.<ref>Hamed, M. M., Al-Hasani, A. A. J., Nashwan, M. S., Sa’adi, Z., & Shahid, S. (2024). Assessing the growing threat of heat stress in the North Africa and Arabian Peninsula region connected to climate change. ''Journal of Cleaner Production'', ''447'', 141639. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.141639</nowiki></ref> | ||
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=== Water Resources === | === Water Resources === | ||
] | ] | ||
The effect of climate change on Syria is reflected primarily by its water scarcity issues. The Middle East is an arid climate, and climate change exacerbates its existing low precipitation levels and susceptibility to drought. Syria’s overall rainfall has decreased over time between 1991 to 2009, particularly in the northwestern portion of the country in the winter and spring.<ref name=":0">Zeleňáková, M., Abd-Elhamid, H. F., Krajníková, K., Smetanková, J., Purcz, P., & Alkhalaf, I. (2022). Spatial and temporal variability of rainfall trends in response to climate change—a case study: Syria. ''Water'', ''14''(10), 1670. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.3390/w14101670</nowiki> </ref> Reports until 2011 show similar trends, along with increases in average temperatures, which have resulted in extreme droughts.<ref name=":1">''Climate change risk profile - syria''. USAID: From the American People. (n.d.). <nowiki>https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2017_USAID_GEMS_Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Profile_Syria.pdf</nowiki> </ref> These periods of drought have also grown in frequency and severity from the late 1990s onwards, with some lasting up to 200 days.<ref name=":2">Skaf M., Mathbout S. Drought changes over the last five decades in Syria. In: López-Francos A. (comp.), López-Francos A. (collab.). ''Economics of drought and drought preparedness in a climate change context'' . Zaragoza: CIHEAM / FAO / ICARDA / GDAR / CEIGRAM / MARM, 2010. p. 107-112. (Options Méditerranéennes: Series A. Séminaires Méditerranéens; n. 95). 2. International Conference on Drought Management, 2010/03/04-06, Istanbul (Turkey). <nowiki>http://om.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a95/00801334.pdf</nowiki></ref> Notable periods of drought include: 1998-1999, 2007-2008, 1972-1973, 2014, and 2016. |
The effect of climate change on Syria is reflected primarily by its water scarcity issues. The Middle East is an arid climate, and climate change exacerbates its existing low precipitation levels and susceptibility to drought. Syria’s overall rainfall has decreased over time between 1991 to 2009, particularly in the northwestern portion of the country in the winter and spring.<ref name=":0">Zeleňáková, M., Abd-Elhamid, H. F., Krajníková, K., Smetanková, J., Purcz, P., & Alkhalaf, I. (2022). Spatial and temporal variability of rainfall trends in response to climate change—a case study: Syria. ''Water'', ''14''(10), 1670. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.3390/w14101670</nowiki> </ref> Reports until 2011 show similar trends, along with increases in average temperatures, which have resulted in extreme droughts.<ref name=":1">''Climate change risk profile - syria''. USAID: From the American People. (n.d.). <nowiki>https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/2017_USAID_GEMS_Climate%20Change%20Risk%20Profile_Syria.pdf</nowiki> </ref> These periods of drought have also grown in frequency and severity from the late 1990s onwards, with some lasting up to 200 days.<ref name=":2">Skaf M., Mathbout S. Drought changes over the last five decades in Syria. In: López-Francos A. (comp.), López-Francos A. (collab.). ''Economics of drought and drought preparedness in a climate change context'' . Zaragoza: CIHEAM / FAO / ICARDA / GDAR / CEIGRAM / MARM, 2010. p. 107-112. (Options Méditerranéennes: Series A. Séminaires Méditerranéens; n. 95). 2. International Conference on Drought Management, 2010/03/04-06, Istanbul (Turkey). <nowiki>http://om.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a95/00801334.pdf</nowiki></ref> Notable periods of drought include: 1998-1999, 2007-2008, 1972-1973, 2014, and 2016.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3">Abd‐Elhamid, H. F., Zeleňáková, M., Soľáková, T., Saleh, O. K., & El‐Dakak, A. M. (2023). Monitoring flood and drought risks in arid and semi‐arid regions using remote sensing data and standardized precipitation index: A case study of syria. ''Journal of Flood Risk Management'', ''17''(1). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12961</nowiki> </ref> | ||
Syria’s water scarcity due to drought is likely to continue intensifying, aligning with IPCC predictions of reduced rainfall in the Mediterranean<ref name=":0" /> |
