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The Battle of Zawichost (1205) was fought between Roman the Great of Galicia-Volhynia and Leszek the White of Sandomierz (in Lesser Poland), along with his brother Konrad I of Masovia. After declaring war and invading Lesser Poland, Roman and his forces (druzhina) were ambushed by the Poles in the vicinity of Zawichost by the river Vistula (Wisła). In the tumult that followed, Roman was killed and the Polish victory would lead to growing power for Leszek and Konrad, while triggering a war of succession in Galicia–Volhynia. The battle is considered one of the greatest victories of medieval Poland.

Background

The motives behind Roman Mstislavovich's campaign remain unclear to this day and are the subject of much debate among historians. Historical sources do not provide a clear cause, which has led to many different hypotheses based on the analysis of available chronicles and political events from the turn of the 12th and 13th centuries.

Hypotheses

One of the more popular interpretations is the so-called Saxon hypothesis, based on the Chronicle of the Cistercian monk Alberic of Trois-Fontaines. According to this source, Roman's campaign was linked to internal power struggles in Germany. It is assumed that the expedition may have been part of a wider political game in which Roman was involved by rival parties in the Empire. Although this hypothesis is supported by some Western European sources, there is no direct evidence of Roman's active involvement in German conflicts. A second interpretation is the so-called Greater Poland hypothesis, which indicates that Roman's actions were the result of internal conflicts between the Polish Piasts. Particular attention is paid to the tensions between Władysław Laskonogi and Leszek the White, which may have prompted Roman to intervene. The Galician–Volhynian Chronicle (c. 1290) indicates that Leszek the White was in conflict with Władysław Laskonogi, and that Roman was supposed to act in favour of one of these rulers. This interpretation has gained popularity in Polish historiography, but later analyses point to its doubts. Historian Artur Foryt suggests that although Roman may have acted in the context of Polish conflicts, it is likely that his actions were motivated by personal goals rather.

According to Ruthenian Hypothesis, the cause of the conflict may have been Roman Mstislavovich's refusal to recognise the supremacy of Leszek the White. This attitude may have provoked the Prince of Galicia-Volhynia to start hostilities. It is possible that earlier Leszek concluded an agreement with Roman, under which Roman pledged certain obligations to the Polish ruler. These obligations may have formed the basis of Leszek's claims against Roman. The Wielkopolska Chronicle, on the other hand, indicates that the main point of contention was Roman's refusal to pay tribute to Leszek. The conflict over tribute was crucial in escalating tensions between the two sides and may have been the direct cause of the outbreak of war.

Hypothesis according to Jan Długosz

According to Jan Długosz, there are several reasons attributed to Roman Mstislavovich's actions. Among them are the enormous wealth gained in Rus at a time when almost the entire country was under his control, the dispersion and dissolution of his forces - both cavalry and infantry - among the numerous Polish principalities, and conflicts between Polish magnates. Another factor was the young age and inexperience of Leszek the White and Konrad I of Masovia , which may have weakened their ability to manage the situation effectively. Roman's actions may also have been motivated by the failure of negotiations with Leszek and Konrad. According to accounts, the Prince of Galicia-Volhynia demanded the handover of the land of Lublin and compensation for the losses suffered during the Battle of the Mozgawa. However, the response of the Polish rulers was decidedly negative - they refused to meet these demands, arguing that Roman, by leaving the battlefield, forfeited his right to any claims.

Długosz further explains that before crossing the Polish frontier, Roman sent emissaries to the Bishop of Volodimer' and asked for his blessing, as he intended to campaign in Poland for three years. The Bishop declined Roman's gifts and denied him any blessing, explaining that "he cannot bless Roman or his enterprise, since he has previously started unjust and wicked wars and is again embarking on one that is quite unjustified, considering that the Poles have so often exposed their bodies to danger and death to defend the Ruthenians against the barbarians." Roman responded by telling the bishop that he will cut his head off when he returns from his victory.

Strengths of the parties

Ruthenian forces

To this day, it is not precisely established how numerous a force Roman the Great amassed during his expedition against the Poles. However, in the light of the available historical sources and analyses, several conclusions can be drawn on this subject. The nature of the expedition, which aimed to intervene militarily in Polish lands, indicates that Roman led a relatively large army, capable of carrying out an offensive deep into the enemy's territory. The Rocznik Krakowski, one of the key sources describing the events of the period, states that the size of the Ruthenian army was around 13,000 men. This figure was for some time accepted by historians as reliable. On the basis of this figure, attempts were made to estimate the mobilisation capacity of the Galician-Volyhnian principality during Roman rule. Modern historical research, however, casts doubt on this figure. Historian Arthur Foryt points out that these figures may be exaggerated and suggests that the size of Roman's army was between 5,000 and 7,500 men. According to Foryt, the size of this force was more in line with the logistical capacity of the principality and the nature of the conflict.

