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Part of a series on the
Holodomor
Holodomor Memorial Day National Museum of the Holodomor-Genocide
Historical backgroundFamines in the Soviet Union Soviet famine of 1932–33 Kazakhstan famine of 1932–1933 Soviet institutions All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Communist Party of Ukraine (Soviet Union) Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Secret police (OGPU) Policies First five-year plan Collectivization Dekulakization Law of Spikelets Reversal of Ukrainization policies Propaganda in the Soviet Union
Responsible partiesSoviet Union Joseph Stalin Vyacheslav Molotov Lazar Kaganovich Pavel Postyshev Stanislav Kosior Vlas Chubar
Investigation and understanding 1984 International Commission 1985 USA Commission Causes of the Holodomor Holodomor denial Genocide question Holodomor in modern politics
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The Holodomor (Template:Lang-uk) is the name given to the famine that took place in Soviet Ukraine in the 1932-1933 agricultural season, as part of a wider famine which took place in other regions of the USSR. The famine was caused by the food requisition actions carried by Soviet authorities. The Holodomor is considered one of the greatest national catastrophes to affect the Ukrainian nation in modern history where millions of inhabitants of Ukraine died of starvation in an unprecedented peacetime catastrophe. Estimates for the total number of casualties within Soviet Ukraine vary between 2.2 million (demographers' estimate) and 3-3.5 million, and up to 14 million (historians' estimate).

The reasons for the famine are a subject of current scholarly and political debate: there is no international consensus among scholars or politicians on whether the famine was specifically planned or an unintended consequence of the economic problems associated with radical economic changes implemented during the period of Soviet industrialization. or whether the Soviet policies that caused the famine were designed as an attack on the rise of Ukrainian nationalism that may fall under the legal definition of genocide, As of March 2008, the parliament of Ukraine and several governments of other countries have recognized the actions of the Soviet government as an act of genocide.

The joint declaration at the United Nations in 2003 has defined the famine as the result of cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime that caused the deaths of millions of Ukrainians, Russians, Kazakhs and other nationalities in the USSR. In 2008 the European Parliament has recognized the Holodomor as a crime against humanity.

Etymology

The origins of the word Holodomor come from the Ukrainian words holod, ‘hunger’, and mor, ‘plague’, possibly from the expression moryty holodom, ‘to inflict death by hunger’. The Ukrainian verb "moryty" (морити) means "to poison somebody, drive to exhaustion or to torment somebody". The perfect form of the verb "moryty" is "zamoryty"—"kill or drive to death by hunger, exhausting work". The neologism “Holodomor” is given in the modern, two-volume dictionary of the Ukrainian language as "artificial hunger, organised in vast scale by the criminal regime against the country's population" Sometimes the expression is translated into English as "murder by hunger."

The Ukrainian term "holodomor" corresponds to Russian term "golodomor" (Cyrillic spelling is the same: "голодомор").

Scope and duration

Historians working with declassified Ukrainian SSR documents have concluded that mass starvation in the Ukrainian SSR lasted from the beginning of January 1933 until mid-June or the beginning of July 1933. The famine affected all 7 oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR as well as the Moldavian ASSR, a part of Ukraine at the time. However, not every raion (district) suffered from famine for the whole 6 month period; starvation peaked in spring 1933. The first reports of mass malnutrition and deaths from starvation emerged from 2 rayons and urban area of Uman - by the time Vinnytsya and Kiev oblasts – now Cherkasy and Kiev Oblast, dated by beginning of January 1933. By mid-January 1933 there were reports about mass “difficulties” with food in urban areas that had been undersupplied through the rationing system and deaths from starvation among people who were withdrawn from rationing supply according to Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine Decree December 1932. By the beginning of February 1933, according to received reports from local authorities and Ukrainian GPU, the most affected area was listed as Dnipropetrovsk Oblast which also suffered from epidemics of typhus and malaria. Odessa and Kiev oblasts were 2nd and 3rd respectively. By mid-March most reports originated from Kiev Oblast.

By mid-April 1933 the Kharkiv Oblast reached the top of the most affected list, while Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Vinnytsya, Donetsk oblasts and Moldavian SSR followed it. Last reports about mass deaths from starvation dated mid-May through the beginning of June 1933 originated from Kiev and Kharkiv oblasts rayons. The “less affected” list noted the Chernihiv Oblast and northern parts of Kiev and Vinnytsya oblasts . According to the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine Decree as of February 8 1933 all hunger cases should not have been remain untreated, all local authorities directly obliged to submit reports about number of suffered from hunger, reasons of hunger, number of deaths from hunger and about food aid provided from local sources and centrally provided food aid required. Alternative reporting and food assistance were managed per GPU of Ukrainian SSR. Many regional reports and most of central summary reports are available at central and regional Ukrainian archives at present time.During the Holodomor, cannibalism was widespread, as evident from the documents of the time.