Syria’s water scarcity due to drought is likely to continue intensifying, aligning with IPCC predictions of reduced rainfall in the Mediterranean.<ref name=":0" /> Between 2021 to 2050, temperatures could increase by approximately 1.6-2°C, with precipitation dropping by approximately 11% in the winter and 8% in the spring.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal |last=Smiatek |first=Gerhard |last2=Kaspar |first2=Severin |last3=Kunstmann |first3=Harald |date=1 April 2013 |title=Hydrological Climate Change Impact Analysis for the Figeh Spring near Damascus, Syria |url=https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/hydr/14/2/jhm-d-12-065_1.xml?tab_body=pdf |journal=Journal of Hydrometeorology |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=577–593 |via=American Meteorological Society}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> By 2070-2099, temperatures could rise by 4°C, with an overall decrease of 22% in annual precipitation across the region.<ref name=":6" /> These reports also predict a 25-27% reduction in runoff, resulting in prolonged dry spells, coastal flooding, and intensified dust storms.<ref name=":1" /> The Figeh Spring, a critical water source near Damascus, Syria, is predicted to decrease its peak spring discharge by 20% by 2050, and up to 50% by the end of the century. Reduced recharge due to less snow and higher evapotranspiration could lead to a 9-30% decrease in annual discharge by the century’s end. The decline of Figeh Spring’s water output poses risks for Damascus’ water supply.<ref name=":6" /> | ||
== Impacts on People == | == Impacts on People == | ||
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=== Agriculture === | === Agriculture === | ||
] | ] | ||
Climate change’s influence on drought periods have had effects on Syria’s agricultural systems.<ref name=":1" /> Only 10% of Syria’s farmland is irrigated, with its remaining portion relying on rainfall. Declining rainfall, poor irrigation practices, and government neglect of rural areas weakened food security and employment. Wheat production, for example, fell significantly, forcing Syria to import it for the first time.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Akhmedkhodjaeva |first=Nodira |date=2 November 2024 |title=Drought in Syria |url=https://www.thealeppoproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Drought-in-Syria-HD.pdf |url-status=live |website=The Aleppo Project}}</ref> This severe strain on Syria’s agriculture sector is due to climate change-driven drought, resulting in intensified water scarcity. Projected climate changes could further reduce agricultural productivity and increase soil salinity<ref name=":1" /> |
Climate change’s influence on drought periods have had effects on Syria’s agricultural systems.<ref name=":1" /> Only 10% of Syria’s farmland is irrigated, with its remaining portion relying on rainfall. Declining rainfall, poor irrigation practices, and government neglect of rural areas weakened food security and employment. Wheat production, for example, fell significantly, forcing Syria to import it for the first time.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Akhmedkhodjaeva |first=Nodira |date=2 November 2024 |title=Drought in Syria |url=https://www.thealeppoproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Drought-in-Syria-HD.pdf |url-status=live |website=The Aleppo Project}}</ref> This severe strain on Syria’s agriculture sector is due to climate change-driven drought, resulting in intensified water scarcity. Projected climate changes could further reduce agricultural productivity and increase soil salinity.<ref name=":1" /> This is especially true for areas such as the Fertile Crescent, an area crucial for agriculture, where decreased precipitation has resulted in major crop losses<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Kelley |first=Colin |date=2 March 2015 |title=Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought |url=https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.1421533112 |journal=PNAS |volume=112 |issue=11 |via=PNAS}}</ref>. Syria’s unsustainable use of water resources and depleted river levels have long presented risks, with future climate trends likely to worsen groundwater depletion and drive greater reliance on rainfall.<ref name=":1" /> | ||