An equally important factor to take into account is the power of the Duchy of Galician-Volhynian in the time of Roman Mstislavovich. This principality was one of the richest and best developed politically and militarily regions of Rus. Roman, as the ruler of this territory, had the resources to maintain a large and well-equipped army, which gave him a significant advantage in clashes with neighbouring states. However, the exact date of the completion of the mobilisation of the army before the expedition against the Poles is not known. The process may have depended on a number of factors, such as the political situation in the region, the availability of resources, and the time it took to gather troops from different parts of the principality. Discussions on the size of Roman forces and the date of mobilisation remain open in historiography. Differences in estimates are due to the lack of clear evidence in the sources and discrepancies in their interpretation by researchers.

Polish forces

Meanwhile, the Polish forces were much less numerous compared to the army of Roman the Great. The mobilisation capacity of the Duchy of Mazovia and the Duchy of Sandomierz was limited due to the small human and economic resources of both regions. It is estimated that the army organised by Leszek the White and Konrad I of Masovia numbered between 2,000 and 2,500 soldiers. Command of the Polish forces was entrusted to the Mazovian Voivode Krystyn, who played a key role in organising the defence and in directing the troops in the decisive battle. Despite the crushing numerical superiority of the Ruthenian army, the outcome of the campaign was not determined solely by the strength of the army. Knowledge of the terrain, effective tactics and probable errors in command on the Roman side played a significant role in the Polish victory.

Before battle

The siege of Łuków and Lublin and the activities of the

The course of Roman Mstislavovich's campaign against the Polish lands remains unclear and difficult to fully reconstruct, mainly due to contradictions in historical sources. Jan Długosz gives a detailed description of the actions in his chronicles, but much important information has been omitted or is not confirmed in other accounts. According to Długosz, Roman held negotiations with two Polish bishops, indicating attempts to resolve the conflict diplomatically, but these talks were unsuccessful. The chronicler also mentions the siege of Lublin by the Ruthenians, but the city was ultimately not captured. Długosz's concise description of the siege remains unconfirmed in other sources. The reasons for the campaign are also controversial. There are two main hypotheses. The first assumes that Roman's actions were a response to provocation by the Poles. The second suggests that Roman acted on his own initiative, driven by an ambition to subjugate Polish lands, in particular the Duchy of Sandomierz.

Historian Artur Foryt provides a detailed breakdown of Roman's campaign into several key stages. The first of these was the strike against the Polish lands, concentrated towards Drohiczyn. This was followed by clashes with a small Polish force of only a few hundred warriors, fielded by Leszek the White and Konrad I of Masovia. The next stage was the siege of several Polish strongholds - according to Foryt, most probably Łuków and Lublin, both of which were to be captured by the Ruthenians. The Polish troops were forced to retreat beyond the Vistula, and the Ruthenian army followed their lead, reaching the Zawichost area in the second half of June.

Prelude

However, the exact location of Roman's crossing of the Vistula is not known. Some sources suggest that it may have taken place south of Zawichost, which raises discrepancies in determining the location of the key battle. The initial phase of the campaign brought success to the army of the Ruthenian prince. Roman managed to capture several strongholds and forced the Polish forces to withdraw. On 18 June, the Ruthenian army established a camp, which marked an important point in the further course of the campaign. Despite the initial successes, the final fate of the expedition depended on further developments, which required Roman to face logistical difficulties and possible resistance from the Poles.

Battle

Earliest accounts

The Suzdalian Chronicle of the Laurentian Codex (compiled in 1377) mentions that "Roman of Halych took on Poles and conquered cities. And stopped at the Vistula River with his small druzhina. Poles then attacked and killed him with the druzhina. And people from Halych came, took their dead prince and carried him to Halych and buried him in a church." Perfecky (1973) interpreted the Suzdalian account as saying that 'Roman died while out on patrol and not in battle.'

The Galician–Volhynian Chronicle (c. 1292) does not provide a coherent narrative of how Roman died, instead repeatedly recording several events "after Roman's death" (opening sentence, sub anno 6709, 6710, 6711). The closet it gets is mentioning in passing that after Roman's death, the Galician boyars invited the Igorevichi princes to the throne; in the confusing attack that followed, Roman's wife Anna-Euphrosyne and sons first fled to Volodimer and then to Poland: 'They did not know where to turn: Prince Roman had been killed in Poland and Lestko had not yet concluded peace. But the Lord interceded in their behalf: Lestko made no mention of the hostilities and received his sister-in-law and her children with great honor. He took pity on them and remarked that the devil had caused this enmity to come between them. And indeed Volodislav had plotted discord between , for he was envious of the amicable relations that existed .' The chronicler thus blamed Władysław Laskonogi (Volodislav Tonkonogij) for the conflict. Mykhailo Hrushevsky suggested that, if true, Władysław's attempts to undermine the Leszek–Roman alliance probably began in 1202, when Władysław was driven out of Kraków by Leszek, although Hrushevsky could not say whether this was the real reason behind the clash.