Causes

The reasons for the famine are a subject of scholarly and political debate. Some historians theorize that the famine was an unintended consequence of the economic problems associated with radical economic changes implemented during the period of Soviet industrialization. Others claim that the Soviet policies that caused the famine were engineered attack on Ukrainian nationalism. They even go further and suggest that may fall under the legal definition of genocide.

Death toll

By the end of 1933, millions of people had starved to death or had otherwise died unnaturally in Ukraine, as well as in other Soviet republics. The total estimate of the famine victims Soviet-wide is given as 6-7 million or 6-8 million. The Soviet Union long denied that the famine had ever existed, and the NKVD (and later KGB) archives on the Holodomor period opened very slowly. The exact number of the victims remains unknown and probably impossible to find out even within a margin of error of a hundred thousand.

The estimates for the number of deaths due to famine in Ukraine (excluding other repressions) vary by several millions and numbers as high as seven to ten million is sometimes given in the media and a number as high as ten or even twenty million is sometimes cited in political speeches.

Estimates vary since some assess the number of people who died within the 1933 borders of Ukraine; while others are based on deaths within current borders of Ukraine. Other estimates are based on deaths of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union. Some estimates use a very simple methodology based percentage of deaths that was reported in one area and applying the percentage to the entire country. Others use more sophisticated techniques that involves analyzing the demographic statistics based on various archival data. Some question the accuracy of Soviet censuses since the may have been doctored to support Soviet propaganda. Other estimates come from recorded discussion between world leaders like Churchill and Stalin. For example the estimate of ten million deaths, which is attributed to have been circulated from within Soviet official sources, could be based on a misinterpretation of the memoirs of Winston Churchill who gave an account of his conversation with Stalin that took place on August 16, 1942. In that conversation, Stalin gave Churchill his estimates of the number of "kulaks" who were repressed for resisting collectivization as 10 million, in all of the Soviet Union, rather than only in Ukraine. When using this number, Stalin implied that it included not only those who lost their lives, but also forcibly deported.

A number of difficulties exist when attempting to estimate casualty rates. Some estimates count death toll from the political repression including those who died in the Gulag while others refer only to those who starved to death. In addition, many of the estimates are based on different time periods. Thus, a definitive number of deaths is difficult to settle upon, and is a source of great debate.

Even the results based on scientific methods obtained prior to the opening of former Soviet archives also varied widely but the range was somewhat more narrow: 2.5 million (Volodymyr Kubiyovych), 4.8 million (Vasyl Hryshko) and 5 million (Robert Conquest).

One modern calculation that uses demographic data including that available from formerly closed Soviet archives narrows the losses to about 3.2 million or, allowing for the lack of the data precision, 3 million to 3.5 million.

The formerly closed Soviet archives show that excess deaths in Ukraine in 1932-1933 numbered 1.54 million. In 1932-1933, there were a combined 1.2 million cases of typhus and 500,000 cases of typhoid fever. Deaths resulted primarily from manifold diseases due to lowered resistance and disease in general rather than actual starvation. All major types of disease, apart from cancer, tend to increase during famine as a result of undernourishment resulting in lower resistance to disease, and of unsanitary conditions. In the years 1932–34, the largest rate of increase was recorded for typhus. Typhus is spread by lice. In conditions of harvest failure and increased poverty, the number of lice is likely to increase, and the herding of refugees at railway stations, on trains and elsewhere facilitates their spread. In 1933, the number of recorded cases was twenty times the 1929 level. The number of cases per head of population recorded in Ukraine in 1933 was naturally considerably higher than in the USSR as a whole. But by June 1933, incidence in Ukraine had increased to nearly ten times the January level and was higher than in the rest of the USSR taken as a whole.

However, it is important to note that the number of the recorded excess deaths extracted from the birth/death statistics from the Soviet archives is self-contradictory and cannot be fully relied upon because the data fails to add up to the differences between the results of the 1927 Census and the 1937 Census.

Stanislav Kulchytsky summarized the natural population change. The declassified Soviet statistics show a decrease of 538,000 people in the population of Soviet Ukraine between 1926 census (28,925,976) and 1937 census (28,388,000). The number of births and deaths (in thousands) according to the declassified records are given in the table (right).