Climate change has caused considerable damage to the livelihood of Syrian farmers. Droughts and desertification have caused a massive exodus of around 1.5 million people from rural agricultural communities to urban environments. These droughts, combined with government mismanagement, caused roughly 800,000 farmers to lose their livelihoods.<ref name=":1" /> The economic impacts of climate change on Syria are also projected to be devastating, with predictions stating that any given Syrian household, rural or urban, stands to lose 1.6 to 2.8 percent of their welfare annually due to climate change.<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |date=June 2011 |title=Global and Local Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Syria and Options for Adaptation |url=https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b5863299-8e47-4c0a-8e43-53d7fc6a651f/content |journal=International Food Policy Research Institute |pages=1-64 |via=Cgiar}}</ref> The poorest groups of farmers have the least amount of resources to recover from droughts. Therefore, they are disproportionately affected by water shortages.<ref name=":10" /> Moreover, they take longer to recover financially.<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |date=2012 |editor-last=Al-Riffai |editor-first=Perrihan |editor2-last=Breisinger |editor2-first=Clemens |editor3-last=Verner |editor3-first=Dorte |editor4-last=Zhu |editor4-first=Tingju |title=Droughts in Syria: An Assessment of Impacts and Options for Improving the Resilience of the Poor |url=https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/155471/?v=pdf |journal=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture |series=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 51 (2012) |doi=10.22004/ag.econ.155471}}</ref> | Climate change has caused considerable damage to the livelihood of Syrian farmers. Droughts and desertification have caused a massive exodus of around 1.5 million people from rural agricultural communities to urban environments. These droughts, combined with government mismanagement, caused roughly 800,000 farmers to lose their livelihoods.<ref name=":1" /> The economic impacts of climate change on Syria are also projected to be devastating, with predictions stating that any given Syrian household, rural or urban, stands to lose 1.6 to 2.8 percent of their welfare annually due to climate change.<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |date=June 2011 |title=Global and Local Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Syria and Options for Adaptation |url=https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b5863299-8e47-4c0a-8e43-53d7fc6a651f/content |journal=International Food Policy Research Institute |pages=1-64 |via=Cgiar}}</ref> The poorest groups of farmers have the least amount of resources to recover from droughts. Therefore, they are disproportionately affected by water shortages.<ref name=":10" /> Moreover, they take longer to recover financially.<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |date=2012 |editor-last=Al-Riffai |editor-first=Perrihan |editor2-last=Breisinger |editor2-first=Clemens |editor3-last=Verner |editor3-first=Dorte |editor4-last=Zhu |editor4-first=Tingju |title=Droughts in Syria: An Assessment of Impacts and Options for Improving the Resilience of the Poor |url=https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/155471/?v=pdf |journal=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture |series=Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 51 (2012) |doi=10.22004/ag.econ.155471}}</ref> | ||
=== '''Human Health''' === | === '''Human Health''' === | ||
The drought in Syria from 2006-2010 decreased agricultural productivity and food access, as well as water scarcity. Scarcity of clean water, especially after Syria's major drought, has increased the risk of waterborne disease. Limited sanitation infrastructure has exacerbated health vulnerabilities, along with displacement and overcrowding which has increased disease transmission<ref name=":15">Bellizzi, S., Lane, C., Elhakim, M., & Nabeth, P. (2020). Health consequences of drought in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean region: Hotspot areas and needed actions. ''Environmental Health'', ''19''(1). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-020-00665-z</nowiki></ref>. Syria’s climate-related impacts may worsen nutrition due to food insecurity related to agricultural productivity losses. Waterborne diseases may also increase, with risks of malaria and vector-borne diseases caused by shifting climates and increases in drought-resilient rodent populations<ref name=":1" /> |