Długosz version (1480)

Writing almost three centuries after the events, Polish chronicler Jan Długosz (1480) published a lengthy and detailed story about what supposedly happened. In the early spring, Roman invaded the land of Lublin and laid siege to the city. The Polish garrison was successful in defending the city, but the Rus'ian caused great destruction to the local population, as they captured and raped the wives of the knights of Lublin. Leszek then started recruiting a force of knights and peasants from Sandomierz, Kujawy, and Mazovia, which was reinforced with a force of volunteers from Kraków. When Roman learned of the Polish force that was advancing towards him, he raised the siege and advanced deep into Poland by pillaging and threatening with devastation and eradication of the Latin rite. Several bishops and nobles approached Roman and asked for peace, promising to pay compensation; Roman accepted, but continued with the war. He captured some priests and had them shot at with arrows, hoping to have the location of Leszek disclosed. Długosz gives a detailed description of the battle.

Many of the Rus' drowned and many more died at the hands of the local population, as Polish troops chased them all the way to Volodimer'. Few survived the massacre and at the order of Leszek and Konrad, Roman's body was buried in Sandomierz. The two factions came to an agreement and the Ruthenians released all their prisoners and paid 1,000 silver marks to recover the body of Roman, which was then buried in Volodimer'.

Aftermath

After his triumph, Leszek's reputation took a positive turn, earning him credibility and the trust of Kraków, which would give him temporary power over the city. Konrad, coming of age, asked for his share of power and at the meditation of their mother and a selected group of aristocrats, the two brothers divide the country under their authority. Rus' turned unstable from its internal conflicts and the country is invaded by Lithuanians, this being the first time the Poles hear of that name. The Ruthenians suffered great casualties, but managed to defeat the invaders. In 1208, the country fell into civil war.

Notes

1. According to Polish historian Artur Foryt, who wrote a work on the battle, the 13,000-strong Ruthenian army is incorrect, claiming that this is due to a misreading of the local chronicle by most Polish historians. He believes that the Ruthenian forces could have numbered between 5,000 and 7,500 men.
2. Original text: "Тогож̑ лѣт̑ . ходиша кнѧзи Рѧзаньскъıӕ В на Половци и взѧша вежѣ ихъ ❙ Тогож̑ . лѣт̑ . Иде Романъ Галичьскъıи на Лѧхъı и взѧ . в҃ . города Лѧдьскаӕ . и ставшю же ѥму над Вислою рѣкою . и ѿѣха сам̑ в малѣ дружинѣ ѿ полку своѥго . Лѧхове же наѣхавше оубиша и . и дружину ѡколо ѥго избиша . приѣхавше же Галичане взѧша кнѧзѧ своѥго мр҃тва . и несоша и в Галичь . и положиша и въ цр҃кви ст҃ъıӕ Бц҃а".)
3. 'Leszek reaches the Vistula and gets his army across, partly in boats, partly by fording, for, thanks to a drought, there are a number of places where the river is so shallow as to allow this, and pitches camp outside Zawichost. When his scouts report the approach of the Poles, Roman laughs at them. Then some soldiers confirm what the scouts have said, but Roman still does not believe them, saying that the Poles will never engage him in battle. Then, at dawn, on June 19, the Feast of the martyrs SS Gervase and Protase, Leszek and Konrad arrive on the scene. Their army, commanded by the Voivode of Mazovia, is already in battle array and ready to fight. The shooting of the Polish archers and the pressure of the Polish attack is such that, in so narrow an area Roman is scarcely able to array his first line. The two armies raise a clamour and engage with spears and lances poised. Although Leszek and Konrad are present, they are not allowed to take part in the fighting but have to remain at a distance, where they await the result, torn between fear and hope. The Poles rout the Ruthenian first line, and it seems that Fortune is favouring them; however, having so many knights, Roman is able to replace those who fall or are wounded. The Poles are not angry with the Ruthenians but with their duke, who to them is a traitor, a breaker of faith and a deserter, and they are after his blood. They surround him, where he is fighting in the front rank, identifiable by his ducal emblems. Roman, seeing those with him hewn down before his eyes and realizing that escape is made difficult by the heaps of bodies on either side, digs his spurs into his horse, which tries to throw him, but he manages to get through the press and reach the river and there his horse falls. Now, how is he to get across and escape? A soldier brings him an old jage, which with great difficulty does get him to the far bank, where he mingles with the throng of fleeing soldiery, only to be rounded up by the Poles and, being taken for a common soldier, cut down. A number of Roman's knights and soldiers are standing on the bank of the river they have just managed to cross, watching the flight of their fellows, when the bank, ripped by the hooves of the struggling horses, is no longer able to bear their weight and collapses. The Ruthenians are now all seeking safety in flight, which means flinging themselves into the river.'