According to the correction for officially non-accounted child mortality in 1933 by 150,000 calculated by Sergei Maksudov, the number of births for 1933 should be increased from 471,000 to 621,000. Assuming the natural mortality rates in 1933 to be equal to the average annual mortality rate in 1927-1930 (524,000 per year) a natural population growth for 1933 would have been 97,000, which is five times less than this number in the past years (1927-1930). From the corrected birth rate and the estimated natural death rate for 1933 as well as from the official data for other years the natural population growth from 1927 to 1936 gives 4.043 million while the census data showed a decrease of 538,000. The sum of the two numbers gives an estimated total demographic loss of 4.581 million people. A major hurdle in estimating the human losses due to famine is the needed to take into account the numbers involved in migration (including forced resettlement). According to the Soviet statistics, the migration balance for the population in Ukraine for 1927 - 1936 period was a loss of 1.343 million people. Even at the time when the data was taken, the Soviet statistical institutions acknowledged that its precision was worse than the data for the natural population change. Still, with the correction for this number, the total number of death in Ukraine due to unnatural causes for the given ten years was 3.238 million, and taking into account the lack of precision, especially of the migration estimate, the human toll is estimated between 3 million and 3.5 million.

In addition to the direct losses from unnatural deaths, the indirect losses due to the decrease of the birth rate should be taken into account in consideration in estimating of the demographic consequences of the Famine for Ukraine. For instance, the natural population growth in 1927 was 662,000, while in 1933 it was 97,000, in 1934 it was 88,000. The combination of direct and indirect losses from Holodomor gives 4.469 million, of which 3.238 million (or more realistically 3 to 3.5 million) is the number of the direct deaths according to this estimate.

A 2002 study by Vallin et al utilizing some similar primary sources to Kulchytsky, and performing an analysis with more sophisticated demographic tools with forward projection of expected growth from the 1926 census and backward projection from the 1939 census estimate the amount of direct deaths for 1933 as 2.582 million. This number of deaths does not reflect the total demographic loss for Ukraine from these events as the fall of the birth rate during crisis and the out-migration contribute to the latter as well. The total population shortfall from the expected value between 1926 and 1939 estimated by Vallin amounted to 4.566 million. Of this number, 1.057 million is attributed to birth deficit, 930,000 to forced out-migration, and 2.582 million to excess mortality and voluntary out-migration. With the latter assumed to be negligible this estimate gives the number of deaths as the result of the 1933 famine about 2.2 million. According to this study the life expectancy for those born in 1933 sharply fell to 10.8 years for females and to 7.3 years for males and remained abnormally low for 1934 but, as commonly expected for the post-crisis peaked in 1935–36.

According to estimates about 81.3% of the famine victims in Ukrainian SRR were ethnic Ukrainians, 4.5% Russians, 1.4% Jews and 1.1% were Poles. Many Belarusians, Hungarians, Volga Germans and rest nationalities became victims as well. The Ukrainian rural population was the hardest hit by the Holodomor. Since the peasantry constituted a demographic backbone of the Ukrainian nation, the tragedy deeply affected the Ukrainians for many years.

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the overall number of Ukrainians who died from 1932-1933 famine is estimated as about four to five million out of six to eight million people who died in the Soviet Union as a whole.

Elimination of Ukrainian cultural elite

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Was the Holodomor genocide?

The Jewish-Polish scholar Raphael Lemkin developed the concept and coined the term “genocide” and applied it to the destruction of the Ukrainian nation and not just Ukrainian peasants. In his work written in the 1950s titled "History of Genocide" he specifically included a chapter on "Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine". Lemkin's concept includes: a) the decimation of the Ukrainian national elites, b) destruction of the Orthodox Church, c) the starvation of the Ukrainian farming population, and d) its replacement with non-Ukrainian population from the RSFSR as integral components of the same genocidal process. The only dimension that is missing in Lemkin’s excellent analysis is the destruction of the 8,000,000 ethnic Ukrainians living on the eve of the genocide in the Russian Republic (RSFSR). Lemkin's analysis of the great Ukrainian catastrophe by the man who did most to have it enshrined in the UN Convention of 1948 recognises the Ukrainian tragedy as “a case of genocide, the destruction of a nation.”

As long as Ukraine retains its national unity, as long as its people continue to think of themselves as Ukrainians and to seek independence, so long Ukraine poses a serious threat to the very heart of Sovietism. It is no wonder that the Communist leaders have attached the greatest importance to the Russification of this independent member of their “Union of Republics,” have determined to remake it to fit their pattern of one Russian nation. For the Ukrainian is not and has never been, a Russian. His culture, his temperament, his language, his religion – all are different.