The drought in Syria from 2006-2010 decreased agricultural productivity and food access, as well as water scarcity. Scarcity of clean water, especially after Syria's major drought, has increased the risk of waterborne disease. Limited sanitation infrastructure has exacerbated health vulnerabilities, along with displacement and overcrowding which has increased disease transmission<ref name=":15">Bellizzi, S., Lane, C., Elhakim, M., & Nabeth, P. (2020). Health consequences of drought in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean region: Hotspot areas and needed actions. ''Environmental Health'', ''19''(1). <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-020-00665-z</nowiki></ref>. Syria’s climate-related impacts may worsen nutrition due to food insecurity related to agricultural productivity losses. Waterborne diseases may also increase, with risks of malaria and vector-borne diseases caused by shifting climates and increases in drought-resilient rodent populations.<ref name=":1" /> The World Health Organization has called for increased support in disease surveillance, mental health services, and emergency preparedness. WHO advocates for targeted aid to address these health impacts.<ref name=":15" /> | ||
There are also health damages associated with Syria's electricity generation system. Heavy fuel oil power plants, due to high sulfur content, generate significant health-related costs through pollutants that lead to respiratory and cardiovascular issues. The costs of these health issues vary significantly depending on the population density around the power plants. Facilities near densely populated areas, like Damascus, result in higher health costs due to more people being exposed to pollutants.<ref>Hainoun, A., Almoustafa, A., & Seif Aldin, M. (2010). Estimating the health damage costs of Syrian electricity generation system using impact pathway approach. ''Energy'', ''35''(2), 628–638. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.10.034</nowiki></ref> | There are also health damages associated with Syria's electricity generation system. Heavy fuel oil power plants, due to high sulfur content, generate significant health-related costs through pollutants that lead to respiratory and cardiovascular issues. The costs of these health issues vary significantly depending on the population density around the power plants. Facilities near densely populated areas, like Damascus, result in higher health costs due to more people being exposed to pollutants.<ref>Hainoun, A., Almoustafa, A., & Seif Aldin, M. (2010). Estimating the health damage costs of Syrian electricity generation system using impact pathway approach. ''Energy'', ''35''(2), 628–638. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.10.034</nowiki></ref> | ||
=== Conflict === | === Conflict === | ||
The major drought in early 2000s affected agricultural production Economic factors have driven force of unrest, along with their failure to address a rising humanitarian crisis<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=de Châtel |first=Francesca |title=Green Planet Blues |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |edition=6 |pages=1-19}}</ref> |
The major drought in early 2000s affected agricultural production Economic factors have driven force of unrest, along with their failure to address a rising humanitarian crisis.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last=de Châtel |first=Francesca |title=Green Planet Blues |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |edition=6 |pages=1-19}}</ref> The discontent in rural areas went back several years before the major drought. Syrian media outlets were also a factor, as they excluded coverage of the drought and its economic and political consequences.<ref name=":9" /> More comprehensively, climate change, poor water management, and lack of governmental support were all major elements that eventually led to the Syrian civil war.<ref name=":9" /> | ||
== Mitigation == | == Mitigation == | ||
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== Policy == | == Policy == | ||
Syria has a number of climate policies which it is involved in, with some being through the UNFCCC. This includes the 2010 Greenhouse Gas Inventory.<ref name=":1" /> | Syria has a number of climate policies which it is involved in, with some being through the UNFCCC. This includes the 2010 Greenhouse Gas Inventory.<ref name=":1" /> | ||
The country's internal environmental legislation is vague and hard to enforce, especially due to the unrest caused by the Syrian Civil war.<ref name=":16">{{Cite journal |last=Prus |first=Alexandra |date=2020-09-30 |title=Protection of the Environment through the Lens of Syria: Scrutinizing the Loopholes in the Prevailing Legislative Framework |url=https://ugp.rug.nl/GROJIL/article/view/37075/34591 |journal=Groningen Journal of International Law |language=en |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=48–68 |doi=10.21827/GroJIL.8.1.48-68 |issn=2352-2674}}</ref> Deliberate environmental attacks have proved hard to stop or are hard to enforce given the vague and high thresholds of both Syrian environmental law as well as international humanitarian and environmental laws.<ref name=":16" /> | |||
