| Revision as of 19:54, 27 April 2008 editGodRousingDogPipes (talk | contribs)50 edits Moore is fine with defining THE good, as he puts it; what he's concerned with is the property (or the 'predicate' or 'notion') goodness← Previous edit | Revision as of 02:41, 7 July 2009 edit undoTisthammerw (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users1,242 edits Limited cleanup; put in some references; deleted last paragraph since that had more to do with noncognitivism than moral naturalismNext edit → | ||
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| ==Description== | |||
| The '''Open Question Argument''' is a philosophical ] put forward by the British philosopher ] in . It sets out to demonstrate the predicate "good" cannot be defined using natural terms: Good cannot be called blue, or rough, or smooth, or smelly - it lacks natural properties. That being said, "good," Moore argued, is not a supernatural property. He merely said that trying to define it using natural terms led to the "]". Moore argues that the question of "What is good?" is an open one. | The '''Open Question Argument''' is a philosophical ] put forward by the British philosopher ] in . It sets out to demonstrate the predicate "good" cannot be defined using natural terms: Good cannot be called blue, or rough, or smooth, or smelly - it lacks natural properties. That being said, "good," Moore argued, is not a supernatural property. He merely said that trying to define it using natural terms led to the "]". Moore argues that the question of "What is good?" is an open one. | ||
| The argument hinges on the nature of statements such as "Anything that is pleasant is also good" and the possibility of asking questions such as "That thing is pleasant but is it good?" According to Moore, these questions are ''open'' and these statements are ''significant''; and they will remain so no matter what is substituted for "pleasure". Moore concludes from this that any analysis of value is bound to fail. In other words, if value could be analyzed, then such questions and statements would be trivial and obvious. Since they are anything but trivial and obvious, value must be indefinable. | The argument hinges on the nature of statements such as "Anything that is pleasant is also good" and the possibility of asking questions such as "That thing is pleasant but is it good?" According to Moore, these questions are ''open'' and these statements are ''significant''; and they will remain so no matter what is substituted for "pleasure". Moore concludes from this that any analysis of value is bound to fail. In other words, if value could be analyzed, then such questions and statements would be trivial and obvious. Since they are anything but trivial and obvious, value must be indefinable. | ||
| ==Objections and rejoinders== | |||
| Critics of Moore's arguments sometimes claim that he is appealing to general puzzles concerning analysis (cf. ]), rather than revealing anything special about value. Other responses appeal to the ]an distinction between ], allowing that value concepts are special and ''sui generis'', but insisting that value properties are nothing but natural properties (this strategy is similar to that taken by ] in ]). | Critics of Moore's arguments sometimes claim that he is appealing to general puzzles concerning analysis (cf. ]), rather than revealing anything special about value. Other responses appeal to the ]an distinction between ], allowing that value concepts are special and ''sui generis'', but insisting that value properties are nothing but natural properties (this strategy is similar to that taken by ] in ]). | ||
| An important response to the open question argument by contemporary ethical naturalists (e.g., ]) is to understand a claim like "goodness is identical with pleasure" as an ] identity claim on a par with "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O". The question "This is H<sub>2</sub>O but is it water?" is intelligible and so, in that limited |
An important response to the open question argument by contemporary ethical naturalists (e.g., ]) is to understand a claim like "goodness is identical with pleasure" as an ] identity claim on a par with "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O". The question "This is H<sub>2</sub>O but is it water?" is intelligible and so, in that limited senhttp://en.wikipedia.org/Wikipedia:Verifiabilityse, whether or not water is H<sub>2</sub>O is an open question, note that this does not address the issue of <i>significance</i>. But that does not lead us to conclude that water is not H<sub>2</sub>O. "Water is H<sub>2</sub>O" is an identity claim that is known to be true ] (i.e., it was discovered via empirical investigation). Another example is "redness" being identical to a certain phenomenon of electromagnetism. This is discovered by empirical investigation. | ||
| Similarly, many moral naturalists argue that "rightness" being the property of "maximizing utility" is an '']'' truth because we invoke rightness and wrongness to explain certain empirical phenomenal, and then discover ''a posteriori'' that maximizing utility occupies the relevant explanatory role.<ref>The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 28</ref>. For example, they argue that since right actions contingently have certain effects e.g. being causally responsible for a tendency towards social stability--so it follows we can fix the term "right" refer to the empirical description "the property of acts, whatever it is, that is causally responsible for their tendency towards social stability."<ref>The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 28</ref> With this description for "right," we can then investigate which acts accomplish this: e.g. those actions that maximize utility. We can then conclude that we have learned that "right" refers to "maximizing utility" through a posteriori means. | |||
| A rebuttal to this is that trying to find an a posteriori means to learn what moality is, such as the above, run into the Open Question argument all over again.<ref>The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 28</ref> For example, it may be that we learn a posteriori that "redness" refers to having certain electromagnetic properties, but first we must attach an initial, a priori definitional reference to the term "redness"--e.g. "that which produces the sensation 'red' to normal perceivers under standard conditions." Because the Open Question argument applies to ''all'' ''a priori'' statements of morality<ref>The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 29</ref>, it applies to the claim that "rightness" refers to "the property of acts, whatever it is, that is causally responsible for their tendency towards social stability." Whether rightness refers to that is an open question. The moral non-naturalist could argue that any attempt to make an initial identity reference is susceptible to the open question argument. | |||