Ukraine is highly susceptible to racial murder by select parts and so the Communist tactics there have not followed the pattern taken by the German attacks against the Jews. The nation is too populous to be exterminated completely with any efficiency. However, its leadership, religious, intellectual, political, its select and determining parts, are quite small and therefore easily eliminated, and so it is upon these groups particularly that the full force of the Soviet axe has fallen, with its familiar tools of mass murder, deportation and forced labor, exile and starvation.

The attack has manifested a systematic pattern, with the whole process repeated again and again to meet fresh outburst of national spirit. The first blow is aimed at the intelligentsia, the national brain, so as to paralyze the rest of the body.

Going along with this attack on the intelligentsia was an offensive against the churches, priests and hierarchy, the “soul” of Ukraine. Between 1926 and 1932, the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, its Metropolitan (Lypkivsky) and 10,000 clergy were liquidated.

In the face of famine on the farms, thousands abandoned the rural areas and moved into the towns to beg food. Caught there and sent back to the country, they abandoned their children in the hope that they at least might survive. In this way, 18,000 children were abandoned in Kharkiv alone. Villages of a thousand had a surviving population of a hundred; in others, half the populace was gone, and deaths in these towns ranged from 20 to 30 per day. Cannibalism became commonplace.

The fourth step in the process consisted in the fragmentation of the Ukrainian people at once by the addition to the Ukraine of foreign peoples and by the dispersion of the Ukrainians throughout Eastern Europe. In this way, ethnic unity would be destroyed and nationalities mixed.

These have been the chief steps in the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian nation. Notably, there have been no attempts at complete annihilation, such as was the method of the German attack on the Jews. And yet, if the Soviet program succeeds completely, if the intelligentsia, the priests and the peasants can be eliminated, Ukraine will be as dead as if every Ukrainian were killed, for it will have lost that part of it which has kept and developed its culture, its beliefs, its common ideas, which have guided it and given it a soul, which, in short, made it a nation rather than a mass of people.

The mass, indiscriminate murders have not, however, been lacking – they have simply not been integral parts of the plan, but only chance variations. Thousands have been executed, untold thousands have disappeared into the certain death of Siberian labor camps.

This is not simply a case of mass murder. It is a case of genocide, of destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and a nation. Soviet national unity is being created, not by any union of ideas and of cultures, but by the complete destruction of all cultures and of all ideas save one – the Soviet.

Robert Conquest, the author of a Western study published prior to the declassification of the Soviet archives, concluded that the famine of 1932–33 was a deliberate act of mass murder, if not genocide committed as part of Joseph Stalin's collectivization program in the Soviet Union. In 2006, the Security Service of Ukraine declassified more than 5 thousand pages of Holodomor archives. These documents suggest that the Soviet Regime singled out Ukraine, while regions outside it were allowed to receive humanitarian aid. Some scholars says that Conquest's book on the famine is replete with errors and inconsistencies and that it deserves to be considered an expression of the Cold War.

R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft have interacted with Conquest and note that he no longer considers the famine "deliberate". Conquest -- and, by extension, Davies and Wheatcroft -- believe that, had industrialization been abandoned, the famine would have been "prevented" (Conquest), or at least significantly alleviated.

...we regard the policy of rapid industrialization as an underlying cause of the agricultural troubles of the early 1930s, and we do not believe that the Chinese or NEP versions of industrialization were viable in Soviet national and international circumstances.

They see the leadership under Stalin as making significant errors in planning for the industrialization of agriculture.

Davies and Wheatcroft also cite an unpublished letter by Robert Conquest:

Our view of Stalin and the famine is close to that of Robert Conquest, who would earlier have been considered the champion of the argument that Stalin had intentionally caused the famine and had acted in a genocidal manner. In 2003, Dr Conquest wrote to us explaining that he does not hold the view that "Stalin purposely incited the 1933 famine. No. What I argue is that with resulting famine imminent, he could have prevented it, but put ‘Soviet interest’ other than feeding the starving first—thus consciously abetting it".

This retraction by Conquest is also noted by Kulchytsky.

Some historians maintain that the famine was an unintentional consequence of collectivization, and that the associated resistance to it by the Ukrainian peasantry exacerbated an already-poor harvest. Some researchers state that while the term Ukrainian Genocide is often used in application to the event, technically, the use of the term "genocide" is inapplicable.

The statistical distribution of famine's victims among the ethnicities closely reflects the ethnic distribution of the rural population of Ukraine Moldavian, Polish, German and Bulgarian population that mostly resided in the rural communities of Ukraine suffered in the same proportion as the rural Ukrainian population. While ethnic Russians in Ukraine lived mostly in urban areas and the cities were affected little by the famine, the rural Russian population was affected the same way as the rural population of any other ethnicity.