] | ] | ||
In an attempt to improve the country's food production and irrigating parts of the Middle Eastern Steppe, the Syrian government has instituted several policies centered around expanding irrigation, damming and the construction of reservoirs. The findings on the sustainability of these projects was inconclusive, however, it was found that irrigation of certain areas led to increased soil salinization.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hole |first=F. |last2=Zaitchik |first2=B. F. |date=15 March 2007 |title=Policies, plans, practice, and prospects: irrigation in northeastern Syria |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ldr.772 |journal=Land Degradation & Development |language=en |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=133–152 |doi=10.1002/ldr.772 |issn=1085-3278}}</ref> | In an attempt to improve the country's food production and irrigating parts of the Middle Eastern Steppe, the Syrian government has instituted several policies centered around expanding irrigation, damming and the construction of reservoirs. The findings on the sustainability of these projects was inconclusive, however, it was found that irrigation of certain areas led to increased soil salinization.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hole |first=F. |last2=Zaitchik |first2=B. F. |date=15 March 2007 |title=Policies, plans, practice, and prospects: irrigation in northeastern Syria |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ldr.772 |journal=Land Degradation & Development |language=en |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=133–152 |doi=10.1002/ldr.772 |issn=1085-3278}}</ref> | ||
Fighting desertification and deforestation has also been a focus of the Syrian government as well as forestry NGOs operating in the region.<ref name=":17">{{Cite journal |last=Al Berni |first=Rim Rateb |date=2010-01-01 |title=An Investigation into Sustainable Forest Policies and Practices in Syria |url=https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk/gees-theses/277/ |journal=School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Theses}}</ref> Only 3% of Syria's land area is forest, and many communities living in those areas use the forest as a resource, but come into conflict with farmers illegally grazing their livestock in and around the forests.<ref name=":17" /> | |||
⚫ | |||
⚫ | == References == | ||
] | ] |
Revision as of 03:40, 15 November 2024
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The effects of global climate change in Syria are considerable. It has adverse effects on the livelihoods of the people as well as its environment. Climate change-induced droughts, water shortages, temperature rises and soil degradation affect particularly agriculture. The Syrian Arab Republic, as a developing and non-industrialized country that located in arid to semi-arid region. Desertification, which has historically been an issue in the region, is accelerating due to climate change. Syria has ratified the Paris Treaty, and submitted its Nationally Determined Contributions and focus on both adaptation and mitigation measures for the period 2020-2030. While it has contributed to only 0.1% of global emissions, it is highly vulnerable to climate change.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Energy
Syria prepared it first national communication on climate change in 2010. Its total GHG emissions reached 79.07 TGCO2 eq in 2005. The emissions originated mainly in the energy sector (73%), followed by agriculture sector (18%). These two sectors contributed to more than 90% of all emissions in Syria. Waste has also contributed to emissions, responsible for approximately 5% amongst all sectors from 1994-2005. Waste primarily emitted methane from organic waste in landfills and untreated sewage, though carbon dioxide accounts for the majority of emissions due to the use of fossil fuels in electricity and transport.
There is high reliance on fossil fuels for energy in Syria, and electricity demand is projected to increase by 2030, especially for industry activity such as automation. However, conflict in Syria has caused electricity generation to decrease by nearly 40% in recent years due to plant destruction and fuel shortages. Electricity access in daily life for Syrians has also been altered due to conflict. Electricity to residents of Syria is largely provided by private diesel generators, which is costly and limited in hours of use. Conflict has increased household electricity expenditures while also decrease household income. Some households have since turned to solar energy as a supplementary source of energy, though high costs limit widespread adoption.