References

1. ^ Perfecky 1973, p. 128.
2. ^ The Annals of Jan Długosz p. 153
3. ^ Perfecky 1973, pp. 127–128.
4. Foryt 2021, p. 121.
5. ^ Foryt 2021, p. 119.
6. ^ The Annals of Jan Długosz p. 154
7. Słupecki Leszek P., (1999) Bitwa pod Zawichostem, 19 czerwca 1205, Szkice Zawichojskie, red. Teresa Dunin-Wąsowicz, Stanisław Tabaczyński, Wydawnictwo Instytutu Archeologii i Etnologii PAN, Zawichost (in Polish)
8. Foryt 2021, p. 108—110.
9. Perfecky 1973, pp. 127–128, 130.
10. Foryt 2021, p. 110.
11. (in Russian) Valentin Yanin; L. M. Popova, N. I. Shchaveleva, "Velikaia khronika" o Polshe, Rusi i i Moscow University, OCLC 22324865
12. Foryt 2021, p. 111.
13. Foryt 2021, p. 111, 112.
14. Foryt 2021, p. 112—114.
15. Foryt 2021, p. 114—117.
16. ^ Długosz 1480, p. 153.
17. Foryt 2021, p. 117—120.
18. ^ Foryt 2021, p. 118.
19. Foryt 2021, p. 120.
20. Foryt 2021, p. 120—122.
21. Foryt 2021, p. 122.
22. Foryt 2021, p. 122—124.
23. Foryt 2021, p. 127.
24. Foryt 2021, p. 128.
25. Foryt 2021, p. 128—133.
26. *Suzdal Chronicle Laurentian Codex
27. Perfecky 1973, pp. 17–19.
28. Perfecky 1973, pp. 18–19.
29. ^ Perfecky 1973, p. 130.
30. ^ The Annals of Jan Długosz p. 155
31. The Annals of Jan Długosz p. 156

Bibliography

Primary sources

Primary sources in Latin

• Długosz, Jan (1480). Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae (Annals or Chronicles of the Famous Kingdom of Poland).
  • (in English) The Annals of Jan Długosz (English translation of key sections of the work) ISBN 1-901019-00-4
• Chronica Poloniae Maioris or Wielkopolska Chronicle ("Chronicle of Greater Poland") (c. 1290).
  • (in Russian) Chapter 31 (Russian translation available online)
• Kadłubek, Wincenty, Chronica seu originale regum et principum Poloniae (1208).
• Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica Albrici Monachi Trium Fontium (1251).

Primary sources in Church Slavonic and Ruthenian

• Galician–Volhynian Chronicle (c. 1292). Preserved in the Hypatian Codex (c. 1425) and Khlebnikov Codex (c. 1560s).
  • (in Ruthenian) Галицько-Волинський Літопис. Іпатіївський список (according to the Hypatian Codex) – Litopys.org.ua
  • (in Ruthenian) Галицько-Волинський Літопис. Острозький (Хлєбниковський) список (according to the Khlebnikov Codex) – Litopys.org.ua
  • (in Ukrainian) Галицько-Волинський Літопис. Переклад Л.Махновця (in modern Ukrainian by L. Makhnovtsya) – Litopys.org.ua
  • (in English) Perfecky, George A. (1973). The Hypatian Codex Part Two: The Galician–Volynian Chronicle. An annotated translation by George A. Perfecky (PDF). Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. OCLC 902306.
• (in Church Slavonic) Suzdalian Chronicle of the Laurentian Codex (1377).

Literature

• Foryt, Artur (2021). Zawichost 1205 (in Polish). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Bellona. ISBN 978-83-11-16068-2.

• (in Ukrainian) Dovidnyk z istoriï Ukraïny, 3-Volumes, Article "Roman Mstyslavych" (T.3), Kyiv, 1993–1999, ISBN 5-7707-5190-8 (t. 1), ISBN 5-7707-8552-7 (t. 2), ISBN 966-504-237-8 (t. 3).
• (in Ukrainian) Ivan Kryp'yakevych, Halych Volynian principality (Kiev 1984).
• (in Ukrainian) Roman Mstyslavych in Енциклопедія українознавства (Encyclopedia of Ukrainian studies). 3 volumes. (Kyiv 1994). ISBN 5-7702-0554-7.
  • (in English) "Roman Mstyslavych". Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. 2001.

50°48′22″N 21°51′32″E / 50.805980°N 21.858755°E / 50.805980; 21.858755

• 1205 in Europe
• Battles involving Kievan Rus'
• Battles involving Poland
• History of Galicia (Eastern Europe)
• Conflicts in 1205
• 13th century in Kievan Rus'
• Kingdom of Galicia–Volhynia