According to University of West Virginia professor Dr Mark Tauger, any analysis that asserts that the harvests of 1931 and 1932 were not extraordianrily low and that the famine was a political measure intentionally imposed through excessive procurements is clearly based on an insufficient source base and an uncritical approach to the official sources.

Holodomor in modern politics

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Comprehending the famine

The famine remains a politically-charged topic; hence, heated debates are likely to continue for a long time. Until around 1990, the debates were largely between the so called "denial camp" who refused to recognize the very existence of the famine or stated that it was caused by natural reasons (such as a poor harvest), scholars who accepted reports of famine but saw it as a policy blunder followed by the botched relief effort, and scholars who alleged that it was intentional and specifically anti-Ukrainian or even an act of genocide against the Ukrainians as a nation.

Nowadays, scholars agree that the famine affected millions. While it is also accepted that the famine affected other nationalities in addition to Ukrainians, the debate is still ongoing as to whether or not the Holodomor qualifies as an act of genocide, since the facts that the famine itself took place and that it was unnatural are not disputed. As far as the possible effect of the natural causes, the debate is restricted to whether the poor harvest or post-traumatic stress played any role at all and to what degree the Soviet actions were caused by the country's economic and military needs as viewed by the Soviet leadership.

Still, the Holodomor issue is politicized within the framework of uneasy relations between Russia and Ukraine (and also between various regional and social groups within Ukraine). Russian political interests and their supporters in Ukraine have reasons to deny the deliberate character of the disaster and play down its scale.

In 2007, President Viktor Yushchenko declared he wants "a new law criminalising Holodomor denial," while Communist Party head Petro Symonenko said he "does not believe there was any deliberate starvation at all," and accused Yushchenko of "using the famine to stir up hatred." Few in Ukraine share Symonenko's interpretation of history and the number of Ukrainians who deny the famine or view it as caused by natural reasons is steadily falling.

On November 10, 2003 at the United Nations twenty-five countries including Russia, Ukraine and United States signed a joint statement on the seventieth anniversary of the Holodomor with the following preamble:

In the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victims to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime. The Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), which took from 7 million to 10 million innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people. In this regard we note activities in observance of the seventieth anniversary of this Famine, in particular organized by the Government of Ukraine.

Honouring the seventieth anniversary of the Ukrainian tragedy, we also commemorate the memory of millions of Russians, Kazakhs and representatives of other nationalities who died of starvation in the Volga River region, Northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan and in other parts of the former Soviet Union, as a result of civil war and forced collectivization, leaving deep scars in the consciousness of future generations.

The Ukrainian communities are sometimes criticized for using the term Holodomor, Ukrainian Genocide, or even Ukrainian Holocaust, to appropriate the larger-scale tragedy of collectivization as their own national terror-famine, thus exploiting it for political purposes.

One of the biggest arguments is that the famine was preceded by the onslaught on the Ukrainian national culture, a common historical detail preceding many centralized actions directed against the nations as a whole. Nation-wide, the political repression of 1937 (The Great Purge) under the guidance of Nikolay Yezhov were known for their ferocity and ruthlessness, but Lev Kopelev wrote, "In Ukraine 1937 began in 1933", referring to the comparatively early beginning of the Soviet crackdown in Ukraine.

While the famine was well documented at the time, its reality has been disputed for ideological reasons, for instance by the Soviet government and its spokespeople (as well as apologists for the Soviet regime), by others due to being deliberately misled by the Soviet government (such as George Bernard Shaw), and, in at least one case, Walter Duranty, for personal gain.

An example of a late-era Holodomor objector is Canadian and journalist Douglas Tottle, author of Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (published by Moscow-based Soviet publisher Progress Publishers in 1987). Tottle claims that while there were severe economic hardships in Ukraine, the idea of the Holodomor was fabricated as propaganda by Nazi Germany and William Randolph Hearst to justify a German invasion.

Remembrance

To honour those who perished in the Holodomor, monuments have been dedicated and public events held annually in Ukraine and worldwide. The first public monument to the Holodomor was erected and dedicated outside City Hall in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada in 1983 to mark the 50th anniversary of the famine-genocide. Since then, the fourth Saturday in November has in many jurisdictions been marked as the official day of remembrance for people who died as a result of the 1932-33 Holodomor and political repression.

In 2006, the Holodomor Remembrance Day took place on November 25. President Viktor Yushchenko directed, in decree No. 868/2006, that a minute of silence should be observed at 4 o'clock in the afternoon on that Saturday. The document specified that flags in Ukraine should fly at half-staff as a sign of mourning. In addition, the decree directed that entertainment events are to be restricted and television and radio programming adjusted accordingly.