Impact on the Natural Environment
Temperature and Weather Changes
There is regional and seasonal variability of droughts in Syria. Autumn seasons have experienced slight increases in rainfall, where critical agricultural seasons such as winter and spring have steadily declined. Additionally, the Southwestern portion of the country, near to the Mediterranean, has experienced minor increases in rainfall, while the Northwestern portion has steadily declined. Drought risks have been found to be greatest in areas such as Al Qadmus. he Syrian Drought, from 2006-2011, is one of the worst in the region’s history, and led to widespread agricultural failures, especially in the northeastern portion of the country. Farming and herding communities were deeply affected. The crisis compelled many rural Syrians to migrate to cities. While the period of time is consistent with decreasing rainfall data, some studies argue that the Syrian Drought was not a part of long term drying trends attributed to climate change.
There are persistent heatwaves in Syria, particularly since the 2010s. Compound events, which are hot and dry conditions simultaneously, have grown in frequency. These heatwaves have an annual frequency increase of 6.3%. Such extremes are particularly pronounced in northeastern and southwestern Syria. Both frequency and severity of extreme heat events are expected to rise significantly, which is especially true for densely populated areas. The number of people exposed to extreme heat is also projected to increase, as urban populations in Syria are expected to become more vulnerable.
Water Resources
The effect of climate change on Syria is reflected primarily by its water scarcity issues. The Middle East is an arid climate, and climate change exacerbates its existing low precipitation levels and susceptibility to drought. Syria’s overall rainfall has decreased over time between 1991 to 2009, particularly in the northwestern portion of the country in the winter and spring. Reports until 2011 show similar trends, along with increases in average temperatures, which have resulted in extreme droughts. These periods of drought have also grown in frequency and severity from the late 1990s onwards, with some lasting up to 200 days. Notable periods of drought include: 1998-1999, 2007-2008, 1972-1973, 2014, and 2016.
Syria’s water scarcity due to drought is likely to continue intensifying, aligning with IPCC predictions of reduced rainfall in the Mediterranean. Between 2021 to 2050, temperatures could increase by approximately 1.6-2°C, with precipitation dropping by approximately 11% in the winter and 8% in the spring. By 2070-2099, temperatures could rise by 4°C, with an overall decrease of 22% in annual precipitation across the region. These reports also predict a 25-27% reduction in runoff, resulting in prolonged dry spells, coastal flooding, and intensified dust storms. The Figeh Spring, a critical water source near Damascus, Syria, is predicted to decrease its peak spring discharge by 20% by 2050, and up to 50% by the end of the century. Reduced recharge due to less snow and higher evapotranspiration could lead to a 9-30% decrease in annual discharge by the century’s end. The decline of Figeh Spring’s water output poses risks for Damascus’ water supply.
Impacts on People
Agriculture
Climate change’s influence on drought periods have had effects on Syria’s agricultural systems. Only 10% of Syria’s farmland is irrigated, with its remaining portion relying on rainfall. Declining rainfall, poor irrigation practices, and government neglect of rural areas weakened food security and employment. Wheat production, for example, fell significantly, forcing Syria to import it for the first time. This severe strain on Syria’s agriculture sector is due to climate change-driven drought, resulting in intensified water scarcity. Projected climate changes could further reduce agricultural productivity and increase soil salinity. This is especially true for areas such as the Fertile Crescent, an area crucial for agriculture, where decreased precipitation has resulted in major crop losses. Syria’s unsustainable use of water resources and depleted river levels have long presented risks, with future climate trends likely to worsen groundwater depletion and drive greater reliance on rainfall.
Climate change has caused considerable damage to the livelihood of Syrian farmers. Droughts and desertification have caused a massive exodus of around 1.5 million people from rural agricultural communities to urban environments. These droughts, combined with government mismanagement, caused roughly 800,000 farmers to lose their livelihoods. The economic impacts of climate change on Syria are also projected to be devastating, with predictions stating that any given Syrian household, rural or urban, stands to lose 1.6 to 2.8 percent of their welfare annually due to climate change. The poorest groups of farmers have the least amount of resources to recover from droughts. Therefore, they are disproportionately affected by water shortages. Moreover, they take longer to recover financially.
