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| '''Reason''' (Latin ''ratio'', through French ''raison''), in ], is the faculty or process of drawing logical ]s. | '''Reason''' (Latin ''ratio'', through French ''raison''), in ], is the faculty or process of drawing logical ]s. | ||
| Thus we speak of '']'' as essentially a rational animal, it being implied that humans differ from all other ]s in that they can consciously draw inferences from ]s. | Thus we speak of '']'' as essentially a ] animal, it being implied that humans differ from all other ]s in that they can consciously draw inferences from ]s. | ||
| It is, however, exceedingly difficult in this respect to draw an absolute distinction between humans and other animals, observation of which undoubtedly suggests that the latter have a certain power of making inferences. | It is, however, exceedingly difficult in this respect to draw an absolute distinction between humans and other animals, observation of which undoubtedly suggests that the latter have a certain power of making inferences. | ||
| Compare ]. | Compare ]. | ||
Revision as of 01:13, 21 September 2002
Reason (Latin ratio, through French raison), in philosophy, is the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences.
Thus we speak of Homo sapiens as essentially a rational animal, it being implied that humans differ from all other animals in that they can consciously draw inferences from premises. It is, however, exceedingly difficult in this respect to draw an absolute distinction between humans and other animals, observation of which undoubtedly suggests that the latter have a certain power of making inferences. Compare instinct.
It is usually agreed, however, that inference by humans differs from that of animals in self-consciousness, and, though there can be no doubt that some animals dream, it is difficult to find evidence for the presence of ideal images in the minds of any but the most closely related animals.
The term reason is also used in several narrower senses. Thus reason is opposed to sensation, perception, feeling, desire, as the faculty (the existence of which is denied by empiricists) by which fundamental truths are intuitively apprehended. These fundamental truths are the causes or "reasons" that things exist or happen.
For Immanuel Kant, reason (Vernunft in Kant's German language) is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles, the concepts provided by the intellect (Verstand). The reason which gives a priori principles Kant calls "Pure Reason" (as in his The Critique of Pure Reason), as distinguished from the "Practical Reason" which is specially concerned with the performance of particular actions.
In formal logic the drawing of inference, or using the reasoning faculty, is called called ratiocination, or, more simply, "reasoning". From Aristotle onwards, reasoning is classified deductive reasoning, meaning "from the general to the particular", and inductive reasoning, meaning "from the particular to the general". In the 19th century, Charles Peirce, an American philosopher, added to these a third, abductive reasoning, by which he meant "from the best available information to the best explanation", which has become an important component of the scientific method. See also logic, syllogism.
In theology, reason, as distinguished from faith, is the human intelligence exercised upon religious truth whether by way of discovery or by way of explanation. The limits within which reason may be used have been laid down differently in different churches and periods of thought: on the whole, modern Christianity, especially in the Protestant churches, tends to allow to reason a wide field, reserving, however, as the sphere of faith the ultimate (supernatural) truths of theology.