In 2007, the 74th anniversary of the Holodomor was commemorated in Kiev for three days on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti. As part of the three day event, from November 23-25th, video testimonies of the communist regime's crimes in Ukraine, and documentaries by famous domestic and foreign film directors are being shown. Additionally, experts and scholars gave lectures on the topic. Additionally, on November 23 2007, the National Bank of Ukraine issued a set of two commemorative coins remembering the Holodomor.

On November 17 2007 members from Aleksandr Dugin's radical Russian nationalist group the Eurasian Youth Union broke into the Ukrainian cultural center in Moscow and smashed an exhibition on the famine.

On November 22, 2008, Ukrainian Canadians marked the beginning of National Holodomor Awareness Week. Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Minister Jason Kenney attended a vigil in Kiev.

See also

• Famines in Russia and USSR

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References

1. ^ - The famine of 1932–33 - Encyclopædia Britannica: "The Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932–33—a man-made demographic catastrophe unprecedented in peacetime. Of the estimated six to eight million people who died in the Soviet Union, about four to five million were Ukrainians... Its deliberate nature is underscored by the fact that no physical basis for famine existed in Ukraine... Soviet authorities set requisition quotas for Ukraine at an impossibly high level. Brigades of special agents were dispatched to Ukraine to assist in procurement, and homes were routinely searched and foodstuffs confiscated... The rural population was left with insufficient food to feed itself."
2. ^ Stalislav Kulchytsky, "Demographic losses in Ukrainian in the twentieth century", Zerkalo Nedeli, October 2-8, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
3. ^ Jacques Vallin, France Mesle, Serguei Adamets, Serhii Pyrozhkov, A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s, Population Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3. (Nov., 2002), pp. 249-264
4. ^ Helen Fawkes , Legacy of famine divides Ukraine, BBC News, 24 November 2006
5. ^ France Meslé, Gilles Pison, Jacques Vallin France-Ukraine: Demographic Twins Separated by History, Population and societies, N°413, juin 2005
6. ^ ce Meslé, Jacques Vallin Mortalité et causes de décès en Ukraine au XXè siècle + CDRom ISBN 2-7332-0152-2 CD online data (partially - http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_publication/cdrom_mortukraine/cdrom.htm
7. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, Hennadiy Yefimenko. Демографічні наслідки голодомору 1933 р. в Україні. Всесоюзний перепис 1937 р. в Україні: документи та матеріали (Demographic consequence of Holodomor of 1933 in Ukraine. The all-Union census of 1937 in Ukraine), Kiev, Institute of History, 2003. pp. 42-63
8. ^ С. Уиткрофт (Stephen G. Wheatcroft), "О демографических свидетельствах трагедии советской деревни в 1931—1933 гг." (On demographic evidence of the tragedy of the Soviet village in 1931-1833), "Трагедия советской деревни: Коллективизация и раскулачивание 1927-1939 гг.: Документы и материалы. Том 3. Конец 1930-1933 гг.", Российская политическая энциклопедия, 2001, ISBN 5-8243-0225-1, с. 885, Приложение № 2
9. Ukraine president says Russia not to blame for Stalin-era famine, RIA Novosti, November 19, 2008, "British historian Robert Service has suggested that some 14 million people lost their lives."
10. 'Stalinism' was a collective responsibility - Kremlin papers, The News in Brief, University of Melbourne, 19 June 1998, Vol 7 No 22
11. ^ Dr. David Marples, The great famine debate goes on..., ExpressNews (University of Alberta), originally published in Edmonton Journal, November 30, 2005 Cite error: The named reference "marples2005" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
12. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Holodomor of 1932–1933 as genocide: the gaps in the proof", Den, February 17, 2007, in Russian, in Ukrainian Cite error: The named reference "KulchFeb2007" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
13. ^ Peter Finn, Aftermath of a Soviet Famine, The Washington Post, April 27, 2008, "There are no exact figures on how many died. Modern historians place the number between 2.5 million and 3.5 million. Yushchenko and others have said at least 10 million were killed."
14. ^ Yaroslav Bilinsky (1999). "Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933 Genocide?". Journal of Genocide Research. 1 (2): 147–156. doi:10.1080/14623529908413948.
15. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Holodomor-33: Why and how?", Zerkalo Nedeli, November 25—December 1, 2006, in Russian, in Ukrainian.
16. sources differ on interpreting various statements from different branches of different governments as to whether they amount to the official recognition of the Famine as Genocide by the country. For example, after the statement issued by the Latvian Sejm on March 13, 2008, the total number of countries is given as 19 (according to Ukrainian BBC: "Латвія визнала Голодомор ґеноцидом"), 16 (according to Korrespondent, Russian edition: "После продолжительных дебатов Сейм Латвии признал Голодомор геноцидом украинцев"), "more than 10" (according to Korrespondent, Ukrainian edition: "Латвія визнала Голодомор 1932-33 рр. геноцидом українців")
17. Ukrainian holod (голод, ‘hunger’, compare Russian golod) should not be confused with kholod (холод, ‘cold’). For details, see romanization of Ukrainian. Mor means ‘plague’ in the sense of a disastrous evil or affliction, or a sudden unwelcome outbreak. See wiktionary:plague.
18. Голодомор, in "Velykyi tlumachnyi slovnyk suchasnoi ukrainsʹkoi movy: 170 000 sliv", chief ed. V. T. Busel, Irpin, Perun (2004), ISBN 9665690132
19. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, "How many of us perished in Holodomor in 1933", Zerkalo Nedeli, November 23-29, 2002. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
20. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, Hennadiy Yefimenko. Демографічні наслідки голодомору 1933 р. в Україні. Всесоюзний перепис 1937 р. в Україні: документи та матеріали (Demographic consequence of Holodomor of 1933 in Ukraine. The all-Union census of 1937 in Ukraine), Kiev, Institute of History, 2003. pp.63-72
21. Голод 1932-1933 років на Україні: очима істориків, мовою документів.