| A moral naturalist could then respond however that "rightness" is analytically equivalent (essentially, true by definition, like 2 + 2 is equivalent to 4) to "the property of acts that is causally responsible for social stability," even if this equivalency does not appear obvoius <ref>The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 31</ref>. From there, both sides could dispute the plausibility of such equivalence statements being true by definition. | |||
| ==Notes== | |||
| The fact that this truth is not known merely by conceptually analyzing the term "water" (and the corresponding fact that the aforementioned open question is at least intelligible) does not falsify the identity claim. Similarly, an ethical naturalist might argue that, say, "goodness is identical with pleasure" is an a posteriori identity claim whose truth is discovered empirically. That we can intelligibly ask "I see that this is pleasant, but is it good?" simply means that we cannot conceptually analyze "good" in terms of "pleasure". It does not mean that goodness is not the same thing as pleasure. "Good" and "pleasant" might pick out (refer to) the same thing. Whether or not this is the case is a matter of empirical investigation, and not conceptual analysis, according to this kind of ethical naturalist. | |||
| {{reflist}} | |||
| Others hold that it may be reasonable to assert, however, that the term "good" is merely an affirmation of approval, and that, as such, good may be defined as "I approve". In this context, questions such as "I see that this is pleasant, but is it good?" translate as "I see this is pleasant, I approve of pleasure". This however may raise the question "Why do I approve of pleasure?" this may lead to analysis of what ] means to ] to consider whether there is a purpose in seeking pleasure, which may lead to analysis of value in terms that relate to living organisms. | |||
| ] | ] | ||
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Description
The Open Question Argument is a philosophical argument put forward by the British philosopher G. E. Moore in §13 of Principia Ethica. It sets out to demonstrate the predicate "good" cannot be defined using natural terms: Good cannot be called blue, or rough, or smooth, or smelly - it lacks natural properties. That being said, "good," Moore argued, is not a supernatural property. He merely said that trying to define it using natural terms led to the "Naturalistic fallacy". Moore argues that the question of "What is good?" is an open one.
The argument hinges on the nature of statements such as "Anything that is pleasant is also good" and the possibility of asking questions such as "That thing is pleasant but is it good?" According to Moore, these questions are open and these statements are significant; and they will remain so no matter what is substituted for "pleasure". Moore concludes from this that any analysis of value is bound to fail. In other words, if value could be analyzed, then such questions and statements would be trivial and obvious. Since they are anything but trivial and obvious, value must be indefinable.
Objections and rejoinders
Critics of Moore's arguments sometimes claim that he is appealing to general puzzles concerning analysis (cf. the paradox of analysis), rather than revealing anything special about value. Other responses appeal to the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, allowing that value concepts are special and sui generis, but insisting that value properties are nothing but natural properties (this strategy is similar to that taken by non-reductive materialists in philosophy of mind).
An important response to the open question argument by contemporary ethical naturalists (e.g., Peter Railton) is to understand a claim like "goodness is identical with pleasure" as an a posteriori identity claim on a par with "Water is H2O". The question "This is H2O but is it water?" is intelligible and so, in that limited senhttp://en.wikipedia.org/Wikipedia:Verifiabilityse, whether or not water is H2O is an open question, note that this does not address the issue of significance. But that does not lead us to conclude that water is not H2O. "Water is H2O" is an identity claim that is known to be true a posteriori (i.e., it was discovered via empirical investigation). Another example is "redness" being identical to a certain phenomenon of electromagnetism. This is discovered by empirical investigation.
Similarly, many moral naturalists argue that "rightness" being the property of "maximizing utility" is an a posteriori truth because we invoke rightness and wrongness to explain certain empirical phenomenal, and then discover a posteriori that maximizing utility occupies the relevant explanatory role.. For example, they argue that since right actions contingently have certain effects e.g. being causally responsible for a tendency towards social stability--so it follows we can fix the term "right" refer to the empirical description "the property of acts, whatever it is, that is causally responsible for their tendency towards social stability." With this description for "right," we can then investigate which acts accomplish this: e.g. those actions that maximize utility. We can then conclude that we have learned that "right" refers to "maximizing utility" through a posteriori means.
A rebuttal to this is that trying to find an a posteriori means to learn what moality is, such as the above, run into the Open Question argument all over again. For example, it may be that we learn a posteriori that "redness" refers to having certain electromagnetic properties, but first we must attach an initial, a priori definitional reference to the term "redness"--e.g. "that which produces the sensation 'red' to normal perceivers under standard conditions." Because the Open Question argument applies to all a priori statements of morality, it applies to the claim that "rightness" refers to "the property of acts, whatever it is, that is causally responsible for their tendency towards social stability." Whether rightness refers to that is an open question. The moral non-naturalist could argue that any attempt to make an initial identity reference is susceptible to the open question argument.
A moral naturalist could then respond however that "rightness" is analytically equivalent (essentially, true by definition, like 2 + 2 is equivalent to 4) to "the property of acts that is causally responsible for social stability," even if this equivalency does not appear obvoius . From there, both sides could dispute the plausibility of such equivalence statements being true by definition.
Notes
- The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 28
- The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 28
- The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 28
- The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 29
- The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, by Hugh LaFollette (Editor), p. 31