Human Health
The drought in Syria from 2006-2010 decreased agricultural productivity and food access, as well as water scarcity. Scarcity of clean water, especially after Syria's major drought, has increased the risk of waterborne disease. Limited sanitation infrastructure has exacerbated health vulnerabilities, along with displacement and overcrowding which has increased disease transmission. Syria’s climate-related impacts may worsen nutrition due to food insecurity related to agricultural productivity losses. Waterborne diseases may also increase, with risks of malaria and vector-borne diseases caused by shifting climates and increases in drought-resilient rodent populations. The World Health Organization has called for increased support in disease surveillance, mental health services, and emergency preparedness. WHO advocates for targeted aid to address these health impacts.
There are also health damages associated with Syria's electricity generation system. Heavy fuel oil power plants, due to high sulfur content, generate significant health-related costs through pollutants that lead to respiratory and cardiovascular issues. The costs of these health issues vary significantly depending on the population density around the power plants. Facilities near densely populated areas, like Damascus, result in higher health costs due to more people being exposed to pollutants.
Conflict
The major drought in early 2000s affected agricultural production Economic factors have driven force of unrest, along with their failure to address a rising humanitarian crisis. The discontent in rural areas went back several years before the major drought. Syrian media outlets were also a factor, as they excluded coverage of the drought and its economic and political consequences. More comprehensively, climate change, poor water management, and lack of governmental support were all major elements that eventually led to the Syrian civil war.
Mitigation
Syria has moderate fossil fuel reserves, including oil and natural gas, though both contribute to emissions and therefore climate change. There have been significant efforts to expand natural gas for electricity production. Fossil fuels in the past and in modern day dominate energy sources, though hydropower is also a dominant source in Syria’s energy profile. Renewable energy has been increasingly considered for long-term sustainability. The Syrian Civil War has also caused considerable damage to the country's infrastructure in areas such as healthcare and residential, which has lowered the ability of the country to respond to the negative effects of climate change.
Syria's poor electricity infrastructure lacks capacity to endure extreme weather events such as heat waves, which are projected to worsen. Syria’s demand for cooling systems has also increased with urbanization, population growth, and rising temperatures.
Adaptation
Syria has high potential for utilization of solar energy, with average irradiance levels about 5 kWh/m²/day. Solar water heating systems have been in use, and there have also been plans to expand photovoltaic systems for both residential and rural applications. The Wind Atlas for Syria shows promising wing speeds in central, southern, and coastal areas. With these speeds, Syria has the potential to produce 85,000 MW of wind energy. Biomass resources, including animal and agricultural waste, are sufficient to produce approximately 357 million m³ of biogas annually. While hydropower energy sources are significant, it is ongoingly limited by low precipitation and reliance on international rivers.
Policy
Syria has a number of climate policies which it is involved in, with some being through the UNFCCC. This includes the 2010 Greenhouse Gas Inventory.
The country's internal environmental legislation is vague and hard to enforce, especially due to the unrest caused by the Syrian Civil war. Deliberate environmental attacks have proved hard to stop or are hard to enforce given the vague and high thresholds of both Syrian environmental law as well as international humanitarian and environmental laws.
In an attempt to improve the country's food production and irrigating parts of the Middle Eastern Steppe, the Syrian government has instituted several policies centered around expanding irrigation, damming and the construction of reservoirs. The findings on the sustainability of these projects was inconclusive, however, it was found that irrigation of certain areas led to increased soil salinization.
Fighting desertification and deforestation has also been a focus of the Syrian government as well as forestry NGOs operating in the region. Only 3% of Syria's land area is forest, and many communities living in those areas use the forest as a resource, but come into conflict with farmers illegally grazing their livestock in and around the forests.
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