22. An article by historian Vasily Sokur, containing citations from documents. The author suggests that never in the history of mankind has cannibalism been so widespread as it was during the Holodomor. - http://www.facts.kiev.ua/archive/2008-11-21/92027/. Accessed 21 November 2008.
23. http://web.archive.org/web/20030429084514/http://www.unimelb.edu.au/ExtRels/Media/UN/archive/1998/319/stalinismwasacollective.html 'Stalinism' was a collective responsibility - Kremlin papers], The News in Brief, University of Melbourne, 19 June 1998, Vol 7 No 22
24. Valeriy Soldatenko, "A starved 1933: subjective thoughts on objective processes", Zerkalo Nedeli, June 28, 2003 – July 4, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
25. BBC report
26. ^ Laura Sheeter, "Ukraine remembers famine horror", BBC News, November 24, 2007
27. The Ukrainian politician Stepan Khmara during the hearings in the Verkhovna Rada (quoted through Kulchytsky): "I would like to address the scientists, particularly, Stanislav Kulchytsky, who attempts to mark down the number of victims and counts them as 3–3.5 million. I studied these questions analyzing the demographic statistics as early as in 1970s and concluded that the number of victims was no less than 7 million"
    Cited through Stalislav Kulchytsky, "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book" Zerkalo Nedeli, August 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian. However, Stanislav Kulchytsky in Демографічні наслідки голодомору 1933 р. в Україні. (Demographic consequence of Holodomor of 1933 in Ukraine), Kiev, Institute of History, 2003, p. 4, notes that the demographic data were opened only in late 1980s; Stepan Khmara had no access to such data in 1970s.
28. Viktor Yushchenko, "Holodomor", The Wall Street Journal, 27.11.2007
29. Ukrainian President Yushchenko: Yushchenko's Address before Joint Session of U.S. Congress
30. Valentin Berezhkov, "Kak ya stal perevodchikom Stalina", Moscow, DEM, 1993, ISBN 5-85207-044-0. p. 317
31. Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine Oxford University Press New York (1986) ISBN 0-195-04054-6
32. Stalislav Kulchytsky, "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book" Zerkalo Nedeli, August 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
33. Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine-2", Zerkalo Nedeli, October 4-10, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
34. Davies and Wheatcroft, p.415
35. Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 429
36. Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 512
37. ^ Sergei Maksudov, "Losses Suffered by the Population of the USSR 1918–1958", in The Samizdat Register II, ed R. Medvedev (London–New York 1981)
38. Robert Potocki, "Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930-1939" (in Polish, English summary), Lublin 2003, ISBN 83-917615-4-1
39. Служба безпеки України
40. SBU documents show that Moscow singled out Ukraine in famine 5tv - Ukraine Channel Five. 22 November 2006. Retrieved 23 November 2006
41. Mark Tauger. Published correspondence (pdf)
42. "Debate: Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: A Reply to Ellman", in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 58, No. 4, June 2006, pp.625-633. (note on conquest (p. 629))
43. "Debate: Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: A Reply to Ellman", in Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 58, No. 4, June 2006, pp.625-633. (p. 626))
44. Davies, R.W. & Wheatcroft, S.G. (2004) The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931 – 1933 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan), p 441, n. 145.
45. ^ Mark B. Tauger, The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933, Slavic Review, Volume 50, Issue 1 (Spring, 1991), 70-89, (PDF)
46. ^ See also the acrimonious exchange between Tauger and Conquest.
47. Dmytro Horbachov, Fullest Expression of Pure feeling, Welcome to Ukraine, 1998, No 1.
48. Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation", Yale University Press, 2002, ISBN 0300093098, p.144
49. J. Arch Getty, "The Future Did Not Work", The Atlantic Monthly, Boston: March 2000, Vol. 285, Iss.3, pg.113
50. Большинство украинцев считают Голодомор актом геноцида, Korrespondent.net, November 20, 2007
51. Joint Statement on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor) on Monday, November 10, 2003 at the United Nations in New York
52. Himka, John-Paul (2005). "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora" (PDF). Spaces of Identity. 5 (1): 5–24. ISSN 1496-6778. I am not saying that the famine or the other components of the victimization narratives do not deserve historical research and reflection, nor that evil should be ignored, nor that the memory of the dead should not be held sacred. But I object to instrumentalizing this memory with the aim of generating political and moral capital, particularly when it is linked to an exclusion from historical research and reflection of events in which Ukrainians figured as perpetrators not victims, and when "our own" evil is kept invisible and the memory of the others' dead is not held sacred. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
53. Vasili Hryshko, Marco Carynnyk, The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933, Bahriany Foundation, 1983, ISBN 0969183003
54. Robert Conquest, The Man-made Famine in Ukraine, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984, ISBN 0844735523
55. James Mace, Soviet Man-Made Famine in Ukraine, chapter 3 in "Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts", Routledge, 2004, ISBN 0415944309
56. Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,. ISBN 0-80205-808-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
57. Bradley, Lara. "Ukraine's 'Forced Famine' Officially Recognized. The Sundbury Star. 3 January 1999. URL Accessed 12 October 2006
58. Yushchenko, Viktor. Decree No. 868/2006 by President of Ukraine. Regarding the Remembrance Day in 2006 for people who died as a result of Holodomor and political repressions Template:Uk icon
59. "Ceremonial events to commemorate Holodomor victims to be held in Kiev for three days." National Radio Company of Ukraine. URL Accessed 25 November 2007
60. Commemorative Coins "Holodomor – Genocide of the Ukrainian People". National Bank of Ukraine.URL Accessed 25 June 2008
61. Ukraine Demanding That Russia Punish Eurasian Youth Union Members For Smashing Famine Exhibition In Moscow
62. "Ukrainian-Canadians mark famine's 75 anniversasry". CTV.ca. Retrieved 2008-11-23.

External links

• "Gareth Jones' international exposure of the Holodomor, plus many related background articles". Retrieved 2006-07-05.
• Template:Uk icon Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933 at the Central State Archive of Ukraine (photos, links)
• Yaroslav Bilinsky, Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?, Journal of Genocide Research , 1(2), pages= 147–156 (June 1999), available at external site
• Stanislav Kulchytsky, Italian Research on the Holodomor, October 2005.
• Template:En icon Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Why did Stalin exterminate the Ukrainians? Comprehending the Holodomor. The position of Soviet historians" - Six part series from Den: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6; Kulchytsky on Holodomor 1-6
• Template:Ru icon/Template:Uk icon Valeriy Soldatenko, "A starved 1933: subjectove thoughts on objective processes", Zerkalo Nedeli, June 28 - July 4 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
• Template:Ru icon/Template:Uk icon Stanislav Kulchytsky's articles in Zerkalo Nedeli, Kiev, Ukraine"
  • "How many of us perish in Holodomor on 1933", November 23 2002 – November 29 2002. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  • "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book" Augist 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  • "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine-2", October 4 2003 – October 10 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  • "Demographic losses in Ukraine in the twentieth century", October 2 2004 – October 8 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  • "Holodomor-33: Why and how?" November 25 - December 1. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
• UKRAINIAN FAMINE Revelations from the Russian Archives at the Library of Congress
• Photos of Holodomor by Sergei Melnikoff
• The General Committee decided this afternoon not to recommend the inclusion of an item on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932-1933 in Ukraine.
• Case Study: The Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 By Nicolas Werth / CNRS - France
• Holomodor - Famine in Soviet Ukraine 1932-1933

Declarations and legal acts

• Findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine, U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Report to Congress. Adopted by the Commission, April 19 1988
• Joint declaration at the United Nations in connection with 70th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933
• Address of the Verkhovna Rada to the Ukrainian nation on commemorating the victims of Holodomor 1932-1933 (in Ukrainian)

Books and articles

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• Articles with empty sections from November 2008
• Holodomor